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## ANNEX

## **Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) Multiannual Indicative Programme 2018-2020**

In accordance with Article 8(3) of the IcSP Regulation<sup>1</sup>, the 2014-2020 Thematic Strategy Paper shall be accompanied by a Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) summarising the priority areas selected for Union financing, the specific objectives, the expected results, the performance indicators and the time frame of Union assistance. The multiannual indicative programme shall determine the indicative financial allocations for each programme therein, taking into account the needs and the particular difficulties of the partner countries or regions concerned.

## 1. GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE RESPONSE STRATEGY

### Time-frame and prioritisation

The previous MIP<sup>2</sup> covered the first four years of the Multiannual Financial Framework, i.e., 2014-2017. This second MIP covers priorities and objectives for 2018-2020, within the framework of the existing 2014-2020 Thematic Strategy Paper<sup>3</sup>.

To enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of IcSP assistance, as well as to facilitate the management of this Instrument, not all priorities will necessarily be targeted every year. Thus, instead of smaller allocations each year for a given priority, it could be that larger allocations are given on a less frequent basis.

## Types of interventions, implementation modalities and partners involved:

With the exception of budget support and of 'blending', all other implementation modalities foreseen in the Financial Regulation may be considered under this MIP. It is thus expected that actions will continue to be implemented through grants contracts, service contracts, delegation agreements and contribution agreements, attributed through calls for proposals, direct agreements and public tenders, depending on the specific activity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> EU Regulation No. 230/2014 of 11/03/2014. OJEU No. L77/1 of 15/03/2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/thematic-strategy-paper-2014-2020-and-accompanying-2014-2017-multiannual-indicative-programme en

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibid.

Likewise, all types of eligible partners (international organisations, public bodies of EU Member States, non-for profit civil society organisations, private companies, etc.) may be involved in the implementation of this MIP depending on the specific activity.

#### **Monitoring and evaluation:**

The MIP 2018-2020 draws on the mid-term review of the External Financing Instruments, notably on the external evaluation of the IcSP covering the period 2014-mid 2017. A further comprehensive evaluation will take place at the end of the programme, including contacts with a representative selection of partners, external monitors and evaluators, beneficiaries and stakeholders, from the EU, international organisations and local governments, and appropriate non-state actors.

#### **Introduction**

According to the Regulation establishing the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the specific objectives of this Instrument are:

- (a) in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, to contribute swiftly to stability by providing an effective response designed to help preserve, establish or reestablish the conditions essential to the proper implementation of the Union's external policies and actions in accordance with Article 21 TEU;
- (b) to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and to ensuring capacity and preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations and build peace; and
- (c) to address specific global and trans-regional threats to peace, international security and stability.

In addition to its worldwide scope, which allows the IcSP to support global and transregional actions potentially involving all kind of countries (i.e. fragile, developing, emerging, in-transition, industrialised, candidate or potential candidate countries), the IcSP is the only dedicated tool of the European Union addressing security issues in partner countries aside from CSDP missions and operations, and is not tied to Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility requirements.

The external evaluation of the IcSP contains the broad finding that actions conducted to date were relevant, effective, efficient, and had a unique added value. Indeed, the evaluation concludes that 'the ICSP's relevance will further increase in the years to come'.<sup>5</sup>

In addition, the external evaluation makes a number of recommendations to maximise the impact of the instrument, including the need to maintain the adaptability and relevance of the IcSP in response to new trends and threats, and to provide strengthened guidance on

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Mid-term evaluation of the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, 30 June 2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/mid-term-evaluation-instrument-contributing-stability-and-peace-icsp-draft-report\_en)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 4

conflict sensitivity. The evaluation also draws attention to some of the risks associated with greater 'securitisation' of peace and development issues. Furthermore, the Coherence Report for the External Financing Instruments<sup>6</sup> highlights a number of broad themes that deserve reflection in the context of the 2018-2020 MIP; notably, responsiveness, consistency, and simplification.<sup>7</sup>

Since the last MIP the external environment has continued to evolve with – as outlined in the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy<sup>8</sup> - instability and insecurity in our wider region on the rise. While not compromising on the worldwide approach of the instrument, the IcSP MIP nevertheless follows the Global Strategy prioritisation of 'State and Societal Resilience to our East and South' ('It is in [our] interests to invest in ... the east stretching into Central Asia, and to the south down to Central Africa').<sup>9</sup>

At the same time, the EU policy response and Global frameworks that have since been endorsed by the EU form an important part of the background to the present document. Particularly noteworthy in the present context are the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals<sup>10</sup>, in particular Goal 16 to promote peaceful and inclusive societies, the new European Consensus on Development<sup>11</sup>, the 2017 Joint Communication on a Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action<sup>12</sup>, and the 2018 Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflict and Crises<sup>13</sup>.

Consistent with the MTR findings, recent policy developments and the evolving external environment, the approach taken here is to build on the 2014-2020 Thematic Strategy Paper and associated 2014-17 MIP. As such, the 2018-2020 MIP recalibrates programming guidance for the instrument.

The IcSP Article 4 aims to prevent conflicts, build peace and to build crisis preparedness capacities. This means supporting and mobilising initiatives and capacities, locally and internationally, contributing to better anticipate, prevent and/or respond to violent conflicts, address pre and post-crisis needs, including stabilisation processes, and create the conditions for peaceful, just and inclusive societies to thrive. In keeping with EU Global Strategy priorities, a strong focus on conflict prevention is maintained, by continuing support to actions aiming to identify and address the root causes of violent conflict. Similarly, the MIP continues to address the link between conflict and

<sup>8</sup> Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-promote-citizens-interests)

<sup>9</sup>, Ibid, p. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Coherence Report – Insights from the External Evaluation of the External Financing Instruments, 4 September 2017 (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/coherence-report-insights-external-evaluation-external-financing-instruments\_en)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Ibid.

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/

<sup>11</sup> https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/new-european-consensus-development-our-world-our-dignity-our-future en

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> JOIN(2017) 21 final

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Council Conclusions (22 January 2018), 5413/18

exploitation of natural resources, including land grabs, and also takes into consideration the cultural dimension of conflicts, both in terms of the impact on cultural heritage and the potential role of cultural heritage in reconciliation.

