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ANNEX I

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the 2022 annual action plan for the global threats part of the thematic programme on peace, stability and conflict prevention

Action Document for Counterterrorism

ANNUAL PLAN
This document constitutes the annual work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, and action plans in the sense of Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2021/947 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe.

1. SYNOPSIS

1.1. Action Summary Table

1. Title CRIS/OPSYS business reference Basic Act	**Counterterrorism** OPSYS/CRIS[1] number: ACT-60757 Financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe) Regulation			
2. Team Europe Initiative	No			
3. Zone benefiting from the action	The action shall be carried out worldwide.			
4. Programming document	Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention Thematic Programme 2021 – 2027			
5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives/expected results	NDICI-Global Europe – Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention Thematic Programme (2021-2027) Area of intervention: Global, trans-regional and emerging threats Priority 4 – Counterterrorism, including preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalisation Specific objective 1: Support multilateral action in the fight against terrorism and the effectiveness of relevant regional and multilateral counterterrorism bodies and fora.			
PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION				
6. Priority Area(s), sectors	Global, trans-regional and emerging threats 152 - Conflict, Peace & Security			
7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	Main SDG: 16 (Promote Peace and end violence) Other significant SDGs and targets: 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls)			
8 a) DAC code(s)	15210 – Security system management and reform - 100 %			
8 b) Main Delivery Channel	PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS - 10000			
9. Targets	☐ Migration ☐ Climate ☒ Social inclusion and Human Development ☒ Gender ☐ Biodiversity ☐ Education ☒ Human Rights, Democracy and Governance			
10. Markers (from DAC form)	**General policy objective**	**Not targeted**	**Significant objective**	**Principal objective**
	Participation development/good governance	☐	☐	☒

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[1] Depending on the availability of OPSYS at the time of encoding, a provisional CRIS number may need to be provided.

	Aid to environment	☒	☐	☐
	Gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment	☒	☐	☐
	Trade development	☒	☐	☐
	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	☒	☐	☐
	Disaster Risk Reduction	☒	☐	☐
	Inclusion of persons with disabilities	☒	☐	☐
	Nutrition	☒	☐	☐
	RIO Convention markers	**Not targeted**	**Significant objective**	**Principal objective**
	Biological diversity	☒	☐	☐
	Combat desertification	☒	☐	☐
	Climate change mitigation	☒	☐	☐
	Climate change adaptation	☒	☐	☐
11. Internal markers and Tags:	**Policy objectives**	**Not targeted**	**Significant objective**	**Principal objective**
	Digitalisation	☒	☐	☐
	Tags: digital connectivity		☐	☐
	digital governance		☐	☐
	digital entrepreneurship		☐	☐
	job creation		☐	☐
	digital skills/literacy		☐	☐
	digital services		☐	☐
			☐	☐
	Connectivity	☒	☐	☐
	Tags: transport		☐	☐
	people2people		☐	☐
	energy		☐	☐
	digital connectivity		☐	☐
			☐	☐
	Migration (methodology for tagging under development)	☒	☐	☐
	Reduction of Inequalities (methodology for marker and tagging under development)	☒	☐	☐
	Covid-19	☒	☐	☐
BUDGET INFORMATION				
12. Amounts concerned	Budget line(s) (article, item): BGUE-B2022-14.020230 – STABILITY AND PEACE - GLOBAL AND TRANSREGIONAL THREATS Total estimated cost: EUR 27 000 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 27 000 000			
MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION				
13. Type of financing	Project Modality **Direct management** through: Service contracts and Grants **Indirect management** with UNOCT			

1.2. Summary of the Action

This action aims at disrupting terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism and bringing terrorists to justice in full respect of human rights and the rule of law, and enhancing the resilience of vulnerable people and communities to violent extremism and terrorist recruitment.

In particular, the action will contribute to compliance in line with the recommendations of the 2020 EU Council Conclusions on Counterterrorism that, recalling its conclusions on EU priorities in UN Human Rights Fora of 17 February 2020, underline that "all counterterrorism measures must be conducted in full compliance with EU core values including the rule of law, and in full compliance with international law, in particular international human rights law, humanitarian law and international refugee law."

Component 1: This component aims to provide additional support to the fight against terrorism through the already established **EU-UN Global Terrorist Threat Facility** (GTTF). As the threat posed by terrorism to international peace and security is on the rise, notably in Africa and the Middle East, the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the vulnerabilities of UN Member States and affected their capacity to effectively combat terrorism, in particular in conflict zones. The action provides a framework for the delivery of rapid response and quick impact interventions to

support UN Member States facing an increase in terrorist threats and requiring tailored assistance to effectively counter terrorism and offer security, while ensuring compliance with international law, human rights and the rule of law. The proposed action will add to the contribution of 2021 to operationalize the UN-EU Framework on Counterterrorism and is in line with the EU Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism[2], the United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy, and relevant Security Council resolutions.

Component 2: **CT CLOSE** This component will continue to enhance local capacities in terms of information collection, analysis and counter terrorism reinforcing national administrations in selected countries. The action focuses on technical assistance to strengthen resilience to the threat of terrorism promoting a rule of law–based response to terrorism. The action is expected to **enhance capacities of relevant entities** to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate with each other at national and regional levels as well as to **enable** the acquisition of relevant equipment (mainly IT and other equipment in full compliance with the human-rights-based approach) to selected countries.

Component 3: Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism (**STRIVE**) through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (**GCERF**). This component will provide support to GCERF, a multi-stakeholder global fund that works with local partners to strengthen community resilience to violent extremism. As an independent public-private partnership, GCERF directs resources to support initiatives led by, and benefiting, local communities that empower women, girls, boys, men and more specifically, persons living in vulnerable situations. GCERF focuses on local communities because they suffer the most from violent extremism, and because they are optimally situated to understand and act upon the drivers of violent extremism.

Component 4: The component **STRIVE Cities** aims to increase the resilience of cities and communities within them to violent extremism. Specifically, the action will seek to strengthen the capacity of cities to develop, implement and share good practices on preventing and countering violent extremism, support city-focused and driven initiatives for strengthening multi-stakeholder coordination and action, as well as increase the engagement of city leaders and practitioners with global and multilateral P/CVE frameworks and programmes.

All components will be implemented in full complementarity with bilateral and regional programmes and in coordination with EU Delegations and relevant units in INTPA and NEAR.

2. RATIONALE

2.1. Context

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to affect the threat posed by Daesh and Al-Qaida. In its 27th report, the United Nations Security Council's Al-Qaida Analytical Support and Monitoring Team noted that the threat of terrorism continued to rise especially in conflict zones, as the pandemic "inhibited forces of law and order more than terrorists." In addition, it stressed that the "consolidation of ISIL and/or Al-Qaida in other conflict zones would likely lead to the revival of external attack plans that would eventually have an impact on non-conflict zones", noting in particular the recent progress made by terrorist groups on the African continent.

Because terrorism is a transnational threat, information needs to be shared both within and between nations and multilateral bodies. Improving Counterterrorism requires investment in building capacity and capability in priority partner countries: as the upsurge in terrorist activity in Europe since 2015 has demonstrated, security threats abroad can have a direct and violent impact on security at home.

Terrorism and counterterrorism initiatives have a direct link with cybersecurity and digital aspects. The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy[3] highlighted the increased use by terrorist groups of information and communication technologies for planning and perpetrating terrorist attacks. Risks exist also with regards to the potential use of emerging technologies by terrorist entities. On the other side, new technologies offer potential to tackle the terrorist threat. The EU Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, encourages capacity building and exchanges with partner countries to maximise the benefits of new technologies for security services and to counter terrorists' misuse of new technologies.[4]

No area is immune from extremist tendencies and as a result, any coherent response must be tackled globally with

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[2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44446/st08868-en20.pdf
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/291
[3] https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/291
[4] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44446/st08868-en20.pdf

actions in every society. The spread of violent extremism over recent years poses a significant threat to the international community's efforts in promoting peace and security, as well as undermining progress made towards fostering sustainable development and upholding human rights.

The use of violence to further extreme ideological platforms, be they political, religious, and nationalist or other, is not a new phenomenon. However, the rise of violent extremist groups in recent years and the ease in which their messages of intolerance can be transmitted has called renewed attention and concern amongst policy makers and practitioners on the importance of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Mitigating the appeal of violent extremism amongst communities and vulnerable groups, particularly young people, is becoming a high priority for many countries around the world.

