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THIS ACTION IS FUNDED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION

ANNEX I

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the 2021 annual action plan for the global threats part of the thematic programme on peace, stability and conflict prevention

Action Document for Counterterrorism (CT)

ANNUAL PLAN

This document constitutes the annual work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, and action plans in the sense of Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe.

1. SYNOPSIS

1.1. Action Summary Table

1. Title	Counterterrorism (CT)					
CRIS/OPSYS	OPSYS/CRIS ¹ number: NDICI THREATS FPI/2021/43399					
business reference	Financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation					
Basic Act	Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe) Regulation					
2. Team Europe	No					
Initiative						
3. Zone benefiting	The action shall be carried out worldwide.					
from the action						
4. Programming	Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention Thematic Programme 2021 – 2027					
document						
5. Link with relevant	NDICI-Global Europe – Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention Thematic Programme					
MIP(s)	(2021-2027)					
objectives/expected	Area of intervention: Global, trans-regional and emerging threats					
results	Specific objective 1: Support multilateral action in the fight against terrorism and the					
	effectiveness of relevant regional and multilateral counterterrorism bodies and fora.					
	Result 1: Enhanced cooperation with the United Nations, the Global Counter Terrorism					
	Forum (GCTF) and the three GCTF-inspired institutions (the International Institute for					
	Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), the Hedayah Centre of Excellence for P/CVE and the					
	Global Community and Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF)), and, where appropriate,					
	the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), INTERPOL, NATO and the Global Coalition					
	against ISIL/Daesh.					
	PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION					
6. Priority Area(s),	Global, trans-regional and emerging threats					
sectors	152 - Conflict, Peace & Security					
7. Sustainable	Main SDG: 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls)					
Development Goals	Other significant SDGs and where appropriate, targets: 16 (Promote Peace and end					
(SDGs)	violence)					
8 a) DAC code(s)	15210 – Security system management and reform - 100 %					
8 b) Main Delivery	PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS - 10000					
Channel						
9. Targets	☐ Migration					
	□ Climate					

¹ Depending on the availability of OPSYS at the time of encoding, a provisional CRIS number may need to be provided.

	☐ Social inclusion and Human Development						
	⊠ Gender						
	□ Biodiversity						
	☐ Education						
							
10. Markers	General policy objective	Significant	Principal				
(from DAC form)	General policy objective	Not targeted	objective	objective			
(110111 2110 101111)	Participation development/good governance			\boxtimes			
	Aid to environment	\boxtimes					
	Gender equality and women's and girl's						
	empowerment						
	Trade development						
	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	\boxtimes					
	Disaster Risk Reduction	\boxtimes					
	Inclusion of persons with disabilities	\boxtimes					
	Nutrition	\boxtimes					
	RIO Convention markers	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective			
	Biological diversity	\boxtimes					
	Combat desertification	\boxtimes					
	Climate change mitigation	\boxtimes					
	Climate change adaptation	\boxtimes					
11. Internal markers	Policy objectives	Not targeted	Significant	Principal			
and Tags:			objective	objective			
	Digitalisation						
	Tags: digital connectivity						
	digital governance						
	digital entrepreneurship						
	job creation						
	digital skills/literacy						
	digital services						
	Connectivity	\boxtimes					
	Tags: transport						
	people2people						
	energy						
	digital connectivity						
	Migration (methodology for tagging under development)	\boxtimes					
	Reduction of Inequalities (methodology for						
	marker and tagging under development)						
	Covid-19		\boxtimes				
	BUDGET INFORMATION						
12. Amounts	Budget line(s) (article, item): BGUE-B2021-14		BILITY AND	PEACE -			
concerned	GLOBAL AND TRANSREGIONAL THREAT	S					
	Total estimated cost: EUR 14 000 000	4 000 000					
Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 14 000 000							
40 m 000	MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENT Project Modality	AHUN					
13. Type of financing	Direct management through: Grants						

1.2. Summary of the Action

This action aims at disrupting terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism and bringing terrorists to justice in full respect of human rights and the rule of law, and enhancing the resilience of vulnerable people and communities to violent extremism and terrorist recruitment.

In particular, the action will contribute to compliance in line with the recommendations of the 2020 EU Council Conclusions on Counter-terrorism that, recalling its conclusions on EU priorities in UN Human Rights Fora of 17 February 2020, underline that "all counter-terrorism measures must be conducted in full compliance with EU core values including the rule of law, and in full compliance with international law, in particular international human rights law, humanitarian law and international refugee law."

Component 1: In support of the Counterterrorism Agenda of the European Union (EU), highlighted in the Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism of June 2020 (point 32), the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) Global Counterterrorism Mechanism – Rule of Law & Human Rights in Practice under this component will provide support to criminal justice stakeholders worldwide in their efforts to integrate human rights and the rule of law into the development of counterterrorism legislation and management of counterterrorism cases.

Component 2: Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (STRIVE) through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). This component will provide support to GCERF, a multi-stakeholder global fund that works with local partners to strengthen community resilience to violent extremism. As an independent public-private partnership, GCERF directs resources to support initiatives led by, and benefiting, local communities that empower women, girls, boys, men and more specifically, persons living in vulnerable situations. GCERF focuses on local communities because they suffer the most from violent extremism, and because they are optimally situated to understand and act upon the drivers of violent extremism.

Component 3: Since 2015, the STRIVE Hedayah programme has provided assistance to governments and civil society organizations to implement activities, acknowledging that locally led organizations taking a leading role in their communities provide for streamlined and more impactful programming. Building on the successes of the first phase (2015-21), this component will expand and enhance previous activities to reduce the risk of radicalization leading to violent extremism through resilience building of vulnerable audiences to recruitment techniques in full respect of human rights and the rule of law. More specifically, component 3 will build the capacity of local civil society organisations and government entities to design and implement impactful interventions in line with their respective national strategies and action plans to prevent and counter radicalization and recruitment to terrorism and facilitate the de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration processes of foreign terrorist fighter returnees and their family members.

