



External Evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (2014 – mid 2017)

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Evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

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Contents

Acronyms	iv
Executive Summary	1
1. Introduction	5
1.1. The IcSP scope and size.....	5
1.2. The global and policy context	6
1.3. The evaluation report.....	7
2. Methodology and Approach	8
2.1. Overview	8
2.2. The IcSP Intervention Logic	8
2.3. Tools and methods	9
2.4. Challenges and limitations.....	10
3. Responses to the Evaluation Questions	12
3.1. Relevance	12
3.2. Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability	16
3.2.1. Judgement Criteria: Effectiveness.....	17
3.2.2. Judgement Criteria: Impact	20
3.2.3. Judgement Criteria: Sustainability	22
3.3. Efficiency	24
3.4. Added Value	26
3.5. Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies.....	31
3.6. Leverage	36
4. Conclusions.....	39
4.1. Relevance and Added Value	39
4.2. Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability.....	39
4.3. Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies, and Leverage.....	40
4.4. The IcSP: Fit for Purpose?	40
5. Recommendations	42
5.1. Ensure IcSP continuity post-2020.....	42
5.2. Build an IcSP baseline.....	42
5.3. Improve the overall strategic framework for the IcSP	42
5.4. Engage in strategic dialogue on systemic challenges with other funds.....	42
5.5. Address identified action/programme-level challenges in the IcSP.....	43
6. Appendices	45
6.1. The IcSP in a global context.....	45
6.2. IcSP Intervention Logic	47

Acronyms

AAP	Annual Action Programme(s)
AU	African Union
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
BWC ISU	Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CC	Council Conclusion(s)
CfP	Call for Proposals
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CI	Critical Infrastructure
CIR	Common Implementing Regulation
CoE	Centre(s) of Excellence
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSDN	Civil Society Dialogue Network
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil Society Organisation(s)
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Co-operation and Development
DG	Directorate General
DG ECHO	Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG HOME	Directorate-General Migration and Home Affairs
DG NEAR	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DG SANTE	Directorate-General Health and Food Safety
EC	European Commission
EAM	Exceptional Assistance Measure
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFI	External Financing Instrument(s)
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENTRi	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
EP	European Parliament

EPLO	European Peace-building Liaison Office
EQ	Evaluation Question(s)
ERMES	European Resources for Mediation Support
ESF	European Security Fund
EU	European Union
EUCAP	European Conference on Antennas and Propagation
EUD	EU Delegation(s)
EUPST	European Union Police Services Training Programme
EUROPOL	European Police Office
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund
EUTM	European Training Mission
FD	Financial Decision
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
HQ	Headquarters
HR	High Representative
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IHR	International Health Regulation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
IO	International Organisation(s)
IP	Implementing Partner(s)
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IRP	Interim Response Programme(s)
ISTC	International Science and Technology Centre
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
JC	Judgement Criterion/Criteria
JRC	Joint Research Centre
KII	Key Informant Interview(s)
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
LAS	League of Arab States
LDDR	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Disaster Assistance
MDGs	Millennium Development Goal(s)
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme(s)
MS	Member State(s)
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
MTE	Midterm Evaluation
NAP	National Action Plan
NAQ	Needs Assessment Questionnaire
NFP	National Focal Point(s)

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation(s)
NT	National Team
OC	Organised Crime
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAMF	Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation, Reconciliation and Other Areas of Assistance
PBP	Peace-Building Partnership
PCD	Policy Coherence for Development
PCNA	Post-conflict needs assessment
PDNA	Post-disaster needs assessment
PI	Partnership Instrument
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STCU	The Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine
STGs	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TOC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNSC Res	United Nations Security Council Regulation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNICRI	United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
VP	Vice President
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPS	Women Peace and Security

Executive Summary

Objectives and context of the evaluation This Midterm Evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is one of several parallel evaluations of External Financing Instruments under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, and feeds into the required Midterm Review report of the External Financing Instruments. The Midterm Review started in June 2016 and is to be finished by the end of December 2017, as per the Common Implementing Regulation Article 17.

The Midterm Evaluation covers all three components of the IcSP: (a) responses in situations of crisis and emerging crisis (IcSP Regulation Article 3); (b) conflict prevention and capacity building in pre- and post-crisis situations and to build peace (Article 4); and (c) global and trans-regional as well as emerging threats to peace, international security and stability (Article 5). It assesses whether the IcSP is fit for purpose to deliver EU resources towards EU external policy objectives, both at the start of the evaluation period (2014) and at present (mid 2017), and considers the current place of the IcSP – its unique function as well as its complementarities and synergies - within the wider set of the EU's External Financing Instruments.

Context The global peace and security context of the IcSP is fast evolving. The Instrument has to adjust to a number of recent and emerging threats and trends, such as the rise of hybrid conflicts¹, the securitisation of development and peace², and the highest recorded levels of refugee and migration flows. The IcSP is also part of the global peace and security architecture; a collection of structures, norms, capacities and procedures that has evolved to avert and resolve violent conflicts and threats to international security, and which remains incomplete and at times fragile, and faces several challenges.

As an EU instrument, the IcSP operates within the framework of EU policy and priorities. Internationally, the EU is committed to Agenda 2030 and the IcSP addresses several elements of Sustainable Development Goal 16. At the core of EU external policy, however, is the Treaty of the European Union, and particularly Title V and Article 21, which sets out the broad principles of the Union's external actions. Key EU peace and security priorities are given in several documents, including the recent *“Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy”* (2016) (the ‘Global Strategy’), and the European Commission's Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development (November 2016).

Methodology and challenges The IcSP Midterm Evaluation is evidence-based, guided by the intervention logic of the Instrument and applies a mixed methods approach that combines quantitative and, more importantly, qualitative data. The approach is focused on answering several evaluation questions that cover EU evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, efficiency, added value, coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies and leverage).

The evaluation involved the review of over 400 documents (decisions, action documents, previous evaluations at project and Instrument level, annual reports, and other documents), about 140 key informant interviews, participation in and extraction of data from a consolidated survey administered to EU Delegations for all External Financing Instruments midterm evaluations, and an Open Public Consultation process. Evaluation hypotheses and preliminary findings were validated during the field visits that covered eight selected partner countries. It is worth mentioning that for the Midterm Evaluation, the IcSP baseline had to be built ex-post, which required substantial research and the preparation of additional outputs.

Key challenges to the evaluation include conceptual and technical elements. A core difficulty is evaluating a largely political instrument, which has political outcomes, with a results-based and technically premised

¹ “Hybrid conflicts” are defined as “violent conflicts or situations of widespread violence where elements of grievance, greed, and/or extremism are intertwined – and where climate changes may play a role”, but also that involve a mix of internal country and cross-border dynamics. See Appendix 1 for more details.

² The concept of ‘securitisation’ typically refers to how a certain issue (e.g. migration, terrorism, etc.) is socially constructed as a threat. Here we use a different, but complementary view of “securitisation”; which covers actions and programmes that are aligned to national security interests (of EU Member States and partner countries) and supportive of partner country government security objectives. Within the IcSP portfolio, Counterterrorism and Countering violent extremism, organised crime, cyber security, and stabilisation (and sometimes migration) activities are part of a securitised portfolio. We do consider such actions and programmes as often necessary, but note that when not designed using a conflict-sensitive and ‘do no harm’ approach, they may generate unforeseen challenges.

evaluation methodology and without a pre-existing baseline. Other challenges include data over-abundance in some areas and scarcity in others; extrapolating macro-level conclusions on topics such as impact and sustainability when few actions and programmes have been completed; and striking a balance between a sufficiently deep understanding of individual IcSP interventions and maintaining a broad view to assess performance of the Instrument as a whole.

Main responses to the Evaluation Questions

Evaluation Question 1 Relevance

Across all Articles, the IcSP responds to the priorities set out in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union. It supports the Global Strategy (notably the realms of security, promoting state and societal resilience in the EU's South and East), takes an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, supports cooperative regional orders, and promotes global governance. It also contributes to Sustainable Development Goal 16 of Agenda 2030. IcSP actions and programmes balance EU priorities and beneficiary country needs.

At the action/programme-level, some improvements are needed in Article 3 to better ground and time actions to the contexts they are implemented in, including a more robust assessment of hybrid conflict dynamics. Challenges for actions in Article 3 and Article 5 programmes include potential negative knock-on effects on EU cross-cutting priorities if actions and programmes in securitised sectors³ are not supported by 'do no harm' and conflict sensitivity analyses.⁴

Evaluation Question 2 Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability

The evaluation found that most actions and programmes (across Articles 3, 4, and 5) are **effective**, and that the Instrument has on the whole delivered on its commitments. Actions and programmes translate EU political priorities into interventions that yield meaningful outcomes. Available project reports and evaluations show good results on mainstreaming conflict prevention, democracy and good governance. IcSP processes have led to the effective identification and implementation of actions and programmes. On the other hand, there have at times been challenges to translate political commitments (e.g. to intervene in particular countries or in relation to specific issues, like migration) into suitable actions that align country needs/priorities with EU political priorities. Also, the mainstreaming of gender and human rights in the Instrument's interventions can be improved.

The **impact** of the IcSP is defined as its contribution to addressing root causes of conflicts and threats, as well as bolstering EU and partner capacities in the longer term. It is especially difficult to measure Instrument-level impacts at present for two reasons. First, most projects initiated under the IcSP are still ongoing today and evaluations of actions and programmes are limited in number. Second, political achievements depend on a complex mix of legislative, normative or behavioural factors and interaction with other actors. Nonetheless, there is evidence of programme-level impacts. Programmes under Articles 4 and 5 often build on initiatives started under the Instrument for Stability (the IcSP predecessor), and outcomes have been embedded into the systems and structures of implementing partners. Examples can be found in interventions in such areas as capacity building in law enforcement and counter-terrorism, or Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risk mitigation amongst others. Stakeholders note that IcSP future impact will benefit from more emphasis and investment in seizing windows of opportunity for peace⁵ (Article 3), and a better strategic framework to underpin support to regional and global peace and security architectures (Articles 4 and 5). The final IcSP evaluation will be able to generate insights on impact as the Instrument's monitoring systems are now operational.

Similarly, overall **sustainability** levels of IcSP actions are likely to become clearer in the future. There are several promising examples, which are helped by the emphasis placed on capacity-building across Articles 3, 4, and 5. With regard to Article 3, sustainability is not the most important consideration in designing actions as

³ See footnote 2 for a short definition of how 'securitisation' is applied in the Midterm Evaluation.

⁴ The application of a "do no harm" approach is taking the necessary care to ensure that an action or programme does not have negative effects on efforts to promote peace and stability. It means considering the potential impacts of an action or programme on a range of factors (such as human rights, good governance, community cohesion, local conflict dynamics, etc.) and making adjustments in the design and implementation phases to mitigate the risk of negative knock-on effects.

⁵ The concept of a 'window of opportunity for peace' typically refers to the early signs that a ceasefire, basic talks between conflicting parties, or a peace process may be possible. In peace mediation practice, an inter-changeable term is 'peace ripeness', which can also be facilitated and promoted through actions that begin to prepare or encourage parties to talk.

these interventions are not programmable and respond to demands and opportunities as they present themselves. However, sustainability, where possible, can benefit from better formulation of exit or transition strategies for actions and programmes across all Articles. Aid effectiveness principles are applied where relevant in Article 3 actions, and broadly across Article 4 and 5 programmes.

Evaluation Question 3 Efficiency

Available evidence shows that the IcSP is **efficient**. The percentage of administrative costs to total budget is 1% in the IcSP, which is lower than in other External Financing Instruments. Budget execution (time taken from commitments to payments) is satisfactory. However, the evaluators were not able to access sufficient data to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs. Aspects of the IcSP Regulation that promote efficiency include flexible management procedures to accelerate contractual procedures and direct selection of implementing partners.

At the action/programme-level, there are cases in Article 3 where delays are seen in the period between needs identification and commitments. While these delays are often justifiable, there remains scope for improvement. New reporting tools for Articles 3 and 4, and a Manual of IcSP Outcome Indicators, were developed in 2016. *Theories of Change* are also more widely used to stimulate thinking and analytical feedback on change processes and this promotes efficiency. Monitoring in crisis or conflict affected contexts remains, however, a significant challenge, not least because of security and access limitations.

Evaluation Question 4 Added Value

IcSP value added is seen at different levels. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts where it is deployed, the multilateral nature of the IcSP and the European values⁶ it promotes are attributes that enhance its acceptability to beneficiary governments, key stakeholders, and implementing organisations. Its niche (including priorities given in the Regulation, such as for the Kimberley Certification Scheme), flexibility, and ability to take risks are broadly complementary and appreciated by Member States and other donors. The IcSP remains an important source of funding for many groups in a period with significant funding cuts to the United Nations and European Non-Governmental Organisations. Within the EU context, and in relation to the EU's External Financing Instruments, the IcSP's speed, flexibility to adapt to evolving contexts, and political influence/leverage are valued. There are other comparative advantages of the Instrument, such as the direct contracting ability, bridging function, expertise/niche role and possibility to engage with specific stakeholders. It also supports the EU's efforts to mainstream conflict-sensitivity in other External Financing Instruments.

At the action/programme-level, there are several examples, such as in Counter Terrorism and Organised Crime programmes under Article 5, where the IcSP has created entry-points and taken risks that other donors could or would not do. Similarly, under Article 3 there are examples where no other donors were willing or legally able to fund certain actions (e.g. a demining project in Colombia involving the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army alongside state actors).

Evaluation Question 5 Coherence, consistency, complementarity and synergies

As with its value added, IcSP coherence, consistence, and complementarity and synergies are seen at different levels. Externally, the IcSP is currently among the largest funds globally dedicated to peace and stability. However, coordination on systemic challenges between the IcSP and other (EU Member States and non-EU) peace and security funding instruments appears limited. In relation to EU external actions and institutions, there is evidence of functional interfaces between the IcSP and Common Security and Defence Policy missions, as well as with the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Among EU External Financing Instruments there appears to be significant and growing programming on peace and security, which partly results from EU efforts to mainstream conflict prevention. Effective synergies between these and the IcSP are hampered by the lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures of most External Financing Instruments. Within the IcSP, there is variation in how joined-up actions and programmes are between Articles 3, 4, and 5. Although actions and programmes under each article are aligned to meet the objectives of the Instrument itself, they also have been used in furtherance of the objectives of other External Financing Instruments: to 'gap fill', as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) Instruments, and as a funding Instrument of last resort.

⁶ Such as support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law as laid out in the TEU.

Evaluation Question 6 Leverage

It is difficult to isolate the contribution of actions/actors to leverage political dialogue or change in general. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the IcSP has contributed to EU policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments in several countries, which in turn has supported a range of outcomes in IcSP actions and programmes. However, the use of the IcSP to contribute to policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments is not consistent and depends on the timeliness and relevance of actions, as well as political will of the EU and partner countries to engage in such dialogue. In terms of catalysing additional donor funding for IcSP actions, there is some indication that IcSP funding has been complemented with parallel financing by other donors, but less so when it comes to co-financing and joint programming.

Conclusions Despite its limited size (budget for 2014-2020 is € 2.34 billion), the IcSP makes significant contributions to EU policy priorities and external action strategy. Overall, it has delivered on its commitments, yielded important outcomes, and is responsive to a fast-evolving peace and security context. It is a relatively efficient instrument, where flexible management procedures that accelerate contractual procedures and direct contracting of implementing partners are widely praised. It is extensively used by EU Delegations, particularly because of its speed and flexibility, and its value added also rests in the promotion of European values in a sector that is increasingly affected by securitisation. The Instrument reaches out to other External Financing Instruments, but its articulation with these is at times challenged by cumbersome Commission procedures. It is an important Instrument that contributes to deepened political dialogue and greater profile for the European Union. The IcSP's relevance will further increase in the years to come.

However, for the Instrument not only to continue to be fit for purpose, but at the same time to enlarge its potential for impact and positive external effects, there are several questions to be considered: (a) how to leverage the Instrument's position to engage in strategic dialogue with other global peace and security funds on systemic challenges, including funding cuts in the sector; (b) how to find the right balance between non-securitised and securitised actions/programmes in the Instrument's contributions to EU security priorities and global commitments; (c) how to bolster the strategic framework and synergies with the European External Action Service and other EU External Financing Instruments in work to strengthen international and regional peace and security architectures; and (d) how to ensure that the evidence-base that underpins the design of IcSP actions and programmes reflects the rise of emerged threats and hybrid conflicts.

Recommendations

REC1: Ensure IcSP continuity post-2020 The European Commission, European External Action Service, European Parliament, and European Council should ensure IcSP continuity post 2020.

REC2: Build an IcSP baseline The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments and DEVCO B5 (DG International Cooperation and Development - Unit B5) should build an IcSP baseline⁷ that enables better future performance measurement.

REC3: Improve the overall strategic framework for the IcSP This needs to include: (a) the development of an European External Action Service and European Commission strategic framework that sets directions and principles for efforts to strengthen the global and regional peace and security architecture and address the global funding deficit for peace and development; (b) systematically monitoring and assessing levels and types of peace and security programming in the European Development Fund, other EU External Financing Instruments, and funding modalities; and (c) defining, beyond existing guidance, a comprehensive approach to 'do no harm' and conflict-sensitivity in actions/programmes in securitised sectors.

REC4: Engage in strategic dialogue on systemic challenges with other peace and stability funds The European External Action Service, together with the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments and DEVCO B5 should regularise strategic dialogue with other peace and stability funds on systemic challenges affecting the sector.