The international community's understanding of the terrorist and violent extremist threat and how best to counter and prevent it have evolved in important ways over the past twenty years. Three important points signal the growing relevance of cities in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE).

First, despite the emergence of increasingly global and interconnected terrorist networks over the years, many threats are locally rooted, with terrorist recruiters often targeting members of historically marginalized or excluded local communities as they seek to exploit political, social, and economic grievances.

Second, the increasing relevance of local contexts has led to growing recognition of the need for cities (and other local actors) to become involved in a discourse that was traditionally seen as falling within the exclusive purview of national governments, and national security actors in particular.

Third, despite this recognition, the disconnect between global or national level policymaking and local action remains. Consequently, the unique role that mayors and cities can play in bridging this gap (including by integrating hyper-local concerns into wider international and national government-driven counterterrorism agendas) and catalysing local action against extremist- and hate-motivated violence are still too often overlooked. National governments often fail to involve cities in their planning and programming around P/CVE; cities sometimes lack an appreciation of the unique contributions they can make to P/CVE; and P/CVE donors tend to prioritize support for national government and civil society capacity-building efforts, although this is beginning to change given increased understanding that cities, with support, can respond to the citizen's needs in ways that build community trust and social cohesion. All the while providing security and protecting democratic values, a response that national counterparts often cannot or will not deliver.

Cities have typically borne the brunt of attacks. They are often the first to respond and, in the long-term, suffer from the fallout of intercommunal tensions and economic slowdowns, which can last for years and spread beyond the target city. They also have wide-ranging contributions to make on preventing violent extremism from taking root in their communities and countering it when is does. For example, cities:

- can create open spaces which all citizens have access to, thus building social capital and contact among them and helping reduce drivers of violent extremism such as segregation, polarization, and perceptions of isolation and non-belonging;
- are well-placed to defuse tensions and build trust between local community members and local police and, more broadly, engage with community leaders, teachers, and youth and social workers;
- can serve as the connective tissue between national government strategies and plans, and local action to address violent extremism, ensuring the former are informed by local practice and perspectives and the latter is in line with national frameworks;
- are well-placed to identify issues of inter-community tension and hatred that might make community members vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment; and
- are adept at developing locally led approaches for preventing radicalization that draw upon the diverse programmes and resources to which they have access that many cities are using to prevent other forms of violence or promote well-being, including those related to housing, education, social welfare, sports, culture, and partnerships with local community-based organizations and the private sector.

The Strong Cities Network (SCN) is a 150-member city network launched at the United Nations in 2015 that supports the development of P/CVE efforts at the municipal level by connecting local leaders and officials to their counterparts in other cities, as well as to national-level authorities and the global P/CVE architecture. The SCN also facilitates knowledge exchange and capacity development, ultimately contributing to increased community resilience and social cohesion against extremist and other forms of violence and conflict. Select examples of the network's success insofar are: the three SCN global mayoral summits; the multi-actor local prevention networks as a result SCN engagement in cities in Bangladesh, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, and North Macedonia; the North-South city-level partnerships facilitated (whether between Dakar and Montreal, or Kristiansand and Mombasa); and the P/CVE toolkits developed

for cities, including on how to map hate and extremism or respond to a terrorist incident within a particular city.

Although launched at the Global Summit to Counter ISIS and Violent Extremism in September 2015, SCN's focus has extended well-beyond a narrow P/CVE lens. This is largely driven by the reality that, while cities have unique contributions to make to "whole of society" efforts to P/CVE, these threats are not the most pressing for most cities. Thus, the more these issues are framed as part of a broader approach to build more resilient and cohesive communities, and the more cities understand how existing resources can be leveraged to prevent extremist and other forms of violence, the more likely they will be interested in contributing to P/CVE efforts and engaging in the network.

SCN is joined by dozens of other international counterterrorism or P/CVE bodies or initiatives that have emerged since September 2001. However, it remains the only one with global reach dedicated to building P/CVE capacities and focused more broadly on the city level, targeting mayors and local practitioners involved in local planning and service delivery. A recent Danish MFA-funded assessment of SCN underscored this comparative advantage. As a result, it is helping to integrate P/CVE within areas that often fall under the purview of municipalities and other local authorities, such as education, sports and culture, social welfare, urban development, vocational training, and housing.

On a more strategic level, it has shined a spotlight on the need to strengthen cooperation between national and local authorities around P/CVE issues, including by identifying and overcoming the barriers to. This recognizes that enhanced vertical cooperation is essential to see more progress in translating the international and national P/CVE frameworks and good practices into local action. These issues featured prominently on the agenda of the 2018 SCN Summit and inspired the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) to develop the first set of international good practices on this topic. The GCTF, in cooperation with SCN, is now focusing on implementing these good practices in specific countries and regions. This will create new opportunities for national and local government policymakers and practitioners to strengthen existing, or develop new, collaborations around the P/CVE agenda.

Although the specific programme activities of each hub will depend on the particular needs and interests of the relevant SCN members in each region, they will focus on the following core areas: 1) facilitating the exchange of expertise, experience, challenges, and good practices among cities and other local authorities in each country and the region, including through regional or thematic working groups; 2) identifying and, where appropriate, delivering support to address capacity and other P/CVE needs and priorities of cities in the relevant region; 3) delivering activities designed to strengthen such cooperation (e.g., those linked to the implementation of the GCTF's good practices in national-local cooperation in P/CVE); 4) ensuring the voices of local leaders and the perspectives of cities are more consistently reflected in national and global P/CVE policymaking and programme development conversations; and 5) connecting young people with local governments and facilitating the development of youth-led, shared solutions to community challenges, such as hate, polarization and extremism.

Current and prospective SCN donors, including the United States, Denmark, and the Netherlands, are being asked to support either 1) a regional hub in one or two regions and a portion of the costs required to resource the central Management Unit that supports and connects the work across the hubs and the global level; and/or 2) an SCN workstream, e.g., on national-local cooperation or youth engagement. For reference, the Netherlands is expected to support an SCN regional hub in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Denmark is expected to support one in West Africa, and the United States is expected to support ones in the Western Balkans and South Asia.

The proposed STRIVE Cities action, which would be delivered under the auspices of the SCN and complement STRIVE GCERF and STRIVE Hedayah, is underpinned by a number of global P/CVE principles and trends. First, the recognition across a range of multilateral bodies (e.g., UN, GCTF, EU) on the critical role that local actors play in P/CVE and the need to invest more in building the capacity of such actors. Second, the growing awareness of the comparative advantages that cities have in P/CVE. Third, increased recognition of the barriers (e.g., political or capacity) that often need to be overcome for cities to be able to leverage those advantages. Fourth, while there are a number of ongoing efforts to support civil society-led P/CVE approaches in ODA-eligible countries, the recent Danish-funded MFA assessment confirmed that SCN remains the only global P/CVE initiative aimed at strengthening the P/CVE capacities of cities and enhancing their influence in national and global P/CVE policymaking. Finally, the recognized need for coordinated city-led action that supports and deepens "whole-of-society" approaches to prevention at local, national and regional levels.

EU funding will, inter alia, support the launch of SCN's regional hub that will cover East and Southern Africa and the delivery of SCN activities in those regions within the framework described above. Critically, the SCN regional hubs, with their focus on strengthening national and vertical cooperation with the relevant countries, can help address three challenges confronting the P/CVE policymakers and practitioners: 1) how to translate global P/CVE frameworks, including relevant GCTF good practice documents into local action; 2) how to provide more opportunities for city leaders and practitioners to connect more consistently on P/CVE issues of common concern with their counterparts (whether in a regional or thematic context); and 3) how to operationalize "whole of society"

approaches to P/CVE at a local level, including through the development of city-led local prevention networks, a model for which SCN has piloted in a number of ODA-eligible countries.

These regional hubs will provide a platform to strengthen cooperation between SCN and the GCTF, in particular the latter's working groups which have struggled as a result of not having presence in the relevant regions. This hubs would overcome such hindrances tos the ability to engage with local actors on a consistent basis regarding relevant GCTF activities and on local perspectives that need to more regularly inform the GCTF's work in those regions. In addition, the hubs will create opportunities for collaboration between SCN and the GCTF "inspired" institutions on the ground. For example, this could involve SCN-IIJ trainings of interested municipalities on how to design and implement multi-actor P/CVE intervention programmes (drawing on the recently-completed EU-funded IIJ curriculum on this topic). It might also allow for more synergies between GCERF-funded civil society organizations and the SCN member cities in which they are operating. Cities with the sufficient mandate and capacity can play an important role sustaining community-based CSO-led efforts and ensuring they are tied into a comprehensive local prevention framework and network.