All components will be implemented in full complementarity with bilateral and regional programmes and in coordination with EU Delegations as well as relevant geographical units in INTPA and NEAR.

2. RATIONALE

2.1. Context

The obligation to respect human rights during the investigation, prosecution, adjudication of terrorism cases and detention of (suspected) terrorists is widely recognised as key to the fight against terrorism. Many states have instituted the tools that are derived from international norms and international law to investigate and prosecute terrorism suspects in compliance with human rights. However, these normative and legal frameworks have not been translated systematically into counterterrorism related trials guided by a rights-based approach. The respect for the rule of law from criminal justice actors, often faces pressure from political actors at the expense of a rights-based approach. The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) believes that counterterrorism has the best chance of being effective when grounded in human rights and the rule of law. Indeed, failing to integrate a rights-based approach into counterterrorism related cases can foster, or even aggravate, the grievances that underpin the existence of violent extremist groups.

Given the increase in the number of terrorism-related offences over the past two decades, criminal justice sectors have adjusted their capacities across their entire criminal justice systems. The previous wave of foreign terrorist fighters and their families traveling to Syria and Iraq has called international attention to this issue and many states have had to make significant and rapid adjustments to their criminal justice systems in order to anticipate, prevent, protect and respond to the threat of terrorism. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic has enhanced the vulnerabilities of

many societies to security and terrorism threats, which increases the opportunity for the radicalisation of political narratives.

Regardless of the nature of the terrorist threat, the high profile and sensitive nature of terrorism investigations and trials raises complex legal issues and can jeopardize the personal safety and security of practitioners involved in the proceedings. These issues pose significant challenges for judges, prosecutors, examining magistrates, investigators, and others, as they seek to ensure just, independent, and transparent trials for individuals accused of terrorist activities in a highly volatile context. This requires a significant degree of resilience at both individual and institutional levels.

The use of violence to further extreme ideological platforms, be they political, religious, and nationalist or other, is not a new phenomenon. However, the rise of violent extremist groups in recent years and the ease in which their messages of intolerance can be transmitted has called renewed attention and concern amongst policy makers and practitioners on the importance of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Mitigating the appeal of violent extremism amongst communities and vulnerable groups, particularly young people, is becoming a high priority for many countries around the world.

2.2. Problem Analysis

Short problem analysis:

EU Fundamental Values

The IIJ Global CT Compliance Mechanism aims to bring together criminal justice sector practitioners from various legal traditions to share insights, experiences, and best practices to standardise the adoption of systems, processes and practices which build the respective institutions to administer justice equitably, independently, and impartially in CT cases. In many countries around the world, the political pressures that attempt to influence the justice sector in their handling of CT cases makes it difficult for the practitioners to simply apply the rule of law and respect human rights as outlined in global standards adopted at the level of the UN and EU.

Component 1 will build a community of like-minded to empower criminal justice practitioners around the world based on common standards and shared principles. This community will support practitioners in becoming more resilient to pressures and able to investigate and adjudicate CT cases independently, guided by the rule of law and a human rights-based approach.

Counterterrorism

Short problem analysis: A lack of compliance with human rights and rule of law partly arises from the lack of capacity of criminal justice sector actors to create and operate in normative and legal frameworks for counterterrorism and other transnational criminal activity.

Component 1: Poorly conceived counterterrorism policies and practices or their forceful application may contribute significantly to widespread resentment against state security providers and hence be counter-productive. Given that many counterterrorism policies are too broad and applied too widely, and given that alternative practices that make a criminal justice system compliant with human rights remain unknown to many states' security and justice sectors, there is an urgent need to enhance rights-based approaches to counterterrorism. The lack of implementation of conventions and provisions plays in the hands of terrorist groups, as they count on weak government systems and inconsistent and unfair delivery of services to forward their aims.

Despite the numerous legal and judicial tools developed to fight terrorism, the adoption of a rights-based approach is lacking. Courses in counterterrorism usually feature one module on human rights which briefs only on the human rights conventions rather than enabling criminal justice sector actors to integrate human rights in their work. Moreover, most courses present human rights as a requirement and in the context of compliance. Unsurprisingly, those courses have not translated into changed practices and approaches systematically. Instead, systematic change occurs when courses offer concrete skills, knowledge and tools. Therefore, the failure of existing courses to truly empower change can be seen in the lack of compliance observed in many states today. Existing courses also fall short in providing instructions that increase the likelihood of buy-in of criminal justice sector actors to laws passed by parliaments or multi-actor/multi-stakeholder referral mechanisms targeting individuals who are on the path to radicalisation and violent extremism.

Components 2 and 3: Drivers of violent extremism are predominantly context specific and require local approaches. While there is a growing consensus that factors such as marginalisation, injustice, alienation, weak state-society relations, and social exclusion contribute to violent extremism, the specific combination of factors that result in violent extremism is less clear and can differ substantially between geographies and populations. When communities are more resilient to violent extremism, the risk of violence is reduced, contributing to a society that is peaceful and

inclusive. Community actors are best situated to strengthen resilience as they are closest to, and understand, the particular local challenges in more detail. Local actors understand what drives recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism in their communities and may know some of the elements for an effective solution, but are often unable to access adequate funding to make a difference. Local P/CVE initiatives may be overlooked by traditional development funding, or they may lack the capacity to access and manage international donor funds where they are available. Traditional development donors have tended to focus on communities at risk of poverty, not at risk of recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism – and often these communities are not the same.