The IcSP Article 5 component maintains a strong focus on enhancing and expanding external efforts on counter-terrorism, as well as Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. Indicatively, and in line with spending in the 2014-2017 MIP, spending on counter-terrorism activities in the neighbourhood is likely to be in the order of 50 per cent of total spend under this heading. Organised Crime activities are focused on the highest security threats to the EU. Further allowance is made for the fact that terrorists may seek to exploit CBRN threats. On the protection of critical infrastructure, we propose a focus on the protection of public spaces, as well as to continue maritime security capacity building with a shift towards port security. In line with the 2017 Joint Communication "Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU" and in light of the evolving cyber threat environment, support to Cyber capacity building should be scaled up and maximized. These streamlined priorities also take into account the added value of the IcSP and the complementary role it can play in relation to other EFIs, as well as the ambition to better link the internal and external dimension of the EU's activities in the security domain.

The EU engages in security, peace-building and conflict prevention through a number of channels and different instruments, including notably through IcSP Articles 4 and 5. Regulation (EU) 2017/2306 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace (the so-called "Capacity building in support of development and security for development (CBSD) initiative") allows support to military actors in order to pursue development and security for development objectives in exceptional circumstances. The new Article 3a, with an additional envelope of €100 million for the period 2018-2020 (split between Articles 3, 4 and 5 according to the same allocation key used for the rest of the IcSP) allows for the provision of training, advice, and equipment to military partners to enhance their capacity to better prevent, prepare for and respond to crises on their own and to strengthen local governance. Assistance under Articles 4 and 5 may therefore also encompass support to military actors in exceptional and limited circumstances in accordance with the provisions laid down in the amended Regulation. Such assistance will be applied in line with the EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform<sup>15</sup>, on the basis of a proper assessment of security sector needs, including institutional checks and balances and after assessing risks and identifying mitigation measures as appropriate.

#### 2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES

#### Art. 4. Assistance for conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> JOIN(2017) 450 final, 13.9.2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> JOIN(2016) 31 final

Objective a) Promoting early warning and conflict- sensitive risk analysis in policy making and implementation

Since the formulation of the 2014-2020 Thematic Strategy Paper and 2014-2017 MIP, early warning and early action, conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity have been accorded a greater priority in EU policy, guidance and programming, as evidenced by language in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, the new Consensus on Development, and the European Neighbourhood Policy.

During the 2014-2017 period, IcSP Article 4 supported invaluable inputs to this field, which has also fed into the development and functioning of the EU's own Early Warning System and approach to conflict analysis. Given the EU's heightened commitment to strengthen its engagement on conflict prevention through the Integrated Approach, Article 4 provides a key vehicle for promoting and supporting the use of early warning, horizon scanning and conflict sensitivity in policy-making and implementation in the coming period, continuing and building on the previous priorities and results articulated in the 2014-2017 MIP. Besides its own early warning and horizon scanning mechanisms, the EU is committed to support and strengthen early warning / early response capacities and conflict sensitive practice in conflict affected contexts to ensure all relevant stakeholders can cooperate to better anticipate and respond to conflict risks. In that respect, the EU might support cutting-edge initiatives, including grasping the potential of new technologies in the field, stimulating innovation, and generating evidence.

- Strengthen early warning early response systems in conflict affected countries drawing on, and enabling cooperation between, local communities, and civil society, as well as local and national authorities by strengthening local-level analysis and dissemination of findings.
- The design and implementation of high quality and relevant early warning systems with a short and medium term horizon, identifying situations at risk of violent conflict including the risk of atrocity crimes or serious destabilisation with indications of the impact on EU security and interests—including generating new data and analysis, such as geospatial models and situation awareness tools. These systems should be operationally relevant in order to support the identification of timely response measures to prevent or mitigate emerging conflicts or crises. Where relevant a more localised and multi-faceted focus will be used, taking into account a resilience dimension.
- The use of new technologies will be explored, which may provide decision-makers an initial assessment of the consequences of emerging threats and external pressures and contributing to the identification of options for early action.
- The use and development of methodologies for conflict analysis, including continuing to strengthen the way gender-sensitivity is embedded in analysis and identification of actions.
- Promoting collaboration with and between EU partners, and supporting partner capacities, including through the development of guidance, knowledge products, and training.

Support a wider and deeper uptake of conflict and resilience sensitive approaches
across the conflict cycle by national and local governments, Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), the private
sector and international actors across political, governance, security, economic,
social and environmental engagement, based on improved lessons learning and
evidence, networking and sharing of good practice, advisory support, capacitybuilding and monitoring.

## Expected results:

- In-country systems to detect, monitor, analyse and respond to conflict risks are strengthened, which in turn are conducive to fostering cooperation between all key stakeholders (CSOs, local and national authorities).
- Actionable early warning systems are put in place to provide medium- and shortterm horizon-scanning mechanisms for emerging conflicts/crises, including information on conflict causes and dynamics to support early responses.
- EU programming, programme implementation and responses to conflicts/crises are underpinned by structured and gender-sensitive conflict and resilience analysis tools.
- Relevant guidance, knowledge products and training opportunities are available to support early warning and conflict and resilience analysis work of the EU and its partners.
- Conflict and resilience sensitivity becomes more widely taken-up, applied, and evidence and lessons are generated through a community of practice.

#### Principal indicators:

- Number of emerging conflicts, including at community level, identified by early warning systems; number of early action policy options generated/implemented on the basis of early warning information.
- Number of countries/regions for which accurate and updated early warning information is available, including new relevant data.
- New technologies being developed and applied in conflict early warning, conflict monitoring and analysis, and preventive action.
- Number of gender sensitive conflict and resilience analyses undertaken to underpin responses to conflict/crisis situations; evolution of the percentage of EU Delegations that systematically undertake such conflict-analysis as part of their programming exercise.
- Number of local conflict and resilience analyses undertaken. Number of local stakeholders actively participating in conflict analysis, including women's organisations.
- Number of guidance documents/knowledge products produced/disseminated.
- Number of countries/situations where the developed guidance is applied.
- Number of training sessions held; number of participations (men/women/girls/boys).
- Number of examples of the take-up of conflict sensitive approaches.

Objective b) Facilitating and building capacity in confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, with particular regard to emerging inter-community tensions

EU efforts in the past four years, including under the previous IcSP MIP, have helped considerably raise the level of ambition and effectiveness of support to global dialogue and mediation work. IcSP-funded actions have helped strengthen international mediation support by the EU and other third parties, including by the UN and other Regional Organisations (ROs). They have also helped the EU mobilise timely and effective direct support to several peace processes.

Evidence shows that while there is today more mediation and mediation support capacity overall in the international system, such support still needs to be made more effective through better design, and timely and flexible implementation over a period of time, rather than 'one off' interventions. Moreover, such support needs to be resourced adequately and, critically, it needs to be well networked to ensure different actors' involvement in one peace process are complementary and add collective value. Strengthening the capacities, readiness and effectiveness of local and national mediation actors (so-called 'insider mediators'), with specific attention to women and women's organisation, Regional organisations (ROs), as well as neighbouring states that are often involved in peace processes, must have a central place in the EU's mediation support strategy.