REC5: Address identified action/programme-level challenges in the IcSP The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments and DEVCO B5 should ensure continued IcSP performance by addressing action/programme level challenges identified in the Midterm Evaluation.

⁷ A "baseline" is defined here as the measurement of conditions at the start of a project or programme, against which subsequent progress can be assessed.

1. Introduction

1.1. The IcSP scope and size

The IcSP was adopted in 2014 and replaced the Instrument for Stability (IFS, 2007-2013) that succeeded the initial Rapid Reaction Mechanism (2001-2006). The IcSP supports EU external action objectives of preserving peace, preventing conflicts, strengthening international security and assisting populations affected by conflict or disasters. It is complementary to other geographic and thematic Instruments and EU external action policies. Its assistance is coordinated with Member States, who approve IcSP actions and programmes in meetings of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).

With a total budget of EUR 2.34 billion⁸ for 2014-2020, IcSP funds represent 3.5% of the overall budget for Global Europe (heading IV of the EU budget). The IcSP is fundamentally a subsidiary Instrument, which can only be mobilised where or when the other External Financing Instruments (EFIs) (see Box 1) cannot or are unable to intervene. Such cases arise when the action required is outside the focus or mandate of other EFIs; when procedures and processes limit the ability of other EFIs to respond in a timely manner; when sanctions imposed restrict the use of other EFIs; when there is a need to fill a funding gap or bridge the transition between humanitarian and developmental action.

Box 1: The IcSP, EDF and other EU EFIs

The IcSP is one of eight EFIs along with the European Development Fund (budget: EUR 30 506 million) that are designed to support the EU's external objectives and actions. The other instruments include the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) (budget: EUR 19661.64 million), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) (budget: EUR 1332.75 million), European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) (budget: EUR 15432.63 million), Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) (budget: EUR 11698.67 million), Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries (PI) (budget: EUR 954.76 million), Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) (budget: EUR 225.321 million) and The Greenland Decision (GD) (budget: 217.8 EUR million).

The IcSP is global in its geographic coverage and includes short-term actions and long-term programmable components, spanning a range of intervention-types as defined in Articles 3, 4 and 5 (see Box 2) of the IcSP Regulation. The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) manages actions under Article 3 and Article 4 programmes. The DG International Cooperation and Development (Unit B5) (DEVCO B5) manages activities under Article 5. EU Delegations in the relevant countries play an important role in ensuring that IcSP actions and programmes are implemented effectively. The largest share of the IcSP budget is allocated to short-term rapid and flexible support measures in countries and regions experiencing situations of crisis or emerging crisis through non-programmable actions under Article 3.

Box 2: The three components of the IcSP. The IcSP Regulation (No 230/2014 of 11 March 2014) defines the scope and budget of the Instrument's actions and programmes:

Article 3 – Assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis to prevent conflicts. These are non-programmable, short-term rapid actions (duration of up to 18 months, with possible extensions of 6+6 months). They enable timely and flexible EU responses to prevent conflict, support post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery in situations of crisis, emerging crisis or disaster. They contribute to fostering the conditions for implementation of EU assistance and cooperation policies and programmes, when opportune financial assistance cannot be provided through other EU financing instruments. Activities cover a wide range of sectors: dialogue and reconciliation, mediation, confidence building; support to democratic institutions; rule of law; transitional justice; SSR and DDR processes; infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction; employment generation; demining; CT/CVE; migration; stabilisation etc. The Article 3 share of total IcSP funds is up to 70%.

Article 4 – Assistance for conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness. This is programmable, long-term assistance (over 18 months) that strengthens EU and partner civilian expertise for peace-building, conflict prevention and addresses pre- and post-crisis needs. Interventions may cover early warning, conflict analysis, capacity-building for mediation, dialogue, civilian stabilisation missions, to mention some. The Article 4 share of total IcSP funds is up to 9%.

Article 5 – Assistance in addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats. This is programmable, long-term assistance (over 18 months) to address specific global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats to law and order, security and safety of individuals, critical infrastructure, public health (e.g. terrorism, cyber-crime, the effects of climate change, organised crime etc.); and risk mitigation and preparedness (e.g. border management; Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear risks; dual use exports control etc.). The Article 5 share of total IcSP funds is up to 21%.

⁸i.e. EUR 2,338,719,000 for the period 2014-2020.

1.2. The global and policy context

The IcSP is implemented within a fast-changing peace and security landscape. Several major trends affect its performance, including the emergence of hybrid conflicts, fragmentation and criminalisation of violent conflict, extremism and terrorism, growing refugee and migrants flows, and the impact of climate change on security (see Appendix 1).

A global context of greater securitisation of peace and development⁹ also carries risks for the IcSP. As the Instrument seeks to balance a human security focus with support to European and beneficiary country national security interests, actions and programmes in securitised sectors (often related to CT/CVE, migration, organised crime, cyber security, security, and stabilisation) carry risks of negative knock-on effects on EU cross-cutting priorities that need to be carefully mitigated.

There remain significant weaknesses in the still emerging, incomplete and at times incoherent global peace and security architecture (see Appendix 1). This is an architecture characterised by poorly joined up “structures, norms, capacities and procedures that are employed to avert conflict and war, to mediate for peace where a conflict has broken out as well as to ensure the general maintenance of peace and security” (Leah Kimathi, 2015). Part of the funding for the institutions, mechanisms, and programmes that make up this architecture has grown over the last decade¹⁰, but remains relatively low and suffered reductions of over 20% from highs in 2011 to lows in 2014 and 2015.

At the core of the EU priorities that the IcSP supports is the Treaty of the European Union, particularly Title V and Article 21 of the Treaty has been followed by several external action strategies and policies. The most recent of these strategies is the “*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*” (2016) (referred to as the ‘Global Strategy’), which sets out the principles and priorities for EU action on peace and security. The Global Strategy’s principles include unity, engagement, responsibility, and partnership. Priorities encompass:

- The security of the Union;
- State and societal resilience in the EU’s East and South;
- An integrated approach to conflicts and crises;
- Cooperative regional orders;
- Global governance.

In addition, the European Commission’s Proposal for a new European Consensus on Development (November 2016) sets out priorities for its support to peaceful and inclusive societies, democracy, effective and accountable institutions, rule of law and human rights for all. These are aligned to the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development - specifically to the Sustainable Development Goal 16 ‘Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions’- and cover the promotion of inclusive societies and accountable, democratic institutions; commitments to the rule of law, addressing the nexus of fragility, conflict, humanitarian crisis, and migration; support for the resolution of crises and conflicts, and building peace, amongst others.¹¹

This overall policy framework places the IcSP into a context that is different from more traditional development Instruments. It also positions it into a broader, global framework with the EU as a global actor. At the global level, the IcSP is one of the largest funds in the area of conflict, peace and security, together with other funds such as the UK’s Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)¹² (see Figure 1 and Annex 7, Box 1 for more details)¹³.

⁹ See footnote 3 for a short definition of how ‘securitisation’ is applied in the MTE or Box 4 for more details.

¹⁰ According to OECD data, funding from OECD countries related to conflict, peace, and security has averaged USD2.54 billion a year in the period 2006-2015; with peaks in 2009 (USD3.04 billion) and lows in 2014 (USD2.2 billion) and 2015 (USD2.55 billion). See <http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE5&lang=en>

¹¹ See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-proposal-new-consensus-development-20161122_en.pdf

¹² For 2015-2016, CSSF funding increased to GBP1.127 billion and will increase by a further 19%, reaching £1.322 billion a year by 2019.

¹³ The range of financing instruments (EU and non-EU) that are involved in different types of peace and security programming is, of course, far more complex. It involves lending instruments, contingent financing instruments, risk sharing and guarantee instruments, grant financing instruments, to mention some. These are currently being mapped through a UN, OECD and WBG joint mapping of financing instruments used for protracted crisis, fragility and sustaining peace, which is currently underway.

Within this global peace and security context, and the specific peace and security objectives of the EU as set out in its Global Strategy, the IcSP's performance is determined by how well it: (a) achieves its stated objectives taking into account an evolving international context and EU priorities; (b) pursues the implementation of IcSP-specific principles, programmes and operations; (c) achieves complementarities and synergies with other EU EFIs; and (d) adheres to the Common Implementing Regulations (CIR).




Figure 1: EU and non-EU financing instruments with peace and security programming

1.3. The evaluation report

The Midterm Evaluation (MTE) of the IcSP is carried out alongside parallel evaluations of the European Development Fund and other External Financing Instruments (see Box 1). It feeds into the required Midterm Review report of the EFIs, which is required by the end of December 2017 as laid out in Article 17 of the Common Implementing Regulation. The IcSP MTE contributes to the Impact Assessment for the next generation of Instruments (proposal due mid-2018) and the final evaluation of EFIs from 2014 to 2020. It also informs the next programming and implementation steps of the Instrument. The users of the IcSP MTE include the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the Council of the European Union, and the European Parliament.

The IcSP MTE, covering the period from 1 January 2014 to 1 June 2017, assesses whether the Instrument is fit for purpose to deliver EU resources towards EU external policy objectives. It considers the place of the IcSP and its complementarities and synergies within the wider set of EFIs. The scope of the evaluation is the Instrument and not its specific projects and programmes. Such an Instrument-wide approach enables recommendations to be made for the future design of EU EFIs.

The report has four main sections beyond this introduction:

- Section 2 describes the methodology used for the MTE;
- Section 3 presents the responses to the evaluation questions;
- Section 4 draws conclusions;
- Section 5 elaborates several high-level recommendations;
- The appendices provide a summary of the global context to the IcSP and the IcSP intervention logic.

2. Methodology and Approach

2.1. Overview

The evaluation evidence-base has been built using a conceptual framework and mixed methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative data. The methodology was designed to assess the assumptions that underpin the Instrument's scope, the nature of its interventions, and how it fits within the broader global peace and security context.

The evaluation uses a numerator/denominator concept to ensure a nuanced assessment. At the numerator level, an IcSP Intervention Logic (IL) was prepared, which was 'true' to the Instrument's Regulation. The evaluation questions and judgement criteria were developed in relation to the IL, along with specific indicators to measure judgement criteria. At the denominator level, in the absence of an existing IcSP baseline¹⁴, a baseline for the evaluation was constructed retroactively including macro and micro-evaluations (from the IfS and, where available, the IcSP), the IcSP regulatory framework, an EU-specific timeline of institutional, instrument and policy developments, and case-studies on focus themes. For the same purpose, good practice notes were prepared in relation to focus sectors (CT/CVE, migration, transitional justice, DDR), stakeholder perceptions on the global peace and security landscape, and a global peace and security timeline.

2.2. The IcSP Intervention Logic

The IcSP Intervention Logic was reconstructed during the MTE and first presented in the Inception Report, with further refinements done since. The revised diagram of IL is given in Appendix 2. The IL shows the logical path from inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes to impact. It serves as an evolving diagram to inform future changes to the IcSP, although it does not propose a significant overhaul or redirection of the Instrument. It is important to note that unlike the other EFIs, there are no performance indicators set for the IcSP within the IcSP Regulation that enable measurement of performance – and consequently no baseline.

The overall objective and expected impact of the IcSP is to contribute to international peace and security. IcSP deployment is triggered by EU political priorities and contextual needs and opportunities. The Instrument is to uphold EU external action objectives of preventing conflicts; providing effective responses to crisis or emerging crisis in coordination with other international actors; strengthening international security; assisting populations affected by natural or man-made disasters; and supporting inclusive societies and human rights, and the resilience of states and societies in conflict and disaster-affected countries and regions.

There is scope, as with other EU EFIs, to make explicit secondary outcomes of the pursuit of EU external prime objectives, such as:

- The understanding and visibility of the EU and of its role on the world scene is enhanced and widened.

At the level of specific objectives and expected outcomes three specific objectives are defined in the IcSP regulation and supported by actions implemented under Articles 3, 4, and 5:

- Outcome 1: Swift contributions to stability in situations of crisis or emerging crisis;
- Outcome 2: Contributions to global conflict prevention, peace-building and crisis preparedness architectures and capacity;
- Outcome 3: Contributions to strengthened architectures and capacity to address global and trans-regional security threats.

¹⁴ A "baseline" is defined here as the measurement of conditions at the start of a project, against which subsequent progress can be assessed.

The three IcSP components are complementary and outcomes should not be understood as specific to either Article 3, 4, or 5. Furthermore, all outcomes at Instrument level are realised in part by largely intangible processes (political engagement, confidence building, creating opportunities for dialogue, or promoting change in attitude/ awareness/ behaviour) that cannot be quantified or captured by monitoring systems.

Outputs produced under Articles 3, 4 and 5 are as varied as the type of activities and processes supported, and can range from research, monitoring, and analysis; mediation, dialogue and confidence-building activities; policy planning; training and skills development works; etc. Hence, it is useful to group outputs by type, rather than by article:

- Type 1: Analytical, planning and strategic documents outputs
- Type 2: Institutional development outputs
- Type 3: Awareness, guidance and capacity outputs
- Type 4: Political dialogue and civil society process outputs
- Type 5: Infrastructure and equipment outputs

Preconditions and assumptions IcSP actions and programmes must comply with and promote EU principles and mainstream crosscutting priorities.¹⁵

Assumptions are identified at the activity, output, and outcome level – and were assessed during the MTE. The results of testing several of these assumptions are given in Section 3 below. For example:

Outcome assumptions

- The EU makes strategic use of policy and political dialogue created by the IcSP to leverage change;
- Efforts are made to ensure that the IcSP contributes to or complements actions of other donors, particularly Member States;
- Commission services promote complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and the interventions of other EU EFIs (including EDF and Trust Funds).

Output assumptions

- Target groups have the means/capacities to take benefit of the outputs;
- Outputs are complementary or support other actions by EU or non-EU actors;
- Other relevant actions implemented in the beneficiary country do not negatively impact on the IcSP actions.

Activity assumptions

- The design of decisions are in line with partner country needs and priorities, as identified by key local stakeholders;
- IcSP decision-making and programming processes are conducive to the timely identification and implementation of interventions and their adaptation, where and as required;
- Implementation is in accordance with regulations, consistent with aid effectiveness principles (e.g. local ownership; partnership; coordination) and cross-cutting issues are effectively mainstreamed where relevant.

2.3. Tools and methods

A mixed methods approach was used that involved the application of several tools throughout the different evaluation phases¹⁶:

¹⁵ These include democracy and good governance; human rights and humanitarian law; non-discrimination; gender equality and empowerment of women; conflict prevention; and climate change.

¹⁶ The evaluation involved five phases: (i) project inception; (ii) desk-based data gathering to develop preliminary findings and hypotheses; (iii) validation of preliminary findings and hypotheses in field missions; (iv) data synthesis and development of conclusions and recommendations;

- An extensive document review covered over 400 policies, communications, regulations/treaties, decisions and programmes, plans, reports, evaluations and studies. Technical, financial and other reporting data related to IcSP decisions for 2014-2016 was extracted.
- A sampling strategy was developed for Article 3 decisions (to enable a 95% confidence level), which involved an in-depth review of 56 (of 231) actions for 18 indicators. All Article 4 and 5 programmes (drawn from 31 decisions for Article 4; 3 decisions for Article 5) were assessed for a cross-section of indicators. European Commission datasets were queried for data on a range of indicators and quantitative analysis was carried out. Similarly, the shared survey to EUDs for all the MTEs provided important quantitative and qualitative data.
- Over 140 semi-structured key informant interviews were carried out and data qualitatively assessed. Field visits covering eight countries (Morocco, Jordan, Georgia, Kenya/Somalia, Turkey, Colombia, and Niger) were implemented and cross-country case-studies drawn up on migration and inter-instrument synergies.
- Supporting studies covered the decision-making processes in Articles 3, 4 and 5; a study of global trends in peace and security and perceived deficits of the global peace and security architecture; and a set of good practice notes covering actions in countering violent extremism / counter-terrorism; disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration (DDR), migration, and transitional justice.

Data analysis, synthesis and triangulation In practice this has meant corroboration of findings from complementary and multiple sources (such as documentation, surveys, and key informant interviews). Expert opinion has guided the interpretation of data and analytical conclusions drawn.

2.4. Challenges and limitations

The core challenge to this MTE has been to apply the prescribed evaluation methodology to the IcSP. The relatively small IcSP actions and programmes implemented rapidly and globally, are less measurable in terms of tangible and aggregated results than those of Instruments with a prescribed regional focus, more narrowly defined thematic scope, and larger budgets. The absence of a robust set of IcSP performance indicators or baseline¹⁷ compounded this challenge.

There are several other **conceptual challenges** associated to an Instrument-level evaluation. These include:

- Data over-abundance in some areas and scarcity in others;
- Defining/attributing the degree to which IcSP interventions have contributed to results (causality and attribution);
- Measuring political (as opposed to developmental) outcomes generated by a largely political instrument; and
- Aggregating results to delineate broader instrument impacts.

In terms of an assessment of whether the IcSP is “fit for purpose”, there are two critical challenges: (a) clearly articulating the global peace and security context the IcSP is meant to address and how it has evolved; and (b) understanding how the IcSP fits into the broader array of EU and other donor Instruments that tackle the issues that fall within the IcSP remit.

In addition, technical challenges were encountered including:

and (v) an Open Public Consultation (OPC) phase. This Final Report integrates the feedback obtained from the OPC in March 2017; detailed feedback from the OPC can be located in the Annex of the report.

¹⁷ A “baseline” is defined here as the measurement of conditions at the start of a project or programme, against which subsequent progress can be assessed.