Key cross-cutting issues

Human rights, rule of law, management/leadership, justice, policing, capacity building, P/CVE, multi-actor and multi-stakeholder referral mechanisms

Relevance and credibility of Partner Country's/Regional Policies and Strategies

Counterterrorism cooperation with EU partner countries is essential to improve the security of the EU and to protect its citizens. The Council has called for further strengthening of the EU's external counterterrorism engagement with a focus on the Western Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, in other African countries where terrorist activities are increasing, and in key regions in Asia. Such engagement can help Member States in their work against terrorist activity, as well as working at a global level to combat terrorist organisations that span across regions and continents. The actual selection of countries to be included in the Global CT Mechanism will require continued support from the CT/Security experts' network in EU Delegations especially in facilitating cooperation and political buy-in as well as promoting its implementation on a political level.

The proposed interventions will support the strategic objectives of targeted national governments to prevent and countering violent extremism. In particular, the actions will contribute to the implementation of national PVE action plans at the local level where existing.

EU added value

The challenge is that the respect of human rights is not straightforward as it requires criminal justice practitioners to carefully weigh the rights of all in a case and make decisions that maximise the respect of human rights within the context of the rule of law. This capacity to understand how to weigh the rights of all involved and the discretion required on a case-by-case basis is the main objective of the proposed global mechanism. The training and exchanges that the mechanism will offer will provide practitioners with the knowledge, skills, insights and approaches they need to adopt a rights-based approach.

For all components under this Action Document, the Commission will ensure that measures are implemented in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and in accordance with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as well as the operational guidance which was developed to ensure that human rights are taken into consideration in the design and implementation of counter-terrorism assistance

Complementarity with EU and other Donors/Partners

The IIJ has implemented grants from: Australia, Canada, Denmark, the EU, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The IIJ also benefits from secondments of experienced justice practitioners from Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as valuable in-kind and administrative support from members of the Governing Board of Administrators (GBA), the IIJ Advisory Board, and regional and international partners. The Institute's GBA comprises representatives of the European Union, represented through the European External Action Service (EEAS) together with 13 countries, including four EU Member States, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In order to enhance efficiency, avoid duplications and address potential gaps, any actions undertaken by Components 1-3 will be defined in complementarity and close coordination with actions covered under geographic, other thematic and rapid response pillars of the NDICI and other financial instruments.

Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action: The IIJ has an extensive expert and alumni network, established relationships with many states which would be invited to leverage the mechanism, and a peer-peer learning methodology.

GCERF and Hedayah work with governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) to implement activities as outlined in their respective countries National CVE Strategies and Action Plans, and will build on existing trust relationships to facilitate the implementation of their projects.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

3.1. Objectives and Expected Outputs

The Overall Objective (Impact) of this action is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights, gender equality and the rule of law.

Component 1: The Specific Objective of this component is to increase compliance of partner countries' counterterrorism policies, legislation and cases with human rights standards. The programme will focus on building and institutionalising knowledge, skills, procedures, and practices for effectively developing and managing counterterrorism-related policy, legislation and cases in compliance with the rule of law and human rights. The outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

Counterterrorism stakeholders in partner countries enhance their understanding of the applicable standards, legislation and procedures to maximise compliance with the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

Criminal justice sector practitioners enhance their knowledge of and skills regarding effective counterterrorism judicial procedures and strategies.

Criminal justice practitioners share their expertise, good practices and practical experience in implementing a Rights based approach (RBA) and respect for the rule of law in counter-terrorism justice processes, to enhance their understanding of the implementation of a RBA.

Component 2: The Specific Objective is that the resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas is increased in countries where the threat and need is greatest.

The outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

Output 2.1: Community focused and driven initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported.

As a funding mechanism, GCERF will provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas.

Output 2.2: Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.

GCERF aims to fill a funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability. Sustainability is ensured first through successive rounds of investment in each beneficiary country, and second by providing capacity development support for example in preparing budgets, monitoring and evaluation, and financial management, to enable communities to raise their own funds in due course.

Output 2.3: Awareness and knowledge of good practices in P/CVE is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries.

GCERF is solutions-oriented. Funding is provided to help launch, reinvest in, and extend successful local initiatives to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas. As the reach of GCERF funding expands, the lessons learned in particular from our monitoring and evaluation of PVE initiatives will contribute to good practices in this currently undeveloped, complex, and highly challenging field. Dissemination workshops will also be organised to this purpose.

Component 3: The Specific Objective is to build the capacity of local civil society organisations and government entities to design and implement impactful interventions in line with their respective CVE National Strategies and Action Plans to prevent radicalization leading to violent extremism, and recruitment to terrorism and facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration processes of foreign terrorist fighter returnees and their family members.

The outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

Output 3.1 Strengthened capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting radicalisation to terrorism.

There is a need to engage proactively with partner country authorities to build their capacity to implement P/CVE work as part of their counter-terrorism response. "Hard" counter-terrorism measures alone cannot address the appeal of terrorist recruiters. This result is tailor-made to work with senior security and law enforcement officials in selected countries to build their knowledge and acceptance of P/CVE approaches that are relevant to the local environment.

This will be followed-up with pilot projects on the ground with officials to encourage the practice of new non-coercive methods.

Output 3.2 Strengthened capacity of civil society organisations to deliver actions that prevent and counter terrorism.

Effective P/CVE work requires engagement with vulnerable communities and groups to identify and operationalize local solutions to the drivers of radicalisation. Support will be provided to the identification, design, implementation and evaluation of a number of specific actions in selected countries within pre-defined subject areas, e.g. youth, prisoners, women, diaspora.

Output 3.3 Strengthened capacity of media to contribute to a responsible and pluralistic media environment that challenges terrorism.

This component will focus on engagement with the media as a conduit for messaging and shaping of public opinion. Support will be channelled to the identification, implementation and evaluation of a number of specific actions in selected countries with the media sector.

Output 3.4 Increased understanding of the drivers of radicalisation to terrorism among vulnerable groups, including region-specific assessments that will direct the design of initiatives.

Research into the drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in respect particularly to support the implementation of activities under result 2 as well as future actions.