The EU is firmly committed to prevent atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.

Civil society remains one of the critical actors at all levels of peace processes and longerterm peacebuilding efforts, and a necessary counter-balance and partner to official multilateral and national actors and institutions. Evidence clearly shows that effective civil society participation in mediation, and peacebuilding significantly increases the likelihood of success, legitimacy, and sustainability.

- Development and operationalisation of EU approaches to support insider mediators at local, national and regional levels (including ROs).
- Help build and support institutions that can effectively mediate and handle disputes in emerging or ongoing conflicts, as well as transitions so called 'peace infrastructure'.
- Further develop international capacity and readiness for better design, delivery and learning from peace processes support.
- Strengthen international and European networks for mediation and mediation support, and encourage joint mediation initiatives by IOs, ROs and CSOs.
- Strengthening channels of exchange with civil society, including women's organisations, on issues related to conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building.
- Setting up dedicated logistical, administrative and financial support to EU-supported peace processes globally.

• Supporting national and international initiatives, in particular by civil society, on Responsibility to Protect and prevention of atrocity crimes.

#### **Expected results:**

- Peace processes that are a priority for the EU are effectively supported politically, technically and logistically and in terms of high quality expertise. Rapid deployment of mediation support experts is ensured through one or several mechanisms.
- Insider mediators are supported to play meaningful and influential roles in peace processes supported by the EU.
- Administrative capacity developed allowing the leveraging of external mediation support actions to complement actions undertaken internally.
- Civil society, including women's organisations, participate effectively in peace processes, including at 'track 1' level, and are linked-up with official institutions that act as 'peace infrastructure'.
- Continuation of channels of dialogue and information exchange with international and local civil society organisations active in the fields of conflict prevention and peace-building.
- The global 'system' for mediation support, including Regional and International Organisations, is better linked and connected to exchange good practice and collaborate on concrete mediation and mediation support initiatives.
- Mediation and mediation support are increasingly used to good effect for preventive purposes.
- There is increased international capacity to mobilise and pull together different types of mediation support—including technical and logistical—effectively and with complementarity, and in a timely fashion.
- Active civil society participation in national and international initiatives on Responsibility to Protect and in the prevention of atrocity crimes.

#### Principal indicators:

- Number of mediation support initiatives developed in a timely manner; number of participants in mediation activities (men/women/girls/boys).
- Number of mediation activities where women were involved.
- Number of instances of women's and civil society organisations' participation in peace processes and peacebuilding initiatives.
- Number of opportunities created for exchange between EU policy-makers and civil society organisations active in the fields of conflict prevention/peacebuilding.
- Number of interactions and joint collaborations between international mediation and mediation support actors, including IOs and ROs, including the setup of durable networks between them.
- Number of exchanges and interactions between civil society organisations and international, national and local 'peace infrastructure' and institutions.
- Number of peace and mediation processes influenced.

- Number of mediation support actions that are complementary with other EU interventions, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations, actions of EU Member States and actions of multilateral, regional and sub-regional organisations and other donors.
- Number of civil society advocacy and outreach initiatives on Responsibility to Protect and prevention of atrocity crimes.

Objective c) Strengthening capacities for participation and deployment in civilian stabilisation missions

Under the previous MIP programmes were funded that contributed significantly to increased capacities of staff participating in civilian stabilisation missions. This experience and the lessons learned are most relevant in considering efforts to continue to strengthen capacities of experts participating in EU-led or international civilian stabilisation missions. Taking into consideration the rise of new security and stabilisation challenges, further specialized training may be considered.

#### Priorities:

- Pre-deployment training of EU civilian experts participating or designated for participation in EU stabilisation missions (CSDP and Article 28 actions) or to international stabilisation missions, to ensure high quality engagement with receiving states.
- Pre-deployment training for third party experts to be deployed to international stabilisation missions.
- Participation of third parties in pre-deployment training for EU stabilisation missions.
- Expand EU pre-deployment training of civilians into additional areas of current and future security challenges of stabilisation concern, such as:
  - Security Sector Reform (SSR)
  - o Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)
  - o Irregular Migration
  - o Hybrid Threats
  - Cyber security
  - o Terrorism
  - Radicalisation
  - Organised Crime
  - Border Management
  - o Maritime Security
  - o Protection of Cultural Heritage
  - o Context analysis and sensitivity (including conflict-sensitivity, cultural-sensitivity and gender-sensitivity)

#### Expected results:

• Increased pool of trained EU experts, higher quality of expertise, better match with needs of receiving states and mission mandates.

- A structured, reliable and easily accessible EU/ EU-financed system of predeployment training is available.
- Pre-deployment courses are accessible to third party experts to be deployed in international civilian stabilisation missions.
- Strategic and selected third parties have access to pre-deployment training for EU stabilisation missions in which these participate.

## Principal indicators:

- Number of individuals who receive EU training for stabilisation missions (men/women).
- Number of trained individuals actually deployed to stabilisation missions (men/women).
- Number of trained third party experts trained participating in international civilian stabilisation missions (men/women)
- Number of third party experts participating in EU/ EU-financed pre-deployment training (men/women).
- Number of civilian stabilisation training actions that are complementary with other EU interventions, CSDP operations, actions of EU Member States and actions of multilateral, regional and sub-regional organisations and other donors.

Objective d) Improving post conflict recovery, as well as post disaster recovery with imminent threats to the political and security situation

Often peace agreements and stabilisation processes are fragile because they do not address root causes and/or do not define in a proper way the details of the different building blocks of sustainable peace. Moreover, conflict parties in general represent and defend partisan and not public interests. It is therefore important to support initiatives by local communities and civil society organisations to tackle conflict and strengthen their resilience, to participate to peace processes and to their different components, and to monitor their implementation. In this respect, women are often the first victims of conflict and insecurity, and at the same time can play a critical role in preventing and addressing conflicts and in mitigating their impact. Women and women's organisations will therefore be priority beneficiaries and partners of support actions.

From a stabilisation perspective, it is important to support the delivery of concrete 'peace dividends' in an inclusive way to all components of the population, in terms of justice and security, of social services provision and of the relaunching of the economic activity. This is important to gain the long-term support of the population for a peace process, which is an essential factor for sustainable stability and development. Post-crisis needs assessment can be an important step.