- The short lifetime of the IcSP at this juncture (2014-2016) meant that data is scarce on the Instrument's performance and results (i.e. there are limited final evaluation reports available); and
- Tight time-frames, delays in agreeing on evaluation tools (notably the evaluation matrix), and delays in accessing launched surveys shortened time for analysis.

The timing of the evaluation meant that most projects initiated under the IcSP are still ongoing. While this is natural for a midterm review, the percentage of actions completed is especially low in this case. As such, outcomes are still being delivered and this makes it difficult to assess impact and sustainability¹⁸.

Nonetheless, the evaluation team is confident in the findings presented in the MTE. Expert judgement has enabled Instrument-level conclusions to be drawn and is based on significant sector expertise in the team, as well as experience in the in the design, implementation, and evaluation of IfS (and IcSP) actions and programmes. Contractor quality assurance systems have also helped ensure rigour in the evidence-base that underpins MTE findings and conclusions.

¹⁸ Article 3 actions were mostly still under way at the time of this MTE. Actions under Articles 4 and 5 are long-term (36 months) actions and programmes adopted in 2014 have yet to reach the point when their midterm evaluation is due.

3. Responses to the Evaluation Questions

3.1. Relevance

To what extent do the overall objectives (IcSP Regulation) and the design of the IcSP respond to: (a) EU priorities and beneficiary needs identified at the time the Instrument was adopted (2014)? And (b) Current EU priorities and beneficiary needs, given the evolving challenges and priorities in the international context (2017)?

Instrument-level findings Across all Articles, the IcSP responds to the priorities set out in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union. It supports the Global Strategy (notably the realms of security, promoting state and societal resilience in the EU's South and East), takes an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, supports cooperative regional orders, and promotes global governance. IcSP actions and programmes continue to balance EU priorities and beneficiary country needs by taking relevant national priorities and strategies of beneficiary countries into consideration, typically involving a range of stakeholder groups in regular dialogue.

Action/programme-level findings Some improvements are needed in Article 3 to better ground and time actions to the contexts they are implemented in, including a more robust assessment of hybrid conflict dynamics. Challenges for actions in Article 3 and Article 5 programmes include potential negative knock-on effects EU cross-cutting priorities if actions and programmes in securitised sectors¹⁹ are not supported by 'do no harm' and conflict sensitivity analyses.

JC1.1: The objectives and implementation of the IcSP in 2014, when the Instrument was adopted, were and remain today aligned with the evolving EU priorities, strategies and external action policy.

Article 3

Article 3 actions²⁰ respond to EU objectives and strategies. IcSP decisions support and are aligned with EU external action political objectives and priorities. These are expressed in related Council Conclusions, EU wide strategies adopted by the Council (e.g. Security and Development Strategy for the Sahel; European Agenda on Migration, etc.), and policy frameworks agreed within broader regional or international frameworks (e.g. the EU-Africa Partnership, UN Resolutions, and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) (I1.1.1, I1.1.A3i).

The AGAMI project in Niger or the provision of boats to the Turkish Coast Guard are illustrative examples of IcSP support to EU political priorities and deliverables in relation to the migration agenda, while providing a bridging function for longer-term support through other EU instruments and mechanisms.

A review of sampled Article 3 decisions (2014-2016) showed no evidence to suggest any significant misalignment with IcSP objectives under Article 3 (I1.1.2).

Article 4

Article 4 programmes respond to EU objectives and strategies (I1.1.1, I1.1.A4.i):

- Under the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) 2014/15 there are 18 programmes (FDs: 37362; 37925 and 39363) for Article 4 that contain the objectives of strengthening the capacity of the EU and its partners to prevent conflict, build peace and address pre- and post-crisis needs in close co-ordination with international, regional and sub-regional organisations, and state and civil society actors.

¹⁹ See footnote 3 for a short definition of how 'securitisation' is applied in the MTE or Box 4 for more details.

²⁰ The number of Article 3 actions for 2014 are 106 with a contracted amount of €140,512,101.93; in 2015, there were 163 actions with a contracted amount of €219,094,729.21; and in 2016 (partly) there are 42 actions with a contracted amount of €89,263,513.75.

- A review of Article 4 interventions finds them supportive of policy statements on the specific drivers of instability such as the illegal trade of conflict minerals²¹ or the role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in key regions. Actions are generally aligned to longstanding EU conflict prevention efforts²² and are designed to promote the mainstreaming of both conflict prevention and crisis management across EU EFIs²³. They also support the five priority areas as set out in the IcSP strategy paper and Multi-annual Indicative Programmes²⁴.

A review of Article 4 decisions (2014-2016) showed no evidence to suggest any misalignment with IcSP objectives under Article 4.

Article 5

Programmes implemented under Article 5²⁵ reflect the adaptations made in the EU's foreign and security policy in response to increasing global complexity²⁶ and mirror advances and activities under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as framed by Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union (I1.1.1, I1.1.A5i).

A review of Article 5 programmes shows that it has fostered a growing toolset and partnerships needed to address evolving threats. For example, Article 5 pilots such as in the STRIVE-HoA project constitute a move into new thematic areas. Research studies and exchanges between diverse communities such as in CT-MORSE research activities and conferences help further develop underlying intervention concepts.

A review of Article 5 decisions (2014-2016) and evaluation reports showed no evidence to suggest any significant misalignment with IcSP objectives under Article 5.

JC1.2: The objectives of the IcSP as set in its Regulation, and the design of IcSP decisions are in line with partner country needs and priorities, as identified by key local stakeholders.

Article 3

There is evidence of alignment of Article 3 actions with relevant national priorities and strategies of beneficiary countries (e.g. Niger Strategy on security and development in the Sahel-Saharan areas adopted in 2011 and focus on vulnerable populations in Diffa²⁷). However, there is also evidence of actions aimed at mitigating the local impact of national policies triggered more by EU political priorities than national ones. In Niger, the EU's focus on the control of illegal migration has contributed to differences between the Government of Niger and decentralised authorities in the region of Agadez, generating new needs that compete for resources and political attention from the partner country. Although there is a shared interest by the Government of Niger, which is concerned primarily by the security risks arising from criminal networks involved in trafficking refugees and migrants, the impact of EU efforts to address migration flows expose tensions between the interests and priorities of central State actors and local authorities and communities, to whom the illegal trafficking of migrants provides an economic lifeline and lucrative business²⁸. EU Trust Fund actions aimed at providing local economic alternatives to trafficking were not yet in place when the first impacts of the IcSP action were felt (I1.2.1).

Sampled Article 3 actions suggest that 75-80% of these show evidence of context and conflict analysis, although this cannot be confirmed as these analyses are not centrally available in Commission databases accessed (I1.2.A3i). Country knowledge is built over time by IcSP personnel, particularly those deployed over

²¹ EU Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (2014), "Responsible sourcing of minerals originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas Towards an integrated EU approach"

²² EU Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention (2011)

²³ EU Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council (2013) The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises

²⁴ Commission decision adopting the IcSP Thematic Strategy Paper 2014-2027, MIP 2014-2020, and Annex (only applies to Arts. 4 and 5)

²⁵ Since 2014, 59 Article 5 contracts have been launched at a value of EUR 90,427,254.

²⁶ See for example: Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World. S407/08 (11 December 2008)

²⁷ FD 38655; EU-Niger NIP 2014-2020; Midterm evaluation of the IFS programme in Niger, 2013

²⁸ Discussions on the AGAMI project at the Steering Committee meeting in Niamey, 15/11/2016.

time in countries where actions are implemented and built into IcSP actions. It has not been possible to ascertain if analyses done are responsive to hybrid conflicts (see Appendix 1).

The relevance of some Article actions is affected by the speed (from identification of need, to the preparation of actions, and contracting of implementing agencies) of funding, particularly when context changes affect the relevance of the original design of actions (I1.2.2).

Although there is evidence (project documentation and KIs) of local stakeholder consultation in the definition of several actions, there are variations that follow who the implementing partners are, their capacity, and how present or rooted they are in the local context²⁹. In some contexts, the IcSP is providing support to national bodies in charge of coordinating peace-building interventions (e.g. in Niger) and supporting local capacities of state and civil society actors to address terrorism, illicit trafficking and the effects of migration flows.

Article 4

Article 4 interventions typically involve the participation of a variety of stakeholders in regular dialogue. For example, the on-going dialogue process between EU policy makers and civil society through the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN)³⁰ is helpful in aligning Article 4 decisions with the priorities of local stakeholders. The CSDN is a mechanism for dialogue between civil society and EU policy-makers on issues related to peace and conflict. The European Peace-building Liaison Office (EPLO) manages the CSDN and helps ensure that civil society groups participate in design processes such as the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) (I1.2.1, I1.2.A4i).

Further evidence of the participation of stakeholders in regular dialogue can be found in other programmes such as “Gender and Transitional Justice” (AAP 2014) where the programme consults with a large group of stakeholders involved in mainstreaming gender such as UN WOMEN, and CSO women’s groups³¹. The “Strengthening the Kimberly Process – Conflict Prevention and Governance in the Diamond Sector” (AAP 2014) programme also facilitates dialogue between civil society and host governments in a unique multi-stakeholder structure (I1.2.1, I1.2.2).

Article 5

Consultations with local stakeholders are evident in the Centres of Excellence (CoE) system, which involves setting up inter-ministerial National Teams, National Focal Points (NFP) and Regional Secretariats. They hold two or more regional roundtable meetings per year. This is today complemented by an active process of conducting national needs assessments by partner countries that in turn develop and adopt National CBRN Action Plans (supported by Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the UN32). A planning matrix maintained by JRC shows that of the 55 partner countries that participate in the CoE initiative, and others which are considering joining it and have participated in some of the activities, 33 have completed national needs assessments and 10 have adopted national action plans. This data compares favourably with the experience from other (global) needs assessments and action plan initiatives, such as UNSC Resolution 1540 (I1.2.1, I1.2.2, I1.2.A5i).

A review of evaluation reports, as well as available programme and project reports and descriptions, also confirms that early involvement of local stakeholders (including competent national authorities and CSO) is common practice in other Article 5 programming (I1.2.1, I1.2.A5i).

²⁹ For instance, in Niger national or country based NGOs were more effective in communicating and maintaining the engagement with local authorities/community level actors than bigger/international organisations, who have on the other hand better entry points with Government.

³⁰ The Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) is co-financed by the European Union (IfS/IcSP) and EPLO, and managed by EPLO in co-operation with the European Commission (EC) and the European External Action Service (EEAS).

³¹ The inclusion of Colombia in the UNWOMEN transitional Justice project was instigated by the IcSP focal point in Colombia. In the UNWOMEN project, stakeholders were involved at an early stage in the process and 250 women were consulted in three regions of the country. This has helped get women’s voices heard and included in the Peace Accords, for example in the area of reparations for sexually based crimes of war.

³² United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI).

JC1.3: The objectives of the IcSP match the principles and policy objectives set out in the TEU (Title V, Article 21).

Article 3

There is no digression under Article 3 from the findings of the final IfS evaluation; Article 3 interventions respond to EU strategies and policies and are consistent with the provisions of TEU Title V Article 21 (I1.3.1).

Article 3 actions in the areas of CT/CVE, migration and stabilisation are at greater risk of indirect negative knock-on effects on human rights, rule of law, international law, and good governance, notwithstanding attention to mainstreaming those principles. KIIIs during field visits (Jordan, Somalia, Niger) flag that the risk of harm increases when actions involve close direct or indirect support with beneficiary government security institutions that are engaged in counter-insurgency, counter-trafficking or counter-terrorism operations (see Figure 3). On the other hand, it is part of the mandate and scope of the IcSP to access and influence such institutions with associated risks. The good practice review undertaken as part of the IcSP MTE shows that when 'do no harm' approaches are built into IcSP actions in these sectors, the risk of knock-on effects decreases³³. There is awareness in FPI and DEVCO B5 of such risks and there are efforts to mitigate potential negative effects (I1.3.1).

Article 4

The AAPs reviewed confirm that IcSP Article 4 interventions are in line with the EU commitments in TEU Title V Article 21. There is no evidence of non-alignment (I1.3.1).

Article 5

The objectives, priorities and programme directions/contents of Article 5 are responsive to EU strategies and policies and consistent with the provisions of TEU Title V Article 21. Mechanisms are in place and have been applied to adapt the implementation of Article 5 in the light of changing strategic orientations and objectives. As with Article 3, programmes in CT/CVE, organised crime and cybersecurity risk having negative knock-on effects which can be addressed by applying conflict sensitivity and 'do no harm' approaches³⁴ in their design and implementation. A guidance document to this end has been developed (see also discussion under J.2.2); but it is too early to assess its effectiveness (I1.3.1).

³³ An example of applied 'do no harm' thinking was seen in a CT/CVE project in the Middle East. Focus group discussions were planned with youth groups, and if good research practice was to be upheld, these were going to be filmed. The risk of footage being used for intelligence gathering purposes by government was noted by the implementing partner. A decision was made to rapidly transcribe filmed footage with non-attribution of statements, and then destroy footage once this was done.

³⁴ The application of a "do no harm" approach is taking the necessary care to ensure that an action or programme does not have negative effects on efforts to promote peace and stability. It means considering the potential impacts of an action or programme on a range of factors (such as human rights, good governance, community cohesion, local conflict dynamics, etc.) and making adjustments in the design and implementation phases to mitigate the risk of negative knock-on effects.




Figure 2: Risks and spectrum of IcSP activities

3.2. Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability

To what extent does the IcSP deliver results against the Instrument's objectives, and specific EU priorities?

Instrument-level findings The IcSP is effective and has delivered on Instrument objectives. IcSP actions and programmes translate EU political priorities into interventions. Funding allocations have been politically responsive and IcSP contributions are seen to deepen political dialogue with governments of partner countries. Data on mainstreaming across the Instrument suggests important contributions to conflict prevention, democracy and good governance, but less on gender and human rights. Further in-depth assessments are needed to confirm actual on-ground/implementation-level mainstreaming. With few IcSP actions and programmes concluded by end-2016, it is too early to assess Instrument-level impacts and sustainability.

Action/programme-level findings Political commitments to spend in particular countries or on specific topics have led to difficulties in identifying suitable actions, although no evidence was found to suggest that the quality of subsequent actions has been reduced. Most projects initiated under the IcSP are still ongoing today. Evaluations of actions and programmes in many cases have yet to be undertaken and this makes it difficult to assess contributions to addressing root causes, EU and partner capacities, and trans-regional and emerging threats. Enhanced results under Article 3 may follow greater emphasis on and investment in seizing windows of opportunity for peace³⁵. Under Articles 4 and 5, contributions to the global peace and security architecture³⁶ can benefit from the elaboration of a strategic framework to guide further investments in this area. Aid effectiveness in Article 3 follows emphasis placed on partnerships, although actions are non-programmable. In Articles 4 and 5, attention is given to ownership, coordination and harmonisation (where the latter is applicable).

³⁵ The concept of a 'window of opportunity for peace' typically refers to the early signs that a ceasefire, basic talks between conflicting parties, or peace process may be possible. In peace mediation practice, an inter-changeable term is 'peace ripeness', which can also be facilitated and promoted through actions that begin to prepare or encourage parties to talk.

³⁶ See page 7 and Appendix 1

3.2.1. Judgement Criteria: Effectiveness

JC2.1: The IcSP has delivered on the commitments set out for the Instrument and contributed to advance EU political priorities.

Article 3

Technical and financial assistance has been delivered under Article 3 towards the objectives and exceptional situations foreseen in the IcSP Regulation. Evidence shows (see JC1.1) that this assistance has contributed to EU priorities, and enabled in some cases deepened political and policy dialogue with beneficiary governments. This dialogue, in turn, has often enhanced both the effectiveness and impacts of these actions. In other cases, political commitments to spend in particular countries, or on specific issues, have led to difficulties in identifying suitable actions. There is no evidence to suggest that compromises have been made on the quality of subsequent actions, although pressure to comply with timing of EU political deliverables or the need for quick start of the project has in a few cases³⁷ left little time for engagement with local stakeholders (I2.1.2).

Article 4

As seen in the AAPs for 2014/15, Article 4 programmes are closely aligned to the commitments set out in the Regulation. A review of the AAR for 2016 shows no evidence of non-performing programmes. All programmes are aligned with the priorities outlined in the IcSP strategy paper and Multiannual Indicative Programming. There is no evidence under Article 4 that political priorities have negatively affected the effectiveness of IcSP programmes (I2.1.2).

Article 5

Article 5 programmes deliver outcomes in EU priority areas related to addressing global and trans-regional threats and emerging threats. The programme portfolio over the past three years has covered all priority areas as delineated in paragraphs 2(a)-(d) and 4(a)-(f) of Article 5. The effectiveness of the outcomes delivered depends on a range of factors, including absorption capacity of the partner countries involved, quality of the work of the implementers and overall programme management. The regional nature of the programmes can facilitate cooperation when bilateral issues complicate work in sensitive security areas. Past assessments that Article 5 programmes deliver the planned outcomes continue to apply (I2.1.2).

There is no direct evidence to suggest that EU political decisions or priority setting on Article 5 programme themes have negatively affected effectiveness. However, political priority setting on budget allocations has meant a cut in human resources available at DEVCO B5 for the IcSP, which may have implications for future effectiveness. Several Article 5 projects have broken new ground (for example in relation to programmes on critical infrastructure protection and CT/CVE). As other EFIs or donors follow into these thematic or geographical areas, there is a question of whether the Article 5 engagements should continue and refocus to more strongly emphasise the security dimension of the intervention, or whether transition strategies are needed towards alternative funding streams (I2.1.2).

JC2.2: IcSP decisions mainstream policy priorities of the EU (e.g. gender, human rights, governance, etc.) and other crosscutting issues highlighted in the IcSP Regulation and the CIR.

