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**"Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability
Crisis Preparedness Component (2007-2013)"**

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Italtrend C&T
via Gramsci 56
I-42100 Reggio Emilia
Italy
Tel: +39 0522 516401
Fax: +39 0522 511113
www.italtrend.it



Office for Economic Policy and Regional Development (EPRD)
Szkolna 36A Street
Kielce 25-604
Poland
Tel: +48 41 345 32 71 (to 74)
Fax: +48 41 345 25 87
Email: eprd@eprd.pl
Website: www.eprd.pl



Socaba (Social Capital Bank)
Boerstenbindervej 12B,
5230 Odense M, Denmark
Tel +44 2032902630
Mob +44 7723 031 296
peter.brorsen@socialcapitalbank.com
www.socialcapitalbank.com

Evaluation Team

Peter BRORSEN, *Team Leader*

Karen SHERLOCK, *Deputy Team Leader*

Leila BOUCEHBOUBA , Fernanda FARIA, Andre KAHLMEYER, Karen SHERLOCK, Michel VANBRUAENE,
Senior Experts

Ana Carina FRANCO, Johannes Reiner SCHOT, Evelien Elisabeth WELLER, Marla ZAPACH, *Junior Experts*

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Final Evaluation Report

Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability Crisis Preparedness Component (2007-2013)

Final report – 25 June 2014

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Table of Abbreviations

AAP	Annual Action Programme
AU	African Union
BCPR	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP)
CICR	Centre for International Conflict Resolution
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CfP	Call for Proposal
CPC	Crisis Preparedness component
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEVCO	Directorate-General EuropeAid Development and Cooperation
DG	Directorate-General
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPBSC	Department for Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion
EC	European Commission
ECHO	Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ELARG	Directorate-General for Enlargement
ERMES	European Resources for Mediation Support
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FAFA	Financial Administrative Framework Agreement
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GM	Gender mainstreaming
HQ	Headquarters
IA	International Alert
IFS	Instrument for Stability
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JUST	European Commission Directorate-General Justice
LCC	Local Conciliation Committee
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MIP	Multi-annual Indicative Programme
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRG	Minority Rights Group
MS	Member State
MSU	Mediation Support Unit
NDCCP	National Directorate for Community Conflict Prevention
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSA	Non State Actor
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PbP	Peacebuilding Partnership
PDA	Peace and Development Advisors
PRADD	Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development
SSR	Security Sector Reform
RCRPO	Regional Crisis Response and Planning Officer
RELEX	European Commission Directorate-General for External Relations
ToR	Terms of Reference
TIPNIS	<i>Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécuré</i>

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

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1 Executive Summary¹

1.1 Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the results of the implementation of the Crisis Preparedness component under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) during the period 2007-2013. More specifically, the evaluation reviews the implementation processes, analyses outcomes and impact, produces a baseline for future monitoring, and provides recommendations on how to maximise future impact with regard to four thematic areas and one cross-cutting area which cover a partial selection of IfS funded activities: (1) Capacity building of civil society in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peacebuilding; (2) Mediation and dialogue; (3) Natural resources and conflicts; (4) Women, peace and security (WPS); (5) Gender mainstreaming (GM).

The 2006 IfS Regulation distinguishes between assistance in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis (Article 3, short term component) and assistance in the context of stable conditions for cooperation (Article 4, long term component). The Regulation foresaw that at least 73 percent of IfS funding be allocated to actions in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis under Article 3 in the period 2007-2013. Activities funded under Article 3 will not be directly assessed by this evaluation and where they are taken into account, the assessment will only be made in relation to the degree to which they focus on activities funded under the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.

The long-term and programmable component of the IfS (Article 4), includes three areas of technical and financial assistance: (1) threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health; (2) Risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents; and (3) Pre- and post-crisis capacity building (the IfS Crisis Preparedness component).

This evaluation focuses on the pre-and post-crisis capacity building component of Article 4.3.