Under the previous MIP, the possibility to mobilise expertise on SSR, DDR, justice (including transitional justice) and constitutional law was already ensured. These stabilisation activities should be continued and support extended to other building blocks for sustainable peace such as the restoration of state legitimacy (civil administration, peaceful electoral processes, capacity of authorities to respond to communities' needs and

concerns). In this context, the protection of cultures and cultural heritage should be taken into consideration as a visible expression of common ground and as a tool for reconciliation and sustainable peace.

With a view to Article 3a of Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace, military actors may be supported to contribute to the delivery of development activities and security for development activities, including training, mentoring and advice, provision of equipment infrastructure improvements and services directly related to that assistance. This can only happen in exceptional circumstances and with the exclusions provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of that Article. This is relevant as regards the scope of the following priorities referring to the CBSD.

- Contribute to stabilisation and reduce the impact of conflict on the population and in particular women, by promoting and supporting violence reduction programs; ceasefires and local security arrangements; measures to counter the spill-over of insecurity to other areas and communities; mine action and the fight against arms trafficking.
- Support the design and implementation of processes to restore or strengthen security and justice for all, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR); reform of the security sector (SSR); and transitional justice. Action in these domains will also be carried out in fragile contexts with conflict prevention objectives.
- Contribute to consolidate or restore state legitimacy and prevent conflicts by supporting the implementation of power sharing provisions, including constitutional and institutional reforms, by preventing electoral violence, and by supporting the conflict-sensitive management of national identity and citizenship issues.
- Support initiatives aiming at creating space for cooperation and partnerships between all key stakeholders: local communities, CSOs, local and national authorities, international actors. Contribute to protect and enhance the value of culture and cultural heritage as a reconciliation tool.
- Combat all forms of Sexual and Gender Based Violence in conflict-affected contexts and strengthen the capacities of women's groups to engage in peacebuilding processes.
- Strengthen the capacity to undertake post-crises needs and peacebuilding assessments.
- Strengthen the capacity to undertake post-disaster needs assessments.
- Strengthen the capacities (and effectiveness) of military actors to restore security in conflict and post conflict areas for development actions (CBSD).
- Strengthen the capacity of military actors to facilitate the return of legitimate civil and security authorities to restore security and justice for all and basic services for populations (CBSD).
- Strengthen the capacity of military actors to protect civilians in conflict or post conflict areas (CBSD).

• Strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations to interact effectively with civilian and military actors in conflict or post-conflict areas (CBSD).

#### Expected results:

- Initiatives such as violence reduction programs, ceasefires and local security arrangements are carried out, stabilise the situation and reduce the impact of the conflict on the population.
- The concrete terms and provisions of peace processes components supported by the EU are better defined, feasible, less likely to be subject to misunderstandings and disagreements and more susceptible to be implemented.
- The risk of electoral violence is reduced.
- Peace process components, including electoral processes, are monitored in a responsible way by involved communities and relevant CSOs.
- Essential institutions of the state such as the national assembly, constitutional court, court of auditors, decentralised authorities, etc. resume their proper functioning and are able to deliver services in a responsible way.
- The concerns and needs of local communities and civil society organisations are better understood and better addressed in conflict and post-conflict situations.
- Justice and security actors are more respectful of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the principles of good governance and provide improved basic justice and security services to the population.
- Improved capacities of EU-mobilised actors to undertake/take part in post-crises needs assessments.
- Increased cooperation between main stakeholders (local communities, CSOs, local and national authorities, international actors) in conflict-affected contexts, including across borders, in each of the peace component areas.
- Increased engagement of women's groups in peacebuilding processes at local, national and international levels.
- The interventions of military actors allow for the better protection of civilians living in conflict or post conflict areas and an overall improvement in human security (CBSD).
- Military actors contribute to restarting economic activity and the provision of basic services (CBSD).
- Military actors contribute to the restoration of the State authority (central and local) in conflict and post-conflict affected areas (CBSD).

#### Principal indicators:

- Number of civil society actors (men/women) active in monitoring the implementation of peace processes and / or parts thereof.
- Number of public authorities engaging in two-way communication with local communities to better understand their concerns and better address their needs.
- Access to basic justice and security services to the population supported in crisis and post-crisis situations.
- Number of partners acting to combat violence against women and girls.
- Number of partners active in the prevention of conflicts and peace-building.

- Number of actions supported that are complementary with other EU interventions, CSDP operations, actions of EU Member States and actions of multilateral, regional and sub-regional organisations and other donors
- Reduction in accidents, injuries and attacks in high risk and fragile areas and increased level of protection of civilians (CBSD).
- Restart of economic and social activities (CBSD).
- Improved access to social services in affected areas (CBSD).
- Public administration offices redeployed / operational in affected areas (CBSD).

Objective e) Assistance to curb use of natural resources to finance conflicts and to support compliance by stakeholders with initiatives, such as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, especially as regards implementation of efficient domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources

#### Priorities:

- Assistance to curb use of natural resources to finance conflicts (including supporting the Kimberley process to prevent blood diamonds entering legitimate trade) and to curb illegal exploitation of natural resources.
- Support compliance by local, regional and international stakeholders with relevant natural resource-related initiatives.
- Promotion of responsible and sustainable management of natural resources as a means for conflict prevention and resolution.
- Strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations to engage on these issues.

### Expected results:

- Improved governance around natural resources management in selected conflict and high-risk countries/regions with a view to contributing to conflict prevention and resolution.
- Enhanced understanding and awareness by stakeholders of the nexus between natural resources and conflicts.
- Enhanced effective engagement by selected national administrations and regional organisations in the fight against illegal exploitation of natural resources and the sustainable management of natural resources including the capacity to generate sustainable and transparent budgetary resources from the mining sector.
- Improved compliance with relevant initiatives, especially as regards implementation of efficient domestic controls on the production of, and trade in, natural resources.
- Enhanced co-operation with major stakeholders (including in the private sector) and/or donor co-ordination with regard to programmes and mechanisms on natural resources and conflict prevention/resolution.
- Increased awareness and use of relevant standards and guidance as common reference for responsible mineral sourcing by stakeholders.
- Enhanced awareness and knowledge on implementing tools, challenges and lessons learnt.

- Improved and increased monitoring and oversight action by civil society actors and communities of the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
- Reduction of natural resources, water related and land-related conflicts in selected contexts.

## Principal Indicators:

- Number, quality and effectiveness of national/regional policies and programmes adopted and implemented by countries/regional organisations to fight against illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources and to sustainably manage natural resources.
- Level of compliance by national administrations and the private sector with initiatives such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, EU Regulation 2017/281 and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.
- Number and quality of i) best practice and lessons learnt documents produced and properly disseminated ii) relevant standards and guidance used as a common global reference by stakeholders iii) studies/research/technical assessments commissioned related to natural resources and conflict.
- Number of civil society actors and communities trained to monitor the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
- Number of civil society actors and communities actively monitoring the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
- Reduction of natural resources, water related and land-related conflicts in selected contexts.