Article 3

There is no data disaggregated by Article on the mainstreaming of several EU cross-cutting priorities. A review of aggregated data, which includes actions under Article 3, is given under the cross-cutting heading below. However, in terms of explicit conflict prevention objectives and guiding principles, 79% of Article 3

³⁷ For instance, the AGAMI project in Niger was a quick response to EU political objectives under the European Agenda on Migration. It was put together in haste, under political pressure to deliver within the timeframe set by the Council of the EU, and to some extent at the expense of a more thoughtful approach, inclusive design of the action and communication with local authorities in the Agadez region. Another example is the demining pilot project in Colombia in the framework of the peace talks which lacked a proper understanding of the context at community/municipal level, despite its positive results and outcomes at political and technical levels.

actions reviewed included such objectives/guiding principles and covered topics such as reconciliation, conflict mitigation and dialogue (I2.2.2, I2.2.3).

Article 4

A review of the AAPs for 2014-16 shows that programmes in the area of democracy and good governance account for over 50%. All programmes contain conflict prevention elements or are focused on conflict prevention. Only 11% of the programmes tackle gender equality and empowerment of women directly, but all programmes contain elements of these areas. Programmes that address environmental (not climate change) issues account for 22% of the total. While there are no dedicated programmes exclusively focused on human rights, a rights-based approach crosscuts all programmes. The annual programming of sub-delegated Calls for Proposals directed at local actors in the area of conflict prevention and peace-building helps Article 4 interventions to further mainstream crosscutting issues. The Gender Facility also helps to mainstream gender for both Articles 3 and 4 (I2.2.1, I2.2.2, I2.2.3, I2.2.5).

Article 5

Most Article 5 interventions have good governance as a primary objective. Some programmes have developed specific mechanisms to help promote good governance, such as the CoE system with its Governance Team (now in Phase III). In other cases, good governance is built into programme design and is addressed together with partner countries in the design and implementation phase of specific projects (I2.2.1).

Gender equality, human rights, and climate change are normally not the primary focus areas of Article 5 programmes. However, a review of AAPs, available project documentation, as well as interviews with DEVCO confirms that these cross-cutting priorities are addressed in Article 5 programmes. One Article 5 programme specifically addresses the security implications of climate change (I2.2.4, I2.2.5).

Mainstreaming and superimposing crosscutting issues, such as human rights, is particularly important in the programme areas dealing with counter terrorism and organised crime. Following the adoption in April 2014 of the Staff Working Document on a “Tool-box for a Rights-based Approach, encompassing all human rights, for EU development cooperation” (SWD (2014) 152 final), DEVCO commissioned a study (with reference to Article 10 of the IcSP Regulation) to develop operational guidelines in this respect. This Guidance document was published in November 2015³⁸ (I2.2.3).

Cross-cutting

Mainstreaming of EU cross-cutting priorities, where possible in the programming of IcSP actions across articles, is an obligation stipulated in the IcSP Regulation (Article 2(4)). Decisions and action/programme documents include a section on cross-cutting issues that identify how and which priorities are covered. However, an accurate assessment of how these are effectively implemented would require a more in-depth analysis of actions/programmes that is beyond the scope of this evaluation. According to the statistical data available (not disaggregated by Article), mainstreaming appears strong on good governance, appropriate on climate relevance (as per the 20% EU target for climate change action expenditure) but weaker on human rights and gender, although there appears to be significant differences across Articles 3, 4, and 539 (I2.2.1, I2.2.2, I2.2.3, I2.2.4, I2.2.5):

- 89% of overall IcSP commitments (Articles 3, 4, and 5) in 2015 are marked as supportive of good governance.
- A human rights marker is not available in the Statistical Dashboard for IcSP actions/programmes.⁴⁰ However, 11% of actions/programmes in 2014-2016 are coded for human rights under DAC criteria.

³⁸ Operational Human Rights Guidance for EU external cooperation actions addressing Terrorism, Organised Crime and Cybersecurity – Integrating the Rights-Based Approach. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/manual-hr-guidance-ct-oc-cyber-20151105_en.pdf.

³⁹ DEVCO Statistical Dashboard, ‘Good governance’, climate and gender equality markers.

⁴⁰ While the evaluators extracted data for other markers, at the time of data extraction, there was no human rights marker that could be used. This may not be the case post December 2016 as DEVCO continues to upload data into the system. Access to the EC data system for the IcSP MTE ended in December 2016.

In 2015, 15% of the Instrument actions (IfS and IcSP) reported 'mainstreaming of human rights' as 'other sector of intervention' alongside the main sector focus of the actions⁴¹.

- 16.6% of IcSP commitments (Articles 3, 4, and 5) in 2015 are marked for gender equality. Gender mainstreaming is, however, stronger in Article 4 and 5 programmes⁴².
- 19.9% of IcSP commitments (Articles 3, 4, and 5) in 2015 are marked as climate relevant.

JC2.3: IcSP decision-making and programming processes are conducive to the timely identification and implementation of interventions and their adaptation, where and as required.

Article 3

Article 3 actions remain among the most rapidly deployable among EFIs, which also partly explains the widespread use of the IcSP at EUD-level (I2.3.1). The CIR Survey indicates that the IcSP is the third most used EU EFI among EUDs. Nonetheless, several respondents see scope for further streamlining and acceleration of the decision-making process related to the adoption of decisions and approval of changes to contracts. The time between adoption of decisions and contracting can vary considerably (from one day to 12 months), and in some cases implementation started prior to the signing of the contract (e.g. JCRP II in Sudan; demining project in Colombia). While for many crisis actions it is in principle important to ensure fast contracting for timely implementation, its urgency depends on the nature of the actions. Contracting speed is also dependent on the readiness of implementing partners to kick-off with implementation, or that they can meet contracting conditions (I2.3.1, I2.3.2).

KIIs indicate that adjustments are regularly made to Article 3 actions during implementation and this is to be encouraged in fast changing crisis contexts. Among Article 3 actions surveyed, 80% had explicit or well-formulated implicit *Theories of Change*, and 59% had a clear and developed risk management framework (I2.3.4, I2.3.5).

Article 4

Article 4 decision-making and programming processes have led to the appropriate design and implementation of interventions. Priorities are set in AAPs (country and themes) and based on the IcSP strategy paper and Multiannual Indicative Programmes in consultation with EUDs. In the 18 Article 4 programmes reviewed, *Theories of Change* are clearly formulated and monitoring is on-going at HQ level. In terms of risk management, all the programmes have reasonable risk management matrices, monitoring and management plans and midterm evaluations built into the design. However, it is not clear from the data gathered on the implementation of programmes to what extent the intentions of the design of the programmes are implemented (I2.3.1, I2.3.2, I2.3.3, I2.3.4, I2.3.5).

Article 5

Article 5 decision-making and programming processes are responsive to opportunities and adapt where necessary during implementation. In programme areas implemented outside the CoE system, decision-making and programming follow DEVCO processes. They build on long-term partnerships (essential for any type of collaboration in security-sensitive thematic areas) and context analysis. But there are also programmes that have chosen a more adaptive and iterative decision making approach to manage uncertainties and fluidity in the recipient partner countries and allow for adaptation of the programme design if and when necessary. It should be noted that in one case reviewed (STRIVE) an adaptive approach to decision making was chosen during the inception phase to validate the choice of partners and test the feasibility of project activities (I2.3.1, I2.3.2, I2.3.3, I2.3.4, I2.3.5).

⁴¹ Analysis Report of 2015 IcSP End-of-Year reports, FPI.2, 2015.

⁴² It is found in all AAP interventions under article 4; and it is a significant objective for 2 of 6 programme areas in AAF 2015, and 3 out of 5 programmes in the 2016 AAF under article 5.

3.2.2. Judgement Criteria: Impact

JC2.4: IcSP decisions contribute toward the overarching goal of stability and peace by: (a) responding to situations of crisis or emerging crisis, often complementing EU humanitarian assistance; (b) addressing root causes of insecurity and conflict; and (c) achieving EU policy objectives.

Article 3

Article 3 actions are responsive to crises and support the achievement of EU policy objectives. The evidence of its contributions to stability and peace is still nascent and accruing. However, available evaluations point to several positive outcomes. For example, in Sudan's border regions with South Sudan, Article 3 support to micro-level peace processes have contributed to stability and peace outcomes that have lasted for more than a year. Article 3 investments in seizing windows of opportunity for peace⁴³ appear relatively modest; although good examples include the Syria Transition Programme and the demining pilot project in Colombia (see Box 3). A review of the Article 3 portfolio shows that 18 actions (7%) have promoted or sought to seize windows of opportunity for peace. There is consensus among respondents that the identification and engagement in such windows may yield important results and add value (I2.4.1, I2.4.A3i).

There is a greater potential for cumulative impacts (i.e. building on the results of previous actions and consolidate outcomes overtime) in countries that have benefited from multiple IfS crisis response and IcSP Article 3 actions over time. Whereas there are examples of possible cumulative impacts (such as COBERM in Georgia, which started in 2010 and has become a long-term engagement that builds confidence at grass-root level when at present there is no progress in addressing a political solution with regard to Georgia and Abkhazia as well as South Ossetia), the evidence-base for findings on Article 3 impacts more broadly is incomplete. Cumulative impacts can only be assessed over a longer timeframe, which may be captured by the final IcSP evaluation (I2.4.2).

Box 3: Demining in Colombia

In Colombia, the IcSP supported a pilot project to implement the 7 March 2015 agreement on demining in the framework of the Peace Dialogues between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) in Havana (Cuba). This took place prior to the global peace agreement at the end of 2016. The project brought together elements of the FARC and civilian and military actors of the Colombian state, who for several months lived and worked side by side demining two sites selected by the FARC and the Government of Colombia at the negotiations table.

This highly political project generated confidence among the parties, and de-escalated tensions after armed confrontations during the peace talks. It was also intended as a gesture of peace and symbol of the parties' commitment to the peace process. The action provided tangible peace dividends for communities that had been severely affected by the conflict⁴⁴. Although fundamentally a political project, its impact on technical and policy aspects of humanitarian demining in Colombia was far reaching and beyond expectations. While the EU had been supporting peacebuilding in Colombia since 2002 through several instruments, timely support and risk acceptance through the IcSP to this political project provided an opportunity for the EU to support the peace process at higher political level, and elevated EU visibility and credibility as a political partner in Colombia.

Article 4

Several Article 4 programmes are focused on addressing root causes of insecurity and conflict, and respond to Article 21 of the TEU, which aims to "preserve peace and prevent conflicts". Some programmes are continuations of phases started under IfS AAPs such as the ENTRI, ERMES and PCNA/PDNA support. These initiatives help to build and enhance capacity to respond to and prevent crises through better trained staff for deployment to CSDP and other civilian stabilisation missions, or, in the case of ERMES, for mediators to be deployed quickly in an emerging crisis. Other programmes help strengthen and support international

⁴³ The concept of a 'window of opportunity for peace' typically refers to the early signs that a ceasefire, basic talks between conflicting parties, or peace process may be possible. In peace mediation practice, an inter-changeable term is 'peace ripeness', which can also be facilitated and promoted through actions that begin to prepare or encourage parties to talk.

⁴⁴ Even though some of these gains are fragile due to other context dynamics like the killings of social leaders, attacks of paramilitary groups and criminal groups taking advantage of the withdrawal of the FARC, desertions of FARC members from the cantonment areas.

and regional organisations to preserve peace and prevent conflicts, and include support to UN agencies, OSCE, OECD, AU, and League of Arab States. For example, support to the League of Arab States is focused on bolstering its crisis monitoring and response capacity and is an important EU contribution to the MENA peace and security architecture (I2.4.1, I2.4A4i).

Whereas these initiatives make important contributions to EU priorities, they do not benefit from an explicit strategic framework that guides efforts to strengthen peace and security architectures and captures EDF and other EFI support in this area.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the scale of support required to strengthen regional and global architectures is not reflected in funding available to Article 4 for this work (I2.4.2).

Article 5

There are several examples (such as capacities built under Article 5 that were redeployed during the international response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa) where long-term Article 5 interventions have resulted in capacities that are deployable on short notice for responses to emerging crisis situations (I2.4.A5i).

Programming of some Article 5 interventions involves the sequencing of CT/OC/CI projects that creates cumulative effects. Examples include AIRCOP I, II and III (Airport Communications Programme), SEACOP I, II and III (Seaport Cooperation programme) and other self-standing projects in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean under the Cocaine Route Programme; the phased approach under the Heroine Route Programme; or the approach of the CT-Sahel intervention with three national capacity components interlocking with a regional component – the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité. A different methodology was chosen by the CoE CBRN Initiative, which has developed standing structures at national and regional levels (NFPs, NTs, RSts) and tools (NAQ, NAP, regional roundtables) that build on past achievements (I2.4.1, I2.4.2).

JC2.5: IcSP decisions contribute to the building of capacity in the EU and of organisations engaged in crisis response and peace building in partner countries/regions.

Article 3

Capacity building, involving beneficiary groups such as civil society and government, is a common component across Article 3 actions reviewed. It features to varying degrees in 86% of the actions reviewed. Although there are examples of Article 3 actions that successfully built capacities for peace of EU and other organisations, it is too early to evaluate these and draw conclusions on the impacts of efforts. From in-country actions reviewed, the *Haute Autorité pour la Consolidation de la Paix* (HACP) in Niger is one noteworthy example for how consecutive Instrument actions have strengthened the capacity of a local peacebuilding structure, boosted its legitimacy and the recognition of its role in the Government of Niger and among international partners (I2.5.1, I2.5.2, I2.5.3).

Article 4

All Article 4 programmes for 2014-2016 support capacity building; 60% of programmes have this as their focus, while 40% contain capacity-building actions. Some Article 4 programmes are in their second or third phases (ENTRi and ERMES). Respondents indicate that strengthened capacities at the regional level (e.g. OECD, OSCE, and League of Arab States) offers the EU important leverage, which is an impact. Support under Article 4 to regional and UN agencies (such as UN WOMEN, UNDPA and UNDP) is seen by interviewees as a useful contribution to the global peace and security architecture. However, as mentioned above, there is no overarching strategic framework to guide this support (I2.5.1, I2.5.2, and I2.5.3).

Article 5

Capacity-building contributions are at the core of Article 5 programmes. Programmes implemented under the CT/OC/CI/CC portfolio are centrally managed or handed over to implementers such as Interpol, UNODC or

⁴⁵ Important investments are made to regional peace and security architectures through the EDF finance, for example. The EDF funds the Africa Peace Facility and is focused on operationalising the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). There is currently no strategy that articulates how the EU (through its EFIs) can effectively contribute to a strengthened international peace and security architecture, which includes regional peace and security architectures.

regional actors. In the CBRN risk mitigation field, equally, there is a stated intent to strengthen national and regional capacity (I2.5.1, I2.5.3).

For example, under the CoE Initiative, essentially all the activities and technical support areas contribute to capacity-building in the field of CBRN risk mitigation, but also in crisis management. A search of the CoE Portal⁴⁶ under all 59 CoE Projects returns 19 projects that build capacity in crisis management or 32% of all CoE projects. This increase in strengthening crisis response capacity (with respect to CBRN risks) reflects an overall trend in the CoE project portfolio from general awareness raising and networking towards more focused training and equipment delivery (I2.5.1).

A review of past evaluation reports shows by and large positive feedback with regard to the contribution of Article 5 to capacity building. Weaknesses relate to difficulties in delivering equipment as part of the capacity building measures (due to administrative issues including delays in procurement; asynchrony of project and procurement cycles), and respondents see greater investment needed in institutional strengthening, training and exercises (I2.5.2). Recent projects in CT/OC, as well as CBRN risk mitigation, have placed more emphasis on equipment delivery combined with training, but there are limits to what the IcSP itself can deliver in this respect. KIIs point to the need for synergies with other EU EFIs and funding modalities that are better suited to deliver equipment.

3.2.3. Judgement Criteria: Sustainability

JC2.6: Results of IcSP interventions are more likely to endure beyond the funding period where key local stakeholders have been involved in the design of the actions from the outset, and local mechanisms and capacities strengthened.

Article 3

Article 3 actions are non-programmable and focused on crisis response, which means they are not designed to be sustainable. Furthermore, sustainability is not necessarily a relevant requirement for every action (e.g. one-off support activities) or may be given greater attention at a later stage in selected actions. Nonetheless, there are examples of actions (such as in the Sudan example given above) where outcomes have outlived funding. Factors that contribute to more sustainable Article 3 actions, which have been identified in KIIs, include capacity building, implementation within broader multi-actor response frameworks, early planning of sequencing with other EFIs or donors, co-financing, ownership of actions by key local stakeholders; or synergy with previous actions. Challenges identified during KIIs in measuring sustainability for Article 3 actions include their political (as opposed to developmental) nature and at times over-ambitious logical frameworks and indicators in the design of actions. However, there is consensus among respondents that integrating thinking at the design stage of actions on exit or transition strategies, where appropriate, will add value to efforts to promote sustainability (I2.6.1, I2.6.2, I2.6.3, I2.6.A3i).

Article 4

There is evidence that training yields outcomes that outlive funding in long-term capacity building programmes such as ENTRI and the European Union Police Services Training Programme II (EUPST II). Through the CfP system, capacity building has been a strong element of Article 4 interventions, but there is insufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the extent to which these are sustainable. Among the Article 4 programmes reviewed, over 50% contain elements that address sustainability issues although a sustainability strategy is not always explicit (I2.6.1, I2.6.2, and I2.6.3).