The above results will be achieved through cooperation with Hedayah and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund. While both mechanisms focus on community engagement their emphasis and articulation with national governments will differ and thus provide fitting and complementary vehicles for channelling EU support to this growing policy area.

3.2. Indicative Activities

Component 1 - Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

Enhancing partner countries and notably criminal justice sector practitioners' understanding of the applicable procedures to maximise compliance with the rule of law and the protection of human rights in the area of Counterterrorism,

Enhancing the knowledge and skills of criminal justice sector practitioners regarding effective counterterrorism judicial procedures and strategies.

Training management-level and senior counterterrorism leaders—specifically heads of jurisdictions, especially of CT units—in leading a project and developing a theory of change within a court, based on human rights, using a cobuilding approach.

Leading seminars on the practical application of the rule of law and the real-world protection of human rights, which will be evaluated by the participants and provide relevant support to identify new needs of the training programmes.

Creating partnerships between mechanism training participants and the IIJ's 6,000+ alumni, from more than 120 countries, who are criminal justice practitioners in: MENA, South and Southeast Asia, the Western Balkans, East and West Africa, and in other African countries where terrorist activities are increasing.

Providing access to current and practical resources as well as supplementing the work of the GCTF with feedback and reflections from practitioners and researchers involved in counterterrorism.

Component 2 - Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

As a funding mechanism, GCERF will continue to provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas.

GCERF aims to fill a funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability. Sustainability is ensured first through successive rounds of investment in each beneficiary country, and second by providing capacity development support for example in preparing budgets, monitoring and evaluation, and financial management, to enable communities to raise their own funds in due course.

GCERF is solutions-oriented. Funding is provided to help launch, reinvest in, and extend successful local initiatives to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas. As the reach of GCERF funding expands, the lessons learned in particular from our monitoring and evaluation of PVE initiatives will contribute to good practices in this

currently undeveloped, complex, and highly challenging field. Dissemination workshops will also be organised to this purpose.

Component 3 - Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

- 1. Through the mechanism of Call for Proposals Hedayah will bring local organizations to the CVE scene, organizations that propose very innovative ways to reach youth and other relevant target audiences and prevent radicalization;
- 2. The project will offer capacity building to local CSOs during all the phases of the project life cycle;
- 3. The project will facilitate an improvement of relationship between governments and CSOs. Through the implementation of projects and outputs obtained mutual trust is built to continue working together;
- 4. Hedayah will create spaces for dialogue for governments and civil society. STRIVE encourages collaborative approaches between government entities and local CSOs for the implementation of any initiative through the establishment of a Project Steering Committee with members of both parties;

Hedayah will continue building transnational and regional collaborations. Based on the relationship started and consolidated with local governments and organizations through STRIVE Global Program at country level, actors from different countries and regions have been put in touch to share successful experiences and CVE approaches. STRIVE has produced curriculums, manuals, guides, protocols, videos that have been shared to be adapted or replicated and improved the CVE work at country level.

3.3. Mainstreaming

Environmental Protection & Climate Change

Environmental Protection & Climate Change

In line with the European Commission's CT Agenda, the European judicial strategy for 2021-2024 and the vision of the IIJ, particular attention will be paid to the environmental costs of such actions and to the use of modern and digital training methods to guarantee a lower environmental impact, sustainability, high-quality, effectiveness and robust Monitoring and Evaluation. The IIJ will achieve this through the dialogue series, minimising the carbon emissions of air travel that would be required for solely in-person events.

An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) will be completed during initial phase of the activity as part of an Inception Report.

Gender Equality and empowerment of women and girls

Closing the gender gap across all IIJ programming is another area of particular focus, and the IIJ team is actively working with partner countries to encourage greater participation of women in all IIJ workshops and programmatic content. In 2018, the Institute observed a significant increase in the participation of women across many IIJ Core Initiatives and Work streams. In 2019, the IIJ convened a regional workshop under the Global Central Authorities Initiative that received, for the first time, a majority of registrations from female practitioners. In 2020, IIJ efforts to encourage and promote the participation of female practitioners continued, with increased female participation across IIJ activities. Moreover, the IIJ staff itself has a gender mix of 39.3% women and 60.7% men that is regularly considered as part of its team structure with the Governing Board of Administrators.

Across all of the Institute's capacity-building and institutional endeavours, the IIJ strives to identify, assess and integrate the various roles women contribute to in terrorism and counterterrorism, whether that be, for example, as a perpetrator, supporter, victim, community leader, policy-maker, or criminal justice practitioner. Whether in the context of the IIJ's Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Terrorism Work stream, our Juvenile Justice Initiative, our Prison Management Initiative, or through our Academic Unit curricula, the IIJ integrates a gender dimension into all phases of its programme design, delivery, and monitoring and evaluation. This not only ensures that underlying gender stereotypes are identified and addressed in the specific contexts of our capacity-building objectives, but that we are promoting and building gender expertise and equality across the criminal justice sectors in the countries and regions the Institute serves.

As the Council of Europe notes, there is wide consensus about the effectiveness of "a dual approach towards gender equality, combining gender mainstreaming with specific policies for the advancement of women, to ensure better policy making and better use of resources." The IIJ has worked proactively with donor and beneficiary governments to encourage the nomination of women practitioners to IIJ-led courses and workshops, and promote equal opportunities for women to serve as facilitators, subject-matter experts, and featured speakers. The IIJ's proactivity

in this regard has led to increased representation in our programmes, including in countries and regions where the criminal justice sector is heavily male-dominated. While such societal shifts cannot be addressed quickly, nor by the IIJ alone, we are committed to ensuring that gender mainstreaming, and the aforementioned dual approach, remains a central focus of our work going forward, including in the context of this proposed global mechanism.