## Art. 5. Addressing global, trans-regional and emerging threats

5.1a. Threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health.

Objective: Strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and all forms of illicit trafficking.

i) Counter terrorism, including preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalisation

- Support the implementation of relevant international legal provisions and compliance with international standards in the fight against terrorism and the effective work of relevant regional and multilateral CT bodies and fora in the long-term, in particular the UN, the Global CT Forum (GCTF) and three GCTF-inspired institutions, Interpol and where appropriate NATO.
- Focus on the following outstanding themes: supporting the efforts of partner countries and regions in preventing and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE)

in line with the UN PVE Action Plan and online recruitment and radicalisation; Foreign Terrorist Fighters both returning to Europe and moving on to third countries; countering the financing of terrorism and anti- money laundering, including the trafficking of cultural goods, to promote compliance with FATF recommendations; and support to targeted capacity building and training on CT-related security issues, including on criminal justice and Civil Aviation Security.

• Geographically focus principally on the EU Neighbourhood (Western Balkans, Turkey, North Africa), the Middle East, as well as Asia (Central, South, South East) and Africa (including the Sahel and the Horn of Africa).

## Expected results:

- Contribute to the implementation of relevant international Counter-Terrorism and P/CVE legal provisions, standards and best practices and the effective work of relevant regional and multilateral CT bodies.
- Increased impact of actions in the following areas: development and implementation of P/CVE strategies, evidence-based interventions to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable regions, countries and communities towards violent extremism and effective strategic communications to address online and offline recruitment and radicalisation; effective contribution to and measurement of AML/CFT frameworks (both legislative and institutional) in line with FATF recommendations and work on the trafficking of cultural goods when linked to terrorism financing; development of targeted support, including capacity building and training on CT-related security issues, including with regard to criminal justice systems, improvement of the investigation of CT related cases within a rule of law perspective and civil aviation security.
- Deepened cooperation with partners in the geographical focus areas.

#### Principal indicators

- Levels of compliance with international criminal justice and law enforcement standards in countering terrorism as per UNCTED reports.
- Level of performance of global CT bodies and for such as the three GCTF-inspired institutions the Malta Institute of Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ), the Hedayah Centre of Excellence for P/CVE and the Global Community and Engagement Resilience Fund (GCERF) as measured through established evaluation mechanisms.
- Level of effectiveness of well-established CT partnerships and CT Road maps /
  Action Plans furthered by high-level CT political dialogues. Emphasis should be
  put on measuring the success of specific actions aiming at countering: online and
  offline recruitment including radicalization to violent extremism; AML/CFT, in
  line with FATF reports; other security issues related to CT and connected with the
  performance of criminal justice systems and Civil Aviation Security.
- Number of fully and effectively implemented CT Strategies that apply a whole-of-government approach in partner countries.
- Number of partner countries / regions that are better prepared to face the threat of violent extremism through an effective whole of society approach in the prevention area.

#### ii) Organised crime and illicit trafficking

#### Priorities:

- Improve situational awareness and threat analysis capabilities of third countries on organised crime (OC) so that they can better monitor, analyse and address OC flows, trends and drivers also in relation to links with terrorism in third countries, with a particular focus on those countries which are assessed to pose the highest risks to EU internal security and the stability of their own regions.
- Taking into account that organised criminals are increasingly adopting a flexible multiple commodity approach, focus on trafficking hubs and routes into Europe, especially from Latin American and South Asia through West Africa, the Sahel and East Africa towards the North African Mediterranean coast, from Turkey and the Western Balkans, and also routes through Southeast and Central Asia.
- Promote synergies with the EU Policy Cycle for Serious and Organised Crime in line with the EU Agenda on Security. Taking into account the findings of EUROPOL's 2017 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment support, where appropriate actions will be complementary to EU internal security priorities, which include facilitation of illegal immigration, trafficking of human beings, environmental crime, excise/MTIC fraud, firearms trafficking, drug trafficking, cybercrime, money laundering and organised property crime.
- Support initiatives to mitigate OC impact on governance, development and the rule of law.
- Strengthen the awareness, technical and strategic capacity and cooperation networks of key policymakers, law enforcement and criminal justice actors and relevant CSOs to counter OC and mitigate its negative impact on citizens.

## Expected results:

- Improved evidence-based knowledge and analysis of OC threats and its trends through dedicated capacity building covering information analysis, intelligenceled policing models and sharing of information/evidence between third countries, other relevant third parties and EU Member States / JHA agencies on all crime types.
- Improved ability of criminal justice actors in third countries to address organised crime cases effectively and in compliance with international due process standards across the whole criminal chain (intelligence – investigation – prosecution – adjudication) and to dismantle criminal organisations along key trafficking routes and hubs.
- Improved mechanisms to reduce the OC threat posed to areas that have been deemed a priority in relation to the EU internal security and the stability of their own region
- Enhanced mechanisms of collection and proper dissemination of timely, strategic and comprehensive data and analysis related to OC.

#### Principal indicators:

- Number of informal and formal operational cooperation mechanisms among criminal justice actors in third countries and EU JHA Agencies (including Europol, Eurojust, EMCDDA and Frontex), EU institutions and Services, law enforcement actors in EU MS and other relevant third parties (e.g. Interpol).
- Number of investigations and convictions on multiple crime types, in compliance with international criminal justice standards, which leads to increased disruption of organised crime groups in key beneficiary countries and regions.
- Identified synergies and complementarities between EU internal security priorities, EU external action and EU development cooperation on areas relevant to the fight against serious and organised crime.
- Availability of statistical OC-related information and analysis to support the design of policies and coordinated responses.
- Number of coordinated operations against OC cases between criminal justice authorities in third countries and EU JHA agencies and / or their EU MS counterparts.

#### *Cybercrime*

#### Priorities:

- Geographically focus principally in developing countries and emerging markets with rapid connectivity growth, and from which serious cybercrime originates as well as in EU neighbouring countries when not addressed by other external financing instruments ('target countries').
- Promote in target countries the introduction of a minimum national legal framework to address cybercrime, where they do not exist, or their requisite update, where they do, in line with existing international standards (Budapest Convention on Cybercrime).
- Support capacity building activities for criminal justice actors in target countries (mainly training of judiciary and law enforcement personnel), aimed at enhancing their specialist knowledge and operational skills to apply legislation on cybercrime and electronic evidence and effectively cooperate nationally and internationally in this area (investigation, prosecution, adjudication), in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law.
- Contribute to the establishment and/or further development of high-tech crime units in target countries.
- Support capacities in target countries to fight against online child sexual abuse and exploitation.