Article 5

All of Article 5 programmes and projects that started after 1 January 2014 are still ongoing and it is premature to comment on the sustainability of their outcomes. There is, however, evidence from previous programme activities (under the IfS) of results that have outlived funding or been sustained through subsequent

⁴⁶ See <https://cbrn-coe.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Projects/ProjectAnalysisTool.aspx>

alternative funding. An example in the CT field is the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité, which the G5 Sahel Summit in Chad (2015) decided to keep under its administrative supervision after the project was completed; another example is the growing number of partner countries of the CBRN CoE Initiative that have developed and adopted a National CBRN Action Plan (as of February 2017: 21 partner countries in 6 regional settings of the CoE Initiative)⁴⁷.

Sustainability approaches are embedded in the programming approach for Article 5 and include the involvement of local stakeholders in the design phase as a key principle. The CoE system has taken this approach one step further and encourages partner countries to embed the activities and results into their own institutional programmes and action plans. In CT, OC and CI, projects are implemented with close involvement of the competent authorities of partner countries and this helps embed results into national systems and protocols (I2.6.1, I.2.6.3, and I2.6.A51).

All Article 5 interventions address sustainability in programme design (I2.6.2). As with actions under Article 3, however, there are also examples where design and framework are at times overambitious. Examples include the CT-Sahel project for which the Final Review (2015) concluded that programme scoping and formulation period had raised expectations far above what the project was able to meet, or the RECSA component of the SALW Programme where programme design had not considered the discrepancy between RECSA's focus on East Africa, parts of the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, and included a programme ambition to cover the entire African continent.⁴⁸

JC2.7: IcSP interventions (Articles 3, 4, and 5) promote some principles of aid effectiveness more than others (i.e. partnership, ownership, coordination, and harmonisation).

Article 3

Although the IcSP Regulation mentions compliance with aid effectiveness principles only in relation to the programmable components of the IcSP, many Article 3 actions also apply some of these principles to the extent they engage with and target civil society actors and/or local authorities, work at community/provincial level, and promote partnership and ownership at that level. For example, partnerships between local and international actors are seen in 66% of Article 3 actions surveyed (I2.7.1, I2.7.A3i).

The short-timeframe of Article 3 actions and political commitments generate pressures to act quickly, at times at the expense of more thoughtful and carefully prepared approaches, especially where the views of beneficiary country priorities and local stakeholders differ or may not be fully aligned with EU's interests (I2.7.2).

Article 4

The principles set out in the Paris Declaration, Busan Agreement, Accra Agenda and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are reflected in Article 4 interventions where partnership, ownership, coordination (and harmonisation, where relevant)⁴⁹ are prioritised. For example, according to the AAR 2016, EUR13.1 million was invested under Article 4 to strengthen in-country civil society actors and their institutional, operational and networking capacity for conflict prevention and peace-building (I2.7.A4i).

Article 5

Creating partnerships, promoting ownership and ensuring coordination with other donors / partners are part of the programming and implementation approach under Article 5. For example, in the CBRN field, the CoE system is an example of a long-term programme that creates ownership (National Team formation and partner countries setting out their strategies in national needs assessments and national action plans) and provides a platform for donors to align with these strategies using local systems (A2.7.1, A2.7.A5i).

⁴⁷ CBRN International Conference Coventry (UK), Presentation by M. E. Rettori (UNICRI), available at the CoE Portal at <https://cbrn-coe.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>.

⁴⁸ Final Review of the CT-SAHEL project (2015), SALW MTR Final Report (2016).

⁴⁹ Harmonisation is not a legal obligation for IcSP – see IcSP Regulation Article 8(2).

Cross-cutting

Across articles, the principles of local ownership and coordination are present in the design of actions, and specifically in connection to context relevance and sustainability. The notion of and emphasis placed on ownership changes across Articles 3, 4, and 5 interventions, and depends on the nature of activities and targeted stakeholders. KIIIs with FPI and DEVCO B5 stakeholders did not highlight any evidence that clearly drew causality between the CIR and the application of aid effectiveness principles across IcSP (all Articles) actions or programmes (A2.7.1).

3.3. Efficiency

To what extent is the IcSP delivering efficiently?

Instrument-level findings The percentage of administrative costs to total budget is 1% in the IcSP, which is lower than in other EFIs. Budget execution (time taken from commitments to payments) is satisfactory. The evaluators were not able to access sufficient evidence to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs. Aspects of the IcSP Regulation that promote efficiency include flexible management procedures to accelerate contractual procedures and direct selection of implementing partners. However, there are cases where the value added of IcSP flexibility was not fully exploited.

Action/programme-level findings There are cases in Article 3 where delays are seen in the period between needs identification and commitments. While these delays are often justifiable, there remains scope for improvement. New reporting tools for Articles 3 and 4, and a Manual of IcSP Outcome Indicators were developed in 2016. *Theories of Change* are also more widely used to stimulate thinking and analytical feedback on change processes. Monitoring in crisis or conflict affected contexts remains, however, a significant challenge, not least because of security and access limitations.⁵⁰ The possibility under the IcSP Regulation to extend IcSP Article 3 actions by 6 + 6 months through no-cost extensions helps implementing partners cope with implementation delays and backlogs. However, its contributions to financial efficiency are limited.

JC3.1: IcSP interventions are delivered in a timely manner and deliver 'value for money'.

Article 3

Speed and flexibility remains a defining characteristic of Article 3 actions, especially when compared to other EU EFIs. Examples from Turkey (support to TCG as a deliverable of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan) and Niger (AGAMI project in Agadez as a deliverable of the EU Agenda on Migration) show rapid (roughly six months) follow up with Article 3 actions to EU political decisions and commitments. When the benchmark considered is the date of presentation of an action to the PSC, 64% of projects were adopted in 2015 within three months of a crisis, compared to an average of 69% for the period 2011-2013 under the IfS, which shows consistency (I3.1.1)⁵¹.

There are some cases where Article 3 actions have suffered delays. Such delays are due to several factors, including: delayed deployment of identification missions; negotiations with the beneficiary on support parameters; contextual changes requiring re-design; lengthy negotiations at higher levels with UN agencies over new contractual procedures and templates; reduced readiness of implementing partners; and protracted budget negotiations with implementing partners. When such delays happen, they may have knock-on effects on relevance, effectiveness, and impact (I3.1.1, I3.1.A3i).

The total duration of Article 3 actions up to 30 months (with two no cost extensions of six months each now permitted) or 36 months (through a 2nd EAM or and IRP in cases of protracted crisis or conflict) is welcomed by implementing partners, many of whom see it as enabling actions to have greater impact (A3.1.2).

⁵⁰ A cross-cutting aspect not captured by the judgement criteria, but relevant to note, is related to IcSP improvements of its monitoring and reporting tools, which seek to capture both quantitative and qualitative data.

⁵¹ DB 2017, IcSP Working Programme Statement (reporting on activities in 2015)

In terms of budget execution (from commitments to payments), KIIs indicate a general level of satisfaction among implementing partners. The evaluators were unable to access a representative sample of budgets for Article 3 actions⁵², and can therefore not draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs (I3.1.3).

Article 4

Long-term interventions under Article 4 are subject to regular contracting procedures through the AAPs. There are no final reports for projects that commenced after 1 January 2014 and it is therefore difficult to determine project completion timeframes. KIIs indicate that any implementation delays are usually associated with in-country security situations, late mobilisation of technical expertise or complicated/lengthy mobilisation processes linked to high-level missions (I3.1.2).

KIIs with implementing partners show overall satisfaction on budget execution under Article 4 programmes. As with Article 3, the evaluators were unable to access a representative sample of budgets for Article 4 actions⁵³, and can therefore not draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs (I3.1.3).

Article 5

Interventions under Article 5, too, are subject to regular contracting procedures through the AAPs. No final reports of Article 5 projects that began after 1 January 2014 were available for review for efficiency assessments.

There is evidence of delays of project implementation in the initial phases of some Article 5 actions. However, these are typically not administrative delays from project approval to contracting, but rather extensions of inception periods. In regional projects, national needs assessments for participating partner countries are often undertaken sequentially by implementers, which create delays. There are proposals to improve the quality of these initial assessments by more strongly involving local experts, which may also shorten inception periods (I3.1.1, I3.1.2).

Several CT/OC/CI projects are phased projects and thus create a strategic long-term engagement between the EU, implementers and the partner countries involved (I3.1.2).

KIIs with implementing partners show overall satisfaction on budget execution under Article 5 programmes. As with Article 3 and 4, the evaluators were unable to access a representative sample of budget breakdowns for Article 5 actions⁵⁴, and can therefore not draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs (3.1.3).

Cross-cutting

The percentage of administrative costs for the management of the IcSP across all Articles (data systems costs included) in relation to total commitments in 2014-2016 is 1%⁵⁵. This compares favourably to other EFIs, with the percentage of administrative costs for selected Instruments ranging from 2.6% (IPA), 3.1% (ENI), 3.5% (DCI) and 3.6% (EDF).

There is no facility under the IcSP to allow for small actions to be decided without a formal decision-making procedure (such as was operationally possible under the IfS via the Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation, Reconciliation and Other Areas of Assistance (PAMF)). This was also noted by stakeholders in the MTE OPC process, with the absence of such a facility having negative effects on efficiency. Small actions (e.g. conflict analyses, feasibility studies, etc.) undertaken to enhance efficiency, should not require the same processes to be followed as large decisions (I3.1.1).

⁵² Detailed budgets, as submitted by implementing agencies for actions are not stored in central databases.

⁵³ *Idem.*

⁵⁴ *Idem.*

⁵⁵ Calculated as €7 million out of a total of €605 million for the 3 years (2014-2016). Data source: CRIS.

JC3.2 CIR and IcSP regulations facilitate the adaptation of IcSP management systems whenever necessary to achieve efficiency gains.

Article 3

Financing decisions under Article 3 of the IcSP Regulation are now required to provide greater definition (e.g. purpose of the action, what is to be supported, and who implements them) compared to the IfS. Although this provides greater clarity, some KIIs expressed concern that it may also limit Instrument flexibility, although the evaluators have not found evidence of that.

Many implementing partners welcome the possibility under the IcSP Regulation to extend IcSP actions by 6 + 6 months through no-cost extensions. The option helps implementing partners cope with implementation delays and backlogs, allowing them to cope with implementation and disbursement pressures that may put a strain on their capacities. It was also suggested during interviews that staff/organisational costs during the extension periods are at times offset by a reduced investment in activities (I3.2.1, I3.2.2).

Article 4 and Article 5

Articles 4 and 5 are programmed using Comitology processes, which the Commission also applies in traditional development programmes. The IcSP Regulation enables direct award contracts; which permit faster and more targeted contracting procedures when needed (I3.2.1, I3.2.2).

JC3.3: The CIR has allowed the EU to respond more rapidly through the IcSP than would have been possible through other EFIs.

According to KIIs with respondents in the European Commission (Brussels) and in EUDs, the adoption of the CIR (and the changes from the IfS to the IcSP Regulation) did not lead to any significant improvements IcSP speed (I3.3.1).

3.4. Added Value

To what extent does the IcSP add value compared to interventions by Member States or other key donors and partners?

Instrument-level findings IcSP value added is seen at different levels. In the fragile and conflict-affected contexts where it is deployed, the multilateral nature of IcSP and the European values (support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law as laid out in the TEU) it promotes are attributes that enhance its acceptability to beneficiary governments and organisations. Its niche (including the priorities given in the Regulation, such as for the Kimberley Certification Scheme), flexibility, and ability to take risks are broadly complementary and appreciated by Member States and other donors. The IcSP remains an important source of funding for many groups in a period with significant funding cuts to the United Nations and European NGOs. Within the EU context, and in relation to the EU's EFIs, the IcSP's speed, flexibility to adapt to evolving contexts, and political influence/leverage are valued. There are other comparative advantages too of the Instrument, such as the direct contracting ability, its bridging function, expertise/niche role, and possibility to engage with specific stakeholders. It is also an important driver of the EU's efforts to mainstream conflict-sensitivity in other EFIs.

Action/programme-level findings The IcSP remains an important resource for the EU for non-programmable short-term crisis response actions (Article 3), and programmable longer-term peace-building (Article 4), and interventions related to global and trans-regional as well as emerging threats (Article 5). There are several examples, such as in the CT/OC programmes under Article 5, where the IcSP has created entry-points and taken risks that other donors could or would not do. Similarly, under Article 3 there are examples where no other donors were willing or legally able to fund certain actions (e.g. the demining project in Colombia involving the FARC-EP alongside state actors). To optimise value added, however, there is a

need for greater emphasis on conflict sensitivity and 'do no harm' in securitised⁵⁶ actions and programmes (CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, stabilisation) in order to reduce the risks of indirect negative effects.

Note: Findings on value added are also covered under other evaluation questions (relevance, efficiency, and leverage).

JC4.1: The IcSP contributes to or complements actions of other donors, particularly Member States, in terms of financial inputs, speed of delivery, policy areas, stakeholders' engagement, expertise, impacts on stability and peace, and political influence.

Article 3

Among EUD respondents who responded to the CIR Survey and use the Instrument, 66% rate the IcSP (all Articles) as complementing the actions of Member States and other donors. Other donors and Member States interviewed during the validation phase view Article 3 actions largely favourably. During the Open Public Consultation, several Member States indicated that they would like to see greater cooperation with and involvement of their Embassies in country in the design of IcSP actions (I4.1.1).

A key value added of Article 3 actions is in the policy and political dialogue it enables with beneficiary governments. Such dialogue is, as mentioned above, also a key driver for effectiveness and impact of Article 3 actions. Of Article 3 actions reviewed, 27 (48%) were deemed likely to have enabled such policy and political dialogue to happen (for example, see the Colombia de-mining project described above). There was not enough data available on the other 29 actions in the sample to determine whether this was likely or not. (I4.1.1, I4.1.2, I4.1.3, I4.1.A3i).

Additional data from the CIR Survey shows that 56% of EUD respondents note that Article 3 actions have helped relations with beneficiary countries (I4.1.3).

The Article 3 cases where the IcSP comparative strengths are questioned are normally those where speed and flexibility have failed. The CIR Survey flags EUD difficulties with the use of IcSP Article 3 support in Zimbabwe and Afghanistan (I4.1.2).

Article 4

As with Article 3, Article 4 actions are seen by EUDs who responded to the CIR Survey as complementing the actions of Member States and other donors.

Documentation and respondents suggest that a key added value of Article 4 is the capacity built for peace-building. End of Year Reports for Article 4 flag the comparative value added as funding being made available where no other EU EFIs can be deployed, and/or where important peace-building/disaster management initiatives (such as the PCNA and PDNA) are being planned and progressed.⁵⁷ Around two thirds of the projects covered by End of Year Reports are internally assessed to have high added value and one third average or low added value (I4.1.1, I4.1.2, I4.1.3).

Data from the CIR Survey shows that 67% of EUD respondents note that Article 4 programmes have helped relations with beneficiary countries.

Article 5

Article 5 interventions have significant interfaces with interventions of Member States and other donors. Examples include the use of expert facilities involving experts and institutions of EU Member States, and complementarity with EU Joint Actions and Council Decisions. The particular added value of Article 5 flagged

⁵⁶ See footnote 3 for a short definition of how 'securitisation' is applied in the MTE or Box 4 for more details.

⁵⁷ See, for example, projects 319543; 319000; 355056; 353003; 328885; and projects: 319000; 319542; 356247.

during interviews is that it can fund actions that other EU EFIs cannot, or could not in the past (such as CT, OC, dual use export control and other areas under the CBRN risk mitigation envelope).

Examples of added value with respect to other (non-EU) donors are evident from collaborations in the Working Groups on export and border controls, as well as the G7 / Global Partnership actions in biosecurity and nuclear security. Both mechanisms are being used for coordination and information exchanges at working and strategy levels between the EU and other donors/partners (US, other donor countries, International Organisations). Another example is the donor collaboration in the Science Centres (ISTC, STCU), which have a long history of close coordination of programme directions and co-funding by the EU and other funding partners (USA, Canada and some other States) and partner and host countries. (I4.1.1, I4.1.2, I4.1.A5i).

Partners (beneficiaries and donors), past evaluations, as well as reports of workshops under Article 5 are consistent in their assessment of its added value, which compared to other donors is the emphasis in programmes on soft measures, tailoring to partner country needs and context, technical competence, and high quality⁵⁸.

Data from the CIR Survey shows that 38% of EUD respondents note that Article 5 programmes have helped relations with beneficiary countries (I4.1.3).

Box 4: What is 'securitisation' of peace and development?

The concept of 'securitisation' in international relations was first developed in 1998 by Copenhagen school researchers such as Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. It sees security as a 'speech act'; i.e. it is not a question of whether a threat is real or not, but how a certain issue (e.g. migration, terrorism, etc.) can be socially constructed as a threat.

Based on interviews and a review of IcSP actions and programmes, the evaluators use a different, but complementary view of "securitisation"; which covers actions and programmes that are aligned to national security interests (of EU Member States and partner countries) and supportive of partner country government stabilisation objectives. Within the IcSP portfolio, CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, and stabilisation (and sometimes migration) activities are seen as securitised.