Where the management and professionalism courses delivered by the IIJ through the mechanism will include a module on closing existing gaps in gender parity regarding hiring and promotion practices, the proposed management curriculum includes ways for CT justice practitioners to inform justice sector actors involved in cases with female suspects, decriminalise young men, and explore similar such topics. The IIJ will ensure it works with mid-level practitioners to avoid gender-based barriers which exist in many countries at the highest levels of leadership.

GCERF and Hedayah will continue to support gender-responsive actions, thriving for gender-equality in line with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Conducting needs and strengths assessments during the identification phase of any project and the design of tailored activities as per needs and strengths identified. Gender equality is key to the success of efforts geared towards peace and security.

Human Rights

A clear human-rights-based approach will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) on the basis of the operational guidance developed to this end by the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperationactions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en). Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen. Also, Pillar IV of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy reaffirms that the promotion and protection of human rights is essential to all measures against terrorism. It also recognises that counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but rather complimentary and mutually reinforcing. The use of API/PNR systems and data presents special challenges with respect to the rights to privacy, the protection of personal data, the right to non-discrimination, and, in some cases, the presumption of innocence. The project includes several activities designed to assist partner countries in the protection and promotion of human rights. Namely, a Guidance Note to address pertinent human rights issues, such as data protection and privacy concerns; and Model Legislative Provisions to guide the development of legislation on API/PNR data transmission, use, sharing and retention. In the case of STRIVE GCERF, respecting human rights is central to the code of conduct signed with every recipient of GCERF funding.

Youth mainstreaming throughout STRIVE GCERF will be important, as a democratic and demographic imperative. Young people should have a say and be involved as much as possible in the programme/project cycle and be consulted meaningfully at all stages.

Conflict sensitivity, peace and resilience

Grantee beneficiaries under STRIVE GCERF and Hedayah shall integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into the design and implementation of GCERF-supported activities so that they do not cause harm or exacerbate conflict, and aim to address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict.

3.4. Risks and Lessons Learnt

Categ	Risks	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigating measures
ory		(High/	(High/	
		Medium/	Medium/	
		Low)	Low)	
2	Significant delays or	Medium	Medium	The IIJ will prioritise the recruitment and take a multi-method,
	other challenges in			comprehensive and competitive recruitment approach to target suitable
	recruiting key IIJ			candidates. The IIJ's extensive network will also be actively leveraged.
	personnel to lead courses			The IIJ also may leverage existing human resources to gap-fill if
				necessary.
2	Significant delays in	High	Medium	The IIJ aims at starting the organisation of training activities well in
	obtaining Schengen visas			advance to ensure sufficient time for visa applications for IIJ
	for programmes in Malta			participants. The IIJ is providing advance notice to these authorities to
				promote the timely facilitation of Schengen visas (or Maltese visas on an
				exceptional basis).
3	Post-course participant	High	High	In as much as IIJ can mitigate the effects of this, the courses will be
	turnover in their CT roles			targeting mid-level officials who are either already involved in CT-
	leading to a loss of			related cases or are selected because they will likely have responsibilities
	competency on the			for such cases in the near future.
	institutional and national			

	level			
1	Operational security risks: threats to the safety of staff and partners or the continuity of programmes		High	Around half of all IIJ events before Covid -19 were held outside of Malta, often in places in which security risks must be taken into consideration. Therefore, the IIJ is completing the "Security Risk Assessment Checklist ² " for all events organised outside of Malta. Completion of the different steps are to be certified by IIJ management and, based on the conclusions reached during this assessment process, an event can be postponed or moved to an alternate location. While the checklist will help IIJ internal preparations, the IIJ also plans to work more closely with its Board Members and donors to ensure the safety and security of IIJ staff traveling to places outside of Malta and participants attending IIJ-organised workshops abroad. Therefore, the IIJ will request the support of its Board Members or other partners in reaching out to their embassies in host countries or to local authorities to assist with safety and security on the ground.
5	Courses are not viewed as Competitive with other Training institutions	Low	High	The outputs will be tailored to target groups, supported by practical and comprehensive resource materials, designed and delivered by top international experts and will provide practitioners with a training opportunity that brings value to their work.
2	Gender participation is unbalanced	Medium	Medium	In the preparations for the delivery, the IIJ will actively recruit for as balanced a participant composition as can be achieved. The IIJ has become more successful at approaching these targets in recent years.
3	Participants' institutions Reportedly engage in human rights violations in their home countries causing potential reputational damage		Low	The funds entrusted by the European Union will primarily be used to train CT criminal justice sector practitioners and will help to enhance the capacity of public officials to respect and promote human rights as a means to effectively prevent and combat terrorism. Work with representatives of law enforcement is envisaged to a lesser extent for these courses but, as per usual IIJ practice, participants will be selected in close coordination with primarily the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs and also building on the IIJ previously established network.
1	Lack of buy-in or follow- up by local authorities	Medium	Medium	Preparatory work assessing interest and demand prior to engagement.
1	Covid-19 pandemic worsens	Medium	Medium	The IIJ switched to online delivery of its training programs at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, employing a <i>flipped learning</i> approach to programme delivery. This has proved effective and online learning remains an alternative to in-person trainings should the need arise.

Lessons Learnt:

Component 1: Based on in-country experience of the IIJ and consultations with numerous supervisory stakeholders in multiple countries, a widespread lack of management and leadership training among the supervisors of the relevant agencies in many countries are reported and observed. Investigators, prosecutors, and judges are routinely promoted to supervisory positions without receiving any training on management tools, leadership skills, or professionalism. Instead, among criminal justice sector stakeholders it is widely—and wrongly—assumed that because these individuals are proficient in investigating, prosecuting, or adjudicating cases, they will be good at managing others. There is also a gender gap among supervisors; decision makers within the IIJ core regions too often fail to take gender parity into account when developing hiring and promotion practices. Through the use of customised management tools, with a proven track record, existing and aspiring supervisors are eager to learn how to manage personnel and files so that investigations and cases move more efficiently in a manner that also respects human rights and rule of law obligations.

