ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND EU'S POLICIES ABROAD

FINAL REPORT ANNEXES

December 07, 2015

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex I: List of project contributors

Annex II: Literature review

Annex III: Comparative public opinion report

Annex IV: Comparative media report

Annex V: Social media report

Annex VI: Key points from Stock Taking Report

ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND EU'S POLICIES ABROAD

ANNEX I – LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

December 07, 2015

CORE TEAM

Table 1. Core team

(Public Policy and Management Institute) PPMI
Haroldas Brožaitis, Managing Director
Egidijus Barcevičius, Director, Research & Policy Advice
Elma Caicedo, Researcher
Levan Tsutskiridze, Researcher
Tadas Šarūnas, Senior Researcher
Gabrielius Sužiedėlis, Junior Researcher
(National Centre for Research on Europe) NCRE - University of Canterbury
Martin Holland, Director
Natalia Chaban, Associate Professor, Co-head of Department of Global, Cultural and Language Studies, University of Canterbury, Deputy Director
Olga Gulyaeva, Post-Doctoral Fellow
Gabriel Weibl, Post-Doctoral Fellow
NFG Research Group - Freie Universität Berlin
May-Britt U. Stumbaum, Head
Anja Lutz, Researcher
Johanna C. Günther, Researcher
Alina Ragge, Student Assistant

COUNTRY EXPERTS

Table 2. List of Country Experts

Country Experts (CES)
Brazil
Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Institute of International Relations (IRI)
Paula Sandrin, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Institute of International Relations (IRI)
Canada
Antoine Rayroux, Assistant Professor, Concordia University, Department of Political Science
China
Zhongqi Pan, Professor of International Relations, Fudan University, School of International Relations and Public Affairs
Suet-yi Lai, Post-doctoral Fellow, Tsinghua University, Department of International Relations
Yan Yee Cheung, Student, Hong Kong Baptist University, Department of Government and International Relations
Japan
Atsuko Higashino, Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba
Michito Tsuruoka, Senior Research Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies
Eijiro Fukui, Researcher, European Union Studies Institute (EUSI) Tokyo

India
Rajendra Jain, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Shreya Pandey, Assistant Professor, International Relations, Central University of Jharkhand.
Mexico
Roberto Dominguez, Associate Professor, Suffolk University Boston, Department of Government
Alejandro Chanona, Professor, National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM)
Diego M. Zambrano Marquez, PhD Candidate, Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, Florida International University
South Africa
Lorenzo Fioramonti, Professor of Political Economy, University of Pretoria, Director of Centre for Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria
Kirsty Agnew, Researcher, Centre for the Study of Governance Innovation, University of Pretoria
South Korea
Sunghoon Park, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Executive Director, KU-KIEP-SBS EU Centre, Korea University
Sae Won Chung, Visiting Research Fellow, KU-KIEP-SBS EU Centre, Korea University
Gawoon, Yoon, Researcher, KU-KIEP-SBS EU Centre, Korea University
Russia
Stepan Goncharov, Researcher, Levada-Center
Denis Volkov, Researcher, Levada-Center
Olga Gulyaeva, Post-Doctoral Fellow, NCRE
US
Roberto Dominguez, Associate Professor, Suffolk University Boston, Department of Government
Maxime H. A. Larivé, Research Associate, European Union Center at the University of Miami

PUBLIC OPINION POLL CONTRACTOR

The field work for the Public Opinion Poll was implemented by TNS Global.

SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS CONTRACTOR

The exploratory analysis of Twitter data was conducted by the Cybermetrics Research Group led by Professor Mike Thelwall at the University of Wolverhampton.

STEERING GROUP ASSIGNED TO THE STUDY

Internal to the EU institutions	
Name	DG/Unit
BECQUART Hughes	EAC E1, Cultural Diversity and Innovation Unit
CONTE Alfredo	EEAS DSG 2.2, Strategic Planning Division
CONTE Marzia	EAC E1, Cultural Diversity and Innovation Unit
DE CLERCK-SACHSSE Julia	EEAS SG.3, Strategic Communication Division
DE MATTEIS Pietro	FPI4, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Partnership Instrument Unit
GASPARINI Nicolo	EEAS SG.3, Strategic Communication Division
MAKINEN Paavo	COMM B1, Deputy head of Unit, Support and Partnership Unit
MANN Michael	EEAS SG.3, Strategic Communication Division
RUCHE Alain	EEAS SG, Special Advisor on Cultural Matters
ZORZAN Federico	EEAS, V.I. Americas, Regional Affairs
VAN VELZEN Eva	FPI4, Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Partnership Instrument Unit
External to the EU institutions	
Name	Title and Institution
ELGSTRÖM Ole	Pro-Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University <ole.elgstrom@svet.lu.se>
FIESCHI Catherine	Director, Counterpoint <catherine.fieschi@counterpoint.uk.com>
FISHER Rod	Director, International Intelligence on Culture <intelculture@yahoo.co.uk>
ISAR Yudhishthir Raj	Professor of Cultural Policy Studies, The American University of Paris <risar@aup.edu>
ISERNIA Pierangelo	FP7 - Transworld project <isernia@unisi.it>
MURRAY Andrew	Director, European Union Network of Cultural Institutes <andrew.murray@eunic-online.eu>
MACDONALD Stuart	Executive Director : Centre for Cultural Relations : University of Edinburg <S.Y.MacDonald@ed.ac.uk>
MELISSEN Jan	Senior Research Fellow, Netherland Institute of International Relations "Clingendael" <jmelissen@clingendael.nl>
OUCHATI Sana (observer)	Director, More Europe – External Cultural Relations <sana.ouchtati@moreeurope.org>
SCHWARZ Isabelle	European Cultural Foundation, Head of Advocacy, Research and Development <ISchwarz@culturalfoundation.eu>
WAGNER Gottfried	More Europe <gottfried.wagner7@gmail.com> or <gottfried.wagner@bmbf.gv.at>

ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND EU'S POLICIES ABROAD

ANNEX II - INTEGRATED LITERATURE REVIEW AND CURRENT PRACTICES IN EU PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

December 07, 2015

Table of Content

Executive Summary

Providing a thorough review of contemporary research on external perceptions of the EU and Europe with a focus on the EU's 10 Strategic Partner countries, the Literature Review (LitRev) spans twelve years of perception research and offers three core findings: trade and economy are dominating themes; existing research has a strong methodological focus on media analyses, descriptive and limited in themes, regions and groups analysed; Europe and the European Union are used interchangeably[1]. The LitRev provides a thorough analysis of perceptions of the EU/ Europe as well as an initial review of current EU Public Diplomacy initiatives[2]. Both parts – the literature review and the initial review of Public Diplomacy initiatives – will be integrated and assessed in order to filter for common foci and objectives. Drawing on a sketchy research body with limited comparability, the LitRev provides a first identification of core themes, trends and tools for the EU Public Diplomacy baseline.

Scope and methodology

Reviewing the state of the art in research on perceptions of the EU and Europe globally and from its 10 Strategic Partners (SP)[3], the LitRev stretches over a twelve year time frame from 2003 (European Security Strategy) to today, encompassing the financial and economic crisis since 2008, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and set up of the EEAS (2009) and the establishment of the Partnership Instrument (PI) in 2014. The reviewed volume amounts to 95 studies, articles and monographs covering 20 countries in English and SP national languages. Country Expert teams[4] based in the 10 SP countries supported the Berlin/ Taipei-based NFG team in charge of the LitRev.

The systematic analysis is structured along three sets of pre-defined parameters: A) the EU's eight main themes and their sub-themes (policy areas such as economy, science and research, environment, energy, political and social issues, development and culture)[5]; B) key research criteria (modes of impact including visibility, actorness, effectiveness, cognitive resonance and

---

[1] The LitRev will accordingly use Europe and European Union interchangeably throughout the report.

[2] This part will be assessed in further detail in the Final Report.

[3] The EU has concluded strategic partnerships with Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Russia and the USA.

[4] The study is operationalised by the core team of PPMI, NFG and NCRE, supported by 10 Country Expert teams consisting of SP national experts on EU studies. For further information, please see Section 2.1 of the Interim Report.

[5] Themes and sub-themes are: Economy (Finance, Investment, Trade, Agriculture, Industry); Science, Research and Technology (R&D, Innovation, IPR, Research Cooperation, Technology Transfer); Political (Internal: EU institutions affairs, Human rights; External. Security, Foreign policy, Effective multilateralism, Human rights, Mass migration/ refugees); Energy (Security of supply, Sustainability, Competitiveness); Development (Aid/ Poverty alleviation, Disaster relief); Environment (Climate change, Biodiversity); Social (Education, Migration, Integration, Refugees); Cultural (Visual and performing arts, Sports, Music). For more details on the themes and sub-themes please refer to the Interim Report.

normative power)[6] and C) explanatory variables (local conditions representing history, culture, political context, training/ education, translation)[7].

Core findings

The LitRev provides four central findings: A) *themes*: the EU is mainly seen as an economic and trade power, ranked second is the perception as a political actor; the EU is almost not visible in the areas of research, culture and social development; B) *research*: perception research is characterised by a substantial methodological focus on media analyses, rather descriptive writings and a limited selection of themes, target groups and regions analysed; C) Economy and culture are the thematic areas mostly featured in EU PD initiatives, while outreach to academia and youth could be enhanced further; D) *EU/ Europe*: EU and Europe are used interchangeably across analysed studies and countries, driven by limited knowledge on/ awareness of the EU. Despite a gradual change due to events such as the financial crisis, Foreign Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations and the EEAS establishment, the overall trends in perceptions have remained consistent in and across countries over the twelve years period.

Perceptions of the EU's economic power and the EU's political power vary the most from each other and within each theme: Elites (such as business and policy-makers) and the general public are the target groups mentioning economy and trade the most, with neutral to negative connotations. Negative assessments are assigned to allegations of perceived neo-colonialist behaviour of the EU (South Africa), alleged protectionist tendencies (Canada) of the EU or distrust in the EU's economic power after the financial crisis (USA, China). The Strategic Partner countries ambivalently assess the EU's political power: East and Southeast Asian countries rather welcome the EU's political actorness (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines); American countries (Mexico, USA, Canada, Brazil) reject the image. In terms of modes of impact, across all policy areas (themes), studies focus primarily on the EU's visibility. The EU's normative power increasingly gains attention, particularly in security-related fields. Effectiveness and actorness only come up in reference to specific sub-themes, such as trade and human rights. Concerning

---

[6] Drawing on terminology used in perception research, Visibility measures the extent to which EU/ Europe is visible and how this visibility is perceived; Actorness measures whether the EU/ Europe is perceived as active and its actions are perceived as cohesive or non-cohesive. Effectiveness is the extent to which the EU is perceived as successful/unsuccessful in reaching its intended goals. Cognitive resonance is the extent to which perceptions differ when the EU is portrayed as acting unto itself vs acting unto the country concerned, or its neighbouring region. Normative Power is a horizontal dimension and focuses on particular actions of the EU and as what kind of actor it is perceived. For more details on the modes of impact please refer to part 3.1.1 of the Interim Report.

[7] Cultural differences/ similarities can lead to a preference for/ indifference towards/ rejection of EU policies; specific cultures might be more open towards 'learning from the outside' than others; Translation refers to differences/ similarities in language/ connotation and translation that can lead to smooth or malfunctioning comprehension/ communication. History can have an impact on what is perceived as well as how. Training/ education can shape perceptions based on experiences. The political context is important to understand the environment in which the EU policies are being implemented/ adopted/ rejected. For more details on local context please refer to section 3.1.4 of the Interim Report.

local conditions in third countries that influence EU's image abroad, the studies primarily refer to history and culture as prime local factors explaining specific perceptions. Other local conditions, such as education (Erasmus and other programmes) and training, are hardly mentioned by interviewees and studies in the existing research settings.

The key negative factor influencing the external perception of the EU is perceived to be a lack of information on the EU and, vice versa, a perceived lack of understanding of national particularities/ local contexts of the partner countries on the EU side. The EU is also viewed as lacking actorness and effectiveness when it comes to non-economic contexts. The EU's ability for effective communication is viewed as constrained by complex external and internal communication structures and limited resources, leading to mixed or even contradictory messages.

Assessment of the state of EU perceptions research

The currently existing research body on external perceptions of the EU is characterised by a lion share of media analyses while including a plethora of methodological approaches from social science, anthropology, and cultural science, . Further features are a patchy geographical reach, a limited number of analysed target groups, themes (policy areas) and local conditions. Beyond economy and trade, themes like culture, science, research and technology are heavily under-researched. Energy and environment related studies have only emerged recently, along the generally growing interest in these themes. In terms of impact modes, besides the emphasis put on studying the EU's visibility in media and general public's perceptions of the EU, impact factors such as cognitive resonance, i.e. does a certain initiative/ policy of the EU resonate with specific topics/ circumstances in the target country, are rarely studied. Research on the extent of the EU's normative power, especially in security-related fields, is on the rise, while effectiveness and actorness are only considered in the context of the EU's economic power respectively development aid and human rights policies.

Local conditions identified as triggering differing perceptions of the EU and Europe provide only partial explanations: history and cultural differences top the ranking, while other factors such as translational issue or education are almost nowhere considered[8]. The impact of political contexts – democracy/ non-democratic systems – is only stressed with regard to particular EU policies, such as the promotion of rule of law.

---

[8] Translational issues particularly come into play in countries with less international influence in daily life respectively less wide use of English even among elites. This it e.g. the case in many Asian SP countries. Moreover, in its research on the role of perception in EU-China and EU-India security policy, the NFG could identify that education such as Erasmus programmes etc. played a key role in the likeliness of norm diffusion from the EU to China and India and for the likeliness of cooperation.

Key target groups in the focus of the studies are mostly limited to business elites, policy-makers, media and the general public. Youth and academia[9] are rarely explicitly studied, despite their eventual role in current and future policy decisions in the SP countries.

Limited by mixed methodological approaches, a confined number of target groups and the dominance of economy as analysed policy area, the comparability of studies is further bound by an uneven geographical spread with most studies focusing on Asian countries, while other regions such as Africa, the Americas or the group of BRICS countries lack sufficient coverage. Lacking clear definitions of the terms, EU and Europe are used interchangeably.

Outlook

Summarising existing literature, the EU is perceived as a powerful player in a multipolar world only in economic and trade relations.

The initial review of current EU PD initiatives and respective literature show that particularly two aspects are essential for future EU PD: a.) a deeper understanding of the local conditions in third countries in which EU policies are communicated and b.) the use of tailor-made Public Diplomacy instruments and initiatives to communicate the EU image and specific EU policies in target countries. Corresponding to these findings, a Best Practise Report[10], part of the Final Report, will present current experiences with existing initiative to contribute to a comprehensive basis for the subsequent policy recommendations.

Drawing on a sketchy research body with limited comparability, the LitRev provides a first identification of core themes, trends and tools as well as an overview over current PD initiatives. These will be further refined in the subsequent analysis of media, social media, a public opinion survey, individual interviews and a Best Practises Report for the required development of an EU Public Diplomacy baseline and applicable policy recommendations.

---

[9] Representatives of think tanks and academia are regularly included in semi-structured interviews of qualitative interviews, yet not explicitly analysed as a target group as comparable to business elites.

[10] The Best Practices Report gives an overview of existing PD strategies by EU and other major international actors. It summarises existing efforts and lessons learned on the general level as well as an overview of Best Practices from the EU Delegation sin the 10 Strategic Partner countries, concluding with an outlook on identified gaps.

1 Analysing the State of the Art of Perceptions Studies

The LitRev's first part analyses the state of the art of research on external perceptions of the EU and Europe, in order to identify a first take on themes, trends and tools for an EU Public Diplomacy baseline. The main objective is to systematically map, analyse and synthetise along pre-defined parameters the findings of existing work on the perception of the EU and Europe and its policies from the external perspective of its partner countries. In its second part, the LitRev furthermore offers an initial review of current Public Diplomacy initiatives and thus aims at analysing the EU's and Europe's soft power capacities and capabilities needed for an effective integrated Public Diplomacy strategy[11]. Both parts are integrated and analysed in a next step to create a baseline for up-to-date policy recommendations in the Final Report. The terms 'European Union' and 'Europe' have been used interchangeably throughout most of the studies; the LitRev attempts to use the terms in a differentiated manner where possible.

The first part of the LitRev including the aggregated analysis and the individual country summaries refers to existing literature on perceptions towards the EU and EU policies. Studies and polls such as the World Value Survey (WVS), the German Marshall Fund's studies on 'Transatlantic Trends', Eurobarometer or Latinobarómetro are taken into account where relevant to the LitRev.

The second part aims at giving an initial overview of existing PD initiatives in the EU's 10 Strategic Partner countries. This portrayal will be further elaborated in the 'Best Practises Report'[12] as an integral part of the Final Report.

1.1 Introduction

The analysis of perceptions of third countries is defined in the literature as a means to reflect upon the effectiveness of the EU's communicational skills with regard to specific themes and policy areas (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009). This is an opportunity to evaluate and adjust the EU's foreign policy objectives and communication strategies according to local circumstances. External perceptions are seen as a key to determine if third countries consider the EU an attractive partner for cooperation on the regional and global scale (Bersick 2012). In this regard, Public Diplomacy is viewed as part of the execution of soft power to enhance the EU's and Europe's visibility, actorness and effectiveness and can be a major tool for changing perceptions.

---

[11] For the purpose of this assignment Public Diplomacy is defined as a set of tools and actions whereby an entity (e.g. country or another organisation) seeks to build trust, increase the understanding of its culture and policies and ultimately positively influence its perception by engaging with third countries' publics beyond the diplomatic and government-to-government avenues (Inception Report 2015: 11)

[12] see fn 50.

Since the early 2000s, the body of literature on the outsiders' perceptions on the EU, Europe and specific EU policy areas is flourishing. It interprets perceptions from a variety of academic angles, disciplines – ranging from social sciences, international relations, communication studies, philosophy to anthropology – and methodological approaches. Categories of analysis range from regions to individual nations, addressing specific themes and policy areas of foreign policy as well as specific target groups.

The present study encompasses 95 studies, articles and monographs, comprising 20 countries: the 10 Strategic Partners of the EU – Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Russia and the USA – plus Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Kenya, Ukraine and Senegal.

The time frame of literature spans over twelve years and includes major turning points of the EU foreign policy and their potential impact on external perceptions: starting in 2003, when the European Security Strategy (EES) was ratified, the period contains the financial and economic crisis starting in 2008, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the announcement of the Partnership Instrument (PI) in 2014.

Comparability across existing research data sets and results remains limited due to the use of different methodologies and foci of analysis. For a common framework of analysis, the review follows a pre-defined sets of parameters, with the chosen terms drawn from the main EU policy fields and existing research: A) eight 'main themes' with sub-themes (economy, science and research, environment, energy, political and social issues, development and culture)[13]; B) 'key research criteria' concerning modes of impact (visibility, actorness, effectiveness, cognitive resonance and normative power)[14] and C) 'explanatory variables' referring to local conditions (history, culture, political context, training/ education, translation)[15].

---

[13] Themes and sub-themes are: Economy (Finance, Investment, Trade, Agriculture, and Industry); Science, Research and Technology (R&D, Innovation, IPR, Research Cooperation, Technology Transfer); Political (Internal: EU institutions affairs, Human rights; External. Security, Foreign policy, Effective multilateralism, Human rights, Mass migration/ refugees); Energy (Security of supply, Sustainability, Competitiveness); Development (Aid/ Poverty alleviation, Disaster relief); Environment (Climate change, Biodiversity); Social (Education, Migration, Integration, Refugees); Cultural (Visual and performing arts, Sports, Music). For more details on the themes and sub-themes please refer to the Interim Report.

[14] Visibility measures the extent to which EU/ Europe is visible and how this visibility is perceived; Actorness measures whether the EU/ Europe is perceived as active and its actions are perceived as cohesive or non-cohesive. Effectiveness is the extent to which the EU is perceived as successful/ unsuccessful in reaching its intended goals. Cognitive resonance is the extent to which perceptions differ when the EU is portrayed as acting unto itself vs acting unto the country concerned, or its neighbouring region. Normative Power is a horizontal dimension and focuses on particular actions of the EU and as what kind of actor it is perceived. For more details on the modes of impact please refer to part 3.1.1 of the Interim Report.

[15] Cultural differences/ similarities can lead to a preference for/ indifference towards/ rejection of EU policies; specific cultures might be more open towards 'learning from the outside' than others; Translation refers to

The cross-country, cross-topic analysis is complemented by an overview of current EU Public Diplomacy initiatives as well as country-focused literature reviews produced by 10 teams of Country Experts (CE)[16], following a common template guaranteeing comparability across countries and literature. The CEs contribute to a better understanding of the perception of topics, policies and target groups most relevant in individual countries and across regions, ensure the inclusion of literature in national languages apart from English and point to under-researched areas.

The LitRev consists of three main parts: (1) an overview of the state of the art of research on external perceptions of the EU, Europe and individual EU policies; (2) an initial review of EU Public Diplomacy programmes and initiatives across countries, the summary of main themes and target groups and the identification of obstacles and gaps; (3) country-focused summaries of the perceptions of the EU and Europe in the eyes of its Strategic Partners. The report concludes with a summary of main gaps and obstacles identified in research and practice.

1.2   Economy

The EU is predominantly viewed as an economic and trade power with primarily neutral and partly negative connotations due to allegations of perceived neo-colonialist behaviour and economic protectionism.

In the analysed studies – with the research body being dominated by media analyses, partly combined with elite interviews –, mass media (print and television) predominantly frames the EU as an economic actor in all geographical regions examined. The degree of dominance of this framing varies within regions: in East Asia for example, the image of the EU as an economic power is by far the most visible in South Korea, while in Japan and China media also focus on other roles like the political actorness of the EU (Bacon and Kato 2013; Gulyaeva 2013; Lai and Zhang 2013; Yoon 2013; Chaban et al. 2009). The European sovereign debt crisis has further increased the share of economically focused news of the EU. The crisis has also changed the tone of news media in some countries, e.g. China and South Korea (Yoon 2013): evaluations turned considerably more negative compared to previous data sets (Lai and Zhang 2013). In this context, the European Central Bank (ECB) became the most visible institution even before the

---

differences/ similarities in language/ connotation and translation that can lead to smooth or malfunctioning comprehension/ communication. History can have an impact on what is perceived as well as how. Training/ education can shape perceptions based on experiences. The political context is important to understand the environment in which the EU policies are being implemented/ adopted/ rejected. For more details on local context please refer to part 3.1.4 of the Interim Report.

[16] The study is operationalised by the core team of PPMI, NFG and NCRE, supported by 10 Country Expert teams consisting of national experts on EU studies and located permanently in the 10 Strategic Partner countries of the EU.

European Commission (EC) (Hwee and Yeong 2013; Lai and Zhang 2013; Yoon 2013). In Japan, media portrays economically framed news generally rather negative (Bacon and Kato 2013).

Public opinion polls, particularly conducted in Asian countries, show that the general public attributes primarily economic images, such as 'trade power', 'economic powerhouse', 'currency'/ 'Euro', 'economic integration' to the EU (Chaban et al. 2013; Gulyaeva 2013; Hwee and Yeong 2013; Lai and Zhang 2013; Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013; Lucarelli 2013; Wong 2012; Zhang 2010; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009; Chaban et al. 2009; Holland et al. 2007; Lucarelli 2007; Chaban et al. 2006). During and after the sovereign debt crisis, the EU's state of economy, concrete ECB policy-making and the actions of individual Member States (particularly Germany), became more visible among the general public (Yoon 2013; Chaban et al. 2009). Pew opinion polls in the USA showed that 78 per cent of the participants found the European economic crisis to be a major or minor threat to the US (PEW 2013). In South Korea, the crisis has not changed the general public's evaluation of the EU's economic role – it has only increased its visibility. In general, among the general public in Asian as well as American countries[17], the EU receives less than or similar attention as the 'Big Three' Member States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom (UK). Chinese general public is an exception in that matter, perceiving the EU as a unified actor (Wong 2012; Zhang 2011).

The predominant perception of elites (political, academic, business and from or civil society) of the EU as an economic power (Elgström 2006; Jain 2007a; Lucarelli 2013; Zhang 2011) has only marginally changed during the economic crisis (Gulyaeva 2013; Lai and Zhang 2013; Chaban et al. 2013) and on average across all studies. An exception from this trend is India, where the EU is perceived as a 'very good economic power' by Indian business elites, yet, under the impression of the crisis, saw a change in perception towards viewing the EU as suffering losses on its economic strength. Indian media and policy-makers agree on this and regard the EU with a loss of its agenda-setting capabilities as an economic power (Jain and Pandey 2013). Chinese elites on the other hand are still enthusiastic about the EU's role in the international economy despite the financial crisis (Lai and Zhang 2013; Dong 2010).

In general, media presents the most negative perception of the EU's economic power compared to elites and the general public (Lai and Zhang 2013; Saraiva 2012; Jain and Pandey 2010). The assessment of the EU's economic power differs according to target group and sub-theme: criticism particularly derives from allegations of protectionism, subsidies and exclusion. Especially elites in countries like India, Canada, Australia and Brazil, which heavily rely on agriculture, express this view (Lucarelli 2013; Jain and Pandey 2012a; Elgström 2007; Fioramonti 2007). In Brazil, a study on elites' perceptions of the EU from 2008 drew a contrasting picture demonstrating an overall positive assessment of the EU as an economic actor supposedly causing positive effects on the national economy (Fioramonti and Poletti 2008). In Japan, a minority of elites has a rather negative image of the EU and sees a stagnation

---

[17] American countries include Canada, United States, Mexico and Brazil.

of the EU-Japan relations due to lengthy Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations. In contrast, most of the media coverage of the EU as an economic power presents a neutral view (Bacon 2013). South Korean students attribute a positive role to the EU for the development of the global economy which will contribute to world peace (Zang 2013). The general public in Korea on the other hand, assesses the EU as a one-dimensional economic powerhouse (Yoon 2013), while Korean media even portray the EU as an insensitive, self-interested 'trading giant' (Yoon et al. 2010). Korean elites, however, have a high regard for the EU as an economic actor, while Vietnamese elites accuse it of protectionist tendencies (Wong 2012).

1.2.1 Trade and finance

Trade and finance is the 'economy' sub-theme that is most mentioned, with national elites considering it the most important issue. The EU's image as a 'trade power' has been damaged in the course of the sovereign debt crisis, but is still dominant.

Depending on the region, media analyses have found trade respectively finance to be portrayed most often in media: while South Korean media predominantly report on EU trade-related issues, Japanese media more often frame finance-related images (Chaban et al. 2009). Media tends to be critical in its reports on the EU's trade power: Brazilian as well as Australian media criticise the EU's protectionist tendencies (Saraiva 2012; Lucarelli 2007). After the economic crisis trade issues remained at the core of EU news reporting with a new focus on the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis.

The general public in the United States (Sperling 2009), Brazil (Saraiva 2012) and Australia (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013) widely perceive the EU's dominant role in international trade, and further regard the actorness of individual EU Member States as equally important.. Chinese perceptions towards the EU – a particularly well researched area, partly a consequence of substantive EU funding for China-related studies – cover general trade topics as well as trade disputes between China and the EU (i.e. anti-dumping in different industrial sectors) (Lucarelli 2013; Lai and Zhang 2013). General public in Australia and New Zealand are mostly concerned about trade relations and their impacts on the national economy (Holland 2015).

In the eyes of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, South African and Brazilian elites, the EU is foremost described as a trade and financial partner and major market in the world, offering opportunities for economic development and growth (Braghiroli and Salini 2014; Jain 2014a; Bacon and Kato 2013; Lucarelli 2013; Lucarelli 2007). The perceptions yet slightly differ from country to country: in the light of the FTA with South Korea, Korean elites' foremost perceive the EU to positively effect on the Korean economy, including the expansion of markets, reduced market risks and reduced transaction costs mentioned, linking the image of the EU as a global power to its trade power (Park and Yoon 2010). Indian elites accentuate the EU's skills in trade negotiations (Jain and Pandey 2010), as do South East Asian elites, who picture the EU as a solid defender of its economic interest (Portela 2010). Additionally, elites in South East Asia widely

acknowledge the EU as an international leader in the areas of commerce, free movement of capital, trade and finance (Chaban et al. 2013; Portela 2010). Although Brazilian elites have found to be overall critical of the EU's trade power due to protectionism allegations, they generally perceived the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations as positive (Lucarelli 2007). Furthermore, Brazilian elites evaluate trade and direct investment as the most important areas for future co-operation between Brazil and the EU (Saraiva 2012).

The debt crisis has been portrayed in Chinese media primarily as an 'internal EU problem' with reports drawing an increasingly negative picture of the EU, leading to a noticeable decrease of Chinese elites' perceptions of the EU as a strong trade power. However, the Chinese elites do not feel their own interests affected by the 'internal EU problem and grant the EU a continued overall positive role in the international economic system (see above, 'economy'). At the same time, the relevance of bilateral relations with individual Member States is seen as increasing (Lai and Zhang 2013). US general public on the other hand feels that the EU's financial and economic troubles pose a threat to the US economy (PEW 2013).

1.2.2   Agriculture

Agriculture is most often mentioned in developing countries and countries with strong agricultural sectors, and assessed rather critically due to accused protectionism and perceived favourism of the EU towards developed countries which in turn causes a loss of credibility for the EU.

In Brazil and Australia, according to media analyses, agriculture ranks second behind trade as the most visible theme in mass media (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013; Lucarelli 2007). News in Australia and New Zealand highlight the topic of EU agricultural policies in general and EU subsidies in particular (Holland et al. 2005; Kelly 2013; Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013). Japan is an exception as agriculture-related topics are found to be almost non-existent in the news as well as public opinion (Bacon and Kato 2013; Chaban, Schneider and Malthus 2009).

Across the general public in African countries, agriculture is often linked to financial and technological aid the EU provides as well as protectionist tendencies in its supposedly 'anti-liberal' agricultural policy (Chaban et al. 2013, Chaban et al. 2012; Schmidt 2012; Olivier in Ortega 2004). In Canada – where visibility of the EU is generally low – agriculture is one of the most visible issues (Malone 2011). In New Zealand and Thailand, agriculture is the most visible theme after economy in public opinion and perceived to be an important area for eventual future cooperation (Chaban et al. 2009).

Different elites studies' results – especially in respect to developing countries and rising powers such as Brazil, India, South Africa, Vietnam – indicate that national elites perceive the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as means to influence the global trade structure in favour of the developed world and to limit the opportunities of economic growth for countries that

depend on the export of their agricultural products (Chaban et al. 2012; Malone 2011; Portela 2010; Elgström 2007; Lucarelli 2007; Holland et al. 2007; Holland and Chaban 2005). The compliance with standards on agricultural products dominate elite perceptions in Thailand and Malaysia (Portela 2010). Developed countries with particularly strong agricultural sectors, for instance Canada (Malone 2011; Croci and Tossutti 2007), Australia (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013), and New Zealand (Kelly 2013), confirm this negative assessment accusing the EU of double standards in its CAP. In view of the EU's stand in international trade negotiations, policy-makers involved in WTO negotiations link the protectionism allegations in the agricultural policy to the EU's lack of credibility and consistency. This perception leads to a generally sceptical approach towards EU initiatives – with a spill-over effect also in other areas than agriculture (Elgström 2006).

1.3   Science, research and technology

This thematic area has not been part of thorough analyses: while generally being invisible across countries and target groups, topics relating to 'Science, Research and Technology' have been mentioned and assessed positively on the margins in East Asian, South Asian and Southeast Asian countries.

The small amount of articles published on research and education in Japan and South Korea dominate coverage of the EU in their assessment of the EU's role as a social actor. Media portray Japan as a technologically advanced actor that has an interest in the EU's technological programmes, research ventures and competing research projects. Korean media, on the other hand, mainly address education opportunities for Koreans in Europe, framing European university degrees as desirable (Chaban Schneider and Malthus 2009).

This image is adopted by Korean public opinion, which views the EU's performance in the area of research and technology as particularly strong (Jiyoon and Friedhoff 2014). According to a public opinion poll, Ukraine general public takes a controversial stand on the EU's role in education: almost the same number of respondents in a 2012 survey were in favour of and against an increased EU involvement in educational matters (Chaban and Vernygora 2013).

Indian elites view the EU as a major source of technology and welcome technology transfer programmes (Peral and Sakhuja 2012). In general, Southeast Asian elites also affirm a great interest in the field of education and training. The EU is evaluated good partner in research and as a role model and partner for technical cooperation and language training (Portela 2010).

1.4   Political issues

While the EU is mostly perceived in terms of its economic strengths and generally assessed as politically weak, especially South East Asian countries credit the EU with an important political role, sometimes even a leadership role, as well.

While primarily framed as an economic actor, images of the EU as a political power are the second most mentioned ones; again, media analyses are the dominant research tools (Lai and Zhang 2013, Lucarelli 2013; Yoon 2013; Portela 2010; Fioramonti and Poletti 2008; Holland and Chaban 2005). Comprehensive media analyses have found Japanese media to present an exception from this finding, framing the EU equally often in terms of its political as of its economic power. Print media furthermore portray the EU as a normative actor promoting human rights and democracy (Bacon and Kato 2013; Chaban, Schneider and Malthus 2009). In general, the EU's external role on the global level is of more interest than its internal policy-making processes (Bacon and Kato 2013; Zhang 2011). In a 2009 media analysis, Thailand and New Zealand media were found to predominantly frame the EU's political role (Chaban et al. 2009); this finding was relativised, however, in later studies portraying the EU as predominantly perceived as an economic power (Chaban et al. 2013).

Public opinion generally mirrors the EU media coverage. However, Chinese general public increasingly perceives the EU as a strong international political player, promoting peace and democracy and scientific progress (Dong et al. 2012; Zhang 2011; Dai and Zhang 2007). Russian general public, on the other hand, feels threatened by the EU's claim to more political actorness (Gulyaeva 2013).

While Asian elites in Asia generally perceive the EU to be economically strong but politically weak, there are few exceptions. Japanese elites mirror the Japanese media that positively frames the EU as a normative political power acting on strong normative grounds – this image appears even more often than reportages of the sovereign debt crisis. Indonesian elites appreciate the EU's political role and have been emphasising their wish to enhance cooperation (Portela 2010). On the other side of Asia, however, Indian elites consider the EU politically weak, viewing the EU almost exclusively as an economic actor (Winaud 2015; Jain and Pandey 2013; Jain 2012; Jain and Pandey 2010; Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2006). The financial crisis has further intensified the Indian business elites' assessment that the EU is an indecisive political actor (Jain and Pandey 2013).

The perception of the political actor EU promoting democracy and human rights is limited across studies, yet positive in assessment: Mexican elites appreciate the EU's 'civil power' and use it as a point of reference in the promotion of democracy, human rights and development, and an alternative power to the USA (Chanona 2009). Filipino elites perceive the EU as a leader in the promotion of democracy and human rights. This perception is noticeable among Australian, Canadian and Japanese elites as well (Lucarelli 2013; Bacon 2013; Croci and Tossutti 2007).

Concerning the political role of the EU vis-à-vis its Member States, the picture is mixed: US policy-making elites do not acknowledge the EU's political role but perceive individual Member States to be the more important entities as e.g. an analysis of documents from US Congress

unveiled (Sperling 2009). In contrast, East Asian states, such as Japan and South Korea, assess the EU to be equally important as its individual Member States in terms of economic and political issues (Chaban et al. 2009). In the context of the economic crisis, Chinese elites and media have taken a more pessimistic stance in this regard (Lai and Zhang 2013). Mirroring the findings in public opinion, Russian elites take quite an ambiguous stand on political matters: European integration is welcomed in terms of economy, but the EU's political power is perceived as a threat (Gulyaeva 2013; Morini 2009).

1.4.1   Security

China and Russia are foremost in the focus of studies dealing with the EU's role as an international security actor. The studies state that the EU is indeed mentioned in security-related contexts, but is generally not considered to be a traditional security power.

The EU is generally not perceived as a traditional security actor (Lucarelli 2013) while the EU's role in the context of traditional and non-traditional security matters (climate change, migration, human rights, peacekeeping) is mentioned in the margin. The research of the NFG Research Group 'Asian Perceptions of the EU' contrasts this view with a focus on the de-facto promotion of security norms. Results show that even though the EU is not considered an important player in the area of security and defence policy, Indian and Chinese policy-makers adopt elements of European policies whenever they seem suitable and if there is urgency for policy development. In particular in the area of non-traditional security challenges, the EU is considered a trendsetter (Stumbaum et al. 2015). Also the US views the EU in terms of security: an analysis of Congressional documents on the EU found that security was – after trade – the second most mentioned topic. Policy-makers linked negative assessments to the EU's role in security matters, such as an increasing European autonomy from the United States (Sperling 2009). In general, studies found that in the US, individual Member States are perceived as more important and influential in security matters than the EU at large (Howorth 2014; Larivé 2014). PEW public opinion polls have furthermore indicated that 29 per cent of US citizens do not reject the image of the EU (China or another country) becoming an equally strong military power as the US (PEW 2009). Russian elites generally perceive the EU's transformation into an autonomous security and military actor rather negative. While fearing that EU's progress in the field would threaten Russia's position as a security power, before the Ukraine crisis, Russia welcomed the perspective that the EU could transform into a NATO counterweight (Secrieru 2010). South Korean as well as Japanese and Mexican general public attribute a significantly more essential role to the USA than to the EU in security matters (Bacon 2013; Lucarelli 2007).

1.4.2   Human rights (including death penalty issue)

Study results concerning the actorness of the European Union in the field of human rights policies vary from strong approval among some East and South Asian countries, via accusations of using

human rights to politically pressure third countries (e.g. Singapore and China), to clear objection, for instance in South Africa.

Human rights – together with development and multilateral cooperation – is one of the policy areas in which the EU is considered a political leader among a number of representatives from elites and general public across countries (Lucarelli 2013). Japanese media frame the EU as an important normative power promoting democracy and human rights. Japanese elites affirm the portrayal of media and regard the EU as an important normative and diplomatic power – an image that is even more commonly featured in media than the debt crisis (Bacon and Kato 2013). In Korea, as elite interviews show, the EU's human rights agenda has not significantly influenced elite perceptions in a positive way – with the exception of civil society, which regards the EU as an important human rights power. So does Korean general public, recognising the EU as the most important and reliable promoter, guardian and thus role model of human rights (Park and Yoon 2010). In particular with regard to the North Korea conflict, South Koreans evaluate the EU's role in promoting human rights as significant (Yoon 2013). Elites in Kenya and Senegal, as well as Singapore and the Philippines extend their positive assessment of the EU's role in international politics to the promotion of peacekeeping missions and democracy (Chaban et al. 2013).

A critical perspective arises in the context of World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations as well as the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). There, Asian elites, e.g. in China and Singapore, regard human rights as taking up too much attention. Furthermore Asian representatives feel the topic is used in order to put pressure on them (Fitrani 2011; Elgström 2006). Neither South African elites nor Brazilian general public acknowledges the EU to be an international human rights actor promoting social development, democracy or justice (Braghiroli and Salini 2014; Fioramonti 2007). Media does not cover these issues either. Moreover, EU-China relations are clouded by on-going disputes over human rights issues leading to frustration among policy-makers as well as Chinese general public (Shen 2012).

1.4.3 Migration

In the area of migration, data is scarce across all countries, except for one study ('EUMAGINE') indirectly dealing with perceptions towards EU migration policies. Contradictorily, the EU's policies are considered a point of reference (Australia) as well as a weak spot (Russia).

The results of the EUMAGINE project looked at Moroccan, Senegalese, Turkish and Ukrainian perspectives, demonstrate the relevance of how migrants view the conditions in their country in terms of human rights and democratic structures for their decision to migrate to Europe. When deciding to migrate, positive job perspectives and low corruption levels play a significant role in people's decisions (EUMAGINE 2013; Timmermann et al. 2014).

Beyond EUMAGINE, there are only few references to migration policy in some studies. Mexican policy-makers, for instance, consider the EU as a point of reference in the area of migration policy (Chanona 2009), as do Australian policy-makers, who view the EU's policies as benchmarks (Stats 2007). Japanese media also occasionally addresses EU migration policies linking it to domestic challenges concerning illegal migration (Chaban et al. 2009). Russian media frame the EU's migration policy as a weak spot accentuating its incapability to deal with migrants in the Mediterranean (Gulyaeva 2013).

1.5 Energy

There are no comprehensive studies on perceptions towards the EU's energy policy as this policy area has only recently caught the attention of international scholars assessing it as rather problematic due to incoherent information and communication strategies among EU institutions.

An on-going project led by NCRE is concerned with the EU's energy policy and external perceptions on it, focusing on five Strategic Partner countries of the EU (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Findings so far include that due to its strategic constraints as well as the securitisation of energy policy, the EU is unable to build cooperation with new emerging powers and establish multipolar energy relations. Additionally, the EU fails to examine, reflect and communicate its EEP, in particular towards the BRICS (Chaban et al. 2015). Knodt and Chaban pinpoint the incoherence of information flows from within EU institutions as problematic for the establishment of profound energy diplomacy. This lack of cohesion potentially sends unclear messages to actors and stakeholders and might translate into an image of a 'weaker partner' (Chaban and Knodt 2015).

In general, the EU's energy policy is not featured in news media across regions. An exception are Australian news media which report extensively on the EU's energy industries evaluating the EU's energy policy as an important theme with national impact (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013).

Chinese elites and the general public view the EU as a trendsetter in promoting and ensuring energy security (Stumbaum et al. 2015). Indian elites furthermore perceive the EU's technological portfolio in the area of energy as very attractive (Jain and Pandey 2013; Malone 2011). Media coverage of the theme mirrors this assessment. US policy-makers add a critical perspective accentuating the EU's energy dependence on Russia (Sperling 2009). Ukrainian general public would welcome if the EU played a greater role in guaranteeing energy security (Chaban and Vernygora 2013). Russian elites, on the other hand, regard the EU's energy and neighbourhood policies as threatening the preservation of Russia's great power status (Secrieru 2010).

1.6   Development and social issues

The EU's social engagement is among the least visible themes in media as well as the public across countries. Whenever mentioned in the margins, assessments vary across the whole spectrum from appreciation to anti-imperialistic resentments.

In general, in East Asia and Southern African regions, development policy (aid, debt relief and poverty reduction) has a low level of media coverage. In line with this finding, the overall public awareness of the EU as a relevant actor in the area of development policy is minimal (Bacon and Kato 2013; Chaban et al. 2009; Chaban et al. 2008). In comparison, in South East and East Asian countries, especially in Vietnam and in South Korea, the EU is seen as a major long-term provider and development partner among elites as well as among the general public (Wong 2012; Park and Yoon 2010). Based on interviews with Indian citizens, the Indian general public is found to have a rather vague idea of the EU's role in international development policies. This correlates with a generally limited knowledge of the EU and EU policies – a finding contrasting the fact that EU is very active in providing India with development aid (Jain and Pandey 2012a). Although being an important partner in development, the EU plays only a minor role in the view of Australian society or Australian aid organisations – this finding is in line with data concerning other policy areas (Stats 2007). In South Africa, the EU was found to be the least known international organisation, although it was the most important provider of development aid in 2007 (Fioramonti 2007). This attitude slightly changed over the following years in the course of the evolving strategic partnership, and in 2012 the EU was sometimes credited to be a relevant actor for social development (Chaban et al. 2012). China, however, was evaluated to be the more relevant actor in this context (Fioramonti and Kimunguyi 2010). The demand for more engagement in the areas of economic development, trade, and regional cooperation is voiced in an analysis of Ukrainian general public's opinions (Chaban and Vernygora 2013).

In Pacific and African countries, elites credit the EU with leadership potential due to its development assistance (Chaban et al. 2012). Among Brazilian elites, the EU is only rarely mentioned as a social actor (Fioramonti and Poletti 2008). Although an increasingly important partner for development (Jain 2014a) in India, both the EU and the US are viewed to operate against the socio-economic development of developing countries (Fioramonti 2007).

1.7   Environment

The increasing documentation of the EU's role in international environmental policy shows an ambivalent development: while in some countries media does not refer at all to this image, elites in general perceive the EU as a leader in the area of environmental policy.

The EU's role in environmental policies and protection is not prominently featured in media (Chaban, Schneider and Malthus 2013; Bacon and Kato 2013). Indian media portrays the EU in a negative tone when reflecting its role in environment policy (Jain and Pandey 2010). In China,

Japan and South Korea, the EU's actions in the environmental sector rarely catch newsmakers' attention (Lai and Zhang 2013; Yoon 2013; Zhang 2010; Dai and Zhang 2007).

Elite perceptions are generally more positive in this regard. In particular, in the fight against climate change, the EU is perceived as an important actor (Lucarelli 2013; Wong 2012): Japanese elites and South Korean civil society perceive the EU as an environmental leader (Park and Yoon 2010). Environment is furthermore one of the areas in which South East Asian, South African and Ukrainian elites would welcome an enhanced cooperation with the EU (Chaban et al. 2013; Chaban and Vernygora 2013; Portela 2010). Chinese and Indian elites acknowledge the EU's role in the promotion of environmental norms and expect it to take on a more active position (Torney 2013). In contrast to the generally positive views, the environment is perceived as a conflictual topic among Chinese elites due to diverging standards (Zhou at al. 2009). In New Zealand, the general public regarded the EU's environmental policy as highly relevant (Kelly 2013).

Based on survey data collected in the context of the three consecutive Conferences of Parties (COP) in Poznán 2008, Copenhagen 2009 and Cancún 2010, Karlsson et al. found that the EU is among the actors most frequently mentioned as taking action against climate change. At the Poznán Conference, even 14 per cent viewed the EU as the only climate leader. However, a dramatic decline in the recognition of the EU as a climate change leader from 62 per cent at the Poznán Conference to only 46 per cent at the Copenhagen Conference was registered. At the same time, the perception of the US as a leader in climate change politics and policies has almost doubled, with 27 per cent around Poznán and 50 per cent around Copenhagen (Karlsson et al. 2012; Karlsson et al. 2011). This development is considered to be a consequence of the EU's failed attempt to produce a legally binding agreement in Copenhagen. The recognition of the EU as a leader in climate change action has stabilised or even improved since Copenhagen. Moreover, in opposite to media which have not been found to portray the EU as a climate leader since Copenhagen, negotiators and government representatives at the Cancún Conference and consecutive conferences in Durban and Doha showed more appreciative attitudes towards the EU's role in climate change action (Elgström 2014; Karlsson 2012).

Elgström complemented these results in a recent study. By means of survey data from COP participants between 2008 and 2010, elite interviews with key negotiators after Poznan 2008 and Doha 2012 and a media review around the time of Doha in 2012, Elgström found that the EU was seen as a climate change diplomacy leader around the Poznán Conference by elites from developed and developing countries alike. The Union was assessed to be a consistent, unified and well-coordinated actor. In contrast, after Copenhagen, the EU seen as weak due to internal disunity, a too normative and naïve strategy, allegedly lead by short-sighted economic self-interests and accused of aiming to circumvent the Kyoto Protocol by means of a new agreement (Elgström 2014). In the course of the Cancún and Durban Conferences, the EU was seen to go through a partial revival by developing a new role ('leader cum mediator'). On the other hand, survey participants increasingly regarded the EU as a follower of the US (Elgström 2014).

In general, the studies by Karlsson et al. and Elgström found that respondents from Africa and Latin America rather turn toward China for leadership and thus are particularly critical of the EU's role, whereas participants from Asia, North America and Oceania look preferably to the EU for leadership (Elgström 2014; Karlsson et al. 2012, 2011).

1.8   Culture[18]

Despite the flourishing literature on culture and in spite of strong cultural diplomacy initiatives, such as the Preparatory Action on Culture in External Relations, research on perceptions of cultural activities is to date very limited. Except for the EU National Institute for Culture (EUNIC) and European Cultural Foundation reports, studies analysing the external perceptions of the EU address the EU's culture and media diplomacy primarily as a secondary topic with contradicting assessments: while EU collaborations are welcome, the EU is accused of promoting a civilisatory agenda.

Asian-Pacific stakeholders often associate the three terms 'Europe', 'culture' and 'civilisation' with the EU. On the one hand, these actors approach Europe with admiration, cultural interest, willingness to co-operate and the notion of shared cultural and historical heritage. They furthermore welcome enhanced cultural co-operation with the EU as well as European institutions (Chaban 2014; Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2006). Although not documented in a comprehensive study but in some of the conducted informal interviews, South Koreans tend to admire Europe's rich cultural traditions including such different dimension such as cinema, arts, music and sports. While the EU's cultural activities are usually not portrayed in media, in the course of the FTA negotiations the South Korean general public has started to assess the concept of Europe also in terms of culture – while the EU is still mainly seen as an economic actor (Le Sourd et al. 2013). On the other hand, there is a growing perception among the general public that European culture increasingly becomes insignificant – along with notions of resentment caused by colonialist experiences, especially in South East Asian (Philippines, Vietnam) and African countries (Kimani 2014, Mpfunya 2014) where the Europe is perceived socially and culturally protectionist (Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2006). Among Russian elites, Europe is an important point of reference in terms of cultural features, with Russia perceived as 'wider Europe' (Chaban 2014). Furthermore, culture is found to be a major reason for tourists, especially from Asia, to visit Europe (Verstraete 2014).

Due to the lack of comprehensive studies on perceptions toward the EU's cultural policies and diplomacy, a differentiation of culture along its various sub-categories, such as arts, heritage, architecture, music, literature, sports, creative industries etc. does not produce tangible

---

[18] Here, culture is defined as a 'theme' including sub-themes, such as arts and performing arts, creative industries, music, cinema and theatre, literature etc. opposite to culture in its anthropological dimension as a local condition influencing perceptions.

outcomes for the LitRev. The October 2014 Final Report of the Preparatory Action 'Culture in EU External Relations' showed that findings differ among the 10 EU Strategic Partners (in alphabetical order) and between different target groups: Brazilian cultural stakeholder are eager to strengthen cultural cooperation with the EU and its Member States alike. Canadian stakeholders prefer cooperation with Europe and European organisations for practical reasons due to Canada's European roots and its profound constitutional connection with the UK. China's first priority – also in terms of cultural cooperation – is the United States. In particular, Chinese private stakeholders are rather critical of an EU Strategy for External Cultural Relations as they fear that the EU will merely use it as another 'soft power' tool. According to Indian stakeholders from the cultural sector, European initiatives should go beyond exclusive representation of European culture but rather produce mutual learning through capacity building and dialogue. While academics would like to increase intellectual exchange, cultural actors would welcome support from the EU and its MS in establishing collaborations. Japanese cultural practitioners find it difficult to separate the EU from its individual Member States. Furthermore, they prioritise cooperation with the United States – also in terms of culture. On the one hand, Mexican governmental and non-governmental stakeholders emphasise their appreciation of strong cultural relations with the EU, also due to Mexico's historical connections with Europe. On the other hand, Mexican stakeholders criticise the lack of actual dialogue as regards culture and education. In view of future cooperation, governmental representatives and NGOs name the areas of heritage conservation and tourism. While Russia recently signed cultural cooperation agreements with Brazil and China, the EU is generally considered to be a less relevant partner. South African cultural stakeholders on the one hand usually trust in European and MS cultural institutions more than they do in government institutions. On the other hand, due to the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, South African government officials sometimes assess European or EU initiatives as subtle modes of colonisation. South Korean cultural practitioners stress that culture could help 'demystifying' the EU. It should however not be used as a one-way-tool but take into account the specific needs and particularities of South Korean audiences. US stakeholders emphasise their preference for an EU strategy focussing on providing advice and exchange of information about young artists and cultural organisations rather than promoting a European 'brand.'(Isar et al. 2014)

1.9   Key research criteria (modes of impact)

This section addresses as 'key research criteria' the modes of impact, i.e. the performance of EU policies in third countries. The EU and Europe are perceived in terms of pre-defined parameters drawn from the most prominent academic discussions: visibility, actorness, effectiveness, cognitive resonance and normative power.[19] In the following section, the findings relating to studying the body of research along these key research criteria or impact modes summarise the perceived impact of hitherto EU foreign policy and Public Diplomacy.

---

[19] For more details, please refer to part 3.1.1 of the Interim Report.

1.9.1 Visibility

Across all studies and regions, the research criterion 'visibility' is reflected the most.

Visibility is closely linked to the assessment of the EU as an economic and trade power. Especially reflecting on the wide-ranging set of data from cross-country media analyses, the EU is a very visible actor in terms of economy, trade, finance and to a lesser extent in agriculture. On the other side, its social policies as well as research and education programmes are only visible to a limited extent in media; among Japanese elites, for example, this assessment differs. The EU's political role is the second most featured frame in media. Elites across countries assess the Union as a strong and visible political leader, for instance in terms of the promotion of human rights and democracy. (Winaud 2015; Bacon 2013; Lucarelli 2013; Zang 2013; Chaban et al. 2012; Malone 2011; Chan 2010; Chaban et al. 2009; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009; Chaban et al. 2008; Lucarelli 2007).

1.9.2 Actorness

Studies deal with the criterion 'actorness' especially with respect to the economic area in which the EU is frequently considered an international leader.

Key words such as 'economic powerhouse', 'economic superpower' or 'trade giant' are mentioned across countries and target groups and demonstrate the overall perceived strong actorness of the EU. Actorness is also addressed in terms of EU policy and institutional coherence, but is generally evaluated rather negatively (Lucarelli 2013; Elgström 2006). The EU is frequently criticised for acting on double standards and being protectionist in its agricultural policy. Among Asian-Pacific elites, the EU is furthermore perceived to be a strong normative actor in the promotion of human rights and democracy – although this image is not often featured in media. In general, there is a clear-cut divide between the economic sphere where the EU is overall perceived as particularly active but partly inconsistent, and the political sphere where the Union is assessed weak and lacking leadership in some areas, e.g. security, and stronger in others, e.g. human rights and peace-building (Jiyoon and Friedhoff 2014; Bacon 2013; Dong 2012; Lai and Zhang 2013; Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013; Torney 2013).

1.9.3 Effectiveness

The EU's effectiveness is assessed very ambivalently: trade and economy are areas that are widely perceived as successful examples of EU strengths, while the hitherto promotion of political and social issues are seen as lacking effectiveness.

Once more, economy and trade are examples for successful EU policy-making and implementation, while in the area of social policies as well as the promotion of political norms,

the EU is considered ineffective and inconsistent, even self-interested and non-credible. This assessment of the EU's effectiveness derives from the perception that for instance the promoted human rights standards are used to politically pressure third countries. The fact that stakeholders assess the EU's messages as mixed and unclear aggravates the perceived ineffectiveness, for example in international multilateral negotiations (Lucarelli 2013; Elgström 2006). This is additionally mentioned across studies with regard to EU internal decision-making processes and institutional competencies. (Chaban and Knodt 2015; Lucarelli 2013; Chaban et al. 2012; Romanova 2011; Lisbonne-de Vergeron 2006; Ortega et al. 2004).

1.9.4   Cognitive Resonance

The extent, to which EU policies are felt to resonate with local issues, to have an impact on domestic policies, is especially significant in countries with a more inward-looking political atmosphere focussing on domestic policy rather than pursuing strong foreign policy goals.

Studies refer to features of cognitive resonance particularly with regard to Australian and New Zealand citizens, and partly to Brazilians. They only take notice of the EU when its policies and initiatives concern domestic topics and areas. For New Zealand newsmakers for instance, EU news must be seen to have direct local consequences in order to be featured (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013; Kelly 2013; Chaban, et al. 2009). Japanese and South Korean media on the other hand mostly portray the EU's international action, even though it did not have immediate local relevance for Japan and South Korea (Chaban, Schneider and Malthus 2009).

Cognitive resonance is specifically featured in and researched on in studies concerning general public's or elite perceptions towards EU policies (Polonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2013; Chaban et al. 2006).

1.9.5   Normative Power

The EU's normative power is particularly viewed in a political context and in relation to the EU's promotion of its fundamental values; it is not assessed to be part of any policy area the EU engages in, such as finance or trade.

The EU's normative power has been subject of a vivid debate in academia (Börzel and Risse 2011; Börzel and van Hüllen 2009; Gerrits 2009; Manners 2002; Manners 2001). In general, Larsen found that literature on EU external perceptions identifies the EU as a normative power only to a limited extent depending on the geographical area. In contrast, the EU's image as a strong economic power is prevalent (Larsen 2014).

As a subject for perception studies, it drew attention particularly in the Asian-Pacific and in African countries, demonstrating very different results. While Japanese, South Korean,

Indonesian and Filipino elites credit the EU with a strong normative power based on values such as the promotion of human rights, democracy, environmental policies and humanitarian aid, African countries – due to a post-colonialist stance – take a rather negative approach towards the EU's normative power. (Stumbaum et al. 2015, Stumbaum 2015; Chaban et al. 2015; Jain and Pandey 2013, Bacon 2013; Chanona 2009)

1.10 Explanatory variables (local conditions)

Country-specific, local conditions represent important factors influencing the way specific policies are perceived as well as which themes are considered important. Drawing on preceding research[20], these explanatory variables aim to give an indication to what extent and which local conditions future Public Diplomacy initiatives have to take into account.

Across studies, especially historical ties are addressed as important factors shaping the perceptions of third country citizens towards EU policies. Particularly European states' colonial past causes resentment along the general public in Asian and African countries. The EU is often accused to have a civilisatory agenda lacking respect for other countries goals and characteristics. This perception leads to scepticism towards European Public Diplomacy initiatives and programmes. The impact of culture[21] is also acknowledged: the distinctiveness of cultural norms and priorities leads, for instance, in the area of human rights, to a clash of positions among Asian and European policy-makers (and with their US counterparts on the death penalty question). This is particularly visible in EU-China relations. Education and training are the third set of influential aspects: a lack of education and knowledge of the EU causes a notion of in-transparency and incoherence of EU decision-making processes among the general public. On the other hand, educational ties with Europe, for example through studying in the EU, help shaping a positive, comprehensive image of the EU. The political context of a country is furthermore accentuated when explaining why and how elites as well as the general public perceive the EU's roles: Chaban et al. found that countries which do not regard themselves as democracies were not aware of the EU as a normative power or leader (Vietnam, the Pacific states). Furthermore, countries that had undergone a dramatic change of their political regime perceived the EU as a diplomatic power because of the EU's diplomatic actions (Fiji, South Africa) (Chaban et al. 2013). Translational issues are not mentioned with regard to analyses addressing external perceptions in the EU's Strategic Partner countries (Stumbaum et al. 2015; Lucarelli 2013; Bersick et al. 2012; Romanova 2011; Lucarelli 2007; Anderman et al. 2007).

---

[20] The NFG Research Group 'Asian perceptions of the EU' has found, analysed and presented these selected 'Explanatory Variables' within their project 'External Views on the EU as a Civilian Power – India and China in Comparison' running from 2010-2015.

[21] Here culture must be understood in its anthropological dimension as a crucial local factor or condition shaping the way how perceptions are shaped, expressed and transported (incl. political culture etc.).

2 Main Initiatives

This section provides a thematically listed initial review of key Public Diplomacy initiatives and programmes of the European Union. Given the high amount of individual initiatives, the following list is by no means exhaustive. It serves as a first basis to inform the Final Report's 'Best Practises Report', the Final Report's aggregated analysis and its policy recommendations. In this regard, literature **on** EU and other major actors' Public Diplomacy as such will only be considered to some extent at this stage and will be more explicitly be dealt with in the Final Report; also other concurrently existing initiatives such as the analysis of the EU's neighbourhood policy will be integrated.

The section of the LitRev starts with an official definition of EU Public Diplomacy and continues with an analysis of EU PD initiatives and programmes along the key research criteria and explanatory variables. Complementing the findings from perceptions from the LitRev, this section provides an overview of existing initiatives and programmes contributing to the development of the EU Public Diplomacy baseline.

The analysis shows that the majority of the EU's Public Diplomacy initiatives target economic and cultural relations, but achieves high visibility only on economic matters.

2.1   EU Public Diplomacy – definition

Following the EU's official definition, the EU Public Diplomacy aims to raise awareness of the foreign policy goals and also to positively influence the perception of the EU as an active and effective player on a global level (Davis Cross 2013: 1), to promote the EU values 'based on delivery of peace, security and prosperity' (Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations 2012: 4)[22]. Since its creation in 2009, the EEAS has been the main EU institution in charge of communication and coordination of Public Diplomacy, in coordination with the Commission and the Directorates Generals with an external mandate. The EU Delegations are central for the implementation of EU Public Diplomacy abroad, not only distributing information on the EU but also telling the EU's narrative and success stories (Rasmussen 2009), A core challenge identified by Duke (2013) is the conflict between internal and external aspects of the EU Public Diplomacy, as the internal narrative of the EU identify (itself an on-going process) can hardly be employed in foreign relations. Another point of contestation is the competition with the Member States, who often view Public Diplomacy part of their national diplomacy and hardly see the benefits of contributing to an EU Public Diplomacy, for example in the promotion of culture (Duke 2013), At the core of every Public Diplomacy initiative is hence the question

---

[22] For a detailed overview of the development of Public Diplomacy please see: Melissen, J: Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, 2005; for an international outlook on Public Diplomacy see: Melissen, J. (ed.): The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

what should be communicated and how this communication can be coordinated to send a coherent message across borders (Henrikson 2006)

In an attempt to communicate the EU more clearly to partners abroad, the creation of the Partnership Instrument (PI) for cooperation with third countries in 2014 acknowledges the importance of Public Diplomacy for the Union's foreign policy. It specifically mentions the objective of enhancing 'widespread understanding and visibility of the Union and of its role on the world scene by means of Public Diplomacy, people-to-people contacts, cooperation in educational and academic matters, think tank cooperation and outreach activities to promote the Union's values and interests.' (Regulation (EU) No 234/ 2014, Article 1.2(d)). The main idea is to promote 'political values, and political systems, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, the EU's commitment to universal values; civil diplomacy of state building, of reform through engagement; economic diplomacy, the weight of the largest trading bloc, the most densely integrated market with its 500 million extremely wealthy consumers and businesses, EU as a force to be reckoned with in new fields, such as climate change, energy, smart development.' (quoted in: Kimunguyi et al 2013: p. 141).

To achieve this far-reaching task, the use of media is seen as key to provide global access to information on Europe and the EU and to create new ways of interactive engagement with global audiences (Grincheva 2012).

2.2 Main themes

Across the main themes identified for this study, a range of initiatives and programmes has been implemented, with a predominance of activities in the area of economic relations, culture and civil society relations.

2.2.1 *Economy*

Business cooperation with the Strategic Partner countries is at the core of each strategic partnership (Cirlig 2012: 4). The EU's perception as a global trading power is firmly established across its partner countries (Lucarelli 2007, 2013), hence the main aim of the initiatives is to manifest and maintain the Union's stand and to open up further avenues of cooperation for mutual benefit. This is achieved by engaging business associations, organising round table exchanges and setting up exchange programmes for current and future business leaders.

Business Associations and Chambers

One form of elites exchanges are EU-focused business associations and chambers, which facilitate the exchange and visibility of the EU and its members with the Strategic Partners. Some are long established, such as EUCOCIT, the *EU Chamber of Commerce in Toronto* since 1995. EUCOCIT has developed into an umbrella organisation for 20 European Union bilateral Chambers of Commerce and Business Associations and 5 associate members from other

European countries. It promotes the EU and Europe as a whole as strong and effective economic partner. In a similar fashion, the EU *Chamber of Commerce in China* (EUCCC)[23], established in 2000, has now more than 1,800 members operating in 9 Chinese cities with the goal of establishing a common voice for the various business sectors.

Round Tables

Similarly, round tables manifest the perception of the EU as an effective global actor in economy and promote direct exchange between business and industry officials and representatives of the Union and its members. Examples are the *EU-Japan Business Round Table* that brings together chief executives of 40 leading EU and Japanese companies, seeking ways to improve the EU-Japan business environment and facilitate investment across sectors, or the *Canada-Europe Roundtable for Business*, initiated in 1999 to make business relations more effective.

Support for SME

Targeting different levels of economy and extending its profile beyond high-level exchanges, the EU also supports Small and Middle Enterprises (SME). The *EU Gateway Programme* has helped European SMEs to establish lasting business collaborations in Asia – initially in South Korea and Japan and now in South East Asia, pointing towards new areas of economic interest for the EU[24].

Exchanges between business elites and youth

Another aspect of the economic cooperation is the exchange between established and future business leaders. Personal experiences with and in the EU and Europe are a major factor for positively shaping the perceptions of the EU and its policies (Stumbaum et al. 2015), stressing the importance of exchanges. The *EU-China Managers Exchange and Training Programme* is one example for high-level exchanges that promotes mutual understanding between the EU and its partner country. Targeting the future economic leaders of Japan, *Vulcanus* is a programme for EU and Japanese students in engineering and architecture for a 1-year exchange with an industrial placement, building relations from an early career level onwards.

2.2.2 Science, research and technology

Closely connected to the development of business relations, but broadening the target groups to academia and research institutions are the initiatives in the area of science, research, technology and innovation. Supporting innovation in research and technology is a core goal of the EU foreign policy (EU Commission COM(2014) 567). It is supported on several levels, ranging from

---

[23] The Chamber is recognised by the European Commission and the Chinese Authorities as the official voice of European business in China and is part of the network of European Business Organisations (EBO).

[24] According to its website, EU Gateway has accompanied 1.500 companies in their endeavour to establish and to expand their business in Japan and Korea, of which 86 per cent of the participants are highly satisfied with the programme and 64 per cent established business collaborations which translate into revenue growth (http://www.eu-gateway.eu/success-stories)

large-scale, international projects to cooperation with Member States and partner countries, engaging different target groups.

Large-scale multisectoral projects

The latest, large-scale funding framework programme *Horizon 2020* emphasises the importance of innovation, science and research. All EU Delegations promote the international participation for *Horizon 2020* calls on their websites or at corresponding events to connect research across regions. For example, the *EU Research and Innovation Day* in South Korea reached out to audiences from business, research and universities as well as potential partners by displaying high-level European technology, attracting nearly 400 participants and top Korean leaders in research and innovation.