The evaluators, however, consider such actions and programmes often necessary, but note that when not designed using a conflict-sensitive and 'do no harm' approach, they may face a number of challenges:

- The 'terrorism', 'crime' or "migration" label at times leads to over-simplified problem-definitions; and consequently, to a narrow set of responses to issues with deeper and broader dynamics.
- In some contexts, counter-terrorism or counter-crime campaigns resemble counter-insurgency campaigns and inflict the same scars on communities. They can lead to new conflict fault-lines being formed, deepen social trauma, and set the stage for new grievances that make future stability and peace harder to achieve.
- Alignment of development and peace-building activities to stabilisation objectives (particularly in 'hot stabilisation' contexts) closely associates these to one party of the conflict. It has implications, therefore, for how neutral a party (and the projects it funds) is seen in the eyes of conflicting parties and affected populations.
- The execution by partner governments of counter terrorism and counter crime operations, or efforts to tackle migration may involve human rights violations. Direct or indirect support of these operations exposes a donor to allegations of complicity in those rights violations.
- Operational dilemmas are seen in securitized actions; i.e. footage from filmed focus group discussions on violent extremism may put participants at risk to interrogation by intelligence services; border closures may lead migrants to take more dangerous routes; etc.

JC4.2: The IcSP promotes European approaches and values⁵⁹ in contributing to: (a) building capacity of organisations engaged in crisis response and peace-building; and (b) addressing specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability.

Article 3

Most surveyed Article 3 interventions refer to EU principles (or values); particularly to good governance and human rights. Many of these principles are mainstreamed within the action, and actions will often directly or indirectly promote them.

It is not possible to comprehensively verify with available documentation whether the promotion of European values is followed through in the implementation of actions, as this would require an assessment of actions and it is too soon to have a significant body of IcSP evaluations to draw on. In actions related to CT/CVE, organised crime, cybersecurity, and stabilisation, EU principles/values may not be aligned to how beneficiary

⁵⁸ CoE conferences Geneva 2015 and La Hulpe 2016. Chatham House Seminars 2016, LL in CT/OC actions.

⁵⁹ As specified in the TEU, these include: "consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law".

institutions (often governments) use the support provided or conduct project-related activities. Where the risk management framework of such actions is not conflict-sensitive and does not consider potential adverse impacts on human rights or other EU principles, the potential for non-alignment with cross-cutting priorities and other risks is likely to be higher. The number of actions under Article 3 in securitised sectors (see Box 4) has fluctuated in 2014-2016; from 8.98% in 2014, to 12.06% in 2015, and 7.89% in 2016⁶⁰ (I4.2.1, I4.2.2, I4.3.3).

Article 4

For Article 4, there is evidence to suggest that EU principles and values are well-integrated in programmes. The linkages that are being created through programmes between the EU and the UN system and regional organisations (OECD, OSCE, League of Arab States) enables the promotion of EU cross-cutting priorities. Article 4 programmes also reflect Council Conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach, such as the Council Conclusion on Conflict Prevention of 20 June 2011.⁶¹ For example, and according to the FPI AAR 2016, the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) funded under Article 4 has enabled the preparation of joint analyses and design of “better response strategies to address threats to peace and security” (I4.2.1, I4.3.3).

There has been no funding for programmes in securitised sectors under Article 4.

Article 5

Past evaluations, as well as feedback from regional partners, have linked IcSP interventions with European values (particularly a democracy and a rule-of-law based approach). This has helped engage with partner countries, which have highlighted this as an advantage over interventions by other donors.

As with Article 3 actions, there may be risks of non-alignment between CT/CVE, stabilisation and organised crime programmes and cross-cutting priorities such as human rights. It is a risk that increases in CT/CVE and organised crimes programmes that directly or indirectly strengthen law enforcement and security agencies in ‘rights-challenged’ third countries. The evaluators recognise, however, that such interventions can firmly promote EU cross-cutting priorities, and be implemented in partnership with law enforcement, judicial and in some cases military actors (e.g. response to Ebola outbreak in West Africa; CVE activities associated with progress insecurity sector reforms) (I4.2.1, I4.2.2, I4.3.3).

Article 5 funding for programmes addressing terrorism and violent extremism, organised crime, cyber security, security, and stabilisation grew from 64.9% of total allocations in 2014 to 70.94% in 2015. Figures for 2016 were unavailable (I4.2.3).⁶²

JC4.3: The IcSP delivers projects and outcomes that other EU Instruments (including Trust Funds⁶³) or EU Member States cannot deliver.

Article 3

Several comparative advantages in Article 3 actions have been found in relation to other EU EFIs (see Table 1 below). Respondents to the CIR Survey indicate: (i) the speed and flexibility that allows the EU to intervene in a timely manner and bridge funding gaps (69%); (ii) political influence/leverage (56%); and (iii) a thematic specificity that allows the IcSP to fund activities other EFIs sometimes cannot fund (44%) (I4.3.1).

Responses to the CIR Survey and KIs indicate other significant comparative advantages of Article 3, which include: (a) access to local actors and mobilisation of civil society capacities, allowing the IcSP to implement actions in conflict areas and countries under sanctions where other EU EFIs are absent; and (b) a peace-

⁶⁰ Calculations are based on a review of Article 3, 4, and 5 actions that address CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, and stabilisation – but not migration. Actions involving dual use are included under stabilisation, in addition to stabilisation specific actions. Administrative expenses and conferences are not included.

⁶¹ See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122911.pdf

⁶² Calculations are based on a review of Article 3, 4, and 5 actions that address CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, and stabilisation – but not migration. Actions involving dual use are included under stabilisation, in addition to stabilisation specific actions. Administrative expenses and conferences are not included.

⁶³ Taking into account that experience with Trust Funds is still relatively recent and information on advantages and impact may still be limited.

building lens and conflict-sensitive approaches to security, humanitarian and development activities. However, the evaluators note that valuable peace and security programming is also seen in DCI, ENI, IPA II, and EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds (I4.3.2). This is discussed below in Section 4.6.

Article 4

In responses to the CIR Survey, Article 4 rates higher than Article 3 and 5 in terms of political influence/leverage (67%). Speed and flexibility rate lower than for Article 3 (59%) considering the programmable nature of the Instrument, while thematic specificity rates higher (56%) in terms of value added than Article 3 (I4.3.1).

It is too early to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Article 4 programmes vis-à-vis several new EUTFs. There is some evidence to suggest synergies between Article 4 work on PCNA/PDNA and the Central African Republic Trust Fund. There are potential synergies, particularly in the areas of peace-building and crisis preparedness between the IcSP and EUTFs on migration, where large EUTF budgets are needed to address issues that span the humanitarian-development-security nexus. Here Article 4 programmes, with their emphasis on soft skills and relatively small funding allocations can address gap issues that Trust Funds cannot. These may be small-scale early and timely interventions aimed at specific issues such as mediation through ERMES to prevent conflict from escalating (I4.3.1, I4.3.2).

Article 5

Thematic expertise and political influence/leverage (63% and 38%, respectively) are identified as the most significant comparative advantages of Article 5 by EUDs in the CIR Survey (I4.3.1).

A recurring theme is the niche role of Article 5 programmes in non-DAC interventions covering CT/CVE and OC, as well as certain programmes in CBRN risk mitigation (e.g. P2P programme on dual use export controls, border controls, redirection of scientists, capacity for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, support to ISTC and STCU International Science Centres). In other areas (such as critical infrastructure or CT in Sahel), the IcSP has had an initial advantage by moving into geographical zones where other donors were absent (I4.3.1, I4.3.2, I4.3.A5i).

Table 1: Comparative value added of IcSP compared to EDF and other EFIs

	IcSP Article 3	IcSP Article 4	IcSP Article 5	EDF	ENI	DCI (Average)	EIDHR (Average)	IPA II
Size of engagement	31%	37%	0%	95%	88%	48.5%	38%	83%
Particular expertise	44%	56%	63%	36%	63%	24.5%	56%	83%
Political influence/leverage	56%	67%	38%	79%	75%	40%	54.5%	67%
Speed of mobilising/engaging funds	69%	59%	0%	5%	0%	6.5%	12.5%	0%
EUDs using the Instrument	41			39	8	66	76	6

Table 1 shows that comparative strength of the IcSP in relation to the EDF and other EFIs, according to EUDs using the Instruments, is primarily its speed. Political influence/leverage and expertise is on par with other EFIs, and size of engagement limited, which reflects its relatively small budget. (Source: CIR survey)

3.5. Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies

To what extent does the IcSP facilitate consistency, complementarity and synergies both internally between its own set of objectives and programmes, and vis-à-vis other EFIs?

Instrument-level findings IcSP coherence, consistence, and complementarity and synergies are seen at different levels. Externally, coordination on systemic challenges between the IcSP and other (EU Member State and non-EU) peace and security funding instruments appears limited. In relation to external EU initiatives and institutions, there is evidence of functional interfaces between the IcSP and CSDP missions, as well as with DG ECHO. Among EU EFIs there appears to be significant and growing programming on peace and security, which partly results from broader EU efforts to mainstream conflict prevention. Peace and security programming is seen in the DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds, but effective synergies with the IcSP are hampered by the lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures of most other EFIs. Within the IcSP, there is variation in how joined-up actions and programmes are between Articles 3, 4, and 5. Although actions and programmes under each article meet the objectives of the Instrument itself, they also have been used in furtherance of the objectives of other EFIs, to 'gap fill', as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) instruments, and as a funding instrument of last resort.

Action/programme-level findings Actions and programmes under Articles 3, 4, and 5 meet the objectives of the Instrument itself. KIIs and the OPC indicate that coordination with Member States, particularly in-country, can be improved for Article 3. No evidence was found to suggest significant overlap or duplication between IcSP actions and peace and security programming of other EFIs and EUTFs. Synergy between IcSP actions and other EFIs is an important prerequisite for its effectiveness, impact and sustainability (in particular in Article 3 actions). More than three quarters of Article 3 decisions make explicit reference to other EFIs, although the follow-through of intent to foster synergies appears variable during implementation. All actions and programmes under Articles 3, 4, and 5 are consistent with the IcSP Regulation.

Note: Findings on complementarity with other donors, IcSP speed, and alignment of long-term components are also covered under other evaluation questions above, and the evaluation question on leverage below.

JC5.1: IcSP decisions, programmes or interventions are internally coherent and consistent with the objectives of the Instrument.

Article 3

Article 3 decisions are consistent with IcSP objectives. There is a degree of consensus among respondents that other EU EFIs should play a greater programming role in protracted crises (e.g. Iraq), which would enable Article 3 to dedicate greater resources to actions that require speed, the opening of spaces for engagement, and launching initiatives in countries and areas where other EFIs are absent. Within Article 3, there is internal coherence and examples of actions that build on and aim to consolidate effects or expand previous (IfS) actions (e.g. in South Sudan, Sudan, Niger).

Article 3 coherence is supported by the decision-making process for its actions (see Annex for an illustration of current decision-making processes). Article 3 decision-making processes involve adequate consultation and coordination mechanisms for synergies within the IcSP at HQ level. At EUD level, coordination is more variable, with some EUDs reporting limited coordination across Article 3, 4, and 5 – and others effective coordination. The restructuring into regional IcSP hubs is likely to enable greater coherence in coordination at a regional level, although there is still a gap concerning centralised coherence and articulation across the Articles and with the EFI's (I5.1.1, I5.1.2, I5.1.3).

Article 4

Article 4 decisions are consistent with IcSP objectives (I5.1.1, I5.1.2, I5.1.3). A comparison of the current AAPs 2014-2016 under Article 4 with AAPs from the IfS 2007-2013 shows evidence that programmes build on previous IfS interventions. Some of the programmes are in their second or third phases: ENTRi trains

(largely European) staff in preparation for their deployment as part of EU or other international civilian stabilisation missions and builds technical expertise; CSDN and support for EPLO enables the EU to have a continuous dialogue with peacebuilding INGOs and NGOs at the European policy level; ERMES, an initiative started under the IfS, trains and deploys European mediators and complements on-going support for the UN Mediation Support Unit (MSU). There are clear links in programmes with UN agencies, AU, OSCE and OECD.

Article 4 coherence is supported by the decision-making process for its programmes (see Annex for an illustration of current decision-making processes).

Building technical capacity is at the core of Article 4 and covers topics such as mediation, early warning and conflict sensitivity that are complementary to crisis response interventions. There is a need to bolster systematic links between work on these issues and Article 3 actions. In relation to Article 5, there is some evidence of links, such as in the 2015 AAP support to the League of Arab States (LAS) and connections with the Centres of Excellence.

Article 5

Article 5 decisions have been found to be internally coherent and consistent with IcSP objectives (I5.1.1, I5.1.2, I5.1.3). They are often long-term phased / sequenced programmes (CT, OC, CI), or in some cases strategic long-term investments (CoE, dual export controls, Science Centres). Ad hoc interventions, such as the Ebola response (mobile laboratories, waste management, controls at border crossing points) or the support for the removal of Syria's chemical weapons in 2013 and 2014, were found to exploit past partnerships and reached back into capabilities developed under previous interventions.

In relation to Article 5 programmes and Article 3 actions, a joined-up approach (with the exception of CT/CVE actions) means connecting trans-regional initiatives (Article 5) with often country-specific (Article 3) actions. This is challenging, but an example is the financial support to the OPCW for the removal of chemical weapons from Syria (financed under Article 5, which responded to a worsening crisis, similar to actions that typically come under Article 3). This complementarity can be further optimised.

Article 5 decision-making processes support internal coherence (see Annex for an illustration of current decision-making processes). They involve Thematic Multi-Annual Papers that develop broader thematic concepts and programme directions aligned with long-term objectives of the IcSP, inter-service consultations with regard to AAPs, and annual work plans (CT/OC/CI/CC) as well as projects/tenders (ISTC, STCU, P2P, CoE) that build on these long-term objectives.

JC5.2: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and the interventions of other EU EFIs (including EDF and Trust Funds).

Article 3

A review of Article 3 actions shows that complementarity with other EU EFIs was identified in 84% of the cases; with 16% of the sample showing intent but not identifying other EFIs. The main EFIs linked to Article 3 actions are EIDHR, DCI, ENI, IPA II, as well as the EDF and EUTFs. There are also identified synergies with the Internal Security Fund, DG ECHO, and CSDP missions. A good example of multiple interfaces between an Article 3 action and other EU initiatives/EFIs is the Support to the State Formation Process in Somalia⁶⁴, which involves coordination with EDF, EUTM, and EUCAP NESTOR under CSDP. In Turkey, IcSP funding is integrated in the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRT), along with other EFIs, the Madad EU Trust Fund, and Member State contributions. The FRT is a mechanism set up to ensure the coordination, complementarity and efficiency of the EU assistance to Turkey in dealing with the flow of refugees from the Syria crisis (I5.2.1, I5.2.A3ii, I5.2.A3iii).

There appears to be significant and growing programming on peace and security in the EIDHR, DCI, ENI, IPA II, and the EDF and EUTFs, which increases the scope for synergy and complementarity between these and

⁶⁴ See FD38806 for more details.

the IcSP. This is seen by several respondents as a beneficial outcome of efforts to mainstream conflict prevention across EU EFIs, EDF and EUTFs. The evaluators have not been able to find data to quantify the monetary value of this programming or trends, although the Africa Peace Facility (funded by the EDF) has contracted in excess of EUR1.45 billion in the period 2003-2014, and EUR750 million for 2014-2016.⁶⁵ There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that a better interface needs to be established between Article 3 and EU Trust Funds, as the latter begin in earnest to fund peace and security initiatives (I5.2.2, I5.2.3).

A more detailed assessment of programming from other EFIs on peace and security is necessary to draw implications for the IcSP. However, if such programming is growing, then more developed coordination mechanisms will be needed among EFIs, the EDF, EUTFs, and CSDP missions on this topic.

Article 4

There is evidence in the AAPs 2014-2016 that complementarity and synergies with other EFIs were anticipated and built into programme design (I5.2.1, I5.2.2, I5.2.3). For example:

- AAPs link the Article 4 Call for Proposals in selected countries to projects financed by DCI's 'Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities' programme.
- The IcSP End of Year report for "Ensuring access to justice for witness/victims through strengthening existing and establishing new witness support for networks across BiH"⁶⁶, notes that this project links to IPA I and II funded in-country (on-going interventions) in the justice sector (e.g. budget support to Prosecutor's Office and Courts dealing with War Crimes, rehabilitation and reconstruction of Courts and Prosecutor premises).

Article 5

Article 5 interventions in the area of nuclear security are complementary to activities in nuclear safety under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC). There is significant overlap in the objectives pursued under the two instruments in a number of technical areas (CBRN Centres of Excellence covering both natural and man-made risks related to RN materials) and in some cases overlapping geographical coverage (e.g. Uranium mining and related transport in Central Africa with CoE project 60 and INSC activities in the same region / mining areas related to safeguards and nuclear safety). Article 5 and INSC interventions are also managed by the same unit (DEVCO B5). As such from a technical and managerial perspective, suggestions by respondents to integrate INSC into Article 5 should be explored (I5.2.1, I5.2.2).

Additional thematic complementarity exists between Article 5 activities on CT/OC/CS activities and ENI programmes on human rights and security sector reform. An example from field visits includes potential synergies between Article 5 activities on export controls and CBRN risk mitigation, and ENI activities related to integration into the EU internal market. In relation to EIDHR, there is potential synergy on Article 5 CT and OC activities, and the application of a human rights lens (I5.2.1, I5.2.2, I5.2.A5i).

DEVCO respondents also recommended drawing on other funding modalities, such as EU Trust Funds, to follow on IcSP interventions. An Article 5 example is work on protection of critical infrastructure (maritime routes) where the IcSP can set in motion certain activities but the follow up and expansion of such measures goes beyond the capacity of the IcSP. Other examples where this synergy is being developed in the area of counter-terrorism and fighting organised crime include WAPIS in West Africa, Ameripol in Latin America and STRIVE in the Horn of Africa. These examples underscore the utility of adopting a more systematic approach towards promoting complementarity and creating better interfaces between the IcSP and other EUTFs (I5.2.3).