Furthermore, much like previous Danish- and Dutch-funded SCN activities enabled relevant city-level P/CVE expertise and models in those countries to inform the development of tailored city-led P/CVE frameworks and programmes in ODA-eligible countries, EU-funded SCN work would allow relevant expertise and models from across the EU - including within its Radicalization Awareness Network - to be brought bear as SCN works with cities across these regions to build P/CVE capacities.

While including a particular focus on cities in East and Southern Africa, STRIVE Cities would also facilitate the participation in SCN capacity-building activities of cities in partners countries in other regions, including in global and other multilateral P/CVE conferences and dialogues, such as SCN's annual global summit.

2.2. Problem Analysis

Short problem analysis:

EU Fundamental Values

The action is built to support partner countries to address terrorist from a criminal justice perspective and addresses particularly compliance with human rights and the rule of law.

The Action will contribute to ensuring and enhancing compliance with the recommendations of the 2020 EU Council Conclusions on External Aspects of Counterterrorism that, recalling its conclusions on EU priorities in UN Human Rights Fora of 17 February 2020, underline that "all counterterrorism measures must be conducted in full compliance with EU core values including the rule of law, and in full compliance with international law, in particular international human rights law, humanitarian law and international refugee law. To this end, the EU will continue to proactively support and promote human rights and the principles of international law, in all aspects of the global counterterrorism efforts and in all its strategic partnerships, including in the regular reviews of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy".

The European Commission and the United Nations will ensure that measures are implemented in accordance with international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law, and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2024). A clear human rights perspective will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (elaboration of the project documents; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) and relevant information will be included in the regular reporting.

Counterterrorism

Component 1 and 2: The threat posed by terrorism to international peace and security is on the rise again, notably in Africa and the Middle East. COVID-19 has exacerbated existing dynamic trends in terrorism and violent extremism, and Africa and the Middle East/Asia are faced with immense security challenges that are having negative impacts on their own security and present an urgent threat to countries from around the world, including Europe.

The COVID-19 pandemic poses a governance challenge to EU partners and terrorist groups are viewing the pandemic as an opportunity to regain momentum. COVID-19 has also weakened security structures particularly in badly affected countries and regions, and thus led to a revival of terrorist networks.

At the same time, the virus outbreak has significantly affected international counterterrorism operations as well as activities to collect information. Global assistance in the field of CT/security has been hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic and will be further impacted by a reallocation of resources towards public health and economic recovery.

Nevertheless, the rising terrorist threat suggests that EU partners may be more than ever in need of specialized assistance that is both rapidly deployable and tailored to their specific situations.

Components 3 and 4: Drivers of violent extremism are predominantly context specific and require local approaches. While there is a growing consensus that factors such as marginalisation, injustice, alienation, weak state-society relations, and social exclusion contribute to violent extremism, the specific combination of factors that result in violent extremism is less clear and can differ substantially between geographies and populations. When communities are more resilient to violent extremism, the risk of violence is reduced, contributing to a society that is peaceful and inclusive. Community actors are best situated to strengthen resilience as they are closest to, and understand, the particular local challenges in more detail. Local actors understand what drives recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism in their communities and may know some of the elements for an effective solution, but are often unable to access adequate funding to make a difference. Local P/CVE initiatives may be overlooked by traditional development funding, or they may lack the capacity to access and manage international donor funds where they are available. Traditional development donors have tended to focus on communities at risk of poverty, not at risk of recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism – and often these communities are not the same.

STRIVE Cities aims 1. To inspire, catalyse and multiply city-driven, non-discriminatory, human rights-based, and gender-sensitive policies and programmes that prevent and counter violent extremism that rest upon trust-based partnerships with communities; 2. To enhance the practical implementation of multi-stakeholder programming and practice at a municipal level aimed at building social cohesion and community resilience to all forms of extremist and hate-motivated violence; 3. To connect city and other local leaders and practitioners from a range of disciplines, including community relations, social and health services, education, housing, economic development, religious affairs, as well as local community and youth leaders and civil society, to exchange lessons learned and provide tailored training through face-to-face and online exchanges; and 4. To elevate the voices of mayors and other local leaders and ensure the needs and priorities of cities and other sub-national authorities are reflected in national, regional, and international conversations around how to most effectively prevent and counter violent extremism, hate and polarization.

It will enable more cities in ODA-eligible countries, with a particular focus on East and Southern Africa, to respond to the challenge of violent extremism with cooperative, context-driven prevention frameworks and programmes that protect human rights, promote the rule of law, respect the "Do No Harm" principle, and, more broadly, are consistent with United Nations and EU standards and frameworks. In particular, the proposed Action will contribute to strengthening the international cooperation and capacity-building efforts envisaged under the Counter-Terrorism Agenda**,** announced in the EU's Security Union Strategy of December 2020. This Agenda sets out ways of supporting local actors and building more resilient communities as a matter of priority and STRIVE Cities would complement existing EU-funded support for locally-led P/CVE efforts in third countries, which have typically focused on civil society and community-based organizations.

P/CVE

Short problem analysis:

Cities have a comparative advantage in identifying communities at risk and steering individuals away from extremist and other forms of violence, and tackling social polarization to prevent extremism from taking root. They are closer to, and often better understand, the relevant groups and individuals, and are generally more practical and less risk-averse than their national counterparts.

Communities around the globe are facing an increasingly hybridized set of threats: extremism and militancy are driving polarization and division, and the mainstreaming of disinformation, conspiracy and extremism are threatening democratic values and institutions. These cyclical and often reciprocal threats have only been exacerbated during the global pandemic. Unlike typically rigid, siloed, and slow-moving national government and multilateral organization processes, cities understand how a hybridized threat is playing out in their communities with material consequences. They are able to, not only discuss it with communities in language that connects with their daily lives, but also help local communities better understand the relevant national and international frameworks, thus making local implementation more likely.

Yet too many cities and other sub-national authorities lack the mandate, expertise, and resources to contribute to efforts addressing the rising extremism, hate, and polarization that their communities are facing. Many national governments remain reluctant to consider cities as partners in addressing violent extremism or to relinquish control or resources over what they perceive to be national security concerns, and local government and civic groups are often excluded from policy and programming discussions about addressing these challenges.

The need to focus more on helping cities leverage their comparative advantages in prevention is heightened as national trends in many countries seem to be going in the wrong direction: authoritarianism is on the rise, corruption is spreading, civil society space is shrinking, and trust between the central government and local stakeholders continues to fray. In other words, national governments – which can often be part of the problem or are otherwise too slow to address it – may not be our optimum partners.

The need for a "whole of society" approach to P/CVE and addressing related threats and challenges is widely recognized and reflected in UN, GCTF, EU and other relevant multilateral frameworks. Efforts of donors and other stakeholders to operationalize these frameworks have tended to prioritize engagement with national governments, civil society and the private sector, often overlooking the catalytic role of cities can play, including in driving integrated, and sustainable approaches.

Key cross-cutting issues

Human rights, rule of law, management/leadership, justice, policing, capacity building, P/CVE, multi-actor and multi-stakeholder referral mechanisms

Relevance and credibility of Partner Country's/Regional Policies and Strategies

Counterterrorism cooperation with EU partner countries is essential to improve the security of the EU and to protect its citizens. The Council has called for further strengthening of the EU's external counterterrorism engagement with a focus on the Western Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, in other African countries where terrorist activities are increasing, and in key regions in Asia. Such engagement can help Member States in their work against terrorist activity, as well as working at a global level to combat terrorist organisations that span across regions and continents. The actual selection of countries to be included in the Global CT Mechanism will require continued support from the CT/Security experts' network in EU Delegations especially in facilitating cooperation and political buy-in as well as promoting its implementation on a political level.

The proposed interventions will support the strategic objectives of targeted national governments to prevent and countering violent extremism. In particular, the actions will contribute to the implementation of national PVE action plans at the local level where existing.

EU added value

The EU has identified terrorism and violent extremism as one of the major threats facing the Union and Member States in the European Agenda on Security (2015) and the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016), as well as in the EU Council Conclusions on External Aspects of Counter-terrorism and the EU CT Agenda. The latter recognises that "international engagement across all four pillars facilitating cooperation and promoting capacity building" is essential to improve security inside the EU. The EU CT agenda also calls for increasing EU engagement with relevant UN bodies such as the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT).