Cooperation between Member States and Partner Countries

Innovation is at the core of many initiatives the Union and its Member States co-operate on, emphasising Europe's profile as a global leader in technology and research. One example is the *European-South African Science and Technology Advancement Programme (*ESASTAP Plus*)*, a strategic cooperation initiative in science and technology between the EU and South Africa, plus a range of European and South African research organisations. It supports the deepening of scientific and technological, innovative cooperation. Another initiative is the *EU-Mexico Programme of Competitiveness and Innovation* (PROCEI), which promotes the competitiveness of SMEs through specialised European technical advice and assistance directed at new technologies and innovation. The *European Business and Technology Centre* in India connects innovation with clean technology. It works towards generating new business opportunities in clean technology transfer, and establishing business relevant cooperation in the field of research, science and technology between 38 partners in the EU and India. The EU also reaches out beyond the business and research community and integrates different stakeholders in its partner countries: for example with the *EU-Russia Cooperation Programme* which is active in economic and public areas combining the EU's experience in economy and governance with Russia's skills.

2.2.3   *Environment and energy*

The area of research and innovation is closely connected to energy and environment. The key area of activity is climate change and the mitigation of its effects on the livelihood of civil society.

Effects of Climate Change

Climate Change is viewed as having an ever more severe effect on the livelihood of societies in all partner countries, putting stress on the availability of food, water, raw materials and energy. This requires innovative solutions and knowledge, causing demand and urgency for the EU to offer its highly-advanced technology and expertise in mutual interest for their SP (EU

Commission C(2014) 4453, Annex). The EEAS promotes its own Climate Change Diplomacy[25] emphasising the urgency and importance of this theme. But despite the emphasis on climate change and environmental cooperation and the perception of the EU as an environmentally aware actor (Geraut 2012; Bacon 2013; Torney 2013), programmes and initiatives in the Strategic Partner countries are limited, leaving space for an increase of activities. Exceptions are the relations with China and India. In China, the *Europe-China Clean Energy Centre*, established in 2010, offers a holistic approach (technical solutions, policy and regulations combined) to promote the introduction of clean energy technologies. It additionally supports the transformation of the Chinese economy into a low carbon one. Engaging local communities, the '*Sustainable Groundwater Management through Social Regulations and Local Governance*' Project in India aims to ensure equitable and sustainable access to water in parts of rural India.

2.2.4 Social issues and development

Civil society interactions are by definition at the core of Public Diplomacy, yet this target group has only limited knowledge of the EU (Chaban et al. 2009). Under the PI, the EU is set to 'promote, develop and consolidate the principles of democracy, equality, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (…) by means of dialogue and cooperation', capacities it lacks from an outsider's point of view. In some countries, for example in South Korea, parts of civil society (for example NGOs, trade unions etc.) view the EU as neo-colonial, intruding entity (Lucarelli 2009), while others, for example in Japan and South Korea, welcome the EU's engagement with its civil society.

Civil society is a broad field with numerous nuances that can be targeted. The EU does so via large-scale educational and exchange programmes.

Large-scale education and exchange programmes

Across its Strategic Partners and beyond, one strongly promoted policy is the *Erasmus Mundus* and the follow *up Erasmus+* programme, strengthening the visibility of the EU through education and training. Another large-scale, more politically minded programme across partner countries is the *EU Visitors Programme*. Each year, it invites young leaders from countries outside the EU to visit Europe to gain a first-hand understanding of the EU's goals and policies, focussing on the role of the EU as a political actor.

Multisectoral civil society programmes

In its partner countries, Public Diplomacy directed at civil society engages representatives from NGOs, academia and think tanks, social and grassroots movement. It covers topics ranging from education, development and sustainability of livelihoods to governance, human rights and health. One example is the extensive *Civil Society Dialogue* with India, with 80 projects involving

---

[25] For more information, see http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm

NGOs and civil society actors are on-going for a combined amount of over €150 million of EU funding[26] . Another large-scale, bilateral *Civil Society Dialogue* is established with China, which aims at supporting the consolidation of a structured on-going dialogue between European and Chinese civil societies (EU Commission C(2009)10108 – PE/ 2009/ 9792). These activities are implemented through local NGOs to meet locale requirements.

Through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the EU promotes its stand as a defender of Human Rights and has funded civil society and human rights initiatives, for example in Russia with the *EU-Russia Civil Society Forum*, a joint platform for cooperation and coordination of civil society organisations from Russia and the EU.

2.2.5 Culture

Cultural diplomacy is a core part in Public Diplomacy, as emphasised by the resolution of the Council of the EU in 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture (Official Journal of the European Union (2007/C 287/01)) and by the European Parliament in 2011 on the cultural dimensions of the EU external action, calling for the development of a visible common EU strategy on culture in external relations (EU Parliament (2010/ 2161(INI)). The emphasis on the role of culture resulted in the Preparatory Action 'Culture in EU External Relations', which resulted in a ground-breaking, extensive report on the EU's cultural relations with 54 countries, supplemented by 23 country reports; it includes the 10 Strategic Partners and provides in-depth recommendation for a strategic use of culture in the EU external relations. Additionally, international networks, such as the European Expert Network on Culture, spanning all partner countries and beyond, as well as events organised by the Delegations, often in cooperation with the Member States, aim to meet the requirement of an intensified use and display of culture to connect with the publics abroad.

International Networks

Following the resolution of the European Parliament on a European Agenda for Culture, the Commission established a consortium of eight cultural institutions and organisations to work on the Preparatory Action 'Culture in EU External Relations' (2011 – 2014). It its unprecedented task, it committed itself to facilitation and support of the research and role of culture in the EU's external relations with its neighbourhood and its Strategic Partners, as well as with is Member States. In its conclusion it affirms that European culture is an influential point of attraction for and in demand of stakeholders across the world, who highly value Europe's cultural diversity. Hence, a cultural relations strategy with clear goals and priorities, while concurrently taking local conditions and concerns of the partner countries into account, is desirable and needed. The main aim of the Preparatory Action is to adopt a spirit of global cultural citizenship that goes beyond the successful projection of European cultural creativity and diversity, but fosters mutual learning and sharing (Isar 2014a).

---

[26] http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/eu_india/civil_society_dialogue/index_en.htm

The cooperation with the Member States and cultural networks (for example the *EU National Institutes of Culture* (EUNIC)), are well advanced. EUNIC fosters the global dialogue on European cultures and works in arts, language, youth, education, science, intercultural dialogue and development sectors. One recent project engaging local partners and EU Member States institutions is the *Europe-China Cultural Compass* (Hellkötter 2011), engaging partners of EUNIC in China, the Goethe-Institut, the British Council, and The Danish Cultural Institute. The result is a handbook on cultural cooperation between China and Europe, also comprising a glossary, an important mean to overcome translational issues that might negatively influence cooperation.

The Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) initiated the *European Expert Network on Culture* (EENC), which on request provides the Commission with studies and reports on the cultural sector and its policy implications. Reports on the cultural relations between the EU and China (Staines 2012)[27] as well as South Korea (Le Sourd et al. 2012)[28] are the only two non-European countries featured in EENC publications, showing an increased interest for cultural exchanges beyond the economic relations with Asia.

Another network is the 'More Europe' initiative, which connects Member States governments, civil society actors and EU institutions to support and reinforce the role of culture in the EU's external relations. Culture is understood as fundamental to the economic and political relations, and to build up civil society exchanges that can build trust between people (Helly 2012). It aims to initiate dialogue and exchange between those active in culture and arts and foreign policy-makers, as well as opening new ways of development for EU cultural diplomacy. It for example proposed new ways of funding strategy and alternative cooperation models in the light of the increasing relevance of culture in foreign policy (Lisack 2014).

Initiatives by the Delegations

Complementing the collaborative initiatives are events organised by the Delegations. Some of them are set by the EEAS for all Delegations, such as the Festival of Europe on May 9, which some Delegations prolong to the 'European Month of Culture', for example the US Delegation. They present music, art exhibitions, film screening and lectures to evoke interest in the EU and Europe. Other events show similar features across the partner countries, such as Film Festivals (for example in Canada, Brazil or South Africa) or Food Fairs (for example in India or Brazil).

---

[27] The request was made in the context of the 2012 EU-China Year of Intercultural Dialogue.
[28] Written in the context of the implementation of the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation of the FTA, which entered into force in 2011 as part of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement.

3 Summary and Comparison: Main Themes and Trends across Research and Initiatives

Economy is the dominant theme across research and perception. Particular in East Asian countries, the EU is also accredited as an important political actor. In a cross-themed, cross country comparison, this section identifies and compares in detail the most relevant themes and trends identified across existing research and EU's and its Delegations' initiatives as listed in the literature along the pre-defined list. The geographical focus is on the 10 Strategic Partner countries.

3.1 Economy

Economy is the dominant theme across research and in the perception of the publics as well as elites in all Strategic Partner countries. Exceptions are Japan and South Korea, where the EU is equally perceived as an economic and political actor. The Public Diplomacy initiatives by the Delegations reflect the preponderance of the 'economy' theme: they cover multiple levels and sectors of economic relations.

3.2 Research and technology

Research and Technology (R&T) is only occasionally mentioned across studies and actors, if at all. There are no studies (except for EUNIC Yearbook 2013/ 2014) exclusively on perceptions of R&T. This does not correspond with the EU's self-perception as an innovative and technologically advanced actor. The promotion of innovative research and technology transfer is playing an important role in the Public Diplomacy initiatives with most of the partner countries, but a lack of up to date research hampers the evaluation of the impact and reception of large scale research outreach initiatives like the Horizon 2020.

3.3 Environment

The EU is generally positively perceived in regard to its actorness in climate change policy. This does not translate into a successful promotion of environmental norms, which is also reflected in the very limited amount of Public Diplomacy initiatives. In the context of COP Conferences, the perception of the EU as a climate diplomacy leader among negotiating elites has changed dramatically. While the EU was seen as one of the major leaders around the Poznán Conference in 2008, it was perceived as acting weakly and inconsistently at the Copenhagen Conference in 2010. For EU diplomacy, environment and climate are recognised as major themes with the EEAS promoting the EU's Climate Change Diplomacy. In the light of the upcoming Paris negotiations (COP 21), climate change is expected to become more of a focus area for events and initiates among Delegations across Strategic Partners.

3.4   Energy

The EU's energy policy has not caught much attention in external perceptions. Only recently research on this thematic area has commenced. Despite the great emphasis on energy cooperation from the EEAS side, programmes and initiatives between the EU and its Strategic Partners are rather limited in the field of energy policy.

3.5   Politics

Particular in East Asian countries, the EU is also accredited as an important political actor, with perceptions varying from positive via neutral to negative, beside the dominant notion of being an economic power. This accounts especially for the promotion of human rights, democracy and social development. Other partners, for example Canada, South Africa or Russia, do not consider the EU a political power. In its outreach to political opinion-makers, the EU relies largely on traditional diplomacy based on government-to-government exchanges.

3.6   Development and social issues

The EU's social engagement and development policies are rarely featured in literature. Perception varies across countries and regions: some partners welcome the EU's efforts (i.e. South Korea), others strongly oppose EU involvement due to alleged neo-colonialist behaviour of the EU (South Africa, India). This mirrors in the Public Diplomacy efforts, which rarely have a developmental agenda. If they do, they emphasise the relevance of local partners to circumvent the accusation of neo-colonialism.

3.7   Culture

In line with the perception of the EU's political and developmental policies, the perception of the EU in cultural affairs is ambivalent. Some stakeholders from civil society or NGOs in cultural affairs welcome the cooperation with the EU due to a favourable view on the EU and its policies (for example in Japan), others reject cooperation due to resentments towards perceived imperialistic behaviour (with resentments expressed for example by left-leaning NGOs in South Africa). International cultural networks, such as 'More Europe', facilitate cultural exchanges between the EU and its partner countries. In the EU's Public Diplomacy, cultural activities are at the heart of many outreach programmes such as Europe Day celebrations, film festivals or food fairs, often in close collaboration with the Member States (see also Sections 1.8 and 2.2.5).

4 Summary and Comparison: Key Audiences and Target Groups

Potential key audiences change according to the policy area being promoted. While in some policy fields public opinion matters, in areas like security the EU rather needs to persuade selected policy-makers. Throughout the analysed literature, the audiences/ groups of business, policy-makers, civil society, media and general public are well covered, whereas the audiences/ groups of youth, academia and think tanks are rarely addressed and analysed.

This section identifies and compares the most relevant and most receptive key audiences and target groups across the Strategic Partner countries along the pre-identified list of target groups (business, policy-makers, media, civil society, universities and think tanks, youth, general public).

4.1 Business

Across all Strategic Partner countries, the business community is the most relevant and most receptive target group. Perception and acceptance of the EU as an economic power is most established and manifested. The Delegations are highly active in engaging established and upcoming business elites to strengthen economic ties and ensure investments.

4.2 Policy-Makers

Policy-makers from national and local government-levels are addressed through traditional diplomatic tools such as Track I government consultations or political leaders summits, for example the G7. Public Diplomacy provides additional tools to create an atmosphere increasingly receptive to the EU and its policies among policy-makers across partner countries, for example through public lectures of EU officials and representatives.

4.3 Media

Media is an important distributor of EU messages to explain the EU to the general public. The reach-out to media depends on the interest of media professionals in EU topics and policies, which varies drastically across the 10 Strategic Partner countries (high interest in Japan, low interest in India or the United States). There are only few exchange programmes for journalists to make them more knowledgeable and sensitive to EU topics (for example the annual *EU-Japan Journalists Conference* or the *Young Journalist Fellowship* in Canada).

4.4 Civil Society

The broad diversity of civil society is the key challenge in targeting this group. Selections of civil actors for engaging them depend on the message the EU wants to spread and promote, and is

based on the local context of the individual Delegations. The Delegations have compiled themes-oriented networks of civil actors for this purpose. A priority area is education, where the EU reaches out to upcoming and established researchers – as well as students and pupils as for example in Japan –across sectors with lectures, the Erasmus Mundus Plus programme and other instruments to strengthen its position as a global innovator. Across social and cultural themes, engaging with and acting through civil society is key for Public Diplomacy initiatives.

4.5 Universities and think tanks

Universities and think tanks are often main partners in the outreach activities of the Delegations, especially in cultural activities, and moreover to promote political messages and social agendas. Despite their high relevance as partners for the outreach, perception among academics hardly features in studies and research.

4.6 Youth

Youth as a target group is heavily under-researched despite its highlighted relevance for the EU. Shaping the views and opinions of future policy- and decision-makers across all partner countries is a key concern for practitioners. Educational and political exchange programmes are highly featured across all Delegations, but their impact is unknown.

5 Main Obstacles

Main obstacles in the EU's effort to communicate its policies encompass institutional obstacles including perceived unclear distribution of competences and cross-institutional support, a lack of knowledge about local conditions, a perceived lack of legitimacy to act in a certain policy field and a deficit of visibility. Institutional obstacles encompass the lack of a 'grand communication strategy' for the SP, the ambivalence between the self-perception and the external perception of the EU, the perception of the inefficiency of internal EU communication, the unclear distribution of tasks in foreign policy making among EU-institutions, the sometimes confusing coordination with the Member States and the time-consuming communication of the SP with the EU. Decision-makers and members of civil society across the partner countries perceive the EU to lack knowledge on local issues and context, and do not see enough possibilities to inform themselves, and also a lack of support in understanding the EU and its institutions. Other obstacles are caused by the perception of the incoherence in efficiency and power across policy areas, often in connection a lack of legitimacy to get involved for example in areas of democracy promotion. Many initiatives by the EU lack broad visibility, and are overshadowed by the dominance and higher visibility of the US and/ or EU Member States. Finally, not all SP are 'like-minded-countries', and dissimilarities for example between Asian and European perceptions about human rights issues make it difficult to positively transport shared messages. The following part lists perceived obstacles across the partner countries for the successful implementation of the EU's foreign policy goals, impacting on the effectiveness of Public Diplomacy initiatives.

5.1 Perception of institutional issues: external and internal communication, capacities

The perception of obstacles in institutional capacities ranges from A) a missing overall strategy what the EU wants to communicate, B) the difference in how the EU views itself and how it is seen from the outside, C) the diffused internal communication, D) the decentralised foreign policy organs, E), the complex coordination with the Member States, and F) the coordination of the partner countries with the EU.

A) One main problem remains the missing 'grand strategy' of what the EU wants to communicate precisely to its Strategic Partners.

B) The often quoted 'expectation – capability gap' (Hill 2003) points to the ambivalence of how the EU perceives itself and how it is seen from outside. Public Diplomacy is a crucial tool to respectively overcome this gap in the views of Strategic Partners.

C) Furthermore, the internal communication among the EU institutions in foreign policy is not perceived to be efficient, effectively coordinated or having a strong leadership.

D) The decentralisation of foreign policy making among the organs of the EU and the overlap and undercut of competencies makes communication and the establishment of a clear

strategy difficult. In a multi-player setting, the EEAS, the Commission and the individual Delegations are involved, calling for a clear distribution of tasks and competencies. Finding a balance will be a challenge: a too centralised structure is not able to respond to local needs and contexts, whereas a too decentralised organisation and fragmentation of competencies prevents the EU from implementing a holistic policy strategy.

E) Coordination with the Member States is also required to promote the EU as a diverse but united entity. This can also result in a better use of synergies. Cooperation has been well established in some areas, for example culture.

F) Also for the Strategic Partners, coordination and communication between the countries and the EU is perceived to be lengthy and time-consuming. They are looking for one line of communication to facilitate the exchange with the EU and to better assess the EU's actions. By sending unified messages, the EU can establish sustainable connections as well as an in-depth understanding in the partner countries.

5.2   Perception of lack of information

Decision-makers and members of civil society perceive A) the EU to lack knowledge on local issues and context, and do not see enough possibilities to inform themselves, and B) a lack of support in understanding the EU and its institutions.

A) One obstacle is the perceived lack of understanding and detailed knowledge of EU representatives on local issues and contexts in the Strategic Partner countries, which mirrors the perceived lack of information distribution and outreach activities.

B) Another issue is the perceived non-transparent and complex institutional system which makes it difficult for outsiders to comprehend decision-making processes and to collect information – for journalists and civil society alike. This perception limits the incentives to engage with the EU.

5.3   Perceptions of lack of actorness and effectiveness

Obstacles for the success of Public Diplomacy are further enhanced through the perception of A) incoherence in efficiency and power, B) a lack of legitimacy, C) a lack of visibility, D) dominance of the US, E) higher visibility of Member States.

A) The EU is perceived incoherently in its efficiency and actorness across issue areas. While perceived as a strong actor in economy and partially human rights, other areas such as research or social issues are much less recognised.

B) Connected to this is a perceived lack of legitimacy of the EU getting involved in certain areas of the partner countries. In sensitive areas such as the promotion of democratic values or development politics, the EU actions are sometimes perceived to be intrusive and patronising.

C) In most countries, a lack of visibility – except for its economic leadership – is an additional challenge: despite its Public Diplomacy efforts, the EU initiatives did not lead to an increase of visibility.

D) Additionally, the US is perceived as being far more dominant than the EU in most areas. A contrasting perspective (for example in Mexico and Japan) is that the EU can function as a possible counter-weight to the US dominance.

E) Often the EU is also perceived as being overshadowed by its own Member States. As lines of communication are much clearer here and especially the big Member States are well established abroad, they are contacted with more ease than the EU.

5.4   Like-mindedness of Strategic Partner countries

Not all of the 10 Strategic Partner countries are viewed as 'like-minded-countries', and dissimilarities for example between Asian and European perceptions on human rights issues make it difficult to positively transport shared messages. In some countries, such as South Africa, the memory of colonial history is described as still vivid with EU activities often met with reservations.

6 Main Gaps

This section identifies the main gaps in research to date identified concerning policies and studies. Research on perceptions towards the EU and EU policies has substantial gaps regarding regions and countries: some regions, like Africa or the Americas are under-researched; across region, there is a lack in scope, timeliness and quality of data; thematic research is fragmented, for example in security; other fields, such as technology transfer of research, are thematic blind spots. There is also a lack of studies on perceptions of academia or youth/ elder people and little research on how interchangeable use of the EU and Europe influences perceptions. The mix of methodologies and approaches makes the comparability of the existing research difficult. Gaps identified in the de facto implementation of Public Diplomacy policies encompass perceived institutional/ programmatic gaps of the Public Diplomacy, which are focused on the lack of initiatives using synergies across target groups, the lack of handbooks and detailed instructions and the use of e-diplomacy under its possibilities. Finally, the lack of in-depth evaluation of specific EU policies and programmes, as well as Public Diplomacy initiatives is viewed as impeding the assessment of their effectiveness and ability to change perceptions. Given the fragmented state of perception studies, there is also a lack of cross-cutting policy recommendations. Connecting the perceived gaps in research as well as the gaps identified in the implementation of policies aims to contribute to the future development of applicable and effective policy recommendations in combination with the upcoming baseline.

6.1　Institutional and programmatic gaps

Institutional and programmatic gaps are A) the limit of Public Diplomacy initiatives of usually a few target groups, B) the lack of instructions and handbooks such as the *Information and Communication Handbook,* and C) the limited use of e-diplomacy.

A) Most Public Diplomacy initiatives target only one or a few target groups. By engaging more actors across selected policy fields, the EU could reach a broader audience, for example by combining the area of development and technology innovation.

B) Handbooks such as the joint EEAS-DEVCO *Information and Communication Handbook* helped unifying and clarifying the communication strategy of the Delegations, but similar handbooks do not exist for other areas. The development of these would be useful for the implementation of policies across countries and themes.

C) Another gap is the use of e-diplomacy under its possibilities. Most Delegations as well as the EEAS make use of social media, but due to the structure of the websites, information is in some cases still difficult to gather.

6.2　Gaps in research

Research on perceptions towards the EU and EU policies has substantial gaps regarding A) regions and countries: some regions, like Africa or the Americas are under-researched; across

region, there is a lack in scope, timeliness and quality of data; B) themes: research is fragmented, for example in security; other fields, such as technology transfer of research, are thematic blind spots; C) target groups: there is a lack of studies on perceptions of academia or youth/ elder people and little research on how the EU is perceived compared to Europe; D) methods: the mix of methodology and approaches makes the comparability of the existing research difficult; E) evaluation: the lack of in-depth evaluation of specific EU policies and programmes, as well as Public Diplomacy initiatives.

A) Generally, there is a strong body of work on the perception of the EU in Asia, whereas African and American countries are heavily under-researched. In addition, there is a lack of current studies and up-to-date research with most studies ranging between 2005 and 2013[29], hampering the analysis of the development and current perception of the EU, which has to rely on secondary and outdated sources.

B) Much of the existing research is quite fragmented, with only some themes being analysed on the country level: for example research on security is mainly conducted in regard to China and Russia and to a lesser extent, India. Another problem are thematic blind spots: there are no studies on public perceptions towards technology transfer or research, areas the EU sees itself as very strong and leading.

C) Similarly, there is a lot of research on newsmakers and media elites, civil society and policy-makers, but not much on academia or youth/ elder people. Youth as a target group is at the centre of a lot of Public Diplomacy initiatives, especially in the area of business; knowing more about their perception of the EU is seen as recommendable. Also, there is little research on how the EU is perceived compared to Europe, and what the effect of this could be. Most of the time, the studies and the EU's Strategic Partners use both terms interchangeably.

D) Additionally, there are only very few integrated cross-country analyses that use the same methodological approaches and tools. The mix of methodology and approaches makes the comparability of the existing research difficult.

E) Another lack of research is an in-depth evaluation of specific EU policies and programmes, as well as Public Diplomacy initiatives. One exception is a recent Report on the EU's outreach to India (MDRA 2015: Qualitative Assessment Study: European Union Public Diplomacy and outreach in India). Similar studies across all partner countries could help to identify gaps in depth and develop country specific strategies.

6.3   Lack of cross-cutting policy recommendations

Deriving from existing research, policy recommendations for the EU to change its perception to date are only rarely applicable to more than one country or regional context. It is important to

---

[29] As an exception to the trend, NFG Research Group's report on EU-China and EU-India security cooperation was published online in February 2015.

have country specific strategies and goals, general recommendations would be useful for developing a clear strategy for improving perceptions.

7 Short Country Summaries

Complementing the cross-country aggregated analysis with a country-focused dossier, the following section provides an overview over research on perception in each of the EU's 10 Strategic Partner countries.

7.1 Introduction to the country summaries

In this section, the Country Experts contribute a short summary on the main findings of the literature review in their country, outlining the main documented perceptions, the main gaps and the key audiences and target groups within their respective country. The CEs thereby combine English- and national language written research and provide a locally informed expert assessment of the findings.

Generalising perceptions across regions is feasible and useful only to a limited scope, as local conditions exert a significant influence on individual perceptions. In this summarising introduction into the Country Summaries the following part lists general conclusions and interconnected regional issues influencing perceptions.

Among all partner countries, the EU is perceived as an economic power. In some countries, the negative influence of the financial crisis is already visible: Japan, Mexico, Russia and the US doubt the ability of the EU to successfully solve the crisis.

Across regions, the EU is perceived the most positive among the East Asian countries, even though this view is hampered by the perception of the inability of the EU to solve the financial crisis. This view is especially strong in Japan due to the open FTA and negative press. In India, the EU is seen of critical importance in economy, but knowledge of and interest in the EU remains low compared to its East Asian neighbours.

In countries of the Americas, the relations with the US dominate the debate in research and public far more than the EU and its policies. The US perceives the EU to be leading in the area of trade, and shares this view with its neighbours Mexico and Canada. Canada shares with the EU its self-perception of a post-modern state and hopes for the EU to be a counterweight to US influence. In Mexico, attention is paid to areas relevant for Mexican politics, such as migration and assimilation of minorities, whereas the economic power of the EU is seen to be dwindle under the impression of the economic crisis. In Brazil, beyond its economic powers, the EU is seen as a model for regional integration.

Also in Russia, the ability of the EU to handle the crisis is doubted, and its role as a global power is seen as much weaker than the US.'

In South Africa, the EU has a very low overall visibility, which is mainly confined to elites engaged with the EU.

Across countries with a colonial history, resentments of an involvement of the EU due to a neo-colonial connotation play a stark role in South Africa, and to a lesser extent also in India; in comparison, in Brazil the EU is welcomed as a possible counter-weight to the dominance of the US.
Consequently, the EU is seen in Brazil as a partner in normative areas such as democracy and human rights, while others, like South Africa, do not appreciate any engagement. Fellow BRICS country China equally does not view engagement in the area of democracy promotion as positive, even though China sees the EU as important Strategic Partner in China's efforts to pursue peaceful development and multipolarity of the world. This view is shared by India, despite an alleged bias of the EU towards China over India.

A major gap across all countries are in-depth surveys focusing on the broader public and their perception of the EU are missing. Similarly, research is thematically fragmented and one-sided across regions and countries other than economy and trade.

In some countries, such as Mexico, research on perceptions is a new field of study, so not many data are available. Across regions, for example in South Korea, South Africa, Canada or the US, there is a lack of up-to-date, first-hand data, hampering the analysis of the development and current perception of the EU, which has to rely on secondary and outdated sources.

The academic landscape and interest in the study of the perception on the EU differ across countries and regions: in Japan, most areas are well covered, whereas in Brazil, most studies are normative assessments by academics. In other countries, such as Russia, research on EU perceptions is almost non-existing.

The following part provides short summaries on each of the 10 Strategic Partner countries.

7.2   Brazil

Business elites and liberal political elites have a positive perception of the EU as a trading power, in comparison to left political elites and civil society, who are more critically about the EU's role in economy, but prefer it to involvement of the US.

7.2.1   Overview

Brazilian perceptions about the EU vary according to audience and topic. Business elites and liberal (in economic terms) political elites have a more positive perspective, and focus on the role of the EU as a powerful trade and investment partner. Political elites and civil society more left oriented tend to be more critical about the EU economic role and EU-Mercosur negotiations,

even if still been seen as better partner than the US given the perception that it is more socially oriented. In that sense, the EU model of integration still has an appeal from both groups of the society, even if this has been questioned in the last years. Member-states are still the main point of reference, especially specially Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, UK and Italy.

The main gaps are about perceptions from other groups of the society beyond economic and political elites, and topics beyond trade, trade negotiations and investments. Topics such as environment and immigration are perceived as important in the context of relations with the EU but poorly represented in the literature.

The key audiences and target groups are economic and political elites, academics and journalists.

7.2.2   Main documented perceptions

The main perceptions about the EU in Brazil is that it is a powerful economic actor in the international global economy, a model of regional integration (for Mercosur), and a counterbalance power to US influence in Latin America. The EU is still the main trade and investment partner for Brazil, despite the relative growth of China in the last years. EU-Mercosur negotiations are a main topic of bilateral relations and inform these perceptions. The EU is seen as an intransigent negotiator regarding agriculture and services, but as a partner in normative areas such as democracy, human rights and environmental protection. Regarding cultural cooperation between the EU and Brazil, governmental actors as well as cultural stakeholders have a generally positive view and welcome the possibility of enhanced future cooperation – although rather in a more emancipated fashion than only implementing EU proposals (Smits 2014a).

Despite the acknowledgement of EU as an actor, member-states as still the main point of reference, specially Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, UK and Italy. Perceptions about the EU vary according to parties; more liberal and business friendly parties (such as PSDB and DEM) having a more favouring perspective than left parties (such as PT and PSB), which have tended to favour partners from the global south. The EU is not generally seen from a post-colonial perspective, i.e. Brazil does not see Portugal or other EU member-states from a revisionist point of view, but economic asymmetry and the perception that the EU should contribute to a fairer and just global economy and political governance is strong (Kotabi et al. 2000; Ribeiro Hoffmann 2010). Brazil does not have a post-colonial perspective about the EU but a perspective from the global south.

7.2.3   Main gaps

The main gaps in about perceptions beyond the political and economic elites as there are almost no studies including public opinion and civil society more broadly. Most existing studies about

Brazilian perceptions are normative assessment by academics, including are the most interviews with elites. As for specific topics, with the exception of trade and investment, most other topics are underrepresented in the available literature. There are some references about environment, energy, immigration and intervention and the principle of responsibility to protect, but not systematically covered.

7.2.4 Key audiences and target groups

Key audiences and target groups are the economic and political elites, including opinion makers, i.e. academics and journalists. Politicians and leaders, including youths active in political parties and party foundations are also key target groups. More liberal and right oriented groups tend to be receptive to the EU and its economic relations, while more left and socially oriented tend to be critical to trade negotiations and the role of the EU in the global economy, but are receptive to the idea of EU's socially-oriented model of regional integration, and its role in global development, democracy and human rights.

7.3 Canada

Awareness of the EU has recently increased in Canada due to the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)[30] among the audiences that took interest in the agreement from government, business community and civil society, much less in the broader public.

7.3.1 Overview

Research on Canadian perceptions of the EU is very limited. There has only been one comprehensive study in that direction (Croci and Tossutti 2007), and there is a significant lack of up-to-date or satisfactory data on how Canadians perceive EU policies, instruments, officials, etc. In a way, Canadian perceptions of the EU are neither positive nor negative, they are mostly inexistent.

That being said, the fact that Canada and the EU have recently negotiated a bilateral Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) has raised local awareness of the EU. This has not so much been the case with the general public as with specialised audiences such as government, political and economic elite, business community, pro- or anti-free trade think tanks, movements and interest groups.

All else being equal, Europe (that is, for a long time, the UK and France to a lesser extent) occupies an important place in the minds of Canadians, who feel a very close cultural proximity with the old continent, but it remains very secondary to the US. Canada is highly dependent on its Southern neighbour for its economy, and in terms of foreign policy and strategic culture, it

---

[30] CETA has not been analysed in the perceptions literature yet it will be addressed in more detail in the Final Report drawing on the empirical material collected for this study.

has always juggled between continentalism – getting closer to the US – and Atlanticism, with an eye towards Europe.

7.3.2   Main documented perceptions

Research on Canadian perceptions of its Strategic Partners highlights how the case of the United States takes large precedence over all other countries. Canada and the US have very close historical, political, economic and cultural relationship with each other. Canadians hold generally positive views of their mighty Southern neighbour, but their perceptions are sometimes ambiguous, as Canadians sometimes feel like they have no choice but to follow US foreign policy choices. Research also demonstrates that the two countries are somewhat less culturally close to one another than is commonly thought.

This central Canada-US relationship dwarfs the perceptions of all other Strategic Partners. It also impacts how Canada views the EU/ Europe: Canada got interested in the EU to minimise its dependency on the US; and it often regrets that both the EU and the US tend to forget about Canada's own interests and values when they talk about transatlantic cooperation. When it comes to Canadian perceptions of the EU, the latter is widely recognised by both government officials and public opinion as a successful and powerful trade bloc with which Canada should cooperate actively. However, even Canadian business community has often failed to take this transatlantic partnership seriously, as they rely on tight economic links with the US (Deblock 2008).

Besides, Canada is a 'postmodern' state. It shares a lot of common economic, cultural and social values with Europe. It is also more postmodern (e.g. less religious, less prone to using hard power, etc.) than the US. For reasons of either values, personal taste or personal ties (immigration), Canadians are quite interested in what happens in the rest of the world, particularly in Europe, and they strongly value international partners such as NATO or the UN. Economically, Canadians have recently shifted their attention to Asia or the BRICS, but on issues others than economy/ trade/ business, Europe remains the main interlocutor. Cultural cooperation and awareness of European culture meet a generally appreciative attitude: Canadian cultural practitioners and stakeholder would especially welcome EU financial assistance (Fisher 2014).

Finally, Canada is also a divided country, with strong regional autonomy and identities. The Quebec province – because of its separate language, history and culture – often has perceptions of the EU/ Europe or other Strategic Partners that differ from the rest of the Canada.

7.3.3   Main gaps

In terms of Canadian perceptions of the EU, the literature is very scant, with little up-to-date data. There has actually been only one real attempt at mapping these perceptions in a

comprehensive way (Croci and Tossutti 2007). Otherwise, one has to rely on standalone contributions, e.g. on how Canadian news depict the EU or how Canadian audiences (mostly government and business) view transatlantic trade issues. In almost all policy areas other than economy/ business/ trade, what we see is a quasi-absence of Canadian perceptions of what the EU is and does. Partial exceptions traditionally include agriculture and fisheries, where the EU is viewed rather negatively, or environment, where the assessment is rather positive (Croci and Tossutti 2007, 2009; Dolate-Kreutzkamp 2010). As regards foreign and security policy, the EU is not considered by either public opinion or government as an important and influential international actor. Finally, the Arctic and energy issues are new topics on the agenda, but so far, they have not led to analysing local perceptions of specific EU instruments and policies on those different issues.

Studies on Canadian perceptions of Strategic Partners suffer from a strong imbalance in favour of the US. Other partners – may it be traditional European powers such as the UK or France, or new economic powers such as the BRICS countries – have received little attention from pollsters, think tanks or academia in the past 10 years.

7.3.4   Key audiences and target groups

In the case of the EU, audiences and target groups have so far focused on the following categories: public opinion in general, media (mostly newspapers), government, academia, and to a lesser extent the business community. In the context of the recent Canada-EU free trade negotiation (CETA – The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), it would make sense to put greater emphasis on trade-related targets groups such as think tanks, EU/ European chambers of commerce, business law firms, and so on. Besides, several audiences have been totally absent from studies on EU perceptions in Canada, notably youth or NGOs (e.g. in the domain of the environment). As those are audiences that the EU clearly aims to address, there is room for improving local perceptions here.

When looking at Canadian media, it quickly appears that apart from traditional newspapers, which in general offer good coverage of the EU, more influential media such as radio and TV hardly ever mention the EU, its policies, instruments or officials. While social media could prove a fruitful avenue to fill this gap, EU channels have only very recently started to develop, and at present they remain too embryonic to strengthen local knowledge and perceptions of the EU.

7.4   China

The EU is generally seen in positive terms in China, especially as an economic international player, but is not very visible in other areas, for example in security.

7.4.1 Overview

Main documented perceptions tell that the EU enjoys a strong and positive visibility in China. The Chinese view the EU as a unitary actor in the international arena. The EU has been positively portrayed as an active player. But the EU is considered just one great power among many in the multipolar world. As a powerful economic entity, the EU is in trouble due to the European debt crisis. The EU is not perceived as a major security actor. The Chinese have negative perceptions of the EU's efforts on norm diffusion.

Main gaps include lack of research on the EU's internal policies; too much attention being devoted to people from Ministry of Foreign Affairs; most surveys targeting business elites with European experience; netizens being overlooked; and conflicting outcomes being produced by qualitative based and quantitative based research.

Key audiences and target groups should focus on Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Department of the CPC central committee (policy makers), the Xinhua News Agency (media), China-Europe International Business School (business), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Fudan University (think tanks and academia), the Western Returned Scholars Association (civil society), college students and netizens (youth and general public).

7.4.2 Main documented perceptions

The EU enjoys a strong and positive visibility in China. The Chinese view the EU more favourably in comparison to the US, Japan and Russia, even though their level of understanding of the EU is lower. The Chinese are impressed by the achievements of European integration and enlargement, seeing the EU as a result of Member States to transfer and share national sovereignty and as a model of economic integration in Asia. There is a strong propensity in China to view the EU as a unitary actor in the international arena. And the EU has been positively portrayed as an active player in world affairs, such as maintaining peace in the world, developing the international economy, protecting the environment, promoting scientific progress and fighting poverty in developing countries. The majority of the Chinese view the EU to be a great power, but they do not see it as a leader in the global political arena specifically. The EU might be considered just one great power among many in the multipolar world. The Chinese believe that the EU has become a powerful economic entity in the world with a single market and unitary currency. But the EU as an economic giant is in trouble due to the on-going European sovereign debt crisis. The EU is not perceived as a major security player. The Chinese are highly doubtful of the EU's ability to be a global actor in security affairs. The EU is, however, seen as a trend-setter and increasingly relevant actor in the area of new, non-traditional security challenges such as climate change, energy security and anti-piracy operations. The Chinese places high importance on the status and role of the EU, taking the EU as China's important Strategic Partner in China's efforts to pursue peaceful development and multipolarity of the world. While the Chinese welcome the EU to be a normative power, they have negative

perceptions of the EU's efforts on norm diffusion. An important concern for the Chinese is that the Europeans are trying to impose Western values on China (Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010), making it more difficult to solve disputes over Tibet, human rights, market economy status, and arms embargo. Regarding the realm of culture, however, Chinese government officials stress the importance of a joint strategy on enhancing EU-China cultural cooperation while academics and cultural practitioners were are partially sceptical about the additional benefit of enhanced cultural relations (Smits 2014b).

7.4.3   Main gaps

Most public opinion surveys are made by the EU side and little by the China side. There are more available data on the Chinese perceptions of the EU than of other international actors, as well as European individual states.

In China, there is lack of data and research on the EU's internal policies, such as laws, social security, welfare states and environmental policies. It is also short of data regarding the EU's identity, actorness and normative power at both regional and global levels. Instead, many topics have been overshadowed by the single focus of China-EU relations, through the lens of which the Chinese perceptions on Europe, the EU, the EU institutions and individual Member States are shaped.

The current research usually does not make an accurate classification of policy makers in China, with too much attention being devoted to people from Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most surveys target at business elites who have somewhat relationship with the EU, unfairly representing the whole group of Chinese business people. There is lack of studies on two individual target groups in China, i.e. netizens and returned Chinese from Europe including students, business people and travellers.

In terms of methodology, there is no really nation-wide, periodical, and in-depth survey of the Chinese perceptions towards the EU. There is discrepancy between qualitative based and quantitative based research, with occasionally conflicting outcomes

7.4.4   Key audiences and target groups

In China, the most relevant policy makers are ministries of foreign affairs, finance, commerce, education, and culture in the government and the department of publicity and international department of the CPC central committee. Department of European Affairs at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU Delegation in China should be the target groups, deserving special attention.

Top media are Global Times, People's Daily, and 21st Century Business Herald, which are influential in reporting the EU's day-to-day actions and shaping the EU's image in China. The Xinhua News Agency should be the target group.

To reach China's big business community, China-Europe International Business School could serve as a target group, given its unique engagement with Chinese business elites.

There are many think tanks and academic institutions working on European affairs in China, such as Institute of European Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Center for China-EU Relations at Fudan University. They shape the Chinese people's perceptions of the EU.

The Western Returned Scholars Association and Chinese Overseas-Educated Scholars Association as NGOs in civil society have close connection with the Chinese educated in Europe.

College students and netizens should also be target groups.

7.5   India

In India, the EU is considered to play an important pole in a multipolar world, much less as a coherent foreign policy actor; if at all visible, it is mainly in economic terms and as a source of technology and energy innovation.

7.5.1 Overview

Historical cultural and colonial encounter of Europe conditioned Indian perceptions of Europe/ European Union. Different levels of socio-economic development, histories and milieus, geographical and geopolitical perspectives and priorities lead to different perceptions, disconnect in world-views, mind-set and practical agendas. The EU is not seen as a coherent foreign policy actor, but an important pole in a multipolar world.

Europe/ EU is the largest trading partner, increasingly important source of arms purchase, energy technology, and FDI. It is perceived as critical to many of the major initiatives of the Narendra Modi government like Make in India, Digital India, Clean India, Skill India, etc.

Key gaps in current research are the making of India's policy towards European Union and the role of various actors and stakeholders including various ministries, key business associations, and the Indian Embassy in Brussels and the lack of a systematic public opinion survey.

The most relevant key audience/ target groups, include policy-makers (select Members of Parliament), political leaders, select GOI officials of key ministries, political leaders in key states, key public and private universities, think tanks, business associations, opinion-makers and foreign affairs editors of leading English and business newspapers.

7.5.2 Main documented perceptions

In economy, the EU and Europe are of critical importance as a market and source of Foreign Direct Investment and as an increasingly important development partner for India's economic growth and integration into global supply and value chains, even though there is divergence on many issues of international trade. The EU is also seen as a key source of high technology for India's modernization and to have an immense potential for collaboration in areas of renewable energy, technology transfer and research and development cooperation for innovations in renewable energy. It is also perceived as at the vanguard of the renewable energy sector and advanced clean energy technologies of energy efficiency and renewable energies, coal and clean coal conversion technologies and fusion energy. In terms of political engagement, the EU is seen as an important pole in an increasingly multipolar world, with a bias towards China over India. Europe is seen as overrepresented in various international institutions, and India does not take EU's rhetoric on effective multilateralism and global goods at its face value and is critical of Europeans' tendency to ascribe nobler intentions to themselves and to the EU's double standards on human rights. Similarly, the EU is not critical to security discourses in South Asia and India is wary about humanitarian intervention and circumstances in which force may be used, as Europe is often seen as intrusive and preachy (Jain 2014b). Whereas the EU seeks to co-opt third countries in CSDP missions, India is steadfast that it will only participate in UN-mandated and UN-led missions.

In energy, the EU is understood as a key source for technology, best practices, renewable energy, nuclear power, and India is looking for an agreement on fusion energy research. In comparison, the EU is almost invisible as a development aid donor. In terms of environment, the EU is seen to pursue an environmental agenda that is all about saving their commercial interests and not necessarily about saving the planet.

In the regard to social issues, Europe is seen as socially and culturally protectionist. But with Europe having become increasingly multicultural, multi-ethnic and multilingual, it is facing a major challenge of diversity management and accommodation. India sees the EU to restrict greater opportunities for highly skilled Indian skilled personnel, with the admission of Turkey into the EU is considered by many in India to be a real litmus test for the secular and pluralistic credentials of Europe (Jain 2014a: 37). Concerning cultural cooperation and the perception of European culture, governmental actors as well as civil society representatives share concerns about paternalistic attitudes on the side of the EU within cultural relations on the one hand. On the other hand, particularly civil society actors would welcome enhanced relations with the EU as a unitary actor rather than strengthen cooperation with individual MS (Isar 2014b).

7.5.3 Main gaps

Amongst the key gaps in current research are the making of India's policy towards Europe/ European Union and the role of various actors and stakeholders like various ministries

(especially the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Commerce), the role of key business associations (especially the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry), and the role of the Indian Embassy in Brussels (which has historically played a key role at many critical junctures).

Apart from several studies of perceptions of key elites (political, civil society, business) over a limited period or of key media outlets (main English, business newspapers), no systematic public opinion survey has so far been conducted.

7.5.4   Key audiences and target groups

The key target groups are decision-makers (government, political parties, select parliamentarians, etc.); leading public policy think tanks and research institutes; local journalists (including the Confederation of Indian Industry, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, ASSOCHAM) bloggers) and media, opinion-makers/ leaders, business and industry associations (including academia at both leading private and public universities and National Law Schools; civil society and Non-Governmental Organizations.

7.6   Japan

The EU enjoys an overall positive image in Japan as an economic and (increasingly) political partner sharing fundamental values, which has been spoiled in the recent years by the financial crisis.

7.6.1   Overview

The EU's overall image in Japan is generally positive as an important economic partner/ market and a political partner sharing fundamental values. However, press reports on the EU have been dominated by the Euro crisis in the past several years, reinforcing sceptical views on Europe as a whole in Japan. Regarding Japan's perceptions on the EU, three major problems can be observed. First, outside the small circle of officials, experts and business people who work on Europe on a daily basis, the EU is generally invisible and the level of ordinary people's knowledge about the EU remains low (as for political and security cooperation, much fewer people are aware what has already been taking place between the two partners). Second, the EU's initial reluctance and the perceived inflexibility during the current FTA negotiations seem to have adversely affected Japanese perceptions on the EU. Third, Europe's approach to China is seen by many Japanese substantially different from that of Japan, causing concerns that Europe is too soft on China, which might lead to distrust between Japan and Europe. In overall foreign policy terms, while people in Japan (including the mainstream foreign policy community) are still wondering what role they want Europe to play particularly in Asia, there seems a growing realization that Europe can be an effective partner in international rule- and norm-making.

7.6.2 Main documented perceptions

A series of media analysis, public survey and elite interviews in Japan, find out that, first, Japanese perceptions of the EU are either positive or neutral and the EU is seldom perceived negatively – predominantly neutral (88.2 per cent in newspaper articles). Second, the EU-Japan relationship is seen by many to be stable and the EU as a good partner for Japan. But in overall terms, what can be observed out of this research is that the EU has been 'less represented in Japan's society' compared to other important partners for Japan, such as the United States, China and other countries in the region and there is a 'tendency to undervalue the EU's global role', which is particularly strong in Japan. The reason why Japanese media reporting about the EU is predominantly neutral has also to do with a sense of 'indifference' toward the EU in Japan in overall terms (Tanaka et al. 2007). Other studies found out that the EU is perceived far more positively as a political and normative actor rather than an economic actor – mainly because negative impressions of the sovereign debt crisis and 'exasperation' regarding the slow progress of the EU-Japan free trade agreement talks. It also argues that there is 'a nagging sense that relations could be significantly better than they already are, that important opportunities for trade and normative co-operation are being missed' (Bacon, Kato 2013). Being asked about the added value of enhanced cultural relations between the EU and Japan, Japanese cultural practitioners point out two difficulties: A) They find it difficult to separate the EU from its individual Member States. B) Also in terms of culture, they regard the cooperation with the United States as more important (Fisher 2014b).

7.6.3 Main gaps

Experts, officials and business people who are working on Europe are generally well-informed about the EU and Europe as a whole – both positives and negatives. There does not seem to be significant information shortage. However, such groups are quite limited and outside those groups, the knowledge base on Europe is generally weak.

Another problem that is often pointed out is that Japanese are heavily dependent on English sources in collecting information on Europe. It can be argued that the fact that English sources (like FT and the Economist) are usually more critical of the EU than mainstream continental (such as French or German) counterparts is reflected in Japan's perceptions of the EU. One possible way to overcome language barrier is to make more extensive use of available English translation of French and German media reports (for example, Der Spiegel and DW have good English website).

Compared to the high level of interest in trade, economic and financial issues related to the EU in Japan, the level of interest in EU foreign and security policy remains low – the EU's political and security profile in Japan has yet to be established, in short.

In thinking about making media analyses reflect today's reality more accurately, it is undeniable that some sort of social media analysis is needed. That said, however, it seems that policy discussions on the EU (and other areas) in social media like Twitter and Facebook are more or less based on media reports – putting links to newspaper articles or retweeting media articles and commentaries carried by traditional media like newspapers – meaning that the role of traditional media remains strong (as far as serious policy discussions are concerned).

7.6.4 Key audiences and Target Groups

In terms of conducting Public Diplomacy in Japan, one of the most fundamental questions that the EU needs to ask is whether focusing on experts, officials and business people who work on Europe on a daily basis and have already extensive knowledge about the EU (helping them deepening their expertise), or trying to reach out to a wider audience who otherwise have little exposure to Europe and limited knowledge about the EU. It is a choice between deepening and widening.

As for foreign, security and defence policy – arguably one of the main priority areas for the EU in terms of raising its profile – the question of how to reach out to the mainstream of Japan's foreign and security policy community, as well as Foreign and Defence Ministries' officials (beyond those who are already dealing with the EU) remains a challenge for the EU. While experts are generally well-informed about the CSDP, for example, mainstream people (who tend to be experts on the United States and Asia) are not aware of the recent development of the EU's CFSP/ CSDP.

In light of limited nature of available resources, certain prioritisation is necessary – the EU needs to ask 'who matters' for what it wants to achieve (while recognising that those who matter could change over time and also depending on specific policy areas).

7.7   Mexico

Mexico's perception of the EU is mainly focused on economy, with a positive view on the EU's role in regard to trade, and a less positive view on how the EU is handling the economic crisis; and to a lesser extent on politics, predominantly with regards to EU border issues.

7.7.1 Overview

The perceptions of the EU in Mexico have been mainly focused on two main areas of EU actorness and its international role: economy (Euro, trade, economic crisis) and politics (domestic—migration, terrorism, minorities--, and actions displayed abroad—aid, EU missions). While research on perceptions of the EU in Mexico became part of the research agenda of institutions or individual scholars after the mid-2000s (opinion polls about Mexican foreign policy and a few scholarly works), the main gaps are that questions about the European Union

in opinion polls have been only a few, sporadically included, and hence systematic information is missing; other gaps refer to the lack of a long-term research agenda, small number of publications, and a dispersion of methodologies.

The interest of target groups or subgroups on the European Union varies according to their level of involvement in specific EU activities in Mexico. As the number of well-informed individuals about EU events is an extremely small share of the Mexican society, in order to improve and enhance the image of the EU in Mexico three main audiences have been identified: the first is the group of actors already conducting activities with the European Union; the second is focused on actors that have played a significant role in disseminating the image of the European Union; and the third is the Mexican society at large.

7.7.2 *Main documented perceptions*

The perceptions of the EU in Mexico registered in the literature have been focused on two main areas of EU actorness and its international role: economy and politics (domestic and display abroad). The area of the European economy has been under the radar of the literature in two different and to some extent contradictory lenses: the actorness of the EU with regard to trade and the implementation of the Euro, which conveys the image of a relatively stable entity; and the EU as an actor with limited capacity to deal with the economic crisis. In the area of politics, the literature has paid attention to events taking place within the territorial confines of the EU such as migration, terrorism or assimilation of minorities. Likewise, some aspects of EU external relations have been studied, particularly EU aid policies (humanitarian disaster or cooperation) and some of the EU missions. Furthermore, external perceptions research analysed cultural cooperation: in this context, governmental as well as non-governmental actors present themselves as highly motivated to strengthen EU-Mexico cultural cooperation as Europe is regarded as culturally closer to Mexico than other regions (Schneider 2014).

7.7.3 *Main gaps*

Research on perceptions in Mexico is relatively a new field of study. It was only until the late 1990s when political actors found quite helpful conducting opinion polls in electoral periods, while scholarly works focused on the image of Mexico in the press in the United States or vice versa. Research on perceptions of the EU in Mexico became part of the research agenda of institutions or individual scholars after the mid-2000s under two different forms. The first was the inclusion of questions related to the European Union in surveys and opinion polls about Mexican foreign policy. The gap in these surveys and polls is that the questions on the European Union have been only a few, sporadically included, and hence systematic information is missing. The second form has been the publication of a few scholarly articles systematizing information on the perceptions of the EU in Mexico as part of larger projects/ conferences on perceptions of the EU worldwide or Mexican foreign policy. The main gap in this group is the lack of a long-term research agenda, small number of publications, and a dispersion of methodologies.

7.7.4 Key audiences and target groups

The interest of target groups or subgroups on the European Union varies according to their level of involvement in specific EU activities in Mexico. This distinction between groups and subgroups is important because while there are very well informed individuals about EU events or EU policies in Mexico within business communities, government officials, academia or civil society, they represent an extremely small share of the Mexican society and are closely related to their quotidian activities linked to the European Union. In this regard, in order to improve and enhance the image of the EU in Mexico three main audiences have been identified. The first is the group of actors already conducting activities with the European Union and following the events in the European Union: supplying general and specialised information to these groups can contribute to improve the links between Mexico and the EU. The second audience is focused on actors that have played a significant role in disseminating the image of the European Union: this is the case of media, professional groups or institutions that while are not exclusively focused on the EU, they are vehicles to reach broader audiences in all the groups of the Mexican society (new business opportunities or more Mexican students submitting application for scholarships). The third is the Mexican society at large: similar to tourist campaigns displayed from countries abroad, publicity in mass media or public spaces can reach out to groups with not connection with the European Union.

7.8 Russia

In Russia, the EU is perceived in largely negative terms: as an un-unified actor that cannot deal with the Eurozone crisis on its own and often in the shadow of the USA.

7.8.1 Overview

The perceptions of the EU in Russia received the considerable resonance in seven thematic frames: economy, science/ research/ technology, politics, energy, development, environment and social affairs. The EU is mainly perceived as an actor that cannot deal with the Eurozone crisis on its own; as being in the shadow of the USA in the issues of scientific development; as a less important actor in the post-Soviet space; as a passive consumer of Russia's gas and oil; as an incoherent actor that cannot speak with a single voice on the matters of multiculturalism and as an actor that is still searching for its own identity through the external development actions. Yet, to some extent these perceptions exist due to the lack of understanding of the EU as an entity, lack of qualitative research on the EU and its institutions and the language barrier that does not allow the Russian-speaking researchers to collaborate with the EU academia. Russia's academic centres, non-governmental research institutions and Russia's civil society activists and contemporary intelligentsia are the crucial audiences and target groups to be contacted in order to promote the EU Public Diplomacy initiatives. Russia's non-governmental organisations have a limited capacity to influence the decision-making process, however they can exhort.

7.8.2 Main documented perceptions

In the economic frame media plays the crucial role in raising the social debate on whether the EU has a capacity to deal with the economic challenges on its own. Something that is not discussed in media is how the EU should act in the times of crisis. Academia raises debate on the EU as an actor in science, research and technology. The EU is considered as one of the leaders in this frame, yet its achievements are not as visible as the achievements of the USA. The EU actions in the frame of politics seem to be widely discussed in the Russia's society thanks to a considerable coverage of the EU's external actions towards Ukraine in the media. Yet, Russia is not capable of understanding the EU because the EU does not speak in a single voice and is not a coherent actor (Romanova 2011). The Russian officials need a better understanding of who speaks for the EU in political matters. The EU image in the media frequently offset Russia's self-image as a global power which has a right to impact on the countries of the former USSR. The Russian media raises social debate on whether the EU is an energy power and frames the EU as an actor dependent on Russia's gas and oil. Sadly, the EU's actions in the frames of development and the environment receive little resonance in media and academia. The EU's social actions are mainly perceived in regards to the problems of multiculturalism and diversity, which the EU, from the point of view of Russia's academic, is not capable to resolve. Differences in understanding what democracy, liberalism and civil society mean and different commitment to human rights are the crucial factors that influence on Russia's public opinion perceptions of the EU. In this context, also perceptions on EU-Russia cultural relations are ambivalent: while cultural practitioners and local government representatives are interested in the EU's cultural market, Kremlin government officials do not want the EU to get financially involved; they rather prefer the EU to focus on Russian culture as a tool to strengthen external relations (Smits 2014c).

7.8.3 Main gaps

Firstly, there is a lack of comprehensive qualitative academic research that would increase the interest in the EU among Russia's academics and youth. It is suggested that in order to develop Russia's existing research on the EU further, actions on both Russia's and the EU sides are required. On the EU side, the EU needs to be clearer with Russia about what it is and how it can contribute to international relations, if it is to become a truly influential intergovernmental organization. On the Russia's side, provision of financial support to the universities, think tanks and research centres is required. This would enable a more thorough understanding of the EU in Russia. Secondly, there is a lack of studies on the perceptions of the EU among Russia's particular influential groups, such as political elites. Academia in Russia frequently feels that they cannot enjoy political independence required for the conduction of a comprehensive research with the political elite representatives. Further assistant in the management, organization and funding of Russian academia are still needed. Thirdly, the Russian research is lacking in reference to the foreign-language sources. Indeed, there is a language barrier existing between the Russia-language academics and researchers writing in other languages. The

Russian language is known by few researchers outside Russia, while the Russian researchers are far from being fluent in other languages and in English in particular. This leads to the problem that the achievements of the EU-based researchers and the debate of the EU academia are frequently overlooked: moreover, the EU documents written in foreign language may not be available to Russian-speaking academics and this can lead to the establishment of misperceptions about the EU as such.

7.8.4 Key audiences and target groups

The key audiences consist of policy-makers and political elites who are competent in such issues as human rights, civil society development and national security. Think tanks representatives (Trenin and Parkhalina) dealing with the foreign and security policy, Russia's relations with the Western organisations and European security can provide insider's explanation to those challenges that the EU is facing when promoting its Public Diplomacy initiatives in Russia. Representatives of the non-governmental organisations are the 'soft power' weapons which can assist in reaching those professional groups who seek change in particular areas of policy regarding human rights issues. Media and business elites get intensely politicised in recent years and have considerable domestic influence on the public level.

The key target groups consist of the Institute of Europe and the Institute for Public Finance Report. The role of the Institute of Europe in the Russian society is paramount as it is capable to influence Russian youth and young academics, in other words, those who represents the future of the country. The Institute for Public Finance Reform is capable to gain a foothold in state-dominated policy network.

7.9 South Africa

Knowledge on the EU is very limited in South Africa throughout the general public, and if at all, it is noticed in terms of trade and economy by elites concerned with these areas; among them, there is also a certain admiration for the multilateral governance achieved by the EU.

7.9.1 Overview

South Africa is a country with limited knowledge about the EU. Findings about perceptions mainly indicated that majority of citizens did not know what the EU was, and furthermore, they ranked their effectiveness and importance in the world lower than other global institutions and 'superpowers.' The first research paper analysed (Fioramonti and Olivier, 2007: 405) makes it clear that South African's in general are not aware of foreign policy topics, and therefore have limited perceptions on foreign institutions in general. Key themes of economy and trade mean that the only truly informed decisions are from elites interviewed and surveyed in the literature analysed. The findings are that historical legacies colour relations, as well as disparities between EU intentions and the realities experienced by South Africa in however admiration of the

multilateral governance achieved by the EU, as well as shared development vision allow the fostering of relations. Gaps identified in the literature relates mainly to the use of second hand research instead of designing and implementing an opinion poll or survey to gain more qualitative information as well quantitative. Furthermore, key audiences have not been included in any of the research, such as business and youth. The represented groups are only a general public, the media, civil society and political elites.

7.9.2 *Main documented perceptions*

The perceptions in the literature were largely divided among four groups in South African society. These are public opinion, political elites, civil society and the media. Based on public perceptions, majority of the research reported indicated limited knowledge from ordinary South African citizens. Many of those that were surveyed in public opinion polls did not see the EU as more effective as other global institutions or 'superpower', however there was a growing trend of increasing awareness and improved opinion when compared to research that had been conducted previously. Political elite perceptions were relatively mixed, with the EU being seen as an opportunity for growth and development, particularly in the trade sector (Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008: 171). However, negative perceptions are also present due to the EU being described as 'inconsistent' (Fioramonti and Olivier, 2007: 408; Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008: 171; Fioramonti, 2012: 154). Fears of neo-colonial type relationships also creates a poor perception in South African relations with the EU. This holds also true when it comes to cultural relations: South African government officials sometimes assess European or EU initiatives as subtle attempts of colonisation (Fisher 2014c). Civil society is described as largely similar to the sentiments of the political elites. Although there are more opportunities through partnerships available, the EU is seen as hypocritical and inconsistent (Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008: 174; Fioramonti and Olivier, 2007: 410). The perceptions are portrayed as far more negative however, as trade unions and NGO's specifically involved with trade and economy see free trade policies encouraged by the EU as harmful to South African citizens. The EU in South African media does feature particularly prominently, and they are mentioned very little. According to the literature, the EU is largely reported on in relation to its economic activities, and when they are reported as an actor the perception is largely neutral. In Fioramonti and Poletti (2008: 176) and Fioramonti (2012: 156) they have found that negative perceptions are reported only in terms of agricultural policies that are detrimental to local farming. There is little reported on EU's financial aid or projects.

7.9.3 *Main gaps*

Most of the literature examined was based on the same sets of data from the same research. Afrobarometer was a popular source, which meant that findings in the research was based on a survey that was not entirely reflective of the research questions being asked in the papers. Only one of the articles analysed (Fioramonti and Kimunguyi, 2011) was based on interviews conducted, which allowed for more 'honest' answers. Other literature acknowledged the

drawbacks of using secondary data, and analysing elite perception through documents instead of through face to face interviews. Opinion polls used as secondary sources were notable limited in that only asked whether people knew the EU and whether they thought they were effective – there were no questions asking WHAT citizens knew of the EU or HOW MUCH they knew about the EU, which would impact why they viewed the EU the way they did in terms of effectiveness. This also meant that gauging the areas that the EU was most well-known was largely determined by media and elites, so cultural impact and other areas of soft politics were not fully explored.

Gaps in target audience is mainly in the under-representation of key groups in society. Business is very poorly represented as a target audience, as are academics and youth groups. Majority of the focus remains on political elites, a broad public opinion and the media.

7.9.4   Key audiences and target groups

The main audiences identified in the literature were the general public, the media, civil society and political elites. Public opinion was gauged through secondary data therefore the true demographic of people completing surveys and opinion polls is not truly know. Target groups such as specific classes, and youth groups were not singled out although could have been included in the data collection. The media was largely represented by both print and TV, or as in the case of Fioramonti and Olivier (2007), it was represented through a study previously conducted, in this case the Media Tenor Institute. Civil society was represented through trade unions and NGO's. Political elite representation varied, but were largely represented through second hand research based on documents or speeches given.

7.10   South Korea

In South Korea, the EU is much less visible than the US or China, with a predominant perception of the EU as an economic power, much less as a power in global politics, which is also mirrored in media coverage.

7.10.1 Overview

Considering the body of literature of Korean perceptions of the EU, the results of empirical studies show that images of the EU were weaker than those of the US and China. Also, for Koreans, the EU's images in global economy were stronger than those in global politics.

Reiterating the current trend of Korea's perceptions of the EU, there are some gaps were found. For the area of elites' perceptions, there is a lack of most up-to-date interviews (the most recent ones were conducted in 2011). For the public opinion area, there is a gap of micro-level of analyses on the Korean public (such as gender, ages and living standards). For media analysis,

EU imageries in internet-related media (such as social media or internet portal sites) are less studied than the traditional media (such as newspapers and televisions).

Regarding the key audiences for this study, policy makers/ governmental officials, academia, think tanks and business elites are not only receptive about the results of the studies on Korea's perceptions of the EU but also effective upon the Korean public. The personnel from NGO or other areas are hard to examine their receptiveness and effectiveness.

7.10.2 Main documented perceptions

The literature about Korea's EU perceptions can be summarised into three big themes: Korean elites' perceptions, media representations and public opinions about the EU. For the first theme, Park and Kim (2006) and Park and Yoon (2010, 2015) explored Korean elites' perceptions and their implications. For the Second theme, Yoon, Chaban and Chung (2010) covered media representation of the EU focusing on the theme of EU-Korea FTA negotiations. Later, Chung (2013) completed his PhD thesis about EU imageries in three major South Korean newspapers and their internet versions. In the last theme, Chaban and Chung (2009) published an article about the changes of Korean public opinion about the EU from 2004 to 2006. Most recently in 2014, Asian Institute for Policy Studies and EU Delegation to Republic of Korea published a booklet about Korean public's understandings about the EU. Other than these publications, some publications were devoted to contain more than two themes. In 2007, Park and Seo wrote a book chapter containing an overview of Korean perceptions of the EU in three areas (media, elites and public). Later in 2013, Yoon published an article dealing with Korea media representations (2004-2011) and public opinions (2006) about the EU in the context of EU-Korea FTA. In the recent report on the Preparatory Action report, culture was identified as an important tool for exchange and a carrier of identity in South Korea – EU relations. However, practitioners from South Korea felt they were not always treated as equals in partnerships with cultural organisations in Europe (Fisher 2014d).

The findings of these publications can be summarised into five points. First, Koreans have lack of understandings about the EU (Zang 2013; Kim and Friedhoff 2014). Second, for Korean public and elites, EU images are weaker than images of other global superpower such as the US, China and Japan to the Korean public (Park and Kim 2006; Park and Seo 2007; Zang 2013; Kim and Friedhoff 2014).Third, the images of the EU in economic area is stronger than that in other areas among the Korean public (Park and Seo 2007; Chaban and Chung 2009; Yoon 2013). Fourth, the Korean media are more inclined to cover EU-related economic issues rather than other areas (Park and Seo 2007; Chung 2013). Last, FTA is a significant issue for the Korean media and elites (Park and Yoon 2010; Yoon et al. 2010; Park and Yoon 2015).

7.10.3 Main gaps

Revising each phase of Korea's EU perceptions, the amount of publications in each area is similar to each other. However, it seems that there is a lack of up-to-date analysis on Korean elites' perceptions of the EU. However, this gap can be filled if our team conducts elite interviews. Also, it is worth investigating the elites in the marginal areas such as military, police and experts on national security. Regarding the topics covered in Korea's EU perceptions, there is no comprehensive research on mixed perceptions about Europe, the EU, its programmes, policies and individual Member States. Looking into target-group focused research, Zang's recent study only devoted to Korean tertiary students' EU perceptions. This gap implies that the current studies on Korean public opinion towards the EU focused on macro-level analysis. In order to fill in this gap, some micro-level analyses of public opinions among varied groups of demographics such as gender (male vs. female), age (young vs. senior) and industry (such as travel, trade, culinary and so on). Reviewing methodologies of media analysis on EU representations, it seems that there is a lack of analyses on internet-related media such as social media (SNS) and internet portal sites (NAVER and DAUM).