With an inclusive and tailored approach, built following a thorough needs assessment which identifies lessons learned, the *IIJ Global CT Compliance Mechanism*, will deliver strong foundational training and tools in leadership and ethics that will enrich the current and future leaders of CT units in the judiciary, as well as in prosecution offices, and in law enforcement agencies. This mechanism will help all relevant stakeholders to be compliant with human rights, by strengthening and developing a reliable and efficient CT community network of rights-based approach practitioners.

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² The checklist takes IIJ staff through a range of practical questions and considerations in planning events, with a view to staying cognisant of evolving threats and managing critical incidents. The checklist is designed to help minimise risk and prepare IIJ staff to react and respond to critical events.

A broader lesson learnt from IIJ work with practitioners is that terrorism is about risk management; managing a risk to which our societies are particularly averse. This is, after all, the aim of terrorists – manipulating public opinion and influencing policy by instilling fear. The temptation may therefore be exceedingly high to take drastic measures and enforce blanket restrictions. As a neutral platform, the IIJ stresses that governments and partners should take the time to weigh options and consider long-term impact; not only immediate security benefits but broader implications on society, human rights, rule of law, and cohesion. The challenge is to ensure these operations are targeted, proportionate, and non-discriminatory.

Components 2 and 3: Main lessons learned from previous EU programming on P/CVE call for this to be evidence-based, tailored according to the local context, and adopting a multi-disciplinary approach. These aspects have been taken into account in the design of the two components. In addition, the proposed components seek to develop further knowledge throughout the implementation to facilitate learning in this complex and challenging domain, and to ensure that steps taken are coherent with the other endeavours and interventions. The proposed STRIVE components build on the good practices and lessons learned identified during past work in focus communities with EU support among others.

3.5. The Intervention Logic

This is based on the assumption that

- IF IIJ, GCERF and Hedayah are successfully implemented,
- THEN partner governments will 1) strengthen their criminal justice responses to terrorism, 2) enhance their capacity to address recruitment to violent extremism 3) increase the resilience of communities and vulnerable people against violent extremist agendas,
- RESULTING in a reduction of the terrorist threat and a contribution to increased stability in the geographical areas in which the activities have been implemented, and abroad.

The action assumes there is sufficient support and willingness from the relevant public authorities to engage with the EU in CT and P/CVE issues and to adopt and implement relevant international CT legal provisions, standards and best practices.

The design of the Action assumes also that key state and non- state actors are willing to address child recruitment and exploitation in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law, as enshrined in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN Charter and the UN's P/CVE Action Plan. This will be monitored throughout the implementation as well as assessed through regular policy dialogue with the partner countries. The programme builds on the experience and lessons learned acquired by the EU in the field of CT and P/CVE and strong emphasis is put on capacity building as a key element for sustainability.

3.6. Logical Framework Matrix

Results	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
Impact	To disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights, gender equality and the rule of law.					
Outcome 1	Increased compliance of partner countries of counterterrorism policies, legislation and cases with human rights standards.	 Percent increase in justice sector response time to counterterrorism cases Percentage of counterterrorism prosecutions that rely solely on confession-based evidence decreases Percentage of countries where national human rights organisations report net improvements in human rights protections in counterterrorism cases by investigators, prosecutors, and judges (Indicators disaggregated by country, region, and type of institution) 		TBD in the inception phase	 Yearly surveys/interviews of participants Yearly surveys/interviews of participants Yearly surveys/interviews of national human rights organisations in partner countries 	
Outcome 2	Resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas is increased in countries where the threat and need is greatest.			TBD in the inception phase		
Outcome 3	To work with local partners to design, implement and develop approaches that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.			TBD in the inception phase		To work with local partners to design, implement and develop approaches that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.
Output 1 related to Outcome 1	Counterterrorism stakeholders in partner countries enhance their understanding of the applicable standards, legislation and procedures to maximise compliance with the rule of law	1.1 Percentage of institutions that enact relevant policy or structural reforms and self-declare that these are a result of members' participation in the programme	1.1 N/A 1.2 N/A 1.3 N/A 1.4 N/A	TBD in the inception phase	1.1 Yearly surveys/interviews of participants 1.2 Yearly surveys/interviews of participants	Alumni participants are in positions where they can recommend reforms and feel free to do so in their institutions without fear of reprisal;

	and the protection of human rights.	1.2 Number of relevant* recommendations for legal, regulatory, or policy reforms formulated and shared within institutions * "Relevant" is defined as those related to both counterterrorism policies and procedures as well as those that are aimed at safeguarding or improving human rights (Indicators disaggregated by country, region, and type of institution)				Stakeholders in the counterterrorism system are willing and able to contribute to the compliance efforts
Output 2 related to Outcome 1	Criminal justice sector practitioners enhance their knowledge of and skills regarding effective counterterrorism judicial procedures and strategies.	2.1 Percentage of alumni that successfully implement a good practice shared on the alumni network 2.2 Percentage of alumni that report an increased commitment to safeguarding human rights (Indicators disaggregated by gender, country, region, and type of institution)	2.1 N/A 2.2 Baseline figure set by post-course evaluation forms	TBD in the inception phase	2.1 Yearly surveys/interviews of participants 2.2 Yearly surveys/interviews of participants	Practitioners will see the need/use of the community of practice and consult/solicit the network and peers (both institutions and individuals)
Output 3 related to Outcome 1	Criminal justice sector practitioners enhanced their knowledge of and skills regarding efficient counterterrorism strategies and case management procedures.	1.1.1 Number of criminal justice sector practitioners trained in applicable procedures to maximise compliance with the rule of law and the protection of human rights 1.1.3 Percentage of participants who demonstrate a better understanding of the international, regional, and national human rights norms 1.1.3 Percentage of participants who report having exercised course learnings on the rule of law and human rights protection in their work after the training (Indicators disaggregated by gender, country, region, and type of institution)	1.1.1 N/A 1.1.2 N/A 1.1.3 N/A	TBD in the inception phase	1.1.1 Training reports 1.1.2 Pre- and post-course tests 1.1.3 Yearly surveys/interviews of participants	The rule of law and human rights content introduced in the training courses are markedly more effective and efficient than those taught in national training institutes; Participants and their institutions recognise the benefits of safeguarding human rights and a rights-based approach in judicial practices/ systems
Output 1 related to Outcome 2	Community focused and driven initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported	5. 1.1 Number of men and women reached by the CSOs through local CVE actions (disaggregated by country and age) 5.1.2 Number of collaboration / partnerships with think tanks / major actors involved in P/CVE work and research established/developed during the implementation.	5.1.1 Project progress reports; 5.1.2 GCERF reports	TBD in the inception phase		Security situation in targeted communities does not deteriorate and allows partners to operate appropriately
Output 2 related to Outcome 2	Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity	5.2.1 Number of CSOs reporting increased capacities in PVE thanks to GCERF support.	5.2.1 Project progress reports and GCERF's financial	TBD in the inception phase		CSOs at community level are free to participate in P/CVE capacity building activities