Article 4.3 of the Regulation "Pre-and post-crisis capacity building" defines the scope of IfS Crisis Preparedness component:

"Support for long-term measures aimed at building and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors in relation to their efforts in:

- (a) promoting early warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions;
- (b) improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery.

Measures under this point shall include know-how transfer, the exchange of information, risk/threat assessment research and analysis, early warning systems and training.

Measures may also include, where appropriate, financial and technical assistance for the implementation of those Recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission falling within the objectives of Community cooperation policy."

The Regulation further defines the allocation for the IfS Crisis Preparedness component as no more than 5 per cent of the total funding which for the period 2007-2013 amounted to EUR 103 million.

¹ For the sake of brevity, references and examples listed in the main body of the report are excluded here.

This evaluation is directed at all interested IfS Crisis Preparedness component stakeholders, including EU Delegations, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO), the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament (EP) as well as civil society actors and other international, regional and sub-regional actors and donors. The executive summary will be available to the public and stakeholders worldwide in English, French and Spanish.

1.2 Methodology

This evaluation was commissioned in the context of broader political and policy discussions on the Commission's proposal for the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, stocktaking of the 2007-2013 Framework, as well as on a replacement for the Instrument for Stability for the period 2014-2020. The evaluation was carried out during September to December 2013 by a ten-person consultant team provided by a consortium led by Italtrend. The evaluation did not include a review of project budgets.

The overall methodology followed EuropeAid guidance and the evaluation questions were based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, with the addition of two ToR-defined criteria, namely 3Cs (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence) and EU added-value, as well as one additional evaluation issue defined by the evaluation team as 'partnerships and knowledge creation'. Each criterion provided a necessary part of the answer to whether and how the IfS Crisis Preparedness component has delivered results. The combination of these criteria also allowed for a critical analysis of how results can be further enhanced.

In order to strengthen the validity and reliability of the evaluation findings, each project was analysed through three types of data (documents, interviews and an online survey), which were triangulated, where feasible. This detailed data provided a baseline for further monitoring and evaluation of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.

The evaluation was carried out in a staged fashion, with each phase concluding with a deliverable informing the subsequent phase. The four phases were (1) Inception phase: Case study selection, evaluation and thematic question development; (2) Headquarters Phase: Interviews and document research; online survey design; (3) Field Phase: Field visits and data collection in 13 countries, online survey process; (4) Synthesis phase: Compilation and analysis of findings.

1.3 Findings

The 2006 IfS Regulation, quoted above, defines the IfS Crisis Preparedness component objective as "building and strengthening the capacity of [a range of organisations and actors] in [a range of peacebuilding areas]." This evaluation assessed whether the IfS Crisis Preparedness component had achieved its objectives as defined in the Regulation, i.e. the evaluation sought to answer the overall question:

Has the IfS Crisis Preparedness component built institutional capacity to address conflict?

The evaluation found that the **IfS Crisis Preparedness component allows the EU to address conflict issues in the broadest sense, and that individual projects have indeed built or strengthened the capacity of organisations to contribute to peace-building efforts.**

1.3.1 Thematic areas

The thematic areas serve as a useful tool to categorise projects and focus attention on specific EU policy frameworks or initiatives. Capacity building of civil society is a prominent issue sought after by the EU that should continue to be mainstreamed throughout IfS Crisis Preparedness actions. The evaluation recommends, however, that it is re-oriented as a cross-cutting issue across the component. Gender mainstreaming has been identified in some projects and there is evidence of increased gender concerns addressed in several actions, although not in all. Natural resources and conflict is an emerging thematic area, and the evaluation recommends that the EU invests further in this theme in order to create dividends from earlier efforts and bring substance to new policy initiatives. Women, peace and security is a theme common to – and popular among – many development agencies, and is increasingly attracting international actors' attention. The evaluation recommends that the EU refines its focus of the IfS Crisis preparedness component, specifying which aspect of this broader topic could best be addressed. Through the IfS Crisis Preparedness component the EU has quickly established itself as a key player in the mediation and dialogue thematic area. Also here the evaluation recommends a review of the specific sub-areas where the component can produce greatest added value for the EU.