The EU recognises that terrorism is both a crime against the right to life, to physical integrity and to property, and a security threat to freedom, security, and justice, and economic development, that particularly affects groups in more vulnerable situations, including women and children. It also recognises that counter-terrorism needs to be anchored in criminal justice, rule of law and human rights.

Because terrorism is a transnational threat, information needs to be shared both within and between nations and multilateral bodies. Improving Counter-terrorism requires investment in building capacity and capability, including with a gender dimension, in priority partner countries: as the upsurge in terrorist activity in Europe since 2015 has demonstrated, security threats abroad can have a direct and violent impact on security at home. The EU recognises that new technologies offer the potential to tackle the terrorist threat, and calls for capacity building with partners to maximise the benefits of new technologies in counter-terrorism activities.[5]

For all components under this Action Document, the Commission will ensure that measures are implemented in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and in accordance with the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as well as the operational guidance which was developed to ensure that human rights are taken into consideration in the design and implementation of counter-terrorism assistance.

Complementarity with EU and other Donors/Partners

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[5] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44446/st08868-en20.pdf

For the purpose of ensuring complementarity, synergy and coordination, the Commission may sign or enter into joint donor coordination declarations or statements and may participate in donor coordination structures, as part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union.

Component 1 will be closely coordinated with ongoing and planned initiatives on similar issues by the EU and United Nations Global Counterterrorism Coordination Compact Entities. A coordination mechanism to create synergies and coherence is foreseen to ensure complementarity and to avoid overlap between activities. Extensive coordination with other actions, in particular those financed by the EU and its Member States shall be ensured.

For component 4, the SCN (through its ISD-led Management Unit) has implemented grants from Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States, and has partnered with a number of multilateral bodies on a range of activities. These include the UN, IIJ, GCERF, OSCE and IOM. This proposed action will be part of a wider strategic and coordinated effort with SCN donors and partners to enhance the network's impact. It includes developing sustained cooperation with the GCTF and its "inspired" institutions, the UN (including UNOCT, UNDP and relevant members of the Global Counterterrorism Compact), and regional organizations including the AU and the Regional Economic Communities.

In order to enhance efficiency, avoid duplications and address potential gaps, any actions undertaken by Components 1-3 will be defined in complementarity and close coordination with actions covered under geographic, other thematic and rapid response pillars of the NDICI and other financial instruments. Furthermore, all actions will be closely coordinated with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations wherever relevant.

Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action: The IIJ has an extensive expert and alumni network, established relationships with many states which would be invited to leverage the mechanism, and a peer-peer learning methodology.

GCERF works with governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) to implement activities as outlined in their respective countries National CVE Strategies and Action Plans and will build on existing trust relationships to facilitate the implementation of their projects.

SCN will work with cities to implement activities as outlined in their respective countries' National CVE Strategies and Action Plans and will build on existing trusted relationships at the national and local levels (both government and non-governmental) to facilitate the implementation of their projects.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

3.1. Objectives and Expected Outputs

The Overall Objective (Impact) of this action is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights, gender equality and the rule of law.

Component 1: The Specific Objective(s) (Outcomes) of the *UN-EU Global Terrorist Threats Facility (GTTF)* is to enhance the resilience of States facing a dynamic and persistent terrorist threat and enable them to rapidly receive expert assistance across the four pillars of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, as well as develop capacities to detect, prevent, counter, investigate and respond to this evolving threat and emerging terrorist modi operandi, while ensuring respect for international law, human rights and the rule of law.

The Outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

- **Output 1**: A technical assistance facility - the *EU-UN Global Terrorist Threats Facility (GTTF)* - is established and implemented to provide demand-driven technical assistance, training and mentoring to address key P-CVE/CT needs, drawing on CTED recommendations where possible. This Facility corresponds to the needs of the priority third countries without overburdening them. The assistance provided by the GTTF depends on the specific need and context of the requesting UN Member States / regional organizations across the four pillars of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy.
- **Output 2**: Provision of tailored capacity building expertise and the delivery of quick impact projects, upon request and drawing upon recommendations of the UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) where possible;
  - ➢ Request for assistance is produced based on needs assessments and where possible, CTED recommendations.
  - ➢ Tailored capacity building project is designed and implemented (in country or abroad) through the delivery of technical assistance, training or mentoring.

- ➤ Opportunities for follow up support through bilateral programmatic activities are identified in areas such as:
  - o Legal and technical assistance for the domestic implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions (notably but not limited to UNSCR 2178 (2014), 2341 (2017) and 2396 (2017)), UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and other relevant international conventions and protocols;
  - o Assistance in developing comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and action plans;
  - o Assistance in strengthening counterterrorism coordination and threat analysis, investigations (including special investigation techniques and respond to terrorist use of new technologies) and criminal justice responses (including the management of terrorist offenders, their rehabilitation and reintegration) under a human rights-based approach;
  - o Assistance in maximizing the use of INTERPOL databases (for both counter-terrorism investigations and border management) and other international/regional information exchange, law enforcement and judicial cooperation tools and mechanisms;

Assistance in addressing evolving terrorist modi operandi and techniques (including kidnapping for ransom, suicide bombing/Improvised Explosive Devices, Unmanned aviation systems (UAS) and strengthening the protection of vulnerable targets and civilians.

Counterterrorism stakeholders in partner countries enhance their understanding of the applicable standards, legislation and procedures to maximise compliance with the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

Criminal justice sector practitioners enhance their knowledge of and skills regarding effective counterterrorism judicial procedures and strategies.

Criminal justice practitioners share their expertise, good practices and practical experience in implementing a Rights based approach (RBA) and respect for the rule of law in counterterrorism justice processes, to enhance their understanding of the implementation of a RBA.

Component 2: The specific objective is to continue to improve analysis, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases by relevant entities and cooperation at the national and regional levels.

The expected outputs are:

Output 2.1: **Enhanced capacities** of relevant entities to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate with each other at national and regional levels.

Output 2.2: **Improved tools** in selected security services to fight against terrorism within a rule of law perspective.

The specific countries to be targeted will be defined according to emerging priorities and based on political engagements, such as through the EU CT political dialogues.

The outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

Component 3: The Specific Objective is that the resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas is increased in countries where the threat and need are greatest.

The outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objectives (Outcomes) are:

Output 3.1: Community focused and driven initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported.

As a funding mechanism, GCERF will provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas.

Output 3.2: Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.

GCERF aims to fill a funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability. Sustainability is ensured first through successive rounds of investment in each beneficiary country, and second by providing capacity development support for example in preparing budgets, monitoring and evaluation, and financial management, to enable communities to raise their own funds in due course.

Output 3.3: Awareness and knowledge of good practices in P/CVE is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries.

GCERF is solutions-oriented. Funding is provided to help launch, reinvest in, and extend successful local initiatives to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas. As the reach of GCERF funding expands, the lessons

learned in particular from our monitoring and evaluation of PVE initiatives will contribute to good practices in this currently undeveloped, complex, and highly challenging field. Dissemination workshops will also be organised to this purpose.

Component 4: The Specific Objective is to increase the resilience of cities and communities within them to violent extremism.

Output 4.1. Strengthened capacity of cities to develop, implement and share good practices on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)

Support will be provided to train mayors, other local leaders and city-level practitioners to increase their understanding of the violent extremist and related threats (both on- and off-line) in their communities. Training will also focus on awareness raising around the different available city-level tools and approaches for addressing these challenges while respecting the "Do No Harm" principle. This training will draw on the expertise in and experience of SCN member cities, as well as from the EU RAN and other relevant practitioner networks, and be delivered, where appropriate, in collaboration with relevant international and regional partners, e.g., the GCTF and its "inspired" institutions, UNOCT and UNDP and other appropriate Global Counterterrorism Compact entities, and regional and sub-regional organizations. A major component of this capacity building effort will be identifying and sharing of good practices among cities in the region and with SCN members and other cities around the globe, including through regional workshops, thematic working groups, and an annual global summit focused on the most pressing P/CVE and related needs and priorities of cities and other local authorities. The regional hub will help cities in the relevant region access the latest research and best practice from across the network through the SCN and develop the capacity of its members through offering data, guides and training modules and building digital observatories that correlate online risks with offline behaviour.