7.10.4 Key audiences and target groups

Key audiences can be divided into six big groups: 1. policy makers/ governmental officials, 2. academia, 3. think tanks, 4. business elites, 5. NGOs and 6. Others. Policy makers, governmental officials, business elites and think tanks can be considered as a powerful and receptive towards the EU and its policies (especially to Korea). Academics are believed to be not powerful but receptive to the EU and its policies. However, it is difficult to assess the receptiveness and powers of NGOs and other audiences.

7.11   United States of America

In the US, the EU tends to be perceived as a powerful actor in areas wherein it is a leading actor, like in trade; in areas of inter-governmentalism (foreign policy, monetary policy, defense policy) the EU is framed as a complex multi-level entity with limited coherence and vision.

7.11.1 Overview

The literature on the EU and the perceptions of its policies is quite broad and complete. EU-US relations have been so strong for decades that most dimensions of the relationship have been covered and analysed like foreign affairs, defence policy (EU-NATO-WEU), monetary policies (ECB-Federal Reserve), trade policies (Commission and US Senate), agricultural policies, development policies and culture. The main dimension missing in the literature is the emphasis on the understanding of the EU and its role in the world in the 21st century. The literature is usually very narrow and issue-area oriented and tend to forget about the overall picture of the EU. Last, the least studied dimension is the understanding of the EU by American citizens.

7.11.2 Main documented perceptions

The perceptions of the EU and its policies change based on the issue areas and themes. On the question of actorness and international presence, the literature can be divided into two groups: in areas of intergovernmentalism and areas of supranationalism. In areas wherein the EU is the leading actor, like in trade, the EU tends to be perceived as a powerful actor. However, in areas of inter-governmentalism, like in foreign policy, monetary policy, defence policy, the EU is framed as a complex multi-level entity with limited coherence and vision. When it comes to perceptions on the ways to enhance US-EU cultural relations, cultural as well as governmental actors are interested in exchange platforms and information databases rather than aiming at giving the EU the possibility to establish its 'brand' in the USA (Fisher 2014e).

The questions of unity, policy-coherence and decision-making processes are extremely important in the literature in explaining US perception of the EU.

7.11.3 Main gaps

The biggest weakness and gap in the research in the US is the perceptions of American citizens about the EU and its policies. If the experts are very knowledgeable about their issue-areas related to the EU, most citizens do not understand what the EU is, how it works and that it has a global role. Most Americans are unaware of the EU and its policies. The data collected by Alec Gallup & Lidya Saad (2004) demonstrates two elements: first, there has not been since 2004 any large study at the national level in order to understand the way Americans perceive the EU and its policies; second, the 2004 data underlined a clear misunderstanding and lack of information about the EU and its policies. This implies that the general public, in the US, tends to be unaware to the EU.

7.11.4 Key audiences and target groups

In the case of the US, the two largest target groups are experts and government officials (elected and non-elected). The experts are part of think tanks, academia, media and business. These experts produce the larger segment of the literature – especially the ones from think tanks and academia –. They shape the narratives and the perceptions of the EU and it policies discussed in the media.

The second group is composed of officials working for the US government. For instance, the US government finances research through powerful institutions like the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Rand Corporations. The CRS work is extremely relevant as it provides policy recommendations to the US government. It gives an insight on the issues relevant to the US.

In terms of the main audience, the target groups are the same: government and experts.

8 Conclusion (Major Shortcomings of Research)

Concluding that the EU is overall seen as a strong and relevant power in a multipolar world almost exclusively in economic and trade terms, this Literature Review (LitRev) provides a systematic comparative review of the state of the art research on external perceptions of the EU and Europe in the eyes of its 10 Strategic Partners[31] and beyond. Only in East Asia the EU receives equal assessments as a political power. Perceptions range from positive (largely in Asia, but also in Brazil), to neutral or indifferent (in Canada) to rather negative (in South Asia). As a building block for the upcoming baseline for EU Public Diplomacy, the LitRev assesses the current external perceptions along main themes[32], modes of impact[33] and local conditions[34] and discloses main gaps in research and implementation (as identified in the literature). Encompassing all major events from the European Security Strategy in 2003 to the financial crisis, the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of the Partnership Instrument (PI) in 2014, the LitRev entails 95 studies, articles and monographs covering 20 countries in a time span of 12 years, reviewed by the Berlin/ Taipei NFG team with support of the 10 Country Experts teams contributing from the Strategic Partner countries. The LitRev concludes with four central findings: A) *themes*: the EU is mainly seen as an economic and trade power, ranked second is the perception as a political actor; the EU is almost not visible in the areas of research, culture and social development; B) *research*: perception research is characterised by a substantial methodological focus on media analyses, rather descriptive writings and a limited selection of themes, target groups and regions analysed; C) Economy and culture are the thematic areas mostly featured in EU PD initiatives, while outreach to academia and youth could be enhanced further; D) *EU/ Europe*: EU and Europe are used interchangeably across analysed studies and countries, driven by limited knowledge on/ awareness of the EU. Despite a gradual change due to events such as the financial crisis, FTA negotiations and the introduction of the EEAS, the overall trends in perceptions have remained consistent in and across countries over the 12 years period.

Explaining the conclusions in more detail, the core finding affirms the widely spread assumption that the EU is across countries and regions predominantly identified as an economic and trade power. This perception carries neutral to negative connotations, the latter being based on the impression that the EU shows neo-colonialist behaviour and protectionist tendencies. Particularly, in East Asian countries, the EU is also considered to be an important political player with regard to the promotion of democracy, human rights, environmental norms and peace. In

---

[31] The EU has concluded strategic partnerships with Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Russia and the USA.

[32] The EU's eight main themes plus sub-themes refer to policy areas such as economy, science and research, environment, energy, political and social issues, development and culture.

[33] Key research criteria refer to modes of impact including visibility, actorness, effectiveness, cognitive resonance and normative power.

[34] Explanatory variables concern local conditions representing history, culture, political context, training/ education, translation)

other areas, such as (social) development, the EU's perception varies across countries depending on local conditions and trajectories. The EU is the least visible in research and perception regarding its social engagement. Across all studies examined as well as all regions covered, 'visibility' as a category has been addressed the most, with actorness following suit. In view of critical local conditions, in particular historical ties are addressed as important factors shaping the perceptions of third country citizens towards EU policies.

The second section of the LitRev provided a definition of EU Public Diplomacy and listed and analysed a selection of exemplary current EU Public Diplomacy initiatives along main themes and impact criteria. The analysis shows that the major part of the EU's Public Diplomacy targets economic and cultural relations, but achieves higher visibility in economic activities. The initial review of current EU PD initiatives and respective literature show that particularly two aspects are essential for future EU PD: a.) a deeper understanding of the local conditions in third countries in which EU policies are communicated and b.) the use of tailor-made Public Diplomacy instruments and initiatives to communicate the EU image and specific EU policies in target countries. Corresponding to these findings, a Best Practise Report[35], part of the Final Report, will present current experiences with existing initiative to contribute to a comprehensive basis for the subsequent policy recommendations.

Drawing on the LitRev and the analysis of the programmes (from an external, non-EU perception), it becomes clear that 'Economy' is the dominant theme across research and perception. Research and technology as well as environment and energy are seldom analysed, even though considered important foreign-policy and Public Diplomacy goals.

Regarding key audiences and target groups, major findings include that in research, the target groups of business, policy-makers, media and general public are well covered, whereas the audiences/ groups of youth, academia and think tanks are rarely addressed and analysed. The core challenge is to (politically) determine who matters most to the EU for achieving its policy goals. While in some policy fields public opinion matters, in areas such as security the EU rather needs to persuade selected policy-makers.

The LitRev identified the obstacles across the partner countries for the successful implementation of the EU's foreign policy goals. Institutional obstacles encompass the lack of a 'grand communication strategy' for the SP, the ambivalence between the self-perception and the external perception of the EU, the perception of the inefficiency of internal EU communication, the unclear distribution of tasks in foreign policy making among EU-institutions, the sometimes confusing coordination with the Member States and the time-consuming communication of the SP with the EU. Decision-makers and members of civil society across the partner countries

---

[35] The Best Practices Report gives an overview of existing PD strategies by EU and other major international actors. It summarises existing efforts and lessons learned on the general level as well as an overview of Best Practices from the EU Delegation sin the 10 Strategic Partner countries, concluding with an outlook on identified gaps.

perceive the EU to lack knowledge on local issues and context, and do not see enough possibilities to inform themselves, and also a lack of support in understanding the EU and its institutions. Other obstacles are caused by the perception of the incoherence in efficiency and power across policy areas, often in connection a lack of legitimacy to get involved for example in areas of democracy promotion. Many initiatives by the EU lack broad visibility, and are overshadowed by the dominance and higher visibility of the US and/ or EU Member States. Finally, not all SP are 'like-minded-countries', and dissimilarities for example between Asian and European perceptions about human rights issues make it difficult to positively transport shared messages.

The LitRev also pointed out the main gaps resulting from the literature review across the 10 Strategic Partner countries. They encompass institutional/ programmatic gaps of the Public Diplomacy, which are focused on the lack of initiatives using synergies across target groups, the lack of handbooks and detailed instructions and the use of e-diplomacy under its possibilities. Research on perceptions towards the EU and EU policies has substantial gaps regarding regions and countries: some regions, like Africa or the Americas are under-researched; across region, there is a lack in scope, timeliness and quality of data; thematic research is fragmented, for example in security; other fields, such as technology transfer of research, are thematic blind spots. There is also a lack of studies on perceptions of academia or youth/ elder people and little research on how interchangeable use of the EU and Europe influences perceptions. The mix of methodology and approaches makes the comparability of the existing research difficult. Lastly, the lack of in-depth evaluation of specific EU policies and programmes, as well as Public Diplomacy initiatives impedes the assessment of their effectiveness and ability to change perceptions. Given the fragmented state of perception studies, there is also a lack of cross-cutting policy recommendations.

The second main part of the LitRev focuses on the individual country profiles of the EU's 10 Strategic Partners, based on the assessments of 10 native Country Expert teams from the respective SP. Providing inside information on country-specific themes, perspectives, circumstances, obstacles and gaps, this section serves as a starting point for developing country-tailored policies

Drawing on a sketchy research body with limited comparability, the LitRev provided a first comprehensive and comparative analysis of existing research including the identification of core themes, obstacles, gaps, trends and tools as well as an overview of current PD initiatives. These will be further refined in the subsequent analysis of media, social media, a public opinion survey, individual interviews and a Best Practises Report for the required development of an EU Public Diplomacy baseline and applicable policy recommendations.

Bibliography

Anderman, Karin, Hagström, Eva, Pallin, Carolina V. (2007), Russia-EU External Security Relations: Russian Policy and Perceptions, Swedish Defence Research Agency, *Defence Analysis*, 02/ 2007.

Archick, Kristin (2013), *US-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism*.

Azpíroz, Maria L. (2015), *Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: The Case of the European Union in Brazil*, Figueroa Press, Los Angeles.

Bacon, Paul, and Emi Kato (2013), Potential Still Untapped: Japanese Perceptions of the European Union as an Economic and Normative Power, *Baltic Journal of European Studies,* Vol. 3, No. 3 (15), 59-85.

Bersick, Sebastian, Michael Bruter, Natalia Chaban, Sol Iglesias, and Ronan Lenihan (2012), *Asia in the Eyes of Europe: Images of a Rising Giant*, Nomos: Baden-Baden.

Bersick, Sebastian (2010), Perceptions of Asia in Europe, *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 8, 245-255.

Börzel, Tanja (2010), The Transformative Power of Europe Reloaded: The Limits of External Europeanization, *KFG Working Paper* No. 11, Freie Universität Berlin, 02/ 2010.

Börzel, Tanja, and Vera van Hüllen (2009), Good Governance and Bad Neighbors? The Limits of the Transformative Power of Europe, *KFG Working Paper* No. 7, Freie Universität Berlin, 09/ 2009.

Börzel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse (2011), Diffusing (Inter-)Regionalism: The EU as a Model of Regional Integration, *KFG Working Paper* No. 35, Freie Universität Berlin, 12/ 2011.

Braghiroli, Stefano, and Luca Salini (2014), How the others see us? An analysis of public opinion perceptions of the EU and USA in Third Countries, *Transworld Working Papers* 33.

Brown, Scott A. W. (2011), Anything But Arms? Perceptions, the European Union and the Arms Embargo on China, *Journal of Contemporary European Research*. Volume 7, Issue 1, 23-40. Available at: http:// www.jcer.net/ ojs/ index.php/ jcer/ article/ view/ 306/ 260.

Cervo, Amadao L. (2010), Brazil's rise on the international scene: Brazil and the World, *Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional* 53.

Chaban, Natalia (2013/2014), Listening to the World, in Europe from the Outside Expectations of Europe's External Cultural Relations, Culture Report, *EUNIC Year Book 2013/ 2014*, Vol. 6, 108-113.

Chaban Natalia, Jessica Bain, Katrina Stats, and Paveena Sutthisripok (2006), Seeing Europe Through the Eyes of Others: How 'Local' is the EU in Asia-Pacific News?, *Language and Intercultural Communication* 6 (3&4), 188-210.

Chaban, Natalia, Jessica Bain, and Serena Kelly (2014), En'vision'ing Europe's crisis: Intertextuality in news coverage of the Eurozone crisis in Chinese, Indian and Russian press, *The Journal of International Communication*, 20 (1).

Chaban, Natalia, and Sae Won Chung (2009), Public Perceptions of the EU in South Korea: Longitudinal Study (2004-2006), *Asia-Europe Journal of EU Studies*, Vol.7 (1-2).

Chaban, Natalia, Ole Elgström, Serena Kelly, and Suet-Yi Lai (2013), Images of the EU beyond its borders: Issue-specific and regional perceptions of EU power and leadership, *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 51(3) 2013, 433-451.

Chaban, Natalia, and Ole Elgström (2014), The Role of the EU in an Emerging New World Order in the Eyes of the Chinese, Indian and Russian Press, *Journal of European Integration*.

Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (2015), *Europe and Asia: Perceptions from Afar*, Nomos: Baden-Baden, forthcoming 2014/ Bloomsbury, forthcoming.

Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (2014), *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (2011), *The EU as an Agent for Democracy: Images of the EU in the Pacific Media 'Mirror*', Journal of European Integration, 2011, 33(3), 285–302.

Chaban, Natalia, Martin Holland, and Peter Ryan (2009), *The EU through the Eyes of Asia: New Cases, New Findings*, World Scientific: Singapore, London.

Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (2009), *The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions of the EU*, London: Routledge.

Chaban, Natalia, and Marco Kauffmann (2007), East is East, and West is West': A Survey of EU Images in Japan's Public Discourses, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 12, Issue 3.

Chaban, Natalia, and Michèle Knodt (2015), *Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS*, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 1-18.

Chaban, Natalia, and Vlad Vernygora (2013), The EU in the Eyes of Ukrainian General Public: Potential for EU Public Diplomacy?, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (15), 68-96.

Chaban, Natalia, Christian E. Schneier, and Richard Malthus (2009), Visibility, Framing and Importance: Images of the EU in Japan and South Korea, *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 27(1), 88-125.

Chan, Kenneth (2010), Images, visibility and the prospects of soft power of the EU in Asia: the case of China, *Asia-Europe Journal* Vol. 8, 133-147.

Chanona, Alejandro (2009), Perceptiones de la Union Europea en Mexico*,* in Lucarelli, Sonia, and Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.), *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor*, New York: Routledge.

Chen, Zhimin (2012), Europe as a Global Player: A View from China, *Perspectives* Vol. 20, No. 2.

Chung, Sae Won (2013), *External Images of the EU: Comparative Analysis of EU Representations in Three Major South Korean Newspapers and Their Internet Editions*, National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury.

Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina (2012), *EU Strategic Partnerships with third countries,* Library of the European Parliament. Available at: http:// www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/ bibliotheque/ briefing/ 2012/ 120354/ LDM_BRI%282012%29120354_REV1_EN.pdf

Council of the European Union (2007), 2007/C 287/01: Resolution of the Council of 16 November 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture.

Croci, Osvaldo, and Livianna Tossutti (2009), Canada and the EU: A Story of Unrequitted Attraction, in: Laursen, Finn (ed.), *The EU in the Global Political Economy*, Brussels: Peter Lang.

Croci, Osvaldo, and Livianna Tossutti (2007), That elusive object of desire: Canadian Perceptions of the European Union, *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 12(3).

Cross, Mai'a K. (2013), Conceptualizing European Public Diplomacy, in: Cross, Mai'a, and Jan Melissen (eds.), *European Public Diplomacy: Soft Power at Work*, Palgrave Macmillan, Chapter 1.

Curzio, Leonardo (2014), La imagen de México, in: Pellicer, Olga and Guadalupe González (eds.), *La política exterior de México. Metas y obstáculos*, ITAM, México.

Dai, Bingran, and Shuangquan Zhang (2007), EU Perceptions in China: Emerging Themes from the News Media, Public Opinion, and Elite Interviews, In: Holland, Martin, Peter Ryan, Alojzy Nowak, and Natalia Chaban (eds.), *The EU Through the Eyes of Asia: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand*, Singapore-Warsaw: Asia-Europe Foundation, National Centre for Research on Europe, Ateneo de Manila University and University of Warsaw. chap. 3.

Damro, Chad (2012), Market power Europe, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(5), June, 682-699.

Deblock, Christian (2008), Le Canada et l'Union européenne: du dialogue économique au partenariat renforcé?, *Cahier de recherche du GRIC*, Centre études internationales et mondialisation, Montréal, Université du Québec à Montréal.

Dolata-Kreutzkamp, Petra (2010), Drifting apart? Canada, the European Union and the North Atlantic, *Zeitschrift für Kanada- Studien*, 30(2).

Dolata-Kreutzkapm, Petra, and Veronica Kitchen (2008), Canada, Germany, Canada-Germany. Relations, *International Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 3.

Dominguez, Roberto (2011), Perceptions of the EU in Latin America, The Third International Conference 'Europe From the Outside', Kollegforschergruppe 'Transformative Power of Europe', Freie Universität Berlin.

Dong, Li Sheng (2012), *Chinese Views of the EU: Latest Data, Contributing Factors and Policy Implications*, Beijing: Social Science Academic Press.

Duke, Simon (2013), The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, No. 127, The Hague.

Eichengreen, Barry (2014), *Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses- and Misuses-of History*, Oxford University Press.

Endo, Ken (2013), *Tougou no Shuuen [The end of integration],* Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Endo, Ken, and Takumi Itabashi (2011), *Fukusu-no Europe – Oushu Togo shi no Frontier [Multiple Conceptions of Europe: at the frontiers of integration history]*, Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press.

Elgström, Ole (2014), Leader, Bridge-builder or 'Hobbled Giant'? Perceptions of the EU in Climate Change Negotiations, in: Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (eds.), *In Communicating Europe in Time of Crisis*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Elgström, Ole (2007), Outsiders' Perceptions of the European Union in International Trade Negotiations, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 45, Issue 4, 949–967.

Elgström, Ole (2006), Leader or Foot-Dragger? Perceptions of the European Union in Multilateral International Negotiations, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Report No. 1, March/ 2006.

Englbrekt, Kjell, and Bertil Nygren (2010), *Russia and Europe: building bridges, digging trenches*, Taylor and Francis.

European Cultural Foundation (2014), T*he Dwarfing of Europe. A dialogue between Brazil, India, China and Europe*, Vol. 2, Amsterdam.

EU Commission (2009), C(2009)10108 – PE/ 2009/ 9792: COMMISSION DECISION of 17/ 12/ 2009 on the Support Measure 'EU-China Civil Society Dialogue' to be financed under Article 19.10.01.01 of the general budget of the European Union.

EU Commission (2014), COM (2014) 567: Report on the implementation of the strategy for international cooperation in research and innovation.

EU Commission (2014), COM(2014) 4453, Annex: First Multi-annual Indicative Programme for the period 2014-2017.

EU Parliament (2011), European Parliament resolution of 12 May 2011 on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external actions (2010/ 2161(INI)).

Everts, Philip (2007), Familiarity breeds content. Chinese views of Europe and international affairs: the role of interest, knowledge and travel, University of Nottingham FP7 2007: *Disaggregating Chinese Perception of the EU and Implications for the EU's China Policy*, Available at: http:// www.nottingham.ac.uk/ cpi/ documents/ funded-projects/ fp7-working-papers-everts.pdf.

Fioramonti, Lorenzo (2012), Is the EU a better global player? An analysis of the emerging powers, in: Renard, Thomas, and Sven Biscop (eds.), *The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century. How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order*, Farnham/ Burlington: Ashgate, 2012.

Fioramonti, Lorenzo, and Patrick Kimunguy (2010), Europe vs. China in Africa*, International Spectator,* Vol. 46, No. 1.

Fioramonti, Lorenzo, and Gerrit Olivier (2009), *The Emerging Global South, in Perceptions of the EU as a global actor*, Routledge.

Fioramonti, Lorenzo, and Gerrit Olivier (2007), Altruism or Self-Interest, *European Foreign Affairs Review*. 12, 401-419

Fioramonti, Lorenzo, and Arlo Poletti (2008), Facing the Giant: Southern perspectives on the European Union, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, Issue 1.

Fioramonti, Lorenzo (2007), *Diffe*rent facets of a strategic partnership: How the EU is viewed by political and business elites, civil society and the press in India, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 12(3), 349–62.

Fisher, Rod (2014), *United States of America Country Report*, Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 26 March 2014.

Fisher, Rod (2014), *South Korea Country Report*, Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 5 March 2014.

Fisher, Rod (2014), *South Africa Country Report*, Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 5 March 2014.

Fisher, Rod (2014), *Japan Country Report*, Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 12 March 2014.

Fisher, Rod (2014) *Canada Country Report*, Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 28 April 2014.

Fitriani, Evi (2011), Asian perceptions about the EU in the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), *Asia Europe Journal,* Vol. 9, 43-56.

Gallup, Alec, and Lydia Saad (2004), Americans Know Little about European Union, *Gallup Poll*.

Gänzle, Stefan, and Steffi Retzlaff (2008), So, the European Union is 50: Images of the EU and the 2007 German presidency in Canadian News, *International Journal*, No. 627.

Gerau, Jasmin (2012), Shared Perceptions of Green? The Perception and Acceptance of European Union values and rules in environmental policy in Jordan, Institute of Development Research and Development policy, *Working Paper* 195, Bochum.

Gerrits, André (2009), Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingedael, 12/ 2009.

Gifford, Daniel J. and Robert Kudrle (2015), *The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust: An examination of US and EU Competition policy*, University of Chicago Press.

Goldgeier, James M. (2010), The future of NATO, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 51.

Gonzalez, Guadalupe (2014), *México, Las Américas y el mundo*, 2014.

Government of China (2014), China's Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation. Available at: http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/ mfa_eng/ zxxx_662805/ t1143406.shtml

Gretskiy, Igor and Eugeniy Treshenkov (2012), *Evropeiskaya Politika Sosedstva: Nyanci Vospriyatia V Rossii [European Neighbourhood Policy: Peculiarities of Perception in Russia.* Муждународные Процессы 10, 3.

Grincheva, Natalia (2012), Digital Diplomacy Rhetoric: International Policy Frame Transformations in Diplomatic Discourse, Journal of Cultural Management and Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 2. Available at: http:// www.encatc.org/ pages/ fileadmin/ user_upload/ Journal/ ENCATC_Journal_02_Digital_Diplomacy_VOL_2_ISSUE_2.pdf.

Gulyaeva, Olga (2013), Russian Vision of the EU in its Interactions with the Neighbourhood, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, 3 (3).

Hama, Noriko (2013), *Shin Tsuka Senso [The new currency war]*, Tokyo: Asahi shinsho.

Hayashi, Shingo (2009), *Aoyama Eijiro den: EU no kiso wo kiduita otoko [Biography of Eijiro Aoyama: The man who built a foundation of the EU]*, Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten. (Japanese)

Healy, Teresa (2014), Canadian and European Unions and the Canada-EU CETA Negotiations, *Globalizations*, Vol. 11, No. 1.

Hellkötter, Katja (2011), *Europe-China Cultural Compass: Orientation for Cultural Cooperation between China and Europe*, EUNIC. Available at: http:// www.eunic-online.eu/ sites/ default/ files/ imce/ u5066/ en_europe_china_cultural_compass_e-book_20112.pdf.

Helly, Damien (2012), More Cultural Europe in the World, More Europe: external cultural relations, More Europe. Available at: http://www.moreeurope.org/sites/default/files/more_cultural_europe_in_the_world_public.pdf

Henrikson, Alan (2006), What can Public Diplomacy Achieve?, *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

Hill, Christopher (1993), The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 09.

Hirashima, Kenji (2008), *Kokkyo wo koeru seisaku jikkenn EU [Policy Experimental beyond Borders: The EU]*, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.

Holland, Martin, Peter Ryan, Alojzy Nowak and Natalia Chaban (2007), *The EU through the Eyes of Asia*, University of Warsaw: Warsaw, Singapore.

Howorth, Jolyon (2014), *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, Basingstoke: MacMillan.

Howorth, Jolyon and John T.S. Keeler (2004), *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Serie, Palgrave Macmillan

Hwee, Yeo Lay, and Loke Hoe Yeong (2013), Who Acts for the EU before and after the Lisbon Treaty? The View through the Media in Singapore and Thailand, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (15), 85-104.

Isar, Yudhishthir R. (2014), *Preparatory Actions 'Culture in EU External Relations': Engaging the World: Towards Global Cultural Citizenship*, European Union.

Isar, Yudhishthir R. (2014), *India Country Report*, Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 26 February 2014.

Jain, Rajendra K. (2014a), India and Europe: Towards a New Narrative, in: Cremer, Marjolein, Cremer and Susanne Mors (eds), *The Dwarfing of Europe? A Dialogue between Brazil, India, China and Europe*, vol. 2, Amsterdam: European Cultural Foundation, 014, pp. 33-*43*

Jain, Rajendra K. (2014b), Asian Perceptions of the EU: External views on the EU as a Civilian Power – India and China in Comparison, *NFG Working Paper*, Free University of Berlin, July 2014.

Jain, Rajendra K. (2012), The European Union as a Global Power, *Perspectives: Review of International Affairs,* Vol. 20, Issue 2, 31-44.

Jain, Rajendra K. (2009), The European Union and China: Indian Perceptions and Perspectives, in: Georg Wiessala, John Wilson and Pradeep Taneja (eds.), *The European Union and China: Interests and Dilemmas*, Amsterdam/ New York: Rodopi, 139-150.

Jain, Rajendra K. (2007a), *The Pale Continent*, Culture Report Progress Europe, 39.

Jain, Rajendra K. (2007b), How they see us, *E!Sharp* Mar-Apr.

Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey (2013), Indian Elites and the EU as a Normative Power, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 3, Issue 3, 105-126.

Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey (2012a), The Public Attitudes and Images of the European Union in India, *India Quaterly*, Vol 68, Issue 4, 331-343.

Jain, Rajendra K., and Shreya Pandey (2012b), Indian Elites and the Eurozone Crisis, *Regional Integration Observer*, Centre for European Integration, University of Bonn, 6(2), August 2012b, 1-2.

Jain, Rajendra K. and Shreya Pandey (2010), The European Union in the Eyes of India, *Asia Europe Journal*, 8(2), 193–210.

Jiyoon, Kim, and Karl Friedhoff (2014), *South Korean Attitudes on the European Union. A Book of Charts*. Available at: http:// eeas.europa.eu/ delegations/ south_korea/ documents/ news/ eubook_0213_low_qual.pdf.

Jones, Seth (2007), *The rise of European Security Cooperation*, Cambridge University Press.

Kagan, Robert (2003), *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York.

Karlsson, Christer, Mattias Hjerpe, Charles Parker and Björn-Ola Linnér (2012), The Legitimacy of Leadership in International Climate Change Negotiations, *Ambio,* 41:46–55.

Karlsson, Christer, Mattias Hjerpe, Charles Parker and Björn-Ola Linnér (2011), Looking for Leaders: Perceptions of Climate Change Leadership among Climate Change Negotiation Participants, *Global Environmental Politics* 11:1, February, 89-108.

Kelly, Serena (2013), New Zealand Elite Perceptions on the EU: A Longitudinal Analysis, *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (15).

Kimani, Peter (2013/2014), Taking the pulse of the continent*,* in: Europe from the Outside Expectations of Europe's External Cultural Relations, Culture Report, *EUNIC Year Book 2013/ 2014*, Vol. 6, 75-79.

Kotabe, Masaaki et al. (2000), Strategic Alliances in emerging Latin America: a view from Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican Companies, *Journal of World Business* 35(2).

Kimunguyi, Patrick and Eva Polonska-Kimunguyi (2013), Communicating the European Union to Australia: The EU Information Strategy and Its Reception Down Under, *Baltic Journal of European Studies,* Vol. 3, No. 3 (15).

Klein, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway (2014), *The collapse of Western civilization: A view from the Future*, Columbia University Press.

Kunisue, Norito (2014), *Kyodai jikken kokka EU ha ikinokoreruka [The EU as a huge testing ground – can it survive?]*, Tokyo: Soshisha.

Larivé, Maxime (2014), *Debating European security and defense policy. Understanding the complexity*, Ashgate.

Larsen, Henrik (2014), The EU as a Normative Power and the Research on External Perceptions: The Missing Link, *Journal of Common Market Studies* Volume 52, Issue 4, 896–910.

Lessa, Antonio C. (2010), Brazil's strategic partnerships: an assessment of the Lula era (2003-2010), *Rev. bras. polít. int.*, Vol. 53, 115-131.

Le Sourd, Marie, Elena Di Federico, and Sung-Won Yoon (2012), *EU-South Korea: Current Trends of Cultural Exchange and Future Perspectives*, EENC Report, November 2012. Available at: http:// www.eenc.info/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2014/ 01/ EU-Korea-Cultural-Exchanges-final-report-September-2013-final.pdf.

Lai, Suet-Yi. And Li Zhang (2013): Challenging the EU's Economic Roles? The Impact of the Eurozone Crisis on EU Images in China, in *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (15), 2013, 13-26.

Liu, Li (2013): *German Public Diplomacy with New Media in China: The Case of Sina Micro-Blogging by the German Embassy.* Deguo Yanjiu [Germany Studies], No. 1. 2013

Lisack, Gaëlle (2014): *European external cultural relations: paving new ways?* ifa & MORE EUROPE – external cultural relations, 2014.

Lisbonne-de Vergeron, Karine (2006): *Contemporary Indian views of Europe*, 2006. http://www.india-platform.org/ files/ www.india-platform.org/ Lisbonne-de%20Vergeron%20-%20Indian%20view

Lucarelli, Sonia (2013): The EU's Leadership in the Global Governance: Perceptions from the Others. Conference Paper, 8th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, 'One International Relations or Many? Multiple Worlds, Multiple Crises', 18 –21 September, Warsaw, Poland.

Lucarelli, Sonia (2007): The External Image of the European Union, *GARNET Working Paper* No. 17.

Lucarelli, Sonia, and Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds) (2009): *External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor.* New York: Routledge.

Malone, Christopher (2011): Les négociations Canada-Union européenne en vue de la conclusion d'un nouvel accord économique: une demarche difficile, Report. Available here: http://www.leppm.enap.ca/leppm/docs/Rapports_Economie/Rapport_hors_serie_vf.pdf

Malone, David M. (2011): *Does the Elephant Dance: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Manners, Ian (2002): Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms, in *JCMS*, Vol. 40, No. 2, 235-258.

Manners, Ian (2001): Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the European Union, Conference Paper, European Union Community Studies Association, Madison, USA.

Martinelli, Alberto (Ed.) (2008): *Transatlantic divide: comparing American and European society Transatlantic divide: comparing American and European society*, Oxford University Press.

Massie, Justin (2013): *Francosphère: l'importance de la France dans la culture stratégique du Canada*, Québec, Presses de l'Université du Québec.

Melissen, Jan (2006): Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael.

Melissen, Jan (ed.) (2005): *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations,* Palgrave Macmillan.

Men, Jing (2006): Chinese Perceptions of the European Union: A Review of Leading Chinese Journals, *European Law Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 6, 788-806.

Mérand, Frédéric / Vandemoortele, Antoine (2009): L'Europe dans la culture stratégique canadienne, *Éudes internationals*, Vol. 40, No. 2.

Mix, Derek E. (2013): The European Union: Foreign and security policy, *CRS Report for Congress*, April 8

Morini, Mara (2009): Report on Russia, in Lucarelli, Sonia, and Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.): The External Image of the European Union, *GARNET Report*, 215-247.

Morozov, Viacheslav (2009): *Russia and the Others: Identity and Boundaries of a Political Community*, Novoe Literaturnoye Obosrenie.

Mpfunya, Farai (2014): A region in flux, in Europe from the Outside Expectations of Europe's External Cultural Relations, Culture Report, *EUNIC Year Book 2013/ 2014*, Vol. 6, 82-85.

Muenchow-Pohl, Bernd von (2012): India and Europe in a Multipolar World, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, May. http:// carnegieendowment.org/ files/ india_europe.pdf

Nikitin, Alexander (2006): Russian Perceptions and Approaches to Cooperation in ESDP. Das Institut der Europäischen Union für Sicherheitsstudien. http:// www.iss.europa.eu/ de/ publikationen/ detail/ article/ russian-perceptions-and-approaches-to-cooperation-in-esdp/

Ordgonidze, M. (2007*): Zapadnii Tcennosti v VospriyatiiRossiyan [Western Values in the perceptions of Russians*], Вестник общественного мнення 2.

Ortega, Martin (ed.) (2004): Global Views on the European Union, *Chaillot Paper*, No. 71, 11/2004.

Otero-Iglesias, Miguel (2012): The Influence of the Euro in Reshaping Global Monetary Governance: Perceptions from financial elites in Brazil and China. *European Law Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 122–142.

Pan, Zhongqi (2012): in Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (eds.), *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union.* Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan

Park, Sung Hoon, and Seo, Yeo Hung (2007), Impaired Vision? The EU in the Eyes of Korea, in M. Holland et al. (eds.) *The EU through the Eyes of Asia: Media, Public and Elite Perceptions in China, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand, & Singapore*, Warsaw, WWZ, 145–165.

Park, Sung Hoon, and Heungchong Kim (2006), The European Union in the Eyes of Korean Elites, *Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies*, 4(2), 12.

Park, Sung Hoon, and Sung Won Yoon (2015) The EU in the Views of Korean 'Elites': New Findings and Some Lessons, in *Asia-Europe Journal*, Vol.13, No.1.

Park, Sung Hoon, and Sung Won Yoon (2010), EU perceptions through the FTA lens: main results of interviews among the Korean 'elites', in *Asia Europe Journal*, No. 8, 177–191.

Peral, Luis, and Vijay Sakhuja (2012), The EU-India Partnership: Time to go Strategic?, EU Institute of Security Studies/ Indian Council of World Affairs, Papers presented at EUISS-ICWA Forum for Effective Multilateralism.

Pi-Suñer, Antonia, Paolo Riguzzi, and Lorena Ruano (2011), *Historia de las Relaciones Internacionales de Mexico, 1821-2010*, Mexico: Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores.

Polonska-Kimunguyi, Eva, and Patrick Kimunguyi (2013), Communicating the European Union to Australia: The EU Information Strategy and Its Reception Down Under, in *Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 15, 127-152.

Portela, Clara (2010), The perception of the European Union in Southeast Asia. Low priority statuses and selectivity, in *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 8, 149-160.

Rasmussen, Steffen Bay (2009), Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: Messages and Practices, *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

Rees, Wyn (2011), *The US-EU Security Relationship: The tensions between a European and a Global Agenda*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Regulation (EU) No 234/ 2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries, Article 1.2(d).

Retzlaff, Steffi (2010), The Representation of the European Union in the Canadian Media during the Climate Change Debate 2007, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, Vol. 4, No. 1.

Ribeiro Hoffmann, Andrea (2010), Between Power Politics and Utopia: a Brazilian perspective on European international role. In: Hauke Brunkhorst, and Gerd Groezinger. (Eds.). *The study of Europe*. Baden Baden: Nomos, 35-49.

Romanova, Tatiana (2011), The Normative Power of the European Union and its Conflictual Perception in Russia as a Barrier for the EU-Russia Legal and Political Approximation, in *Вестик Санкт-Петербургского Университета* 6, No 1.

Ruano, Lorena (2012), Relaciones Mexico-Union Europea: Tendencias Actuales y Perspectivas, in Schiavon, Jorge, and Velazquez Flores, Rafael (eds.), *La Politica Exterior de Mexico: 2012-2018. Diagnostico y Propuestas.* Mexico: AMEI, 31-6.

Saraiva, Miriam Gomes (2010), Brazil's view on Europe, *Policy Brief*, 44.

Saraiva, Miriam Gomes (2012), Brazil's strategies and partnerships: the place of the European Union. *Perspectives* (Prague, Print), Vol. 20, p. 45-62.

Schneider, Mirjam (2014), *Mexico Country Report*: Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 5 March 2014.

Secrieru, Stanislav (2010), Russia's Mainstream Perceptions of the EU and its Member States, The Study Programme on European Security (SPES), *Policy Paper*, 11/ 2010.

Shambaugh, David (2008), China eyes Europe in the world: Real convergence or cognitive dissonance? In: Shambaugh, David, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong (eds.) *China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Politics and Prospects*, London: Routledge, ch.7

Shen, Wen (2012), The EU's Promotion of Human Rights in Global Information Age: the Case of China, Paper to be presented at the UACES Annual Conference 'Exchanging Ideas on Europe 2012: Old Borders – New Frontiers', 3-5 September 2012, Passau/ GER.

Smits, Yolanda (2014a), *Russia Country Report*. Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 26 February 2014.

Smits, Yolanda (2014b), *Brazil Country Report*. Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 26 March 2014.

Smits, Yolanda (2014c), *China Country Report*. Preparatory Action 'Culture in the EU's External Relations', 19 May 2014.

Song, Xinning (2008), China's view of European integration and enlargement. In: Shambaugh, David, Eberhard Sandschneider, and Zhou Hong (eds.) *China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Politics and Prospects*. London: Routledge.

Sperling, James (2009), Report on American Perceptions of the EU, in Lucarelli, Sonja, and Lorenzo Fioramonti (eds.), *The External Image of the European Union*, GARNET Report, 279-326.

Staines, Judith (2012): Mapping Existing Studies on EU-China Cultural Relations, EENC Short Report, March 2012. Available at: http:// www.eenc.info/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2013/ 01/ JStaines-Mapping-Existing-Studies-on-EU-China-Cultural-Relations.pdf.

Stats, Katrina (2009), Report on Australia, in Lucarelli, Sonia, The External Image of the European Union, *GARNET Working Paper* No. 17, 37-77.

Stormy-Mildner, Annike (2009), Junior partner Canada. Transatlantic trade relations and under Germany's EU Presidency', *International Journal*, No. 646.

Stumbaum, May-Britt (2015), The diffusion of norms in security-related fields: views from China, India and the EU, *Asia Europe Journal*, 05/ 2015.

Stumbaum, May-Britt (2014), Asian Views on Venus: Perceptions of the EU in Security Policy Fields. in Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland (eds.) *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union*. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, ch. 4.

Stumbaum, May-Britt, Olivia Gippner, Anja Lutz, Garima Mohan, Jizhou Zhao (2015), Does Europe Matter? EU as a Security Actor in the Asian Century, *NFG Final Report*, Freie Universität Berlin.

Timmermann, Christiane, De Clerck, Helene Marie-Lou, Hemmerechts, Kenneth, and Willems, Roos (2014), Imagining Europe from the Outside: The Role of Perceptions of Human Rights in Europe in Migration Aspirations in Turkey, Morocco, Senegal and Ukraine, in Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (eds.), *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 220-226.

Torney, Diamurd (2013), Outsiders'Perceptions and EU Influence in the World: The Case of Climate Change. *NFG Working Paper Series*, No. 04, 03/ 2013, NFG Research Group 'Asian Perceptions of the EU', Freie Universität Berlin.

Tanaka, Toshiro, Fukui, Eijiro, and Bain, Jessica (2007), Cast in America's Shadow: Perceptions of the EU in Japan, in Holland, Martin al. (eds.), *The EU through the Eyes of Asia*, Warsaw: University of Warsaw.

Tsuruoka, Michito (2008), Expectations Deficit' in EU-Japan Relations: Why EU-Japan Partnership Cannot Flourish', *Current Politics and Economics of Asia*, 17-1.

Tsuruoka, Michito (2007), EU no henyou to EU kenkyuu no atarashii kadai: Nihon karano shiten (Transformation of the EU and New Agendas for EU Studies: A View from Japan) in Tanaka, Toshiro, Yasuyuki Kokubo and Michito Tsuruoka (eds.), *EU no kokusai seiji (International Politics of the EU),* Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2007 (in Japanese)

Usui, Yoichiro (ed.) (2015), *EU no kihan seiji – Global Europe no riso to genjitsu [Normative politics of the EU: The idea of Global Europe and its Reality]*, Kyoto: Nakanishiya, 2015

Vaz, Alcides Costa (2014), Brazil´s Strategic Partnerships: Origins, Agendas and Outcomes. *European Strategic Partnerships Observatory*, Vol. 9, 1.

Verstraete, Katelijn (2014): From conversation to 'conversAsian'?, in Europe from the Outside Expectations of Europe's External Cultural Relations, Culture Report, *EUNIC Year Book 2013/ 2014,* Vol. 6, 172-177.

Wakisaka, Noriyuki (2006), *Dai-Oshu no jidai* [The age of Great Europe], Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho. (in Japanese)

Winand, Pascaline (2015), EU-India current perceptions and implementation challenges, in: Winaud, Pascaline, Marika Vicziany, and Poonam Datar (eds): *The European Union and India*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 166-202.

Woll, Cornelia (2011), Who scripts European trade policies? Business-government relations in the EU-Canada partnerships negotiations, in Hübner, Karl (ed.), *Europe, Canada and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement*, Abingdon, Routledge.

Wong, Reuben (2012), Still in Deficit. Perceptions of the EU's Capabilities among Foreign Policy Elites in Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. *EU External Affairs Review*, 07/ 2012, 33-45.

Yoon, Sung Won (2013), Is FTA for 'Up Closer and Personal'?: Some Reflections on Media and Public Views on the EU in Korea, *The Baltic Journal of European Studies*, Vol.3, Issue 3.

Yoon, Sung Won, Natalia Chaban, and Sae Won Chung, (2010), Trading Giant' and 'Economic Powerhouse'?: Images of the EU on Korean News Television, *Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 28, Issue 3.

Yuichi, Kimura (2012), *Yo-roppa no seiji keizai nyumon*, [Introduction to European Political Economy], Tokyo: Yuuhikaku.

Zabludovsky, Jaime, and Sergio Gomez Lora (2005), Challenges in the Negotiation of Mexico's Free Trade Agreement with the European Union', *Working Paper SITI-09*, INTAL. Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2005.

Zang, Bung-ik (2013), A short study on the university students' perception of the EU and its implication, *Journal of European Union Studies*, Vol. 33.

Zhang, Li (2011), The Changing Images of the EU: A Longitudinal Representation in the People's Daily, in Zhang Li, *News Media and EU-China Relations*, Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan.

Zhou, Hong et al. (2009), Chinese perspective on Europe in 2008, *Journal of Europe Studies*, No. 5, 99-155.

Zhou, Hong (2008), A Survey and Preliminary Analysis of the Chinese Perception of the EU and China-Europe Relations, *Working Paper Series on European Studies* Vol. 2, No. 1.

Zhou, Hong (2007), A Chinese perspective on Lisbon Strategy. *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 3. 357-365.

ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND EU'S POLICIES ABROAD

ANNEX III COMPARATIVE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY REPORT

December 07, 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

LIST OF ACCRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BR	Brazil
CA	Canada
CN	China
EC	The European Commission
ECB	The European Central Bank
EP	The European Parliament
Erasmus	The Erasmus Student Exchange Programme
EU	European Union
Euro	The Official Currency of European Union
IMF	The International Monetary Fund
IN	India
JP	Japan
KR	South Korea
Mercosur	The Southern Common Market
MX	Mexico
N	Number of cases
NAFTA	The North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PPMI	Public Policy and Management Institute
RU	Russia
UK	The United Kingdom
UN	The United Nations
US or USA	The United States of America
WB	The World Bank
WTO	The World Trade Organization
ZA	South Africa

1. INTRODUCTION

This report provides an outline of the results of the public opinion surveys carried out as part of the study 'Analysis of the perception of the EU and EU's policies abroad'. These public opinion surveys were carried out in August 2015 in Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the US. The report provides a comparative analysis of survey data across the countries under study. Country-specific analysis is provided in separate country reports, which were prepared for each of these 10 EU Strategic Partner countries.

The survey was a key source of information for the study on 'Analysis of the perception of the EU and EU's policies abroad'. It was designed to primarily inform the analysis of the following aspects of the perception of the EU:

- to what extent the EU and its particular policies **are visible** and perceived as **effective**;
- whether the EU is perceived as **an important actor**, and one comparable to selected key countries and international organisations;
- to what extent the revealed **perception of the EU is positive, negative or neutral** or what is the emotional connection with the EU; and
- to what extent respondents feel the norms and ideas promoted internationally by the EU (**normative power**) are accepted and supported, as well as the extent to which these resonate with pre-existing ideas and concepts of political order embedded in a given country's institutions (**local resonance**).

Chapter 2 is subdivided into four subchapters. Findings on the general view of the EU, including visibility and positive versus negative reactions to the EU in general and compared with selected countries and organisations are presented in section 2.1. Descriptive images respondents associate with the EU, as well as attractiveness of its Member States are covered in section 2.2. Next, Section 2.3 explores the EU's role in international affairs, namely how desirable and likely respondents find the EU to take a leadership role in world affairs. Section 2.4 analyses how respondents from different countries view EU's performance in different thematic fields including economic affairs and trade, global peace and stability and social development among others. Finally, Chapter 2.5 looks at how respondents view the importance of the EU in the areas of trade; international relations; science, research and technology as well as education. Respondent views on the importance of the EU in these areas are compared to how important they find EU's partnership with their country in the same areas, this juxtaposition allows to look for local factors that may influence perceptions. Summarised insights on the survey results for each of these research criteria are provided in section 2.6.

The third chapter of the report contains a comprehensive transcript of the survey results. This chapter starts with a short outline of the survey. Further on it provides with frequency tables of all survey questions.

Short outline of the survey

Most of the data was gathered through online omnibus surveys, which were implemented in all Strategic Partner countries except in India. In India the survey was conducted face-to-face. The surveys were coordinated by the Public Policy and Management Institute (PPMI) and conducted by TNS Global, which was responsible for data collection and ensuring methodological precision and robustness throughout the whole process. Survey questionnaires were translated into official languages of the surveyed countries. Multiple translations were available in Canada (French and English) and in India (Hindi, Bengali, Tamil and Kannada). Data collection took place in August 2015. A table below shows the number of people interviewed in each of the countries (N).

Table 1. Number of respondents of the survey (N).

Country:	Total number of responses (N):
USA	1007
Canada	1022
Russia	1321
Japan	1024
China	1410
Brazil	1210
Mexico	1164
S. Korea	1238
S. Africa	1169
India	1056
Total:	11621

The survey results are representative for age, gender and region. Respondent profiles have been taken from the most recent national census data and other reliable data sources. A detail description of the quotas selected for the samples are available in country reports of the survey. The robustness of the results was guaranteed by extensive national online survey panels, the members of which are randomly selected (e.g., river sampling is not allowed), while the data collection and analysis process was subject to a number of filters and checks to ensure that any bias was removed as much as possible.

Given that the survey was implemented using an online survey panel, as typical to this methodology, the sample in some countries includes more individuals from an affluent background and urban areas than would be expected in the population at large. In two countries a significant percentage of respondents, who have ever lived in Europe is also visible - 19,8% in China and 13,4% in the US. During statistical analysis of survey data experience of living in Europe was analysed as an independent variable influencing perceptions of the EU. Analysis showed some statistically significant influence of this experience across answers to the survey questions. However the relationships between answers to survey questions and this independent variable proved to be weak. Thus a given share of respondents, who have ever lived in Europe, could not have a major influence on overall survey results described in frequency tables.

Disclaimer on comparability of cross-country survey data

Collecting comparable data in multiple nations and cultures is a highly complex task, in which one can expect to encounter a variety of languages and cultural contexts. This study and the public opinion survey in particular definitely fall into this group of tasks, therefore any comparison of survey results in different countries should be approached with due caution.

There is ample literature[1] documenting and analysing the existence of variable response styles across the nations and cultures and its implications to the potential comparison of survey findings across the countries and cultures. Paulhus[2] suggests that to the extent that an individual displays the bias consistently across time and situations, the bias is said to be a response style; the response bias here is understood as a systematic tendency to respond to a range of questions on some basis other than the specific item content. Such literature not only identifies common forms of response styles (such as the Extreme Response Style - a tendency of respondents to use the endpoints of the answer scale in the questionnaire; or the Acquiescence Response Style – a tendency of respondents to agree with items despite having a range of possibilities), but also discusses which styles are likely in which culture (e.g., the Acquiescence Response Style is likely in Japan).

In analysing the results of our public opinion survey we have also noted the presence of such varying response styles, such as aversion to extremes of the response scale in Japan, or a tendency of respondents to agree with items in India. Therefore any **direct** comparison of the public opinion survey data (incl. frequencies, shares and similar) across the 10 Strategic Partner countries should account for the presence of such styles. As a result, in this report we prefer to compare not directly the data itself[3] but the findings established in different countries[4]. Similarly, the integrated table of frequencies provided in the second part of this report is there to facilitate the reading of the data, but not as a comparative summary.

---

[1] See for example Paulhus, D.L. (1991), "Measurement and control of response bias", In J.P. Robinson, P.R. Shaver & L.S. Wrightsman (eds.), Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes, San Diego: Academic Press, pp.17-59; or more recently: Anne-Wil Harzing (2006), "Response Styles in Cross-national Survey Research. A 26-country Study", International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 2006 Vol 6(2): 243–266.; Sara Dolnicar, Bettina Gruen (2007), "Cross-cultural differences in survey response patterns", International Marketing Review, Vol. 24 Iss: 2, pp.127 – 143.

[2] Paulhus, D.L. (1991), "Measurement and control of response bias", In J.P. Robinson, P.R. Shaver & L.S. Wrightsman (eds.), Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes, San Diego: Academic Press, pp.17-59.

[3] To provide a hypothetical example, we do not compare that the EU was seen a very important in some area by 12 % of respondents in one country, but only 5 % in the other.

[4] To provide a hypothetical example, we note that the EU is the most visible organisation in some area in two countries, but not the third.

2. FINDINGS OF THE SURVEY

2.1. The general view of the European Union

At the beginning of the survey respondents were asked to rate their view of the EU and other countries or international organisations on a positive/ negative scale. Respondents were not informed that the survey is focused on the EU. The results therefore indicate the overall visibility of the EU and the strength of positive and negative evaluations (emotional connection) compared to a number of a selected list of peer countries and organisations.

Figure 1 provides an overall summary on positive and negative views in different countries. It shows that the EU is rarely seen as negative in most of the selected countries, with the clear exception of Russia, where the EU is evaluated particularly negatively. It also shows marked differences in the positive view on the EU. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that Figure 1 provides only a simplified visualisation of the views in different countries. Positive and negative views on the EU are illustrated more clearly when the EU is compared to other organisations and selected countries.

The next two figures provide a summary of respondent views on the EU as compared to countries (Figure 2) and organisations (Figure 3). These figures confirm that the EU is rarely seen as negative. However, they also show more subtle differences in the positive evaluation and visibility of the EU.

Figure 1. Visibility and positive/ negative view of the EU in different countries.

Note: Based on the answers to Q1: Generally speaking, as an overall point of view, please tell me how positive or negative you feel about each of the following countries and organisations? The positive evaluation scale combines the answers "very positive" and "somewhat positive". The negative evaluation scale combines the answers "very negative" and "somewhat negative". The visibility scale, which is illustrated by the size and colour of the bubble, represents the share of respondents that did not choose the answer "do not know".

Overall, the general view on the EU can be summarised as follows:

- as concerns visibility, which can be measured by how many respondents couldn't express a positive or negative view on the EU, and chose not to answer, the EU is least visible in Canada (14.4 per cent of respondents couldn't answer), followed by the US (14%), and Japan (13.5%). This finding corresponds to results in other questions, where respondents could not provide an opinion, for example on Q2, where they were asked to associate the EU and other countries with a mix of positive and negative adjectives (see Section 2.2 – Frequency of the use of selected words to describe the EU);

- when compared to selected countries (Figure 2) respondents in the majority of countries see the EU among those most positively viewed. The EU is usually sharing the highest positions together with the US and Japan, and is usually lagging behind the respondents' home country. In China and India, views on the EU are comparable to those on Russia and Brazil. However, in Russia, the EU is seen mostly negatively and less negatively only than the US;

- compared to other international organisations (Figure 3), respondents in most of the studied countries evaluated the EU more positively. However the UN in most countries is seen more positively than the EU, with exception of India, where it was the WB that ranked above the EU. In the US and China, the EU was also surpassed by NATO and WTO, respectively. In Russia, however, the EU was evaluated more negatively than most other organisations, with a clear exception of NATO;

- in most countries, the overall visibility of the EU is similar or lower to the that of other countries used for comparison, while it is more visible than most other international organisations (with the frequent exception of the UN).

Country reports provide more detailed bar charts illustrating the overall view of the EU as compared to other countries and organisations. Figure 2 and Figure 3 also rank countries and organisations in terms of their visibility. The extent to which a given country or organisation is visible in specific country is depicted by the size and colour of the bubble, that shows the percentage of respondents that chose the answer "do not know". The smaller size and darker colour of the bubble signifies a higher share of respondents choosing "do not know".

Figure 2. The general view of the EU and selected countries selected for comparison in different countries.

Note: Based on the answers to Q1: Generally speaking, as an overall point of view, please tell me how positive or negative you feel about each of the following countries and organisations? The positive evaluation scale combines the answers "very positive" and "somewhat positive". The negative evaluation scale combines the answers "very negative" and "somewhat negative". The size and colour of the bubble shows the percentage of respondents that chose the answer "do not know". The smaller size and darker colour of the bubble signifies higher share of respondents choosing "do not know".

Figure 3. The general view of the EU and other organisations in different countries.

Note: Based on the answers to Q1: Generally speaking, as an overall point of view, please tell me how positive or negative you feel about each of the following countries and organisations? The positive evaluation scale combines the answers "very positive" and "somewhat positive". The negative evaluation scale combines the answers "very negative" and "somewhat negative". The size and colour of the bubble shows the percentage of respondents that chose the answer "do not know". The smaller size and darker colour of the bubble signifies higher share of respondents choosing "do not know".

2.2. Descriptive images of the European Union

The survey aimed, among other ways of measuring the public's perception of the European Union, to identify the images that are most commonly associated with both the European Union and Europe, and explore whether respondents have different associations for the two actors. In this chapter, we firstly explore which selected themes respondents associate with the EU and Europe (Q23), and compare responses for both. Next, we look at which EU Member States target country respondents find most and least attractive (Q25), followed by which EU institutions and symbols are most visible (Q26). Finally, we look at which words respondents in specific countries and across them chose to describe the EU, also as compared to other global actors (Q2).

Association of different themes to the EU versus Europe

A look into how the general population views Europe and the European Union in relation to specific themes – particularly in economy; science research and technology; politics; social development; culture and sports (Q23) provides three types of information. Firstly, we can see the dominant themes in association with the EU and with Europe, which illustrates what type of actors the two are perceived as being. Secondly, it allows to see the differences in the associations respondents have with the two European actors. Lastly, it also shows to what extent respondents are able to formulate whether a specific theme is associated with the EU versus Europe, showing to an extent the level of awareness about what these two actors represent (represented by the share of respondents without an opinon on the question), and the extent that they are seen as overlapping in certain themes (represented by the share of respondents marking "no difference" among answer choices).

Dominant themes for EU and Europe

EU - The list of themes was ranked in mostly the same order for the EU. The EU is first and foremost associated with economy across the studied countries (cross-country average 46%), with politics being the second theme most associated with the EU across the board (42.6%). One exception is Russia, where the order is reversed – the EU is seen first as a political actor, then as an economic one. Social development was the theme all country respondents ranked in the middle (30.5%), followed by science, research and technology (26.9%). In some countries social development and science followed closely after politics (India, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, South Africa and US), wheras in others the latter were much less often associated with the EU than economy and politics (Russia, Canada, Brazil, China). Lastly, the area least often associated with the EU is culture and sports (17.6%).

Europe – Similarly to the association of selected themes with the EU, themes respondents chose to be most associated with Europe ranked in mostly the same order across countries with minor differences. Moreover, the order of themes most to least associated with Europe is the reverse of that of the EU. The area most associated with Europe is culture and sports (cross-country average 49.1%), followed by science (38.3%), and social development (32.7%) in the middle. This order held true for all countries but India, where Europe was most associated with the economy, followed by science, and the remaining three areas were ranked equally. The areas least often associated with Europe in all countries were politics (23.4%) and economy (23%), as concerns

the latter with the exception of India, where it was the second theme most associated with Europe, with almost no difference between the two.

Differences between the EU and Europe

The general trend across countries is that the EU and Europe are associated to different areas, as illustrated in the above section. Respondents in most countries differentiated between these two actors rather strongly, as noted earlier seeing the EU in economic and political terms, and Europe in sports and culture as well as science. The outlier is India, where a similar amount of respondents chose the EU and Europe in association to the economy and science, and no differentiation was found between culture and sports, social development and politics.

Another trend is that on average 20 per cent of respondents across countries saw no difference between the EU and Europe in relation to the listed themes, with no marked differences across countries. The last portion of respondents didn't have an opinion on which of the two actors to attribute to the listed themes. While across countries, on average 13 per cent of respondents didn't have an opinion, there were differences in how many respondents chose this answer in the studied countries. In this respect, Japan, the US and Canada had the largest proportion of respondents – around a quarter - who didn't have an opinion, while in other countries this figure was closer to 10 per cent. This finding corresponds to results of EU visibility, which was found lowest in the US (see Chapter 2.1 – General View of the EU).

Lastly on the topic of which themes are most associated to the EU and Europe, there were differences across countries in the amount of respondents that either didn't have an opinion on these questions or marked "no difference" on the EU and Europe in relation to the specified themes.

Attractiveness of EU Member States

When asked to rank which EU Member States they find most attractive (Q25), respondents across countries most often indicated France, Germany and Italy, all of which on average were found as attractive by over half of the respondents in all countries. Other Member States mentioned among the Top three include Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Portugal and Spain. There were slight variations in the ranking of most attractive Member States across countries – for example, Italy was seen as the most attractive in the US, Canada and Brazil, while India, South Africa, South Korea, Mexico and China placed France in the first place, and Japan with Russia ranked Germany highest.

The Baltic States and other CEE countries were least often mentioned across the countries as most attractive.

Visibility of different elements of the EU's image

The survey also looked into the visibility of different institutions and symbols of the EU in target countries, namely the European flag, the Erasmus student exchange programme, the European Delegation in the target country, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the European Council (Q26).

- The most visible institutions and symbols representing the EU across the board included the euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP).

- The least visible institution by a considerable percentage was the Erasmus student exchange programme, and, to a lesser extent, the EU delegations in the target countries.

Frequency of the use of selected words to describe the EU

Based on Q2: Which of the following words, if any, do you think best describe each of the following countries and organisations? EU (answer options: multicultural; modern; united; strong; peaceful; efficient; trustworthy; arrogant; hypocritical; aggressive; none of these)

Another aspect of EU perceptions explored in the survey is what different words respondents across target countries felt best desribe the EU. Moreover, respondents were asked to make these associations in relation to the other global actors (the US, China, Russia, Brazil, India and Japan), which allows to look at how the EU fared comparatively with other global actors.

Main findings concerning the EU (see Figure 6):

- Across countries, *multicultural* was the adjective chosen by respondents in most countries as best fitting the EU – it ranked as the first word that best describes the bloc in the US, Canada, China and Mexico; as second in Russia and Japan; and third in Brazil and South Korea;

- *Modern* and *strong* were the second and third adjective most commonly associated with the EU. Interestingly, the EU was not seen as modern in either Russia or Brazil, while countries like the US, Canada, Russia, Japan and South Korea didn't see it as strong. Other positive adjectives used to describe Europe included *peaceful*, *efficient*, and *united*.

- There was considerable variation across countries in what portion of the respondents didn't attribute any of these words as describing the EU, which to an extent reflects the visibility or lackthereof of the EU itself in the given countries. The highest percentage of respondents not choosing any of the provided words was found in Japan (32%); the US (29.9%) and Canada (24.3%). These results correspond to the finding that EU had the lowest visibility in these three countries (see Chapter 2.1 – General View of the EU).

- While on the whole respondents across countries overwhelmingly chose positive adjectives to describe the EU as compared to negative ones, Russia is an outlier – respondents there indicated *hypocritical* and *arrogant* as the second and third most common adjective describing the block, accordingly, albeit chose *multicultral* most often of all adjectives. Also, while in no other countries respondents chose negative adjectives among the top ones describing the EU, the on average 13.3 per cent of respondents found the EU *arrogant*, followed by *hypocritical* (12%) and, least often, *aggressive* (8%).

As concerns the association of selected adjectives with the EU as compared to other countries:

- the EU ranked higher than other countries in being associated with the adjectives *multicultural* and *trustworthy,* in this respect followed by the US and India on the former and by Japan and the US in the latter.

- The EU by and and large respondents least often associated the EU with the words *aggressive* in comparison to other countries, in which respect it was outranked by Russia, the US and China, respectively.

Figure 4. Frequency of the use of selected words to describe the EU.

Note: Based on the answers to survey Question 2: Which of the following words, if any, do you think best describe the EU

2.3. EU's role in international affairs

Two survey questions allow to describe the general perceptions of the EU's role in international affairs. Firstly, respondents were asked to describe how desirable it would be that specific countries take a strong leadership role in international affairs. Further on, they were also asked to provide opinions on how likely it is that these countries will take an active role in international affairs in the future. Since this question addressed the EU among other international actors, it is possible to compare the EU in this respect to other global players. As shown in Figure 7, EU's leadership in world affairs is mostly seen as desirable and likely in Mexico, India and South Africa, while respondents from Russia and Japan express the lowest desirability and likelihood of the EU having a major role to play in international affairs. Figure 8 provides a more detailed view, which comes from comparing the EU with international players in this respect.

Figure 5. The desirability and likelihood of EU's strong leadership role in world affairs.

Note: The horizontal scale is based on the answers to Q4: How desirable is it that each of the following countries and organisations take a strong leadership role in world affairs? It shows answers "Very likely" and "Rather likely" combined. The vertical scale is based on the answers to Q5: And, in your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that each of the following countries or organisations will take a strong leadership role in world affairs five years from now? It shows answers "Very desirable" and "Somewhat desirable" combined.

The general comparative conclusions are the following:

- EU's leadership in world affairs is seen as desirable. In most of the selected countries the EU stands among top three major players in this respect. It takes the first position in Canada and Mexico, and the second in the US, South Korea and South Africa, in these countries lagging only behind the US. Russia was the only exception where EU's leadership is not seen as desirable, for Russian respondents EU's leadership was more desirable solely than the US. In India, EU's leadership overall is seen as desirable, but only more than that of Brazil or China;

- EU's leadership in the selected countries is also seen as likely. The EU again in a majority of countries takes one of the three top positions in terms of the likelihood that it will take a strong leadership role in the future. In this respect, respondents from Japan, Brazil and Mexico ranked the EU second, behind only the US. In the rest of selected countries, the EU was rated third, surpassed by the US and China, with the recurrent exception of Russia, where the respondents rated their country's leadership as more likely, and India, where the EU surpassed only Brazil and China.

Country reports provide with a more detailed view in terms of how desirable or likely respondents find the EU and other countries to take a leadership role in world affairs. These reports contain bar chart graphs for answers to each of these questions.

Figure 6. The desirability and likelihood of EU's strong leadership role in different countries.

Note: The horizontal scale is based on the answers to Q4: How desirable is it that each of the following countries and organisations take a strong leadership role in world affairs? It shows answers "Very likely" and "Rather likely" combined. The vertical scale is based on the answers to Q5: And, in your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that each of the following countries or organisations will take a strong leadership role in world affairs five years from now? It shows answers "Very desirable" and "Somewhat desirable" combined.

2.4. EU's performance in various fields

The majority of the remaining survey questions were used to measure the EU's performance in various thematic fields. Figure 8 shows answers to survey questions soliciting an overall assesment of the EU's performance in a list of selected thematic fields (Q6-Q12). The graph allows to compare opinions from different countries on how the EU performs in a given area. It also provides an opportunity to compare the EU's performance across some of the analysed thematic fields [5]. In addition to a general evaluation of importance, the influence or atractiveness of the EU, one or several other questions inquire more specifically about how EU performance is seen in the same themes. Below we provide a summary of the findings on each of these topics.

Economic affairs and trade

The EU is among the global players respondents from selected countries see as most influential in economic affairs and trade. In this respect it received positive evaluations in all of the countries, with the lowest one from the US. According to separate country data, in most of the selected countries, the EU is seen as lagging behind the US and China, with the exception in Brazil and Mexico where the EU is surpassed only by the US and in India where the EU is lagging behind the US, India, Japan and, to a lesser extent, Russia (Q6). The EU is perceived as performing fairly good in global trade, and in Brazil and Mexico the EU is seen as performing very good (Q13). This view is further supported by the finding that a high share of respondents agree that the EU is an important trade partner for their countries (Q14).