1.3.2 Relevance

The evaluation found that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component is highly relevant to the general objectives of the EU and its international commitments, particularly by funding actions in fragile states for peace-building and conflict prevention pre- and post-crisis. Further to the findings of the 2011 *Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union's Instrument for Stability*, **the present evaluation concludes that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component is an indispensable element of the comprehensive EU peace, security and development architecture and should be fully embedded into this structure.**

The IfS Strategy Papers and Multi-Indicative Programmes (MIPs) reinforce the flexibility of the component by providing a wide remit for adapting to new themes, engage with new emerging actors, and respond to new relevant international initiatives. The various funding modalities (direct grants and calls for proposals) are helpful in retaining this flexibility within the component. By an open approach to innovative projects and emerging themes, the component increases its relevance to both the external stakeholders who cannot secure other funding sources for such initiatives, and to the EU, which benefits from the knowledge products and experiential learning from such projects.

As a political tool, the IfS Crisis Preparedness component has been used to great effect in creating strategic partnerships, particularly at the multilateral level with UN projects. Compared to the thematic and geographic instruments, the component has only a small envelope of funds, and yet it is designed to produce a significant impact on EU relations with several of the UN's specialised agencies. While not being a primary policy objective for the component, the evaluation found that the drive to create more UN inter-agency cooperation did not generate the expected results, and the evaluation recommends that this objective is re-assessed. Within the EU architecture, the component also aims to create coherence by facilitating support for identified funding gaps and providing a bridge for a longer term funding perspective, whether from the EU or other sources. The catalytic or seed funding is intended to kick-start work in areas that eventually complement longer-term work through the themed and geographic EU instruments. The evaluation found that only in a limited number of cases, the intended catalytic effects and the opportunities for coherence were achieved. This assessment echoes the finding of the 2011 IfS evaluation and, given the persistent challenge this represents, this evaluation recommends that, as a matter of strategic planning routine, EU Delegations are encouraged to draw linkages to IfS activities.

The IfS strategic vision that drives its Crisis Preparedness component is compromised by difficulties in linking project-driven demands from the field with policy driven demands deriving from various EU commitments. Combined with, and possibly caused by, these diverging demands, the component does not have clear indicators for success. The evaluation recommends that, alongside the objectives set forth in the Strategy Paper, IfS defines success for each work stream, for example by identifying a range of optimal outcomes for specific interventions.

The projects funded under the component demonstrate a high degree of relevance to the respective country needs and priorities. The projects address thematic areas that are complementary to the geographic instruments. In most projects the emphasis on building capacity and networking between partners helps to strengthen the concept of a community of practitioners. The sub-delegation of the Calls for Proposal (CfP) aiming at building the capacity of civil society has been instrumental in making the projects relevant to the country contexts and ensure that they meet the priorities and needs, not just at country level but also locally. The regional projects awarded through sub-delegated Calls for Proposals, however, have sometimes lacked coherence and have not always meet the needs identified by the EU Delegations in the region they are intended to cover.

1.3.3 Effectiveness

The component has selected good implementing partners, who are key actors in their field, have relevant initiatives and who are effective project implementers. Most projects have effectively contributed to the MIP objectives 2012-13 “building conflict prevention and crisis response capacities.”

The effectiveness of cooperation with UN agencies has, however, been identified as an issue as certain projects have not been managed optimally on the ground, resulting in a lack of coherence and coordination with EU Delegations. A lower level of effectiveness was also created by inefficiencies such as staff shortages or logistical shortcomings. The evaluation noted difficulties in building relationships between different UN institutions, as well as making partnerships work in projects. This caused some projects to be less effective and was detrimental to the emergence of an understanding of a global community of practitioners. The evaluation found that support from EU Delegations, especially in the initial stages, is crucial for making projects more effective. That was equally the case for HQ-managed projects. The evaluation recommends that IfS, in consultation with its UN partners, re-assesses how they engage in order to align expectations of processes and outcomes.