Output 4.2. City-focused and driven initiatives for strengthening multi-stakeholder coordination and action- in beneficiary countries are supported.

Support will be provided for a dedicated programme of engagement for member and other relevant cities that meet assessed P/CVE needs while building city engagement with relevant municipalities, institutions and stakeholders through relevant SCN "Regional Hubs" and benefiting from expertise shared by practitioners from SCN member cities as well as from the EU RAN and other relevant practitioner networks. Although the specific city-level initiatives supported will depend on the particular needs and interests of the targeted cities, examples of what they will focus on include: 1) a city-level mapping of the threat (both on- and off-line) drawing on the SCN toolkit developed for local risk assessments; 2) a city-level resources/stakeholder/capacity-mapping which draws on the existing SCN "city consultation" methodology for conducting a local needs assessment; 3) the design of a multi-stakeholder, local prevention framework that is data-driven and linked, where possible, to existing resources/capacities, and aligned with a national P/CVE or other relevant strategy; 4) the launch of a local prevention network to facilitate the multi-stakeholder trust-building and wider coordination required to implement such a local framework; and; 5) the development of city-led P/CVE programmes, including those focused on engaging with young people, linked to the implementation of the local prevention framework and implemented by a member of the local prevention network.

Output 4.3. City leaders and practitioners engage with global and multilateral P/CVE frameworks and programmes to ensure they reflect city-level perspectives and priorities.

Support will be provided to enable more involvement of city- and local-level policymakers and practitioners from cities in the partner countries in P/CVE and related conferences, workshops, and trainings convened by the GCTF, EU, OSCE, UNOCT, UNDP, UN HABITAT, the IIJ, GCERF, African Union and other relevant institutions to elevate the voices of mayors and cities in these global and regional activities.

3.2. Indicative Activities

Component 1 - Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

Output 1:

– Establish the *UN-EU Global Terrorist Threats Facility (GTTF)* as a technical assistance facility, drawing on existing EU and UN capacities deployed in the region;
– Identify, select and train a pool of thematic experts with subject-matter knowledge in all four pillars of the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and field experience in the priority geographic areas (roster of experts);
– Review priority technical assistance needs for each request for assistance from interested countries drawing on the UN Member States' and/or regional organizations' requests, CTED assessments where available, and

information shared by relevant UN entities (Resident Coordinators, UN missions), (sub)regional organizations and EU Delegations.

- Identify and select available expertise within the roster for rapid deployment to support the requesting UN Member State / regional organization.

Output 2:

- Provide assistance in the form of quick impact projects, advisory, capacity building, training or mentoring services.
- Deploy programmatic expertise to build capacity of the requesting UN Member States.
- Mobilize the UN system, including UNODC, and establish coordination modalities with UN entities with CT mandates and capacities, including the Department of Safety and Security.

As indicative examples, if conditions are met and upon request, the GTTF could deliver the following support activities:

- **Libya:** Assistance with the implementation and operationalization of the recently endorsed Libya Counter Terrorism Strategy. Delivery of capacity building training on counter terrorism investigations, international law enforcement and judicial cooperation.
- **Mozambique:** Strengthen the inter-agency CT coordination mechanism and fusion capacity to improve threat analysis and operational planning. Assist with the development of a specialized CT investigative unit with the capacity to collect evidence and effectively prosecute terrorist offenders. Support the development and testing of operational procedures for the protection of vulnerable targets and critical infrastructures.
- **DRC:** Provision of specialized training to prevent, counter and investigate kidnap for ransom / hostage situations. Support the forensic capacity of national authorities to collect and preserve evidence for criminal investigations. Assistance with the strengthening of inter-agency cooperation among relevant CT authorities (law enforcement, intelligence, armed forces, judiciary).
- **Iraq/Syria:** Deploy expertise to support the prosecution, reintegration and rehabilitation of foreign terrorist fighters/returnees.

Component 2 - Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

Output 2.1:

- supporting the update of relevant legal and regulatory frameworks regulating intelligence services and related cross governmental cooperation, including the use of intelligence in criminal justice investigations and prosecutions;
- support for ensuring legal and human rights compliance into the business practices of the entire intelligence cycle, notably in the development of key intelligence methodologies and doctrines in the intelligence cycle;
- support for using and protecting intelligence in Criminal Justice-Led Investigations and Prosecutions including the development of intelligence (also financial intelligence) into tangible evidence for use in investigations and court procedures;
- support for capacity building in the field of analysis of information including the identification of required technologies and the use of related technologies/software tools e.g. for data processing, filing etc including related training of personnel;
- support to develop human resources policies and training of relevant CT actors.

Output 2.2:

- the acquisition of highly specialised material for security services to allow them to increase their effectiveness across the Counterterrorism related cycle.

Component 3 - Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

As a funding mechanism, GCERF will continue to provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas.

GCERF aims to fill a funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability. Sustainability is ensured first through successive rounds of investment in each beneficiary country, and second by providing capacity development support for example in preparing budgets, monitoring and evaluation, and financial management, to enable communities to raise their own funds in due course.

GCERF is solutions-oriented. Funding is provided to help launch, reinvest in, and extend successful local initiatives to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas. As the reach of GCERF funding expands, the lessons learned in particular from our monitoring and evaluation of PVE initiatives will contribute to good practices in this currently undeveloped, complex, and highly challenging field. Dissemination workshops will also be organised to this purpose.

Component 4 - Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

Enhancing understanding among city and other local leaders and practitioners of 1) how local governments can contribute to "whole of society" efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and related threats; and 2) how to develop and implement effective city-led P/CVE and related policies and programmes.

Facilitating the exchange of P/CVE and related expertise, experience, challenges, and good practices among cities and other local authorities in the relevant country and wider region, including through SCN's Regional Hubs and its regional or thematic working groups and webinars.

Identifying and, where appropriate, delivering support – e.g., drawing on expertise within the SCN membership and SCN Management Unit tools to support city-level P/CVE capacity-building efforts - to address capacity and other prevention needs and priorities of target cities.

Facilitating activities designed to strengthen national-local cooperation, whereby the voices of local leaders and the perspectives of cities around preventing violent extremism and other forms of violence and conflict are reflected in relevant national and global policymaking and programme development conversations.

Providing access, through SCN's online resource hub, to practical resources for local leaders and practitioners, geared to gaining a better understanding of the different, often innovative, approaches cities around the globe are taking to prevent and counter violent extremism and related challenges.

3.3. Mainstreaming

Environmental Protection & Climate Change

Environmental Protection & Climate Change

In line with the European Commission's CT Agenda, the European judicial strategy for 2021-2024 and the vision of the IIJ, particular attention will be paid to the environmental costs of such actions and to the use of modern and digital training methods to guarantee a lower environmental impact, sustainability, high-quality, effectiveness and robust Monitoring and Evaluation. The IIJ will achieve this through the dialogue series, minimising the carbon emissions of air travel that would be required for solely in-person events.

An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) will be completed during initial phase of the activity as part of an Inception Report.

Gender Equality and empowerment of women and girls

GCERF will continue to support gender-responsive actions, thriving for gender-equality in line with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Conducting needs and strengths assessments during the identification phase of any project and the design of tailored activities as per needs and strengths identified. Gender equality is key to the success of efforts geared towards peace and security.

SCN maintains gender-disaggregated participation/training/engagement statistics in order to accurately monitor equality, diversity and inclusion targets, including for gender. SCN events always seek to ensure a gender balance, especially for panel discussions and conference-style activities. Consistent attention needs to be paid to this beyond such events given the largely male-dominated workforces (and especially leadership) of local government bureaucracies in many countries. There are also occasions when cultural and religious sensitivities demand particular consideration be given to the inclusion and empowerment of women in SCN programmes.

Whether in the context of workshops, trainings, or tool-development processes, the SCN integrates a gender dimension into all phases of its programme design, delivery, and monitoring and evaluation. This ensures that underlying gender stereotypes are identified and addressed in the specific contexts of our capacity-building objectives, and the promotion and building of gender expertise and equality in the municipalities engaged.

SCN will continue to support gender-responsive actions, thriving for gender-equality in line with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Conducting needs and strengths assessments during the identification phase of any project and the design of tailored activities as per needs and strengths identified. Gender equality is key to the success of efforts

geared towards peace and security.

ISD, which staffs the SCN Management Unit, places a premium on gender equality through all its activities and internal policies. ISD's global Senior Leadership Team is 75% women, and women make up 50% of the global senior management team of ISD. Of the total organisation, 60% are women and within ISD Germany, the team is 70% women.