#### **Expected results:**

- Target regions and countries have in place a minimum national legal framework aligned with existing international standards to address cybercrime (Budapest Convention on Cybercrime).
- Increased capacity of the judicial and law enforcement authorities of third countries/regions to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cybercrime.

- Increased capacity of target countries to engage with international cooperation networks that facilitate the prevention, investigation and prosecution of cybercrime.
- High-tech crime units exist in targeted third countries/regions, and are properly resourced and trained, to include systems for the minimum protection of investigation data, digital forensics capabilities, and other technological capabilities to investigate cybercrime.

## Principal indicators

- Number of countries with adequate legislation for addressing cybercrime, in compliance with existing international standards (Budapest Convention on Cybercrime).
- Number of cybercrime cases reported, investigated and adjudicated in target countries.
- Number of requests handled by national 24/7 cybercrime points of contact.
- Number of countries where cybercrime modules and good practice guides based on international standards are incorporated in judicial, police and competent authorities' training academies.
- Number of target countries that develop cybercrime strategies and policies that promote operational interagency, public-private and international cooperation through informal and informal modalities.

## iii) Capacity-Building for Security and Development

#### Priorities:

- Strengthen the capacities of military actors to deliver security for development activities, protect civilian interests, and create the space for the return of legitimate civil and security authorities in conflict and post-conflict areas.
- Increase the capacities of military actors to contribute to economic reconstruction and development.

#### Expected results:

- Increased professionalism of military personnel towards the civilian population, and greater civilian understanding of the respective roles of military and law enforcement agencies.
- Greater security for economic actors and enhanced infrastructure allowing for resumption of economic activity (airports, roads, bridges, markets etc.)
- Decreased level of violence in remote areas allowing law enforcement agencies to be redeployed and resume their tasks for the benefit of the population.

#### Principal indicators:

• Increased level of confidence of the local population in the military, particularly women, and children, and greater understanding of the respective roles of military/police.

- Reduction in injuries and deaths from improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordinance; increased number of arms and ammunition storage facilities; increased number of accessible roads and streets.
- Percentage of the territory where law enforcement agencies are able to work after having taken over from military forces.

#### Objective: Addressing threats to critical infrastructure

## i) Protection of Public Spaces

#### Priorities:

- Improve cooperation between public authorities, private operators, and citizens, which should include sharing of information and good practice.
- Enhance capacity to reduce threats and to mitigate the consequences of attacks on critical infrastructure and soft targets in priority countries.
- Improve future protection of public spaces by promoting "security by design".

#### Expected results:

- Decreased risk of future attacks in priority public spaces, with associated decrease in risk of injuries or deaths attributable to terrorism.
- Improved use of detection capability, security vetting procedures for staff, and enhanced capacity of first responders.
- Greater protection of buildings and crowded places through embedded security features.

#### Principal indicators:

- Greater use of guidance on the protection of public spaces in priority countries, including establishment of networks of public/private practitioners and an increased level of public awareness.
- Increased level of detection capability and capacity of first responders.
- Implementation of urban landscape design principles, such as protective walls, bollards, planters, and shelters.

### ii) International transport

#### Civil aviation security

- Support the compliance of priority third countries with UNSCR 2309 and ICAO international aviation security standards and recommended practices in priority third countries, as determined using a risk-based approach, with a focus on counter terrorism.
- Support the introduction of appropriate legislative frameworks in priority countries.

• Support the implementation of appropriate oversight mechanisms on civil aviation security in priority countries.

#### Expected results:

- Strengthened aviation security levels in partner countries in compliance with international standards.
- Creation of viable, effective and self-sustaining aviation security culture within all organisations involved in civil aviation in priority third countries, allowing efficient operation of aviation security systems that are readily adaptable to emerging threats.

## Principal indicators

- Aviation security shortcomings identified in third country, allowing for targeted capacity building activities.
- Improved third country compliance with international ICAO standards and recommended practices. Reviews and evaluations confirm that capacity building activities have contributed to improving a self-sustaining aviation security culture in third countries.

## *Maritime security*

- Contribute to the implementation of the external dimension of the EU Maritime Security Strategy, in coordination with other relevant regional EU policies and programmes, in particular the EU Strategy for the Gulf of Guinea and the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. In particular, this should include a focus on development of a maritime situational awareness picture and deterrence of maritime crime incidents, in support of regional and sub-regional capacities in the African continent, and in line with the Yaoundé and Djibouti Codes of Conduct.
- Support improvement of capacities and cooperation among maritime authorities, including law enforcement and judicial actors, to effectively fight, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate maritime crimes/illicit acts.
- Support the adoption of mechanisms to improve the security of critical maritime infrastructure, notably ports and tourist facilities, including increased compliance with the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code, and enhancing the links between maritime security, the blue economy and development.
- Promote rules-based governance at sea as an enabler of safe and secure maritime passage for maritime transport and, in particular, encourage the universal application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
- Support coordination mechanisms for multilateral maritime security initiatives, fostering trans-regional exchange of best practices, in particular between the Eastern and Western Indian Ocean Rims as well as the Gulf of Guinea, and cooperation with international organisations, in particular the International

Maritime Organisation (IMO) and, whenever possible, increasing the involvement of private sector actors.

## Expected results:

- Improved technical and analytical skills of maritime security-related authorities and institutions, as well as law enforcement and judicial authorities to carry out successful (joint) operations to fight maritime crime in affected countries signatory to the Yaoundé and Diibouti Codes of Conduct.
- Enhanced inter-agency, regional and transregional cooperation and information exchange in the above-mentioned target regions.
- Improved maritime port security governance and link with hinterland countries and coordination with their services, exploring also the potential of the CBRN Centres of Excellence.
- Increased harmonization of legal texts, judicial interpretations and (maritime) law enforcement practices in line with international law, in particular with UNCLOS.
- Improved security models in key maritime infrastructure (e.g. port facilities) that directly contribute to the development and 'blue economy' of coastal states.
- Reduced maritime crime incidents and compliance with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

## Principal indicators

- Increased coherence and complementary between IcSP-supported programmes and other civil and military EU initiatives promoting maritime security.
- IcSP-supported programmes conduct feasibility studies and fact-finding missions to individual countries across the targeted region, and report regularly on the results of their missions.
- Likeminded countries as well as regional and international organisations support and coordinate with IcSP-supported programmes.