On the whole, NGOs, both international and national, have been effective implementers. Elements that have made the projects effective are, *inter alia*, building on lessons learned, good project design, strong analysis of the context, or strong methodologies. In many projects, risk management has been a common element contributing to effectiveness. Evaluators found that risk management elements, such as risk assessments and contingency plans, have been included in most projects. There were also some good practice elements such as: pre-empting problems; remaining engaged in adversity; and working through risks and managing them jointly (EU Delegation and implementer).

1.3.4 Efficiency

Most projects were on target to achieve the project outcomes within the allocated financial resources and time frame and the evaluation thus judges the IfS Crisis Preparedness component efficient. While this conclusion has internal validity, the evaluation found it difficult to establish the external validity due to the unique nature of many projects. Based primarily on the

online survey, however, the evaluation finds that the projects have delivered outputs with an efficiency factor comparable to similar projects funded through other financing instruments.

Where projects were less efficient this was primarily due to timing issues, lack of adequate resources and poor communication. Some no-cost extensions were granted to implementers for failure to complete activities in the given time-frame. The evaluation found that the EU human resources devoted to the IfS Crisis Preparedness component and project management was generally of a very high calibre but often insufficient in volume. At both HQ level and in the EU Delegations, too little staff time is allocated to manage the various aspects of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component. In particular, regional actions are often very time-consuming for EU Delegations. Meanwhile, the role of the Regional Crisis Response and Planning Officers (RCRPO) has not been fully developed and has occasionally caused further challenges to the reporting lines. The efficiency of a number of projects is hampered by sometimes intermittent communication between EU Delegations and HQ on specific issues. Communication between and within UN agencies was also found lacking. Yet, in most cases, the staff resources of implementing partners were considered fully adequate to the tasks.

1.3.5 Impact

Certain projects lack ways of measuring results, thus leading to difficulties in ascertaining impact. Nevertheless, some projects have established baselines either from existing data or by conducting new studies at the start of the project. Projects that most clearly coincide with demonstrated changes to the environment include the following, the first of which are likely to have helped reduce actual violence.

In Timor-Leste, the IfS-funded Early Warning and Early Response system has had an impact with government, civil society and international agencies. Project data is being used at all levels for policy briefings, security briefings and progress reports. The availability of trusted and timely data has reinforced community preparedness and responses to emerging conflict and inter-community tensions. The evaluation found that the number of conflicts in several geographical locations has decreased significantly after the introduction of the system. Other EU Delegations have already expressed interest in replicating this early warning model.

In Chad evaluators learned that the number of conflicts have drastically dropped in the areas where the IfS-funded CSO Radio FM Liberté has broadcasted its conflict-awareness programmes targeting herd owners, farmers and local authorities. Several other countries have shown an interest in the project, hoping to replicate the success.

In Zimbabwe, CSOs attributed the almost violent-free 2013 elections to efforts such as the IfS project, which created a more peaceful election environment compared to the 2008 violence. IfS implementing partners confirmed a significant reduction in political violence and claimed this was a direct result of their interventions. Some have been able to provide evidence for this through surveys in follow up to baseline studies.

Positive changes have also been recorded in several Bolivian municipalities where an IfS-funded project has been operating for two years. The changes include an upswing in the effective implementation of traditional justice and consequent referrals to the ordinary judicial system. Discussions between the State and indigenous actors are now easier within some of the municipalities that have received IfS-funded trainings.

Several other projects have recorded a positive impact in terms of capacity building.

In Bolivia IfS project trainees are now raising awareness about dialogue and mediation in order to prevent and address conflict, thus far benefiting 400 people in their communities. In Jordan,

evaluators found evidence of improved conflict prevention and resolution skills being acquired and applied within the management structure of several civil society organisations (CSOs). In Timor-Leste local civil society organizations have developed and strengthened their capacities for social lobbying, advocacy and institutional dialogue with justice bodies and public services, potentially contributing to the strengthening of democratic institutions and strengthening their roles as independent actors for development.