Human Rights

A clear human-rights-based approach will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) on the basis of the operational guidance developed to this end by the European Commission (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperationactions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en). Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen. Also, Pillar IV of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy reaffirms that the promotion and protection of human rights is essential to all measures against terrorism. It also recognises that counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but rather complimentary and mutually reinforcing. The use of API/PNR systems and data presents special challenges with respect to the rights to privacy, the protection of personal data, the right to non-discrimination, and, in some cases, the presumption of innocence. The project includes several activities designed to assist partner countries in the protection and promotion of human rights. Namely, a Guidance Note to address pertinent human rights issues, such as data protection and privacy concerns; and Model Legislative Provisions to guide the development of legislation on API/PNR data transmission, use, sharing and retention. In the case of STRIVE GCERF, respecting human rights is central to the code of conduct signed with every recipient of GCERF funding.

Youth mainstreaming throughout STRIVE GCERF will be important, as a democratic and demographic imperative. Young people should have a say and be involved as much as possible in the programme/project cycle and be consulted meaningfully at all stages.

For SCN, respecting human rights is central to central to its mission statement and terms of reference, as well as to the commitment that all members make before joining the network.

Conflict sensitivity, peace and resilience

Grantee beneficiaries under STRIVE GCERF and Hedayah shall integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into the design and implementation of GCERF-supported activities so that they do not cause harm or exacerbate conflict, and aim to address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict.

Beneficiaries under STRIVE Cities shall integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into the design and implementation of SCN-supported activities to not cause harm or exacerbate conflict, and aimed to address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict.

3.4. Risks and Lessons Learnt

Category	Risks	Likelihood (High/ Medium/ Low)	Impact (High/ Medium/ Low)	Mitigating measures
	The lack of political buy-in from partner countries for CT and P/CVE activities despite COVID related challenges	**Medium**	**Medium**	Making the facility demand-driven ensures that actions will only occur when political buy-in has been obtained and plan according to COVID measures per country.
	EU support to CT capacity building strengthens the repressive rule of authoritarian regimes	**Medium**	**Medium**	With a strong focus on International Law, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law, it is essential that all capacity building relies on European/International norms and values.
	The lack of absorption capacity in partner countries	**Medium**	**Medium**	By providing tailor-made assistance, the Facility ensures complementarity to existing programmes and thereby reducing the risk of lacking absorption capacity.
	Working in unstable security environments poses a risk to	**Medium**	**Medium**	The previous/extensive experience of UNOCT of working in unstable security environments will be essential. Implementers will be required to provide contingency plans.

	implementers (especially if the situation worsens)			
	The risk of doing more harm than good, including lack of context-specific gender awareness.	**Medium**	**Medium**	The "Do No Harm" principle is key to all EU CT and P/CVE programming. Comprehensive and rigorous needs assessment will be carried out prior to commencing any work, ensuring that implementers and recipients will be in line with this key principle.
	Overlapping mandates, initiatives and lack of coordination of various technical assistance providers to end violence against children, including both boys and girls, within the same region.	**Medium**	**Medium**	The Facility will establish close working relationships with all relevant stakeholders and counterparts including international, regional and national stakeholders to maximise use of resources and avoid duplication of efforts.
5	Courses are not viewed as Competitive with other Training institutions	**Low**	**High**	The outputs will be tailored to target groups, supported by practical and comprehensive resource materials, designed and delivered by top international experts and will provide practitioners with a training opportunity that brings value to their work.
2	Gender participation is unbalanced	**Medium**	**Medium**	In the preparations for the delivery, partners will actively recruit for as balanced a participant composition as can be achieved.
2	Significant delay in or other challenges in recruiting key SCN personnel to staff the relevant "Regional Hubs"	**Medium**	**Medium**	SCN will prioritise the recruitment and take a multi-method, comprehensive and competitive recruitment approach to target suitable candidates. The SCN's extensive network will also be actively leveraged. The SCN also may leverage existing human resources to gap-fill if necessary.
1	COVID-19-related restrictions in key countries of operation	**Medium**	**Medium**	The SCN Management Unit will regularly monitor relevant public health and travel restrictions and modify the scope, target, location, and/or format of the activity as necessary. Since the start of the pandemic, SCN Management Unit has utilized virtual and hybrid formats for delivering SCN activities. It will rely on this experience should on-the-ground conditions in the relevant countries and cities require.
3	General instability in countries of operation	**High**	**High**	SCN Team will continually assess risk states in the countries of operation. It will work with security officials to ensure safety of the project team and participants in project activities during project implementation. If risks are considered too severe, alternative locations or methods of implementation will be considered. This will be done in consultation with the EU.
1	Lack or loss of support for the project from key national stakeholders	**Medium**	**Medium**	The SCN Management Unit will engage with relevant national officials and seek to include them, where appropriate, in its engagements with cities in that country. If national governments start creating barriers to SCN engagement with cities, the Team will work with the EU and other SCN donors and partners to overcome them.
1	Cities are reluctant to engage with SCN and participate in project activities.	Low	Medium	There is a growing appetite from SCN members for more engagement with the network and the relevance of cities in P/CVE is becoming increasingly recognized by national and global actors. Based on past experience, the SCN Management Unit recognises that often the main barriers to participation includes concern over time commitment or lack of understanding of their role in P/CVE. The project activities, in particular the establishment of a "Regional Hubs" in select regions, are being designed with this barrier in mind.
2	Significant delay in or other challenges in recruiting key SCN personnel to staff the relevant "Regional Hubs"	**Medium**	**Medium**	SCN will prioritise the recruitment and take a multi-method, comprehensive and competitive recruitment approach to target suitable candidates. The SCN's extensive network will also be actively leveraged. The SCN also may leverage existing human resources to gap-fill if necessary.

Lessons Learnt:

An evaluation of the EU external engagement on CT and P/CVE found that the EU has become a major actor in CT and P/CVE external assistance, and the scale and speed of investment (from a standing start in 2011) has been impressive. In addition to its global actions, the EU's CT and P/CVE interventions financed via the external instruments cover around 40 countries in all high-threat regions and many areas where the threat may be lower, incipient or in abeyance, but significant nonetheless. The EU succeeds in balancing operational priorities and opportunities with comprehensive coverage.

Recent external evaluations on individual CT programmes consider the "facility approach" as highly relevant in the context of EU policies and strategies and call for continuity and reinforcement. For the EU cooperation to be successful in this area in unstable regions facing multi-faceted CT PCVE challenges, is critical that the EU is equipped with effective tools able to rapidly respond to emerging threats.

The proper identification of weak links in the chain will therefore be essential for this action and will require the mobilisation of the full range of CT expertise available to the UN and the European Union, including CT experts and other colleagues in EU Delegations, EU Member States' subject matter experts, practitioners and researchers.

There is need for complementarity and coordination with related actions implemented by other Commission actors. Experience shows that CT actions, especially at local/community level, must be supported by accompanying measures: improving access to basic services, supporting local governance, etc.

Components 3 and 4: Main lessons learned from previous EU programming on P/CVE call for this to be evidence-based, tailored according to the local context, and adopting a multi-disciplinary approach. These aspects have been taken into account in the design of the two components. In addition, the proposed components seek to develop further knowledge throughout the implementation to facilitate learning in this complex and challenging domain, and to ensure that steps taken are coherent with the other endeavours and interventions. The proposed STRIVE components build on the good practices and lessons learned identified during past work in focus communities with EU support among others.

The SCN Management Unit has learned a number of lessons since the network's launch in 2015, many of which were reaffirmed in a recent independent assessment of SCN's work commissioned by the Danish MFA. This assessment was informed by conversations with a wide range of SCN stakeholders, such as national and local government officials, multilateral partners, local practitioners, and donors. These lessons, all of which will inform this Action, include: 1) the importance of ensuring that the SCN's activities are driven by the needs and priorities of its member cities; 2) the need for SCN to provide more consistent and tailored engagement to more of its members in ODA-eligible countries; 3) the imperative of elevating the voices of mayors and perspectives of cities in national and global P/CVE conversations; and 4) better connecting SCN's work with the wider P/CVE architecture.

This Action is taking a number of steps to incorporate these lessons.