	for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.	5.2.2 % of CSO representatives trained by GCERF who can provide at least one example of using these skills & knowledge in their work within the following year	documentation; 5.2.2 Survey of CSOs			and to apply new knowledge in their communities
Output 3 related to Outcome 2	Awareness and knowledge of good practices in the field of preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries.	5.3.1 number of stakeholders reached through workshops/events where findings/ good practices/ lessons learned where disseminated, disaggregated by sex, sector and country	5.3.1 Database of event participants			A robust M&E system which allows for the identification of good practices and lessons learned is in place.
Output 1 related to Outcome 3	To work with local partners to design, implement and develop approaches that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.			TBD in the inception phase	Outcome 1	To work with local partners to design, implement and develop approaches that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.
Output 2 related to Outcome 3	Strengthened capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities to engage with civil society in fighting radicalisation to terrorism.	Improvements in policies, law and regulations Increased willingness from Government, to host/encourage/agree to a range of P/CVE activity Increased collaboration between different parts of Government with an overarching workable structure for co-operation in place Increased awareness of the causes and nature of violent extremism amongst frontline officials		TBD in the inception phase	Surveys conducted among key stakeholders and participants and beneficiaries Published texts of Government policy Personal evidence of new overarching structures (e.g. crossagency CVE working groups) meetings Agenda, reports and registers of attendance at events Public decisions on future dissemination of the sensitisation training product	Participation of relevant stakeholders Consensus among relevant stakeholders and different parts of government Political stability and security in the regions where actions are taken place
Output 3 related to Outcome 3	Strengthened capacity of civil society organisations to deliver actions that prevent and counter terrorism.	 The emergence of CVE activity in locations where it was not previously present Increased professionalization of key community actors who are better equipped to offer a more effective response to violent extremism 		TBD in the inception phase	Qualitative assessments of the participant target audience of each project (e.g. analysis of how a young person has been made less vulnerable to recruitment by violent	Participation of relevant stakeholders Consensus among relevant stakeholders and different civil society groups

		 Increased sense of security in target community Improved articulation of the needs of civil society relating to P/CVE through direct engagement with key Government actors 		extremist groups through participation in an initiative funded through Activity A2) • Public decisions on civil society engagement • Government/internation al funding and fiscal incentives for continued civil society initiatives. • Surveys conducted among key stakeholders and participants and beneficiaries	Support/decisions/funding from government of civil society organisations Political stability and security in the regions where actions are taken place
Output 4 related to Outcome 3	Strengthened capacity of media to contribute to a responsible and pluralistic media environment that challenges terrorism.	 Improvements in polices, laws and regulations Improved practice by Government spokespersons Improved practice by journalists Increased constructive engagement between Government and media on violent extremism related issues 	TBD in inception phase		Participation of relevant stakeholders Consensus among relevant stakeholders in government-including unified government response Transparent, credible media outlets reporting on events Political stability and security in the regions where actions are taken place
Output 5 related to Outcome 3	Increased understanding of the drivers of radicalisation to terrorism among vulnerable groups, including region-specific assessments that will direct the design of initiatives.	 Increased understanding amongst international partners of the key themes and issues that are being researched Increased effectiveness of CVE practitioners engaged on these themes and issues A more diverse and wide range of individuals accessing research material related to countering violent extremism 	TBD in inception phase	I	Participation of relevant stakeholders Consensus among relevant stakeholders Support/decisions/ funding from government for research activity Political stability and security in the regions where actions are taken place

4. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

4.1. Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries.

4.2. Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Financing Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

4.3. Implementation Modalities (applicable for Project modality)

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures³.

4.3.1. Direct Management (Grants)

Component 1: This component will be implemented with a direct award to IIJ (direct management).

(a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 1 is to increase compliance of partner countries of counterterrorism policies, legislation and cases with human rights standards. The component will focus on building and institutionalising knowledge, skills, procedures, and practices for effectively developing and managing counterterrorism-related policy, legislation and cases in compliance with the rule of law and human rights

In case negotiations do not conclude with IIJ the Contracting Authority will seek to conclude an agreement with a relevant not for profit organisation/public sector administration that can deliver the requested services.

(b) Justification of a direct grant: Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to IIJ.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the Regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

Component 2: This Component will be implemented with a direct award to GCERF (direct management).

(a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 2 is to work with civil society partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

As the main purpose of the actions under component 2 is to provide financial support to third parties no maximum amount for sub-granting will apply. The Description of the Action for this grant shall define the types of entities eligible for financial support and include a list with the types of activity which may be eligible for financial support. The criteria for the selection of the third party recipients of this financial support, including the criteria for determining its exact amount, shall also be specified in the Description of the Action.