In certain other cases, impact has been more difficult to measure or has been absent. The general lesson that peacebuilding needs a long-term commitment in order to produce sustainable impact was highlighted in the IfS Crisis Preparedness component projects in Lebanon. The capacity building efforts would require a sustained input, especially on training of local mediators. It was generally noted in several projects, that awareness raising and capacity building are processes that require long-term engagement. Project stakeholders commented that societal change is a slow process depending on many different factors. In addition some conflicts are deep-rooted and complex, making impact difficult to measure.

Some projects were positively affected by unintended consequences. This included helping to promote democratic practices and strengthen the role of civil society in the context of nation building. In Bolivia, for examples, minority and marginalised groups are gaining a voice through the IfS support.

1.3.6 Sustainability

Unlike development projects, conflict prevention activities seldom generate economic gains that can help sustain funding beyond a given project cycle. Sustainability also refers to outcomes, however, and such results can be achieved with a combination of good planning and effective engagement of stakeholders.

Some projects funded under the IfS Crisis Preparedness component have produced sustainable outputs at the level of organizational-technical capacity thereby contributing to achieving the overall aims and objectives of the component. Yet, several of the networks and partnerships that have been built up under the projects were not found to be sustainable and the results are likely to evaporate without further financial support.

Several CSOs are dependent on continued donor funding in order to sustain their operations and continue their projects. Arguably this may not be the concern of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component as it seeks to prioritise the initiation of projects with catalytic effects. Nevertheless, there are some ambitious sustainability expectations written into project designs that are not always compatible with pilot projects.

The EU offers support for CSOs to help maintaining human resource costs in some fragile and conflict environments. However, finding and securing access to new funding at the end of a project cycle is often highly challenging. In the absence of new funding, any recently built capacity is likely to dissipate, and the larger impact of the work is unlikely to materialise.

In many projects, securing ownership was a key element in their effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. This was achieved by engaging communities and the evaluators generally noted that participatory approaches in actions funded under the IfS Crisis Component helped secure such ownership.

Surprisingly, the *concept* of a community of practice did not resonate with many component partners during the evaluators field research. In practice, however, some projects did establish local communities of practice although they were not defined as such at the onset of the project.

1.3.7 Monitoring and measuring

Monitoring and evaluation of projects in the IfS Crisis Preparedness component programme is variable with only a few strong examples of baselines and sound ex post analysis. Follow-up at the EU Delegation level is particularly variable. Some IfS Crisis Preparedness component projects, particularly those managed by international or local CSOs, have had their own independent evaluations which points to good practice for continuous learning and improving design in subsequent projects. The evaluators note that weak monitoring and evaluation systems are a lost opportunity for capturing lessons, increasing accountability and building on successes. The evaluation recommends that the component projects are required to report on a minimum set of indicators, tailored to each thematic area, allowing HQ managers to identify in a comprehensive fashion the most critical successes and failures.

1.3.8 3Cs - Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence

Evaluation survey results, combined with interviews, indicate that coordination between MS and the EU Delegations has generally been effective. HQ led projects help deliver the 3Cs at the global level, which for some projects results in greater coherence across a thematic area. Better coordination between EU Delegations and UN agencies at country level would likely have improved the impact of some projects.

Complementarities with other EU initiatives is regularly lacking, and the evaluators found that IfS Crisis Preparedness projects are only receiving limited attention from non-IfS staff in EU Delegations, thereby reducing the opportunity for linkages and allowing component projects to feed into broader EU country initiatives. Similarly, in some projects the coherence in-country has been variable and in some regions there has been a lack of coherence between the MS and UN agencies.

1.3.9 EU added value

EU's particular added value includes the ability to support valuable projects which have no other donors. In some cases the IfS Crisis Preparedness component was a unique funding opportunity, for example in Jordan where no MS made conflict prevention funding available. The strong focus on women, peace and security was also considered a particular EU added value in some projects, including in Timor-Leste's early warning project.

Some component projects have been used to seize opportunities to support newly opened up areas of engagement, for example in Zimbabwe where the component funded 12 local CSOs specialised in peacebuilding and human rights. Overall, the evaluation survey found that 55 per cent of the EU Delegations consider that the projects 'inspired new ideas' and 27 per cent felt they 'inspired new projects.'