While continuing to support "deep dive" city-level capacity-building projects in select cities, SCN is taking steps to be able to engage more consistently with more cities around the globe, to allow more local authorities to benefit from the network's services and support. Under this Action and with complementary support from other SCN donors, including the United States, SCN will focus more attention on facilitating the sharing, across the membership, of relevant city-level lessons and blueprints for what has worked in other cities and mayoral and practitioner dialogues and member exchanges. In addition, through its "regional hub" model, SCN will be more attuned to the different needs and perspectives of the various regions, including but not limited to, allowing for more regional exchanges and sharing, and for the development of region-specific city-level good practices for building resilience and strengthening social cohesion and, more broadly, addressing the root causes of extremist and other forms of violence and conflict.

3.5. The Intervention Logic

This is based on the assumption that

•   IF actions are successfully implemented,

•   THEN partner governments will 1) strengthen their criminal justice responses to terrorism, 2) enhance their capacity to address recruitment to violent extremism 3) increase the resilience of communities and vulnerable people against violent extremist agendas,

•   RESULTING in a reduction of the terrorist threat and a contribution to increased stability in the geographical areas in which the activities have been implemented, and abroad.

The action assumes there is sufficient support and willingness from the relevant public authorities to engage with the EU in CT and P/CVE issues and to adopt and implement relevant international CT legal provisions, standards and best practices.

The design of the Action assumes also that key state and non- state actors are willing to address child recruitment and exploitation in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law, as enshrined in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN Charter and the UN's P/CVE Action Plan. This will be monitored throughout the implementation as well as assessed through regular policy dialogue with the partner countries. The programme builds on the experience and lessons learned acquired by the EU in the field of CT and P/CVE and strong emphasis is put on capacity building as a key element for sustainability.

3.6. Logical Framework Matrix

Results	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
Impact	To disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights, gender equality and the rule of law.					
Outcome 1	Enhanced resilience of States facing a dynamic and persistent terrorist threat and increased capacities of selected states to develop to detect, prevent, counter, investigate and respond to this evolving threat and emerging terrorist modi operandi, while ensuring respect for international law, human rights and the rule of law.	Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined	To be defined	Project internal and external monitoring system (M&E)	Necessary political will at the national and regional level No substantial deterioration in the current security/ post pandemic situation
Outcome 2	Improved analysis, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases by relevant entities and cooperation at the national and regional levels.	Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined	To be defined	Project internal and external monitoring system (M&E)	Necessary political will at the national and regional level
Outcome 3	Resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas is increased in countries where the threat and need is greatest.				To be defined in the inception phase	
Outcome 4	More cities, particularly in East and Southern Africa, to respond to the challenge of violent extremism with cooperative, context-driven prevention policies and programmes that align with	− # of cities benefiting from STRIVE Cities, including in East and Southern African cities, engaged by SCN that report developing, strengthening and/or implementing relevant prevention mechanisms − # of cities benefiting from STRIVE Cities, including in East and Southern African, cities	− 0 − 0	− 8 − 20	− Surveys, interviews, observation − Survey	Cities have a mandate to act on preventing violent extremism and have the political will and capacity necessary to gain from their inclusion in the network.

			To be defined	To be defined	Project internal monitoring system (M&E)	
	international standards and frameworks	engaged by SCN that report developing stronger inter- or intra-city partnerships through the SCN				
Output 1 related to Outcome 1	Establish the UN-EU Global Terrorist Threats Facility (GTTF) as a technical assistance facility, Identify, select and train a pool of thematic experts with subject-matter knowledge in all four pillars of the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy and field experience in the priority geographic areas (roster of experts); Review priority technical assistance needs for each request for assistance from interested countries drawing on the UN Member States' and/or regional organizations' requests, CTED assessments where available, and information shared by relevant UN entities (RC, UN missions), (sub)regional organizations and EU Delegations.	− Facility established − Number of experts mobilized across the EU and UN CT strategies on CT − Number of requests from partner countries	To be defined	To be defined	Project internal monitoring system (M&E)	Partner countries respond by requesting multilateral support and engage in programme activities.
Output 2 related to Outcome 1	Provide assistance in the form of quick impact projects, advisory, capacity building, training or mentoring services. Deploy programmatic expertise to build capacity of the requesting UN Member States. Mobilize the UN system, including UNODC, and establish coordination modalities with UN entities with CT mandates and capacities, including the Department of Safety and Security.	− Number of CT projects mobilised in partner countries − Number of capacity building exercises − Number of EU and UN joint missions to partner countries to reinforce CT strategies	To be defined	To be defined	Project internal monitoring system (M&E)	Partner countries respond by requesting multilateral support and engage in programme activities.

Output 1 related to Outcome 2	Enhance capacities of relevant entities to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate with each other at national and regional levels	– Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined		To be defined	
Output 2 related to Outcome 2	Enable the acquisition of relevant equipment (in full compliance with the human-rights-based approach) to selected countries.	– Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined		To be defined	
Output 1 related to Outcome 33	Community focused and driven initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported		– Number of men and women reached by the CSOs through local CVE actions (dis-aggregated by country and age) – Number of collaboration / partnerships with think tanks / major actors involved in P/CVE work and research established/ developed during the implementation.	– Project progress reports; – GCERF reports	TBD in the inception phase	Security situation in targeted communities does not deteriorate and allows partners to operate appropriately
Output 2 related to Outcome 33	Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.		– Number of CSOs reporting increased capacities in PVE thanks to GCERF support. – % of CSO representatives trained by GCERF who can provide at least one example of using these skills & knowledge in their work within the following year	– Project progress reports and GCERF's financial documentation; – Survey of CSOs	TBD in the inception phase	CSOs at community level are free to participate in P/CVE capacity building activities and to apply new knowledge in their communities
Output 3	Awareness and knowledge of good practices in the field of		– number of stakeholders reached	– Database of event		A robust M&E system which allows for the identification of

		Indicators	Baseline	Target	Means of Verification	Assumptions
related to Outcome 33	preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries.			through workshops/events where findings/ good practices/ lessons learned where disseminated, disaggregated by sex, sector and country	participants		good practices and lessons learned is in place.
Output 1 related to Outcome 4	Strengthened capacity of cities to develop, implement and share good practices on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE)	− # of cities benefiting from STRIVE Cities engaged by SCN East and Southern Africa and other regional hubs − # of cities that participate in training activities and events − % of participants who demonstrate a better understanding of human rights compliant prevention and counter terrorism mechanisms	− 0 − 0	− 40 − 25 − 60%	• Project reports, observation • Participant lists Pre-post surveys	Support offered by SCN is markedly more effective and efficient than that received through other actors. Cities see the value of adopting preventative approaches in line with international standards. Member cities see the value in sharing good practices through the regional hub and both adopt and contribute good practices through it. These practices are evidence-based and can be effectively translated to other contexts.
Output 2 related to Outcome 4	City-focused and driven initiatives for strengthening multi-stakeholder coordination and action in beneficiary countries are supported	− % of relevant stakeholders in selected cities who report that prevention efforts are more coordinated in their municipality after the project − # of prevention activities from the local action plans of selected cities conducted by local stakeholders	− TBC − 0	− 50% − 3	• Survey • Observation, interviews, project reports	City leaders and practitioners have the time, resources, capacity and motivation to contribute to a multi-stakeholder coordination system
Output 4 related to Outcome 4	City leaders and practitioners engage with global and multilateral P/CVE frameworks and programmes to ensure they reflect city-level perspectives and priorities	− % of cities benefiting from STRIVE Cities, including in East and Southern Africa, that report engaging with national, regional and/or global institutions on P/CVE at least once annually − # of cities benefiting from STRIVE Cities, including in East and Southern Africa, represented at national, regional and international P/CVE events, including through SCN	− TBC − 0	− 50% increase on baseline − 10	• Surveys /interviews • Participant lists, observation	Promoting the inclusion of city-level actors in discussion held at national, regional and global levels will be sufficient to encourage the adoption of local perspectives into multilateral frameworks.

4. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

4.1. Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries.

4.2. Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Financing Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

4.3. Implementation Modalities (applicable for Project modality)

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures[6].

4.3.1. Indirect Management with an international organisation

Component 1 will be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), part of the UN Secretariat as established in the General Assembly resolution 71/291.