⁶⁵ See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en

⁶⁶ Contract 2014/355-056

Cross-cutting

Across IcSP Articles, 54% of the EUDs using the IcSP noted it is used in conjunction with other EU external action Instruments (CIR Survey), which supports findings that important efforts are made in the IcSP to ensure synergies with other EFIs⁶⁷ (I5.2.2).

JC5.3: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and interventions and EU foreign and security policy (CFSP) activities.

Article 3

A third of Article 3 actions reviewed are linked to or part of broader EU multi-actor response frameworks, ranging from coordinated actions with EU Member States, alignment with CSDP mission objectives (e.g. EUTM in Somalia), or other CFSP initiatives (e.g. EU-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Dialogue). For the remaining 66% of actions, no direct link was evidenced (I5.3.2).

Evidence of coordination between Article 3 actions and CSDP missions is found in some countries (e.g. Somalia), but the depth of coordination varies. Respondents indicate that coordination between the IcSP and CSDP missions in particular has been frustrated by IcSP inability to fund 'soft' support initiatives to military forces. This may now change with the proposed Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) amendment to the IcSP Regulation (I5.3.1)⁶⁸.

Article 4

Evidence from interviews and documentation suggests that Article 4 interventions enable synergy between the IcSP and EU CFSP activities. This takes a number of forms, such as through the ENTRI programme, where pre-deployment training is provided for staff of CSDP missions or staff being deployed to UN, OSCE or AU civilian stabilisation missions. Another example is the support provided to police training under EUPST II, which trains police and gendarmerie staff for potential deployment as part of CSDP or other civilian stabilisation missions. Thematically, Article 4 funding of Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS), PCNA/PCDA, natural resources and conflict, as well as support to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in the AAPs 2014-2016 promote complementarity with EU foreign policy activities (I5.3.1, I5.3.2).

Article 5

Article 5 CT/OC activities, as well as those related to cyber-crime, critical infrastructure and the security aspects of climate change, are developed and implemented within the wider CFSP framework and with support of relevant Member States. The same can be said about activities in the areas of export controls and CBRN risk mitigation. With regard to CBRN risk migration, the CBRN CoE initiative is increasingly a platform for coordination and synergy, and now used to a greater extent by other EU actors (I5.3.A5i).

Article 5 programmes involve a range of mechanisms in pursuance of EU CFSP objectives to promote complementarity, including with other donor programmes (EU and external). A review of strategic and programming documents under Article 5 IcSP has not revealed any inconsistencies with CFSP activities (I5.3.1, I5.3.2).

⁶⁷ The way the CIR Survey question is formulated does not allow for clarity of the results. It asks respondents to "indicate which of the instruments used in your Delegation complement or duplicate actions of other EU external action instruments", but the response does not distinguish between 'complementarity' or 'duplication'. The evaluators, however, have reviewed the specific answers given by EUDs and find complementarity with other EFIs is the norm, rather than duplication.

⁶⁸ Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, COM(2016) 447 final, 5/7/2016. It proposes changes to allow the EU to support capacity-building (training and mentoring) of military actors, the provision of non-lethal equipment and infrastructure improvements, to contribute to peace-building, stabilisation and sustainable development.

JC5.4: The IcSP promotes complementarity and synergy between IcSP programmes and interventions and other actors/donors (including Member States).

Article 3

A review of Article 3 actions shows integration into regional (e.g. Somali Compact, IGAD, etc.) or international (UN Country Team strategies, International Contact Group, Recovery and Peace-building Assessment, etc.) strategies of 63% of actions. For 10% of actions, such integration was not relevant; and for 27% there was no integration. There is some consensus among respondents that integration into broader response frameworks enhances the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability potential of these actions (I5.4.A3i).

Article 3 actions in focus sectors for the MTE⁶⁹, that are most often coordinated with Member States and other non-EU partners, are in CT/CVE (Tunisia, Lebanon, Somalia, and Pakistan) and migration (Niger, Turkey and Jordan). CT/CVE actions are also ones where there may be coordination difficulties due to limited information exchange. There is inadequate evidence on synergies with Member States and other non-EU partners when it comes to DDR and transitional justice (I5.4.1, I5.4.2).

Overall there have been significant advances in in-country coordination in fragile states through initiatives such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, collaboration between the UN, EU, and World Bank on Post Conflict and Post Disaster Needs Assessments (PCNAs and PDNAs), as well as other national-level coordination frameworks/mechanisms. Most KII interviewees however, agree that a fundamental weakness remains limited in-country coordination between development partners, host governments, and civil society groups.

Article 4

Article 4 programmes involve upstream consultations with Member States as part of annual programming as set out under Article 8(2) of the Regulation⁷⁰. Several Article 4 programmes draw in other donors (such as USAID in the Kimberley Process certification scheme; the World Bank/EU and UN in PDNA and PCNA; OSCE and the AU in the ENTRi III programme). The evaluators do not have a robust enough evidence base to draw conclusions with regard to the annual sub-delegated CfP for civil society actors in conflict prevention and peace-building under Article 4, but note that in two countries (Colombia and Somalia) there was no evidence of misalignment between funded actions and other EU and Member States activities (I5.4.1, I5.4.2, I5.4.A4i).

Article 5

There are close ties between Article 5 programmes on CT, OC, and export controls, with activities of Member States that implement bilateral programmes in these sectors. There also is close coordination with the US in many thematic areas at both strategic and working levels. Examples include the coordination through the export control and border monitoring working groups, which link back to the respective US outreach programmes in these fields (USEXBS and other initiatives) as well as through the G7 / Global Partnership mechanisms in such areas as chemical and biological safety and security (I5.4.1, I5.4.2).

With regard to UN and international organisations, and in the fields of CT and OC, there is coordination with (and in certain cases implementation by) organisations such as UNODC or Interpol. In the CBRN risk mitigation field, the CoE provides a by-now well-accepted and effective platform that involves a number of international organisations as partners at the programming as well as implementing ends, such as IAEA, WHO, OPCW, Interpol, and BWC-ISU (I5.4.1, I5.4.2, A5.4.A5i).

There is no direct evidence of inconsistencies between Article 5 programmes and those of Member States and other international organisations, but note that there remains space for closer coordination (I5.4.1, I5.4.2).

⁶⁹ CT/CVE, DDR, migration, and transitional justice

⁷⁰ It should be noted that the same practice takes place in relation to programming under Article 5.

Cross-cutting

Across Articles, 66% of the EUDs that use the IcSP noted it is applied in conjunction with actions of other actors/donors (CIR Survey) (I4.5.1).⁷¹

3.6. Leverage

To what extent has the IcSP leveraged further funds and/or political or policy engagement?⁷²

Instrument-level findings It is difficult to isolate the contribution of actions/actors to leverage political dialogue or change in general, and even more so of an Instrument with limited financial resources. However, there is evidence that the IcSP has contributed to EU policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments in several countries, which in turn has supported a range of outcomes from the Instrument. The use of the IcSP to contribute to policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments is not consistent and depends on the timeliness and relevance of actions, as well as political will of the EU and partner countries to engage in such dialogue. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the IcSP has contributed to EU policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments in several countries, which in turn has supported a range of outcomes in IcSP actions and programmes. The use of the IcSP to contribute to policy and political dialogue with beneficiary governments is not consistent and depends on the timeliness and relevance of actions, as well as political will of the EU and partner countries to engage in such dialogue. Where the Instrument is used mainly for the purpose of bridging long-term EFIs that have greater financial capacity but are slower in deploying resources, the role of the Instrument is acknowledged, but its 'political footprint' is limited. An important area of leverage is in catalysing additional donor funding for IcSP actions. There is some indication that IcSP funding has been complemented with parallel financing by other donors, but less so when it comes to co-financing and joint programming.

Action/programme-level findings There is evidence that timely support to critical processes, such as those funded under Article 3, can enhance the visibility and credibility of the EU as a political actor and open doors for greater political dialogue (e.g. Colombia).

JC6.1: The IcSP has enabled the EU to make strategic use of policy and political dialogue to leverage change.

Article 3

IcSP leverage or political influence is considered important by 18 EUDs (out of 32 using Article 3) (56%) in the CIR Survey as one of the main comparative advantages of the Instrument (I6.1.1, I6.1.A3i).

Respondents to the CIR Survey flag several pre-requisites for the IcSP to generate opportunity for strategic engagement. These include rapid funding, flexibility, advocacy, engagement in actions by senior EUD staff, consultation and coordination with development partners, timeliness of actions, technical expertise at EUD-level, size of action, coordination with other EFIs, and alignment with beneficiary country needs (I6.1.1). There are several examples of Article 3 use for strategic positioning and engagement, which have been evidenced by respondents in Somalia, Niger, Colombia, and Turkey (I6.1.2).

Article 3 interventions in Jordan and Somalia, for example, have been used to deepen EU policy and political dialogue in those countries. Respondents in these countries see this kind of dialogue as both a useful consequence of IcSP actions, but also necessary for the successful implementation of these actions as engagement with beneficiary governments can help move agendas forward and address implementation challenges. Another significant example, already mentioned above is the demining project in Colombia, where IcSP funding has helped profile the EU as a political partner (I6.1.1, I6.2.2).

⁷¹ The CIR Survey question does not distinguish between 'complementarity' or 'duplication' in the question regarding complementarity with other EFIs.

⁷² Leverage is defined as either additional funds brought by the IcSP or as the re-allocation of existing funds towards other policy areas. A broader view of the leverage concept includes whether the instrument has contributed to the ability of the EU to make strategic use of policy and political dialogue to leverage change.

Article 4

IcSP leverage or political influence is mentioned by 18 EUDs (out of 27 using Article 4) (67%) in the CIR Survey as one of the main comparative advantages of the Instrument (I6.1.1).

Article 4 programmes generate a variety of leverage opportunities for the EU (I6.1.2):

- Programmes such as support for the Kimberly Process and OECD due diligence initiative on conflict minerals strengthen EU influence on these topics.
- ERMES allows the EU to deploy and train its own mediators and resources the UN Mediation Support Unit, which in turn offers insight and leverage of dialogue/mediation processes.
- Support to the League of Arab States (LAS) crisis response capability enables dialogue on crisis issues and management with the LAS.

Furthermore, Article 4 programmes contribute to greater EU influence with a variety of international organisations such as the UN, World Bank, OSCE, and OECD, as well as regional bodies (AU, League of Arab States).

Article 5

IcSP leverage or political influence is mentioned by three EUDs (out of eight using Article 5) (38%) in the CIR Survey as one of the main comparative advantages of the Instrument (I6.1.1).

As with Article 4, Article 5 interventions open opportunities for a broader political exchange and the discussion of policy objectives on key topics with institutional partners and beneficiary governments (I6.1.2). Examples include:

- The setting up of National CBRN Teams by the partner countries (inter-ministerial arrangements involving actors that had little contact in the past). EU support is seen by many interviewees as essential (CoE governance team, workshops promoting the concept; collaboration with UNICRI; guidance documents) and has promoted political and policy dialogue between the EU and partner countries.
- The work on cybercrime and the creation of multi-agency national project teams has enabled the EU to promote key policy priorities, such as the ratification of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (ratified by two countries as a result of the GLACY project engagement and support).
- In the CT area, actions support the operationalisation of CT dialogues, and the heroin route programme that interfaced with regional players in ECO, which amongst others opened up additional avenues for interaction with Iran.

Cross-cutting

The evaluators note the following lessons learnt (I6.1.1, I6.1.2) when it comes to leverage:

- The IcSP contributions to leverage in 'strong' states (e.g. Nigeria) and middle-income countries that are not dependent on external aid (e.g. Turkey) depend on entry points chosen and the political outcomes sought. Examples include resourcing the Turkish coast guard to signal EU support on migration challenges faced.
- Where the Instrument is used mainly for the purpose of bridging long-term EFIs that have greater financial capacity but are slower in deploying resources, the effectiveness and role of the Instrument is acknowledged, but its 'political footprint' is limited and attention is on what comes next.

- Where the Instrument is used to respond primarily to EU political interests and deliver rapidly on political commitments (such as in Turkey and Niger), its political value depends fundamentally on the extent to which the actions undertaken respond to shared interests of the partner country.⁷³
- IcSP leverage/political influence seems to be greater where the Instrument acts through local actors, who have the legitimate/internal political recognition and take ownership of conflict prevention and peace building activities.
- Visibility and leverage are not necessarily a 'win-win' match, especially if the purpose is to enhance ownership by local actors.

JC6.2: The IcSP funds have catalysed additional resources – from government, international organisations, and other donors.

Article 3

Data shows that 35% of Article 3 actions surveyed included reference to parallel financing of other donors and 2% that were co-financed. For 63% there was no data on parallel or co-financing. There is some evidence of other donors building on IfS actions (Turkey and Niger), but insufficient data has been found to draw any conclusions. A good example of parallel financing from other (non-EU donors) for an Article 3 project is “Strengthening resilience to violent extremism in Jordan”⁷⁴, which involves separate funding by Canada, Japan, and the US (I6.2.1, I6.2.2).

Article 4

Beyond co-funding of some Article 4 programmes (such as the strengthening of the crisis response capability of the Arab League) by other international organisations, evidence remains limited when it comes to additional resources being leveraged by Article 4 programmes from Member States, with the exception of German engagement in follow-up to the early warning programme. However, End of Year reports indicate that under the annual sub-delegated Calls for Proposals for civil society actors on conflict prevention and peace-building, projects occasionally attract other donor funds (I6.2.1, I6.2.2).

Article 5

Some programmes under Article 5 depend on in-kind co-funding by other donors (Member States, as well as partner countries). To that extent, they have leveraged additional resources or provided frameworks, within which other donors could contribute both financially and in-kind. An example is the CoE system that has leveraged financial commitments by the partner countries hosting Regional Secretariats. The Science Centres (ISTC, STCU) similarly are well-established platforms for coordinated interventions by multiple donors, and have mechanisms to attract additional external funding through partner projects. The Science Centres are co-funded by the EU and other partners (US, Canada, commitments by the host countries) and implement, amongst others, partner projects funded by non-EU donors. This has become an attractive way of organising scientific collaborations and for commercialisation efforts (I6.2.1, I6.2.2).

⁷³ In the case of Niger, despite differences in perspective and priorities, there is common ground on issues linked to migration. However, the approach and the priorities set by the EU are not consensual between national actors in Niger. The IcSP, as part of wider EU action on this topic, is clearly contributing to internal debate and EU-Niger dialogue on migration.

⁷⁴ See FD38522 for further information.

4. Conclusions

4.1. Relevance and Added Value

The IcSP is of critical and increasing relevance globally and to the EU, and its value added will grow further in years to come. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, its multilateral nature and the European values⁷⁵ it promotes enhance its acceptability to beneficiary governments and organisations. Its niche, flexibility, and ability to take risks are key attributes that are seen by Member States and other donors as key to its relevance and value added. For global and regional organisations and NGOs, the IcSP is an important source of funding in a period of reduced investment in the sector.

At a policy level, the IcSP promotes and serves as an important implementing vehicle for EU external action priorities and the work of the High Representative/Vice President and the EEAS. It responds to the priorities of the Treaty of the European Union (Article 21) and supports the implementation of the Global Strategy and the EU's commitments to Agenda 2030 (and specifically SDG 16). In relation to other EU EFIs, the IcSP's speed, flexibility to adapt to evolving contexts, and political influence/leverage are comparative advantages that enhance relevance and value added.

Challenges to relevance and value added are found at the action/programme level. For example, there is a need to better ground and time Article 3 actions to the contexts they are implemented in, including improving methods to assess hybrid conflict dynamics to bolster relevance. The value added of Article 3 actions and Article 5 programmes in securitized sectors⁷⁶ (CT/CVE, organised crime, cyber security, stabilisation, and in some cases migration), require the full roll-out of conflict sensitivity and 'do no harm' approaches to reduce risks of indirect negative effects.

4.2. Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, and Sustainability

Available data suggests that the IcSP is performing efficiently. The percentage of administrative costs to total budget is lower than in other EU EFIs and budget execution is satisfactory. Flexible management procedures that accelerate contractual procedures and the direct selection of implementing partners are key elements that contribute to IcSP efficiency and by extension enhance its relevance and added value. It has not been possible, however, to gather enough evidence to draw conclusions on the justifiability of costs.

The IcSP is also effective and has delivered on Instrument objectives. However, with no developed Instrument baseline and few actions and programmes concluded by end-2016, it is both difficult and too early to assess Instrument-level impacts and sustainability. Nonetheless, the IcSP is politically responsive. It has served to deepen political dialogue in partner countries and increased the profile of the EU as a political actor globally. The Instrument also makes important contributions to mainstreaming EU cross-cutting priorities in its actions and programmes.

At an action/programme level, there are several areas where improvements should be made. These relate to:

- Reducing delays between needs identification and commitments in Article 3 actions.
- Increasing attention to and investments in seizing windows of opportunity for peace⁷⁷ in Article 3 actions.

⁷⁵ Support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law as laid out in the Treaty of the European Union.

⁷⁶ See footnote 3 for a short definition of how 'securitisation' is applied in the MTE or Box 4 for more details.

⁷⁷ The concept of a 'window of opportunity for peace' typically refers to the early signs that a ceasefire, basic talks between conflicting parties, or peace process may be possible. In peace mediation practice, an inter-changeable term is 'peace ripeness', which can also be facilitated and promoted through actions that begin to prepare or encourage parties to talk.

- Addressing the absence of an EEAS/European Commission strategic framework to guide and promote synergy in investments by the EDF and EU EFIs (including those made under Article 4 and 5) to bolster international and regional peace and security architectures.