The evaluation also found that despite a limited budget, the IfS Crisis Preparedness component contributes to fulfillment of EU commitments related to women, peace and security and mediation and dialogue.

1.3.10 Partnership and knowledge creation

Relatively few knowledge products have been generated and captured by the component's projects, thus questioning the broader return on investment and the sustainability of lessons identified. On the global project on equipping actors with dialogue skills, for example, a specific objective to produce guidance notes has not yet been achieved. The material on natural resources and conflict, however, has been broadly welcomed and it is critical that the EU follows up on this work in order to capitalise on the goodwill and knowledge products created. Meanwhile Timor-Leste has produced an effective database to record incident for its early warning system but it is unlikely to transfer directly as a product to other conflict-affected areas because it offers little conceptual progress that would help actors in other conflicts think afresh.

In El Salvador, on the other hand, a project to support victims of social violence enabled the EU Delegation to better understand the issue and integrate this thinking into other programming. The evaluation recommends that the IfS consider seminars or platforms to capture lessons learned, discuss difficulties and promote continuous learning within the EU.

Project collaboration at HQ level is quite strong for the EU-UN partnership in terms of design, management and monitoring. This relationship, however, is more variable at the level of EU Delegation. For CSO implementers, evaluators recorded requests for more local, as compared to international, partners.

1.4 Conclusions and recommendations

The evaluation found that IfS Crisis Preparedness projects have built or strengthened the capacity of organisations to contribute to peace-building efforts. Although attribution is difficult in fragile and conflict affected settings, several projects are likely to have helped reduce actual violence, and there is evidence of greater capacity for conflict prevention across all thematic areas. The IfS Crisis Preparedness component is highly relevant to the general objectives of the EU and its international commitments, and projects generally address thematic areas that are complementary to the geographic instruments. Some projects help to strengthen the concept of a community of practitioners but more can be done to link individual efforts and build on investments that could generate broader and more sustainable gains.

Overall, the consultant recommends:

1. Given the flexible, unique relevance of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component in support of the EU's ambitions globally, funding should continue and be increased for the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.

In order to maximise impact of IfS funding, the consultant also recommends:

2. IfS Crisis Preparedness component vision and strategy should be more clearly defined and widely communicated within the EU system, and it would be helpful if EU Delegations engaged in more analysis of how to effectively use the funding to link to long-term objectives.
3. Alongside the objectives set forth in the Strategy Paper, IfS should define benchmarks for success for each work stream.
4. The thematic area capacity-building of civil society should be re-oriented as a cross-cutting issue like gender mainstreaming. EU should invest further in natural resources and conflict to create dividends from earlier efforts and bring substance to new policy initiatives. The EU should review the specific sub-areas of the mediation and dialogue and the women, peace and security thematic areas where the component can produce greatest added value for the EU.
5. As a matter of strategic planning routine, EU Delegations should be encouraged to draw linkages with other IfS activities in other components.
6. The ambition to create more UN inter-agency cooperation should be re-assessed. More generally, through consultations with its UN partners, IfS should examine how to engage in order to align expectations of processes and outcomes, and that EU Delegations and UN Agencies establish closer collaboration on the ground when UN agencies act as implementing partners.
7. The EU should consider ways to ensure sufficient human resource capacity, both at HQ and EU Delegation level, especially for follow-up of the projects. This will become even more critical if the IfS Crisis Preparedness component funding volume is increased.

8. In order to minimise single project spending with little sustained impact, ensure that good and replicable initiatives benefit from cross-fertilization, it is strongly recommended that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component invests in an ongoing effort to capture the experiences, follow-up and capitalise on the lessons learned.
9. In keeping with the IfS Crisis Preparedness component objectives, consideration should be given to allocating greater weight to the criteria of sustainability and catalytic effect.
10. All projects should have monitoring and evaluation procedures outlined in the initial design of the project. All project managers should subsequently be required to report on a minimum set of indicators, tailored to each thematic area, allowing HQ to identify in a comprehensive fashion the most critical successes and failures.
11. The IfS Crisis Preparedness component should consider some seminars/forums/web-platforms/community of practice or other forms of spaces to capture lessons learned, discuss difficulties and promote continuous learning within the EU.