## iii) Electronic information and communication networks (Cybersecurity)

- Geographically focus principally in developing countries and emerging markets with rapid connectivity growth, in countries from which serious cybersecurity threats originate, as well in EU neighbouring countries when not addressed by other external financing instruments ('target countries').
- Support the development of holistic and actionable national cybersecurity strategies and policies in target countries / regions consistent with a whole-of-government and multi-stakeholder approach.
- Promote the introduction of legislative, policy, organisational and technological measures to protect national critical information infrastructure and electronic networks supporting critical services in target countries/ regions, including identifying critical electronic services, and setting up cooperation networks between public and private sector actors.

- Support the establishment and/or professionalisation of national Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), including through specialised training, acquiring equipment and exchange of best practices within international professional CSIRT networks.
- Promote a culture of cybersecurity across decision makers, government services and society at large in target countries, including through consistent awareness raising efforts tailored to international standards as well as collaborative, scalable and locally-owned measures for increasing cybersecurity skills / expertise.

## **Expected** results:

- Holistic and actionable national cybersecurity strategies are adopted / enhanced in target countries with the necessary coordination structures in place between the private and the public sector, both at policy and operational levels.
- Increase in target countries' local operational capacities to adequately prevent, detect, deter, respond to and recover from cyber security incidents.
- Improved trust and regional, trans-regional and international cooperation on cyber incidents.
- Intensified awareness and promotion of cybersecurity culture and good practices in target countries/regions on the basis of European and international standards.

#### Principal indicators

- Number of target countries/regions that adopted national cyber strategies and action plans with whole-of-government and multi-stakeholder structures.
- Number of target countries with identified Critical Information Infrastructure Protection sectors and services.
- Number of target countries with functioning national CSIRTs in place with a minimum incident monitoring and response capacity.
- Number of target countries where the national incident response organisations or CSIRTs are organisationally linked to the country's Critical Infrastructure Protection system with political/democratic oversight over the activities of this technical organisation.
- Number of target countries where the national incident response organisations or CSIRTs have a training programme in place.
- Number of target countries where the national incident response organisations or CSIRTs have gained membership in international professional cyber associations (ex. FIRST, Trusted Introducer TF-CSIRT).
- Number of formal and informal cooperation mechanisms/agreements set in place between target country governments and private sector actors.
- Number of cyber incident information sharing networks and early warning networks that are established and / or enhanced in targeted countries / regions, with an involvement of CSIRTs, the private sector and law enforcement actors.

Objective: Addressing global and trans-regional effects of climate change and related environmental factors having a potentially destabilising impact

#### **Priorities:**

- Against the backdrop of the implementation of the Paris Agreement and in line with the EU Global Strategy, strengthen capacities, institutions and policies, and support relevant initiatives, at national, regional and multinational levels to understand and address climate security risks and provide support to international dialogue and cooperation in this area, including for the sharing of information and best practices. This may include initiatives stemming from the G7 (climate and fragility group) or plurilateral formations such as the Platform on Disaster Displacement where the EU has an interest in active participation.
- Countries and regions combining high levels of socio-economic instability and pre-existing environmental vulnerability/degradation to growing climate impacts will be targeted as a priority. This should include areas in the African dry belt, including the Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean basin. As climate impacts are largely mediated through water, the link between climate, water and security is becoming increasingly relevant as underlined by 22 July 2013 Council conclusions on EU water diplomacy. As such, support may be targeted at initiatives aiming at developing cooperative approaches to water management in countries and regions particularly vulnerable to evolving availability and quality of water.
- Enrich the knowledge base on climate change impacts on ecosystems and societies, notably by better assessing hotspots for climate risks and their contribution to escalating security issues; support the subsequent integration of this knowledge base into integrated approaches, notably in vulnerable dry or semi-arid regions, and strengthen the connections between climate risk management, humanitarian action, stabilisation and development.
- Enhance the capacity to understand and on a case by case anticipate, limit, manage and accompany the displacement of people, including across borders in the context of climate change and extreme weather events, including slow or sudden onset impacts. Promote the sharing of good practices at national, regional and international levels to include forced cross-border or internal displacement risks into preparedness plans in both potential sending and recipient countries (contingent planning, strengthening of early warning system, etc.)

#### Expected results:

- Awareness of climate security risks is enhanced and regional / transboundary dimensions are recognized. Key stakeholders in hotspot areas are better informed and integrate the climate / security nexus in their policy approaches.
- Deeper understanding developed of climate change impacts and their interrelation
  with security considerations (e.g. vulnerability assessments, identification of
  hotspots, risk mapping and modelling, etc.); governments and other key
  stakeholders are empowered to develop security-sensitive policies and adaptation
  strategies.
- Good practice is shared and adopted in addressing the needs of people that may be
  or have been displaced due to disaster and climate related causes. Tools, concepts
  and methodologies to collect and analyse such displacement are improved and
  applied, evidence strengthened and research gaps addressed.

- Bilateral and regional contingency planning and preparedness planning are supported; operational and technical support to include human mobility challenges in national Disaster Risk Reduction / Climate Change Adaptation Plans is provided.
- Training and capacity building on human mobility in the context of disasters and climate change supported.

## Principal indicators

- Lessons learnt from pilot projects are mainstreamed in project and program design by the implementing institutions.
- Third parties and institutions refer to and take up lessons from IcSP funded projects.
- Integration of climate security dimensions in national climate plans (NDCs) and development plans by countries as a result of IcSP projects.
- Integration of the climate security nexus in National security policies by countries as a result of IcSP projects.
- Diffusion of policy lessons beyond the countries targeted by IcSP projects
- Number of multilateral initiatives addressing the nexus between climate and security/displacement/fragility supported.
- Integration of climate adaptation planning and disaster risk reduction in countries targeted by IcSP projects.

## Objective: Ensuring and adequate response to major threats to public health

This objective will be pursued under the biosafety component of wider the CBRN risk mitigation objective (see below).

5.1b. mitigation of and preparedness against risks, whether of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents.

Objective: Mitigation of and preparedness against risks, either of an intentional, accidental or natural origin, related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials or agents

The EU CBRNe Centres of Excellence (CoEs) are a unique platform where CBRNe experts exchange information, coordinate their activities and cooperate on common projects. So far, the main objectives of the initiative were focused on general CBRN awareness as well as the specific development of a culture of safety and security for biological and chemical materials. For the 2018-2020 programming period, a central objective is to expand the scope of the initiative into new CBRNe-related fields (e.g. law enforcement, organised crime, counter-terrorism, Cyber, critical infrastructure protection) in order to reflect current EU and partners' priorities. In addition, further steps should be taken towards the sustainability of training / education activities in CBRNe field,

developed within the EU CBRNe CoE Initiative, identifying potential synergies with the H2020 Community of users, ongoing project eNOTICE<sup>16</sup> as well as with other partners as appropriate such as the EU Member States, or NATO-accredited training centres. The ISTC and STCU will continue to be addressed outside the Centres of Excellence framework but their links and synergies with the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence will be reinforced.