A number of questions showed that tourism is seen as an important economic activity for the EU. In most of the selected countries (with the exception of India and China), respondents see it as the economic field in which the EU performs best (Q13). Respondents from selected countries generally see Europe as an attractive tourist destination both as relating personally to them (Q22) and to tourists from their countries in general (Q20).

Global peace and stability

In terms respondent opinions on performance in global peace and stability, the EU was evaluated as performing fairly good. In most countries the EU was seen as lagging behind the US and also performing similarly to the UN. In this respect, the EU was evaluated least positively in Russia and India, where the EU was in a lower position in relation to other global players than in any other country. Looking more specifically, EU's performance in peacekeeping operations is regarded slightly more positively than in other fields related to peace and stability, namely military operations or the fight against terrorism (Q15), with the exception of Russia, Brazil and India, where the EU is seen as performing better in the fight against terrorism.

---

[5] Although for the sake of convenience these questions are visualized in one picture, due to variance in used scales only the answers to questions Q7, Q8, Q9, Q10, Q11 can be compared across different topics. Please refer to the note below the Figure for more details.

Figure 7. EU's performance in various fields: perceptions in different countries.

Note: Based on the answers to survey question Q6: In your view, how influential in global economic affairs are the following countries and organisations? The bars for Q6 stand for: dark orange - "very influential", light orange - "somewhat influential". Other questions: "In your view, how important a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in..." Q7. ...maintaining global peace and stability? Q8. ...fighting global climate change and protecting the environment? Q9. ...in providing support to developing countries to eradicate poverty and to build a fairer and more stable world? Q10. ...in promoting and defending human rights worldwide to protect human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity? Q11. ...in advancing innovation and technological progress in the world? The bars for Q7-Q11 stand for: dark orange - "very important", light orange - "somewhat important". Q12: How attractive to you personally are the following countries in terms of their culture and lifestyle? The bars for Q12 stand for: dark orange - "very attractive", light orange - "somewhat attractive". All answers are for sub-question on European Union only.

Climate change and environmental protection

The EU's role in fighting global climate change and protecting the environment (Q8) is evaluated positively in all of the selected countries, with the lowest result found among Russian respondents, who evaluated the EU's performance at approximately 55 per cent (compared to 71.1 per cent cross-country average). The EU in this respect mostly falls behind the US and/ or the UN, with the exception of India, China and Russia. In the countries under study, protection of the environment and the fight against climate change (with the exception of Russia and China) is not among the fields in which the EU is seen as standing out the most (Q15). Respondents from the selected countries see the EU's performance in green technologies similarly to that in other economic activities and other specific fields of technological development, however, respondents from Japan give a more positive evaluation (Q13).

Social development

Speaking about support to developing countries, respondents view the EU once more as performing fairly good. However, in most of the countries the EU is seen as lagging behind the US (with exception of Brazil and Mexico) and/ or the UN (Q9). Respondents from China, India, Japan and Russia also see their home country as a more important actor than the EU in this respect. In most cases the EU surpasses the WB and the remaining countries used for the comparison.

In terms of opinions on more specific topics related to internal social development, most survey respondents see the EU as performing fairly good in social justice and solidarity (e.g. social rights, the public welfare system) (Q17). Furthermore, the EU's performance in overall quality of life is among the most positively evaluated areas of social development (Q17).

Human rights

Overall, survey respondents see the EU's performance in the field of promoting and defending human rights worldwide very similarly to how it fares in social development, with main rivals in these areas in most countries seen as the UN and the US (Q10). Respondents from Mexico and South Africa were providing most positive evaluations in this respect.

The survey also contained several questions on more specific human rights issues. Results show that in all of the countries the EU's dealing with refugees (and displaced people) is seen as less positive when compared to the overall fairly positive evaluation of the EU's performance in other fields (with the exception of Russia, where many other fields were seen in a negative light as well) (Q15). This area clearly stands out across countries as the one that respondents least often evaluated positively. In all of the selected countries, with the exception of Japan, the EU's performance in integration of migrants and refugees was also seen least positively among other areas of social development (Q17). For comparison, respondents across the studied countries evaluated the EU's performance in gender equality as the most positive among other human rights related issues listed in this survey question.

Innovation and technological progress

In the field of innovation and technologies survey respondents from most of the countries see the EU as lagging behind the US, China and Japan (Q11). The main exception is South Korea, where the

EU is seen as behind only the US. Respondents from India and Russia also rank the EU behind their home country. Overall, most respondents view the EU's importance in innovation and technological progress similarly to that in other areas, however they see rival countries as much more important than the EU in this field in relation to how their performance compares in other areas. Overall, respondents from Brazil, Mexico and China were most in agreement and respondents from Japan, Russia, Canada and the US were least in agreement about EU's importance in this respect. Despite of the overall reserved view on EU's global importance in this field, respondents feel the EU performs fairly well in various fields of technology, as well as science research, and technology (Q13).

Culture, education and lifestyle

In the selected countries, EU Member States are mostly seen as particularly attractive for their culture and lifestyle (Q12). Even though respondents evaluated all areas related to European culture very positively, they were more likely to choose historical heritage, arts, lifestyle, luxury goods and clothes over cinema and theatre, music, sports, food and cuisine (Q19). These opinions are in line with those on EU's performance in the entertainment industry, which in most of the countries (with the exception of Russia and Japan) is evaluated less positively compared to other economic activities (also seen least positively in China and South Korea) (Q13). In relation to other questions, respondents from the studied countries (with the exception of India) also tended to agree less often with the statement that Europe is a producer of music and arts popular in their country (Q20).

At the same time, respondents across the studied countries view the EU positively in terms of the level of education of its population (Q17), which in most of the target countries (with the exception of Russia, Japan, South Korea and India) is seen as the area of social development where the EU performs best. The EU is also seen as an important partner for all of the selected countries' educational exchanges (Q18).

2.5. Local resonance of EU

The survey was also designed to see to what extent and how general and topic-specific perception of the EU change when a respondent is asked to think of the EU through a more local lens, e.g. in relation to their home country. Besides addressing this difference in the general emotional connection respondents have with the EU (Q1) and in terms of their country's relation to the EU (Q3), the survey questions allow exploring specific themes and how respondents view the EU generally as performing in these areas and then specifically in how important the EU is in those areas specifically for their country. Any differences in the general view respondents have of Europe or how it performs in certain areas in general and Europe's importance, be it generally or in specific areas, in relation to their country, may signal the presence of some local issues resonating and either improving or worsening the perception of the EU.

General view of EU

Figure 8 shows how respondents across countries evaluated their home country's relationship with the EU. Interestingly, respondents from Canada, the US and India saw their country's relations with the EU more positively than when asked to express their general view (Q1). While in Mexico, Russia, South Africa and South Korea the personal view on the EU was more positive than specifically in terms of the countries' relationship with the EU. As underlined in the introduction to this chapter, these differences might signal that local resonance in these countries influences the perception of the EU. The specific issues are further explored in country reports.

Figure 8. The view on home countries' overall relationship with the EU.

Note: Based on the answers to Q3: Generally speaking, which of the following best describes (your country's) overall relationship with each of the following countries and organisations?

Field-specific view of EU

Furthermore, the survey explored how EU's performance is viewed in specific areas, both generally and in relation to the respondents' country. The specific areas explored in the analysis below include: trade; international relations; science research and technology; and education.

Figure 9 below shows respondents' views on the importance of EU as a partner in the specified fields. As can be seen, Canada and India respondents find the EU has an important role in partnership to their country irrespective of the specific areas. Findings for other countries, which rated EU's importance similarly save for slightly lower scores in Japan, also did not vary based on the specific field addressed in each question.

The juxtaposition of these questions on importance of EU partnership with the respondents' countries in the following fields versus the importance of the EU in those fields in the global scene is presented in Table 1 that follows.

Figure 9: The EU as a partner in various fields: perceptions in different countries

Note: Based on the answers to survey question Q16. Looking from (Your country)'s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the political relations with the European Union?... The European Union is an important partner to (Your country) in international relations ... The European Union is a trustworthy partner to (Your country) in international relations. Q14. Looking from (Your country)'s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the economic relations with the European Union?... The European Union is an important partner to (Your country) in science, research and technology...The European Union is an important trade partner with (Your country)...The European Union is an important foreign investor in (Your country)...The European Union is protecting its market at the expense of others Q18. Looking from (Your country)'s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the European Union?...The European Union is an important partner for (Your country) education exchanges. The bars stand for: dark orange - "strongly agree", light orange - "agree".

Table 1 below illustrates to what extent there were differences in how respondents in the countries under study viewed the EU differently in terms of how it performs in these areas overall, and in the same fields but specifically in relation to their country.

The countries are listed in descending order, meaning those at the top of the list had the highest differences between how the respondents view EU's performance in the specific field overall in comparison to how they view the EU's importance in that field in relation to their country specifically. The (-) sign before some of the countries under specific areas indicates that with local resonance – i.e. specifically in relation to the respondents' country, the EU is seen as less important than it generally is in the global context.

Interestingly, in most countries the EU is seen as less important in partnership to the studied countries as opposed to Europe's global role in international relations, which is seen more positively. This trend didn't hold true only for Mexico in Brazil, where there was little to no difference in how respondents gauged the EU's importance in IR in general and in partnership with their countries.

Another trend is that no differences were found as concerns respondents' views of how important the EU is globally in education, as compared to its importance in terms of partnership with their countries specifically in educational exchanges. Finally, on issues of trade and science, research and technology, respondents viewed the EU as more important in relation to their country specifically than overall in the global context.

Table 2: Local resonance of EU in specific areas

	Pronounced difference	Minor difference	No difference
General view vs partnership in trade	Brazil Russia South Korea Mexico South Africa Japan (-)India	Canada	The US China
General view vs partnership in international relations	(-)Japan (-)China (-)South Korea (-)India (-)The US (-)Canada	(-)Russia Brazil	(-)South Africa Mexico
Partnership view vs partnership in science, research and technology	Brazil Mexico South Korea Canada Japan South Africa Russia China	The US	India
General view vs partnership in education exchanges	Mexico	South Africa India	(-)South Korea Brazil Russia Canada China The US Japan

Note: Based on comparison of the answers to:

Trade - Q6: In your view, how influential in global economic affairs are the following countries and organisations? (EU) and Q14: … How strongly do you agree or disagree… The European Union is an important trade partner with (Your country);

International relations: Q5: And, in your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that each of the following countries or organisations will take a strong leadership role in world affairs five years from now? (EU) and Q16…How strongly do you agree or disagree… The European Union is an important partner to (Your country) in international relations;

Science, research and technology: Q14: How strongly do you agree or disagree… The EU is an important partner to my country in science, research and technology? And Q11: In your view, how important are the following countries and organisations in advancing innovation and technological progress in the world? (EU)

Educational exchanges: Q17. Generally speaking, how well do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development? (Level of education) and Q18: How strongly agree / disagree: EU is an important partner for your country's education exchanges?

NB (1): Difference levels are distinguished as follows: pronounced difference – above 10 per cent; minor difference –5 per cent -10 per cent; no difference – under 5 per cent)

NB (2): The (-) sign before some of the countries under specific areas indicates that with local resonance – i.e. specifically in relation to the respondents' country, the EU is seen as less important than it generally is in the global context.

2.6. Information preferences

At the end of the survey respondents were approached with two questions, which provide with information on respondents' preferences for information on the EU. Data on these survey questions were not meant to shed more light on the respondents' opinions and perceptions of the EU and thus cannot be directly used to answer main research questions of this study. However they provide with information, which is important for implementation of information activities.

Sufficiency of information on the EU

One of the survey questions (Q29) covered sufficiency of the information that respondents feel they have on the EU and also the demand for additional information. Figure 10 shows the extent to which respondents from different countries feel informed about the EU and also the extent to which they express willingness to receive more information.

Figure 10. Sufficiency of information on the EU and demand for additional information on the EU.

Note: Based on the answers to Q29: Would you say you are sufficiently informed about the European Union? Answer options: Yes, I have sufficient information; Yes, but I would like more information; No, but I would like more information; No, but I am not really interested.

The extent to which respondents feel sufficiently informed on the EU proved to be important independent variable explaining some variation in opinions and perceptions of the EU. These correlations are described in detail in country-specific reports of the survey. Statistical analysis of

the survey data shows, that respondents contact with Europe (Q24), respondents age and gender and other variables had some influence on answers to this question. Therefore here we provide with insights on how answers to this question correlate with independent variables.

Respondents' previous contact with Europe was measured by asking if they have ever travelled to Europe, lived in Europe or have relatives in Europe. If at least one of the answers was positive, it was interpreted that a specific respondent had previous contact with Europe. Contact with Europe proves to have a positive influence on how respondents view sufficiency of the information they have on the EU. For example in the US respondents, which have at least some contact with Europe, are up to two times more likely to state, that they have sufficient information on the EU. Similar trend holds true in Russia, China or Brazil and to somewhat lesser extent also in Mexico, South Korea and South Africa. Respondents without previous contact with Europe usually are more likely to state that they are not sufficiently informed about the EU, but they would like to receive more information. This trend is clearly visible in all countries except Japan and India.

Gender proved to be statistically significant variable that explains variations in sufficiency of information. In the US, Canada and Russia male respondents are up to twice more likely to feel sufficiently informed about the EU. In other countries, except China, this trend is also visible although not as marked. In a number of countries younger respondents were more likely to feel better informed about the EU than the older respondents. For example, in the US youngest respondents were more than twice more likely to state, that they have sufficient information on the EU. Similar trend, although not as marked as in the US, also holds true in Mexico, India and to some extent also in Canada. The opposite trend is seen in Russia and South Africa, where older respondents are slightly more likely to feel sufficiently informed, but also would like to be informed more. In the US and to a lesser extent also in Brazil and India older respondents are somewhat more likely to state both that they are not sufficiently informed about the EU and that they would like to have more information on the EU.

Income has a marked effect on the extent to which respondents feel informed about the EU. In the US, Russia, China, Brazil and South Korea respondents from highest income bracket are more likely to feel sufficiently informed about the EU compared to respondents from the lowest income bracket. Also in Mexico less affluent respondents are somewhat more likely to be both less informed about the EU and would like to receive more information. Working status has a similar influence on answers to this survey question. In the US, China, Brazil and to some extent also in Russia, Mexico, South Korea and Canada the unemployed are less likely to feel sufficiently informed about the EU.

In a number of countries region of residence has a significant influence on sufficiency of information respondents have on the EU:

- in the US respondents from the Northeast and the West are more likely to be better informed about the EU;
- in Russia respondents from Volga Federal district are more likely to feel well informed about the EU, but also would like to receive more information. Respondents from Southern

/ North Caucasian Federal District are also more likely to feel better informed about the EU. Whereas respondents from Far Eastern Federal district are least informed about the EU;

- in Japan respondents from Chubu region are more likely to feel well informed about the EU, but also would like to receive more information. Respondents from Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku regions are more likely to be less informed about the EU;
- In Brazil respondents from Center West are more likely to feel sufficiently informed about the EU. Whereas respondents from North are more likely to feel not sufficiently informed about the EU;
- In Mexico respondents from Baja California region are least likely and respondents from the Bajio region are more likely to feel sufficiently informed about the EU and also to feel the need for additional information;
- In South Korea respondents from the East are less likely to feel sufficiently informed about the EU and also to feel the need for additional information;
- In India respondents from Delhi and Chennai are more likely to feel sufficiently informed about the EU;
- In South Africa, China and Canada region of residence of respondent has no marked or statistically significant influence on sufficiency of the information on the EU.

Level of education has little effect on sufficiency of information on the EU. This variable had some statistically significant influence only in the US, where least educated were more likely to state that they are sufficiently informed, and also in South Korea where the least educated were more likely to state that they are both sufficiently informed about the EU and would also like to receive more information.

Preferred information activities

The final question of the survey (Q30) showed preferences of respondents for information activities, through which they would like to receive information on the EU or Europe. Figure 11 summarises answers to this questions in different countries.

Figure 11: Preferences for information activities to inform about the EU or Europe.

Note: Based on the answers to survey question Q30. In which of the following activities related to the European Union or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?

This question (Q30) provided respondents with possibility to choose two types of answers. The first set of answers covered information activities, which require a more active involvement of participants. Cultural events were the most popular answer option among respondents especially in Mexico, China and Russia. This answer option was followed by activities between Europeans

and people from home country. Various demographic qualities of the respondents proved to have little influence on the answers to this question. However in some cases age was a statistically significant independent variable:

- In the US, Canada, China, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and India younger respondents were more likely to choose European Film festivals as a preferred activity;
- Similar trends hold true for joint sport initiatives, but only in the US and Canada;
- In Canada cultural events were more preferred by younger respondents. In Russia, Japan and South Korea this trend was the opposite – cultural events were more often preferred by older respondents;
- In all countries, except Japan, age was statistically significant variable explaining preferences for academic exchanges, scholarships and opportunities for academic mobility. Younger respondents were more likely to choose this option compared to older respondents;
- In Russia, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa older respondents are somewhat more likely than young respondents to prefer activities between European people and people from their home countries.

The other set of answers to survey question covered demand for different information topics. Most popular option from this set of answers was information on how to travel to Europe. This option was particularly popular among respondents from Mexico, Russia, China and South Korea. Other answer options, which were more often chosen by respondents, were getting information on how to live in Europe and also online initiatives. The age of respondents once again proved to be significant independent variable explaining variation in answers to this question:

- In Russia and South Africa older respondents were somewhat more likely to prefer information about EU's policies;
- In Canada younger respondents were up to three times more likely than older respondents to prefer information on how to live in Europe. Same trend, although not as marked as in Canada, holds true for the US. In Russia this trend is opposite – older respondents were somewhat more likely to choose this answer option;
- In the US, Canada, Russia, Brazil and India younger respondents were also slightly more likely to choose information on how to invest and do business in Europe;
- In Canada information on how to live in Europe was more often preferred by younger respondents. Whereas in Russia, Japan, South Korea and South Africa it was somewhat more often preferred by older respondents;
- In Russia, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa older respondents were slightly more likely to choose online initiatives.

Respondents were also able to state that none of the proposed answer options are suitable to them. This option was most widely used by respondents from Japan, the US and Canada. In the US and Canada older respondents were up to twice more likely to choose this option. In Russia, Japan and S. Korea the trend is opposite – younger respondents are more likely to choose this answer option.

2.7. Conclusions

Visibility

Overall visibility is interpreted as the presence/ absence of not having a position/ opinion on any given question; especially in the first part of the questionnaire, Q1-Q12 when a respondent still does not know that the survey is about the EU; some aspects of visibility are also caught by questions asking about the performance of the EU in specific areas – these primarily indicate the perception of effectiveness, but also gives insights into which sub-themes/ topics of the broader themes seem to be most visible.

- The EU is well visible across the surveyed countries: both in comparison to other leading countries (such as US or China) and international organisations (such as UN); in fact, it is definitely better visible than most international organisations (with the exception of the UN) and should be rather compared to the leading countries.
- The variation of visibility across the studied key themes is limited, although there is a slight tendency for the EU (and Europe more generally) to be more visible in the area of culture and general international affairs, and somewhat less visible in the areas of environment/ climate change or aid to developing countries.
- Looking at more specific sub-themes and topics, the variation of visibility remains limited; topics where the EU tends to be slightly more visible (within a given theme) across the surveyed countries would include tourism (in economy), peacekeeping operations (in peace and stability), level of education (in social), and essentially all surveyed aspects of culture (arts, history, museums and monuments, and so on).

Emotional connection

Emotional connection is better caught through content analysis (mass media, social media); however the survey uses proxies – asking respondents to express positive or negative feelings towards and/ or (personal) assessment of the EU – which inform this research variable.

- Emotional connection is pre-dominantly rather neutral;
- When we look for specifically for positive or negative assessments, the key finding here is that while level of positive emotional connection in the perception of the EU varies across the countries (although in general it is rather high and puts the EU among the first two or three most positively viewed countries), the perception of the EU is characterised by lack of negative emotional connection (negative assessments are by comparison to the other countries very limited), with the sole exception of Russia where there is clear negativity expressed;
- As a further proxy to measuring emotional connection there were questions asking whether respondent's home country should strengthen economic, political and cultural ties to the EU: all three questions tended to attract very high approval (usually among the highest across all the countries and for all the studied questions), Russia included, thereby indicating towards (the prospect of) positive emotional connection.

Actorness

Mostly assessed through comparison of the EU to other key countries and int'l organisations in Q1-12; being recognised as likely, important, influential or attractive all indicate the perception of the EU as an active actor; a second dimension of actorness – whether it is a cohesive actor – is difficult to determine using a survey, but there are two proxy questions – Q2 (is united) and Q22 (should be more united).

- Overall, the EU is seen as an *active*, well-established actor in all of the researched themes, although there is variation across the themes and the countries:
  - The EU and Europe more generally are most recognised in the area of culture, followed by economy and global peace and stability politics, with the less acknowledgement in the areas of environment/ climate change, social development/ development aid and promotion of human rights;
  - On average, the acknowledgement of the EU as an actor was somewhat less expressed in US, Russia, Japan, and India, although probably due to various reasons (e.g., US being the leader, Russia expressing the aforementioned negativity); similarly the EU tended to receive more acknowledgement in China, Brazil, Mexico.
- As to the cohesiveness, the survey provides less data; Q2 revealed, perhaps rather surprisingly, that the EU is seen as rather united (with the exception in Russia, Japan and Brazil); at the same time there was an overwhelming support/ expectation across the countries that "Europe as a continent should be definitely more united". Perhaps this could be interpreted that there is an untapped potential of the cohesiveness: while the EU is perceived as rather united (or maybe there is lack of obvious and strong internal divisions in the researched themes), Europe as a continent could be a much stronger actor if it becomes more cohesive.

Effectiveness and normative power

Unlike other building blocks (media, social media, etc.), the survey addresses effectiveness: it is asking how the EU or Europe perform in specific fields (Q13-Q20) which indicates how successful the EU or Europe are perceived to be. At the same time being perceived as very successful is some area effectively serves as a leading indicator for normative power of the EU in that field. There are also two questions which attempt to ask about normative power directly – Q20 (the same social values) and Q18.3 (equality between men and women).

- The perception of the success of the EU and Europe more generally is very varied across the themes (sub/ themes and topics) and the surveyed countries; the more pronounced indications where the EU and Europe more generally as seen as successful (and thereby potentially as a benchmark and a source of inspiration) include:
  - in economy: global trade (especially in Brazil, Mexico, also China, S. Africa and India), also tourism; [but not agriculture or space exploration technologies]
  - in political: to some extent – media freedom (more so in Brazil, India, Mexico, China, and S. Africa);

- o in social: overall quality of life, level of education, as well as social justice and solidarity (e.g. social rights, the public welfare system); [though not integration of migrants and refugees]
  - o in culture: more or less of surveyed sub-themes and topics; overall analysis tends to suggest higher appreciation of historical (monuments, history, all types of art) rather than modern;
  - o across countries: there is a tendency for respondents from BRICs (though less so in Russia) and Mexico to more acknowledge the success of the EU in variety of fields.
- The survey does not provide any conclusive indication of the EU having a stronger normative power in the field of democratic principles, social values and human rights; one possible exception is the area of promoting equality between women and men, where the EU tends to be acknowledged as a good example in China, Brazil, Mexico, and S. Africa.

Local Resonance

A survey as a method is not fit/ suitable to establish factors for local resonance; however in the present design it allows for comparison between a personal assessment (of some theme, sub/ theme) and the view on home countries' relationship with the EU; the (more pronounced) differences between these two assessments might signal the presence of some local issues resonating and influencing perception of the EU.

- Hard to generalise, as local resonance is specific to country and to a theme;
- The survey results suggest that there might be important local resonance factors in
  - o Brazil, Mexico, S. Korea, also in Japan, S. Africa and Russia,
  - o and they appear to mostly be related to the theme of economy (especially trade).

3. EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND FREQUENCY TABLES

This chapter provides with a brief comparative overview of demographic characteristics and other explanatory variables, which had an influence on answers to survey questions in different countries. The chapter also contains tables describing the frequency of answers to survey questions in different countries. A summary of the main outliers in different countries is provided to facilitate the reading of frequency tables on EU's performance in various policy themes.

Explanatory variables

A simple binary logistic regression analysis was employed in order to explore how various variables influence answers to general survey questions (Q1, Q3-5, Q6-11, Q12). For questions on more specific aspects of the EU's performance in various policy themes Crammer's-V and Chi square values were explored to analyse strength and statistical significance of the association between different variables. This analysis showed the extent to which variation in answers to specific survey questions is related to respondent age; their previous contact with Europe and the extent to which they feel informed about the EU. It also showed influence of the other significant explanatory variables, such as gender, income, level of education, working status, region and for more specific questions also the social grade and occupation.

Table 3 summarises the correlation of answers to general survey questions with demographic characteristics of the respondents and other significant variables. These insights summarise analysis presented in the country reports of the public opinion survey. Country reports should be consulted for a more detailed presentation of the findings. Table 4 shows the influence of demographic characteristics and of other significant variables on perception of the EU's performance in policy sub-themes.

Table 3. Influence of demographic characteristics and of other explanatory variables on general perception of the EU.

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
Age	↑↑ More positive views among older (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q6-11)	↑ More positive views among younger (for Q1)	↑ Slightly more positive views among older (Q3) or younger (Q6-11)	↑ More positive general view among younger (for Q1)	↑↑ More positive views among older (for Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)
Gender	↑ Somewhat more positive views among men (for Q1 and Q5)	↓ Lower level of awareness and less positive views among women (for Q3)	---	↓ Less positive views among women (for Q3 and Q5)	↓ Lower level of awareness and less positive views among women (for Q3, Q4, Q5)
Contact with Europe[6]	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q6-11, Q12)	---	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)
Sufficiency of information on the EU	↑↑ More positive views among those sufficiently informed (for Q1, Q3, Q6-11)	↑ More positive views among those sufficiently informed (for Q1)	↑↑ More positive views among those sufficiently informed (for Q1, Q3, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those sufficiently informed (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5)	↑ Slightly more positive views among those sufficiently informed (for Q1)
Income	↑↑ More positive views among those in the higher income brackets (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q12)	---	↑↑ More positive views among those in the higher income brackets (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in the higher income brackets (for Q3, Q4, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in the higher income brackets (for Q1, Q3, Q4)
Level of education	---	↑↑ More positive view among more educated (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5,	---	---	---

---

[6] Those, who visited and/or have lived in and/or have relatives in Europe are defined as having contact with Europe.

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
		Q12)			
Working status	↑ More positive views among employed (for Q1 and Q3)	↑ More positive views among employed (for Q1 and Q3)	↑↑ More positive views among employed (for Q1, Q3, Q5)	---	---
Region	---	↑ Slightly more positive view among those from British Columbia (for Q12)	---	↑ More positive general view among those from Bangalore region (for Q1, Q5, Q6-11)	↓↓ Less positive views among those from Hokkaido region (for Q1, Q3, Q4)

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
Age	↑↑ More positive views among younger (for Q1, Q6-11)	↑↑ More positive views among older (for Q1, Q3, Q6-11, Q12)	↑ Somewhat more positive views among older (for Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ Somewhat more positive views among younger (for Q1, Q3, Q6-11)	↑↑ More positive views among older (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q6-11, Q12)
Gender	↓↓ Lower level of awareness and less positive views among women (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q12)	↓↓ Less positive views among women (for Q1, Q3, Q4)	↑ Somewhat more positive views among women (for Q6-11, Q12)	↓ Lower level of awareness and less positive views among women (for Q1, Q3)	↓ Less positive views among women (for Q3 and Q4)
Contact with Europe[7]	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in contact with Europe (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)
Sufficiency of information on the EU	↑ More positive views among those sufficiently informed	↑ More positive views among those sufficiently informed	↑ Somewhat more positive views among those willing to receive	↑ More positive views among those sufficiently informed	↑ More positive view among those sufficiently informed

---

[7] Those, who visited and/or have lived in and/or have relatives in Europe are defined as having contact with Europe.

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
	(for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	(for Q3)	more information (for Q4, Q5, Q6-11)	(for Q3)	(for Q3)
Income	↑↑ More positive views among those in the higher income brackets (Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in the higher income brackets (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)	↑ Somewhat more positive views among those in the higher income brackets (for Q3, Q12)	↑ More positive view among those in the higher income bracket (for Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among those in the higher income brackets (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6-11, Q12)
Level of education	---	↑ More positive view among more educated (for Q5)	↑↑ Somewhat more positive views among those still studying and less educated (for Q3, Q6-11)	---	---
Working status	↑↑ More positive views among employed (Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q12)	↑↑ More positive views among employed (for Q1, Q3, Q4)	---	---	↑↑ More positive views among employed (for Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q12)
Region	↑ Somewhat more positive views among those from Northeast and the West (Q3, Q4)	---	↑ Somewhat more positive views among those from Southern/ North Caucasian Federal District (for Q12)	---	↑ Some more positive views among those from North (for Q5)

Key to the labels:

The arrows indicate how often specific demographic characteristic was found to have positive or negative correlation with perceptions of the EU:

↑   - positive correlation in one or several themes
↑↑ - positive correlation across most of the themes
↓   - negative correlation in one or several themes
↓↓ - negative correlation across most of the themes

Table 4. Influence of demographic characteristics and of other explanatory variables on perception of the EU's performance in policy sub-themes.

in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
Age: (none)	**Age:** (none)	**Age:** (none)	**Age:** (none)	**Age:** (none)
Gender: (none)	**Gender:** Lower level of awareness among women: ↓ Global trade (Q13.2) ↓ Entertainment industry (Q13.7) ↓ Financial services and banking (Q13.9) ↓ Space exploration technologies (Q13.12) ↓ Foreign policy (Q15.2) ↓ Justice and rule of law (Q15.3) ↓ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation (Q15.4) ↓ Support to developing countries (Q15.7) ↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8) ↓ Military operations (Q15.9) ↓ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10) ↓ Eradication of poverty (Q17.4) ↓ Reducing income	**Gender:** (none)	**Gender:** (none)	**Gender:** (none)
Lived in Europe: (none)		**Lived in Europe:** More positive views among those who lived in Europe: ↑ Military operations (Q15.9) ↑ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10) ↑ Creating employment opportunities (Q17.3) ↑ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): those who lived in Europe hear or read more	**Lived in Europe:** (none)	**Lived in Europe:** (none)
Sufficiency of information on the EU: Higher level of awareness and more positive views among sufficiently informed: ↑ Agriculture (Q13.4) ↑ Green technologies (Q13.13) ↑ Support for regional and international cooperation (Q15.1) ↑ Fight against climate change and protection of the environment (Q15.6) ↑ Support to developing countries (Q15.7) ↑ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8) ↑ Military operations		**Sufficiency of information on the EU:** More positive views among sufficiently	**Sufficiency of information on the EU:** ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): sufficiently informed hear or read more **Income:** ↑ Sufficiency of information (Q29): better informed in higher income brackets **Level of education:** (none)	**Sufficiency of information on the EU:** More positive views among sufficiently informed: ↑ Development of new technologies (Q13.1) ↑ Global trade (Q13.2) ↑ Agriculture (Q13.4) ↑ High quality food industry (Q13.6) ↑ Media and publishing (Q13.8) ↑ Financial services and banking (Q13.9) ↑ Space exploration technologies (Q13.12) ↑ Support for regional and international cooperation (Q15.1)

in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
(Q15.9) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27) _____ **Income:** (none) _____ **Level of education:** (none) _____ **Working status:** (none) _____ **Social Grade:** (none) _____ **Type of work:** (none) _____ **Region:** (none) _____	inequality (Q17.7) ↓ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9) ↓ Respect for human dignity (Q21.1) ↓ Liberty (Q21.2) ↓ Democracy (Q21.3) ↓ Equality (Q21.4) ↓ The rule of law (Q21.5) ↓ Respect for human rights (Q21.6) ↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities (Q21.7) ↓ Pluralism (Q21.8) ↓ Non-discrimination (Q21.9) ↓ Tolerance (Q21.10) ↓ Justice (Q21.11) ↓ Solidarity (Q21.12) ↓ Equality between women and men (Q21.13) ↓ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27) _____ **Lived in Europe:** ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): those who lived in Europe hear or read more often _____	informed: ↑ Military operations (Q15.9) ↑ Creating employment opportunities (Q17.3) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27) : sufficiently informed hear or read more often _____ **Income:** More positive views in higher income brackets: ↑ Development of new technologies (Q13.1) ↑ Financial services and banking (Q13.9) ↑ Green technologies (Q13.13) ↑ Social justice and solidarity (Q17.8) ↑ Sufficiency of information (Q29) _____ **Level of education:** (none) _____ **Working status:** (none) _____	**Working status:** (none) _____ **Social Grade:** (none) _____ **Type of work:** (none) _____ **Region:** Overall more positive views in Chennai: ↑ Development of new technologies (Q13.1) ↑ Global trade (Q13.2) ↑ Industrial development (Q13.3) ↑↑ Agriculture (Q13.4) ↑ Tourism (Q13.5) ↑ High quality food industry (Q13.6) Entertainment industry (Q13.7) ↑ Financial services and banking (Q13.9) ↑ Science and research (Q13.10) ↑ Medical research (Q13.11) ↑ Space exploration technologies (Q13.12) ↑ Green technologies	Foreign policy (Q15.2) Justice and rule of law (Q15.3) ↑ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation (Q15.4) ↑ Media freedom (Q15.5) ↑ Fight against climate change and protection of the environment (Q15.6) ↑ Support to developing countries (Q15.7) ↑ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8) ↑ Military operations (Q15.9) ↑ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10) ↑ Overall quality of life (Q17.1) ↑ Creating employment opportunities (Q17.3) ↑ Eradication of poverty (Q17.4) ↑ Protection of minorities (Q17.6) ↑ Reducing income inequality (Q17.7) ↑ Social justice and solidarity (Q17.8) ↑ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9) ↑ Music (Q19.1) ↑ Lifestyle (Q19.9) ↑ Sports (Q19.10)

in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
	Sufficiency of information on the EU: (none) _____	**Social Grade:** (none) _____	(Q13.13) ↑ Support for regional and international cooperation (Q15.1) Foreign policy (Q15.2) Justice and rule of law (Q15.3) ↑ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation (Q15.4) ↑ Media freedom (Q15.5) ↑ Fight against climate change and protection of the environment (Q15.6) ↑ Support to developing countries (Q15.7) ↑↑ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8) ↑ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10) ↑ Overall quality of life (Q17.1) ↑ Creating employment opportunities (Q17.3) ↑ Eradication of poverty (Q17.4) ↑ Equality between men and women (Q17.5) ↑↑ Protection of minorities (Q17.6) ↑ Reducing income inequality (Q17.7) ↑↑ Social justice and solidarity (Q17.8) ↑ Integration of migrants	↑ Respect for human dignity (Q21.1) ↑ Liberty (Q21.2) ↑ Democracy (Q21.3) ↑ Respect for human rights (Q21.6) ↑ Pluralism (Q21.8) ↑ Tolerance (Q21.10) ↑ Solidarity (Q21.12) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27) _____
	Income: (none) _____	**Type of work:** (none) _____		
		Region: (none)		**Income:** (none) _____
	Level of education: (none) _____			**Level of education:** (none) _____
	Working status: (none) _____			**Working status:** (none) _____
	Social Grade: ↓ Development of new technologies (Q13.1): lower level of awareness among those from lower social grade _____			**Social Grade:** ↓ Media and publishing (Q13.8): lower level of awareness among those from lower social grade _____
	Type of work: (none) _____			**Type of work:** ↑ Sufficiency of
	Region: (none)			

in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
			and refugees (Q17.9) ↑↑ Music (Q19.1) ↑ Theatre and cinema (Q19.3) ↑ Food and cuisine (Q19.8) ↑ Lifestyle (Q19.9) ↑ Sports (Q19.10) ↑ Multiculturalism (Q19.11) ↑ Respect for human dignity (Q21.1) ↑ Liberty (Q21.2) ↑ Democracy (Q21.3) ↑ Equality (Q21.4) ↑ The rule of law (Q21.5) ↑ Respect for human rights (Q21.6) ↑ Rights of persons belonging to minorities (Q21.7) ↑ Pluralism (Q21.8) ↑ Non-discrimination (Q21.9) ↑ Tolerance (Q21.10) ↑ Justice (Q21.11) ↑ Solidarity (Q21.12) ↑ Equality between women and men (Q21.13) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): more often in Delhi and less often in Bangalore ↑ Sufficiency of information (Q29): best	information (Q29): those working in general management positions feel better informed _____ **Region:** (none)

in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
			informed in Delhi and Chennai, least informed in Kolkata, Bangalore, Mumbai	

in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
Age: ↓ Foreign policy (Q15.2): less positive views among older ———————————— **Gender:** Lower level of awareness among women: ↓ Development of new technologies (Q13.1) ↓ High quality food industry (Q13.6) ↓ Media and publishing (Q13.8) ↓ Science and research (Q13.10) ↓ Medical research (Q13.11) ↓ Space exploration technologies (Q13.12) ↓ Green technologies (Q13.13) ↓ Support for regional and international cooperation	**Age:** (none) ———————————— **Gender:** (none) ———————————— **Lived in Europe:** (none) ———————————— **Sufficiency of information on the EU:** More positive views among better informed: ↑ Military operations (Q15.9) ↑ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27) ———————————— **Income:** (none) ———————————— **Level of education:**	**Age:** (none) ———————————— **Gender:** Lower level of awareness among women: ↓ Military operations (Q15.9): lower level of awareness among women ↓ Sufficiency of information (Q29) ———————————— **Lived in Europe:** (none) ———————————— **Sufficiency of information on the EU:** More negative views among those who feel better informed: ↓ Foreign policy (Q15.2) ↓ Justice and rule of law (Q15.3)	**Age:** (none) ———————————— **Gender:** ↓ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): women hear or read about the EU less often ———————————— **Lived in Europe:** (none) ———————————— **Sufficiency of information on the EU:** More positive views among better informed: ↑ Industrial development (Q13.3) ↑ Green technologies (Q13.13) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): better informed hear or read	**Age:** (none) ———————————— **Gender:** (none) ———————————— **Lived in Europe:** (none) ———————————— **Sufficiency of information on the EU:** More positive views among better informed: ↑ Industrial development (Q13.3) ↑ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8) ↑ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27) ———————————— **Income:** More positive views in

in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
(Q15.1) ↓ Foreign policy (Q15.2) ↓ Justice and rule of law (Q15.3) ↓ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation (Q15.4) ↓ Media freedom (Q15.5) ↓ Fight against climate change and protection of the environment (Q15.6) ↓ Support to developing countries (Q15.7) ↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8) ↓ Military operations (Q15.9) ↓↓ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10) ↓ Overall quality of life (Q17.1) ↓ Creating employment opportunities (Q17.3) ↓ Eradication of poverty (Q17.4) ↓ Equality between men and women (Q17.5) ↓ Protection of minorities (Q17.6) ↓ Reducing income inequality (Q17.7) ↓ Social justice and solidarity (Q17.8) ↓ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9)	(none) _____ **Working status:** (none) _____ **Social Grade:** (none) _____ **Type of work:** (none) _____ **Region:** (none)	↓ Pluralism (Q21.8) ↓ Equality between women and men (Q21.13) _____ **Income:** (none) _____ **Level of education:** (none) _____ **Working status:** (none) _____ **Social Grade:** ↓ Media and publishing (Q13.8): lower level of awareness among those from lower social grade _____ **Type of work:** (none) _____ **Region:** (none)	more often _____ **Income:** (none) _____ **Level of education:** (none) _____ **Working status:** (none) _____ **Social Grade:** ↓ Media and publishing (Q13.8): lower level of awareness among those from lower social grade _____ **Type of work:** (none) _____ **Region:** (none)	higher income brackets: ↑ Support for regional and international cooperation (Q15.1) ↑ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10) ↑ Food and cuisine (Q19.8) ↑ Liberty (Q21.2) ↑ Democracy (Q21.3) ↑ Equality (Q21.4) ↑ Respect for human rights (Q21.6) ↑ Equality between women and men (Q21.13) ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): hear or read more often in higher income brackets _____ **Level of education:** (none) _____ **Working status:** ↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): hearing or reading more among employed. _____ **Social Grade:** (none) _____

in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
↓ Respect for human dignity (Q21.1) ↓ Liberty (Q21.2) ↓ Democracy (Q21.3) ↓ Equality (Q21.4) ↓ The rule of law (Q21.5) ↓ Respect for human rights (Q21.6) ↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities (Q21.7) ↓ Pluralism (Q21.8) ↓ Non-discrimination (Q21.9) ↓ Tolerance (Q21.10) ↓ Justice (Q21.11) ↓ Solidarity (Q21.12) ↓ Equality between women and men (Q21.13) ↓ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27) ↓↓ Sufficiency of information (Q29) _____				**Type of work:** (none) _____ **Region:** (none)

in the US (remaining demographics):		
Lived in Europe: Higher level of awareness and more positive views among those who lived in Europe: ↑↑ Development of new technologies (Q13.1) ↑ Global trade (Q13.2) ↑ Industrial development (Q13.3) ↑ Agriculture (Q13.4)	↑ Respect for human dignity (Q21.1) ↑ Liberty (Q21.2) ↑ Democracy (Q21.3) ↑ Equality (Q21.4) ↑ The rule of law (Q21.5) ↑ Respect for human rights (Q21.6) ↑ Rights of persons belonging to minorities (Q21.7)	↑ Music (Q19.1) ↑ Theatre and cinema (Q19.3) ↑ Modern architecture and design (Q19.6) ↑ Lifestyle (Q19.9) ↑ Multiculturalism (Q19.11) ↑ Respect for human dignity (Q21.1) ↑ Liberty (Q21.2) ↑ Democracy (Q21.3)

↑ High quality food industry (Q13.6)
↑ Entertainment industry (Q13.7)
↑ Media and publishing (Q13.8)
↑ Financial services (Q13.9)
↑ Science and research (Q13.10)
↑ Medical research (Q13.11)
↑ Space exploration technologies (Q13.12)
↑ Green technologies (Q13.13)
↑ Support for regional and international cooperation (Q15.1)
↑ Foreign policy (Q15.2)
↑ Justice and rule of law (Q15.3)
↑ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation (Q15.4)
↑ Media freedom (Q15.5)
↑ Fight against climate change and protection of the environment (Q15.6)
↑ Support to developing countries (Q15.7)
↑↑ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8)
↑↑ Military operations (Q15.9)
↑ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10)
↑ Overall quality of life (Q17.1)
↑ Level of education (Q17.2)
↑ Creating employment opportunities (Q17.3)
↑ Eradication of poverty (Q17.4)
↑ Equality between men and women (Q17.5)
↑↑ Protection of minorities (Q17.6)
↑ Reducing income inequality (Q17.7)
↑↑ Social justice and solidarity (Q17.8)
↑↑ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9)
↑ Music (Q19.1)
↑ Arts (Q19.2)
↑ Monuments and museums (Q19.4)

↑ Pluralism (Q21.8)
Non-discrimination (Q21.9)
↑ Tolerance (Q21.10)
↑ Justice (Q21.11)
↑ Solidarity (Q21.12)
Equality between women and men (Q21.13)
↑↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27)
_____

Sufficiency of information on the EU:

More positive views among better informed:
↑ Development of new technologies (Q13.1)
↑↑ Global trade (Q13.2)
↑ Industrial development (Q13.3)
↑ Agriculture (Q13.4)
↑ Tourism (Q13.5)
↑ High quality food industry (Q13.6)
↑ Entertainment industry (Q13.7)
↑ Media and publishing (Q13.8)
↑ Financial services (Q13.9)
↑↑ Science and research (Q13.10)
↑ Medical research (Q13.11)
↑↑ Space exploration technologies (Q13.12)
↑ Green technologies (Q13.13)
↑ Support for regional and international cooperation (Q15.1)
↑ Foreign policy (Q15.2)
↑ Justice and rule of law (Q15.3)
↑ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation (Q15.4)
↑ Media freedom (Q15.5)
↑↑ Fight against climate change and protection of the environment (Q15.6)
↑ Support to developing countries (Q15.7)

↑ Equality (Q21.4)
↑ The rule of law (Q21.5)
↑ Respect for human rights (Q21.6)
↑ Rights of persons belonging to minorities (Q21.7)
↑ Pluralism (Q21.8)
↑ Non-discrimination (Q21.9)
↑ Tolerance (Q21.10)
↑ Justice (Q21.11)
↑ Solidarity (Q21.12)
↑ Equality between women and men (Q21.13)
↑↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27)
↑ Sufficiency of information (Q29)
_____

Income:

↑ More sufficiently informed in the higher income brackets (Q29)
_____

Level of education: (none)
_____

Working status:

↑ How often hear or read about the EU (Q27): hearing or reading more among employed.
_____

Social Grade:

↑ Media and publishing (Q13.8): more positive views among those belonging to higher and medium social grade.

↑ Modern architecture and design (Q19.6) ↑ Luxury goods and clothes (Q19.7) ↑ Food and cuisine (Q19.8) ↑ Lifestyle (Q19.9) ↑ Sports (Q19.10) ↑ Multiculturalism (Q19.11)	↑↑ Dealing with refugees, displaced people (Q15.8) ↑ Military operations (Q15.9) ↑ Peacekeeping operations (Q15.10) ↑ Overall quality of life (Q17.1) ↑ Level of education (Q17.2) ↑ Creating employment opportunities (Q17.3) ↑ Eradication of poverty (Q17.4) ↑ Equality between men and women (Q17.5) ↑↑ Protection of minorities (Q17.6) ↑↑ Reducing income inequality (Q17.7) ↑ Social justice and solidarity (Q17.8) ↑↑ Integration of migrants and refugees (Q17.9)	_____ **Type of work:** ↓ Arts (Q19.2): lower awareness among manual workers and other non-manual employees. _____ **Region:** (none)

Key to the labels:

The arrows indicate how often specific demographic characteristic or other variable was found to be associated with perceptions of the EU:

↑ or ↓ - there is a week, but statistically significant association between variables: the value of Cramer-V coefficient is above 0.2, but below 0.3 and the p value is below 0.05.

↑↑ or ↓↓ - there is statistically significant association of medium strength between variables: the Cramer-V coefficient is above 0.3, but below 0.5 and the p value is below 0.05.

To facilitate the reading of frequency tables on answers about EU's performance in various policy fields a brief summary on main outliers was prepared. This summary is presented in Table 5 and in Table 6. Table 5 compares opinions on EU's performance in various policy themes (Q6-12) within specific country. Table shows that in majority of the Strategic Partner countries EU's performance in different themes is evaluated similarly. However in Brazil, China, Mexico and especially in Russia views of respondents diverge. It should be noted that this table only provides insights coming from answers on more general survey questions (Q6-12). This table works as a key to guide through main differences among answers to these survey questions within countries, which could be explored in more detail in frequency tables.

Table 5. Main thematic outliers of the EU's performance.

in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
↑ Attractive culture and lifestyle ↑ Influential in global economic affairs ↓ Important in fighting global climate change and protecting the environment ↓ Important in providing support to developing	(no outliers among themes)	↑ Important in advancing innovation and technological progress ↓ Influential in global economic affairs	(no outliers among themes)	(no outliers among themes)

in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
(no outliers among themes)	↑↑↑ Attractive culture and lifestyle ↓ Important in providing support to developing countries	↑↑↑ Attractive culture and lifestyle ↑↑↑ Influential in global economic affairs ↑ Important in advancing innovation and technological progress ↓ Important in maintaining global peace and stability ↓ Important in promoting and defending human rights worldwide ↓↓↓ Important in providing	(no outliers among themes)	(no outliers among themes)

in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
		support to developing countries		

Table 6 differs from previous table in the detail of the provided data. Rather than comparing opinions of EU's performance across themes in specific country, it compares opinions on specific aspects of EU's performance within different themes in specific country. This table provides with main insights coming from answers to more detailed survey questions on EU's performance in various policy themes (Q13, Q15, Q17, Q19, Q21). This table works as a key to guide through the answers to these thematic questions and identifies main thematic outliers as seen from the survey data. For a more detailed view of the data presented in Table 6 one should consult frequency tables of this report or frequency tables provided in country reports of the public opinion survey.

Table 6. Outliers of the EU's performance within specific policy themes.

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
Economy, trade, research and technology	↑↑↑ Tourism ↑ Science and research ↑ Global trade ↓ Space exploration technologies ↓ Green technologies ↓↓ Agriculture	↑↑↑ Tourism ↑ Global trade ↓ Entertainment industry ↓↓↓ Space exploration technologies	↑ Tourism ↑ High quality food industry ↑ Global trade ↓ Space exploration technologies ↓ Agriculture ↓↓ Entertainment industry	↑ Development of new technologies ↓ Media and publishing ↓ Agriculture	↑↑ Tourism ↑ Global trade ↓ Media and publishing ↓↓↓ Space exploration technologies
Politics and security	↑ Justice and rule of law ↑ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation ↓ Support to developing countries ↓↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people	↑ Media freedom ↑ Peacekeeping operations ↑ Justice and rule of law ↓ Military operations ↓↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people	↑ Justice and rule of law ↑ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation ↑ Support for regional and international cooperation ↓ Support to developing countries ↓ Military operations ↓↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people	↑↑ Support for regional and international cooperation ↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people	---
Social development, education	↑↑↑ Level of education ↑↑↑ Overall quality of life ↓ Reducing income inequality ↓ Protection of minorities ↓↓ Integration of migrants and refugees	↑↑↑ Level of education ↑↑↑ Overall quality of life ↑ Equality between men and women ↓↓ Eradication of poverty ↓↓ Reducing income	↑↑↑ Level of education ↑↑ Overall quality of life ↑ Social justice and solidarity ↓ Reducing income inequality ↓ Protection of	↑↑ Level of education ↑↑ Overall quality of life ↓ Social justice and solidarity ↓ Reducing income inequality ↓ Protection of	↑↑ Equality between men and women ↑↑ Level of education ↑ Social justice and solidarity ↓↓ Reducing income inequality ↓↓ Eradication of

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in Brazil	in Canada	in China	in India	in Japan
		inequality ↓↓ Integration of migrants and refugees	minorities ↓↓ Integration of migrants and refugees	minorities	poverty ↓↓ Protection of minorities
Culture	↑↑ Monuments and museums ↑ History ↓ Theatre and cinema ↓ Music ↓ Multiculturalism	↑↑ Monuments and museums ↑↑ History ↑ Food and cuisine ↓ Sports ↓ Theatre and cinema ↓ Multiculturalism	↑ Luxury goods and clothes ↓ Theatre and cinema ↓ Sports ↓ Food and cuisine	↑ Music ↑ Luxury goods and clothes ↑ Sports ↓ Theatre and cinema ↓ Food and cuisine	↑↑ Arts ↑ Monuments and museums ↓ Multiculturalism ↓ Lifestyle ↓ Food and cuisine
Similarity of the personal views with views of the EU (normative)	↑ Liberty ↓ Non-discrimination ↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities	↑ Respect for human dignity ↑ Democracy ↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities ↓↓ Pluralism	↓↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities	↑ Respect for human dignity ↑ Liberty	↑ Democracy ↑ Liberty ↑ Respect for human rights ↓ Solidarity ↓ Pluralism

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
Economy, trade, research and technology	↑↑ Tourism ↑ Global trade ↓ Entertainment industry ↓↓ Space exploration technologies	↑↑↑ Tourism ↑ Global trade ↑ Science and research ↓↓ Agriculture ↓↓ Entertainment industry ↓↓↓ Space exploration technologies	↑↑↑ Tourism ↑ Medical research ↑ Financial services and banking ↓ Agriculture ↓ Media and publishing ↓↓↓ Space exploration technologies	↑↑ Tourism ↑ Global trade ↓ Entertainment industry ↓ Agriculture ↓↓ Space exploration technologies	↑↑↑ Tourism ↑ Global trade ↑ Science and research ↓ Agriculture ↓↓ Space exploration technologies ↓↓ Entertainment industry
Politics and security	↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people	↑ Media freedom ↑ Peacekeeping operations	↑ Fight against climate change and protection of the environment	↑ Justice and rule of law ↓ Dealing with	↑ Peacekeeping operations ↑ Media freedom

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
		↓ Support to developing countries ↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people	↑ Justice and rule of law ↑ Media freedom ↓ Peacekeeping operations ↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people	refugees, displaced people	↑ Foreign policy ↓ Fight against terrorism and radicalisation ↓ Support to developing countries ↓↓↓ Dealing with refugees, displaced people
Social development, education	↑↑ Overall quality of life ↑↑ Level of education ↓ Reducing income inequality ↓ Protection of minorities ↓ Integration of migrants and refugees	↑↑↑ Level of education ↑↑ Overall quality of life ↑ Equality between men and women ↓ Eradication of poverty ↓↓ Protection of minorities ↓↓ Integration of migrants and refugees	↑↑↑ Overall quality of life ↑↑ Level of education ↑↑ Equality between men and women ↓ Creating employment opportunities ↓↓ Eradication of poverty ↓↓↓ Integration of migrants and refugees	↑↑↑ Level of education ↑↑ Overall quality of life ↑ Equality between men and women ↓ Eradication of poverty ↓ Protection of minorities ↓↓↓ Integration of migrants and refugees	↑↑ Equality between men and women ↑↑ Level of education ↑↑ Overall quality of life ↓ Creating employment opportunities ↓ Eradication of poverty ↓↓↓ Integration of migrants and refugees
Culture	↑↑ Monuments and museums ↑↑ History ↑ Arts ↓ Sports ↓ Theatre and cinema	↑ Monuments and museums ↑ Arts ↓ Music ↓↓ Theatre and cinema	↑ Luxury goods and clothes ↑ Monuments and museums ↓ Lifestyle ↓↓ History	↑ Luxury goods and clothes ↑ Monuments and museums ↓ Theatre and cinema ↓ Music ↓↓ Multiculturalism	↑ Monuments and museums ↑ Arts ↓ Music ↓ Theatre and cinema ↓↓ Multiculturalism
Similarity of the personal views with views of the	↓ Pluralism	↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities	↑↑ Respect for human dignity ↑ Respect for human	↑ Respect for human rights ↑ Respect for human	↑ Liberty ↑ Respect for human dignity

Country / Theme/ Demographics	in the US	in Mexico	in Russia	in South Africa	in South Korea
EU (normative)			rights ↑ Liberty ↓ Tolerance ↓ Pluralism ↓↓↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities	dignity ↓ Tolerance ↓ Solidarity ↓↓ Pluralism	↑ Equality ↓ Solidarity ↓ Pluralism ↓↓ Rights of persons belonging to minorities

Key to the labels and the list of the sub-themes:

The arrows indicate to what extent opinions about EU's performance in specific sub-theme diverge from the average of opinions within specific theme. The list of themes and their specific sub-themes is provided below. The arrows indicate the difference between the share of respondents who gave very positive response (or combined share of respondents who gave positive and very positive response) and the corresponding overall average of responses within the theme:

↑   - indicates more than 5 percentage point difference
↑↑   - indicates more than 10 percentage point difference
↑↑↑ - indicates more than 15 percentage point difference
↓   - indicates more than -5 percentage point difference
↓↓   - indicates more than -10 percentage point difference
↓↓↓ - indicates more than -15 percentage point difference

Economy, trade and research and technology	Politics and security	Social development, education	Culture	Similarity of the personal views with views of the EU (normative)
Development of new technologies Global trade Industrial development	Support for regional and international cooperation Foreign policy Justice and rule of law Fight against terrorism and	Overall quality of life Level of education Creating employment opportunities Eradication of poverty	Music Arts Theatre and cinema Monuments and museums	Respect for human dignity Liberty Democracy Equality

Economy, trade and research and technology	Politics and security	Social development, education	Culture	Similarity of the personal views with views of the EU (normative)
Agriculture Tourism High quality food industry Entertainment industry Media and publishing Financial services and banking Science and research Medical research Space exploration technologies Green technologies	radicalisation Media freedom Fight against climate change and protection of the environment Support to developing countries Dealing with refugees, displaced people Military operations Peacekeeping operations	Equality between men and women Protection of minorities Reducing income inequality Social justice and solidarity (social rights, public welfare system) Integration of migrants and refugees	History Modern architecture and design Luxury goods and clothes Food and cuisine Lifestyle Sports Multiculturalism	The rule of law Respect for human rights Rights of persons belonging to minorities Pluralism Non-discrimination Tolerance Justice Solidarity Equality between women and men

Responses described in these frequency tables were weighted according to the quotas described in country reports to better represent population of the respective country in terms of age, gender and regions. Since survey in India was conducted face-to-face respondents were chosen according to the predefined quotas. Thus no weighting was necessary for responses from India. The tables show the percentage of respondents that chose specific answers to each survey question and the total number of respondents (N).

Q1. Generally speaking, as an overall point of view, please tell me how positive or negative you feel about each of the following countries and organisations?

European Union (EU)

Responses from:	Very positive	Somewhat positive	Neither positive nor negative	Somewhat negative	Very negative	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	13,8%	32,8%	34,3%	8,5%	3,2%	7,4%	11621
USA	12,2%	26,4%	36,9%	6,9%	3,2%	14,4%	1007
Canada	7,9%	30,8%	36,1%	7,3%	3,2%	14,6%	1022
Russia	5,5%	17,4%	35,3%	24,8%	13,6%	3,5%	1321
Japan	3,3%	23,5%	52,6%	5,8%	1,3%	13,5%	1024
China	12,8%	42,9%	36,1%	4,7%	0,6%	2,8%	1410
Brazil	22,3%	36,3%	28,6%	4,9%	1,7%	6,2%	1210
Mexico	23,2%	39,5%	25,9%	5,8%	1,9%	3,7%	1164
South Korea	7,7%	36,1%	42,5%	8,4%	1,4%	3,9%	1238
South Africa	17,1%	35,7%	28,5%	8,4%	3,3%	6,9%	1169
India	26,5%	36,7%	21,3%	5,7%	0,9%	8,9%	1056

Q2. Which of the following words, if any, do you think best describe each of the following countries and organisations?

Responses on European Union

Responses from:	Modern	Peaceful	Efficient	Strong	United	Trustworthy	Multicultural	Aggressive	Hypocritical	Arrogant	None of these	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	30,5%	19,6%	22,6%	25,6%	21,6%	18,1%	31,7%	8,3%	12,0%	13,3%	12,8%	11621
USA	24,4%	20,1%	14,1%	16,5%	19,1%	13,0%	30,8%	4,6%	7,6%	8,5%	29,9%	1007
Canada	28,4%	20,0%	16,9%	21,4%	24,8%	16,3%	34,3%	5,7%	8,1%	8,5%	24,3%	1022
Russia	28,0%	6,6%	12,0%	13,6%	4,8%	7,9%	39,2%	19,7%	48,0%	37,9%	7,7%	1321
Japan	20,2%	8,5%	12,2%	7,2%	13,3%	10,2%	29,1%	2,2%	7,7%	6,3%	32,2%	1024
China	38,6%	25,2%	26,5%	32,5%	24,1%	22,1%	41,5%	9,1%	6,9%	13,1%	3,6%	1410
Brazil	25,0%	12,0%	25,9%	33,9%	19,3%	20,2%	25,2%	7,8%	9,2%	13,7%	9,5%	1210
Mexico	34,0%	15,5%	25,9%	31,2%	29,7%	23,4%	38,1%	8,4%	7,3%	14,0%	4,6%	1164
South Korea	24,5%	24,3%	20,1%	19,9%	22,7%	20,0%	23,7%	4,9%	5,7%	8,9%	11,1%	1238
South Africa	28,4%	18,5%	23,6%	29,2%	22,4%	18,4%	27,7%	8,0%	11,9%	11,0%	10,9%	1169
India	52,3%	47,5%	48,6%	49,6%	38,0%	29,1%	24,0%	9,9%	2,2%	4,7%	1,5%	1056

Total responses from all countries (N = 11621)

Total responses from all countries on:	Modern	Peaceful	Efficient	Strong	United	Trustworthy	Multicultural	Aggressive	Hypocritical	Arrogant	None of these
USA	42,3%	10,4%	26,1%	45,7%	17,9%	15,3%	35,6%	31,3%	25,1%	36,5%	5,8%
China	24,4%	16,6%	27,0%	34,8%	22,3%	13,1%	16,8%	24,6%	14,1%	18,3%	9,5%
Russia	17,7%	12,8%	15,7%	34,5%	16,2%	12,6%	18,1%	32,4%	14,0%	24,1%	11,3%
European Union	30,5%	19,6%	22,6%	25,6%	21,6%	18,1%	31,7%	8,3%	12,0%	13,3%	12,8%
Brazil	14,9%	25,0%	11,6%	11,8%	15,4%	13,8%	27,3%	8,6%	6,8%	4,9%	22,3%
India	12,4%	28,0%	15,1%	13,2%	15,2%	14,9%	25,8%	8,3%	7,1%	5,1%	23,5%
Japan	40,0%	23,1%	35,0%	25,9%	22,0%	19,5%	10,4%	12,6%	17,0%	15,3%	8,5%

Q3. Generally speaking, which of the following best describes (Your country's) overall relationship with each of the following countries and organisations?

European Union

Responses from:	Very good	Rather good	Neither good nor bad	Rather bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	12,2%	34,7%	33,0%	8,6%	2,1%	9,5%	11621
USA	20,8%	32,9%	24,8%	3,0%	0,7%	17,9%	1007
Canada	16,1%	41,8%	20,9%	1,6%	0,6%	19,0%	1022
Russia	1,8%	9,3%	25,5%	46,6%	11,8%	4,9%	1321
Japan	3,5%	31,7%	43,6%	3,6%	0,9%	16,7%	1024
China	8,8%	48,2%	37,5%	2,9%	0,4%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	16,1%	41,4%	27,6%	5,0%	1,4%	8,4%	1210
Mexico	12,6%	37,2%	38,9%	4,5%	0,9%	5,9%	1164
S. Korea	4,6%	35,4%	51,3%	3,0%	0,3%	5,5%	1238
S. Africa	10,8%	31,5%	34,8%	7,4%	1,7%	13,8%	1169
India	31,2%	38,4%	21,4%	2,4%	0,4%	6,3%	1056

Q4. How desirable is it that each of the following countries and organisations take a strong leadership role in world affairs?

European Union

Responses from:	Very desirable	Somewhat desirable	Neither desirable nor undesirable	Somewhat undesirable	Very undesirable	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,9%	34,9%	27,2%	7,1%	4,1%	7,8%	11621
USA	23,9%	28,8%	24,3%	4,0%	2,9%	16,2%	1007
Canada	22,0%	36,7%	20,0%	3,8%	2,2%	15,4%	1022
Russia	8,3%	22,8%	25,6%	20,7%	16,4%	6,3%	1321
Japan	5,9%	31,4%	37,9%	6,7%	2,8%	15,2%	1024
China	9,6%	46,1%	35,6%	5,0%	0,6%	3,0%	1410
Brazil	23,2%	32,7%	25,6%	8,9%	4,5%	5,1%	1210
Mexico	27,9%	38,3%	21,8%	5,7%	3,0%	3,3%	1164
S. Korea	9,8%	38,8%	37,5%	6,3%	1,5%	6,1%	1238
S. Africa	32,9%	33,8%	18,0%	4,9%	3,9%	6,4%	1169
India	29,5%	37,5%	23,0%	2,6%	1,7%	5,7%	1056

Q5. And, in your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that each of the following countries or organisations will take a strong leadership role in world affairs five years from now?

European Union

Responses from:	Very likely	Rather likely	Neither likely nor unlikely	Rather unlikely	Very unlikely	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	22,7%	36,7%	24,2%	6,2%	2,2%	8,0%	11621
USA	20,8%	29,4%	24,5%	4,6%	3,6%	17,2%	1007
Canada	18,5%	34,6%	21,9%	5,8%	2,5%	16,7%	1022
Russia	19,5%	33,4%	19,7%	15,2%	5,5%	6,7%	1321
Japan	8,4%	30,9%	35,3%	7,7%	3,4%	14,2%	1024
China	17,2%	50,8%	25,9%	3,1%	0,3%	2,6%	1410
Brazil	31,5%	33,4%	21,0%	6,1%	2,1%	5,9%	1210
Mexico	35,2%	37,7%	17,9%	4,6%	1,3%	3,3%	1164
S. Korea	12,7%	40,8%	34,8%	5,9%	0,7%	5,1%	1238
S. Africa	32,3%	33,3%	19,9%	4,9%	2,4%	7,2%	1169
India	31,2%	37,8%	21,5%	3,1%	0,9%	5,6%	1056

Q6. In your view, how influential in global economic affairs are the following countries and organisations?

European Union

Responses from:	Very influential	Somewhat influential	Not very influential	Not at all influential	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	32,7%	43,8%	12,2%	1,8%	9,5%	11621
USA	26,8%	36,0%	12,9%	2,4%	21,8%	1007
Canada	27,5%	40,2%	10,5%	2,4%	19,4%	1022
Russia	23,6%	52,5%	13,9%	3,7%	6,3%	1321
Japan	17,5%	47,5%	14,0%	1,4%	19,7%	1024
China	29,6%	55,5%	11,5%	0,7%	2,7%	1410
Brazil	49,5%	34,0%	8,5%	1,7%	6,4%	1210
Mexico	46,9%	37,4%	10,4%	1,1%	4,2%	1164
S. Korea	28,8%	52,9%	12,6%	1,2%	4,4%	1238
S. Africa	40,5%	38,6%	10,3%	1,8%	8,8%	1169
India	34,2%	37,8%	18,4%	1,8%	7,9%	1056

Q7. In your view, how important a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in maintaining global peace and stability?

European Union

Responses from:	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	32,9%	40,3%	13,7%	3,9%	9,2%	11621
USA	34,6%	32,3%	11,2%	2,9%	19,1%	1007
Canada	34,2%	37,2%	7,8%	2,5%	18,2%	1022
Russia	17,3%	35,6%	24,4%	15,4%	7,3%	1321
Japan	21,5%	44,0%	12,5%	2,1%	19,9%	1024
China	31,8%	53,0%	11,8%	1,1%	2,3%	1410
Brazil	40,8%	36,7%	12,3%	3,0%	7,3%	1210
Mexico	43,9%	36,9%	12,4%	2,3%	4,5%	1164
S. Korea	29,8%	48,7%	13,4%	2,0%	6,1%	1238
S. Africa	44,0%	35,5%	9,7%	2,9%	8,0%	1169
India	32,6%	39,1%	20,3%	2,8%	5,2%	1056

Q8. In your view, how important a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in fighting global climate change and protecting the environment?