This implementation entails to support key Government (executive and its security agencies and legislative bodies, where appropriate) and non-Government actors in being better prepared to contribute to CT objectives in targeted regions and countries. This implementation is justified because of the nature of the activities foreseen (provision of capacity building and technical assistance). The UN is best placed to cover the wide range of fields of highly specialised expertise required to perform interventions in the diverse fields of capacity building, law enforcement, and regional cooperation while ensuring confidentiality. The proposed action is an initiative of the UNOCT in close partnership with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Office of Information and Communication Technology (OICT), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). UNOCT was established through the adoption of General Assembly resolution 71/291 on 15 June 2017 as the main focal point of the United Nations system for the prevention of violent extremism. The EU welcomed that the Office of Counter-Terrorism is addressing P/CVE as a core part of its responsibility for the balanced implementation of the Global Counter- Terrorism Strategy, which also resonates with the overall prevention agenda of the Secretary-General which the EU and its Member States fully endorse.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: carrying out the necessary procurement and grant award procedures and awarding, signing and executing the resulting procurement and grant contracts (in line with the rules foreseen in the Special Conditions) for services and other benefits to be provided to the beneficiary countries. UNOCT will be in charge of the overall designing, planning, coordination, implementation and monitoring of the proposal for both substantive and administrative matters.

The international organisation identified above (UNOCT through the UN Secretariat) is currently undergoing an ex-ante of its systems and procedures for the pillars. This assessment is expected to be finalised by 30 June 2022.

4.3.2. Direct Management (Grants)

Component 2: This Component will be partly implemented with a direct award to the Spanish Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) (direct management).

(a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 2 is to enable the acquisition of relevant equipment (mainly IT and other equipment in full compliance with human rights) to selected countries

In case negotiations do not conclude with CNI the Contracting Authority will seek to conclude an agreement with a

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[6] www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

relevant not for profit organisation/public sector administration that can deliver the requested services.

(b) Justification of a direct grant

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Centro Nacional De Inteligencia.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

Component 3: This Component will be implemented with a direct award to GCERF (direct management).

(a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 2 is to work with civil society partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

As the main purpose of the actions under component 2 is to provide financial support to third parties no maximum amount for sub-granting will apply. The Description of the Action for this grant shall define the types of entities eligible for financial support and include a list with the types of activity which may be eligible for financial support. The criteria for the selection of the third party recipients of this financial support, including the criteria for determining its exact amount, shall also be specified in the Description of the Action.

(b) Type of applicants targeted: GCERF was established as an independent legal entity formed under the law of Switzerland in 2014 and enjoys all privileges and immunities equivalent to those given to international organizations which can be granted by way of a Host State Agreement. GCERF is governed by a board which includes country representatives from both recipient and donor nations as well as other constituencies.

(c) Justification of a direct grant: Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

Component 4: This component will be implemented with a direct award to the Strong Cities Network (direct management).

(a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 4 is to work with local authorities to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

(b) Type of applicants targeted: The Strong Cities Network was launched in 2015 to catalyze more city-led efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism, hate, and polarization. It has grown into a global network of over 150 cities and local governments in which local knowledge and practice inform national, regional, and international approaches to addressing these challenges. It is managed by Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). The three SCN global mayoral summits; the multi-actor local prevention networks that have emerged in cities in Bangladesh, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, and North Macedonia; the North-South city-level partnerships it has facilitated – whether between Dakar and Montreal or Kristiansand and Mombasa; and the tool kits it has developed for cities, including ones on how to map hate and extremism or respond to a terrorist incident within a particular city, are just a few examples of the network's successes to date.

(c) Justification of a direct grant: Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

4.3.3. Direct Management (Procurement)

The specific objectives of **component 2** will be (partially) achieved in direct centralised management, through the conclusion of a service contract with International and/or Public organisations including not for profit organisations, or consortia thereof to achieve the results outlined above.

4.3.4. Changes from indirect to direct management mode (and vice versa) due to exceptional circumstances

In the interest of the programme, or if the negotiations with the selected entities fail, all parts of this action may be implemented in indirect management according to the same selection criteria as above.

4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

4.5. Indicative Budget

	EU contribution (amount in EUR)
Component 1 Indirect management with UNOCT	6 000 000
Component 2 Service (direct management)/Grant (direct management)	10 000 000
Component 3 STRIVE GCERF - grants (direct management)	6 000 000
Component 4 STRIVE Cities - grants (direct management)	5 000 000
Grants – total envelope under section 4.3.2	**11 000 000**
Evaluation, (cf. section 5.2)– Audit (cf. section 5.3)/Expenditure verification	Will be covered by another decision
Communication and visibility (cf. section 6)	N.A
Contingencies	0
Total	**27 000 000**

4.6. Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

The EU UN Global Terrorism Threat Facility will be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), part of the UN Secretariat as established in the General Assembly resolution 71/291.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

The Commission will coordinate and lead the implementation of this action partly through the procurement of service and supply contracts and partly by entrusting tasks to international organisations in which case the Commission will be closely involved through a Steering and/or Coordination Committee.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

4.7. Pre-conditions

N/A

5. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

5.1. Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project

modality). When training courses are delivered as part of the activities of a project, entry and exit tests will be done to assess the increased capacities of the trainees. The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.2. Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, evaluations of single components/projects are carried out via an implementing partner. The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake mid-term or final evaluations for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner. The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

5.3. Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

6. COMMUNICATION AND VISIBILITY

Communication and visibility is a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to advertise the European Union's support for their work to the relevant audiences. To that end they must comply with the instructions given in the *Communication and Visibility Requirements* of 2018 (or any successor document), notably with regard to the use of the EU emblem and the elaboration of a dedicated communication and visibility plan, to be completed for every action at the start of implementation. These obligations apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, the partner country (for instance, concerning the reforms supported through budget support), contractors, grant beneficiaries or entrusted entities. In each case, a reference to the relevant contractual obligations must be included in the respective financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

Communication and visibility measures may be funded from the amounts allocated to the action. For the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the EU and its contribution to this action, the Commission may sign or enter into joint declarations or statements, as part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union. Visibility and communication measures should also promote transparency and accountability on the use of funds. Effectiveness of communication activities on awareness about the action and its objectives as well as on EU funding of the action should be measured. Implementing partners shall keep the Commission and concerned EU Delegation/Office fully informed of the planning and implementation of specific visibility and communication activities before work starts. Implementing partners will ensure adequate visibility of EU financing and will report on visibility and communication actions as well as the results of the overall action to the relevant monitoring committees.

APPENDIX 1 REPORTING IN OPSYS

An Intervention[7] (also generally called project/programme) is the operational entity associated to a coherent set of activities and results structured in a logical framework aiming at delivering development change or progress. Interventions are the most effective (hence optimal) entities for the operational follow-up by the Commission of its external development operations. As such, Interventions constitute the base unit for managing operational implementations, assessing performance, monitoring, evaluation, internal and external communication, reporting and aggregation.

Primary Interventions are those contracts or groups of contracts bearing reportable results and respecting the following business rule: 'a given contract can only contribute to one primary intervention and not more than one'. An individual contract that does not produce direct reportable results and cannot be logically grouped with other result reportable contracts is considered a 'support entities'. The addition of all primary interventions and support entities is equivalent to the full development portfolio of the Institution.

Primary Interventions are identified during the design of each action by the responsible service (Delegation or Headquarters operational Unit).

The level of the Primary Intervention is defined in the related Action Document and it is revisable; it can be a(n) (group of) action(s) or a (group of) contract(s).

Tick in the left side column one of the three possible options for the level of definition of the Primary Intervention(s) identified in this action.

In the case of 'Group of actions' level, add references to the present action and other action concerning the same Primary Intervention.

In the case of 'Contract level', add the reference to the corresponding budgetary items in point **Error! Reference source not found.**, Indicative Budget.

Option 1: Action level		
☐	Single action	Present action: all contracts in the present action
Option 2: Group of actions level		
☐	Group of actions	Actions reference (CRIS#/OPSYS#):
Option 3: Contract level		
☒	Single Contract 1	Contract with UNOCT
☒	Single Contract 2	Contract with CNI (service)
☒	Single Contract 3	Contract with CNI (grant)
☒	Single Contract 4	Contract with Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
☒	Single Contract 5	Contract with ISD (DE)
☐	Group of contracts 1	

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[7] ARES (2021)4204912 - For the purpose of consistency between terms in OPSYS, DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI have harmonised 5 key terms, including 'action' and 'Intervention' where an 'action' is the content (or part of the content) of a Commission Financing Decision and 'Intervention' is a coherent set of activities and results which constitutes an effective level for the operational follow-up by the EC of its operations on the ground. See more on the concept of intervention.