## Sub-objective A: CBRN risk mitigation and security governance through the EU Centres of Excellence

#### Priorities:

- Expand EU Centres of Excellence activities to CBRNe related risks:
  - CBRN counter-terrorism and anti-organized-crime operations
  - CBRN critical infrastructure protection, including port infrastructure
  - cybersecurity for CBRN facilities
  - CBRN consequence management
  - explosives
- Increase the operational capacity of the EU CBRN CoEs by setting up simulations, table top and field exercises at cross-border level.
- Building on existing capacities, work on development of existing national research and training centres in EU Member States and partner countriesto prepare their potential transformation into regional training hubs.
- Increase the mirror effect between internal and external EU policies (in close coordination with the Commission's CBRN Action Plan).
- Strengthen the pilot role of EU Delegations in coordination with Member States and Commission / EEAS services in Brussels.
- Build synergies between CBRN CoE activities and other EU funded actions that have similar purposes. In particular, actions on explosives should connect with the EU inter service group on mine action.
- Increase the effectiveness of projects by further refining their terms of reference and introducing additional quality control measures, including sensitizing partner countries as to the importance of selection of trainees and their competences / expertise.

#### Expected results:

- Greater number of partner countries and level of engagement according to their security priorities and EU strategic security priorities.
- Increased number of National CBRN Needs and Risk Assessments (NAQs) in CoE partner countries.
- Increased number of National CBRN Action Plans (NAPs) in CoE partner countries.
- Increased role and empowerment of the national CBRN teams in CoE partner countries.
- Increased internal-external cooperation and activities.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> https://uclouvain.be/fr/instituts-recherche/irec/research-h2020.html

- Move towards a 'train the trainers' model of training and education where appropriate
- Increased technical capacity in the Centre of Excellence Regional Secretariats.
- CoE Regional Secretariats are better able to formulate CBRNe projects.
- Existing projects are completed and the implementation of new projects is more efficient.
- Partner countries' CBRNe strategies and policies to mitigate CBRNe risks and threats are developed in due time.
- Empowerment of National Focal Points and their national CBRN teams as single entry points in partner countries to tackle CBRNe issues.

## **Principal indicators**

- Number of participating countries and institutes.
- Number of trainings, simulations, table top and field exercises held.
- Number of NAQs finalised or reviewed.
- Number of NAPs finalised or reviewed.
- Number of internal-external activities ('mirroring effect').
- Number of projects designed and developed by the CoE partner countries which are financed through the IcSP.
- Number of projects identified through the EU CBRN CoEs and financed by other EU sources (including the European Commission, EU Member States).
- Number of projects identified through the EU CBRN CoEs and financed by other non EU sources.
- Number of experts trained in internationally certified training centres.
- Project proposals emerging from Regional Secretariats require less screening and inputs.

#### **Sub-objective B: Outreach on Export control for dual use items**

#### Priorities:

- Developing sound regulations at national and regional level, where appropriate inspired by EU Regulation 98/2013 on explosives precursors and Regulation 428/2009 on the export on dual-use goods and by the international regimes that deal with dual-use export controls (Australia Group, Missile Technology Control regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement).
- Increasing participation of partner countries in the initiative.
- Increasing coordination with other donors within the EU (EU entities and Member States) and outside the EU (notably, the U.S. and Japan).

#### Expected results:

- Improved administrative capacity to exercise control over trade of dual-use items.
- Greater country participation.
- Trade facilitation including modernised administrative and smoother procedures.
- Improved safe transport of CBRN materials and dual use items.

#### Principal indicators

- Number of participating countries and breadth of participants' backgrounds.
- Number of adopted upgraded legal frameworks.
- Number of trained staff from target countries.
- Number of licenses delivered by partner countries.
- Number of participating countries making use of the EU control list

# Sub-objective C: International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU)

#### Priorities:

- Consolidating the work of the ISTC and STCU including co-financing of projects in particular in supporting the implementation of the 1540 UNSCR.
- Targeting dual-use knowledge.
- Promoting geographic expansion of the activities and extended membership.
- Increased cooperation with the CBRN CoE initiative, e.g. in terms of project implementation.
- Increase security in partner countries
- Increased regional dimension and size of projects while decreasing the number of projects.

#### Expected results:

- Increased number of project participants with dual-use knowledge in different regions.
- Increased number of strategic countries participating in the programme.

#### Principal indicators

- Number of participating countries involved.
- Number of participating institutes involved.
- Number of participating scientists with dual use knowledge involved.
- Number of trained scientists.
- Number of projects implemented by ISTC and STCU on behalf of the CBRNe CoE initiative.

## 3. INDICATIVE FINANCIAL ALLOCATIONS 2018-2020 in MEUR (±20% per priority/year)

IcSP MIP 2018-2020 (Articles 4 and 5)	2018	2019	2020	SUM
Early warning and conflict-sensitive risk analysis in policy making	6	7	8	21
Confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation	7	7	9	23
Participation and deployment in civilian stabilisation missions	5	4	2	11
Post conflict and post disaster recovery	9.7	10.5	12.8	33
CBSD	2.7	2.5	2.8	8.00
Curb the link between natural resources and conflicts	6	7	8	21
Total Article 4	33.70	35.53	39.80	109.00
Counter-terrorism*	21.50	22.50	22.50	66.50***
Fight against Organised Crime**	6.00	10.00	10.50	26.50
Illicit Trafficking (Drugs, Human Beings, SALW)	6.00		10.50	16.50
Cybercrime		10.00		10.00
CBSD	6.25	6.30	8.45	21.00
Critical Infrastructure Protection	10.00	9.50	9.50	29.00
Maritime Security	6.00	9.50		15.50
Cyber Security	4.00		9.50	13.50
Climate Change and Security	2.50	2.50		5.00
CBRN Risk Mitigation	24.00	20.50	24.00	68.50
Expert Support Facility	1.90	2.60	2.30	6.80
Total Article 5	72.15	73.90	77.25	223.30

<sup>\*</sup> Including the terrorist threat to civil aviation and to critical energy infrastructure

\*\* Includes money laundering and illicit trafficking (SALW, trafficking in human beings, drugs)

\*\*\* The envisaged financial allocation for the neighbourhood is 50 per cent.