European Union

Responses from:	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	33,6%	37,5%	13,6%	3,6%	11,6%	11621
USA	33,8%	28,5%	10,5%	5,8%	21,4%	1007
Canada	36,4%	30,7%	7,9%	3,5%	21,4%	1022
Russia	15,3%	40,0%	21,7%	7,9%	15,1%	1321
Japan	20,2%	40,8%	13,9%	2,6%	22,5%	1024
China	39,4%	46,5%	9,9%	1,3%	3,0%	1410
Brazil	37,7%	35,3%	13,6%	5,6%	7,7%	1210
Mexico	42,4%	35,6%	13,7%	3,3%	5,0%	1164
S. Korea	31,3%	45,3%	12,9%	1,9%	8,6%	1238
S. Africa	45,0%	31,8%	10,8%	2,3%	10,2%	1169
India	34,8%	36,5%	20,7%	1,9%	6,1%	1056

Q9. In your view, how important a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in in providing support to developing countries to eradicate poverty and to build a fairer and more stable world?

European Union

Responses from:	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	30,9%	38,0%	14,9%	4,8%	11,3%	11621
USA	30,1%	30,3%	12,3%	5,4%	21,9%	1007
Canada	29,2%	35,6%	9,6%	3,5%	22,1%	1022
Russia	10,1%	32,8%	27,3%	15,0%	14,8%	1321
Japan	20,2%	40,3%	14,1%	2,5%	22,9%	1024
China	35,2%	48,9%	11,8%	1,8%	2,3%	1410
Brazil	36,0%	37,4%	14,5%	4,9%	7,3%	1210
Mexico	39,1%	35,4%	14,8%	5,4%	5,3%	1164
S. Korea	32,3%	44,9%	13,5%	1,9%	7,4%	1238
S. Africa	42,1%	35,6%	9,9%	2,8%	9,6%	1169
India	34,9%	35,7%	20,2%	4,1%	5,1%	1056

Q10. In your view, how important a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in in promoting and defending human rights worldwide to protect human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity?

European Union

Responses from:	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	34,4%	37,4%	13,2%	4,2%	10,9%	11621
USA	34,1%	31,3%	10,8%	4,5%	19,4%	1007
Canada	35,5%	35,6%	6,6%	3,0%	19,3%	1022
Russia	15,5%	35,0%	23,3%	13,6%	12,5%	1321
Japan	21,7%	38,7%	14,1%	1,8%	23,8%	1024
China	38,7%	46,9%	10,3%	1,9%	2,2%	1410
Brazil	39,3%	35,6%	12,5%	4,2%	8,3%	1210
Mexico	43,1%	34,4%	13,0%	4,3%	5,2%	1164
S. Korea	34,8%	42,6%	12,2%	2,3%	8,0%	1238
S. Africa	46,1%	33,2%	7,9%	3,0%	9,8%	1169
India	34,8%	37,6%	20,0%	2,4%	5,3%	1056

Q11. In your view, how important are the following countries and organisations in advancing innovation and technological progress in the world?

European Union

Responses from:	Very important	Somewhat important	Not very important	Not at all important	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	34,3%	39,3%	14,1%	2,6%	9,6%	11621
USA	28,8%	32,9%	14,8%	4,0%	19,6%	1007
Canada	28,5%	36,2%	15,1%	2,3%	17,9%	1022
Russia	21,6%	43,5%	20,5%	5,5%	8,9%	1321
Japan	18,8%	42,7%	14,7%	1,2%	22,7%	1024
China	43,3%	44,7%	8,0%	1,8%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	46,9%	33,9%	11,5%	1,6%	6,1%	1210
Mexico	46,4%	35,6%	13,1%	1,1%	3,8%	1164
S. Korea	31,2%	45,4%	13,6%	2,5%	7,4%	1238
S. Africa	37,9%	35,6%	14,5%	3,8%	8,2%	1169
India	36,3%	40,2%	16,8%	1,9%	4,8%	1056

Q12. How attractive to you personally are the following countries in terms of their culture and lifestyle?

European Union countries

Responses from:	Very attractive	Somewhat attractive	Not very attractive	Not at all attractive	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	35,0%	41,1%	12,3%	3,7%	7,9%	11621
USA	29,6%	37,5%	11,2%	5,0%	16,7%	1007
Canada	33,3%	39,4%	9,8%	3,6%	13,9%	1022
Russia	28,5%	48,2%	10,5%	6,0%	6,8%	1321
Japan	16,4%	44,7%	17,0%	3,0%	18,8%	1024
China	34,4%	48,1%	12,9%	2,6%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	50,8%	32,0%	10,0%	3,6%	3,6%	1210
Mexico	56,7%	31,6%	7,9%	1,0%	2,7%	1164
S. Korea	26,0%	47,8%	15,7%	2,7%	7,8%	1238
S. Africa	39,2%	38,6%	11,8%	3,7%	6,7%	1169
India	33,0%	40,1%	16,4%	6,3%	4,3%	1056

Q13. How well do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?

Development of new technologies

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	24,8%	37,9%	20,8%	3,3%	0,9%	12,3%	11621
USA	16,2%	28,7%	24,1%	3,7%	1,6%	25,7%	1007
Canada	13,7%	33,7%	22,1%	3,8%	0,9%	25,8%	1022
Russia	25,5%	43,8%	16,2%	3,9%	1,9%	8,6%	1321
Japan	5,4%	30,4%	32,2%	5,1%	0,9%	26,1%	1024
China	29,3%	46,0%	18,9%	1,9%	0,4%	3,5%	1410
Brazil	38,2%	35,8%	13,1%	3,1%	0,4%	9,4%	1210
Mexico	33,6%	42,7%	16,7%	1,8%	0,5%	4,5%	1164
S. Korea	8,2%	35,2%	37,8%	6,2%	0,8%	11,8%	1238
S. Africa	27,9%	38,1%	17,7%	3,7%	1,2%	11,4%	1169
India	46,7%	40,2%	10,1%	0,4%	0,1%	2,6%	1056

Global trade

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	27,0%	39,5%	18,0%	3,3%	1,0%	11,3%	11621
USA	18,5%	32,4%	20,7%	3,9%	1,0%	23,6%	1007
Canada	17,0%	39,0%	17,1%	2,8%	0,9%	23,1%	1022
Russia	26,7%	40,2%	15,0%	7,0%	3,4%	7,7%	1321
Japan	9,0%	37,4%	25,1%	2,8%	0,9%	24,8%	1024
China	32,8%	46,2%	15,6%	1,8%	0,4%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	40,4%	36,0%	11,9%	2,4%	0,6%	8,8%	1210
Mexico	40,1%	39,6%	13,7%	2,0%	0,3%	4,5%	1164
S. Korea	10,3%	40,0%	33,8%	5,6%	1,0%	9,4%	1238
S. Africa	36,1%	37,3%	13,3%	2,0%	0,7%	10,6%	1169
India	34,5%	44,5%	15,0%	1,9%	0,6%	3,6%	1056

Industrial development

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	23,8%	38,0%	21,2%	3,5%	1,0%	12,6%	11621
USA	14,7%	31,0%	22,3%	4,4%	1,5%	26,1%	1007
Canada	14,4%	34,4%	21,0%	3,0%	0,7%	26,5%	1022
Russia	23,8%	40,3%	20,6%	4,4%	2,0%	8,8%	1321
Japan	5,9%	30,3%	32,0%	4,6%	0,8%	26,5%	1024
China	28,2%	46,4%	19,2%	2,6%	0,4%	3,1%	1410
Brazil	40,8%	34,4%	11,9%	2,6%	1,1%	9,3%	1210
Mexico	32,4%	45,7%	13,9%	2,6%	0,4%	5,0%	1164
S. Korea	7,0%	35,9%	37,8%	6,4%	0,9%	12,0%	1238
S. Africa	27,1%	39,2%	18,2%	2,4%	1,0%	12,1%	1169
India	39,6%	38,2%	16,3%	2,0%	0,7%	3,3%	1056

Agriculture

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	17,2%	36,2%	26,8%	5,2%	1,4%	13,2%	11621
USA	13,4%	30,3%	24,1%	4,8%	1,3%	26,1%	1007
Canada	12,2%	33,0%	22,8%	4,0%	1,3%	26,7%	1022
Russia	19,2%	37,8%	22,7%	7,7%	3,3%	9,2%	1321
Japan	8,1%	32,2%	30,0%	3,4%	1,0%	25,3%	1024
China	19,0%	44,8%	29,0%	3,1%	0,4%	3,6%	1410
Brazil	21,8%	36,2%	22,8%	6,1%	1,6%	11,5%	1210
Mexico	20,3%	39,7%	28,2%	4,3%	1,2%	6,4%	1164
S. Korea	5,2%	30,0%	44,3%	6,7%	1,6%	12,2%	1238
S. Africa	20,5%	36,4%	22,7%	6,3%	1,5%	12,6%	1169
India	31,0%	38,6%	19,5%	5,1%	0,7%	5,1%	1056

Tourism

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	36,2%	34,7%	15,4%	2,3%	0,8%	10,7%	11621
USA	31,1%	28,1%	15,4%	1,9%	1,0%	22,6%	1007
Canada	32,7%	31,8%	12,1%	2,0%	0,6%	20,8%	1022
Russia	40,3%	35,2%	12,2%	2,3%	2,2%	7,8%	1321
Japan	19,8%	32,9%	21,0%	2,3%	1,0%	22,9%	1024
China	35,4%	43,0%	16,0%	2,0%	0,4%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	52,0%	26,9%	10,6%	1,7%	0,7%	8,1%	1210
Mexico	47,9%	35,5%	11,6%	1,0%	0,3%	3,6%	1164
S. Korea	20,9%	38,9%	25,3%	5,1%	0,7%	9,1%	1238
S. Africa	41,6%	33,3%	12,3%	2,2%	0,6%	9,9%	1169
India	36,9%	38,4%	17,3%	2,6%	0,2%	4,5%	1056

High quality food industry

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	25,0%	35,2%	21,9%	3,9%	1,3%	12,7%	11621
USA	19,7%	27,6%	21,9%	4,8%	1,1%	24,9%	1007
Canada	19,4%	31,8%	20,9%	2,0%	1,0%	25,0%	1022
Russia	22,8%	34,3%	23,1%	6,7%	4,2%	9,0%	1321
Japan	6,1%	29,1%	31,7%	5,0%	1,2%	27,0%	1024
China	34,2%	41,7%	18,3%	1,6%	0,3%	3,9%	1410
Brazil	36,9%	34,1%	15,3%	2,8%	0,9%	10,0%	1210
Mexico	30,2%	43,6%	18,6%	1,9%	0,7%	5,1%	1164
S. Korea	9,0%	33,0%	38,7%	5,9%	1,2%	12,2%	1238
S. Africa	31,1%	36,5%	16,5%	3,5%	1,0%	11,3%	1169
India	36,7%	37,6%	13,7%	5,6%	1,3%	5,0%	1056

Entertainment industry (movies, TV, music)

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,9%	34,0%	28,2%	5,1%	1,5%	12,3%	11621
USA	14,1%	23,6%	28,1%	5,8%	2,0%	26,4%	1007
Canada	12,3%	27,6%	28,3%	5,3%	1,4%	25,1%	1022
Russia	26,1%	40,0%	18,7%	4,3%	2,5%	8,4%	1321
Japan	7,2%	28,1%	33,5%	5,9%	1,4%	23,9%	1024
China	17,1%	41,8%	33,6%	3,7%	0,4%	3,4%	1410
Brazil	27,8%	37,2%	19,8%	4,3%	1,2%	9,7%	1210
Mexico	20,5%	38,7%	30,5%	4,2%	1,2%	4,9%	1164
S. Korea	5,8%	24,6%	44,6%	11,2%	1,8%	12,0%	1238
S. Africa	23,8%	32,6%	24,6%	4,4%	2,1%	12,5%	1169
India	32,2%	41,9%	19,5%	2,0%	0,7%	3,8%	1056

Media and publishing

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	20,6%	35,7%	24,8%	4,0%	1,5%	13,4%	11621
USA	14,6%	27,1%	25,8%	3,9%	1,3%	27,2%	1007
Canada	12,4%	32,8%	24,3%	3,7%	0,8%	26,0%	1022
Russia	21,5%	34,2%	19,5%	7,8%	6,3%	10,7%	1321
Japan	6,1%	25,9%	34,6%	5,7%	1,5%	26,4%	1024
China	20,8%	46,0%	26,8%	2,0%	0,3%	4,1%	1410
Brazil	31,8%	37,9%	16,1%	2,6%	1,0%	10,7%	1210
Mexico	29,8%	43,3%	19,4%	2,1%	0,3%	5,1%	1164
S. Korea	6,0%	29,3%	43,1%	7,4%	0,9%	13,3%	1238
S. Africa	29,5%	36,1%	18,3%	3,2%	1,3%	11,6%	1169
India	31,3%	40,8%	20,6%	1,6%	0,5%	5,2%	1056

Financial services and banking

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	25,5%	35,5%	19,9%	5,7%	1,7%	11,8%	11621
USA	16,3%	28,9%	20,5%	8,0%	2,5%	23,8%	1007
Canada	15,5%	29,5%	20,3%	8,4%	2,9%	23,4%	1022
Russia	30,1%	39,1%	15,1%	4,5%	2,4%	8,7%	1321
Japan	9,6%	30,1%	28,3%	5,4%	1,6%	25,1%	1024
China	32,5%	43,7%	16,2%	3,5%	0,8%	3,3%	1410
Brazil	33,9%	36,1%	14,3%	4,4%	1,0%	10,3%	1210
Mexico	33,2%	35,9%	19,6%	5,5%	1,0%	4,8%	1164
S. Korea	10,5%	34,7%	34,1%	9,0%	1,8%	9,9%	1238
S. Africa	33,2%	36,3%	14,2%	4,2%	1,8%	10,3%	1169
India	34,9%	36,3%	17,7%	4,7%	1,3%	5,0%	1056

Science and research

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	26,3%	38,6%	19,0%	2,9%	0,8%	12,2%	11621
USA	17,0%	31,3%	21,0%	4,4%	1,3%	25,0%	1007
Canada	17,3%	33,4%	20,2%	3,1%	0,9%	25,1%	1022
Russia	25,4%	43,2%	16,9%	3,1%	2,2%	9,2%	1321
Japan	8,1%	32,9%	28,1%	4,2%	1,2%	25,5%	1024
China	30,0%	47,5%	17,1%	1,5%	0,5%	3,4%	1410
Brazil	43,6%	33,6%	10,7%	1,9%	0,6%	9,7%	1210
Mexico	37,0%	41,7%	14,8%	1,5%	0,3%	4,7%	1164
S. Korea	9,4%	39,5%	33,4%	5,3%	1,0%	11,3%	1238
S. Africa	32,1%	37,3%	16,0%	2,4%	0,3%	11,9%	1169
India	39,8%	41,4%	13,4%	2,3%	0,3%	2,9%	1056

Medical research

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	26,4%	37,5%	19,2%	3,2%	0,8%	13,0%	11621
USA	16,1%	30,5%	21,0%	4,1%	1,2%	27,2%	1007
Canada	15,7%	34,5%	19,1%	3,3%	0,8%	26,6%	1022
Russia	31,8%	40,8%	13,0%	3,0%	1,9%	9,5%	1321
Japan	9,3%	31,9%	27,6%	4,3%	0,9%	26,0%	1024
China	28,3%	47,8%	17,5%	2,5%	0,3%	3,7%	1410
Brazil	37,9%	35,3%	13,6%	2,2%	0,8%	10,3%	1210
Mexico	36,7%	41,1%	15,4%	1,6%	0,5%	4,7%	1164
S. Korea	9,7%	34,7%	36,0%	6,4%	1,0%	12,2%	1238
S. Africa	34,0%	35,8%	14,2%	2,4%	0,3%	13,3%	1169
India	40,4%	38,2%	15,6%	2,0%	0,1%	3,7%	1056

Space exploration technologies

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	16,4%	29,8%	29,5%	7,8%	2,2%	14,4%	11621
USA	10,0%	22,4%	27,0%	10,5%	3,1%	27,0%	1007
Canada	8,6%	21,0%	27,8%	9,8%	3,3%	29,5%	1022
Russia	9,7%	28,6%	31,6%	12,7%	5,5%	12,0%	1321
Japan	3,6%	18,4%	38,5%	10,3%	2,2%	27,1%	1024
China	19,3%	44,2%	27,1%	4,5%	0,6%	4,2%	1410
Brazil	26,3%	32,1%	22,9%	5,0%	1,4%	12,2%	1210
Mexico	20,4%	34,9%	31,7%	5,2%	0,9%	7,0%	1164
S. Korea	6,5%	24,1%	43,4%	11,1%	1,9%	13,1%	1238
S. Africa	18,7%	28,9%	27,7%	7,2%	2,5%	15,0%	1169
India	40,0%	37,5%	16,8%	1,8%	0,6%	3,4%	1056

Green technologies

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	23,0%	37,2%	21,9%	3,6%	1,1%	13,3%	11621
USA	17,2%	26,5%	23,9%	4,7%	1,1%	26,6%	1007
Canada	15,4%	30,3%	22,0%	3,4%	1,4%	27,5%	1022
Russia	20,7%	40,5%	20,9%	4,7%	2,3%	10,8%	1321
Japan	10,9%	32,0%	25,4%	4,5%	1,5%	25,7%	1024
China	29,8%	46,1%	17,5%	2,5%	0,3%	3,8%	1410
Brazil	26,1%	34,8%	21,4%	3,6%	1,7%	12,5%	1210
Mexico	32,9%	39,1%	19,3%	2,7%	0,6%	5,4%	1164
S. Korea	11,0%	36,8%	34,4%	5,7%	1,1%	11,1%	1238
S. Africa	27,3%	38,2%	17,8%	3,4%	0,7%	12,6%	1169
India	36,0%	42,5%	16,7%	1,0%	0,4%	3,4%	1056

Q14. Looking from (Your country)'s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the economic relations with the European Union?

The European Union is an important trade partner with (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	24,4%	40,4%	19,9%	4,0%	1,7%	9,6%	11621
USA	25,8%	34,7%	18,1%	1,9%	0,9%	18,7%	1007
Canada	16,7%	41,5%	18,9%	2,5%	1,3%	19,1%	1022
Russia	25,4%	29,8%	25,2%	8,4%	5,6%	5,6%	1321
Japan	10,9%	39,5%	26,0%	2,3%	1,1%	20,2%	1024
China	34,1%	50,5%	12,0%	1,2%	0,2%	1,9%	1410
Brazil	21,9%	36,1%	24,9%	6,5%	1,8%	8,8%	1210
Mexico	22,9%	43,4%	21,7%	5,3%	1,1%	5,5%	1164
S. Korea	14,5%	48,7%	23,0%	5,1%	0,7%	7,9%	1238
S. Africa	24,9%	39,5%	19,3%	3,9%	1,6%	10,7%	1169
India	44,7%	38,3%	10,2%	1,4%	2,1%	3,3%	1056

The European Union is protecting its market at the expense of others

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,2%	31,4%	29,2%	6,2%	1,6%	13,5%	11621
USA	14,5%	22,8%	30,7%	6,4%	0,9%	24,7%	1007
Canada	9,1%	25,4%	30,6%	5,9%	0,8%	28,2%	1022
Russia	34,3%	32,5%	18,0%	4,2%	2,3%	8,6%	1321
Japan	4,9%	20,9%	41,7%	7,2%	2,6%	22,7%	1024
China	16,0%	38,0%	35,2%	6,2%	0,9%	3,7%	1410
Brazil	20,2%	31,3%	28,5%	6,4%	1,4%	12,1%	1210
Mexico	21,6%	37,9%	25,9%	4,9%	1,6%	8,2%	1164
S. Korea	5,7%	28,5%	39,8%	11,8%	1,6%	12,5%	1238
S. Africa	18,6%	29,6%	28,7%	6,8%	1,8%	14,6%	1169
India	34,1%	43,8%	12,7%	1,8%	1,7%	6,0%	1056

The European Union is an important foreign investor in (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	20,0%	37,4%	24,0%	5,3%	2,0%	11,4%	11621
USA	19,2%	32,0%	22,6%	4,3%	0,9%	20,9%	1007
Canada	13,8%	35,0%	20,9%	4,3%	1,1%	24,9%	1022
Russia	19,7%	29,1%	26,3%	9,8%	7,5%	7,7%	1321
Japan	7,7%	29,3%	34,7%	4,5%	1,1%	22,7%	1024
China	21,1%	48,1%	23,0%	3,8%	0,5%	3,4%	1410
Brazil	19,7%	35,3%	25,1%	8,3%	1,9%	9,7%	1210
Mexico	23,0%	40,8%	24,2%	5,3%	1,1%	5,5%	1164
S. Korea	10,8%	46,0%	27,9%	5,7%	0,7%	8,8%	1238
S. Africa	28,1%	35,4%	19,2%	4,0%	2,1%	11,1%	1169
India	36,1%	39,7%	15,3%	1,7%	2,1%	5,1%	1056

The European Union should have stronger economic ties with (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	31,1%	37,8%	17,9%	2,7%	1,1%	9,4%	11621
USA	19,7%	29,5%	26,5%	3,8%	1,0%	19,5%	1007
Canada	20,3%	36,1%	19,4%	2,5%	1,3%	20,5%	1022
Russia	46,9%	30,9%	11,7%	3,0%	2,0%	5,5%	1321
Japan	10,4%	36,8%	28,4%	3,1%	1,0%	20,3%	1024
China	38,4%	46,2%	12,0%	1,1%	0,4%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	30,9%	37,3%	18,6%	3,6%	1,8%	7,8%	1210
Mexico	47,3%	34,5%	11,7%	2,0%	0,3%	4,2%	1164
S. Korea	16,6%	47,2%	23,7%	3,8%	1,1%	7,7%	1238
S. Africa	37,3%	34,1%	15,6%	2,6%	1,5%	9,0%	1169
India	35,4%	43,1%	15,1%	1,8%	1,1%	3,5%	1056

The European Union is an important partner to (Your country) in science, research and technology

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	20,1%	38,2%	24,2%	4,9%	1,7%	11,0%	11621
USA	22,0%	31,8%	21,2%	3,4%	1,5%	20,2%	1007
Canada	14,1%	34,5%	22,1%	4,0%	1,5%	23,8%	1022
Russia	23,9%	29,1%	25,5%	9,2%	5,6%	6,7%	1321
Japan	10,2%	35,4%	28,8%	3,1%	0,9%	21,7%	1024
China	27,2%	50,0%	18,5%	1,8%	0,3%	2,3%	1410
Brazil	17,3%	34,4%	29,7%	6,6%	1,9%	10,0%	1210
Mexico	19,2%	39,4%	27,7%	6,1%	1,1%	6,4%	1164
S. Korea	10,7%	45,8%	28,9%	4,8%	0,9%	8,9%	1238
S. Africa	23,1%	35,8%	22,0%	5,6%	1,8%	11,7%	1169
India	31,1%	43,1%	16,9%	3,4%	1,6%	4,0%	1056

The European Union is an important source of agricultural and food products for (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	13,8%	28,1%	28,7%	13,0%	5,2%	11,1%	11621
USA	16,9%	22,6%	27,3%	9,7%	2,1%	21,4%	1007
Canada	8,0%	25,1%	27,8%	12,3%	2,7%	24,0%	1022
Russia	11,2%	15,7%	26,7%	20,3%	20,0%	6,1%	1321
Japan	8,1%	31,3%	34,2%	4,7%	1,7%	20,0%	1024
China	18,2%	37,0%	28,3%	11,6%	1,8%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	12,3%	21,2%	26,8%	21,4%	8,1%	10,2%	1210
Mexico	12,7%	26,3%	32,9%	16,4%	4,7%	7,0%	1164
S. Korea	7,1%	31,6%	37,4%	13,0%	1,6%	9,3%	1238
S. Africa	14,1%	28,4%	27,1%	13,1%	5,6%	11,7%	1169
India	30,0%	42,5%	17,7%	4,4%	1,5%	3,9%	1056

Q15. Generally speaking, how well do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?

Support for regional and international cooperation

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	17,4%	36,8%	25,3%	5,5%	2,1%	12,8%	11621
USA	15,2%	29,0%	25,3%	4,5%	1,7%	24,4%	1007
Canada	10,9%	34,3%	21,2%	4,8%	1,3%	27,6%	1022
Russia	5,7%	24,0%	30,3%	18,9%	8,7%	12,3%	1321
Japan	7,0%	33,1%	31,7%	3,9%	0,8%	23,4%	1024
China	21,3%	48,2%	24,5%	2,6%	0,7%	2,8%	1410
Brazil	22,5%	36,9%	23,3%	4,2%	1,9%	11,2%	1210
Mexico	24,5%	40,9%	23,1%	3,4%	1,6%	6,4%	1164
S. Korea	7,6%	38,4%	35,8%	6,7%	1,4%	10,1%	1238
S. Africa	17,4%	39,9%	24,6%	3,2%	2,1%	12,9%	1169
India	43,0%	41,3%	11,4%	1,1%	0,3%	2,9%	1056

Foreign policy

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	15,4%	37,1%	25,7%	6,6%	2,9%	12,3%	11621
USA	13,1%	29,9%	24,8%	6,5%	1,9%	23,8%	1007
Canada	8,3%	33,2%	25,3%	4,1%	1,8%	27,3%	1022
Russia	7,2%	16,8%	27,0%	23,8%	16,1%	9,0%	1321
Japan	7,0%	32,7%	31,8%	4,2%	1,1%	23,2%	1024
China	16,5%	50,4%	27,0%	2,9%	0,4%	2,9%	1410
Brazil	21,7%	38,6%	22,5%	5,4%	1,2%	10,6%	1210
Mexico	24,3%	42,5%	22,1%	3,8%	1,3%	6,0%	1164
S. Korea	8,3%	39,7%	36,8%	4,8%	0,8%	9,5%	1238
S. Africa	18,6%	36,6%	22,5%	6,2%	2,4%	13,8%	1169
India	29,0%	48,9%	15,8%	2,3%	0,4%	3,7%	1056

Justice and rule of law

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,8%	36,3%	24,4%	5,3%	2,7%	12,5%	11621
USA	15,6%	29,7%	22,8%	5,7%	1,9%	24,3%	1007
Canada	13,3%	34,3%	20,9%	4,2%	2,1%	25,1%	1022
Russia	9,5%	25,0%	26,1%	16,6%	11,8%	11,0%	1321
Japan	7,8%	30,1%	33,0%	3,6%	0,8%	24,7%	1024
China	24,4%	46,4%	22,9%	2,7%	0,6%	3,0%	1410
Brazil	26,4%	38,8%	18,0%	4,0%	1,7%	11,1%	1210
Mexico	24,6%	42,6%	21,9%	3,2%	1,8%	5,9%	1164
S. Korea	8,7%	35,4%	39,0%	5,5%	1,1%	10,3%	1238
S. Africa	23,9%	39,6%	18,7%	3,3%	2,7%	11,8%	1169
India	33,2%	39,1%	19,7%	2,8%	0,9%	4,2%	1056

Fight against terrorism and radicalisation

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	16,4%	32,7%	26,4%	8,8%	3,5%	12,2%	11621
USA	15,1%	25,1%	23,1%	9,0%	4,0%	23,6%	1007
Canada	10,7%	31,8%	21,9%	8,5%	2,8%	24,2%	1022
Russia	6,4%	24,3%	26,9%	19,6%	12,7%	10,0%	1321
Japan	5,8%	28,8%	33,7%	6,4%	2,1%	23,2%	1024
China	16,6%	42,1%	30,4%	6,3%	1,1%	3,5%	1410
Brazil	26,4%	36,2%	20,1%	5,3%	2,4%	9,6%	1210
Mexico	25,1%	37,4%	22,4%	7,3%	1,7%	6,1%	1164
S. Korea	6,9%	27,9%	41,0%	10,8%	2,3%	11,1%	1238
S. Africa	21,6%	32,8%	22,0%	8,0%	2,9%	12,7%	1169
India	30,6%	38,4%	20,1%	4,8%	1,8%	4,4%	1056

Media freedom

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	20,6%	35,4%	23,5%	5,4%	2,7%	12,4%	11621
USA	17,7%	26,1%	24,2%	4,8%	2,5%	24,7%	1007
Canada	15,0%	33,9%	20,7%	4,3%	1,5%	24,6%	1022
Russia	10,1%	21,9%	25,3%	18,8%	13,9%	10,1%	1321
Japan	9,8%	31,8%	30,7%	3,4%	0,6%	23,7%	1024
China	26,5%	48,4%	20,2%	1,5%	0,2%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	28,9%	34,9%	20,9%	3,1%	1,3%	10,8%	1210
Mexico	29,5%	41,5%	17,8%	4,2%	2,0%	5,1%	1164
S. Korea	12,0%	36,6%	34,7%	5,2%	0,8%	10,7%	1238
S. Africa	24,0%	33,2%	22,9%	5,2%	1,9%	12,7%	1169
India	31,4%	43,4%	18,0%	2,3%	0,5%	4,5%	1056

Fight against climate change and protection of the environment

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	17,0%	35,7%	26,5%	5,7%	2,1%	13,0%	11621
USA	14,2%	24,3%	28,1%	5,3%	2,1%	26,1%	1007
Canada	10,3%	30,6%	25,3%	5,6%	2,4%	25,8%	1022
Russia	7,6%	27,9%	32,6%	11,9%	5,5%	14,5%	1321
Japan	7,7%	30,8%	33,3%	3,8%	0,7%	23,7%	1024
China	23,6%	47,0%	23,1%	2,3%	0,6%	3,3%	1410
Brazil	19,6%	34,8%	25,4%	7,6%	2,7%	9,8%	1210
Mexico	26,4%	39,8%	21,6%	4,4%	2,0%	5,8%	1164
S. Korea	7,9%	36,6%	38,0%	5,8%	1,4%	10,3%	1238
S. Africa	20,5%	37,0%	21,8%	6,1%	2,3%	12,3%	1169
India	31,2%	45,5%	14,5%	3,5%	0,9%	4,5%	1056

Support to developing countries

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	13,8%	31,7%	30,3%	8,1%	3,1%	13,0%	11621
USA	13,4%	23,6%	28,5%	6,5%	2,2%	25,8%	1007
Canada	6,9%	31,4%	25,9%	7,8%	1,6%	26,4%	1022
Russia	4,8%	19,3%	32,9%	19,7%	11,2%	12,1%	1321
Japan	4,4%	30,0%	36,0%	4,0%	1,3%	24,3%	1024
China	14,6%	39,9%	35,0%	6,2%	0,8%	3,5%	1410
Brazil	16,3%	33,7%	27,8%	8,8%	3,7%	9,8%	1210
Mexico	21,2%	36,0%	26,9%	5,9%	3,2%	6,8%	1164
S. Korea	4,9%	25,7%	47,9%	8,6%	1,6%	11,3%	1238
S. Africa	16,8%	37,4%	24,4%	6,9%	3,2%	11,4%	1169
India	36,0%	39,9%	13,8%	4,5%	0,9%	4,8%	1056

Dealing with refugees, displaced people

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	12,1%	27,9%	29,6%	12,2%	4,6%	13,7%	11621
USA	12,1%	20,9%	27,9%	9,7%	3,1%	26,3%	1007
Canada	5,6%	24,2%	25,3%	12,9%	3,3%	28,7%	1022
Russia	5,6%	15,5%	25,3%	25,5%	17,7%	10,4%	1321
Japan	6,0%	27,5%	34,8%	6,2%	1,8%	23,8%	1024
China	13,8%	37,9%	35,6%	7,9%	0,6%	4,1%	1410
Brazil	16,3%	27,7%	25,5%	13,4%	6,6%	10,5%	1210
Mexico	18,7%	35,2%	26,2%	9,6%	2,9%	7,4%	1164
S. Korea	3,9%	19,4%	47,2%	16,3%	1,9%	11,4%	1238
S. Africa	15,0%	31,2%	23,5%	10,3%	5,0%	14,9%	1169
India	24,3%	39,2%	22,3%	7,1%	0,9%	6,2%	1056

Military operations

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	13,7%	31,1%	30,2%	7,7%	3,5%	13,8%	11621
USA	12,4%	26,5%	25,7%	8,3%	2,9%	24,1%	1007
Canada	8,6%	27,9%	29,2%	6,0%	1,6%	26,8%	1022
Russia	4,5%	12,3%	30,2%	21,9%	17,2%	13,9%	1321
Japan	6,3%	26,4%	36,6%	5,2%	1,1%	24,5%	1024
China	13,6%	39,9%	36,7%	5,2%	1,1%	3,6%	1410
Brazil	22,7%	33,2%	25,7%	4,4%	1,4%	12,6%	1210
Mexico	18,5%	36,3%	30,3%	5,0%	2,1%	7,8%	1164
S. Korea	3,9%	25,8%	47,3%	9,9%	1,1%	12,1%	1238
S. Africa	18,7%	35,7%	23,3%	6,1%	2,5%	13,8%	1169
India	29,3%	47,5%	13,8%	3,2%	1,7%	4,5%	1056

Peacekeeping operations

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	16,5%	35,8%	25,8%	6,6%	3,5%	11,8%	11621
USA	15,9%	27,0%	25,3%	5,7%	2,3%	23,8%	1007
Canada	9,7%	38,3%	21,1%	4,9%	1,8%	24,2%	1022
Russia	5,4%	16,0%	29,5%	20,0%	18,2%	10,8%	1321
Japan	7,2%	32,1%	32,0%	4,3%	1,0%	23,3%	1024
China	17,5%	45,2%	29,8%	4,3%	0,4%	2,8%	1410
Brazil	24,0%	36,0%	22,8%	5,8%	2,2%	9,1%	1210
Mexico	25,9%	42,5%	19,5%	4,9%	2,1%	5,1%	1164
S. Korea	10,4%	39,0%	34,7%	5,7%	0,7%	9,5%	1238
S. Africa	22,0%	36,3%	22,4%	5,0%	2,7%	11,6%	1169
India	27,5%	45,2%	18,7%	2,9%	1,7%	4,1%	1056

Q16. Looking from (Your country)'s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the political relations with the European Union?

The European Union is an important partner to (Your country) in international relations

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	25,2%	42,1%	18,6%	3,6%	1,7%	8,7%	11621
USA	28,6%	33,8%	17,3%	1,9%	1,1%	17,4%	1007
Canada	20,6%	42,8%	15,9%	2,3%	1,1%	17,3%	1022
Russia	24,5%	36,8%	17,9%	8,8%	7,0%	5,1%	1321
Japan	11,7%	43,0%	24,9%	3,1%	0,8%	16,4%	1024
China	29,9%	51,2%	15,5%	1,3%	0,1%	1,9%	1410
Brazil	22,4%	37,1%	24,9%	6,0%	1,6%	8,0%	1210
Mexico	29,1%	43,1%	18,8%	3,5%	0,8%	4,7%	1164
S. Korea	14,3%	51,9%	21,9%	4,0%	0,6%	7,3%	1238
S. Africa	28,1%	40,0%	18,0%	3,6%	1,5%	8,7%	1169
India	42,8%	38,7%	10,8%	0,9%	2,0%	4,8%	1056

The European Union is a trustworthy partner to (Your country) in international relations

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	19,2%	37,3%	24,7%	6,3%	3,5%	9,0%	11621
USA	21,5%	30,9%	24,3%	4,0%	1,4%	17,9%	1007
Canada	18,4%	39,1%	20,7%	2,6%	1,5%	17,7%	1022
Russia	8,5%	13,0%	26,0%	26,1%	20,7%	5,7%	1321
Japan	9,5%	39,5%	29,5%	4,0%	0,9%	16,7%	1024
China	21,1%	48,2%	25,9%	2,6%	0,3%	2,0%	1410
Brazil	20,1%	34,8%	29,5%	6,2%	1,6%	7,9%	1210
Mexico	27,5%	41,8%	21,9%	3,7%	0,8%	4,3%	1164
S. Korea	12,5%	46,3%	28,2%	4,6%	0,6%	7,8%	1238
S. Africa	22,9%	34,9%	25,9%	4,9%	2,5%	9,0%	1169
India	31,6%	45,6%	13,4%	1,5%	2,0%	5,9%	1056

The European Union should have stronger political ties with (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	30,0%	39,8%	18,1%	2,8%	1,1%	8,3%	11621
USA	22,0%	30,1%	25,5%	2,7%	1,5%	18,2%	1007
Canada	16,8%	36,4%	22,7%	3,9%	1,8%	18,5%	1022
Russia	44,0%	36,9%	10,0%	2,6%	1,5%	4,9%	1321
Japan	11,9%	39,1%	28,3%	3,4%	0,5%	16,8%	1024
China	32,7%	50,7%	13,1%	1,6%	0,3%	1,6%	1410
Brazil	30,5%	38,0%	19,0%	4,1%	1,7%	6,6%	1210
Mexico	44,0%	38,5%	12,0%	1,2%	0,8%	3,5%	1164
S. Korea	15,8%	49,6%	23,5%	3,6%	0,3%	7,2%	1238
S. Africa	34,4%	33,8%	18,8%	4,2%	1,9%	6,9%	1169
India	42,0%	40,5%	11,8%	1,1%	0,7%	3,9%	1056

Q17. Generally speaking, how well do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?

Overall quality of life

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	26,5%	39,4%	19,4%	3,3%	1,1%	10,3%	11621
USA	18,3%	34,7%	21,0%	2,8%	1,4%	21,9%	1007
Canada	16,3%	39,5%	17,6%	3,9%	1,1%	21,5%	1022
Russia	20,2%	43,3%	19,6%	5,2%	3,0%	8,8%	1321
Japan	7,3%	33,3%	33,4%	3,4%	1,2%	21,4%	1024
China	33,5%	48,2%	14,8%	0,9%	0,1%	2,5%	1410
Brazil	43,4%	32,6%	13,5%	2,6%	0,7%	7,2%	1210
Mexico	35,1%	40,5%	16,5%	2,5%	0,9%	4,5%	1164
S. Korea	12,2%	42,3%	30,2%	5,7%	0,7%	8,8%	1238
S. Africa	28,3%	39,0%	18,1%	3,6%	1,2%	9,9%	1169
India	47,4%	36,2%	11,2%	2,6%	0,4%	2,3%	1056

Level of education

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	29,6%	37,3%	18,0%	3,3%	1,1%	10,7%	11621
USA	21,5%	30,9%	20,3%	3,0%	1,3%	23,0%	1007
Canada	20,3%	36,0%	17,3%	2,4%	0,8%	23,2%	1022
Russia	17,4%	39,8%	20,3%	8,8%	4,6%	9,1%	1321
Japan	10,9%	35,6%	27,7%	3,7%	0,6%	21,4%	1024
China	38,0%	44,3%	13,3%	1,6%	0,3%	2,6%	1410
Brazil	52,0%	24,6%	13,4%	2,3%	0,6%	7,0%	1210
Mexico	43,8%	37,3%	11,9%	1,7%	0,6%	4,6%	1164
S. Korea	14,5%	39,6%	31,1%	4,9%	0,5%	9,5%	1238
S. Africa	37,8%	32,6%	15,6%	2,9%	1,6%	9,4%	1169
India	36,3%	50,8%	9,2%	0,9%	0,2%	2,7%	1056

Creating employment opportunities

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	16,0%	33,2%	28,2%	8,0%	2,2%	12,4%	11621
USA	13,9%	25,0%	26,6%	6,8%	2,4%	25,3%	1007
Canada	6,0%	28,3%	27,0%	8,2%	2,9%	27,6%	1022
Russia	7,1%	25,5%	32,3%	17,1%	5,3%	12,7%	1321
Japan	4,5%	23,6%	38,9%	9,2%	1,2%	22,7%	1024
China	17,7%	46,2%	27,9%	5,1%	0,4%	2,7%	1410
Brazil	23,2%	36,4%	23,2%	6,5%	1,7%	9,1%	1210
Mexico	22,2%	38,5%	25,5%	6,5%	1,9%	5,4%	1164
S. Korea	6,7%	29,1%	42,6%	10,0%	1,3%	10,3%	1238
S. Africa	21,0%	36,5%	22,8%	6,4%	2,1%	11,1%	1169
India	38,4%	39,4%	13,7%	3,1%	2,3%	3,0%	1056

Eradication of poverty

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	14,1%	31,3%	29,7%	9,5%	3,0%	12,4%	11621
USA	12,9%	23,0%	28,1%	7,6%	3,5%	24,9%	1007
Canada	5,6%	23,7%	28,5%	11,8%	3,0%	27,4%	1022
Russia	7,0%	22,0%	31,2%	19,5%	9,1%	11,2%	1321
Japan	3,3%	19,7%	40,7%	11,8%	1,7%	22,8%	1024
China	17,7%	45,3%	28,9%	4,6%	0,5%	3,0%	1410
Brazil	23,2%	36,6%	22,4%	6,9%	1,8%	9,2%	1210
Mexico	19,1%	35,3%	30,4%	6,3%	2,9%	6,0%	1164
S. Korea	5,3%	28,6%	42,3%	12,2%	1,5%	10,1%	1238
S. Africa	15,8%	33,9%	27,4%	8,4%	3,0%	11,5%	1169
India	30,2%	40,7%	16,5%	5,7%	2,7%	4,2%	1056

Equality between men and women

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	21,8%	38,3%	22,2%	4,3%	1,8%	11,5%	11621
USA	17,2%	27,7%	22,7%	5,6%	2,6%	24,3%	1007
Canada	13,4%	32,5%	20,7%	7,1%	2,4%	23,8%	1022
Russia	18,2%	37,7%	24,3%	5,1%	4,4%	10,4%	1321
Japan	12,9%	33,7%	27,5%	3,0%	1,3%	21,6%	1024
China	25,7%	49,6%	19,7%	1,6%	0,4%	2,9%	1410
Brazil	26,3%	38,6%	21,0%	3,9%	1,3%	8,9%	1210
Mexico	31,0%	40,8%	19,4%	3,2%	0,7%	4,9%	1164
S. Korea	15,4%	40,0%	28,8%	5,3%	0,8%	9,7%	1238
S. Africa	24,3%	37,5%	21,1%	4,6%	2,0%	10,4%	1169
India	32,0%	39,4%	17,1%	4,5%	2,5%	4,5%	1056

Protection of minorities

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	14,6%	31,2%	30,1%	7,7%	2,8%	13,5%	11621
USA	12,6%	21,9%	28,5%	7,1%	2,8%	27,0%	1007
Canada	6,7%	25,1%	27,1%	9,4%	3,3%	28,4%	1022
Russia	20,3%	27,9%	24,4%	8,7%	5,7%	12,9%	1321
Japan	3,4%	19,5%	43,0%	7,9%	2,0%	24,1%	1024
China	15,5%	42,4%	33,5%	4,5%	0,6%	3,4%	1410
Brazil	18,3%	33,4%	25,8%	8,4%	3,2%	10,8%	1210
Mexico	16,2%	34,7%	32,7%	6,7%	2,2%	7,6%	1164
S. Korea	7,4%	30,7%	40,3%	10,2%	1,5%	9,9%	1238
S. Africa	15,7%	33,4%	26,8%	7,9%	3,6%	12,7%	1169
India	28,0%	38,5%	18,5%	7,0%	3,1%	4,8%	1056

Reducing income inequality

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	13,7%	29,7%	30,5%	9,5%	3,0%	13,6%	11621
USA	13,5%	21,6%	26,9%	8,3%	2,7%	26,9%	1007
Canada	7,0%	21,2%	29,0%	11,0%	2,4%	29,4%	1022
Russia	6,1%	21,3%	31,1%	18,5%	8,0%	14,9%	1321
Japan	3,2%	19,9%	40,2%	11,2%	2,3%	23,0%	1024
China	16,4%	43,0%	32,1%	4,3%	1,1%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	22,6%	35,8%	23,1%	6,9%	2,0%	9,6%	1210
Mexico	18,1%	36,4%	30,0%	6,0%	2,1%	7,3%	1164
S. Korea	5,7%	27,9%	42,1%	11,8%	2,3%	10,3%	1238
S. Africa	15,1%	27,8%	30,8%	9,5%	3,0%	13,8%	1169
India	29,3%	38,0%	17,8%	7,3%	3,4%	4,3%	1056

Social justice and solidarity (social rights, public welfare system)

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	20,1%	37,3%	23,1%	5,2%	2,1%	12,2%	11621
USA	16,8%	27,0%	23,1%	5,6%	2,6%	24,9%	1007
Canada	11,6%	34,1%	20,7%	6,5%	1,3%	26,0%	1022
Russia	12,3%	30,2%	26,7%	12,4%	6,8%	11,5%	1321
Japan	9,6%	32,9%	31,3%	3,6%	1,1%	21,5%	1024
China	30,2%	46,9%	17,7%	2,2%	0,4%	2,6%	1410
Brazil	29,0%	36,7%	19,9%	3,8%	1,3%	9,3%	1210
Mexico	24,5%	43,3%	21,3%	2,9%	1,4%	6,6%	1164
S. Korea	12,9%	40,3%	31,5%	4,9%	0,8%	9,5%	1238
S. Africa	21,6%	39,9%	21,2%	3,6%	2,1%	11,7%	1169
India	29,3%	38,6%	17,9%	6,2%	3,5%	4,5%	1056

Integration of migrants and refugees

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	11,4%	27,2%	31,2%	12,2%	4,4%	13,5%	11621
USA	12,4%	20,0%	27,8%	9,6%	3,9%	26,3%	1007
Canada	5,6%	22,2%	26,0%	12,2%	5,0%	29,0%	1022
Russia	6,0%	18,2%	27,3%	24,6%	11,8%	12,2%	1321
Japan	3,9%	22,0%	38,1%	10,5%	2,7%	22,7%	1024
China	12,2%	39,5%	36,9%	7,2%	0,9%	3,3%	1410
Brazil	15,0%	26,9%	27,7%	14,0%	6,0%	10,2%	1210
Mexico	15,3%	33,3%	31,5%	9,3%	3,4%	7,3%	1164
S. Korea	3,7%	22,8%	45,1%	14,9%	2,4%	11,1%	1238
S. Africa	11,5%	30,0%	29,0%	10,4%	4,7%	14,4%	1169
India	29,9%	34,1%	20,4%	7,8%	2,9%	4,9%	1056

Q18. Looking from (Your country)'s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the European Union?

The European Union is an important partner for (Your country) education exchanges

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	24,3%	39,0%	20,3%	4,5%	2,2%	9,7%	11621
USA	21,4%	29,1%	23,4%	4,4%	1,7%	20,1%	1007
Canada	18,3%	35,5%	19,3%	4,3%	1,4%	21,3%	1022
Russia	17,9%	35,8%	19,2%	10,8%	9,2%	7,0%	1321
Japan	9,0%	37,3%	30,3%	3,4%	1,1%	18,9%	1024
China	29,8%	50,0%	16,5%	1,5%	0,1%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	34,8%	37,8%	16,0%	3,5%	1,1%	6,8%	1210
Mexico	31,4%	38,2%	19,3%	4,6%	1,4%	5,2%	1164
S. Korea	10,8%	48,1%	27,7%	5,1%	0,6%	7,6%	1238
S. Africa	25,7%	35,6%	22,3%	4,7%	2,1%	9,5%	1169
India	43,3%	38,6%	10,1%	1,7%	2,1%	4,2%	1056

The European Union shares the same democratic principles as (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	14,8%	31,3%	27,0%	11,0%	4,8%	11,1%	11621
USA	17,2%	25,9%	26,3%	7,2%	2,5%	20,9%	1007
Canada	13,1%	34,4%	24,2%	6,0%	1,6%	20,7%	1022
Russia	6,0%	15,5%	26,2%	25,6%	17,9%	8,8%	1321
Japan	10,0%	37,0%	29,0%	3,1%	1,0%	19,9%	1024
China	15,0%	32,1%	35,2%	11,5%	2,8%	3,4%	1410
Brazil	14,9%	26,6%	30,1%	14,7%	4,3%	9,3%	1210
Mexico	15,8%	29,0%	27,9%	14,5%	5,8%	6,9%	1164
S. Korea	10,7%	46,8%	27,4%	6,2%	0,9%	8,0%	1238
S. Africa	12,1%	24,5%	29,6%	14,2%	7,0%	12,6%	1169
India	36,0%	43,6%	10,8%	2,3%	2,1%	5,3%	1056

The European Union is a good example for (Your country) in promoting equality between women and men

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	21,1%	35,0%	24,2%	6,0%	3,5%	10,3%	11621
USA	16,4%	24,2%	28,3%	6,5%	2,6%	22,0%	1007
Canada	11,1%	27,0%	27,8%	8,5%	3,2%	22,4%	1022
Russia	10,8%	19,1%	23,8%	18,4%	19,7%	8,1%	1321
Japan	10,3%	31,9%	33,1%	3,8%	1,0%	19,9%	1024
China	26,2%	49,7%	19,2%	2,3%	0,2%	2,3%	1410
Brazil	27,4%	35,9%	21,9%	5,5%	1,0%	8,3%	1210
Mexico	33,5%	38,7%	19,5%	2,8%	1,0%	4,4%	1164
S. Korea	13,3%	44,4%	29,2%	4,5%	0,7%	7,8%	1238
S. Africa	22,7%	36,4%	25,7%	5,0%	1,7%	8,6%	1169
India	37,9%	38,2%	15,2%	1,9%	2,2%	4,7%	1056

Q19. Generally speaking, how would you rate the European Union and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?

Music

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	30,8%	37,7%	19,3%	2,3%	0,8%	9,2%	11621
USA	23,2%	31,2%	21,9%	2,4%	1,1%	20,2%	1007
Canada	24,4%	33,6%	20,8%	2,2%	0,8%	18,3%	1022
Russia	28,6%	40,3%	18,8%	2,5%	2,1%	7,6%	1321
Japan	20,8%	36,8%	21,6%	2,7%	0,7%	17,5%	1024
China	35,4%	45,9%	15,2%	1,1%	0,4%	2,0%	1410
Brazil	41,3%	33,1%	15,9%	2,2%	0,5%	7,1%	1210
Mexico	37,8%	38,4%	17,5%	2,0%	0,3%	4,0%	1164
S. Korea	15,1%	36,6%	34,1%	4,0%	0,7%	9,5%	1238
S. Africa	33,7%	35,5%	18,0%	3,1%	0,7%	9,0%	1169
India	45,6%	42,7%	8,9%	1,3%	0,3%	1,1%	1056

Arts

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	38,4%	36,0%	14,7%	1,8%	0,7%	8,5%	11621
USA	35,4%	27,8%	16,3%	1,3%	0,8%	18,5%	1007
Canada	36,9%	32,2%	11,6%	1,7%	0,4%	17,2%	1022
Russia	30,3%	40,5%	17,3%	2,6%	1,7%	7,5%	1321
Japan	31,1%	33,8%	16,9%	1,3%	0,8%	16,2%	1024
China	40,5%	41,6%	13,9%	1,6%	0,5%	1,9%	1410
Brazil	55,3%	24,9%	11,0%	1,5%	0,7%	6,7%	1210
Mexico	53,1%	31,7%	10,7%	0,9%	0,3%	3,3%	1164
S. Korea	25,4%	41,4%	21,7%	3,3%	0,7%	7,5%	1238
S. Africa	42,4%	30,1%	14,8%	2,8%	0,3%	9,5%	1169
India	32,3%	53,9%	11,6%	0,7%	0,1%	1,4%	1056

Theatre and cinema

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	27,3%	38,2%	21,3%	2,9%	0,8%	9,4%	11621
USA	22,6%	29,0%	23,9%	3,3%	1,0%	20,2%	1007
Canada	23,0%	33,2%	21,3%	2,9%	0,7%	18,9%	1022
Russia	25,7%	41,1%	20,0%	3,3%	2,2%	7,7%	1321
Japan	16,8%	36,1%	25,8%	3,4%	0,7%	17,2%	1024
China	28,8%	49,1%	17,2%	2,1%	0,4%	2,5%	1410
Brazil	41,8%	33,3%	15,0%	2,0%	0,6%	7,4%	1210
Mexico	34,1%	41,8%	18,0%	1,9%	0,3%	3,9%	1164
S. Korea	12,4%	37,4%	35,9%	5,3%	0,4%	8,6%	1238
S. Africa	36,3%	32,8%	17,4%	2,9%	0,9%	9,8%	1169
India	29,9%	44,6%	20,1%	2,3%	0,7%	2,5%	1056

Monuments and museums

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	42,0%	32,1%	14,6%	1,7%	0,7%	8,8%	11621
USA	40,2%	24,9%	14,0%	1,3%	0,9%	18,7%	1007
Canada	44,6%	25,8%	10,9%	1,0%	0,5%	17,2%	1022
Russia	39,9%	35,2%	13,8%	2,0%	2,0%	7,1%	1321
Japan	29,5%	33,3%	18,4%	1,6%	0,7%	16,5%	1024
China	38,7%	41,8%	15,4%	1,4%	0,4%	2,3%	1410
Brazil	59,9%	21,1%	10,8%	1,5%	0,3%	6,5%	1210
Mexico	54,6%	32,9%	7,9%	0,6%	0,5%	3,4%	1164
S. Korea	27,3%	37,6%	24,1%	2,7%	0,3%	8,0%	1238
S. Africa	49,4%	25,4%	12,7%	2,3%	0,8%	9,5%	1169
India	34,6%	39,9%	18,3%	3,0%	0,6%	3,7%	1056

History

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	36,7%	33,2%	17,5%	2,9%	1,0%	8,8%	11621
USA	39,1%	24,5%	15,9%	1,6%	0,6%	18,4%	1007
Canada	44,4%	24,6%	11,8%	1,6%	0,8%	16,8%	1022
Russia	26,6%	31,0%	22,0%	7,9%	4,2%	8,4%	1321
Japan	25,2%	34,3%	20,7%	2,5%	0,9%	16,4%	1024
China	29,9%	43,5%	21,9%	2,4%	0,3%	1,9%	1410
Brazil	54,8%	25,3%	10,2%	2,4%	0,5%	6,9%	1210
Mexico	48,8%	33,3%	12,7%	1,4%	0,3%	3,5%	1164
S. Korea	18,4%	40,7%	28,8%	3,6%	0,5%	8,1%	1238
S. Africa	45,8%	27,5%	14,7%	2,2%	1,0%	8,7%	1169
India	36,9%	43,8%	13,0%	2,4%	0,6%	3,3%	1056

Modern architecture and design

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	34,4%	37,0%	16,8%	1,9%	0,6%	9,1%	11621
USA	25,2%	31,1%	21,0%	2,2%	0,9%	19,6%	1007
Canada	29,3%	31,8%	17,8%	2,1%	0,8%	18,3%	1022
Russia	33,4%	38,0%	15,7%	2,9%	1,5%	8,6%	1321
Japan	22,3%	36,3%	22,0%	2,0%	0,3%	17,2%	1024
China	37,4%	44,9%	14,5%	0,9%	0,4%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	48,0%	29,9%	12,9%	1,6%	0,5%	7,2%	1210
Mexico	47,5%	35,0%	12,1%	1,4%	0,2%	3,8%	1164
S. Korea	19,3%	44,9%	24,5%	2,8%	0,6%	8,0%	1238
S. Africa	40,8%	31,7%	15,7%	2,1%	0,6%	9,1%	1169
India	38,3%	43,6%	13,7%	1,6%	0,7%	2,2%	1056

Luxury goods and clothes

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	38,3%	34,3%	16,0%	1,7%	0,7%	9,1%	11621
USA	28,4%	29,3%	19,7%	1,8%	0,6%	20,3%	1007
Canada	33,5%	31,0%	14,0%	2,0%	0,7%	18,9%	1022
Russia	40,0%	37,4%	11,3%	1,7%	1,7%	7,9%	1321
Japan	20,9%	36,6%	22,2%	2,3%	0,7%	17,3%	1024
China	41,7%	39,7%	15,1%	1,1%	0,2%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	52,1%	26,2%	12,6%	1,8%	0,6%	6,8%	1210
Mexico	44,5%	37,0%	12,9%	1,5%	0,4%	3,7%	1164
S. Korea	23,6%	39,2%	25,5%	2,4%	0,7%	8,6%	1238
S. Africa	51,5%	25,7%	13,2%	1,2%	0,3%	8,0%	1169
India	43,1%	38,8%	14,2%	1,5%	0,6%	1,8%	1056

Food and cuisine

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	32,1%	37,0%	18,4%	3,0%	0,9%	8,6%	11621
USA	34,2%	28,8%	16,8%	1,3%	0,8%	18,2%	1007
Canada	38,9%	31,1%	11,9%	0,7%	0,9%	16,6%	1022
Russia	28,4%	39,9%	17,3%	4,8%	2,3%	7,3%	1321
Japan	14,0%	38,5%	25,8%	3,8%	1,4%	16,5%	1024
China	24,8%	42,9%	25,0%	4,5%	0,9%	2,0%	1410
Brazil	50,2%	28,8%	11,7%	1,8%	0,2%	7,3%	1210
Mexico	39,5%	40,5%	14,6%	1,1%	0,6%	3,7%	1164
S. Korea	17,3%	42,8%	27,3%	4,0%	0,4%	8,2%	1238
S. Africa	45,7%	29,9%	13,1%	2,6%	0,5%	8,2%	1169
India	28,7%	43,8%	19,0%	5,2%	0,9%	2,4%	1056

Lifestyle

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	31,3%	38,2%	18,0%	2,7%	0,9%	8,8%	11621
USA	23,7%	33,1%	20,9%	2,0%	1,0%	19,4%	1007
Canada	24,6%	39,3%	16,9%	1,7%	0,8%	16,7%	1022
Russia	22,1%	37,9%	23,5%	5,8%	2,8%	7,9%	1321
Japan	14,2%	39,6%	26,1%	2,4%	0,4%	17,3%	1024
China	32,0%	47,1%	16,9%	1,3%	0,4%	2,3%	1410
Brazil	48,5%	31,0%	11,2%	2,4%	0,3%	6,5%	1210
Mexico	44,8%	39,3%	11,2%	1,1%	0,3%	3,4%	1164
S. Korea	18,6%	43,9%	25,7%	2,7%	1,0%	8,0%	1238
S. Africa	44,4%	31,2%	13,9%	1,9%	0,8%	7,9%	1169
India	38,4%	37,6%	14,5%	5,5%	1,2%	2,7%	1056

Sports

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	31,3%	38,2%	18,5%	2,1%	0,6%	9,2%	11621
USA	21,3%	30,3%	23,1%	3,9%	1,1%	20,4%	1007
Canada	23,6%	36,5%	18,2%	2,2%	0,7%	18,9%	1022
Russia	26,7%	43,0%	17,9%	2,6%	1,5%	8,2%	1321
Japan	17,3%	39,6%	24,2%	1,8%	0,7%	16,4%	1024
China	28,5%	44,7%	23,3%	1,3%	0,1%	2,0%	1410
Brazil	45,5%	31,7%	13,0%	2,4%	0,5%	6,9%	1210
Mexico	43,6%	38,9%	11,9%	1,3%	0,3%	4,0%	1164
S. Korea	20,1%	41,4%	27,0%	2,8%	0,5%	8,2%	1238
S. Africa	41,9%	31,9%	15,0%	1,9%	0,6%	8,7%	1169
India	42,8%	41,0%	10,8%	1,4%	0,3%	3,7%	1056

Multiculturalism

Responses from:	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	28,2%	37,2%	20,9%	3,1%	1,1%	9,5%	11621
USA	23,2%	30,8%	21,1%	4,0%	1,3%	19,7%	1007
Canada	21,4%	33,0%	22,3%	3,8%	1,4%	18,1%	1022
Russia	29,8%	38,3%	18,2%	3,9%	2,3%	7,3%	1321
Japan	14,9%	36,4%	27,5%	2,9%	0,7%	17,7%	1024
China	34,4%	45,7%	16,2%	1,1%	0,5%	2,1%	1410
Brazil	40,4%	32,2%	16,9%	2,6%	0,7%	7,2%	1210
Mexico	42,9%	37,0%	14,2%	1,8%	0,4%	3,7%	1164
S. Korea	11,1%	38,2%	35,3%	5,6%	1,0%	8,9%	1238
S. Africa	27,8%	35,8%	21,6%	3,6%	1,6%	9,5%	1169
India	32,1%	42,0%	17,2%	2,1%	0,6%	6,1%	1056

Q20. Looking from (Your country)'s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

Europe is an attractive destination for tourists from (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	40,3%	37,5%	12,9%	2,2%	0,9%	6,3%	11621
USA	38,9%	30,5%	13,6%	2,3%	0,9%	13,9%	1007
Canada	39,4%	34,1%	12,0%	1,7%	0,8%	12,0%	1022
Russia	40,8%	39,0%	11,2%	2,8%	2,1%	4,0%	1321
Japan	25,4%	38,6%	19,7%	1,9%	0,9%	13,6%	1024
China	39,6%	46,0%	12,1%	0,7%	0,2%	1,4%	1410
Brazil	47,6%	31,1%	13,1%	2,3%	0,7%	5,1%	1210
Mexico	51,3%	34,7%	9,7%	0,5%	0,6%	3,2%	1164
S. Korea	28,1%	44,9%	17,7%	3,3%	0,5%	5,6%	1238
S. Africa	43,6%	34,7%	12,3%	2,1%	0,8%	6,6%	1169
India	46,9%	37,9%	8,1%	4,7%	1,6%	0,8%	1056

Europe is a producer of music and arts popular in (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,2%	35,4%	26,4%	9,4%	2,6%	8,0%	11621
USA	19,8%	32,3%	24,9%	5,7%	1,6%	15,8%	1007
Canada	15,0%	31,4%	28,5%	8,3%	1,7%	15,2%	1022
Russia	17,7%	38,3%	25,2%	8,6%	4,2%	6,0%	1321
Japan	16,1%	37,2%	26,5%	3,9%	0,9%	15,3%	1024
China	22,2%	50,9%	22,0%	2,8%	0,5%	1,7%	1410
Brazil	13,7%	20,4%	30,1%	21,7%	5,9%	8,1%	1210
Mexico	16,9%	27,3%	33,5%	13,6%	3,7%	5,0%	1164
S. Korea	10,2%	35,0%	35,2%	11,1%	1,8%	6,8%	1238
S. Africa	18,8%	34,0%	26,6%	9,5%	2,8%	8,3%	1169
India	32,5%	44,5%	10,1%	8,1%	2,7%	2,1%	1056

Europe is a producer of luxury goods and clothes popular in (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	26,2%	38,8%	20,3%	5,1%	1,5%	8,0%	11621
USA	24,9%	35,4%	19,1%	2,9%	1,1%	16,7%	1007
Canada	23,1%	33,3%	22,0%	3,5%	1,1%	17,0%	1022
Russia	27,7%	43,0%	15,8%	4,7%	3,2%	5,8%	1321
Japan	21,7%	37,8%	21,5%	2,8%	0,9%	15,3%	1024
China	31,4%	48,0%	16,9%	1,5%	0,4%	1,8%	1410
Brazil	20,1%	30,3%	26,1%	13,5%	2,7%	7,3%	1210
Mexico	23,2%	36,7%	25,6%	8,3%	1,7%	4,5%	1164
S. Korea	22,1%	46,9%	20,2%	4,0%	0,6%	6,3%	1238
S. Africa	29,2%	37,8%	19,8%	4,5%	1,0%	7,7%	1169
India	37,4%	34,9%	17,0%	5,6%	2,7%	2,3%	1056

Europe shares and embodies the sample social values and principles as (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	13,6%	30,3%	29,3%	12,6%	5,1%	9,1%	11621
USA	15,8%	29,9%	26,1%	8,8%	2,3%	17,0%	1007
Canada	14,2%	35,2%	26,2%	6,7%	1,6%	16,1%	1022
Russia	7,7%	17,6%	26,1%	24,2%	16,7%	7,8%	1321
Japan	11,1%	32,7%	34,5%	4,1%	1,1%	16,4%	1024
China	13,0%	31,1%	35,2%	14,3%	3,5%	2,9%	1410
Brazil	12,5%	21,6%	29,8%	20,3%	7,1%	8,7%	1210
Mexico	13,4%	30,2%	30,2%	15,1%	5,8%	5,3%	1164
S. Korea	9,1%	40,4%	34,6%	6,2%	1,5%	8,2%	1238
S. Africa	13,0%	25,1%	31,9%	15,3%	5,7%	9,0%	1169
India	29,4%	42,0%	15,8%	6,2%	2,8%	3,8%	1056

Europe should be engaged more actively in cultural exchanges with (Your country)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	29,5%	40,5%	18,5%	2,7%	1,2%	7,6%	11621
USA	21,1%	30,1%	27,5%	3,5%	1,2%	16,7%	1007
Canada	21,5%	34,7%	24,3%	2,3%	1,1%	16,1%	1022
Russia	32,2%	39,7%	14,0%	4,3%	3,7%	6,1%	1321
Japan	14,6%	39,4%	27,7%	2,3%	0,9%	15,0%	1024
China	36,2%	47,9%	13,7%	0,4%	0,2%	1,6%	1410
Brazil	33,6%	39,5%	17,4%	2,6%	0,7%	6,1%	1210
Mexico	47,0%	37,4%	10,7%	1,3%	0,3%	3,3%	1164
S. Korea	17,8%	50,5%	22,0%	3,3%	0,4%	6,1%	1238
S. Africa	31,7%	38,3%	18,0%	3,3%	1,3%	7,4%	1169
India	34,3%	43,9%	13,8%	4,1%	1,7%	2,2%	1056

Q21. Thinking now about your own personal point of view on each of the following issues listed below. Please tell me for each, how similar are your views with respect to the views of European Union?