- (b) Type of applicants targeted: GCERF was established as an independent legal entity formed under the law of Switzerland in 2014 and enjoys all privileges and immunities equivalent to those given to international organizations which can be granted by way of a Host State Agreement. GCERF is governed by a board which includes country representatives from both recipient and donor nations as well as other constituencies.
- (c) Justification of a direct grant: Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the

³ www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

Component 3: This component will be implemented with a direct award to Hedayah (direct management).

- (a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 3 is to build the capacity of local CSOs and government entities to design and implement impactful interventions in line with their respective CVE National Strategies and Action Plans to prevent radicalization leading to violent extremism, and recruitment to terrorism and facilitate the de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration processes of foreign terrorist fighter returnees and their family members.
- (b) Type of applicants targeted: The Hedayah Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism was established in December 2012 as an initiative launched through the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Hedayah is a "think" and "do" tank which promotes evidence-based practice, research and the implementation of community engagement. The grant is provided to Hedayah for sub-granting purposes. This support will thus not be providing direct support to the operation of Hedayah, rather using this Centre of Excellence which is unique globally, as a mechanism to support P/CVE actions around the world. The EU is part of the overall Steering Board of the Hedayah Centre.
- (c) Justification of a direct grant: Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to Hedayah.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

4.3.2. Changes from indirect to direct management mode (and vice versa) due to exceptional circumstances

In the interest of the programme, or if the negotiations with the selected entities fail, all parts of this action may be implemented in indirect management.

4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

4.5. Indicative Budget

	EU contribution (amount in EUR)
Component 1 IIJ - grants (direct management)	3 000 000
Component 2 STRIVE GCERF - grants (direct management)	6 000 000
Component 3 Hedayah- grants (direct management)	5 000 000
Grants – total envelope under section 4.3.1	14 000 000
Evaluation, (cf. section 5.2)— Audit (cf. section 5.3)/Expenditure verification	Will be covered by another decision
Communication and visibility (cf. section 6)	N.A
Contingencies	0
Total	14 000 000

4.6. Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

The Commission will coordinate and lead the implementation of this action partly through the procurement of service and supply contracts and partly by entrusting tasks to international organisations in which case the Commission will be closely involved through a Steering and/or Coordination Committee.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

N/A

5. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

5.1. Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality). When training courses are delivered as part of the activities of a project, entry and exit tests will be done to assess the increased capacities of the trainees. The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.2. Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, evaluations of single components/projects are carried out via an implementing partner. The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake mid-term or final evaluations for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner. The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

5.3. Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

6. COMMUNICATION AND VISIBILITY

Communication and visibility is a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to advertise the European Union's support for their work to the relevant audiences. To that end they must comply with the instructions given in the *Communication and Visibility Requirements* of 2018 (or any successor document), notably with regard to the use of the EU emblem and the elaboration of a dedicated communication and visibility plan, to be completed for every action at the start of implementation. These obligations apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, the partner country (for instance, concerning the reforms supported through budget support), contractors, grant beneficiaries or entrusted entities. In each case, a reference to the relevant contractual obligations must be included in the respective financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

Communication and visibility measures may be funded from the amounts allocated to the action. For the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the EU and its contribution to this action, the Commission may sign or enter into joint declarations or statements, as part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union. Visibility and communication measures should also promote transparency and accountability on the use of funds. Effectiveness of communication activities on awareness about the action and its objectives as well as on EU funding of the action should be measured. Implementing partners shall keep the Commission and concerned EU Delegation/Office fully informed of the planning and implementation of specific visibility and communication activities before work starts. Implementing partners will ensure adequate visibility of EU financing and will report on visibility and communication actions as well as the results of the overall action to the relevant monitoring committees.

APPENDIX 1 REPORTING IN OPSYS

An Intervention⁴ (also generally called project/programme) is the operational entity associated to a coherent set of activities and results structured in a logical framework aiming at delivering development change or progress. Interventions are the most effective (hence optimal) entities for the operational follow-up by the Commission of its external development operations. As such, Interventions constitute the base unit for managing operational implementations, assessing performance, monitoring, evaluation, internal and external communication, reporting and aggregation.

Primary Interventions are those contracts or groups of contracts bearing reportable results and respecting the following business rule: 'a given contract can only contribute to one primary intervention and not more than one'. An individual contract that does not produce direct reportable results and cannot be logically grouped with other result reportable contracts is considered a 'support entities'. The addition of all primary interventions and support entities is equivalent to the full development portfolio of the Institution.

Primary Interventions are identified during the design of each action by the responsible service (Delegation or Headquarters operational Unit).

The level of the Primary Intervention is defined in the related Action Document and it is revisable; it can be a(n) (group of) action(s) or a (group of) contract(s).

Tick in the left side column one of the three possible options for the level of definition of the Primary Intervention(s) identified in this action.

In the case of 'Group of actions' level, add references to the present action and other action concerning the same Primary Intervention.

In the case of 'Contract level', add the reference to the corresponding budgetary items in point 4.6, Indicative Budget.

Op	Option 1: Action level					
	Single action	Present action: all contracts in the present action				
Op	Option 2: Group of actions level					
	Group of actions	Actions reference (CRIS#/OPSYS#):				
Op	Option 3: Contract level					
\boxtimes	Single Contract 1	Contract with Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ)				
\boxtimes	Single Contract 2	Contract with Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund				
\boxtimes	Single Contract 3	Contract with Hedayah				
	Group of contracts 1					

⁴ <u>ARES (2021)4204912</u> - For the purpose of consistency between terms in OPSYS, DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI have harmonised 5 key terms, including 'action' and 'Intervention' where an 'action' is the content (or part of the content) of a Commission Financing Decision and 'Intervention' is a coherent set of activities and results which constitutes an effective level for the operational follow-up by the EC of its operations on the ground. See more on the <u>concept of intervention</u>.