4.3. Coherence, Consistency, Complementarity and Synergies, and Leverage

The IcSP's performance on external interfaces and internal consistency is mixed and affected by several factors. Although its funding is relatively small in comparison to other EU EFIs, the IcSP is among the largest funds globally dedicated to peace and stability. The Instrument has not fully leveraged its position in relation other (EU and non-EU) peace and stability funds to coordinate on key systemic challenges in the sector. However, action and programme-specific coordination and leverage with external actors is largely robust and has helped advance EU dialogue and priorities with beneficiary governments and organisations, and in some cases led to parallel financing, co-financing, and joint implementation. When used for bridging long-term EFIs with greater financial capacity, the IcSP is acknowledged, but its 'political footprint' will be less visible.

In relation to EU institutions and activities, the IcSP has a number of functional interfaces, including with CSDP missions and DG ECHO. Whereas peace and security programming is seen in the DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as in the EDF and EU Trust Funds, effective synergies with the IcSP are hampered by the lack of flexibility and lengthy procedures of most EFIs. Nonetheless, the IcSP has been used in furtherance of the objectives of other instruments to 'gap-fill', as a forerunner for interventions by other (larger) instruments, and as a funding instrument of last resort. Actions and programmes under Article 3, 4, and 5 are aligned to meet the objectives of the Instrument itself, but there is variation in how joined-up they are.

4.4. The IcSP: Fit for Purpose?

Despite the absence of a baseline, the evaluation finds sufficient action/programme-level evidence to conclude that the IcSP has made important contributions to address threats to international and EU peace and security. It is an Instrument of critical relevance to the EU, and this relevance is likely to grow in the years to come.

The IcSP is deployed in contexts that involve newly emerged threats, and trends such as the rise of hybrid conflicts, securitisation, mass migration, and funding cuts, which together challenge, perhaps in an unprecedented way, the ability of global, regional, and national structures to promote peace and stability. In light of this, a continued fit-for-purpose IcSP should consider several key issues raised in this MTE, including:

- How to leverage the Instrument's position to engage in strategic dialogue with other global peace and security funds on systemic peace and security challenges, including funding cuts in the sector.
- How to find the right balance between non-securitised and securitised actions/programmes in the Instrument's contributions to EU security priorities and global commitments. Finding this balance includes further strengthening 'do no harm' and conflict-sensitivity approaches in IcSP actions/programmes in securitised sectors.
- How to bolster the strategic framework and synergies with the EEAS and other EU EFIs in work to strengthen international and regional peace and security architectures.
- How to ensure that the evidence-base that underpins the design of IcSP actions and programmes reflects the rise of emerged threats and hybrid conflicts.

Within the EU institutional and policy context, ensuring that the IcSP continues to be internally fit-for-purpose means addressing several key challenges identified in the sections above:

- How to build a baseline for the Instrument that reflects its programmable and non-programmable components and the political outcomes it generates.
- How to maintain and ensure the Instrument's continued speed, flexibility, niche, and risk-taking approach.
- How to further improve synergies between the Instrument and DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, as well as with the EDF and EU Trust Funds, especially in view of peace and security programming in these.

5. Recommendations

5.1. Ensure IcSP continuity post-2020

The European Commission, EEAS, European Parliament, and European Council should ensure IcSP continuity post 2020. Given peace and security trends and the value of the IcSP as vehicle of implementing EU priorities, the IcSP should be maintained as an EU EFI.

5.2. Build an IcSP baseline

FPI and DEVCO B5 should build an IcSP baseline⁷⁸ that enables better future performance measurement. Among other elements, the baseline needs to reflect the programmable and non-programmable parts of the Instrument and the political nature of Instrument outcomes.

5.3. Improve the overall strategic framework for the IcSP

The EEAS and European Commission should develop an EDF and EU EFI strategic framework that sets directions and principles for efforts to strengthen the global and regional peace and security architecture and address the global funding deficit for peace and development. Building on the Global Strategy and the Commission's Proposal for a New European Consensus on Development, the IcSP should fund a research and strategy formulation process that yields an evidenced strategy to guide efforts by EU EFIs and EUTFs to strengthen the global and regional peace and security architecture, and financing of key United Nations agencies, international and regional organisations, and civil society organisations working on peace and development.

FPI and DEVCO B5 should systematically monitor and assess levels and types of peace and security programming in the EDF, other EU EFIs, and funding modalities. Particular attention should be placed on the EDF, DCI, ENI, IPA II, EIDHR, and EU Trust Funds. This data should be used to guide appropriate coordination between the IcSP, the EDF, other EU EFIs, and Trust Funds, and maximise opportunities for synergies.

FPI and DEVCO B5 should define, beyond existing guidance, a comprehensive approach to 'do no harm' and conflict-sensitivity in actions/programmes in securitised sectors. This may involve requiring more robust risk assessment and a 'do no harm'/conflict-sensitivity framework⁷⁹ for actions/programmes in securitised sectors.

5.4. Engage in strategic dialogue on systemic challenges with other peace and stability funds

The EEAS, together with FPI and DEVCO B5 should regularise strategic dialogue with other peace and stability funds on systemic challenges affecting the sector. Such dialogue should leverage the IcSP to further promote EU external action priorities in peace and security as laid out in the Global Strategy and the Commission's Proposal for a New European Consensus on Development, and address peace and security challenges identified in this MTE.

⁷⁸ A "baseline" is defined here as the measurement of conditions at the start of a project or programme, against which subsequent progress can be assessed.

⁷⁹ The application of a "do no harm" approach is taking the necessary care to ensure that an action or programme does not have negative effects on efforts to promote peace and stability. It means considering the potential impacts of an action or programme on a range of factors (such as human rights, good governance, community cohesion, local conflict dynamics, etc.) and making adjustments in the design and implementation phases to mitigate the risk of negative knock-on effects.

5.5. Address identified action/programme-level challenges in the IcSP

FPI and DEVCO B5 should ensure continued IcSP performance by addressing action/programme level challenges identified in the MTE. These include:

- *FPI should improve, where necessary and possible, speed and flexibility in Article 3 actions.*⁸⁰This can involve the establishment of a task force within FPI to review Article 3 actions where speed and flexibility has been suboptimal and develop remedial and actionable recommendations within the IcSP Regulation.
- *FPI should create a facility under the IcSP to fund small actions without a formal decision-making procedure.* FPI should explore the re-establishment of a PAMF-like facility, aligned to the IcSP Regulation that enables it to fund small actions without requiring time-consuming and formal decision-making processes.
- *FPI and DEVCO B5 should ensure a solid analytical grounding of IcSP actions and programmes.* Better contextual and conflict analysis (particularly in relation to hybrid conflicts and associated threats), as well as mapping of related donor and partner countries activities, is needed in Article 3, 4, and 5. The IcSP should set minimum standards for such analyses, require contextual and conflict analysis (where relevant and possible) for its actions and programmes, fund these from a facility under the IcSP akin to the former PAMF, and store these analyses in its central databases.
- *FPI should identify opportunities for greater investment under Article 3 to seize windows of opportunity for peace*⁸¹. This may include closer cooperation with the early warning system operated by EEAS⁸² and developing guidance to IcSP focal points and implementing partners that explains the value added seen by the IcSP in identifying and seizing windows of opportunity for peace in countries affected by protracted conflict.
- *FPI and DEVCO B5 should provide guidance for EU personnel and implementing partners on hybrid conflicts and associated threats.* The IcSP should commission the development of a manual that provides analytical and design guidance to EU staff and implementing partners on how to address hybrid conflicts and associated threats.
- *FPI and DEVCO B5 should require transition or exit strategies for Article 3 actions and explicit Theories of Change (ToC) in IcSP actions/programmes.* FPI should integrate a transition/exit strategy component into the design and decision templates for Article 3 actions. FPI and DEVCO B5 should integrate a theory of change component into the design and decision templates for IcSP actions and programmes (across all Articles); and align ToCs to M&E systems.
- *FPI and DEVCO B5 should discourage over-ambitious logical frameworks and indicators in IcSP actions and programmes.* IcSP personnel and implementing partners should be discouraged from designing actions and programmes with over-ambitious metrics that carry unrealistic expectations and promises. Guidance may need to be developed for implementing partners to ensure metrics are well informed of context and conditions, and to make actions/programmes efficient and effective within a realistic framework.

⁸⁰ Similar issues also apply to some Article 4 and 5 programmes and solutions found by the EUTFs may be usefully considered.

⁸¹ The concept of a 'window of opportunity for peace' typically refers to the early signs that a ceasefire, basic talks between conflicting parties, or peace process may be possible. In peace mediation practice, an inter-changeable term is 'peace ripeness', which can also be facilitated and promoted through actions that begin to prepare or encourage parties to talk.

⁸² This may require some adjustment to the EEAS early warning system. Specifically, the evaluators understand that there is no capacity in the current system to monitor important issues such as 'peace ripeness' in crises or protracted conflict contexts.

- *FPI and DEVCO B5 should bolster data collection and management associated to actions/programmes.* This should include centrally storing context, thematic, and conflict analyses related to actions/programmes, as well as budgets and proposals prepared by implementing partners.
- *FPI and DEVCO B5 should commission studies on mainstreaming and risk management in actions/programmes during implementation.* This should include a review of how actions/programmes have mainstreamed cross-cutting priorities during implementation, and how actions/programmes have identified and managed risks during implementation.

6. Appendices

6.1. The IcSP in a global context

The IcSP is implemented in a context of evolving peace and security trends and a developing global peace and security architecture. Its relevance, effectiveness, impact, sustainability, added value, and how 'fit for purpose' it is as an Instrument derives in part from its responsiveness to these trends and the contribution it makes to the global architecture.

Much is written about emerged (and emerging) threats, and peace and security trends. The best summary, perhaps, is that while the causes of war and instability are old and recognisable, their dynamics today are new⁸³. In a reflection on recent conflicts in Syria, Mali, and Libya, a 2014 Clingendael research paper notes, *"The main problems for the international community emerging from this most recent wave of conflicts – their intractability, the risk of an unpredictable spill-over of organised violence and the limited relevance of existing global security institutions – derive in large part from the evolutionary dynamic of modern organised violence, rather than the initial causes"*.⁸⁴ This evolutionary dynamic, which has accelerated over the last 15 years, is best understood by talking about 'emerged threats', which are described in Box 5.

It is also an evolutionary dynamic fuelled by three over-arching peace and security trends; hybrid conflicts, securitisation, and mass displacement.

The first trend, which in part flows from the emerged threats, is the rise of **hybrid conflicts**, defined as *"violent conflicts or situations of widespread violence where elements of grievance, greed, and/or extremism are intertwined – and where climate changes may play a role"*⁸⁵, but also that involve a mix of internal country and cross-border dynamics.

The prevalence of hybrid conflicts in many countries (e.g. North-eastern Nigeria, Syria/Iraq, Mali, Somalia, Afghanistan/Pakistan, etc.) has important implications for assumptions that underpin the (often grievance-premised) understanding of what it takes to promote peace and security.

The second and perhaps contentious trend is the **securitisation of peace and development**⁸⁶. Respondents interviewed distinguished between actions on the security-development nexus (greater attention in development to *insecurity*, which is in line with thinking on the need to build peace in order to promote

Box 5: Emerged peace and security threats

There is a growing consensus both in the literature and from key informant interviews that emerged peace and security threats today include fragmented conflicts, criminalised conflict, extremism and terrorism, and climate change.

The **fragmentation of violent conflict** has two main (and interlinked) dimensions. The first is that today's 'new wars' are highly localised. For example, the conflict in North-eastern Nigeria is often interpreted as between Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. However, it is rooted in conflict fault-lines within communities and towns, between ethnicities, and groups within ethnicities. The second relates to the fragmentation of armed groups. This can be seen in the proliferation of non-state armed groups, the engagement of criminal and extremist groups in conflict, and consequently "in the decentralized multiplication of fronts and factions engaged in conflict".

The notion of **criminalised conflict** gained traction in 2004 with Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's research on "greed and grievance in civil war" and work on "armed violence" defined by the OECD/DAC as "the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death, or psychosocial harm which undermines development". The difference between the two is illustrated by conflicts in the DRC or Somalia (criminalized conflict) and violence in Jamaica or parts of Mexico (armed violence situations). A useful definition of criminalised conflict is, "a violent conflict situation characterised by the widespread use by armed groups of illicit economic activities to fund insurgent activities or otherwise derive personal gain".

Extremism and terrorism is often framed in terms of events seen unfolding in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine; but also more recently in attacks in Norway, Turkey, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium and Germany. Definitions of extremism and terrorism (but terrorism in particular) are contentious, and definitions used will either serve to extend or contract the list of countries seen as affected by it. Situations where terrorist acts (e.g. mass atrocities, symbolic killings, such as public beheadings, etc.) or violence is used against civilians or civilian targets by armed groups are numerous – and span currently or in the recent past Africa (Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, etc.), Asia (Afghanistan, Thailand (South), Pakistan, etc.), Europe (Russia (North Caucasus)), Central and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia), and the MENA region (Iraq, Syria, Yemen).

Climate change is seen as a conflict and security threat multiplier and magnifier, although how it does so (and will in the future) is subject to debate. Research by Sol Hsiang and Marshall Burke (2014), which reviews a variety of case studies and types of conflict concludes that "it seems likely that climatic changes influence conflict through multiple pathways that may differ between contexts" [and] "there is considerable suggestive evidence that economic factors are important mechanisms, especially in low income settings where extreme climate often quite directly affects economic conditions through agriculture."

⁸³ See <https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Conflict,%20security%20and%20emerging%20threats%20-%20Ivan%20Briscoe.pdf>

⁸⁴ Idem

⁸⁵ See <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1009-early-warning-and-response-to-violent-conflict-time-for-a-rethink>

⁸⁶ See footnote 3 for a short definition of how 'securitisation' is applied in the MTE or Box 4 for more details.

development; the need to address security issues as part of broader peace-making and peace-building efforts (e.g. through DDR and SSR efforts); and the need to strengthen civilian oversight and management of security forces, on the one hand, and securitisation trends, on the other, particularly the shift in development (and peace-building) from a human security focus to alignment with national security interests (such as those related to CT/CVE, organised crime, and cybersecurity); and active use of development and peace-building approaches to stabilise localities following military action (e.g. “hot stabilisation” of areas taken from insurgents).⁸⁷

A number of respondents argued that securitisation has increased over the last 15 years, and echoed findings in research that this has an “unwelcome and negative impact on key development areas, such as social development, human rights and governance reform”.⁸⁸ Risks identified and that are associated to securitised activities, include problem over-simplification, amplified trauma and new conflict fault-lines, lost neutrality, negative effects on EU cross-cutting priorities, and operational dilemmas.

The third trend relates to **refugee and migration flows**. According to UNHCR data, the number of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returnees and stateless persons are the highest in recorded history. Refugee and migration flows to Europe have received a great deal of political attention, but population movements in source regions dwarf these numbers. As explained in an EU Trust Fund study on migration in the Horn of Africa, “[they] move across what are often short distances, and many remain displaced and in conditions of political and economic insecurity for decades. Mass displacement itself can be a trigger for further instability, creating a spiral in which people become trapped”.⁸⁹ The impact of mass displacement on stability, of course, is not new – and is not necessarily a driver of instability. Indeed, Kenya has hosted refugees for 20 years from Sudan/South-Sudan and Somalia and remains stable. However, the size of current mass displacements and the complexity of its drivers may potentially make migration and internal displacement a contributor to instability in different parts of the world.

There is much literature on the global peace and security architecture, and this literature is not summarised here. Rather, two observations (or perceptions) made during KIIs (largely EU and UN officials, and European civil-society groups) are given, along with related evidence from the literature.

The 20th and 21st century methods and models divide A continued weakness in the global peace and security architecture noted in the literature and by interviewees is the use of 20th century methods of peace-making and peace-building in the 21st century context of hybrid conflicts. What this means is that the relevance analytical tools and intervention models, which historically have been grievance-focused, may become increasingly limited.

Finance and finance modalities are not commensurate with or adapted to the scale of the challenge. Finance for conflict, peace, and security work may be insufficient to address the magnitude of current challenges. Furthermore, interviewees and studies show that funding is hampered by a number of factors including challenges associated to multiple institutional mandates and budget lines, thus complicating efforts to ensure joined-up approaches; and a focus on risk avoidance rather than context-specific risk management, which address donor fiduciary and reputational risks rather than the risks of state failure and a return to conflict. Furthermore, there are few agreed upon crisis-specific strategies, and when these are in place, they often lack clear prioritisation. And finally, incoherence across instruments is driven by instrument designs that “are often based on specific institutional mandates and operating procedures rather than on effective delivery approaches. This has resulted in both duplication and a fragmentation of efforts”.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ See <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/Securitisation%20briefing%20pages.pdf>


⁸⁸ See https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_publication_docs/INTA91_1_08_Fisher_Anderson_0.pdf

⁸⁹ See <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8GXUDmZVqWtTkRXtndxN09tN0E/view>

⁹⁰ See http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3223/unu_cpr_financing_for_peacebuilding.pdf

6.2. IcSP Intervention Logic

INTERVENTION LOGIC OF THE INSTRUMENT CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND PEACE (ICSP)



* The term 'outcome' equals the term 'result' as in the new instructions from the Secretary General linked to the Better Regulation Guidelines and the development of Strategic Plans of DGs. Due to the fact that the IcSP is an external action instrument with a strong influence of OECD/DAC terminology, the term outcome is used.

** Threats including threats to law/order, to security/safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health

*** SALW = Small Arms and Light Weapons