Respect for human dignity

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	25,3%	41,5%	15,2%	4,7%	13,3%	11621
USA	18,9%	36,0%	12,7%	4,8%	27,6%	1007
Canada	19,0%	42,6%	9,8%	2,8%	25,8%	1022
Russia	22,2%	41,5%	16,6%	8,6%	11,1%	1321
Japan	8,7%	38,2%	20,0%	2,1%	31,0%	1024
China	29,1%	52,6%	13,3%	1,8%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	25,0%	39,6%	17,3%	7,5%	10,7%	1210
Mexico	31,5%	38,7%	18,0%	6,4%	5,2%	1164
S. Korea	19,5%	49,5%	17,9%	2,7%	10,4%	1238
S. Africa	29,9%	37,9%	13,5%	5,8%	12,9%	1169
India	47,3%	34,3%	11,9%	3,8%	2,7%	1056

Liberty

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	22,8%	43,2%	15,7%	4,7%	13,6%	11621
USA	17,5%	35,9%	14,2%	4,8%	27,6%	1007
Canada	16,7%	43,6%	10,6%	2,3%	26,8%	1022
Russia	18,3%	39,7%	19,8%	10,0%	12,2%	1321
Japan	8,2%	39,3%	20,1%	2,7%	29,7%	1024
China	30,1%	50,2%	15,0%	1,8%	2,8%	1410
Brazil	28,1%	38,0%	16,9%	6,4%	10,7%	1210
Mexico	32,3%	40,8%	16,6%	5,6%	4,8%	1164
S. Korea	20,0%	50,9%	16,2%	2,7%	10,2%	1238
S. Africa	25,1%	38,8%	15,3%	5,4%	15,3%	1169
India	27,8%	53,4%	10,8%	4,6%	3,3%	1056

Democracy

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	22,0%	41,3%	17,2%	5,5%	14,0%	11621
USA	17,4%	35,1%	14,2%	5,1%	28,3%	1007
Canada	18,4%	42,8%	9,5%	2,4%	26,8%	1022
Russia	15,7%	33,5%	23,5%	13,9%	13,3%	1321
Japan	8,1%	40,2%	19,9%	2,1%	29,6%	1024
China	26,3%	50,0%	18,2%	2,3%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	25,5%	40,3%	17,2%	5,4%	11,6%	1210
Mexico	26,4%	39,5%	20,2%	8,5%	5,4%	1164
S. Korea	19,9%	49,4%	16,6%	3,2%	10,8%	1238
S. Africa	28,2%	39,1%	12,9%	6,1%	13,7%	1169
India	32,0%	41,0%	17,8%	5,1%	4,1%	1056

Equality

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	22,2%	41,6%	17,1%	5,2%	13,8%	11621
USA	18,9%	34,2%	14,1%	5,1%	27,8%	1007
Canada	17,9%	40,3%	12,0%	3,1%	26,6%	1022
Russia	16,9%	39,9%	19,7%	10,1%	13,5%	1321
Japan	7,3%	36,8%	22,1%	2,9%	30,9%	1024
China	28,1%	53,3%	14,5%	0,8%	3,4%	1410
Brazil	21,9%	38,9%	20,6%	7,5%	11,1%	1210
Mexico	29,2%	41,8%	16,8%	6,8%	5,3%	1164
S. Korea	17,2%	50,7%	18,3%	3,5%	10,3%	1238
S. Africa	28,1%	38,5%	14,2%	6,2%	13,1%	1169
India	34,7%	36,7%	18,7%	6,3%	3,6%	1056

The rule of law

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	20,8%	40,6%	17,8%	5,0%	15,8%	11621
USA	15,8%	36,4%	13,7%	4,3%	29,8%	1007
Canada	15,3%	41,2%	10,4%	3,3%	29,8%	1022
Russia	17,2%	36,5%	20,7%	9,5%	16,1%	1321
Japan	7,7%	35,9%	21,3%	2,4%	32,6%	1024
China	25,1%	50,0%	19,9%	1,8%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	24,6%	37,7%	19,0%	5,5%	13,2%	1210
Mexico	26,7%	41,6%	17,0%	7,6%	7,1%	1164
S. Korea	15,9%	46,1%	22,0%	3,5%	12,5%	1238
S. Africa	25,8%	37,6%	15,0%	7,5%	14,1%	1169
India	31,6%	40,1%	16,9%	4,5%	6,9%	1056

Respect for human rights

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	24,1%	41,8%	15,5%	5,0%	13,6%	11621
USA	19,7%	37,5%	11,5%	3,8%	27,5%	1007
Canada	19,1%	41,2%	11,9%	2,1%	25,7%	1022
Russia	20,4%	39,4%	18,4%	10,0%	11,8%	1321
Japan	8,4%	39,0%	18,7%	2,7%	31,1%	1024
China	30,6%	51,0%	13,0%	2,1%	3,3%	1410
Brazil	25,0%	39,1%	18,2%	6,8%	10,9%	1210
Mexico	32,1%	39,7%	16,2%	7,0%	5,0%	1164
S. Korea	20,2%	47,4%	18,0%	3,6%	10,7%	1238
S. Africa	31,4%	37,0%	13,2%	5,6%	12,8%	1169
India	31,1%	44,2%	15,2%	5,0%	4,5%	1056

Rights of persons belonging to minorities

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	16,0%	36,2%	23,5%	8,2%	16,1%	11621
USA	15,6%	35,6%	13,2%	5,6%	30,1%	1007
Canada	12,3%	38,4%	14,0%	5,3%	30,0%	1022
Russia	9,4%	26,3%	26,0%	23,2%	15,1%	1321
Japan	5,0%	25,3%	30,6%	4,7%	34,5%	1024
China	15,7%	44,3%	29,6%	4,0%	6,5%	1410
Brazil	18,4%	33,3%	25,3%	10,2%	12,8%	1210
Mexico	23,2%	39,9%	23,9%	6,9%	6,1%	1164
S. Korea	11,0%	41,6%	29,6%	5,7%	12,1%	1238
S. Africa	21,4%	36,5%	18,6%	7,6%	15,8%	1169
India	28,5%	39,7%	20,5%	6,5%	4,8%	1056

Pluralism

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	17,4%	38,2%	19,4%	5,1%	19,9%	11621
USA	13,2%	30,8%	13,5%	3,4%	39,1%	1007
Canada	10,5%	32,6%	12,4%	2,9%	41,5%	1022
Russia	11,6%	30,7%	23,9%	10,7%	23,1%	1321
Japan	5,7%	29,3%	26,8%	3,2%	35,0%	1024
China	28,3%	54,0%	13,2%	1,4%	3,1%	1410
Brazil	21,0%	37,5%	21,0%	5,9%	14,7%	1210
Mexico	26,0%	42,8%	18,9%	5,3%	7,0%	1164
S. Korea	11,5%	43,1%	26,5%	4,6%	14,4%	1238
S. Africa	14,6%	35,9%	19,6%	5,0%	24,9%	1169
India	29,2%	40,2%	17,3%	8,0%	5,4%	1056

Non-discrimination

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	19,1%	39,5%	20,1%	6,4%	14,9%	11621
USA	16,8%	34,5%	14,2%	4,8%	29,8%	1007
Canada	14,9%	37,7%	15,5%	4,4%	27,6%	1022
Russia	15,9%	36,0%	22,4%	11,6%	14,2%	1321
Japan	6,4%	32,2%	25,9%	3,8%	31,7%	1024
China	22,0%	51,0%	20,4%	2,5%	4,1%	1410
Brazil	20,1%	34,7%	22,8%	11,1%	11,3%	1210
Mexico	27,9%	39,9%	19,8%	6,7%	5,7%	1164
S. Korea	13,6%	47,9%	23,2%	3,6%	11,6%	1238
S. Africa	22,4%	37,2%	18,4%	7,6%	14,4%	1169
India	29,6%	39,8%	16,7%	7,4%	6,5%	1056

Tolerance

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,4%	40,6%	19,8%	6,5%	14,7%	11621
USA	16,4%	36,0%	13,3%	5,7%	28,6%	1007
Canada	15,3%	39,4%	14,3%	3,4%	27,6%	1022
Russia	11,5%	32,3%	24,4%	17,5%	14,3%	1321
Japan	5,7%	32,6%	25,2%	3,4%	33,0%	1024
China	26,2%	53,1%	15,5%	1,8%	3,4%	1410
Brazil	18,6%	38,6%	22,1%	9,3%	11,3%	1210
Mexico	27,8%	40,6%	20,0%	6,5%	5,1%	1164
S. Korea	11,9%	47,4%	25,5%	3,5%	11,7%	1238
S. Africa	19,1%	41,1%	18,4%	7,0%	14,5%	1169
India	29,6%	41,2%	17,9%	6,1%	5,2%	1056

Justice

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	21,4%	40,8%	17,2%	6,2%	14,4%	11621
USA	17,1%	36,0%	14,7%	4,3%	27,9%	1007
Canada	16,9%	41,7%	10,4%	2,9%	28,1%	1022
Russia	16,4%	38,4%	21,6%	10,8%	12,8%	1321
Japan	6,6%	36,5%	22,4%	2,8%	31,6%	1024
China	26,4%	53,5%	15,0%	2,0%	3,2%	1410
Brazil	26,7%	34,7%	18,2%	9,3%	11,1%	1210
Mexico	29,8%	36,7%	17,5%	10,6%	5,3%	1164
S. Korea	15,3%	48,1%	20,4%	3,4%	12,8%	1238
S. Africa	26,2%	37,1%	14,6%	8,6%	13,4%	1169
India	30,6%	42,1%	16,2%	6,0%	5,1%	1056

Solidarity

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,6%	41,4%	19,2%	4,7%	16,1%	11621
USA	15,8%	34,1%	14,9%	4,1%	31,2%	1007
Canada	15,1%	39,6%	11,1%	2,6%	31,6%	1022
Russia	15,7%	36,8%	23,2%	9,1%	15,1%	1321
Japan	5,0%	31,2%	27,5%	2,9%	33,4%	1024
China	25,6%	54,6%	15,0%	1,5%	3,3%	1410
Brazil	22,2%	37,8%	21,8%	6,9%	11,2%	1210
Mexico	27,4%	45,4%	15,9%	5,3%	5,9%	1164
S. Korea	11,5%	45,6%	26,2%	3,0%	13,8%	1238
S. Africa	18,2%	42,1%	17,1%	5,3%	17,4%	1169
India	27,4%	41,9%	18,2%	6,4%	6,2%	1056

Equality between women and men

Responses from:	Definitely the same	More or less the same	Not very similar	Not at all similar	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	21,9%	41,7%	17,7%	4,9%	13,9%	11621
USA	16,7%	36,9%	13,8%	4,5%	28,1%	1007
Canada	17,9%	39,8%	12,1%	3,4%	26,8%	1022
Russia	16,4%	40,0%	21,0%	10,4%	12,0%	1321
Japan	8,4%	33,5%	24,3%	3,4%	30,3%	1024
China	28,2%	53,5%	14,1%	1,1%	3,0%	1410
Brazil	25,6%	38,5%	18,8%	5,7%	11,4%	1210
Mexico	31,2%	39,4%	18,3%	6,2%	4,9%	1164
S. Korea	16,9%	44,9%	23,5%	3,5%	11,3%	1238
S. Africa	26,1%	39,6%	15,0%	5,2%	14,1%	1169
India	28,4%	46,7%	15,3%	5,5%	4,1%	1056

Q22. And generally speaking please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?

Europe is a continent looking towards the future

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	25,4%	36,5%	23,7%	4,9%	1,8%	7,8%	11621
USA	20,9%	30,8%	26,8%	3,9%	2,2%	15,5%	1007
Canada	17,1%	35,4%	25,8%	4,2%	1,8%	15,7%	1022
Russia	15,5%	29,5%	26,0%	13,9%	7,6%	7,3%	1321
Japan	6,4%	24,2%	42,1%	7,9%	1,7%	17,7%	1024
China	20,6%	49,7%	24,7%	1,8%	0,6%	2,6%	1410
Brazil	31,9%	33,2%	24,8%	3,6%	1,2%	5,3%	1210
Mexico	43,4%	38,3%	13,1%	2,0%	0,3%	2,8%	1164
S. Korea	14,5%	41,4%	30,0%	6,1%	0,7%	7,4%	1238
S. Africa	34,9%	39,0%	15,7%	2,3%	0,5%	7,6%	1169
India	49,5%	39,1%	8,2%	2,2%	0,7%	0,3%	1056

Europe is a continent that should be more united to tackle today's challenges

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	27,9%	39,9%	19,7%	2,8%	1,1%	8,6%	11621
USA	19,3%	32,1%	26,3%	3,1%	1,9%	17,3%	1007
Canada	20,3%	33,6%	24,2%	2,9%	1,1%	18,0%	1022
Russia	31,7%	36,5%	15,6%	4,4%	2,9%	8,9%	1321
Japan	10,0%	34,5%	32,1%	4,1%	1,8%	17,6%	1024
China	27,0%	51,1%	17,9%	1,2%	0,4%	2,5%	1410
Brazil	36,6%	35,2%	17,8%	3,3%	0,6%	6,5%	1210
Mexico	43,3%	37,6%	14,0%	1,3%	0,5%	3,3%	1164
S. Korea	14,5%	47,9%	25,7%	4,0%	0,6%	7,4%	1238
S. Africa	35,8%	36,1%	16,9%	2,7%	0,9%	7,5%	1169
India	37,2%	50,9%	9,1%	1,1%	0,9%	0,7%	1056

Europe is a continent attractive for its history

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	37,2%	36,6%	15,8%	2,6%	1,3%	6,5%	11621
USA	37,1%	34,4%	13,2%	1,8%	1,2%	12,3%	1007
Canada	46,6%	29,1%	10,9%	1,2%	0,9%	11,4%	1022
Russia	32,2%	35,8%	16,3%	5,7%	3,9%	6,1%	1321
Japan	23,2%	39,8%	18,6%	2,5%	1,6%	14,4%	1024
China	27,7%	46,4%	21,3%	2,1%	0,5%	1,9%	1410
Brazil	48,8%	30,3%	12,6%	2,1%	0,9%	5,4%	1210
Mexico	53,6%	31,3%	10,6%	1,4%	0,4%	2,8%	1164
S. Korea	22,3%	45,9%	20,8%	4,1%	0,6%	6,3%	1238
S. Africa	42,2%	31,7%	15,7%	2,4%	1,4%	6,8%	1169
India	41,7%	38,2%	16,1%	2,2%	1,1%	0,8%	1056

Europe is a continent providing many opportunities

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	24,9%	37,5%	23,4%	4,9%	1,5%	7,8%	11621
USA	20,9%	31,1%	24,2%	5,4%	1,9%	16,6%	1007
Canada	19,9%	36,4%	23,6%	4,6%	1,2%	14,4%	1022
Russia	24,5%	38,2%	21,1%	5,7%	4,3%	6,3%	1321
Japan	7,8%	27,9%	38,4%	7,1%	1,9%	16,9%	1024
China	18,2%	45,6%	27,9%	4,8%	0,6%	2,9%	1410
Brazil	35,5%	33,3%	20,0%	4,0%	1,2%	6,1%	1210
Mexico	36,9%	35,1%	19,5%	4,6%	0,9%	3,1%	1164
S. Korea	14,6%	44,2%	28,0%	5,7%	0,5%	7,0%	1238
S. Africa	37,2%	35,2%	17,3%	2,3%	0,8%	7,2%	1169
India	33,0%	44,2%	15,0%	4,6%	2,2%	1,0%	1056

Europe is a destination you would like to visit

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	42,5%	34,0%	13,1%	2,7%	1,7%	6,0%	11621
USA	38,2%	28,6%	13,9%	4,3%	3,1%	11,9%	1007
Canada	44,3%	26,2%	13,2%	3,5%	1,7%	11,1%	1022
Russia	42,6%	35,1%	11,1%	3,3%	3,6%	4,5%	1321
Japan	24,0%	38,1%	18,2%	3,7%	2,2%	13,8%	1024
China	38,1%	44,9%	14,3%	1,0%	0,4%	1,3%	1410
Brazil	53,1%	26,3%	12,0%	2,6%	1,1%	5,0%	1210
Mexico	61,9%	26,1%	8,0%	0,9%	0,3%	2,8%	1164
S. Korea	31,6%	40,8%	17,6%	3,2%	1,0%	5,8%	1238
S. Africa	52,6%	29,3%	8,7%	1,9%	1,1%	6,3%	1169
India	36,2%	41,4%	14,7%	3,9%	2,9%	0,9%	1056

Europe is a place you would like to do business or cooperate with

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	24,8%	36,0%	22,4%	5,2%	3,1%	8,5%	11621
USA	20,0%	30,1%	26,6%	5,1%	3,2%	15,0%	1007
Canada	17,7%	34,7%	24,3%	4,3%	2,3%	16,6%	1022
Russia	13,9%	26,5%	24,8%	13,8%	11,6%	9,5%	1321
Japan	8,1%	33,0%	33,4%	5,5%	2,3%	17,7%	1024
China	23,5%	47,4%	22,9%	2,8%	0,2%	3,3%	1410
Brazil	35,5%	33,1%	19,2%	4,2%	1,7%	6,3%	1210
Mexico	41,3%	36,0%	16,7%	1,4%	0,9%	3,8%	1164
S. Korea	13,3%	43,8%	28,3%	5,9%	1,2%	7,5%	1238
S. Africa	39,1%	34,3%	15,4%	2,8%	1,1%	7,4%	1169
India	35,3%	38,6%	12,6%	5,9%	6,6%	0,9%	1056

Europe is a place where you would like to live

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	24,4%	28,8%	23,8%	10,2%	6,1%	6,7%	11621
USA	18,4%	21,8%	25,4%	12,9%	9,2%	12,2%	1007
Canada	16,4%	21,6%	26,8%	13,7%	8,9%	12,5%	1022
Russia	13,7%	20,7%	23,6%	17,6%	17,6%	6,7%	1321
Japan	8,1%	24,5%	33,2%	13,3%	6,3%	14,6%	1024
China	25,0%	40,6%	24,7%	6,0%	1,8%	1,9%	1410
Brazil	36,6%	27,5%	19,7%	8,0%	3,1%	5,1%	1210
Mexico	40,3%	28,4%	20,2%	5,8%	2,6%	2,7%	1164
S. Korea	17,4%	36,1%	30,1%	7,9%	1,8%	6,7%	1238
S. Africa	32,8%	26,4%	19,8%	10,6%	3,7%	6,8%	1169
India	33,6%	37,2%	14,6%	7,5%	6,2%	0,9%	1056

Europe is a place where you would like to study (or your kids to study)

Responses from:	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	27,7%	33,6%	21,1%	6,4%	3,8%	7,4%	11621
USA	22,3%	26,6%	23,4%	8,1%	5,4%	14,2%	1007
Canada	19,7%	30,0%	23,5%	8,2%	4,0%	14,6%	1022
Russia	17,8%	25,4%	23,3%	13,6%	13,1%	6,8%	1321
Japan	10,5%	30,5%	30,6%	7,8%	4,0%	16,5%	1024
China	25,4%	45,1%	22,7%	3,3%	1,0%	2,5%	1410
Brazil	43,0%	30,2%	16,3%	4,2%	1,3%	5,0%	1210
Mexico	47,3%	31,8%	14,8%	2,3%	1,1%	2,7%	1164
S. Korea	17,4%	40,4%	27,0%	6,9%	1,1%	7,1%	1238
S. Africa	40,6%	29,7%	16,4%	5,0%	1,6%	6,7%	1169
India	31,5%	44,4%	12,9%	4,6%	5,1%	1,4%	1056

Q23. Some people think about Europe, whereas others think about the European Union when talking about economy, politics, culture, sports and other areas. In your case, which term – Europe or the European Union - comes to your mind first when you think about the following subjects?

Economy

Responses from:	"European Union"	"Europe"	No difference between them	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	46,6%	23,0%	18,1%	12,4%	11621
USA	35,7%	17,4%	21,8%	25,1%	1007
Canada	40,7%	14,7%	20,2%	24,5%	1022
Russia	48,8%	19,5%	22,4%	9,3%	1321
Japan	38,0%	15,6%	21,2%	25,2%	1024
China	55,6%	26,6%	13,8%	3,9%	1410
Brazil	52,9%	24,9%	13,6%	8,6%	1210
Mexico	54,0%	26,4%	15,0%	4,6%	1164
S. Korea	50,6%	20,4%	17,9%	11,1%	1238
S. Africa	46,3%	27,5%	14,8%	11,4%	1169
India	36,4%	34,8%	22,3%	6,5%	1056

Science, research and technology

Responses from:	"European Union"	"Europe"	No difference between them	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	26,9%	38,3%	21,6%	13,1%	11621
USA	18,6%	28,7%	26,5%	26,2%	1007
Canada	20,4%	29,7%	23,8%	26,1%	1022
Russia	17,8%	45,8%	26,9%	9,5%	1321
Japan	18,1%	31,1%	24,3%	26,6%	1024
China	31,1%	45,4%	18,4%	5,1%	1410
Brazil	34,2%	41,2%	15,0%	9,5%	1210
Mexico	38,9%	38,7%	17,5%	4,9%	1164
S. Korea	27,1%	35,7%	25,5%	11,7%	1238
S. Africa	26,4%	44,5%	17,3%	11,8%	1169
India	34,4%	36,6%	22,3%	6,8%	1056

Politics

Responses from:	"European Union"	"Europe"	No difference between them	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	42,6%	23,4%	20,5%	13,5%	11621
USA	31,7%	20,0%	22,0%	26,3%	1007
Canada	33,8%	20,4%	19,8%	26,1%	1022
Russia	56,9%	11,8%	22,9%	8,3%	1321
Japan	32,9%	17,4%	23,6%	26,1%	1024
China	53,0%	25,5%	17,0%	4,6%	1410
Brazil	49,1%	25,8%	15,4%	9,6%	1210
Mexico	47,9%	29,5%	17,5%	5,2%	1164
S. Korea	38,0%	25,9%	23,5%	12,5%	1238
S. Africa	46,0%	24,9%	16,9%	12,2%	1169
India	27,8%	32,6%	28,4%	11,2%	1056

Social development

Responses from:	"European Union"	"Europe"	No difference between them	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	30,5%	32,7%	23,1%	13,8%	11621
USA	22,9%	25,1%	25,8%	26,1%	1007
Canada	22,6%	26,9%	24,8%	25,7%	1022
Russia	24,6%	34,7%	28,6%	12,1%	1321
Japan	24,6%	23,6%	25,1%	26,7%	1024
China	33,7%	41,9%	19,7%	4,7%	1410
Brazil	36,2%	37,9%	16,8%	9,1%	1210
Mexico	40,5%	36,4%	18,0%	5,0%	1164
S. Korea	32,1%	29,1%	26,2%	12,7%	1238
S. Africa	36,5%	34,4%	17,0%	12,1%	1169
India	27,8%	31,3%	30,3%	10,6%	1056

Culture and sports

Responses from:	"European Union"	"Europe"	No difference between them	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	17,6%	49,1%	20,7%	12,6%	11621
USA	13,4%	38,3%	23,6%	24,6%	1007
Canada	9,1%	44,5%	21,8%	24,6%	1022
Russia	10,2%	53,3%	27,6%	9,0%	1321
Japan	7,0%	47,4%	21,4%	24,2%	1024
China	23,1%	56,0%	16,7%	4,2%	1410
Brazil	23,1%	52,4%	15,2%	9,3%	1210
Mexico	25,6%	53,6%	16,8%	4,0%	1164
S. Korea	18,5%	48,9%	21,8%	10,8%	1238
S. Africa	15,7%	57,1%	15,9%	11,4%	1169
India	28,5%	33,5%	27,7%	10,3%	1056

Q24. And finally, I would like to know a little bit more about your own personal experiences of Europe: (Yes, Percentage)

Responses from:	Have you ever lived in Europe?	Have you ever visited Europe?	Have you got any relatives that live in Europe?	Do you speak any European language?	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	8,9%	32,3%	24,5%	21,6%	11621
USA	13,4%	38,3%	22,3%	N/A	1007
Canada	9,3%	38,7%	34,7%	N/A	1022
Russia	11,6%	51,9%	27,9%	N/A	1321
Japan	3,5%	26,0%	7,7%	11,6%	1024
China	19,8%	40,3%	24,6%	41,3%	1410
Brazil	7,0%	27,8%	34,7%	N/A	1210
Mexico	6,3%	28,9%	28,4%	N/A	1164
S. Korea	4,8%	30,0%	10,3%	18,9%	1238
S. Africa	9,1%	32,2%	44,4%	N/A	1169
India	1,8%	2,9%	7,2%	8,0%	1056

Q25. Please tell me which European countries look the most attractive to you?

Responses from:	(all countries)	USA	Canada	Russia	Japan	China	Brazil	Mexico	S. Korea	S. Africa	India
Austria	31,0%	23,1%	27,9%	37,2%	30,5%	28,2%	28,1%	30,8%	26,7%	35,0%	42,1%
Belgium	23,2%	20,1%	25,3%	20,7%	25,4%	16,6%	25,3%	26,7%	16,7%	29,4%	27,9%
Bulgaria	8,0%	3,9%	2,3%	21,0%	10,7%	4,5%	5,9%	6,4%	6,1%	6,2%	10,9%
Croatia	9,0%	5,2%	7,5%	15,8%	6,4%	3,5%	10,2%	10,8%	11,4%	11,5%	6,1%
Cyprus	8,3%	5,8%	5,3%	31,3%	2,6%	3,0%	2,7%	4,2%	1,8%	14,6%	9,3%
Czech Republic	12,0%	6,4%	9,3%	38,7%	8,0%	4,8%	10,7%	14,3%	7,5%	7,9%	8,3%
Denmark	27,4%	25,8%	30,1%	18,2%	22,4%	31,5%	31,1%	29,6%	30,1%	30,1%	24,3%
Estonia	3,6%	2,7%	2,3%	6,3%	2,8%	2,3%	3,5%	3,4%	2,2%	3,2%	7,2%
Finland	24,4%	18,8%	27,9%	31,4%	28,8%	22,3%	20,1%	27,7%	31,3%	19,8%	14,7%
France	58,1%	43,8%	54,3%	49,4%	43,8%	65,3%	66,2%	75,9%	49,4%	65,1%	64,3%
Germany	53,7%	39,1%	40,0%	53,6%	44,3%	59,0%	60,4%	70,8%	45,3%	59,3%	59,6%
Great Britain	45,3%	43,5%	52,3%	36,4%	41,5%	55,7%	37,5%	57,0%	45,2%	51,3%	30,3%
Greece	29,8%	24,5%	31,3%	34,5%	11,2%	26,0%	37,6%	48,4%	21,2%	35,4%	25,4%
Hungary	7,8%	5,2%	6,8%	11,7%	7,7%	5,0%	7,8%	8,3%	7,8%	6,8%	10,3%
Ireland	23,7%	37,0%	41,2%	15,6%	7,9%	14,8%	24,8%	28,5%	13,9%	37,0%	21,7%
Italy	52,8%	51,7%	55,0%	50,5%	41,5%	45,7%	66,4%	73,3%	36,0%	61,2%	46,8%
Latvia	3,2%	2,6%	2,2%	4,7%	2,7%	2,1%	3,1%	3,0%	1,7%	2,6%	8,2%
Lithuania	3,6%	2,8%	2,8%	3,6%	3,5%	3,3%	3,6%	3,9%	2,9%	3,1%	6,9%
Luxembourg	13,9%	11,0%	12,7%	17,1%	7,8%	17,7%	15,5%	24,9%	9,8%	12,7%	6,5%
Malta	6,8%	4,2%	6,8%	19,2%	4,9%	3,0%	5,3%	3,6%	3,7%	7,7%	9,1%
Netherlands	34,6%	28,3%	36,6%	26,2%	28,9%	35,7%	18,4%	62,3%	38,8%	51,3%	17,9%
Poland	11,5%	9,8%	10,9%	8,1%	9,5%	9,2%	11,0%	19,4%	9,2%	11,3%	17,6%
Portugal	23,7%	13,6%	22,0%	18,2%	11,7%	12,6%	60,6%	33,8%	9,1%	35,4%	19,4%
Romania	8,4%	6,6%	7,5%	6,3%	6,3%	5,4%	8,3%	16,2%	4,8%	11,4%	12,0%
Slovakia	5,2%	2,9%	4,1%	12,0%	3,3%	2,7%	5,2%	7,5%	2,8%	4,8%	6,3%
Slovenia	4,8%	2,7%	2,9%	11,1%	3,0%	2,6%	4,2%	7,0%	2,5%	3,6%	8,3%
Spain	45,0%	38,4%	40,5%	46,9%	30,3%	28,7%	59,3%	72,0%	33,3%	58,6%	42,1%
Sweden	38,2%	35,9%	43,7%	40,7%	30,1%	38,9%	40,1%	41,8%	34,7%	44,6%	29,3%
None of these	5,9%	11,2%	8,3%	5,0%	20,6%	3,0%	2,9%	1,2%	7,3%	2,6%	0,2%
	11621	1007	1022	1321	1024	1410	1210	1164	1238	1169	1056

Q26. Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about…?

The Euro (the official currency)

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	59,0%	20,9%	7,0%	4,2%	8,9%	11621
USA	44,0%	23,5%	7,9%	7,3%	17,4%	1007
Canada	57,3%	18,3%	4,4%	7,1%	12,9%	1022
Russia	83,1%	10,4%	1,7%	0,5%	4,2%	1321
Japan	44,3%	18,8%	13,0%	5,7%	18,2%	1024
China	48,6%	35,2%	9,6%	1,8%	4,8%	1410
Brazil	66,6%	20,1%	5,9%	1,7%	5,9%	1210
Mexico	74,5%	16,3%	4,1%	2,2%	2,8%	1164
S. Korea	59,7%	20,7%	9,5%	2,7%	7,4%	1238
S. Africa	70,6%	14,4%	5,5%	2,7%	6,9%	1169
India	33,6%	30,7%	9,6%	13,0%	13,2%	1056

The European Flag

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	25,9%	28,3%	20,1%	12,4%	13,3%	11621
USA	16,1%	22,1%	17,4%	20,5%	23,9%	1007
Canada	20,3%	23,9%	16,7%	21,5%	17,6%	1022
Russia	35,0%	21,1%	22,4%	10,7%	10,7%	1321
Japan	13,7%	19,8%	28,1%	13,1%	25,3%	1024
China	23,5%	43,5%	18,7%	4,3%	9,9%	1410
Brazil	31,7%	31,1%	20,6%	8,9%	7,7%	1210
Mexico	36,8%	28,4%	17,2%	12,8%	4,9%	1164
S. Korea	20,2%	27,8%	26,8%	11,1%	14,1%	1238
S. Africa	34,6%	26,9%	18,6%	10,4%	9,5%	1169
India	22,7%	34,4%	13,0%	15,5%	14,4%	1056

The Erasmus Student Exchange Programme

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	9,5%	18,2%	26,1%	28,6%	17,6%	11621
USA	8,3%	14,6%	17,6%	33,7%	25,8%	1007
Canada	7,0%	10,9%	18,5%	43,1%	20,5%	1022
Russia	8,5%	15,0%	30,1%	34,3%	12,2%	1321
Japan	1,9%	6,7%	32,6%	30,0%	28,8%	1024
China	10,2%	31,3%	29,1%	11,3%	17,9%	1410
Brazil	14,7%	19,6%	28,6%	27,2%	9,8%	1210
Mexico	16,1%	26,3%	24,3%	26,8%	6,5%	1164
S. Korea	4,1%	14,8%	33,4%	29,2%	18,5%	1238
S. Africa	10,0%	14,6%	27,1%	33,9%	14,4%	1169
India	12,7%	23,9%	16,2%	21,1%	26,1%	1056

The European Union Delegation in (Your country)

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	14,6%	27,8%	26,4%	16,2%	15,0%	11621
USA	11,4%	17,9%	19,9%	26,0%	24,8%	1007
Canada	6,8%	18,2%	23,4%	32,3%	19,3%	1022
Russia	21,3%	30,2%	27,5%	9,1%	12,0%	1321
Japan	3,4%	12,5%	37,5%	17,9%	28,6%	1024
China	22,1%	44,8%	20,2%	3,5%	9,4%	1410
Brazil	18,7%	32,0%	27,7%	12,5%	9,2%	1210
Mexico	21,5%	31,4%	26,0%	15,3%	5,8%	1164
S. Korea	9,6%	27,6%	33,4%	15,2%	14,2%	1238
S. Africa	14,4%	27,3%	28,1%	18,5%	11,6%	1169
India	11,8%	27,6%	20,5%	19,3%	20,8%	1056

The European Commission

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	18,7%	30,5%	22,8%	12,9%	15,1%	11621
USA	11,8%	20,9%	19,6%	22,5%	25,2%	1007
Canada	9,5%	23,3%	21,4%	26,5%	19,4%	1022
Russia	36,2%	32,4%	17,0%	5,1%	9,2%	1321
Japan	8,1%	20,2%	30,6%	14,5%	26,7%	1024
China	19,1%	44,6%	21,2%	3,7%	11,4%	1410
Brazil	27,6%	37,6%	19,4%	6,8%	8,6%	1210
Mexico	24,5%	33,0%	25,3%	10,7%	6,5%	1164
S. Korea	10,6%	27,7%	33,3%	13,6%	14,9%	1238
S. Africa	21,0%	30,1%	23,7%	13,2%	12,0%	1169
India	12,4%	28,2%	16,6%	19,3%	23,5%	1056

The European Parliament

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	25,6%	32,2%	18,5%	10,3%	13,4%	11621
USA	19,8%	25,7%	16,5%	16,1%	21,9%	1007
Canada	16,4%	25,7%	16,5%	22,9%	18,5%	1022
Russia	49,0%	29,7%	10,3%	3,7%	7,3%	1321
Japan	9,7%	23,8%	28,6%	12,9%	25,0%	1024
China	24,9%	41,3%	19,9%	3,6%	10,3%	1410
Brazil	35,6%	33,8%	16,4%	6,0%	8,2%	1210
Mexico	36,7%	38,4%	12,5%	7,1%	5,2%	1164
S. Korea	17,9%	34,6%	25,8%	8,6%	13,0%	1238
S. Africa	25,7%	32,8%	20,4%	10,2%	10,9%	1169
India	12,8%	31,5%	18,8%	17,4%	19,5%	1056

The Council of the European Union

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	17,9%	30,7%	23,2%	13,3%	14,9%	11621
USA	11,9%	20,1%	20,2%	22,8%	24,9%	1007
Canada	10,7%	22,8%	20,8%	26,1%	19,6%	1022
Russia	25,4%	31,4%	24,5%	7,8%	10,9%	1321
Japan	6,0%	19,5%	33,1%	14,5%	27,0%	1024
China	24,5%	45,9%	17,5%	3,3%	8,8%	1410
Brazil	27,7%	36,7%	20,0%	7,3%	8,3%	1210
Mexico	25,9%	39,7%	19,7%	9,4%	5,4%	1164
S. Korea	12,7%	30,9%	30,2%	12,0%	14,2%	1238
S. Africa	17,1%	27,9%	27,4%	14,6%	12,9%	1169
India	11,6%	23,8%	19,3%	21,9%	23,5%	1056

The European Central Bank

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	27,1%	33,2%	16,8%	9,7%	13,2%	11621
USA	18,7%	24,3%	16,7%	17,4%	23,0%	1007
Canada	19,7%	28,1%	14,5%	20,4%	17,3%	1022
Russia	41,0%	33,5%	13,0%	3,7%	8,7%	1321
Japan	13,5%	24,1%	24,9%	13,4%	24,1%	1024
China	25,9%	43,1%	18,7%	2,7%	9,6%	1410
Brazil	36,9%	35,8%	15,5%	4,7%	7,1%	1210
Mexico	35,8%	37,8%	13,7%	7,6%	5,0%	1164
S. Korea	28,4%	35,5%	18,4%	6,9%	10,7%	1238
S. Africa	30,9%	32,5%	18,6%	8,1%	9,8%	1169
India	13,1%	31,4%	15,1%	18,1%	22,3%	1056

The European Council

Responses from:	Definitely yes	Most likely yes	Most likely no	Definitely no	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	16,9%	31,0%	24,1%	12,8%	15,2%	11621
USA	13,3%	23,8%	19,4%	20,0%	23,5%	1007
Canada	9,4%	24,7%	21,7%	24,3%	19,9%	1022
Russia	29,4%	33,3%	20,7%	5,8%	10,7%	1321
Japan	5,8%	19,6%	33,0%	14,5%	27,1%	1024
China	20,6%	43,8%	20,3%	4,4%	11,0%	1410
Brazil	23,4%	34,0%	24,9%	8,7%	9,1%	1210
Mexico	21,3%	36,6%	23,5%	12,0%	6,5%	1164
S. Korea	11,2%	27,1%	33,6%	13,1%	15,0%	1238
S. Africa	18,0%	30,5%	27,4%	12,2%	11,9%	1169
India	10,8%	31,2%	16,0%	18,9%	23,1%	1056

Q27. Generally, how often if ever do you hear or read about the European Union? This can be on TV or the radio, via the Internet, or in newspapers or magazines…or simply by word of mouth…

Responses from:	More or less everyday	About once a week	About once a month	Less often than once a month	Never	Do not know/ cannot answer	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	23,5%	29,2%	13,6%	15,7%	8,9%	9,0%	11621
USA	10,6%	21,6%	13,2%	18,7%	24,0%	11,8%	1007
Canada	10,7%	21,4%	13,3%	20,5%	21,4%	12,8%	1022
Russia	63,5%	17,1%	4,8%	4,9%	2,7%	6,9%	1321
Japan	8,5%	21,9%	11,8%	18,8%	14,9%	24,0%	1024
China	30,1%	43,0%	11,3%	9,6%	1,1%	4,8%	1410
Brazil	28,6%	35,6%	11,9%	12,5%	4,5%	6,9%	1210
Mexico	23,6%	36,7%	16,9%	14,3%	5,1%	3,4%	1164
S. Korea	14,2%	36,8%	18,0%	15,9%	7,4%	7,8%	1238
S. Africa	23,2%	30,5%	15,6%	16,0%	6,4%	8,3%	1169
India	9,4%	21,9%	21,3%	31,9%	8,5%	7,0%	1056

Q28. And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the European Union or more generally Europe as a whole?

Responses from:	(all countries)	USA	Canada	Russia	Japan	China	Brazil	Mexico	S. Korea	S. Africa	India
Online media	51,8%	37,9%	50,2%	54,5%	35,1%	71,0%	54,9%	49,7%	54,5%	60,2%	29,1%
Print media: Newspapers and Magazines	35,2%	26,6%	31,2%	27,8%	29,3%	35,3%	38,0%	38,8%	27,9%	40,4%	53,8%
Television channels	69,5%	54,6%	59,6%	81,7%	72,4%	67,2%	70,7%	61,8%	69,7%	67,8%	81,7%
The radio	22,0%	18,7%	25,7%	28,6%	10,4%	23,4%	18,5%	24,0%	9,9%	39,2%	15,8%
Social media (Facebook, Twitter, others)	34,7%	18,7%	27,9%	33,2%	14,4%	48,2%	40,5%	54,9%	21,2%	41,8%	24,6%
School, college, university	13,3%	10,7%	11,0%	5,1%	5,3%	16,3%	19,4%	19,1%	6,1%	14,4%	21,7%
The Government	12,3%	12,2%	8,9%	8,6%	7,4%	21,8%	13,6%	13,9%	7,9%	12,2%	11,3%
Personal and professional contact with Europeans	8,2%	10,1%	8,2%	8,4%	4,2%	11,0%	7,0%	10,4%	3,7%	10,7%	7,0%
The European Union's delegation in your capital	3,7%	7,1%	2,4%	1,8%	1,9%	5,9%	3,5%	3,3%	2,9%	3,3%	4,4%
Other format	3,4%	2,0%	4,0%	2,8%	4,0%	5,0%	3,0%	3,4%	2,8%	3,4%	3,3%
Do not know/ cannot answer	2,1%	5,0%	1,8%	1,4%	5,3%	0,9%	1,4%	1,1%	2,2%	1,7%	3,5%
Total responses (N)	9559	650	671	1193	633	1324	1070	1068	1060	998	892

Q29. Would you say you are sufficiently informed about the European Union?

Responses from:	Yes, I have sufficient information	Yes, but I would like to more information	No, but I would like to more information	No, but I am not really interested	Total responses (N)
(all countries)	14,1%	33,5%	41,0%	11,4%	9559
USA	25,9%	30,7%	31,7%	11,8%	650
Canada	17,4%	26,6%	39,1%	16,8%	671
Russia	22,5%	32,0%	31,8%	13,7%	1193
Japan	4,8%	19,5%	53,6%	22,1%	633
China	12,7%	43,5%	39,3%	4,5%	1324
Brazil	16,8%	39,6%	38,8%	4,9%	1070
Mexico	10,1%	39,6%	46,2%	4,0%	1068
S. Korea	6,2%	30,4%	47,1%	16,3%	1060
S. Africa	17,1%	33,5%	38,4%	11,0%	998
India	8,5%	27,9%	46,1%	17,4%	892

Q30. In which of the following activities related to the European Union or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?

Responses from:	(all countries)	USA	Canada	Russia	Japan	China	Brazil	Mexico	S. Korea	S. Africa	India
European Film festivals	28,4%	15,9%	19,5%	39,4%	16,5%	48,3%	28,0%	32,6%	16,6%	28,0%	30,2%
Joint Sport initiatives	21,7%	10,9%	12,5%	27,6%	11,6%	30,6%	19,8%	18,0%	18,7%	23,7%	38,7%
Cultural events	43,6%	34,2%	37,4%	54,7%	29,1%	53,6%	47,0%	55,0%	42,1%	38,8%	36,2%
Academic exchanges, scholarships, and opportunities for academic mobility	30,2%	17,0%	20,5%	18,6%	9,8%	36,5%	46,8%	56,2%	15,1%	42,0%	34,8%
Activities between European and (Your country) people	38,2%	25,2%	29,6%	45,4%	21,4%	50,0%	41,2%	51,9%	25,4%	50,3%	33,2%
Getting information about European Union's policies	21,8%	18,1%	18,3%	16,0%	11,0%	30,5%	29,1%	24,9%	19,3%	23,0%	24,6%
Getting information on how to live in Europe	30,6%	15,3%	21,2%	44,7%	7,7%	33,0%	44,2%	42,8%	21,0%	42,0%	24,8%
Getting information on how to invest or do business in Europe	21,7%	9,8%	10,5%	19,5%	9,6%	29,6%	28,5%	34,1%	13,9%	38,0%	17,7%
Getting information on how to travel to Europe	43,1%	30,1%	39,3%	54,3%	28,3%	50,1%	47,0%	54,4%	50,4%	47,0%	19,8%
Online initiatives open to (Your country)	30,7%	17,9%	21,2%	38,2%	14,0%	48,9%	40,0%	39,5%	14,5%	50,7%	11,3%
Other (please specify)	1,0%	0,6%	1,5%	0,8%	0,2%	0,1%	1,2%	2,6%	0,2%	1,8%	1,4%
None of these	17,1%	33,9%	29,7%	13,6%	43,0%	4,7%	8,8%	5,1%	17,8%	10,9%	13,4%
Total responses (N)	11621	1007	1022	1321	1024	1410	1210	1164	1238	1169	1056

ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND EU'S POLICIES ABROAD

ANNEX IV – COMPARATIVE MEDIA REPORT

December 07, 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

1. INTRODUCTION

The comparative media report at hand draws on media analysis conducted in the months of April to July, 2015, in ten Strategic Partner countries, namely: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, US. The sample in the target countries included two popular dailies and one business daily (see Table 1 below). The analysis was coordinated by the NCRE, University of Canterbury, and conducted by Country Experts and their teams in the target countries.

The findings of the media analysis are presented in this comparative report, as well as Country Chapters on each of the Strategic Partner countries (see Chapter 3 of the Draft Final Report).

Table 1. Newspapers used for media analysis

Country	Newspaper 1 - Popular Prestigious	Newspaper 2 - Popular Prestigious	Newspaper 3 - Business
Brazil	O Globo	Folha de São Paulo	Valor Economico
Canada	The Globe and Mail	The National Post	La Presse*
China	People's daily	Global Times	Reference News
India	The Times of India	The Hindu	The Economic Times
Japan	Yomiuri shinbun	Asahi shinbun	Nikkei
Russia	Russian Newspaper	Kommersant	Vedomosti
South Africa	The Star	The Times	The Business Day
South Korea	Chosun Ilbo	Joongang Daily	Donga Ilbo
Mexico	La Jornada	El Universal	El Financiero
The US	The New York Times	Washington Post	The Wall Street Journal

*Francophone

2. VISIBILITY

1.1 EU

The main triggers for EU coverage in 2015 have been a series of dramatic and increasingly tragic events and crises, **within the EU and its Member States**: namely, the Greek crisis and fear of Grexit; UK election and possibility of Brexit; and the Mediterranean irregular migration and refugee crisis. These emotionally provocative events drew the newsmakers' attention across all locations. Importantly, the reporting was characterised by strong negative connotations associated with the events taking place in the EU, as well as the EU's role in coping with them.

'Peaks' in the news coverage of the EU typically coincided when a particular **location had a high-profile interaction** with the EU. Significantly, these reports usually featured positive profiles of the EU. For example:
- In China: EU-China Summit and Mogherini's visit to Beijing (where these two events diverted the local media's attention overshadowed the coverage of the crises)
- In Brazil and Mexico: the EU-CELAC Summit
- In South Africa: the EU's profile in controversial SA-US Agao trade deal

In the observed period, across 10 countries, the highest volume of EU news was in Japan and the lowest in South Africa (Figure 1 and Table 2). Please, note that in India, Japan and South Africa, the EU was predominantly reported in the business press.

Brazil **Russia** **India** **China** **South Africa**

Canada **Mexico** **Japan** **South Korea** **USA**

■ April ■ May ■ June

Table 2. Volume of news across the observed outlets and countries

	USA	Canada	Brazil	Mexico	South Africa	India	Russia	China	South Korea	Japan
Popular 1	316	257	212	175	24	97	189	138	121	178
Popular 2	149	241	148	198	86	92	117	190	80	170
Business	220	100	213	178	141	121	203	152	139	402
Total	400	598	573	551	251	310	509	480	340	750

Certain important news-making mechanisms were rarely employed by local journalists and editors that could have helped to underline the salience of the EU as an international actor. For example, it is known that the placement of news items is specifically used to reflect the significance the newspaper gives to an actor/ event (Leff, 2006), and to demonstrate the importance of news (Higgins, 2005). Consequently, an article's location in the newspaper constitutes a significant factor in the transmission of salient issues from the media agenda to the public agenda (Rogers et al, 1991).

Generally, news related to the EU rarely appeared on the first page of the popular media outlets. However, in some cases, the papers printed a 'preview' text (a running title) about the EU on the front page, followed by a longer piece of news inside the paper (e.g. in *Washinton Post* (USA), or *Kommersant* (Russia) or *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* (Japan)). News appearing in the location's main local news section, render the message of more salient for location actors and events. Such placement for EU news was noticed in the Chinese, Korean

and Japanese papers, for example. Most of EU news appeared in the International/ World and Business/ Economy sections in all locations.

Visual support is also known to be a key factor in attracting readers' attention. Typically, the vast majority of articles that referenced the EU were not accompanied by photos, Figures or cartoons (60- 80 per cent); they simply presented text. There were some exceptions, however: the coverage by the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* (USA), *21st Century* (China), as well as Korean and Japanese press who employed significant visual support.

In general, no single pattern across all 10 countries was observed that correlated the degree of centrality (Figure 2), length (Figure 3), placement and visual support (Figure 4) of news articles – rather four distinct patterns reflecting how the media presents EU salience through visibility were identified (please, note that the patterns introduced below introduce the leading trends in each location).

Pattern 1 'Pronounced visibility'
- **USA**: long articles + major degree of centrality + high visual support +(often on the 1st page) = pronounced visibility
- **Korea**: medium length + major/ secondary degree of centrality + high visual support + main section placement = pronounced visibility

Pattern 2: 'Heightened visibility'
- **Brazil**: medium length + major degree of centrality (but low visual support) = heightened visibility
- **Mexico**: medium length + major degree of centrality (but low visual support) = heightened visibility
- **South Africa**: medium length + major degree of centrality (but low visual support) = heightened visibility
- **India** (*Hindu*): medium articles + major degree of centrality (never on 1st pages, and with low visual support) = heightened visibility

Pattern 3: 'Partial but local visibility'
- **China**: long articles + low degree of centrality + 'main news' section (but low visual support) = partial but local visibility
- **Russia**: long articles + low degree of centrality + often on the 1st pages/ events and comments (but low visual support) = partial but local visibility
- **Japan**: long to medium articles + low degree of centrality + (occasional 1st pages + 'general section' + high visual support) = partial but local visibility

Pattern 4: 'Nominal visibility'
- **India** (popular 2/ business): medium length + secondary degree of centrality + low visual support + never on the 1st pages, typically in international (not domestic) news = nominal visibility

- **Canada**: medium length + low degree of centrality + low visual support + mostly in business sections = nominal visibility.

Figure 1. Degree of Centrality, across observed papers and across the countries

Brazil Russia India China South Africa

Canada Mexico Japan South Korea USA

■ Major ■ Secondary ■ Minor

Figure 2. Length, across observed papers and across the countries

Brazil Russia India China South Africa

Canada Mexico Japan South Korea USA

■ Long ■ Medium ■ Short

Figure 3. Presence of visual support, across observed papers and across the countries

Brazil — Russia — India — China — South Africa

Canada — Mexico — Japan — South Korea — USA

■ With ■ Without

1.2 Europe

While the volume of news with a reference to 'Europe' (exclusive reference, without mentioning the EU) was typically higher than the EU-focused sample (Figure 5), the intensity of its representation was almost always lower than that for the EU (India was an exception where majority of articles presented 'Europe' with the same degree of intensity as the EU (secondary))(Figure 6). The concept of 'Europe' was most often used as a geographical indicator; consequently, there was a wide diversity for both placement and the type of events where Europe was mentioned – from culture, lifestyle and art sections, to business, world, and main local news. In most countries, the length of Europe-related articles was long to medium (Figure 7): this, coupled with a dominant low degree of centrality, suggests a 'weak' diluted presentation of the concept 'Europe'.

Figure 4. Volume distribution of Europe across 10 countries

Brazil — Russia — India — China — South Africa

Canada — Mexico — Japan — South Korea — USA

Figure 5. Degree of Centrality, across observed papers and across the countries

Brazil **Russia** **India** **China** **South Africa**

Canada **Mexico** **Japan** **South Korea** **USA**

Major **Secondary** **Minor**

Figure 6. Length, across observed papers and across the countries

Brazil **Russia** **India** **China** **South Africa**

Canada **Mexico** **Japan** **South Korea** **USA**

Long **Medium** **Short**

3. ACTORNESS

3.1 EU

The **EU** was framed as acting mainly in the political, economic and social spheres. This finding differs somewhat from the EU's external media profiles researched in the past, where typically and consistently the EU was framed primarily as an economic actor. In 2015 the EU was seen as acting in the context of three crises: 1) UK election and possible Brexit; 2) Greece and the Eurozone and possible Grexit; and 3) Mediterranean migration and refugees. These three thematic representations dominated media coverage: all other frames (the EU as an

energy, environmental, research/ science and technology (RST) and development actor) were on the periphery. In some cases, these EU actions were not even reported.

The 2015 EU revealed a set of visible **EU actors** – institutions and leading individuals – across all countries. The two most visible institutions were the ECB (in Canada, USA, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Korea, Japan), and the European Commission (India, Russia and China). The ECB – and its President Draghi – was prominent in the evolving reportage of the Greek economic crisis. The Commission – and its President Juncker – was visible acting across many different frames. Similarly, High Representative Mogherini, gained a noticeable profile, especially in relation to news reports concerning the Mediterranean migration crisis (except in Japan where she had somewhat limited visibility). In Japan, in contrast to other locations, the second most visible EU institution (after the ECB) was European Council. European Council President Donald Tusk was the second most visible official in Japan, and another discernible EU face across other locations, while Commissioner Vestager also enjoyed a heightened profile due to her tough stance towards Google. Occasionally, other Commissioners were highlighted in specific countries (e.g. Dijsselbloem in Korea and Japan, or Lafazanis in Russia). Somewhat contrastingly, the European Parliament was rarely in the media spotlight during the three-month period of observation. Textual findings were supported by the visual analysis. The latter featured numerous photos of three EU actors – Morgherini, Vestager and Draghi (Figure 8). The visibility of the EU institutions and leaders was much less than the visibility of the EU Member States and their leaders acting within the EU context.

Figure 7. Visual images of the EU actors

Federica Mogherini   Margrethe Vestager   Mario Draghi

As for the visibility of the **Member States** within the EU news stories, in all 10 countries the same four member states stood out: Greece, Germany, Britain and France. Heightened media visibility of the 'troika' – UK, France and Germany – has been observed in the past (see studies of EU external perceptions before the outbreak of the crisis, 2002-2009). The beginning of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis saw an almost total absence of the UK in EU-related reportage: just Germany and France were now reported as acting together in fighting the crisis (Chaban, Holland 2012). The 2015 data seems to bring the media spotlight back to the EU's 'Big 3'. Yet, importantly, this time they are not reported acting together to fight numerous crises. Each received media visibility in their own right. Germany and Greece – the most reported EU Member States in all locations (other than India) – were virtually always reported in tandem. Germany was the main actor in the unfolding Greek drama. The UK was extensively reported in relation to its well-publicised election and possible Brexit

(and was the most reported EU Member State in India, largely due to historical connections and the sizable Indian diaspora in Britain). France was occasionally reported in the context of the Greek crisis, but more often in a wider variety of topics – such as its role in EU-CELAC summit, business activities, or in relation to the WWI and WWII commemorations. These four Member States' respective leaders – Tsipras, Merkel, Hollande and Cameron – received substantial attention and profiling in news stories, and this visibility was enhanced by supporting visual images. Lower visibility was observed for Italy (stories on the Mediterranean crisis), and Spain and Poland (elections/ new government).

If we consider the visibility of the EU Member States, the EU 'media map' created by reputable press in the 10 Strategic Partner countries predominantly highlights the large and powerful states: however, understandably it also focuses on the states directly affected by crises (Greece, Italy), or involved in current political developments (Spain, Poland)). The rest of the EU – the smaller states, as well as the larger Central- European EU Member States –- were bestowed with only marginal visibility.

With the social actions being the third most visible frame of EU actions in all 10 countries, the intensity of framing the EU as a political *vis-à-vis* economic actor followed three patterns in the popular newspapers (unremarkably, the business papers in each country predictably prioritised reporting on the EU's economic actions) (Figure 9). The division distinguished between those countries where:

1) political representations of the EU were ranked first (US, Mexico, Japan);
2) the EU's political and economic actions received a similar share of media attention (Russia, China, India); and where
3) economic actions of the EU were reported the most (Canada, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea).

Figure 8. Distribution of the thematic frames of the EU, across selected outlets and countries

EU Internal political topics that attracted most of media attention were Brexit/ the UK election and Grexit/ Greek politics (in the USA, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, China, Korea and

Japan).   A different pattern was evident in Russia, South Africa and India who focused on the EU's internal political actions only in the context of Brexit.

EU external political topics that were most frequently reported focused on **acting towards 'hot spots' in the world**: Ukraine, Russia and Iran (for Canada, US, Brazil, Mexico, China, South Africa, Korea, Japan). The Russian and India media were once again exceptions, yet for different reasons. Unsurprisingly, Russia's media focused mainly on the EU's actions towards Russia and Ukraine, not on EU dealings with Iran. The Indian media preferred to focus on the EU as a facilitator during the Iranian nuclear agreement, leaving EU-Russia-Ukraine relations at the margins. The data confirms that each location has its own 'hierarchy' of 'hot spots' reflecting geography and geo-politics.

In addition, the media in all countries assigned higher visibility to **EU actions when this was directed explicitly to that country, its immediate geopolitical region, or its key partners**. For example, Brazil widely reported on the EU's relations with Venezuela; Brazil and Mexico reported on EU-CELAC interactions; China, Mexico, Japan and India extensively covered their respective EU bilateral relations; South Africa presented the EU as an actor contributing to global and regional security; South Korea and India reported on the EU's relations with the US, a key partner for both (in India, EU-US relations were discussed in the context of the TTIP agreement); while Japan focused on the EU in the context of the G7 as well as in relation to Japan's security.

In the **economic sphere**, the EU was reported reacting to the Greek crisis (in Canada, US, Brazil, Mexico, China, South Africa, Korea, Japan and India). As such, the theme of the EU's state of economy was the most visible in these nine countries. On the one hand, the EU was reported as an entity hit hard by the crisis: on the other, it was also portrayed as recovering from the crisis, with EU officials and institutions undertaking an array of actions to repair the situation. Such contradictory representations arguably add to the challenges in understanding the EU.   The second most visible EU topic in the economic sphere - in the US, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, China and South Africa - was trade. In Korea, Japan and India, news stories on the EU's performance in business and finance were a close second, covering a range of topics focusing on the EU in the context of competition laws, mergers and acquisitions, and investments. Russia was an exception. EU trade (and its sanctions against Russia in particular) were the most visible topic while the state of the EU economy was not given top visibility in Russian media.

The portrayal of EU **social actions** in most countries was inevitably dominated by the depictions of the EU's reactions to the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean (in Canada, US, Brazil, China, South Africa, Korea, Japan and India). However, Russia proved an exception with the media instead reporting on EU social legislation more visibly. After migration, a secondary focus of media attention was crime (for the US, Korea and Japan), education (Mexico), healthcare (Canada and China), and social legislation (India). In the other three countries, no perceptibly visible secondary topics surfaced.

The EU actions in the fields of **environment** were not extensively reported and thus in general limited visibility was given (with Japan, US, Canada and Brazil the leading media in

terms of environmental visibility). Importantly, across all 10 countries, the EU's environmental credentials were predominantly mentioned in the context of the debate on climate change and reduction of carbon emissions, and the approaching next COP21 in Paris. These EU actions received continual media interest despite the other crises noted already, and enjoyed increasing frequency as the end of year COP approached. Japan stood out as a county whose media was the most active in reporting the EU's actions in this sphere. Japan's domestic debate on its position in view of COP21 was at its peak in April-June 2015. In this context, the EU was often mentioned as a reference point often regarded in a normative framework as being ambitious and forward-leaning.

In contrast, for all 10 countries, EU involvement in the topics of **energy, global development,** and **research/ science/ technology** were reported only marginally (and sometimes not at all). In the energy field, EU actions to curb CO_2 emissions and developing a climate action plan were somewhat more visible. In the global development field, EU help to Nepal was briefly mentioned. In RST, EU initiatives, such as Horizon 2020 were only occasionally mentioned. It is important to stress that the number of such articles is extremely low – often less than 10 articles per country per field over the three months of observation. Again, the Russian media proved an exception – where the reportage of EU actions in the energy field (specifically around Russia's gas) was prioritised.

In summary, these observations suggest that in tracing and understating EU external images context is important. In this study, Russia presents a vivid illustration of the key role of how local contexts are needed to explain peculiarities in EU images shaped by the local media opinion-makers. Another important observation is about consistent media disinterest in certain frames of EU actions (e.g. development).

3.2 Europe

To reiterate, **Europe** was mainly used in the reportage across 10 countries as a geographical indicator, not an actor. When Europe is referred to as an actor, it was occasionally used to identify a high degree of unity on the continent (e.g. in the US or Japanese cases). In some cases, the term 'Europe' was used as a synonym for the 'EU' (without the EU being mentioned in the text). Yet, instances where Europe was used as a synonym for the EU were much more infrequent than where the concept 'Europe' was used as geographical indicator. Overall, only in four countries (USA, Brazil, Korea and India) were synonyms employed in a quarter or more of the news articles. India stands out as the most distinct – there, the concept of Europe in the relevant reportage was widely used as a synonym to the EU (Figure 10). According to local experts, in India, the term 'EU' suggests a highly technical and complex concept, both for newsmakers and the general public. This is in contrast to a more familiar term 'Europe' which is preferred when referring to the integrated region on the European continent.

Figure 9. Europe and the EU: Synonyms or not

| Brazil | Russia | India | China | South Africa |

| Canada | Mexico | Japan | South Korea | USA |

■ Synonym ■ Not Synonym

Similar to the framing of the EU, the most visible frames for Europe actions were *politics*, *economy* and *social* affairs (Figure 11). But in contrast to the EU representations, *politics* was not the most visible frame for Europe (except in the USA) while the *social* frame was highly visible (the leading frame in Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Korea, India and Japan and in second place in Canada, China and South Africa). It is noteworthy that business newspapers profiled most of the news referencing 'Europe' in the economic sphere, a parallel finding to the EU dataset.

The pronounced visibility of the *social* frame for the concept 'Europe' is not surprising. A civilizational and historical concept, it was often mentioned in stories about culture, art, lifestyle, history. As a geographical concept, it often featured in stories on travel and tourism. Similarly, it was not surprising that these profiles were usually less visible in the EU reportage.

Visibility of the concept Europe in *economic* terms was often linked to interpretation of Europe as a market interacting with the location in question – a place to invest, export, move businesses into, etc. – a geographical reference point for economic activity. Importantly, in some cases there was a higher interaction recorded between Europe and a country in question than between the EU and this country (e.g. South Africa, Brazil). This could be explained by the fact that there was a higher share of Europe news written by local authors than was the case for EU news (see section 'Local Resonance' below) across the 10 countries.

Figure 10. Thematic frames for Europe news, across the observed outlets and 10 countries

Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa

Canada	Mexico	Japan	South Korea	USA

Legend: ■ Politics ■ Economy ■ Energy ■ Soc&Cult ■ R,S,T ■ Environment ■ Development ■ Normative

Europe displayed a variety of profiles within **internal political sphere** reportage. These followed country-specific idiosyncratic patterns. In some cases, they replicated the EU frames, but not always. In the former case, in the US and Indian media the concept of Europe was particularly prevalent in the context of the UK election, echoing the visibility pattern of the EU. In Mexico, Europe was visible in the context of the Greek Eurozone crisis. In the latter case, as in the Brazilian media, it was the democratic systems in Europe – usually compared to the electoral system in Brazil – that attracted media interest. Practices of private financing for political campaigns, the rise of far right parties and new leftist social movements and political parties were the focus of Europe coverage. This topic was absent within the EU-focused articles. For other countries the number of articles that reported Europe in internal political affairs was too low to draw valid conclusions.

In contrast, Europe as a concept appeared more frequently in the news reporting of **external political actions**. Usually the concept of Europe appeared in the reportage of issues directly related to policy-making of a country or in articles where a country was interacting with European actors: for example, the American media noted terrorism, migration, Ukraine, Russia, NATO as areas importance for US foreign policy. In other cases, Europe was reported to interact with the countries in question (e.g. with Mexico, Korea, China, Japan, Russia and India). The local press also framed Europe in a visible manner when Europe was seen interacting with the immediate geo-political region. For example, in Brazil, Europe was frequently mentioned interacting with Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba. In Japan, visibility centred around Europe-China interactions in the context of the Chinese Silk Road Plan. Once again, the higher share of local sources in the 'Europe' versus 'EU' dataset may well account for these location-grounded representations of Europe.

Europe was also featured as a participant in global interactions – yet with a perceptible 'local hook' to those interactions. Europe was presented interacting with international

organisations (the ICC in the South African reportage, OECD in Russia, a variety of international bodies in Brazil, G7 in Japan and India, the AIIB in China and Japan). Arguably, these bodies bear a direct relevance to/ impact on to the countries in question (for example, the OECD is involved in observing conflict in Ukraine, the ICC became involved when South Africa had an issue with a fugitive, etc.).

Europe was also reported as dealing with 'other' poles of power. For example, Europe's relations with the USA received substantial media attention in Russia, China, Brazil, India and Korea. Europe's interaction with Russia, specifically in the context of conflict with Ukraine, was also frequently reported in all countries other than Mexico. The Russia/ Ukraine crisis and its geopolitical implications was one of the issues where 'EU,' 'Europe,' 'the West,' tended to be used synonymously. Europe's dealings with Iran and other Middle Eastern players (e.g. Israel and Palestine or ISIS) also employed Europe as a synonym for the EU.

The use of concept 'Europe' added historical reflections that did not typically surface in the EU coverage, into the reportage. In Russia, such coverage featured stories with historical elements of contemporary Europe-Russia political relations and highlighted Europe's relations with the USSR. In Brazil, articles on Europe dealt with the legacy of colonialism. Europe also frequently appeared in the articles about WWI and WWWII commemorations.

Turning to the economic frame of actions, Europe was painted differently from the EU economic portrayals.   In many countries it was Europe in *the business and finance* sphere that dominated the coverage, not the *state of economy* which was typical of EU coverage. Business and finance related news referencing Europe was the most visible in eight countries (the exceptions being Japan and India where Europe was more visible in the *industry* sphere. *Business and finance* themes were the close second in Japan, and the distant second in India). Trade was the second most visible area for Europe's economic activity in Canada, US and Russia: i*ndustry* was number '2' in Korea and *infrastructure* in China. Europe was presented as a topic of significance to local businesses who traded and performed financial transactions and business operations with various European partners, state and non-state. *State of economy* – a theme that did echo the EU profiles – was second in terms of visibility only in Brazil and South Africa. In Brazil, for example, many articles were dedicated to monetary and fiscal policies (also in the context of the crisis), the state of the services and industrial sectors in Europe and Brazil and the consequences for commercial relations between the two. Arguably, Europe's economic profiles were regarded as more positive than the EU profiles (with the latter profile closely linked to the theme of crisis). They were also plenty of 'local hooks' explicating each location's economic ties with Europe. In contrast, EU reportage was more often focused on EU and EU Member States' economies inside the Union.

Reporting within the **social frame** for Europe demonstrated a broad spectrum of topics across the 10 countries – and was much more diverse in visibility than the EU's social affairs portrayals. One common element, however, was the level of attention paid to the *migration crisis in the Mediterranean*. Europe's frames echoed the EU frames in all countries – the portrayal of the refugees' crisis with reference to Europe was abundant. *Social legislation*,

another theme visible in the EU coverage, also received noticeable attention when Europe was reported (in Mexico, US, Russia, China).

Yet, in contrast to the EU coverage, several other themes received a heightened visibility in Europe's case. Among those was the theme of challenged *multiculturalism* (in Brazil, US, Mexico, Russia, Korea, Japan and India): reports in these countries talked about the challenges of Europe to integrate migrants; continuing prejudice against migrants; Islamophobia; and persisting historical anti-Semitism.

The topic of *history* provided yet another ground for prolific reports referencing Europe. Specifically, commemorations of WWI and WWII that took place in the first half of 2015 conveyed the image of Europe that had overcome its bloody past (found in the media in Japan, Canada, US, South Africa and India), although Nazism and the Holocaust were also mentioned in this coverage of Europe. In Russia and Japan references to Europe in relation to WWII were among the most visible, yet the context was different. Russia's media reported on the Moscow Victory Day Parade that took place in Red Square on 9 May 2015 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the capitulation of Nazi Germany. The decision of many European leaders not to attend the parade to protest Russia's aggression in Ukraine was covered extensively in Russian press. In Japan, the press reflected in more general terms that May 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe (V-E day).

A set of social themes evoked positive images of Europe. Admirable high-standards of *lifestyle* in Europe and *tourism and travel* to Europe were the two themes that frequently featured the concept of Europe in geographical terms (which was not found in the EU sample). Many such examples were evident in the media of Canada, Russia, South Africa, Korea, Japan and India. Europe was also portrayed with higher visibility in *cultural affairs* than the EU. Europe as a producer of high quality entertainment, art and culture were also visible references of Europe in all countries (both in terms of popular and high culture - articles covered European rock bands, classical music, movies, literature, exhibitions, architecture, performers, artists, etc.). This visibility, while not unexpected, confirmed the assumption that Europe exhibits a globally recognised cultural cache and reputation.

There were also individual countries' particular emphases. For example, China and India reported extensively on European *welfare*. Korea was interested in *healthcare* in Europe. Yet, some social themes generated more critical reflections about Europe. For example, *crime*, a visible theme in the Mexico, US and Japan was reported (some of this reportage was in relation to drug trafficking (that either transits through Europe, or has Europe as its final destination), prostitution, human trafficking, etc.).

In comparison with EU news, the number of stories about Europe in the areas of **research, science and technology** was slightly higher. Technological progress coming from Europe received more attention in Russia, China, South Africa, Korea, India and Japan. Europe's achievements in space and nuclear science/ CERN were noted. However, the overall numbers remained low in comparison with the level of social and economic news on Europe.

Only occasionally was the coverage in this area boosted due to Europe's actions with the country in question (e.g. partnerships in research).

A very positively coloured, but extremely infrequent topic of reporting was Europe's contribution to **environment** protection. Europeans were seen as establishing the baseline for recycling, renewable energies, curbing pollution, and climate change measures. The concept 'Europe' was used in order to make direct reference to European countries and corporations, echoing the corresponding EU framing mainly in the context of the upcoming COP (a finding other than in India).

In the context of **energy,** Europe attracted a uniformly low profile in all countries. A common theme was observed however – the prestigious international press saw Europe's challenge as its ability to transform its economy by remaining green. Europe's energy sustainability was reflected on in Canada, US and Korea. Brazil, India and Japan instead focused on Europe's competitiveness, and Russia considered Europe in the context of security of supply. In the other three countries, the visibility of Europe's energy actions was extremely low.

Europe has some added value in some countries when used as a synonym (e.g. particularly in India where 'Europe' is used as a concept that is more familiar and 'comfortable' for both newsmakers and readers to understand the EU). 'Europe' as a concept allows discussion of additional facets that are typically overlooked in the EU media profiles (e.g. cultural, historical, lifestyle aspects). Perhaps the most valuable profile is Europe's framing as a market and business destination interacting with the countries. It seems to remain high on the media agenda and contrasts with the current EU profiles which are now firmly linked to the Eurozone crisis. Also, it seems that RST themes receive slightly more visibility when Europe is referenced than in the EU case. In the political frame, in some locations (e.g. USA), Europe seems to appear more united, while elsewhere the EU seems to be fragmented by the EU Member States. However, one of the later sections in this report will demonstrate that in various locations in terms of evaluations, Europe as a concept is not necessarily presented more positively than the concept 'EU' (see section 'Emotive charge' below). Thus the discussion about the potential of the concept 'Europe' to the EU's Public Diplomacy should remain issue- and location-specific.

4. NORMATIVE

4.1 EU

The framing of the EU in terms of 'Normative Power Europe' did not enjoy major visibility. The sample across 10 countries registered only **very small numbers** of news stories in which the EU was presented as a *normative power* or *actor*.

The Mediterranean crisis presented the background against which the EU's ability to live up to its own norms and values was critically assessed. Reports registered images of the EU not delivering on its own normative standards in human rights (e.g. in Canada and Russia). In other countries, the EU's normative identity was contextualised against situations and cases

directly relevant to the location in question (or to its region). In these scenarios, the EU's role and normative identity were assessed from a positive perspective. For example, the norm of *democracy* was seen to be reinforced by the EU in its dealings with Venezuela, as noted in the Brazilian media. The EU's high standards in and commitment to *human rights* were used as a reference point in Mexico, when its local media discussed the case of the 'normalistas de Ayotzinapa,' the crisis of the 43 assassinated students. The Mexican media also noted the EU as a reinforcer of *good governance* in news items that dealt with the   negotiations to renew the Cooperation Agreement between Mexico and the EU.

The norms of *peace*, *human rights* and *good governance* facilitated by the EU came through in the South African reporting when the EU was reported to operate within Africa, sometimes imposing sanctions on the violators of those norms. The norm of *peace* at the core of EU identity was noted in South Korea, a country currently in a state of war with North Korea. South Korea coverage also demonstrated a wide array of normative themes (albeit with low numbers in each topic): *antidiscrimination, human rights, rule of law, sustainability, good governance*. In China, another very sample presented norms of *democracy*, *food standards* and *human rights* in EU political, environment and social news. In India, a very low number of normatively framed news talked about *peace*, *liberty* and *human rights* (Table 3).

In Japan, EU normative profiles were among the most visible in the 10 country study (repeating the pattern found in previous EU perceptions projects conducted in the Asia-Pacific), with the norms of *sustainable development; human rights and rule of law* noted in EU reportage of environment, social and cultural affairs and economy respectively. Sustainable development was reflected within the context of the COP21; human rights were discussed within the articles on migration to Europe from North Africa; rule of law got high profile in the news on the European Commission's anti-trust investigations against such major IT companies (Amazon and Google) in the April-June 2015.

In the eyes of the leading press in some of the EU's Strategic Partners (with the exceptions of Russia, Canada and the US), the EU remains a normative beacon, recognised typically in positive terms, with a relevant impact in each location. But any inferences that are drawn must acknowledge that **the visibility of this frame is very low**. Moreover, the most recent migration crisis in the European continent put the EU under the spotlight of global scrutiny. The international media has critically questioned if the EU is able to live up to its own normative standards that it has been preaching to the world - and on human rights in particular. Coverage of the Mediterranean crisis was substantial. This has resulted in increased visibility for critical reflections on EU normative identity and actions.

4.2 Europe

Press in the USA and India did not link the concept 'Europe' to the core normative concepts. The other eight Strategic Partner countries presented a range of norms and values which were assigned to Europe (Table 4). Yet, without exception, the number of 'normative' articles for all countries was **very low**.

The press in Brazil associated Europe with the norms of *anti-discrimination, good governance and democracy*. Mexico's media reported on Europe in the context of *human rights, peace, rule of law*. In Japan, the norms of *human rights* in social development, *sustainable development* in environment and energy, and *peace* in politics were found in Europe's reportage. As for *human rights*, press in Japan paid attention to Europe in the context of the Irish referendum on same-sex marriage; sustainable development theme was note in reports on COP21 and other environment and energy topics. Finally, Europe was also depicted as a region that enjoys *peace* (in contrast with Asia where various tensions exist).

The Russian media talked about *human rights, liberty* and *rule of law*. Some of them appeared within the context of the conflict around Ukraine: e.g. Crimean prisoners that are in between Russia and Ukraine's jurisdiction systems, or the decision of Ukraine's parliament to adopt the laws that would limit the human rights. In South Africa, *human rights, rule of law, anti-discrimination* were assigned to Europe. Chinese papers featured a long list of norms but each was given very low visibility: *sustainable development, human rights, liberty, peace, good governance, anti-discrimination*. In Korea a similar pattern was observed where abroad range of normative representations included *peace, good governance, democracy, human rights, social solidarity* and *sustainable development*.

Most importantly, the representation of Europe in normative terms was contradictory. Some stories critically assessed Europe in the context of these core norms – the press discussed racism and discrimination towards migrants in Europe, creating negative perceptions of the values practiced in Europe, raising the notion of double standards. Other stories used the same norm in a different situation as a positive reference. For example, while Europe was criticised for not observing human rights when dealing with the refugees, it was also praised when it was acted as an example to follow (such as the promotion of gay rights in Europe). In this contradictory profiling, the normative framing of Europe echoed that found in the normative framing of the EU.

An overall comparison reveals that the press in some countries were more prone to report on normative issues, while in other countries the topic was avoided for various reasons. For example, the 'EU' reportage did not feature normative frames in the US and China. The 'Europe' reportage did not feature normative frames in the US, Canada and India.

Comparison also indicates a varying range and intensity in norms representation. For example, in the 'EU' dataset, Korea reported a range of norms, while normative reportage in Canada, Brazil Mexico and Russia was limited in scope. In the 'Europe' dataset, there is slight increase in intensity of normative representations (in Brazil, Mexico, Russia, China and Korea); yet low volume representations remained constant in South Africa, Japan and the US (here it was non-existent in two datasets), and decreased in Canada and India (to being non-existent).

Table 3. Normative framing of the EU, across 10 countries

	USA	Canada	Brazil	Mexico	Russia	China	SA	SK	Japan	India
Democracy			X			X				
HR		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Peace							X	X		X
Rule of law								X	X	
Good governance				X			X	X		
Social solidarity										
Antidiscrimination										
Sustainable development								X	X	
Liberty										X
Food standards						X				

Table 4. Normative framing of Europe, across 10 countries

	USA	Canada	Brazil	Mexico	Russia	China	SA	SK	Japan	India
Democracy			X					X		
HR				X	X	X	X	X	X	
Peace				X		X		X	X	
Rule of law				X	X		X			
Good governance			X			X		X		
Social solidarity								X		
Antidiscrimination			X			X	X			
Sustainable development						X		X	X	
Liberty					X	X				

These patterns indicate that each location has its own set of normative visions which it assigns to the EU, as a supranational political actor guided in its activities by a set of norms and values, and to Europe, as a wider civilizational concept of a global region that produced those norms historically.   Other sections of this project – specifically, individual and group interviews – are in place to explain cultural filters behind these media frames. Importantly, and as mentioned above, the media visibility of the EU and Europe in terms of norms was **extremely low**.

5. LOCAL RESONANCE

Other than in South Africa (and to some degree India and Canada), EU news was largely produced by local correspondents in the Strategic Partner countries (Figure 12). This news sourcing is predictable as the newspapers chosen for monitoring are leading national opinion-making media outlets that pride themselves on hiring the best local journalists as well as having enough resources to feature a high-quality of reporting (including for international affairs) and may even post their journalists abroad (including to Europe). To use or not to use international sources - and with what intensity - is often an editorial decision. It is sometimes based on a financial rationale (sourcing news from international wires can save media organisations money, especially if there are special relations between an outlet and a particular news agency). It sometimes reflects the self-vision of the mission of the paper (some newspapers promote an image of having an international outlook, and thus profile internationally sourced news). It is sometimes based on ideological grounds (some papers could be disinclined to use international sources due to an internal political environment that discourages profiling external views). In other cases, it is the combination of these rationales.

Figure 11. Local vs. International news sources, across observed outlets and countries

Brazil | Russia | India | China | South Africa

Canada | Mexico | Japan | South Korea | USA

■ International Sources ■ Local Sources

The 10 country sample featured three broad patterns in the use of international sources when reporting the EU.

Pattern #1: Heavy reliance on local sources
The press in Russia, China, South Korea and Japan demonstrated almost exclusive use of local sources for all three papers. In China, one of the chosen papers, *Global Times*, has its mission to report international news, thus it did feature some EU news sourced from outside China, yet, those sources – Die Welt, EUobserver, Financial Review Australia, Forbes – were not the typical sources noted in other countries (see below). In South Korea, international voices were also heard, but these came from international experts who contributed to the papers, rather than professional journalists or agencies. In Japan, the newspapers under observation

are among the largest in the world, with massive resources that allow many Japanese correspondents to be posted in numerous locations around the world and Europe.

Pattern #2: Substantial local sources
In five other partner countries - Canada, US, Brazil, Mexico and India - the newspapers chosen for observation relied on a relatively high share of local sources, but also accessed between 20 to 50 per cent of EU-news stories from international sources. For example, Mexico's *La Jornada* published 50 per cent of its EU news from international sources and used a variety of sources. *La Jornada* is a leading national paper that prides itself on its global outlook. *Hindu* in India also sourced almost a half of its EU coverage (45 per cent) internationally. Similar to *La Journada*, *Hindu* is known for its left political outlook. In Canada, a higher dependency on international sources is based on financial as well as cultural/ linguistic explanations. The French speaking paper analysed relied on the AFP extensively. Importantly, *Global Mail* is the only newspaper in Canada with a European bureau with a permanent correspondent outside the UK.

Pattern #3: Heavy reliance on international sources
In only one country – South Africa – did the press demonstrate a particularly high share of internationally sourced EU news (from 65 to 100 per cent).

A relatively limited number of international agencies supplied news to the press in the Strategic Partner countries – principally Reuters, AP, AFP and Bloomberg. Individual outlets – the *New York Times, the Wall Street Journal*, the *Financial Times*, and *Daily TeleFigure* were also among the sources used. The list of the most used sources is dominated by agencies from Anglo-Saxon countries – the UK and the US (with the one exception of AFP).

Reuters was the No.1 supplier of EU news in Mexico, South Africa and Canada. It was No.2 in the US and India, and ranked No.4 in Brazil. Reuters was the most preferred source of visual images to the EU news in Brazil, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Japan. It also supplied visual images to the newspapers in the US, Canada and India.

AFP was the most popular source of EU news in India, second most popular source in Mexico, the third in the US and South Africa, and the fourth in Canada (but first-choice in the case of the French language paper). Visual images from AFP were found in Canada, Brazil, India and Japan.

AP was the leading source in the US, second in Canada, third in India and fourth in Mexico. AP was a leading supplier of visual images for EU stories in both the US and South Korea and the second one in Japan.

Bloomberg was a leading source of EU news for business outlets across the 10 countries. It was ranked No.2 in Brazil and South Africa, and No.3 in Canada. Bloomberg also supplied visual images on the EU in South Korea, Canada, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa.

The Daily Telegraph and the *New York Times* were among the leading sources of EU news in Canada and South Africa. *The Financial Times* was among the leaders in Brazil and South Africa, while the *Wall Street Journal* was extensively used in Brazil. The outlier in our sample is Mexico who used **DPA** and **Xhinhua** as its third and fourth most-preferred international source respectively.

Lesser frequent sources, yet still among the leaders, were **European Press Agency** (used for visual images in the US and Russia), **Xhinhua** (used for visual images in South Korea and Mexico).

In all locations, when the concept of 'Europe' was reported the share of local sources was slightly higher than in the EU reportage.   Significantly, the pool of international sources used remained the same: **Reuters** led in the coverage of Europe in India, South Africa, US, Canada and Mexico. **AFP** was the next popular source in India and Mexico, and the third most popular in South Africa and Canada. **AP** was ranked No.2 in Canada, Russia, and No.3 in India and the US. **Bloomberg** was the second most used in South Africa and Canada, and the third in Brazil. As was found for the reportage of the EU, China, South Korea and Japan rarely used international sources to cover Europe. Nor did the sources used for Europe news differ from those used for EU news, suggesting a resonance in the framing of the two concepts. The differences with EU framing came mostly when Europe was reported by local authors as interacting with the location in question.

In summary, there was limited diversity in the international sources used in the coverage of both the EU and Europe. From a Public Diplomacy perspective this poses a challenge as well as opportunity. Clearly there is greater Public Diplomacy potential where stories are locally written: direct engagement with local news-makers is essential. However, where the EU and Europe are reported via international wires the scope for Public Diplomacy within a specific country is constrained. The choice of subjects and the tone conveyed are beyond any Public Diplomacy influence. An important question in each of the Strategic Partner countries will be to identify if there is a local trend for the greater use of international wire.

Somewhat in parallel with the patterns found for news sources (local *vs.* international) were the EU profiles in terms of domesticity of its actions (Figure 13). Comparison across the 10 countries reveals three patterns in framing the EU in terms of the domesticity of its actions.

Figure 12. Focus of domesticity of the EU, across the observed outlets and 10 countries

Brazil   **Russia**   **India**   **China**   **South Africa**

| Canada | Mexico | Japan | South Korea | USA |

Legend: ■ Local □ Global ■ 3rd Counrty ■ EU MS ■ EU

Pattern 1: Lower Focus on EU Local news, High Focus on EU/ EU Member States news
In the USA, Canada, Brazil, Japan (two popular papers) and South Africa, the leading focus of domesticity of EU actions was the EU in general or specific Member States. The EU was framed in these locations as an actor who mainly acts on the European continent, with its own members and their citizens. This focus of domesticity was somewhat predictable, due to the severity of the unfolding crises in the EU. Yet, these four countries also profiled a low share of EU news with the local 'hook': under 10 per cent in the USA, under 15 per cent in South Africa and under 20 per cent in Canada and Japan (two popular papers). Such 'hooks' are believed to increase the readers' perceptions of relevance of an international actor to the country in question. The combination of low local focus and high external focus suggests that the EU is framed as an actor who acts far away, without any clear link/ impact/ relevance to the location in question.

However, the local grounding of the EU actions did take place in the news reporting, even if this was somewhat minimal. In the USA, in those rare articles that presented the US and the EU acting together, the focus was mainly on the EU-US trade agreement (TTIP), their dialogue on environmental issues (in the COP21 context), and joint actions during the Iranian nuclear negotiations. Outside of these topics, the EU and the USA were not in the same 'frame' for American newsmakers. In Canada, the local dimension appeared mostly in the coverage of CETA – the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU. In Brazil, the local angle appeared in the context of reviving EU-MERCOSUR trade liberalization negotiations, as proposed by President Dilma Rousseff during the EU-CELAC summit. In Japan, EU-Japan Summit attracted some attention. In South Africa, remarkably, most articles were not about bilateral EU-South Africa relations. Beyond a single incident involving Spain and South Africa's citrus fruit farmers, the EU is only mentioned interacting with South Africa in articles - such as those discussing Agoa - in passing without much detail on relations between the two.

Pattern 2: High Focus on EU Local News
In contrast, EU news in China, Korea, Russia and India (business paper) featured a pronounced local perspective when reporting the EU – the EU was seen to act in or with the country more frequently than towards its own states, or third countries, or globally. Such profiling suggests that the EU is framed by leading opinion-making sources as a 'significant Other' able to influence the location.

In Russia, where the EU is a geographically close 'Other', the Union was presented as able to actively impact Russia's political, economic and cultural life. In China, the EU was framed as a political partner: the China-EU Summit and the anniversary of China-EU diplomatic relations triggered a high share of news with a local focus of domesticity. In Korea and India, the EU was seen as an influential bilateral economic partner. In Korea, many EU news stories with a local focus reported on the implications of the ECB's quantitative easing on the Korean stock market. The Indian business paper dedicated much of its attention to the EU-India FTA talks and their conclusion.

Pattern 3: Balanced Foci of Domesticity (between EU&EUMSs focus vs. Local Focus)
EU reportage in Japan (for the business paper), India (for the two popular papers) and Mexico can be characterised as balanced between the EU-oriented foci (EU and EU MSs) and the local focus. Although the EU's actions in EU Member States received slightly more attention than other foci of domesticity, EU news with local grounding in these cases was also relatively visible (featured in around 20 - 25 per cent of the news). In Mexico, articles with a local 'hook' frequently focused on the negotiations to renew the Cooperation Agreement between Mexico and the EU. In India, EU-India relations were discussed in the context of renewing of political dialogue between the two in the near future, and specifically within the framework of the long-negotiated EU-India FTA. In Japan, the business daily looked into EU-Japan FTA negotiations as well as EU economy and business matters directly related to the Japanese economy and business.

6. EMOTIVE CHARGE

6.1 EU

Understanding EU media reporting in different policy frames is not complete without assessing the **evaluations** assigned to the representations given to the EU, its institutions and leaders. While in all 10 countries **neutral assessment dominated**, in all cases the three most visible frames – EU news in the political, economic and social spheres – tended to attract more negative than positive evaluations (Figure 14).

Figure 13. Evaluations of the EU, general

| Brazil | Russia | India | China | South Africa |

| Canada | Mexico | Japan | South Korea | USA |

Legend: ■ Pos ■ Pos/Neut □ Neut ■ Neut/Neg ■ Neg ■ Mixed

The economic crisis confronting Greece was an ongoing theme in EU external media reports, with a corresponding tendency to profile negative assessments of the EU as an economic actor. The prolonged Eurozone debt crisis, slow economic recovery, the continuing economic troubles in Greece, as well as the austerity and possibly ineffective conditions imposed on Greece by the EU, all attracted critical reflections. This negative portrayal of EU economy has been ongoing since 2010-11, and is at risk of becoming *the* typical way to report/ imagine the EU's economy around the world.

The political crises of 2015 (with contemplations of Grexit and Brexit) represented another ongoing theme in EU media portrayals around the world – namely the internal divisions within the EU. How the EU was handling potential Grexit and Brexit issues received critical attention. These two latest developments can be added to the list of other major political crises that were extensively reported by the international media in previous years (as earlier research has shown). Among those were the EU's inability to produce a unified response to the War in Iraq; the Constitutional Treaty's lost referenda in 2008; as well as the rise of extremist parties in the EU political arena – all of which have attracted negative reflections.

But perhaps the most dramatic change – a steep rise of negativity in EU media reporting – is now associated with the **social crisis** of migrants and refugees in Mediterranean. Media in all 10 countries profiled the EU in a very negative way in this instance not lastly due to the EU proposing policies to curb the migration which were assessed as inhumane, excessively restrictive and even militaristic. In contrast, social policy of the EU had not been that heavily negatively assessed in the past, as earlier EU perceptions studies demonstrate. Importantly, reports on refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean are a recurrent theme in EU news reports throughout the year. Since this crisis is ongoing, with no easy solution in view, it is fair to suggest that this theme will continue to add to an overall negativity in the EU image constructed by reputable international media and disseminated to the global audiences.

The far less visible representations of the EU – as an actor in **energy, environment and development** spheres – tended to be dominated by positive evaluations in the 10 countries. The EU's actions in advocating and developing renewable energy, discussing climate change and reducing carbon emissions, and helping countries in need around the world (such as aiding Nepal after the devastating earthquake) were commented on in all countries. Yet, these representations remained peripheral and effectively dwarfed by the mostly negative political, economic and social reporting of the EU.

As discussed above, **normative** profiles of EU actions attracted very limited media attention featuring a split evaluation. When EU norms and values were reported in the context of the refugee crisis, the EU was often seen by the newsmakers in all 10 countries as not living up to its own standards, and these reports had a tendency to portray the Union's actions quite negatively, from a critical standpoint. When the EU was presented as acting as a normative interlocutor with a specific Strategic Partner country, sometimes these actions were assessed positively, framing the EU as a valuable reference point or interlocutor (e.g. in Mexico, Japan or South Africa), but at other times they were presented negatively, framing the EU as interfering actor (as expressed in the Russian media) (Figure 15)

Figure 14. Evaluations of the EU, across frames

Brazil   Russia   India   China   South Africa

Canada   Mexico   Japan   South Korea   USA

■ Pos+pos/neut   □ Neutral   ■ Neg+neut/neg   ■ Mixed

Although some common patterns in the evaluation distribution could be identified, individual countries also displayed different and individual assessment patterns. The press in the USA, Korea and Mexico tended to produce a more balanced reportage, with almost equal shares of positive, negative and neutral news (with neutral news still being the more prevalent). In contrast, other countries had a much more dominant share of neutral EU portrayals, with the **Russian and South African media being the most neutral** – perhaps a somewhat counter intuitive finding. In all locations other than Japan, negative assessments overshadowed positive ones.

Importantly, positive profiling of the EU in the three most visible frames did not disappear altogether. In the **political** field, positive assessments were typically observed when the EU was reported as a key player in the Iran deal. The EU's quantitative easing policy and its impact were reported positively when the EU was seen acting in the **economic** sphere. The EU's implementation of competition law and establishment of regulatory practices in business, finance and industry were also addressed from a positive angle. A growth in the manufacturing sector of the Eurozone was reported alongside reports about recovery of the

Eurozone. In the **social** frame, the EU's communal response to the Mediterranean refugee crisis was presented from a positive angle (while the solutions may have been criticised, the idea of the institution taking action and addressing it was viewed as positive - see for example reports in Mexico). The EU was also reported as having initiated measures to ensure the protection and evacuation of migrants. Lastly, in the social frame in countries the EU attracted a positive assessment when it was seen to advance social legislation and tolerance towards diversity and multiculturalism (specifically, reports on legalising gay marriages in the period of observation).

While a neutral assessment dominated overall, positive or negative evaluations were more likely to be triggered if the EU was presented as **interacting with the country** in question and **producing impact on that location**. For example, reportage on China-EU relations were positively-evaluated, especially those referring to the China-EU Summit anniversary celebrations. A similar frame was observed in India – news about the upcoming EU-India summit was reported with enthusiasm and from a positive perspective. The EU-India FTA, however, was a polarising case – while the possibility of breaking the deadlock was reported positively, the coverage of the negotiation process contained plenty of negative assessments towards the EU. In South Africa, articles on the strengthening euro and rising economic power of the EU were presented positively because of the favourable repercussions these could have on South Africa. The negative evaluations in the social frame were noticed in those articles about the treatment of African migrants, a topic of direct relevance to South African readers.

Close attention to the textual expression used in all countries points to a set of shared **metaphorical images** that allow a more nuanced insight into the conceptualisation of the EU in the 10 very different media discourses. In this case, Japan stood out as its press did not profile high numbers of metaphors to make meaningful conclusions. Despite linguistic and cultural differences in the other nine cases, analysis explicated that in the field of **economic actions**, the EU was often compared to a sick/ weak/ unhealthy person, potentially contagious to the world, at risk of spreading its economic ills globally (images noted in the USA, Canada, Russia, China, South Africa). Another popular metaphor was of comparing the EU's economy to an unstable structure in danger of collapse and on shaky ground (Brazil, Mexico). The EU was also described as engaged in battles and war in the field of economy trying to fight its way out of the crisis (Canada, China, Korea). Even in these examples it is evident that the evaluations of the EU's actions in economic field are contradictory – while a sick person or a collapsing structure arouse unequivocal negative associations, ability to fight and undertake war suggests aggression as well as energy, resources and vigour. In India, the metaphor of the family/ personal relations under strain was noticed in this field.

Political depictions of the EU's internal actions were dominated by metaphorical categorisations of a disintegrating fabric or material substance lacking wholeness (US, Korea, Russia), war/ battle (Brazil, China, South Africa) and a wounded/ disease infected person (India). The EU was seen to be on the 'war path' when dealing with its internal problems. Image of 'Fortress Europe' also re-emerged and became visible in external political reports (USA). A typical metaphorical categorisation describing EU internal political news came with

images of an unstable structure in Mexico, or a game in Brazil. When reports focused on EU relations with locality in question, different metaphors came to the fore. For example, the Russian media extensively used metaphors of animalisation, comparing the EU with animals and even a monster (strongly negative connotations). In contrast, in the Chinese media EU-China relations were compared to a growing plant (positive connotations).

In the **social** frame, which was dominated by the topic of refugees, the most typical metaphor was of a flood, with a tidal wave of refugees crashing on the shores of the EU. The other visible metaphor in this reportage was the one of personalisation where the EU was compared to a human being experiencing highly negative emotions and even being threatened (by a 'bomb' planted by the refugee crisis (Russia) or poisonous toxic substances (India)). All these images had highly negative connotations.

The assessment of evaluation patterns also explores the correlation between evaluations rendered by both textual and visual means. According to Kress and van Leeuwen, bounded visual images and verbal texts exist as a united sign which retains semantically powerful messages more than separate signs (Kress and Leeuwen, 2006). In all localities in our study, negative textual images of flood and negative emotions resonated with the selected visual images of refugees being rescued from the waves, or on the boats crossing the sea. The metaphors of the EU under threat resonated with the images of immigration officers processing refuges while wearing full protective gear, as if an epidemic was about to enter the EU.   Similarly, news stories about Greek economic difficulties often pictured anonymous people in Greece protesting, closing shops, burning the EU flag, clashing with police, holding anti-EU banners (reinforcing the idea of the crisis impacting ordinary people the most) or of politicians in tense poses with serious (sometimes stressed) faces (reinforcing the idea of tough political decisions and gravity of the situation). Often a neutral tone of the articles was echoed by neutral images of the leaders, talking, gesticulating, or standing.

Sometimes, a particular dissonance between textual and visual evaluations was observed. In these cases, while the text might carry the neutral or even neutral-to-positive evaluation of EU news, the visual support would introduce a more negative image. For example, and typically in the social affairs frame, the articles were not negative in the tone as they were simply describing the facts and/ or commenting on meetings taking place in Brussels, but the illustrations chosen (photographs) portrayed either sad exhausted refugees (adults and children) waiting for hours in lines or on the floor, or a destroyed boat implying human deaths, etc. In these cases, a negative evaluation gained power through the use of visual elements rather than words. Frequently, neutral reporting on economic trends in the EU was accompanied by Figures that demonstrated a decline of various indicators. With visual images being more appealing and easier for information processing, and able to leave long-lasting cognitive and emotional effects, the impact of the visual would trump the impact of the textual images. There is, however, a general tendency in modern-day newsmaking to choose pictures with more negative, dramatic impacts as negativity/ drama/ scandal 'sells' the news. Importantly, the similarities in visual images used across all 10 countries were not incidental. As discussed above, in all localities there was a tendency to use a limited pool of Western news agencies to source visual support.

6.2 Europe

Finally, understanding EU assessment patterns becomes clearer when they are offset by the patterns of assessments assigned to the concept 'Europe' (Figures 16, 17).   Originally, we hypothesised that 'Europe' would be presented in more positive terms than the EU keeping in mind its cultural cache, reputation in art, high standards of social and environmental protection, and lifestyle in general. This was predicted to constitute a potential for the EU's Public Diplomacy – a pool of images to 'dip' into to raise/ improve the EU's profile.

Figure 15. Evaluations of Europe, general

Figure 16. Evaluations of Europe, across frames

However, systematic analysis of evaluations patterns in representations of the EU versus Europe demonstrates that the reality of media discourses is much more complicated. Resulting evaluations of Europe *vis-a-vis* the EU form several patterns. Importantly, as discussed above the notion of Europe in most countries was not used as a synonym to the EU.

Pattern 1: 'Europe is less negative than EU'
The press in two countries – China and Korea – evidenced a rise in neutrality in Europe's representations compared with the EU portrayals, and accompanied by decrease in negativity. A significant share of Europe's positive coverage in these two locations referred to European culture (film, cuisine, architecture) and Europe as a tourist destination. In China, the positive consequences of One Belt One Road were also discussed. They were seen to further strengthen the connection and cooperation between China/ Asia and Europe. Europe was also reported as a coveted destination for Chinese investments. In China, most of negatively-evaluated Europe news related to economic issues, mainly news stories on economic stagnation and the financial crisis.

Pattern 2: 'Europe is more neutral than the EU'
In two locations – Canada and India – the share of neutral evaluations grew in Europe news versus EU news, with both negative and positive news shrinking. In Canada, the strong negative evaluation of EU actions in the social frame (focused around the refugee crisis) found in the EU database disappeared. In India, positive news included reports about the BRICS summit or Modi's signal to Europe that investment is very welcome from the West. Positive news also covered the increase in investment and growth in Europe's agriculture, automobile and smart city businesses, as well as about high levels of hygiene in Europe, European cultural history, Cannes Film Festival, Europe's status as an educational superpower, and legalization of gay marriages. News items with a negative tone included news about ISIS luring Europeans, foreign fighters from Europe in Iraq and Syria and the Mediterranean refugee crisis. Negative news came from the coverage of the Greek debt crisis as well as of anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe, Europe entering a period of uncertainty, drinking habits in Europe, a European obesity crisis by 2030, mental health of pilots, the ill-effects of European style toilets and the increase in percentage of rapes committed in Europe. This list demonstrates that the coverage of Europe, in India and the other nine locations, covered an almost unlimited range of diverse topics.

Pattern 3: 'Europe is as neutral as the EU'
In two locations – Russia and South Africa – the share of neutral news in the EU and Europe datasets was dominant and almost identical in the two datasets.

Pattern 4: 'Europe is less positive that the EU'
In two locations – the USA and Japan (but for *Asahi*) –the share of positive evaluations of Europe was less than the share of positive profiles assigned to the EU. In the USA, Europe was often mentioned in reports on high-level politics, like security and defence. In those frames, Europe was negatively represented as the European continent was seen to host a number of conflicts that are of high priority for the US foreign policy: e.g. the crisis in

Ukraine, a powerful and unpredictable Russia, migration and terrorism. In the context of these political issues, Europe was usually reported in a negative tone echoing the rhetoric of the US policy-makers. In Japan, 'politics' and 'economy' frames carried more negative than positive representations of Europe, whereas Europe's portrayals in 'social & cultural affairs', 'environment' and 'energy' frames attracted more positive than negative evaluations.

Pattern #5: 'Europe is more negative than the EU'
In two countries - Brazil and Mexico – Europe was seen in a more negative light than the EU. In Brazil, negative evaluations in social and cultural affairs and in economy were related to, respectively, European policies on migration and the economic/ Greek crisis, as was found in the EU dataset. Negative evaluations in social and cultural affairs and normative frames were also due to news items mentioning European prejudice, xenophobia, racism and the problem of dealing with differences in the context of the migrant crisis, policies on migration and the failure to integrate migrants; prejudice against migrants of African descent; Islamophobia and historical anti-Semitism. Specifically in Mexico, the EU is perceived as a moral bastion, while Europe is criticised instead of mentioning the EU in issues where the EU should take action.

In conclusion, the notion of Europe does not bring positive connotations automatically. Every location has a different frame for Europe *vis-à-vis* the EU. These tensions must be taken into account when dialogues and outreach to the locations are designed by the EU.

7. SUMMARY

The foregoing presentation of data has attempted to highlight key trends within the media while recognising – and respecting – the clear diversity and unique profiles found in each country. The danger to conclude that 'one size fits all' must be avoided. What is essential – and what this analysis contributes – is to draw evidence-based conclusions and policy insights.

At the broadest level, the data reminds us that a distinction must be drawn between current effects (crises) and longer term dispositions in reporting. To that extent the micro-level details presented here is very time-specific and at best can only represent and snap-shot measurement to inform a baseline longitudinal analysis for the future. Agreement on what to measure and how to measure such factors, is the necessary basis for meaningful comparisons over time. A comprehensive and consistent approach to media monitoring in relation to Public Diplomacy is required, not separate and idiosyncratic studies as has been the case in the past.

Perhaps the most significant Public Diplomacy media observation is that while the media is effective in reporting current news/ crises it seems less able, capable or interested in covering other EU policy spheres. This presents several problems: the constantly changing nature of news on the EU as crises come and go; a general contextualisation of Europe being reactive rather than proactive; and a diminished local relevance for the Strategic Partners as

Europe is principally examined in isolation rather than through any local or bilateral linkages.

Lastly, a final word of caution: it is often tempting to stretch empirical data too far in order to fit models/ types/ groups. The dominant conclusion from this analysis is that country-specific Public Diplomacy is the priority and not a single strategy on how to best engage with all 10 Strategic Partners, or the BRICS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chaban, Natalia and Holland, Martin (2012), 'After Lisbon: The EU as an Exporter of Values and Norms through ASEM', EU External Perceptions study, NCRE (Jean Monnet Lifelong Programme of the European Commission).

Higgins, Joyce, V.M. (2005), 'Crime Coverage by Brazilian Media: an Agenda-Setting Influence of Selective News'. *International Communication Association*, 1-28.

Kress, Gunther and Theo Van Leeuwen (2006), *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design (2nd Ed.),* London and New York, Routledge.

Leff, Laurel (2006), *Buried by the Times: the Holocaust and America's most important newspaper,* New York, Cambridge University Press.

Rogers, Everett M., James W. Dearing., Soonbum S. Chang (1991), 'AIDS in the 1980s: The agenda-setting process for a pblic issue', *Journalism MonoFigures*, No. 126, Columbia, SC: Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication.

ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND EU'S POLICIES ABROAD

ANNEX V – SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT

December 07, 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF FIGURES IN SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT APPENDIXES

LIST OF TABLES IN SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT APPENDIXES

1 INTRODUCING SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING PROJECT

This project analyses images and profiles of the EU and its institutions and leaders that surfaced in social media communications (in Twitter, through tweets and re-tweets) around the time of three key events in 2015: 'Europe Day' May 9; the G7 Summit (Schloss Elmau, Germany, 7-8 June) and the European Union Summit (Brussels, Belgium, 25-26 June). Data collection included three periods of observation – 8-10 May, June 6-8 and June 24-26, 2015 respectively. Collected data was analysed using exploratory analysis in the three case-studies (by University of Wolverhampton, UK) complemented by in-depth content analysis in the cases of the Twitter monitoring during G7 and EU Summits (by the NCRE).

The social media analysis (focused on Twitter and the three 2015 events) is a part of a larger project: 'Analysis of the Perception of the EU and the EU's Policies abroad' undertaken in the 10 Strategic Partner countries of the EU. In the delivery of the social media analysis, two organisations have collaborated under the umbrella of the project: NCRE (University of Canterbury, New Zealand) and the Statistical Cybermetrics Research Group (University of Wolverhampton, UK).

Keeping in mind a unique character of the social media – its ability to provide evidence/ snapshot of opinions expressed, as well as evidence of the media texts/ content – the two main objectives of the social media analysis were to:

- Trace the ***formulation, projection and communication*** of the EU and its messages to the global audiences by means of social media (Twitter in our case).
- Trace the ***reception*** of the EU and its messages by various global audiences

To achieve these objectives, the analysis identified the volume and origins of the EU-focused tweets/ retweets released by selected EU actors and their representatives, as well as other Twitter users following Europe Day celebrations, the G7 meeting and the EU Summit. The analysis also examined the content of the tweets/ retweets focusing on identifying framing and evaluation of the EU actors and their representatives (exploratory in the case of Europe Day sample, and in-depth in the case of the G7 meeting and the EU summit samples). The focus on the three events in the research design was intentional, as they were able to gauge projection, *communication* and *reception* of the EU during events that had local, regional and global relevance. They were also seen as the type of events that would trigger active communication outreach among the senders of the messages (EU institutions and their representatives). The three events took place during the period of press monitoring of the project, and thus provides additional comparative insights into the overall findings on EU images reflected in the baseline indicator analysis.

The Statistical Cybermetrics Research Group of the University of Wolverhampton (Cybermetrics) produced a report for each event providing an exploratory social media analysis. These reports provided the foundation and broader context for the in-depth social media analysis case-studies undertaken by the NCRE. This particular methodological design was implemented to address two key elements in the analysis of Twitter as one social media platform. Firstly, all social media research is challenged by the sheer volume of information communication. Thus, quantitative insights, mediated by software processing tools, are increasingly needed. However, such substantial volume of information often prevents the *systematic in-depth consideration of the content of the message*, overlooking critical nuances in content and evaluation. Thus, qualitative insights are highly sought after. This project

aimed to address both challenges, with the Cybermetrics group addressing the quantitative aspects, and the NCRE the qualitative ones.

It was agreed with the Contractor that Twitter communications during Europe Day would only be subject to quantitative exploratory analysis by the Cybermetrics group. This first exploratory analysis report built a valuable context for the following in-depth Twitter analyses of EU images, profiles and communications during the two summits (G7 and EU). Importantly, the three cases – Europe Day, G7 Summit and EU Summit – all used the same hashtags and Twitter accounts/ channels in their data collection. In addition, the Europe Day case was instrumental in identifying additional hashtags and accounts/ channels for the upcoming G7 Summit and EU Summit exploratory and in-depth analysis. Finally, some of the Europe Day dataset was analysed in-depth to test coding protocols for the subsequent in-depth stage of research.

1.1   Case-Study 'Europe Day 2015'

Europe Day, 9 May, was chosen as a significant date for the analysis of social media communications between the EU and its 10 Strategic Partner countries. The purpose of this case-study was to analyse Twitter interactions between official EU channels (including the EU Delegations) and Strategic Partner countries on Europe Day to reveal: the volume of tweeting; the most prolific tweeters; the most retweeted tweets (quantitative analyses); and, the main discussion topics (through a descriptive qualitative analysis).

1.2   Case-Study 'G7 Summit 2015'

The G7 Summit of 7-8 June 2015 was held under the presidency of Germany. It was attended by the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the USA and the EU with guests representing Ethiopia, Iraq, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and the UN.

The purpose of this case-study was to analyse Twitter interactions between official EU channels and the global community to reveal: the volume of tweeting; the most prolific tweeters; the most retweeted tweets (quantitative analyses); and, the main discussion topics (exploratory qualitative analysis) with special attention to the nuanced framing and evaluations forming the images of the EU and its actors (in-depth analysis).

1.3   Case-Study 'EU Summit 2015'

The European Council meeting (or EU Summit) on Thursday 25 June and Friday 26 June focused on a range of topics – Greece, migration, the foreshadowed referendum in the UK, security and defence, and economic issues. The purpose of this case-study was to analyse Twitter interactions between official EU channels and global community to again reveal: the volume of tweeting; the most prolific tweeters; the most retweeted tweets (quantitative analyses); and, the main discussion topics (exploratory qualitative analysis) with special attention to the nuanced framing and evaluations forming the images of the EU and its actors (in-depth analysis).

2 LITERATURE AND THEORY OVERVIEW

Since it was created in March 2006 and launched of July the same year, Twitter has rapidly grown to gain worldwide popularity. It has being posting approximately 340 million tweets per day since 2012 and handles almost 1.6 billion search queries daily. It has been described as the 'SMS of the Internet' and by May 2015 it had 302 million active users out of the overall 500 million registered twitters. It is becoming extremely widespread in popular culture; its server crashed after the death of Michael Jackson in June 25, 2009, not being able to cope with a rate of 100,000 users per hour. It has also proved instrumental to the media during periods of political unrest or in natural disasters; its coverage is vast and seems limitless. There are six main categories of tweets, depending on the trending topics. These are: pointless babble (40 per cent); conversational (38 per cent); pass-along value (nine per cent); self-promotion (six per cent); spam (four per cent); and, news (four per cent). Tweets studied in the three cases in this project were found to belong to the last three categories.

Specifically in terms of political communication, Twitter is credited with power to enable organised protests, or the so-called 'Twitter Revolutions'. Among those were events triggered by Twitter during the Arab Spring: 2011 Egyptian revolution; 2010–2011 Tunisian protests; 2009–2010 Iranian election protests'; as well as the 2009 Moldova civil unrest. These protests resulted in respective governments blocking the service. In China, Twitter was closed altogether. Unsurprisingly, Twitter has been nicknamed as a 'strategic weapon' due to its ability to abruptly challenge and re-align social order in real time. Another aspect of Twitter's power lies in its relatively young demographic, with 63 per cent of its users being under 35 years.

In terms of research access, Twitter data is in the public domain, which means that informed consent is not required. Other advantages account for the ability to maintain ongoing entries for an audience (reverse and/ or chronological); links to other webpages; in-depth analysis of communication patterns; real time analytics and possibly two-way communication and interaction - making it a unique research tool in comparison to other (social) media avenues. In addition, it is frequently updated, is online, can link different bloggers thus creating social networks and it can be monthly archived. Its spontaneous and revelatory style of writing and the frequent and daily use by a diverse range of individuals - from ordinary citizens to policy makers - makes it an exciting tool to explore public opinion. Hence, it can relatively easily capture and analyse data, including 'large N datasets.' However, there is weak evidence of its representativeness in the case of targeted actors, events and analysis. From the methodological point of view, the predominantly quantitative methods employed to analyse Twitter tend to offer analytical width rather than depth, while slow and laborious data processing is involved when qualitative approach is employed to undertake in-depth insights into voluminous datasets.

2.1 State of the Art

The Internet together with social media has emerged as a new and effective communication mechanism for numerous international relations actors. In addition, digital media – with its open and non-hierarchical design – has empowered non-state actors by directly challenging state actors' former monopoly of international relations. But it has also provided new instruments for the international actors to maximise the process of 'winning hearts and minds' globally, largely due to the more effective spread of strategic narratives.

Most of the literature on the EU's communication deficit, apart from few exceptions, focuses on traditional media (such as Meyer, 1999; Van Noije, 2010; De Vreese, 2004). Therefore the, the focus of this study on Twitter adds value in terms of its contribution to the literature. Another value in focusing on Twitter is the fact that the EU has embraced public communication, in particular through social media as a result of the period of reflection and implementation of the Commission's plan D (Badouard & Monnoyer-Smith, 2013). Moreover, this has been matched by empirical evidence that 'hearts and minds' of citizens are increasingly engaging in response to EU communication and by entering dialogue. This has significant implications for European political communication in terms of theory and practice. Consequently this project is one of the first to address this phenomenon by the re-examination of theoretical arguments regarding the Union's effectiveness and communication competence in Public Diplomacy employing social media.

It has been contended that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit (Beetham & Lord, 1998; Lord, 2000; Eriksen & Fossum, 2002), a tendency which has escalated even further as one of the consequences of euro crisis (McCartney, 2013). The high profile of the euro crisis in the media, among others, served as an impetus to heighten public engagement and dialogue with citizens, initiated by the two Barroso Commissions. A part of this initiative was the establishment of DG Communication with its vibrant multi-media platform, eager to engage in social media communication with EU citizens and international audiences. The Commission also hosts its own YouTube channel used to 'advertise' relevance of Union's legislation to the EU citizens. In addition Facebook has been extensively used to organise groups active in various outreach programmes. Twitter has been embraced by EU officials: many of the Commissioners' Twitter accounts enjoy 'celebrity-like' status with high numbers of followers. In general, there is evidence that the EU has enthusiastically embraced social media accompanied by direct public engagement with citizens.

Thus, it can be argued that the EU is no longer disengaged and/ or unwilling to communicate with citizens when it comes to informed public deliberation on the crucial issues in the process of integration (Longo and Murray 2011, P.669). Importantly, all these social media resources and growing expertise could be used not only to better engage the EU with its own citizens, but also to enhance the EU's dialogue with global audiences, something critical for successful Public Diplomacy. Relevant research has already looked into the emergence of the English language as a Commission lingua franca in the social media communication efforts (Kosiken 2013). This linguistic expertise could be used to reach to various international audiences.

2.2 Theoretical Contexts

The issue of communicating Europe and the EU through social media during three specific events (Europe Day, G7, and the EU Summit) uses several conceptual lenses in its analysis. It blends the concept of 'strategic narratives' with the 'cascading activation framing theory.' This makes the theoretical approach multidisciplinary, and offers a wider perspective. The study involves comparative elements (three case studies), two of which were examined qualitatively, in addition to all three using quantitative tools. The qualitative part of this analysis builds on a well-established methodological approach (Chaban and Holland 2008, 2014; Holland and Chaban 2014; Chaban and Bain 2015a, 2015b; Bain and Chaban forthcoming 2016).

2.3 Key concepts

This research is informed by two important premises. First, that an evolving communications environment (in this case Twitter) is linked to the transformation of how politics work and informs our research (Castells 2009). Second, that the online platforms offer 'for the first time, normative models of public spheres and cosmopolitan dialogue' (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 4) by communicating at many levels simultaneously. This allows for the two-pronged nature of the social media output. One of which is a media product, able to be analysed for its content and 'highlights packaged in selective, framed communications' (Entman 2003: 421) and the other, which is evidence of a public opinion and public engagement mediated by online media.

Keeping with the two-pronged nature of the social media, this project employs the Strategic Narratives Theory to lead its research design. Strategic narratives are defined here as a 'tool for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environments in which they operate' and narratives are the stories that 'have always shaped the way humans understand the world.' The theory of strategic narratives advocates a comprehensive assessment of three elements – <u>formation, projection and reception</u> (Miskimmon et al. 2013). The research traces the formation of the narrative, intended to raise a positive profile of the EU (Roselle et al. 2014: 78), during the selected three public events, which were considered to have the potential to boost Public Diplomacy profiles and outreach. Since projection of the narrative involves communication, this study traced the narrative flow (Roselle et al. 2014: 78) by studying the EU and its actors' communication on Twitter. The advantage of communicating positions through Twitter in comparison to other media is to assess the position by all sorts of actors, including receivers of the EU messages. In this case the flow of the narrative between the EU actors and other non-EU actors (state, non-state and individuals) was assessed in order to identify who speaks on behalf of the EU. The data gathered from Twitter was examined from the actors' point of view (authors of the tweets) through a set of frames present in the texts. Similarly, the reception of narratives was assessed through framed communications (Entman 2003: 421), through tweets and retweets, facilitated by online communication.

In the cases of the EU's communications during the G7 Summit and the EU Summit, a constellation of issue narratives could be traced – a systemic narrative (focus on the world order), an identity narrative (explored here in the context of the 'Normative Power Europe') and issue narrative (which was 'seeking to shape the terrain on which policy discussions take place.'). Importantly, according to Roselle, 'strategic narratives employed at one level may affect narratives on the other levels' (Roselle et al. 2014: 70-84) which is relevant, because this study seeks to monitor the EU's communication as a way of dismantling and extending its narratives to multiple actors on multiple levels.

The study was also guided by the cascading activation framing theory (Entman 2003). The theory explains how ideas in foreign policy and international relations are spread and activated from the upper to the lower levels within a 'cascading' network. On the upper levels are administration and non-administration elites as well as media professionals. It is argued that the upper levels are more capable of activating ideas and frames on foreign policy and spreading them down the cascade. Importantly, every level of the cascade is capable of forming ideas and communicating them through selective frames produced by media. News media is argued to be very important in this process as it can activate and

spread frames on foreign policy and international relation across the media level as well as up and down the cascading network. Importantly, social media is argued here to be a tool that empowers lower levels in the cascade to become powerful in creating and spreading frames 'up' the cascade and within its own level. It also can offer instant communication (dependant though on its availability and access).

Three elements are drawn from this theory and utilised in the qualitative analysis: – namely, <u>visibility, cognitive/ local resonance and emotive charge</u>.

2.4 Challenges

The possible limitations in this approach were brought to our attention during the Interim Report meeting in June 2015, and have been addressed as follows:

- For the social media analysis - for understandable reasons - the study focusses on analysing the communications from EU actors, or that reference these actors' selected hashtags. Thus, it does not attempt to find references (elsewhere on Twitter) to the EU events or entities under discussion.' While the main focus is on the analysis of the EU communications originating from official EU accounts/ channels, for the raised issue, several filters were employed to produce a smaller dataset for coding through the in-depth qualitative analysis. It selected posts by any authors engaged in twitter communication during the times of the events. Their messages were either posted general or event related hashtags (#greece, #EU, #g7, #g7 summit). Other filters included posts which originated from any author on Twitter during the events addressing official EU accounts/ channels or any of the chosen hashtags, which had references to EU actors in the body of their tweets/ retweets, or references to the main events.
- In passing, it's not immediately clear how cascade activation theory can be applied (from the general media analysis) without knowing something about the network position of actors in Twitter (that is: how influential the user is). Perhaps the retweet statistics provide a workable surrogate for this.' One of the aims of this study was to reveal the identity of the communicating entities, which were coded according to four categories: 'EU author' (referring to EU official, institutions and four forms of EU reference); the 'EU other author' (which consisted of a sub-set of categories – government, civil society, business, lobby, university, student, ordinary citizen …); 'non-EU Strategic Partners – authors' (South Africa, South Korea, Brazil, China, Mexico, India, Japan, USA, Canada and Russia); and 'non-EU other authors' with the same subset of categories as the 'EU other.' A best attempt was made identify the authors by the team of coders through Twitter, Google search, etc. However, some authors' identity could not been traced successfully. The retweet statistic was a helpful tool in this regard (the data collection focused on both tweets and retweets). The cascading activation framing theory informed us on the need to focus on authors at multiple levels and monitor the flow of communication in various directions. It also suggests that social platforms like Twitter are able to empower lower levels in the cascading model to form and spread frames capable to influence other levels.
- More importantly, the current [as of June 2015] conclusions are 'The analysis suggests that during Europe Day, Twitter was predominantly used for light entertainment purposes, announcing the day and the Open House and distributing some facts about Europe' and 'it is unlikely that it would be possible to gather many tweets that are

about both EU policy and a specific important event, however, unless the two were already naturally coupled (e.g., in the news).' Indeed it is a challenging conclusion; however, it was based on quantitative exploratory analysis at that stage (case study #1 'Europe Day'). In contrast, the two cases of in-depth qualitative analysis undertaken later revealed the opposite findings (discussed below).

- 'It is unlikely that it would be possible to gather many tweets that are about both EU policy and a specific important event, however, unless the two were already naturally coupled (e.g., in the news).' This study has identified several of these instances, which argues for the relevance of the in-depth analysis involving trained qualitative researchers.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Data

Twitter was monitored before, during and after Europe Day (8-10 May 2015), G7 Summit, (June 6-8) and EU Summit (June 24-26, 2015). During this period the Twitter Applications Programming Interface (API) was automatically queried by the Twitter monitoring program Mozdeh every 15 minutes for tweets that (a) were to or from EU Delegations channels, (b) were from a number of other specified EU institutions' channels, or (c) mentioned any one of a number of EU-related hashtags. Appendix 1 contains the list of all hashtags and accounts/ channels. Although the Twitter API does not return 100 per cent of all tweets for searches with a high volume of matches, in this case the volume is not high enough to cause a significant loss of the data. As such, it is likely that most tweets matching the searches during the time period were recovered. This excludes tweets that were filtered out by Twitter for apparently being spam.

The tweets gathered were processed to remove duplicates (recovered by more than one query). For each tweet, the following information was recorded:

- the tweet text;
- the username and display name of the sender;
- the language of the tweet;
- the geographic location of the tweeter (in 1 per cent of cases for which it was available);
- the number of retweets; and,
- the source of the tweet, if known.

The retweet counts may be underestimates because a tweet may be retweeted after it was collected by Mozdeh and this information is not updated.

3.2 Research Design: Exploratory analysis

For the exploratory analyses, Excel was used to sort and select samples from the set of tweets collected. The more substantial methods are described below.

3.2.1 Coword Frequency Method to Detect Topics

Coword frequencies are used to detect the main topics for each channel and hashtag. This method adopts the following 7 steps, which are conducted separately for each channel and hashtag:

1. Compile a list of all words used in all tweets from the channel or hashtag.
2. For each word w, calculate the proportion of tweets p_w in the channel/ hashtag that contain the word. For example, if 100 tweets had been collected for the hashtag #EUday and the word energy occurred in 30 of them, then $p_{energy} = \frac{30}{100} = 0.3$.
3. For each word w, calculate the proportion of tweets q_w collected but NOT in the channel/ hashtag that contain the word. For example, if 1000 tweets had been

collected, excluding those collected for the hashtag #EUday, and the word energy occurred in 200 of them, then $q_{energy} = \frac{200}{1000} = 0.2$.

4. For each word w, calculate the extent to which the word occurs more often in the channel/ hashtag than outside: $p_w - q_w$. For example, in the above case $p_{energy} - q_{energy} = 0.3 - 0.2 = 0.1$, so the word energy occurs 10 per cent more often in tweets from the channel/ hashtag than in the remaining tweets, and so energy is a candidate for being an important topic for the channel/ hashtag.

5. For each word w for which $p_w - q_w > 0$, calculate a normal distribution statistic z_w that indicates how likely it is that the difference between p_w and q_w occurred by chance (a difference in proportions calculation that is standard in statistics).

6. Rank all the words in the channel/ hashtag with $p_w - q_w > 0$ in decreasing order of z_w value so that the words that occurred most significantly disproportionately often in channel/ hashtags are at the top.

7. Manually filter out irrelevant terms (e.g., pronouns, conjunctions) and report the top results

This statistical procedure essentially identifies words that are characteristic of a particular channel or hashtag in comparison to all other channels/ hashtags analysed. Its advantage is that is can be mainly automated and so it is practical to apply it to detect topics in many different channels. Its disadvantages are that it is relatively crude, may miss topics that are expressed with common words or with multiple words, and will not work well for channels and hashtags with only a few matching tweets.

3.3   Research Design: In-depth Analysis

The in-depth social media analysis of EU images through Twitter, is a part of the broader media analysis of this project. Therefore, the analytical and methodological approach to investigate tweets in-depth intentionally parallels the research approach employed for the analysis of EU images in the press in the 10 countries. The objective is to gather, conceptualise and study social media information on how the EU's projects onto and communicates with global audiences and how the EU is framed by the means of social media (Twitter).

This study follows in its method an earlier work by Chaban and Bain (2015a, 2015b) and Bain and Chaban (forthcoming 2016), which explored the EU's social media profiles and images using in-depth analysis. Echoing research by Chaban and Bain, this analysis addresses calls for methodologies in terms of richer qualitative data based on the quantitative scale by employing methodology used for traditional news media analysis (Chaban and Holland 2008, 2014; Chaban et al. 2011) which codes the Twitter data using a nuanced qualitative framework (for the detailed description of the categories of the in-depth analysis see Appendix 1).

Due to the nature of the Twitter platform – with its sheer data volume – social media studies tend to be quantitative (example of this approach is demonstrated in this report, study undertaken by the Cybermetrics group). The NCRE team addressed the call for 'more qualitative research' in the field of social media. It complemented the Cybermetrics exploratory analysis by engaging in a human-driven qualitative analysis of Twitter data with a focus on the EU. Based on the content analysis method developed for traditional media analysis, this approach allowed a more nuanced look at the sampled tweets. Consequently,

the in-depth section of the social media analysis offers a quantitative and qualitative analysis. It analyses quantitative data qualitatively by narrowing the data to a meaningful sample through the process of filtering following two key methodological criteria – visibility and actorness.

A total of 43,061 tweets were gathered for Europe Day, 105,661 tweets in the case of the G7 Summit[1], and a total of 164,924 tweets for the EU Summit[2]. The Cybermetrics's Twitter Applications Programming Interface (API) was automatically queried by the Twitter monitoring program Mozdeh every 15 minutes for tweets that (a) were to or from EU institutions' channels, (b) mentioned any one of a number of G7-related hashtags, or (c) mentioned any one of a number of EU-related hashtags. This approach followed the objectives of this study and served as a departing point for further filtering of data into smaller and more focused samples (filtering is discussed below).

However, prior to the Mozdeh data gathering the first step was the identification of hashtags and accounts/ channels relevant to the events. Usually each event had its hashtag, which can be found through Twitter's search engine; however, there were some variations in the spelling or several hashtags for example: #Europaday, #Europeday, #Europe_day). At the same time, some of the hashtags were more popular than others based on the number of posted tweets, for example the #G7 received 17,082 English tweets based on the three day data set as opposed to the #G7Summit which received 7,468 or #G7meeting with only 7 tweets – this is according to data received from Cybermetrics.

A good practice in identifying relevant hashtags and channels or accounts from which the tweets were to be collected was to read into individual tweets posted at the main event related hashtags. The tweets needed to be meaningful and relevant to the events which meant that many of the tweets contained other Europe Day, G7 or EU Summits related hashtags. This could perhaps be called a 'snowball' method. A composite list was created of hashtags and channels subsequently sent to the Cybermetrics Research Group for data/ tweet collection.

A similarly labour intensive and perhaps even frustrating procedure was the search for accounts of individual EU institutions or individuals, because not all of them have their twitter accounts published on the front page of their website. Even more challenging was the fact that there was not any comprehensive lists of EU accounts and hashtags that was available.. Finally, the hashtags and EU accounts or channels had to be monitored over the period of data collection in order to identify any new hashtag or accounts/ channels which could have been created as a consequence of an event or as a random action. For example, #tsipars was one such case which was added later following the escalation of events in Greece.

The sample for the in-depth analysis was limited to the tweets published in English (English remains a language of global communication in the Twitter-sphere) and filtered through a number of criteria discussed below.

---

[1] From a total of 41,429 tweeters
[2] From a total of 66,571 tweeters

4 FINDINGS

4.1 Case-Study 'Europe Day'

4.1.1 Exploratory Analysis: Main Conclusions[3]

The exploratory analysis suggests that during Europe Day, Twitter was predominantly used for light entertainment purposes - announcing the day and the Open House and distributing some facts about Europe. Although there were some serious tweets about substantial topics, these were a small minority. Some tweets contained links to the texts of longer speeches, however. This type of information does not seem to be useful for monitoring EU foreign policy or relations because there is very little relevant content. Although sentiment could be extracted from most of the tweets, only one was found that was explicitly positive or negative about EU policy and so Twitter does not seem to be a useful source of information about attitudes to EU policy, at least when the focus is on one specific special day. It might be possible to gather relevant information from Twitter in other ways, however, such as by targeting a particular important incident and gathering relevant tweets. The current analysis suggests that it is unlikely that it would be possible to gather many tweets that are about both EU policy and a specific important event, however, unless the two were already naturally coupled (e.g., in the news).

4.2 Case-Study 'G7'

4.2.1 Exploratory Analysis: Main Conclusions[4]

This study gathered and analysed 105,661 tweets from a total of 41,429 different Twitter accounts. These tweets were all posted between 6-9 June 2015 and were either from an official EU Twitter account, were posted to an official EU Twitter channel, or matched one of a small number of hashtags related to the G7 meeting or the EU.

The set of tweets gathered for the G7 event contained a lot of spam, probably because it was a high profile news event and therefore a logical target for spammers. Although Twitter attempts to filter out spam, it was not fully successful in this case. As a result, the automatic quantitative methods used to analyse the tweets gathered mainly reflected spam and did not give much useful information. An important lesson for the future, however, is that if Twitter is used to monitor public opinion then strategies need to be devised to gather tweets in a way that minimises spam. The main exception was that the automatic analysis revealed a concerted anti-G7 protest movement on Twitter.

A manual content analysis of tweets that were in English and relevant to both the EU and the G7 was able to give insights into topics of public interest. Although a wide variety of different topics were discussed in these tweets, two themes emerged. First, topical issues that were relevant to G7 attendees were frequently discussed, including some that were not explicitly G7 agenda items (e.g., UK membership of the EU). Second, pressure groups raised issues that they believed were important enough to relate to the G7 meeting (e.g., poverty, diabetes) although they were also not agenda items. About half of these tweets originated from

---

[3] By Cybermetrics - see Appendix 3 for the detailed findings of this case

[4] By Cybermetrics - see Appendix 4 for the detailed findings of this case

individual citizens, with the remainder being posted by people with a professional interest, journalists, NGOs, and government organisations. This restricted set included a substantial minority of tweets from five Strategic Partner countries for the EU. This approach suggests that Twitter may be useful for gaining insights into public opinion in the USA and Canada, in particular. Although most tweets expressed no sentiment towards the EU, of those that did there was an equal split between positive and negative messages. This sentiment was normally implicit and so would be difficult to automatically identify for long term systematic analyses.

The first case-study confirmed the need to constantly monitor, identify and test the relevance of hashtags and accounts/ channels in regard to event related messages, because some messages are not related to the topic of the event, regardless of having been posted at the most popular hashtags at that time. There is a need to monitor both, the hashtags and accounts/ channels as different actors prefer different avenues of social media. Also, different avenues attract different audiences and different numbers of retweeted messages.

There is a need for data filtering for the purpose of analysis, as in-depth analysis offers more quality information and in the context of other tweets originating for example from the same account/ channels or grouped according to the same variables. However, filtering is a time consuming exercise, especially if the aim is to produce a representative sample.

It is necessary to monitor all types of tweets (information, newsjacking, primitive/ entertaining) and of all lengths - short, medium, long, as there is no rule or pattern as to which tweets are likely to be retweeted, as those are likely to increase the visibility of the actor/ author.

The following in-depth part of the case-study seeks to confirm or challenge some of the findings of the exploratory analysis, such as:

a) 'Most of the tweets gathered were either not relevant to Europe or not relevant to the G7.'
b) 'None of the #G7 hashtags gave any co-occurring keywords that related to the EU, suggesting that Europe was not seen as a separate major issue within the summit. Similarly, the EU-related hashtags had no G7 topics associated with them.'
c) 'For tweets mentioning the G7, most were neutral but more were negative about the G7 than were positive about it. The most common topic was the environment but other topics occurring at least twice in the list include diabetes, Syria, jokes and gossip. The most common topic for highly retweeted tweets which mentioned the EU was the UK's membership of the EU, but Turkeys' membership, the Ukraine, EU finances and Greece were also included.'
d) 'Almost two thirds of the tweets did not convey a sentiment polarity towards Europe and, of those that did, about half were positive and about half were negative. Few of the tweets were explicitly positive or negative about individual EU policies although many more were implicitly critical in the sense of making the case for a policy change. The negative sentiments tended to be expressed by individual citizens whereas the positive sentiments tended to be expressed by governments, journalists, NGOs and professionals.'

4.2.2   In-depth Analysis: Main Conlcusions

(By the NCRE - see Appendix 5 for the detailed findings in the four filters of this case)
A total of 105,661 tweets were gathered for the G7 Summit, in multiple languages – which was not the case of the dataset for the EU Summit where tweets/ retweets were in English only. So the G7 tweets needed to first be filtered for English tweets: there were 51,929 tweets in English. There were altogether 62,380 tweets to the official/ chosen hashtags (20 of them), which were monitored for the G7Summit out of which 41,430 were in English. There were 10,475 English tweets which originated from and/ or were posted to 118 official EU accounts/ channels according to the G7 dataset.

The filtering for a smaller data set of tweets followed. The filtering meant that the great volume of tweets received from Cybermetrics was reduced to a smaller set of data. The filtering helped to identify tweets needed for the in-depth analysis, following criteria such as: tweets/ retweets posted on the official events' hashtags or to the EU accounts/ channels; tweets and retweets created by EU officials and EU institutions; tweets/ retweets which contained reference to the EU in their content; or tweets received by EU accounts and channels which were retweeted more than 20 times. Similarly, the focus was on hashtags which had the most tweeted posts during the monitored events.

Hashtags

The following 20 hashtags were monitored for the in-depth analysis; some of them did not receive any tweets and some of the hashtags did not have any posts from any of the EU channels/ accounts based on the initial G7 dataset. The most popular were the #G7 and #EU hashtags with the data below.

- #G7 (17,082 out of which 12,297 were tweets and 4,785 were RT – in all there were only 49 tweets during this #G7 which originated from EU official channels/ accounts/ actors/ officials, (they were from 6 different EU@s), this data is represented in the Filter 1 of this report
- #G7Summit (7,468 out of which 5,509 were tweets and 1,959 were RT, none of them by any of the EU channels)
- #G7meeting (seven out of which six were tweets and one was RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #Luebeck (27 out of which 24 were tweets and three were RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #SchlossElmau (38 out of which 30 were tweets and eight were RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #stopg7elmau (141 out of which 50 were tweets and 91 were RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #BlockG7 (10 out of which six were tweets and four were RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #elmau (159 out of which 126 were tweets and 33 were RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #g7gipfel (75 out of which 66 were tweets and nine were RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #g8 (128 out of which 102 were tweets and 26 was RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #merkel (1,168 out of which 899 were tweets and 269 was RT, none of them by EU channels)

- #presidency (46 out of which 40 were tweets and 6 were RT, none of them by EU channels)
- #EU (14,852 out of which 11,870 were tweets and 2,982 were RT,
- #EUCO (22 out of which 15 were tweets and 7 were RT)
- #EuropeanUnion (207 out of which 176 were tweets and 31 were RT)
- #Lübeck; #G7WarmUp; #G7Luebeck; #EUCOLive had no tweets at all during the monitored period according to the G7 dataset

Appendix 2 contains a comprehensive list of all hashtags and EU accounts/ channels, which were monitored for this study.

There were 10,475 tweets to and/ or from EU accounts/ channels. Most of the tweets were to the @eu_commission with 1,566 tweets, followed by @juncker_eu with 1,314, @europarl_en with 1090 and @g7 with 1,080 accounts during the three days monitored and the G7Summit' data set.

EU main accounts/ channels

There was a group of channels which were termed the 'main channels' representing the main EU actors (EU officials and EU institutions): there were 45 of them out of all 118 EU channels/ accounts. Tweets were often preferred or selected from these EU actors and they represented the main EU institutions:

- EU Delegations (@UEnoBrasil (Brazil), @MarieAnnConinsx (Canada), @EUinChina (China), @EU_in_India (India), @EUinJapan (Japan), @andrewpstandley (Mexico), @EUinRussia (Russia), @euinkorea (South Korea), @EUintheUS (USA)
- EU Council (@EUCouncil, @eucopresident, @EUCouncilPress, @EUCouncilTVNews, @eu2015lv – 5 of them)
- EIB (@EIBtheEUbank - 1)
- ECB (@ecb, @ecb_europa_eu, @wiktwit, @DraghiBCE - 4 of them)
- ECJ (@EUCourtPress – 1)
- EEAS (@FedericaMog, @CatherineEUspox, @MajaEUspox, @eu_eeas, @MichaelMannEU, @EUDefenceAgency – 6 of them)
- EP (@ParliamentEU, @EUparliament, @EP_Edinburgh, @europarl, @europarlAV, @MartinSchulz, @EP_President, @europarlpress, @Europarl_EN, @jduch, @europarltv – 11 of them)
- EC (@EU_Commission, @JunckerEU, @TimmermansEU, @MargSchinas, @Mina_Andreeva, @A_WintersteinEC, @JensMesterEU, @MimicaEU – 8 of them)

G7 Summit in-depth monitoring proved that the relevance of tweets/ retweets to Europe and to the G7 varied across the data set of four different filters. In some cases all messages related to the event in other cases there was a ratio.[5]

The EU was seen as one of the major issues or actors through tweets/ retweets on #G7/ #G7 Summit, regardless of the lack of co-occurring keywords that related to the EU identified

---

[5] From the abovementioned findings of the exploratory analysis: "a) Most of the tweets gathered were either not relevant to Europe or not relevant to the G7."

through exploratory quantitative methods. This was the case of the Filter 1, where based on the centrality of actors the EU was foremost a major and also secondary player, mainly due to the number of EU officials and institutions mentioned in the messages.[6] Furthermore, the EU-related hashtags did have G7 topics associated with them, which was identified through the Filters 2 – 4. This was manifested for example by establishing the EU as predominantly political and sociocultural actors through the thematic and normative frames and later through the conceptual metaphors which were frequently referring to the G7 Summit in terms of the location, agenda or participants in conjunction with references to the EU.[7]

The findings confirm that of tweets mentioning the G7 most were neutral, this was based on Filter 3 which selected the dataset based on tweets/ retweets containing G7 in the body of the message. However, the evaluation is in regards to the EU, which was identified in this case as a major political actor, rather than analysis of the G7 event as such. Similarly, the most common topic was politics (86 out of 112), while environment was in third position (7 out of 112), but here again focus was on the EU as an actor within these thematic frames. Ukraine was mentioned as one of the reoccurring topics, but this dataset did not find references to diabetes, jokes or gossip, perhaps partly because the focus was on tweets/ retweets posted on EU official accounts/ channels only.[8]

All four of the Filters monitored sentiments of the EU actors and revealed predominantly neutral sentiment in regards to EU actors. However, closer examination of the conceptual metaphors, which in some filters occurred in half of the tweets, in another at a rate of one tweet from every ten, the sentiments towards Europe were mostly negative and critical.[9]

Visibility

The highest **volume** of tweets was posted on the EU accounts/ channels, which in the case of these four filters was Filter 2. It received 361 messages, slightly less tweets (172) than retweets (189), which is rare, because in the remaining three cases there are more tweets posted than retweets, about 5 to 6 times more tweets consistently than retweets. Another first position to Filter 2 – the sum of the retweeted messages was 22,928. This is partly due to the fact that volume was one of the criteria of this selection as those tweets were collected which had already been retweeted at least more than 10 times. Nevertheless, this reinforces the findings that indeed the EU accounts/ channels were popular during this event in terms of placing posts. This means that there was interest to either target the EU with a message, meaning to let the EU know or the case was that certain authors prefer posting on EU accounts/ channels rather than to general hashtags. Looking at the authors of the posts

---

[6] "None of the #G7 hashtags gave any co-occurring keywords that related to the EU, suggesting that Europe was not seen as a separate major issue within the summit.

[7] 'b) <…> Similarly, the EU-related hashtags had no G7 topics associated with them.'

[8] "c) For tweets mentioning the G7, most were neutral but more were negative about the G7 than were positive about it *(Appendix 4)*. The most common topic was the environment but other topics occurring at least twice in the list include diabetes, Syria, jokes and gossip. The most common topic for highly retweeted tweets which mentioned the EU was the UK's membership of the EU *(Appendix 4)*, but Turkeys' membership, the Ukraine, EU finances and Greece were also included."

[9] "d) Almost two thirds of the tweets did not convey a sentiment polarity towards Europe *(Appendix 4)* and, of those that did, about half were positive and about half were negative. Few of the tweets were explicitly positive or negative about individual EU policies although many more were implicitly critical in the sense of making the case for a policy change. The negative sentiments tended to be expressed by individual citizens whereas the positive sentiments tended to be expressed by governments, journalists, NGOs and professionals *(Appendix 4)*."

therefore, the authors of the tweets were predominantly EU based, see Figure 1. Interestingly though, it was not necessarily EU officials or EU institutions, but citizens, business, lobby, media, government, etc., which were the authors of the tweets (107 *vs.* 232 tweets).

Figure 1. G7 – Filter 2 - Authors of tweets/ retweets

The story is the same in the case of the G7 Filter 3 which collected posts sent to EU accounts/ channels with the condition of having 'g7' in the body of the tweet. Here again the EU other (77) were the most common authors of tweets in comparison to the second most popular authors the non-EU other (29 authors). In conclusion, the EU accounts/ channels are popular places of posts and attention should be paid to posts uploaded there, especially because it seems as though information arriving there is largely from other than EU official sources (EU and non-EU other), hence these are the sources with which the EU can engage if it wants to communicate with the public.

When the **centrality** of the posts is concerned, here again, the findings support the argument made in the case of the 'Volume,' which is that the vast majority of tweets/ retweets were EU centred. However, in the case of the third filter (G7 Filter 3) the centrality of the EU, EU as the major actor within tweets/ retweets is equal to the sum of the EU as secondary and minor actor (56 : 43 + 14).

The vast majority of all the tweets were long, which means that tweeters used just up to or all 140 characters for writing a post, or retweeted posts of that **length**. As identified earlier, the length of the post does not have an impact on the popularity of the post if it is based on the number of retweeted messages, as one of the most retweeted posts was 'medium' according to the 'length' criteria.

Resonance

As revealed a little earlier, the EU as an institution was not the main **author** of the tweets/ retweets. The EU and its actors were only the sole authors of messages only in Filter 1 and Filter 4 (collecting tweets/ retweets from EU official accounts/channels). Based on the data about the authors, it can be said that the EU is a subject of tweets/ retweets posted by many

'EU other' and 'non-EU other' with the EU officials and EU institutions being the most visible actors in tweets/ retweets (a common trend across all datasets, see Figures 2, 3, 4 and 26 for comparison). Interestingly, in the case of Filter 4 (Figure 5), the EU as an actor was most visibly referenced as the EU, European Union, Europe and Eurozone, as opposed to EU officials and EU institutions.

Figure 2. G7 – Filter 1 - EU actors mentioned within tweets/ retweets

Figure 3. G7 – Filter 2 - EU actors mentioned within tweets/ retweets

Figure 4. G7 Filter 3 – EU actors mentioned within tweets/ retweets

Figure 5. G7 Filter 4 – EU authors

When we examined different types of **actors** within tweets/ retweets, the messages reveal an abundance of EU institutional actors as well as various EU entities (European Council, European Parliament, European Commission, Donald Tusk, Martin Schultz, Federica Mogherini and Jean-Claude Junker). There is also a plethora of non-EU Strategic Partners (although Brazil, South Africa, and Mexico are less visible). There is a great diversity of non-EU other actors, which mostly include entities which are in the global public arena, predominantly in terms of politics. Arguably, these are positive findings for the EU, as far as its visibility is concerned.

Politics and sociocultural are the main **thematic frames** in the four samples created by the four filters. The *political* frame was dominant in the dataset of posts on the hashtag G7/ G7 Summit by EU officials and institutions (Filter 1) and in the dataset of tweets/retweets posted on EU official channels/ accounts by any authors (Filter 3) with 'G7' in the body of the message, here most of the authors turned out to be 'EU other' entities[10]. Thus, two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, since the G7 was a high level political meeting, the EU through the references to its actors in the body of the tweets/ retweets with 'G7' in the body was framed as political entity. Second, based on the authors of the tweets, those who actually write or retweet the content of the previous messages, consider the EU as a political actor mostly. The *sociocultural* thematic frame was another leading frame; in part with political in some Filters and actually surpassing political frame in other filters. In the case of tweets/ retweets posted on EU official accounts/ channels which were retweeted more than 10 times from any author (Filter 2), most of them turned out to fit the 'EU other' category, just as in one of the political frames. The second case was for the posts from EU officials and EU institutions on the hashtag EU, which is the most popular general EU hashtag (Filter 4). This suggests a balance in EU's images coming through the G7 sample – the EU is seen as both political and sociocultural actor.

Normative frames

In the G7 case, the EU's normative profile appears in the political context the most frequently. When examining the EU in the two Filters where it was identified as the major political actor, Filter 1 registered two references to liberty and one to the rule of law. In the other Filter 3, politically-themed comments featured norms of liberty twice and the rule of law three times. Other norms mentioned in the G7 sample were good governance (6), social solidarity (3), democracy (2), peace (2), and sustainable development (1). Consequently, the vision of the EU as a normative political actor comes through the two datasets of filtered tweets. Turning to the *sociocultural frame* within Filters 2 and 4 (the leading frame), Filter 4 reveals that the EU is associate with human rights in only one case.

Emotive charge

The **generic evaluation** is based on all tweets/ retweets in the sample, yet a more nuanced assessment of the EU images took place through emotively charged images surfacing through metaphoric expressions. For example, the **conceptual metaphors** allowed us to identify that the EU's *sociocultural* persona is not presented in a neutral light in the G7 sample. In the case of the sociocultural frame, the presence of a metaphor can vary from one in every 10 to one

---

[10] (Governments, international organisations, lobby/ civil society/ think tank, business, university, students and ordinary citizens originating in the EU)

in every five posts. The EU is often conceptualised as a 'house, these challenging issues are on his/ her 'doorsteps' both from within (Greece) and from outside (refugees). Metaphors also painted a dramatic image of the EU embroiled in a 'war' on its social and cultural issues. The EU hinders, pimps, destroys, sheds blood; it kills and they want to kill him/ her - the references to war are found in 21 out of the 145 metaphors in the G7 case and the other metaphors are overwhelmingly negative. The EU 'destabilise(s),' 'kick(s)' and 'play(s) dirty tricks.' At the same time, Europe 'does not think about good politics' and considers people 'idiots.' So the metaphors render the images of the EU wither 'breaking' or 'remaining broken.' This drama 'darkens the mood,' as the 'way is lost' for the EU who now will have to find the 'lost bits' if it wants to 'build a bridge.' Despite the EU's 'growing' and 'rowing burden', it can 'still imagine its energy efficient cities,' 'all the colours of the world,' 'through wildflower meadow' or 'sunny terrace restaurant' and thrives (I'm) 'telling you' for the healthy oceans and 'healthy planet.' So 'let's hope that a different story' (to the first one) 'has begun to be written.'

To a certain degree, the positive metaphorical images coming through the sociocultural frames is counterbalancing a gallery of negative metaphorical images appearing in the second most visible frame, politics. The EU was 30 times accused of 'corporate takeover' and several times called names like 'the God Father.' Time has come now also for the political Europe to stop being a 'pathetic bunch of liars,' and move the 'dumb mule' to 'stand up' and help to eradicate poverty,' as well as start the 'global fight against climate change.' Enough of 'handshakes, (they) don't save the word.' 'Political Europe 'must build on this momentum,' 'get on the same page' and start to speak with one voice' and 'act together.' These words need to 'take off' to Strasbourg and 'materialise into concrete' 'actions' in Elmau as the 'road from Elmau to Paris is not long.' The 'family photo' taken at Elmau, of the 'community of values' which extends beyond Europe must 'speed up' 'efforts' as 'climate change is a shared challenge.'

Accounting for these images suggests that there is a need for the EU to start projecting an alternative picture of the EU. This is of particular importance during major political events, such as the G7, when global agenda dominates judgements of the communication participants. Importantly, negative publicity leaves a bitter aftertaste among the global audiences and this is potentially damaging for EU Public Diplomacy. One action for the EU could be to identify and project a set of well-established positive images and metaphors describing the EU. The question remains whether metaphors change during other events, with different agendas. Future studies could help answer this question. One thing is obvious – it is necessary to monitor social media constantly in order to identify the EU's changing images and actively offer alternatives to mend negative images as well as construct an attractive resonating image. However, this is challenging given the multiplicity of actors who act and speak for Europe.

Another set of conclusions that followed from this case-study relates the methodology in the study of the EU's Twitter communications. If the EU is serious about regular monitoring of its images and profiles through social media in general, and Twitter in particular, there is a clear need to constantly monitor, identify and test the hashtags and accounts/ channels in regards to the researched events. The critical audit of the hashtags and accounts/ channels should continue throughout the life-cycle of the event in order to capture new hashtags or accounts that may emerge as a response to new or dramatic developments during the event.

Not all tweets collected from or received by the hashtags and accounts/ channels relate to the monitored events, regardless of them being set up for the purpose of communicating the EU during the event. Hence, if the EC/ EEAS commits to regular monitoring of its images and profiles through social media in general, and Twitter in particular, there is an acute need for constant monitoring of the accounts. Furthermore, if in-depth nuanced content analysis is envisioned, there must be a process in place to filter the datasets narrowing them to a manageable sample for the in-depth analysis.

If EC/ EEAS is investing into the in-depth content analysis in the future, it is important to remember that while not all tweets and retweets appear meaningful at first read, this does not necessarily determine their popularity (determined by the number of retweets in our case). The same is true in the case of tweets/ retweets carrying links to pictures, videos or other (online) information (predicted due to the limited size of the tweets or the relevance of the attached news/ media to the topic). This was the case of the most retweeted tweet identified in this study – it contained a three minute video of Kofi Annan.[11]

4.3 Case-Study 'EU Summit'

4.3.1 Exploratory Analysis: Main Conclusions[12]

This study gathered and analysed 164,924 tweets from a total of 66,571 different Twitter accounts. These tweets were all posted between 24-26 June 2015 and were either from an official EU Twitter account, were posted to an official EU account, or included one of a small number of hashtags related to the EU Summit or topical events (e.g., Grexit, migration, austerity).

The main topic of the tweets collected was the Greek crisis, reflecting the topicality of the issue, widespread media coverage, its EU-relevance and its position on the agenda of the summit. A secondary topic was the EU itself and particularly the potential for the UK to leave. Austerity was also mentioned in at least 3 per cent of the tweets, either in connection with Greece or other countries, including the UK. Finally, the TTIP deal was also discussed in 3 per cent of the tweets, reflecting relatively marginal interest in it. Nevertheless, the variety of tweets about the TTIP suggested widespread concern about its serious implications for important aspects of European society, such as healthcare.

A manual content analysis of English tweets with the hashtag #EUSummit or term EUSummit gave some insights into comments about the summit itself. Most strikingly, of the tweets that were not neutral, the remainder were overwhelmingly negative. Although the sample is biased towards English-speaking countries, reflects Grexit crisis worries to some extent, and is probably biased towards vocal EU opponents, it suggests that the EU Summit does not provide good publicity for the EU and may be a source of negative reactions. Many of the tweets did not give explicit reasons for being anti-EU (e.g., 'God make it stop #EUsummit', '…Agreement achieved on new EU emblem #SPECTRE'), although some were negative about specific policy issues (e.g., '…Med refugee crisis is not only Greek tragedy - leaders @

---

[11] *'See great video by Kofi Annan @UNGeneva @g7 @FLOTUS @NewClimateEcon @EUClimateAction @greenpeaceusa @GermanyDiplo https://t.co/za6xcOQahR.'* By Caroline Kende-Robb (@CarolineKende - represents a non-EU twitter)

[12] By Cybermetrics - see Appendix 6 for detailed findings of this case

#EUsummit must do more...') or the summit itself (e.g., '...No-one knows what's going on at #EUsummit but is too embarrassed to ask....'). The large number of jokes about the EU summit is another indicator that the event does not generate good publicity.

From the perspective of the implications of the results for the value of monitoring Twitter for the EU, the identification of the negative publicity that the EU summit appears to have attracted and the negative but relatively considered tweets about the TTIP are two issues that the Twitter analysis identified that might not be obvious from traditional press coverage. In contrast, the remaining issues seem to be relatively minor or obvious (e.g., Grexit, UK referendum). This suggests that a Twitter analysis is capable of identifying specific issues of relevance to the EU, although the biases inherent in Twitter data mean that the results must be treated cautiously.

The EU Summit exploratory report provided background information and rationales for identifying a smaller dataset used for the in-depth content analysis. It also challenged the in-depth research in terms of verifying or further examining some of the findings in the EU Summit report. For instance

- The hashtag #greece was chosen as one of the main variables to create a smaller dataset for in-depth analysis.
- The other official EU hashtags (#DigitalSingleMarket, #eurogroup, #migrationEU, #euco) and the hashtag #Tsipras were also used for filtering data for further examination – Table 1.of the EU Summit report.
- The focus was on the main EU bodies and individuals when there was a need to choose a smaller set of tweets/ retweets, as they produced the highest volume of tweets - Table 3. of the EU Summit report.
- 'Almost half of the 247 tweets classified came from people tweeting as individuals rather than organisations or in a capacity that related to their profession in some way.'
- Place a greater emphasis on analysing tweets originating from and addressing the EU institutions/ bodies and their officials, in conjunction with tweets from ordinary citizens, or other EU and non-EU bodies, in order to learn from their communication and provide EU with suggestions for future engagement with social media.

4.3.2 In-Depth Analysis: Main Conclusions

(By NCRE - see Appendix 7 for the detailed findings of the analysis that applied 5 filters)
Comparing the findings of the in-depth analysis with some findings of the exploratory analysis, it was found that:

- Migration was also one of the highly debated topics identified through the in-depth analysis. In addition, the in-depth analysis of the tweets revealed a more balanced attitude expressed in regards to the issue of migration as opposed to any other issue in the EU Summit data. This was captured to a great degree through the analysis of the conceptual metaphors. However, looking into the data filtered for the in-depth

analysis[13], it is the Greek crisis that has attracted most of attention in the Twittersphere.

- The in-depth analysis indicates that the EU as an actor was predominantly portrayed as a *neutral* actor in the Case-study #2, not as a *negative* player. While there were some 35 accounts that framed the EU as a *negative* actor and 20 accounts that presented it as a *positive* actor, and the number of accounts portraying the EU in *neutral* light stands at 602.[14]

- The EU Summit in June 2015 contained a challenging and diverse agenda. This complexity was reflected through messages which included both positive *and* negative references. [15] Significantly, Twitter offered a valid platform for the EU's public profile during the EU Summit, featuring a balanced expression of positive and negative evaluations of the EU's actions captured through the in-depth analysis of tweets/ retweets. In this analysis, the tool of the conceptual metaphor was of particular value. The in-depth analysis of Twitter also points to the emerging virtual community ready to engage in the genuine debate on European integration (a different finding if compared with the in-depth analysis of the G7 tweets in Case-study 2). Further studies could examine similar high-profile EU events to trace if this virtual community continues to exist and how the virtual space created by it could be used for the Public Diplomacy purposes.

Visibility

Five filters were applied in the case of the EU Summit Twitter coverage creating five datasets (one more than in the G7 case-study). It should be noted that the last two Filters in this case-study – Filter 4 (posts to any accounts/ channels/ hashtags having reference to the EU in the body of the tweet/ retweet) and Filter 5 (messages posted on EU official accounts/ hashtags) produced data which was less event-related.[16]

The highest number of messages for a single filter was 282 tweets (Filter 2 – posts to any account/ channel / hashtag from official EU accounts/ channels, without any conditions on the content of the message), although in the case of the last filter not all data was collected and analysed due to time constraints (Filter 5 – messages above 10RT to official EU accounts/ channels). The second highest level of tweets was 190, received through Filter 4 – which applied to any messages with reference to EU accounts/ channels in the body of the tweet/ retweet posted on any hashtag, account or channel. The third greatest number of tweets/ retweets – 138 – was through Filter 3 and was posted to official EU accounts/ channels with the condition of already having been retweeted more than 20 times. This condition resulted in the dataset of messages whose overall number of retweets at the point of extracting them for the data analysis reached 7,922 collectively, which is the highest

---

[13] Reply to the statement from the Cybermetrics analysis: "Migration (21 per cent) was the most common issue, and this was reflected in extensive media coverage, at least in the UK.

[14] Reply to the statement from the Cybermetrics analysis Just over half of the tweets (53 per cent) did not convey a sentiment polarity towards Europe (Table 8) but, of those that did, the vast majority were negative (43 per cent), with only a few being positive (5 per cent).

[15] Reply to the statement from the Cybermetrics analysis negativity may partially reflect the reality of the Greek crisis, however, and it probably also reflects a vocal minority that used the summit to air their anti-Europe sentiment.

[16] In Filter 4, 40 tweets were relevant, 112 were irrelevant and 38 unsure; and in Filter 5, 17 tweets were relevant, 26 were irrelevant and 3 unsure.

number of retweets in all five data sets. This argues for the greatest visibility – if the calculation is based on the number of retweets. Arguably, this is meaningful for the EU. It concerns 138 tweets posted on their official accounts/ channels, in which from the point of view of centrality, the EU was framed as the major entity (89 times, 35 times it was central and 14 minor). The other four filters (Filters 2-5) collected messages with a considerably high number of retweets made prior to this analysis, which based on this premise suggests a high visibility of messages being posted.

When it comes to the volume in terms of tweets vs. retweets, in two datasets out of five the retweets were more popular than the tweets, meaning that more retweets were used or posted as initial messages than original messages were created. This is the case of the already mentioned Filter 3 that contained the most of retweeted messages (7,922). Similarly, the final dataset, Filter 5 which collected messages already retweeted more than 10 times and posted on official EU accounts/ channels, had a set of 42 retweets as opposed to 14 original tweets. This dataset has the second highest overall number of retweets (2,487). From the visibility point of view, it means a pronounced profile and high level public attention. In contrast, one of the datasets (Filter 1) contained only tweets and no retweets. It collected tweets posted to the #Greece from EU accounts/ channels, which was the most popular hashtag of the EU Summit event.

In this case, Filter 1 had one more distinct feature. This time it was about **centrality** of the EU and its actors in the content of the tweets. Importantly, all tweets posted to #Greece from the official EU accounts/ channels were EU-centred, with all of the EU actors mentioned within these messages cast into a major role. None of the tweets in this Filter had the EU actors with either secondary or minor status. In all other Filters, the EU actors were often assigned the major role by those who tweeted, more so than secondary and minor profiles. The highest share of EU major degree of centrality was found within Filter 2 (it selected tweets/ retweets from the official EU accounts/ channels). The EU actors appeared here as a major actor in 241 cases, secondary in 28 cases and minor in 13. Such profiling sends the message that the EU is perceived by the users of Twitter as a visible actor able to take a major role.

Local Resonance

In all five Filters, there were more **authors** from the EU than non-EU authors. Perhaps unsurprisingly, European authors were more engaged in tweeting/ retweeting reacting to the EU Summit than non-Europeans. In Filters 1 and 2 there were only EU authors as this was the precondition in selecting the messages. The closest ratio of European authors vs. non-Europeans, 89:49, is in Filter 3 (it collected all the above 20 retweets to EU official accounts/ channels).

Echoing the findings about the authors of the messages, our analysis revealed a higher visibility of EU **actors** vs. non-EU actors (1,425 instances of EU actors vs. 199 of non-EU actors). When looking at the individual categories of the EU actors, the most popular across the five dataset were: the EU bodies/ institutions (385), followed by EU officials/ individuals (323) and by the EU portrayed either as the EU/ European Union, Europe or Eurozone (297). The most popular EU actors within tweets/ retweets in terms of the EU bodies/ institutions were respectively: European Council, European Parliament and the European Commission. In terms of the EU officials/ individuals, the most popular actors were ranked: Donald Tusk, Martin Schulz, Jean-Claude Junker, Federica Mogherini, Frans Timmermans, and Daniele

Nouy[17]. The EU Member States were in fourth position (179) with Greece far ahead of any of the other Member States. The UK, Latvia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Germany, and Spain were the other most popular countries mentioned as the EU actors. Hence, the Twitter seems to deliver the message that it is the EU actors (its institutions and officials) who are more visible in this case than the EU Member States.

Analysis of the five filters revealed that the *political* frame of EU actions was the most popular outnumbering all of the other frames. The *economic* frame followed the *political* frame, although it was a close second only in one case, in Filter 4 (any messages posted to any hashtags, accounts/ channels, but containing official EU accounts/ channels in the body of the posts) (30 for political frame vs, 29 for economic).

In the case of the Filters 2[18] and 3[19] (which collected tweets posted by the EU official actors and then by any authors to official EU accounts respectively), the *economic* frame was present but only at a ratio of 1:3. Interestingly, the *sociocultural* frame is also present in these Filters. The economic and sociocultural frames, although further behind the political frame both scored at the same position in terms of popularity when filter sought to identify any retweets above 20 posted to the official EU accounts/ channels. The authors in this search were not predefined in the filter. They carried the same score in the case of any authors posting messages above 20 RT to official EU accounts/ channels. Closer examination of those authors posting over 20RT revealed that they were predominantly from the 'EU other category' (80) vs. 9 (EU officials or EU institutions). Also, 80 of them are from EU authors vs. 49 from non-EU authors. This suggests that the EU sociocultural and economic matters resonate with ordinary people who see the EU as both economic and sociocultural actor, and this vision, in the Twitter, but these two frames follow the main perception of the EU as a political actor from a far distance. When the EU official accounts/ channels were the authors (Filter 2) the *sociocultural* frame was in the third position, distant to the economic frame which was the second most visible.

In summary, in the case-study 'EU Summit', the Twitter communicated the EU predominantly as a *political* entity by both EU officials and other EU authors and, to a lesser degree, it is recognised as an *economic* and then a *sociocultural* actor. This contrasts the findings of the G7 case-study, where EU was equally seen a *political and socio-cultural* actor. The normative frame offers some additional explanations to this perception and framing.

Normative frames

The examination of the EU framing in terms of normative profiles revealed that EU normative identity is overwhelmingly located within *political* perceptions. The most visible norms and values assigned to the EU's actions were good governance, rule of law, human rights and social solidarity. Only on one occasion were human rights were seen in the *sociocultural* context. Looking at the evaluation of these tweets, the EU actors were predominantly viewed as 'neutral' actors. However, there were four instances when the EU was seen as a positive normative actors, first was in regards to good governance with thematic frame being social and cultural affairs. Human rights were mentioned twice, once in

---

[17] President of the Supervisory Council at the European Central Bank
[18] Politics (160), economy (62) and sociocultural (47)
[19] Politics (74), economy and sociocultural (26)

the *political* context and once in the *sociocultural* context. Lastly, the norm of sustainable development was observed in the comment about the EU's actions in the *environment* field. The EU was seen as a positive actor in the tweets that talked about development (e.g. economic investment and aid in Africa in Filter 3); as well as sustainable development; good governance; democracy and peace. The EU's normative performance in the area of human rights within *social and cultural* thematic frame attracted both positive and negative evaluations. The EU's human right actions in *political* frame were presented in a positive light.

In terms of visibility, human rights got the most attention (22), followed by good governance (13) and sustainable development (10). The second tier of the visible normative frames (less than 10 occurrence) included social solidarity (6), democracy (5), peace and rule of law, each (4), and finally liberty (1). There were no references to the EU as an antidiscrimination actor. See the Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, which highlight the dominance of the political perception in regards to the EU, in conjunction with the set of normative frames identified within tweets/ retweets across the whole dataset.

Figure 6. EU Summit Filter 1 - Normative frames

Figure 7. EU Summit Filter 2 - Normative frames

Figure 8. EU Summit Filter 3 - Normative frames

Figure 9: EU Summit Filter 4 - Normative frames

Figure 10. EU Summit Filter 5 - Normative frames

Emotive charge

In Filters 2 and 5, the EU is overwhelming perceived as a neutral actor (602), followed by 'positive to neutral' (41), negative (35), neutral to negative (28) positive (20) and finally mixed (5). The concentration of views on the EU being a positive actor (9) were in the Filter 5 which collected tweets on official EU accounts/ channels (above 10RT). However, this Filter just as many other filters recorded also negative (8) references. The most negative references (17) were gathered within Filter 3 (messages on official EU accounts/ channels; above 20RT). This seems to be an important finding as this is the dataset which contains the highest number of retweets (7,922); hence, this filter has potentially larger audience than other filters. However, as mentioned previously, the number of retweets is not a perfect measure of visibility.

The EU, seen predominantly as a *political* actor, was assessed *neutrally* in this frame (738 tweets). In terms of conceptual metaphors, they occurred 266 times, although, on some occasions a tweet would have more than one metaphor. Nevertheless, this gives a ratio of nearly one metaphor in every third tweet. The following collage of metaphors is clustered around two main topics: one has examples and parts of tweets in regard to the Greek events, more dramatic in tone perhaps; and the other, which almost doubled the number of tweets, refers generally to the events during the EU Summit. Perhaps a subcategory can be detected in the latter case, with groups of tweets around the EU as an actor (including EU officials), within the set of general EU Summit tweets/ retweets.

The metaphors painted an image of the EU being accused of creating 'debt slavery on Greece' (which was the result of playing 'European Poker') and expecting of an imminent 'Greek Hara-kiri.' Once again the EU was compared to the 'house', only now its tenants were leaving. Some suggested Greece was already on the 'doorstep' and ready for 'departure.' The advice Europe was receiving through Twitter was to 'stop sticking plaster' on problems and asking 'why not shovel taxpayers' euros into a white-hot furnace?' The Greek events seemed to divide the public as Greece was also negatively referenced, being advised to 'start sticking to rules.' The most negative references compared the events to 'declaring war,' 'killing 000' more Greeks' and pointing out that the outcome is poverty, and 'poverty is violence.' On the other hand, there was hope voiced that 'unlike in Sophocles' tragedies this story will have a happy end.' The EU announced that it aims to 'build bridges with Greece' and commented that the 'new govt proposal is a step in the right direction' which some press news retweeted saying that they 'provided positive impulse on #Greece.'

Turning to the dataset that contained tweets reacting to the EU Summit and the EU, messages portrayed the EU both negatively and positively. Overall the comments with metaphors rendered that there is a sense of unity or greater unity in general with regards to the EU Summit (if compared with the G7 Summit). The G7 was a global event which provided the EU an avenue for global exposure. While there could have been tweets rendering the sense of unity or community, perhaps around some topics, there was not enough evidence in our sample to identify this. Secondly, it seems that the EU was more active in posting messages in regards to the EU Summit, than during the G7 meeting. The former was a more EU-focused event. For these reasons also there were more EU institutions and officials engaged in tweeting. The actors' profile could be a reason for more balanced images of the EU in terms of evaluation, in contrast to the G7 sample.

Numerous tweets/ retweets projected a positive attitude and confidence, sometime in almost a cheerleading style. Yet, many of them were recognised by the coders as genuine. For example, (we) 'need to create a level playing field,' we will 'close deal' and the 'EU means business' these three sound confident, but the following: 'terrorists want to divide us, they unite us.' In terms of more specific events within the EU Summit, the EU announced the need to 'keep the momentum' and having now a 'useful road map.' It reported on 'good progress today in Brussels' and to the 'dialogue for normalisation of their relations' which referred to Serbia and Kosovo. There were calls to be 'ready to be solidar(ity)' with those 'arriving' at our 'doorstep. Naturally, there were contrary messages talking about 'building walls against migrants' in these 'turbulent times' of 'struggles with flood of migrants.'

Another topic of the summit was captured by the following tweet: 'EU_Commission should get in the fast lane on #Iran's #gas; first crucial step.' The credo for the EU's business and economy was formulated as 'economy is engine for growth' and 'to 'strike deals.' On the other hand, there were noises on Twitter about 'trade secrets,' 'behind the scenes,' and 'back deals.' Finally, general announcements such as 'Europarl_EN to abolish #roaming in EU & set out his plans,' could leave twitter positively charged. As mentioned previously, posts on official EU accounts/ channels seek attention and often dialogue, one of such tweets says it all, the 'EUCouncil must listen to the people' and perhaps even 'act now.'

The EU Summit was an EU event and based on its twitter 'performance' the EU was more engaged in Twitter communications than during the G7 summit. Among its good practices demonstrated during the EU Summit, the EU engaged with each topic listed on the agenda, has featured a detectable positive outlook and rendered a sense of community through its messages. Yet, when it comes to the engagement with citizens, this analysis did not identify 'dialogic' tweets. These were difficult to identify (not impossible, if proper software is used). Future research should look into the examination of the dialogic tweets between the EU and the receivers of its messages, especially given the fact of the members of the public being straight forward on EU accounts/ channels. It is recommended to undertake the research on Twitter dialogues alongside the already suggested longitudinal monitoring while employing both exploratory and in-depth analyses techniques.

5 FINAL CONCLUSIONS

This analysis of the social platform of Twitter concerned messages posted during three events in 2015 – Europe Day, the G7 Summit and the EU Summit – with the task to monitor the EU profiles in Twitter in their projection, communication and reception. Two types of methodology were applied – exploratory analysis (in three cases) and the in-depth analysis (in the cases of G7 and EU Summit). The events were different in scope and in their agenda. While Europe Day was celebrated both in the EU and outside it, G7 Summit and the EU Summit took place in Europe. Comparison across the three cases points to some similarities and differences in EU images discussed in this summary, followed by a set of recommendations.

For both events chosen for the in-depth analysis (G7 and EU Summits), the total data collected for exploratory analysis was too large for the manual in-depth analysis; therefore, for these two case-studies smaller datasets were created through the application of 'filters' for relevant tweets/ retweets according to different criteria. The filtering took into consideration the hashtags related to the events and all official EU accounts/ channels. All in all there were four filters in the case of the G7 Summit and five filters in the EU Summit case resulting in four and five datasets respectively). The G7 Summit dataset consisted of 632 analysed tweets/ retweets, while the EU Summit datasets contained altogether 738 analysed messages. The distribution according to individual filters is following: for G7: Filter 1 (56); Filter 2 (361); Filter 3 (112); and Filter 4 (103); for EU Summit: Filter 1 (72), Filter 2 (282), Filter 3 (138), Filter 4 (190) and Filter 5 (56).

Assessing the **visibility**, the G7 Summit was not well profiled by the EU in terms of the volume or depth of communication. This finding is based on the exploratory analysis as well as on the outcomes of the in-depth analysis that employed filters (thus the decision to focus more on EU communications during the EU Summit in the in-depth analysis in order to work with more meaningful and representative data). G7 Summit tweets/ retweets often neither represented EU communications, nor did they contain references to the EU. Predictably, most of the messages from the EU that projected the EU's position during the G7 and EU Summit events were produced by the key EU institutions, their officials and their press agencies. Occasionally, visibility of the projected positions was enhanced through Twitter communications by different EU DGs, but this was mostly the case of posts during the EU Summit. The greatest numbers of tweets concerning the EU were posted on official EU accounts/ channels, as opposed to hashtags (event specific or EU general hashtags). Regardless, the EU actors were typically cast into the major roles in the messages observed in the two cases. Only occasionally the EU and its actors were presented with secondary or minor degree of centrality. Most of the tweets/ retweets were long (80-140) characters. Of note, it has been identified in the G7 data that the single most retweeted message was medium in length, but included a link to a short video clip.

In the G7 case, the EU and its actors were not found to be the dominant authors of the majority of the messages analysed. This conclusion is based on both the exploratory and in-depth analysis. This is not surprising as this global event was not organised by the EU. While it is true that the EU institutions which produced most of the EU related tweets during the G7 Summit projected or communicated EU as a major actor in terms of the centrality, the number of such tweets was limited. Some of the EU-centred messages in the G7 Summit sample originated from the non-EU sources (meaning that their authors were non-EU

entities). This suggests that the EU has enjoyed some international attention and struck global resonance. If one of the priorities of the EU is to communicate itself globally, this finding indicates there is global audience which already engages in social media exchanges while focusing on the EU. Hence, studies of EU social media profiles – especially when it comes to the EU's participation in major global events – should not omit examination of non-EU authors alongside the EU authors of the tweets.

Keeping in mind the filters applied, most of the tweets referencing the EU in the case of the EU Summit were posted by either EU officials or EU institutions. This might be different if the entire volume of EU Summit tweets/ retweets were examined. In our case some filters specifically targeted EU entities as producers or authors of messages. Arguably, the authorship could correlate with the evaluations of the EU (especially visible through the analysis of the conceptual metaphors) – greater twitter activity of the EU authors during the EU Summit was perhaps the reason for more positive profiles of the EU in this case vis-à-vis more negative EU profiles in the case of the G7 tweets.

The number of references to the EU actors in the G7 sample was high, considering the limited overall amount of EU-centred messages within G7 sample. The references to EU actors within the EU Summit tweets/ retweets were even more frequent. This could be due to a large share of messages produced by EU authors, or the fact that the EU Summit was an EU-specific event, in contrast to the G7 Summit. Topics discussed during the EU Summit also had more references to the EU. However, there were tweets/ retweets in the EU Summit sample which also contained a few references to the non-EU actors.

In the case of the G7 Summit, the EU (with its actors and institutions) was predominantly framed as a *political* actor as well as an actor in *social and cultural* affairs. Since Twitter carries evidence of both the text and the opinion, this finding suggests that the EU was perceived by the authors of the tweets mainly as a political and sociocultural player in the global context. In contrast with the G7 case, the EU Summit tweets framed the EU mostly from political perspective, with profiles in economy and social and cultural affairs being second and third respectively. Significantly, the most visible images of the EU as a political actor in both cases carried pronounced normative features. In both cases, the EU was seen to be associated with the norms of human rights, good governance and sustainable development. While the majority of the EU's normative profiles were commented on from a natural perspective, positive and positive-to-neutral posts within both the G7 and EU Summit samples portrayed the EU actors in terms good governance, human rights, democracy, peace and sustainable development. When the EU was acting in the political sphere, good governance, human rights, democracy, and peace were mentioned. In the field of development, tweets commented on peace and democracy. In the sociocultural sphere, human rights were mentioned, and EU actions in environment attracted comments that noted sustainable development. Importantly, comments about the EU's actions around human rights also received a fair share of negative comments – and this is specifically the case in the comments about how the EU is coping with the irregular migration. Arguably, the thematic and normative frames are partly determined by the agenda of the events chosen for analysis. Thus, future studies should consider monitoring of EU profiles on social platforms through a wider range of major events, with the view of tracing a broader spectrum of the EU's projection, communication and reception.

Assessing the emotive element in the EU Twitter profiles, the tool of conceptual metaphors was instrumental in uncovering a more nuanced insight into the images of the EU than the generic assessment of EU evaluation. The exploratory analysis revealed that almost two thirds of the tweets did not convey a sentiment towards the EU. The in-depth analysis echoed this finding, with most of the analysed tweets/ retweets selected through filters also being neutral in connotations about the EU. Nevertheless, the conceptual metaphors helped to have a closer look into the evaluations and see that some messages that could be seen as neutral in the exploratory analysis, carried evaluation by means of conceptual metaphors. Metaphors, due to their emotional and cognitive appeal, are often argued to result in powerful impression in political communication. The examination of the posts containing conceptual metaphors during the G7 event revealed a more negative image of the EU and its actors. In contrast, the analysis of the tweets during the EU Summit showed a relatively balanced profile of the Union, with an almost even ratio of negative vs. positive metaphorical images. Perhaps, the fact that the EU was in charge of communicating this EU-focused event has influenced the production of more positive metaphorical images of the EU.

To conclude, our insights into the EU's Twitter communications prove that during the EU Summit the EU showed itself as a capable communicator who has established a good grasp of social media. The challenging agenda of the summit was reflected through the Twitter communications, projecting a message of a united entity and community, as well as of leadership and determination to counterbalance negative (and sometimes abusive) communications towards the EU. However, our in-depth analysis – due to human and resource limitations – dealt only with a relatively small sample of tweets. Moreover, it was intentionally focused on an event which was high on the EU agenda. Further studies could assess EU communications during less visible events, as well as through a variety of major global events. The latter direction of studies is prompted by our analysis of the EU's projections and communications during the G7 Summit. This global event demonstrated that EU communications during it did not sufficiently project the EU's strategies and visions.

The list of recommendations following this report notes good practices which can be preserved and replicated, as well as suggestions where to improve EU communications via Twitter. Perhaps, the greatest potential of EU communications through this social media platform is a chance to engage in a truly 'cosmopolitan dialogue' (Miskimmon et al. 2013) and therefore a direct democracy of a sort. In this light, further quantitative and in-depth qualitative research of EU social media communications and images, including systematic examinations of the dialogic tweets[20] and on-going enhancement of the methods, is critical. Remarkably, for the communications coming from the EU, the EU and its audience were not identified to be engaged in a dialogic conversation. The responses to citizens (if there were any) took the form of press releases or links to speeches. While featuring useful information, these messages could be improved by direct dialogic address to the citizens. The public – in the EU and around the world – seems to be eager to communicate directly with the EU and its actors. This offers a unique opportunity to boost the EU's profile and start a genuine dialogue inside Europe and outside its borders. A respectful dialogue is a prerequisite for any successful Public Diplomacy outreach, be it inside the Union or outside it. Perhaps a good start would be to communicate strategically – with those members of the public who already show interest in EU affairs – and narrate the EU actions through a set of positive conceptual

---

[20] A direct conversation between the EU (official and/ or institution) and the other (EU and/ or not-EU other).

metaphors already entrenched in the public arenas in the EU and in various locations around the world.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations are based on the following sources.
- Findings of this quantitative and in-depth qualitative study.
- Extensive reading of tweets/ retweets.
- Inductive study method which included: monitoring of event related tweets/ retweets, accounts/ channels and hashtags; a pilot study in terms of coding small sample of tweets and retweets based on Europe Day data; training in media analysis; working with the team of coders and Twitter experts; engaging with literature.

The recommendation can be divided according to EU objectives/ future intentions in regards to the Twitter
- Monitor tweets/retweets
- Increase visibility/ perception of the EU
- Engage with public

6.1 Monitor Tweets and Retweets

- Monitor all types of tweets/ retweets and tweets/ retweets of all lengths:
  - Comment type of tweets (personal communication or advertisement of speeches / actions / positions / events).
  - Primitive or rude/ entertaining tweets/retweets.
  - News jacking type of tweets/ retweets (accumulated sequence of hashtags and accounts/ channels included as well as links to news/ videos/ pictures).
- Monitor tweets/ retweets regularly and/ or continuously (non-stop) and/ or in times of events/ meetings/ negotiations and/ or randomly; monitoring is essential.
- The analysis of monitored data requires quantitative and qualitative methods, but preferably in-depth methods over certain time period. Focus needs to be on several variables and several frames and themes, including conceptual metaphors.

6.2 Increase Visibility and Perception of the EU

- Be active on Twitter, this way you can raise your own profile and visibility easily, quickly and cheaply. Even the British Queen is on Twitter.
- You can raise the profile of your other engagements or official channels by attaching their links to your tweets/ retweets (your websites, videos, speeches and so on).
- If you are going to be active on Twitter from now on, consider running a campaign in this regard and be prepared for it and for the time after (don't be taken by surprise – you can hire interns – e.g. media students who can help you to deal with the influx of tweets/ retweets. They can also keep you Twitter savvy and improve or design for you attractive profiles).
- After the campaign and after some time with your new approach, consider scheduling in a similar study to this in order to examine changes in perceptions of the EU over time – adjust or change your approach accordingly.
- You can advertise, as a part of your online Twitter campaign, how IT and ICT friendly the EU is, for example highlighting the Union's achievements in regards to phone charges/ Facebook or online EP elections (if you are preparing for some) and always end on the note that citizens can reach their MEPs and representatives in the

Commission and even individual Commissioners through Twitter (have some self-promotion of your achievements but not too much).

- Have a central portal with all your Twitter accounts, emails and telephones in order to be truly easily accessible. It took considerable time in some cases to identify all the 118 EU accounts/ channels. Have this list monitored and regularly updated. Have a help section there, where citizens can leave their messages if they request contact information in case they still cannot find it through that website. This centralised website should be advertised and should include all EU institutions as well as links to EU Delegations abroad and EU Strategic Partners with all their available twitter accounts, emails and phones.
- Consider developing software which is capable of monitoring how many people read or view your tweets/ retweets, visibility based on the number of retweets is not a reliable indicator.
- No day without a tweet - engage in tweeting and retweeting, read all types of tweets.
- Learn the best practices in regards to tweeting from international entities (USA – embassies, companies and civil societies); follow academic articles; learn from best practice of your own colleagues, some of them were identified in this study DG Clima and Maroš Ševcovič; learn from popular celebrities). Raise your own Twitter celebrities, the effect is better and some of them already exist, because many of the tweets, especially those seeking communication address EU officials/ individuals.
- Post tweets and retweets on other EU accounts/ channels and EU hashtags in order to create an interconnected web of users, this will eventually translate to increased visibility. It also looks good in the eyes of the public to see interconnectedness.
- Post tweets and retweets on general hashtags and accounts/ channels, for example in regards to particular events and discussions; these engage a wider audience, and it can also potentially increase the number of your followers.
- Post tweets and retweets at the peak time – don't miss the 'tweet traffic' as it works on the 'geyser effect,' especially if the topic or event is highly relevant to your agenda or if it is one you want to break in.
- Engage in posting tweets and retweets on your wider network – Delegations to third parties, 10 non-EU Strategic Partners (there was hardly any communication from their accounts aside from the US and Canada on a few occasions, this includes areas of strategic importance, Middle East, or Africa and so on). Twitter can help you to communicate with migrants, as many of them are misinformed about what to expect in Europe – this can help them to ensure safe passage, they are communicating with their smugglers via smartphones….
- Read the tweets/ retweets posted on your account/ channels, and preferably respond to them. This leads to the third set of advice, which argues for engagement in dialogue with public through the Twitter.

6.3 Dialogue with Citizens (EU and non-EU)

- The rationale for engaging in dialogue with citizens or other authors who post tweets on your accounts/ channels is that they are usually bringing something to your attention, by posting it particularly on your account/ channel. This means that in most times it will have relevance to your work. Some of the tweets/ retweets can be in CAPITAL or have emotional language, including the use of metaphors, which in a way emphasises the messages being put forward to you – such dialogues can further develop; nevertheless, they can enhance direct democracy.

- Dialogue is a quick and relatively cheap way to gain information, ideas, or feedback on topics which are designed for public anyway.
- Eventually you can identify authors with whom you can launch an ongoing or sporadic communication in order to test your ideas or in order for them to spread your ideas, information, policies, or statements.
- Dialogue can engage grassroots and citizens of variety demographics and other backgrounds which seem to be essential in the atmosphere of political apathy and democratic deficit – dialogue can improve your democratic deficit.
- Dialogue is free and quick press without being manipulated.
- Dialogue can turn into a survey type testing device, regular or event necessary.
- Dialogue can be an additional tool to your regular/ normal social media practice. You don't need to change your practice but add dialogue, perhaps gradually.
- Dialogue can help you to build natural 'allies' out of those people who already communicate with you and/ or retweet your 'boring' (Sheftalovich 2015) tweets. They either monitor your tweets/ retweets – out of interest or for their work/ study. Many of them have genuine interest in what you do so by engaging with them through dialogue, they can help to increase your profile or even become your 'spin-tweet-doctors.'
- Dialogue is advisable because Twitter is powerful, instant, unpredictable and an effective tool – geyser effect (it was pivotal in the Arab Spring or in organisation of student protests in the UK), master its use and learn about similar platform used in China.
- Dialogue should be sought after in each event which you plan to monitor, international is as important as regional and vice-versa.
- Study dialogic tweets/ retweets and develop a procedure to identify them.

6.4 Further Research and Recommendations

This study recommends the following ideas for consideration and further study:

- It argues that the inductive character of studying social media is an inevitable part of this research which required a large amount of time, posing a challenge for researchers (ongoing identifying and monitoring relevant hashtags and official EU accounts/ channels; and the filtering of datasets for in-depth analysis, due to the large list of hashtags and accounts/ channels for monitoring). However, ultimately these depend on the objectives and the timeframe allocated for such research and have a potential to result in a voluminous useful data as was the case of this study.
- Miskimmon et al. (2013) idea that the online platform offers 'for the first time, normative models of public spheres and cosmopolitan dialogue' seems to be a highly relevant observation; it requires further study of Twitter communications, especially of dialogic tweets, which are at this stage difficult to identify.
- The observation of the communication and the clustering of messages and their content suggest the need for further examination of a 'geyser effect'. It is captured by Figure 11 below, illustrating one of the findings of data analysis and describes different peaks of Twitter communication, so-called 'Twitter traffic.' It reveals that the 'peaks' in communication could follow the patterns of the 'hot topics', or could be sporadic, or follow the agenda. Importantly, communications could be also strategically released to narrate certain agenda. This 'geyser effect' in connection with 'twitter traffic' should be examined during major events as well as 'uneventful'

periods to gain comparative understanding of the effect. Furthermore, it should ideally consist of exploratory quantitative analysis in combination with the in-depth qualitative analysis of the data. Depending on the scale of the study, it would have to employ a number of filters (discussed below) in order to create a workable qualitative dataset.

Figure 11. The total number of hourly tweets collected for all searches combined

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bain, Jessica, and Natalia Chaban (forthcoming 2016). 'Emerging Eu Strategic Narrative?: Twitter Dialogues on the EU's Sustainable Energy Week.' *Comparative European Politics.*

Castells, Manuel (2009), ed. *Communication Power.* Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.

Chaban, Natalia, Allan M. Williams, Martin Holland, Valerie Boyce, and Frendehl Warner (2011), 'Crossing Cultures: Analysing the Experiences of NZ Returnees from the EU (UK Vs. Non-UK)', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 35/6: 776-790.

Chaban, Natalia, and Jessica Bain (2015a), 'An Emerging EU Strategic Narrative and Twitter Communication During the EU's Sustainable Energy Week.' Paper presented at the NZ EUCN International Symposium *Strategic Narratives of Identity*, University of Canterbury, Christchurch.

Chaban, Natalia, and Jessica Bain (2015b). 'Gazing in the Mirror? An Emerging EU Strategic Narrative and Twitter Communication During the EU's Sustainable Energy Week.' Paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) 56th Annual Convention, New Orleans.

Chaban, Natalia, and Martin Holland (2014), eds., *Communicating Europe in the Times of Crisis: External Perceptions of the European Union*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Chaban, Natalia and Martin Holland (2008), eds., *The European Union and the Asia-Pacific*. Routledge, London.

Entman, Robert M. (2003), ed., *Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame after 9/11*, Taylor & Francis Inc., New York.

Holland, Martin, and Natalia Chaban (2014), eds., *Europe and Asia: Perceptions from Afar*, Nomos, Baden-Baden.

Miskimmon, Alister Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle (2013), *Stategic Narratives, Communication Power and the New World Order*. Routledge, New York.

Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O'Loughlin (2014), 'Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power', *Media, War & Conflict*, 7/1.

Sheftalovich, Zoya (2015), 'Twitter Takes Politics by Storm, EC by Drizzle - Politico Analyzes the European Commission's Best and Worst Tweeters', *Politico*, July 2.

LIST OF APPENDIXES

ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU AND EU'S POLICIES ABROAD

ANNEX VI – KEY POINTS FROM STOCK TAKING REPORT

December 07, 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 CONTENTS

1 STOCK TAKING OF EU PD ACTIVITIES

Public Diplomacy (PD) activities differ starkly across all 10 EU Strategic Partner (SP) countries,[1] depending on the Delegation's human and financial resources and the depth and status of relations between the EU and the respective country. This Stock Taking Report (STR) is based on semi-structured qualitative interviews with all EU Delegations in EU Strategic Partner countries and a thorough systematic review of current and past EU public diplomacy initiatives. In general, civil society engagement activities seem to be rather underdeveloped within Delegations' PD outreach while Delegations describe their cultural diplomacy as well as their outreach to newsmakers as fairly strong; external perceptions differ from this assessment.[2] EU Delegations increasingly rely on and enhance social media and digital outreach, yet interviewees emphasise the necessity for more and better trainings on opportunities, challenges and usefulness of social media as a PD tool. Beyond resources, challenges span limited geographical outreach of the EUDs being located in capitals only and their constrained infrastructure, language barriers, perceived lack of charisma/ communication skills of the of the diplomats, structural/ institutional tensions within the EUDs, challenging media environments, local scepticism due to negative historical legacies (e.g. colonialism), and a simple lack of awareness and interest towards the EU in third countries.

Other major actors – namely, China, the US, the UN and NATO – have significantly increased the overall amount of digital diplomacy efforts, diversified the arsenal of PD tools[3] intensified the focus on younger generations and enhanced educational, cultural and exchange opportunities in their respective PD outreach activities. A systematic on-going assessment of the best practices of the big global 'players' in their PD efforts towards the SPs can be fed to the EUD practices in the respective countries.

Main objectives for future PD identified by EU Delegations include the identification and determination of the most relevant target groups for EU PD messages, the promotion of the EU as an entity which despite all crises remains united, a powerful foreign policy/ security/ environmental/ sustainable energy actor; and the promotion of (higher) education opportunities and exchanges in the EU Member States. Interviewees expressed the demand and necessity for the EU to improve its outreach on a strategic level. This would include establishing a comprehensive Public Diplomacy framework and strategy with centralised core messages and decentralised implementation approaches that leaves sufficient flexibility and capabilities to Delegations on the operational level in order to adapt outreach to national and local contexts. In this regard, many key requirements in terms of strategies and tools are already in place and can serve either as best practices/ sources of inspiration, or avenues that are in place but need improvement. Policies such as the European Neighbourhood Policy and its entailed instruments for example can eventually serve as a basis for an over-arching PD strategy – also for addressing distant partners. Yet, this should not lead to a 'one-size-fits-all' approach as SP countries starkly differ on various levels. Overlaps and opportunities

---

[1] The 10 EU Strategic Partner countries encompass Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA

[2] As previous research on perceptions has shown. See the main study 'Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU's Policies Abroad', particularly Chapters 2 and 3.

[3] Examples here are e.g. 'celebrity' diplomacy, 'NGO' diplomacy, 'diaspora' diplomacy, 'business' diplomacy, 'energy' diplomacy, etc.

within the set of existing strategies need to be better identified in EEAS HQs and communicated to Delegations and between existing programmes in order to operate more efficiently and coherently. Working towards joint strategies with Member States is necessary to better synchronise outreach in respective third countries and reinforce messages wherever necessary and possible. Multi-annual PD frameworks and accumulated PD budgets, including combined 'visibility' positions in different project, on a country level are seen as crucial in order to guarantee consistency, credibility and capacity-building. Furthermore, regular and systematic evaluation cycles – so far not always a standard part of Delegation outreach initiatives – are seen as crucial, as is a centralised platform to share lessons learned and assess impact. Involvement of local experts in planning stages is critical. Paying attention to nuances, non-Eurocentric attitudes, attentive listening, respectful dialogue and true mutually-beneficial collaboration are the key words that have come up both in the STR and the major study it complements: the 'Stock Taking Report of Practises in EU Public Diplomacy Outreach' supplements the Final Report of the joint study 'Analysis of the Perception of the EU and EU's Policies Abroad'[4] aiming to provide fundamental insights for designing an over-arching, comprehensive EU Public Diplomacy strategy. This Report is based on insights drawn from four sources: A) semi-structured qualitative interviews with EU Delegation staff in all EU Strategic Partner countries, B) selected, non-representative, semi-structured qualitative interviews with elite groups[5] C) publicly available information on EU strategies and initiatives and D) internal Delegation documents. The report is structured along four lines of interest: I) EU strategies and capabilities organised according to key themes for EU PD outreach, II) Benchmarking actors' activities and local conditions, III) EU Delegations' activities in the EU's SP countries, and IV) Existing research on EU PD.

1.1 Country specific recommendations

1.1.1 Brazil

* Focus on the concurrent distribution of information via a) social media and b) radio to positively affect the outreach activities, due to Brazil's size and diversity in publics, media access and infrastructural conditions,
* Set up a mission in Sao Paolo to effectively broaden activity scope and outreach.
* Enhance cooperation in selected focus areas of common interest (economy, trade, environmental protection and climate change), to overall improve EU-Brazil relations.
* Reach a broader audience by nurturing EU-Brazil collaborations on environment protection and climate change issues.

1.1.2 Canada

* Move from trade promotion to the active promotion of CSDP aspects to increase the scope of EU PD messages.

---

[4] This grant study is built on a systematic, empirically rigorous mapping of images and perceptions of the EU, drawing on several methods, that indicate the many nuanced shades in recognition and reception of the EU by third countries.

[5] Pre-identified elite groups are: business, academia and think tanks, media, civil society, policy-makers, youth and general public. Interviews are non-representative due to a relatively small sample.

* Reduce significantly bureaucratic and hierarchic hurdles – within the EEAS administration (in Brussels and between Brussels and Delegations) and in the budget application processes – that to date consume 'disproportional' resources.
* Aim for smoother and in time-coordination among DGs' services in order to contribute to planning of EU Delegations.
* Delegate the tailoring adjustment of PD strategies/ implementation details to national conditions and regional contexts to the EU Delegation.

1.1.3 China

* Use tools, such as positively connoted messages on visa or enhanced trade facilitation, as incentives for positive development in order to pave the way for more sensitive thematic messages.
* Focus on the strengths and areas where the EU is actually perceived as an example of best practice (e.g. combating climate change, clean energies etc.) when communicating messages.
* Provide lump sum budgets and let EU Delegations allocate funding as they are well-informed about the national and regional context and the main actors within it (e.g. currently EU Delegations are not involved in any monitoring of DEVCO funded projects; each of these has individual, small visibility budgets).
* Cooperate on joint Outreach Activities across DGs, Brussels HQ and Delegation and for a better cooperation with Member States as only 'strong, coordinated' activities attract attention.
* Develop and distribute more creative online content to reach Chinese general public.

1.1.4 India

* Provide more seminars and trainings for Delegation members to improve PD and social media skills and make use of capacities more effectively.
* Organise more high level visits to shape a powerful and present image of the EU as Indian media are reluctant to cover EU issues and require a profound 'India Angle.'
* Make sure of mutual commitments to joint (education) projects through signing formal agreements with potential partners.

1.1.5 Japan

* Extend networks to areas outside Tokyo and other bigger cities as collaborating with local partners is key to successful outreach activities in Japan.
* Provide inputs from Brussels HQ in time as not only time zone differences, but also time needed for translating into Japanese needs to be taken into account.
* Provide for sufficient resources to ensure timely information in Japanese.

1.1.6 Mexico

* Encourage Member States with a long experience in PD to share their experiences and best practices and establish adequate platform and institutionalised processes for sharing.
* Provide stronger incentives (such as Europe-Trips as prizes for competitions) when attempting to sell the EU (not just Europe or individual Member States) via cultural diplomacy.

* Design financial resources more flexible in order to avoid time-consuming bureaucracy and to respond fast to events and arising necessities.

1.1.7 Russia

* Exchange information on most recent developments and events and adjust messages fast and continuously as a reactive instead of active approach runs the risk of undermining the EU's credibility.
* Use enhanced exchange with EU Member States to make (in-town) experts available that are instrumental for successful EU PD.
* Strive for a better coordination of a joint (strong) stance among EU and individual Member States.
* Actively resist attempts of political intimidation, and encourage and support local actors.
* Enhance non-political outreach (education, local/ urban development) as a response to a direct and significant demand on the Russian society's side, keeping channels of communication open.
* Design flexible PD activities on a local level relating to local conditions, integrated into an overarching framework with centrally determined set of EU main objectives and core messages.
* Use pipeline infrastructure and technology in PD messages as oil and gas are a powerful commodity needed by Europeans which Russians are generally very proud to possess.

1.1.8 South Africa

* Continuously address the fact that Europe is not a colonial, oppressive power anymore when developing Public Diplomacy activities in South Africa.
* Design PD outreach in South Africa 'more humble' as the EU and its representatives are regarded as arrogant and disparaging.
* Further enhance mixed outreach approaches aiming at specific target groups as well as the general public in order to broaden outreach: cultural activities pose a good platform in this regard.

1.1.9 South Korea

* Better tailor and frame EU messages in order for Korean general public to accept and welcome them.
* Designed more outreach (information as well as events) in Korean language to broaden the scope of targeted audiences.
* Enhance emphasis on pressing political issues with high public interest, such as the conflict with North Korea.
* Set a multi-annual budget in order to assure greatest possible flexibility on the ground.
* Substitute work and role of EU Centres that will be closed through new Centres of Excellence and other outreach activities.
* Organise an online film festival providing a good opportunity to attract (media) attention.

1.1.10 USA

* Allocate further resources to reaching out to new target groups (Latino/ Hispanic community).
* Address increasing demand for climate diplomacy.

* Use high level visits, such as popular HR/ VP to increase focus on EU foreign policy messages.
* Enhance use of social media and E-diplomacy, ever more important tools to reach out to (distant) publics.

1.2 Aggregated key recommendations

* Determine a common set of core messages for the EU with Member States relating to an aggregated Public Diplomacy (PD) framework in Strategic Partner countries (general EU messages and country specific emphases).
* Establish an EU PD Strategy Committee in Brussels consisting among others of local experts, academics researching in this field and Delegation staff in charge of regular evaluations of impact and implementation of EU's PD.
* Create a data pool of on-going EU PD initiatives and their impact assessment, sharing lessons learned among Delegations. Keep it updated on an annual basis.
* Create a data pool of on-going PD initiatives by big global players – established and emerging powers such as China, the United States, Canada and Korea, UN, NATO, – and their impact assessment, sharing lessons learned among Delegations. Keep it updated on an annual basis.
* Further embrace the use of online/ social media to target civil society, promoting 'e-diplomacy.' Train EU Delegations staff accordingly and repeatedly along new technological developments.
* Develop a clear, comprehensive PD Strategy based on attentive listening and dialogue with third countries to point out priorities, key messages, and a toolkit for potential outreach activities, which EU Delegations can individually adjust in a country-specific and target group-oriented approach to the local context.
* Provide a multi-annual, increased lump sum budget to Delegations that also integrates various visibility positions of DEVCO projects.
* Slim down bureaucratic and hierarchical hurdles between DGs, EEAS HQ and Delegations and within PD activities budgetary processes to use less (human) resources for the administration of PD activities.
* Take into account regional and local specificities when developing a comprehensive EU Public Diplomacy Strategy, use local experts to test and fine tune the outreach activities, and hence make sure that Delegations are provided with sufficient flexibility 'on the ground' attuned to local experts and themes.
* Design over-arching PD strategy which determines priorities while leaving sufficient flexibility to adjust outreach to local contexts and which includes a further enhanced use of e-diplomacy as an instrumental tool to reach out to more (distant) publics.