2 Introduction

2.1 Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the results of the implementation of the Crisis Preparedness component under the Instrument for Stability (IfS) during the period 2007-2013.²

2.2 Objective

The objective of the evaluation was to assess the overall implementation of the Crisis Preparedness component and its results, identify lessons, and provide recommendations for the future.

More specifically the evaluation aimed to:

- review the implementation of four thematic areas of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component carried out from 2007 to 2013;
- document the outcomes and – where feasible – the impact of these outcomes in four thematic areas of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component;
- provide recommendations, in particular on how to maximise impact of funding having regard to the constraints imposed by the EU Financial Regulation and the new IfS Regulation³ and,
- produce a baseline for future monitoring and evaluation.

2.3 Scope

The 2006 IfS Regulation distinguishes between assistance:

- in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis – short term component (article 3)
- in the context of stable conditions for cooperation – long term component (article 4).⁴

The Regulation foresaw that at least 73 percent of IfS funding be allocated to actions in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis under Article 3 in the period 2007-2013. Activities funded under Article 3 will not be directly assessed by this evaluation and where they are taken into account, the assessment will only be made in relation to the degree which they focus on activities funded under the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.

The long-term and programmable component of the IfS (Article 4), includes three areas of technical and financial assistance: (1) threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health; (2) Risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents; and (3) Pre- and post-crisis capacity building.

Article 4.3 of the IfS Regulation defines the scope of Crisis Preparedness Component, which is the focus of this evaluation:

² Under the IfS article 4.3 Crisis Preparedness component, the relevant services of the European Commission established the Peacebuilding Partnership (PbP) to describe a portfolio of the projects that aimed at partners in the areas of pre and post crisis capacity building, thereby better anticipating responses to crisis situations worldwide. To be accurate, this evaluation will not refer to PbP but rather to the Crisis Preparedness component.

³ Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, OJ L 77/1, 15.3.2014.

⁴ Regulation EC 1717/2006 as published in OJEU L327 of 24.11.2006

"Support for long-term measures aimed at building and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors in relation to their efforts in:

- (a) promoting early warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions;*
- (b) improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery.*

Measures under this point shall include know-how transfer, the exchange of information, risk/threat assessment research and analysis, early warning systems and training.

Measures may also include, where appropriate, financial and technical assistance for the implementation of those Recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission falling within the objectives of Community cooperation policy."

The Regulation further defines the allocation for the IfS Crisis Preparedness component as no more than 5 per cent of the total funding which for the period 2007-2013 amounted to EUR 103 million.⁵

This evaluation is focused specifically on four thematic areas and one cross-cutting issue within the IfS Crisis Preparedness component:

- Capacity building of civil society in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peacebuilding;
- Mediation and dialogue;
- Natural resources and conflicts;
- Women, Peace and Security; and,
- Gender Mainstreaming (cross-cutting).

The present evaluation follows a stock-taking and scoping exercise⁶ carried out in 2009 and an overall IfS Programme-level evaluation published in July 2011.⁷

2.4 Coverage

The evaluation covers IfS Crisis Preparedness component activities financed under the 2007-2012 Annual Action Programmes and assesses the programming of interventions for 2013. As regards the thematic area covering the capacity building of civil society in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building, the evaluation focuses on the interventions funded from 2010 to 2013.

2.5 Audience

This evaluation is directed at all interested IfS Crisis Preparedness component stakeholders, including EU Delegations, the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO), the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament (EP) as well as civil society actors and other international, regional and sub-regional actors and donors. The executive summary will be available to the public and stakeholders worldwide in English, French and Spanish.

⁵ Article 24 (c)

⁶ *Stocktaking and scoping of Peacebuilding Partnership, August 2009.* Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union's Instrument for Stability.

⁷ Overall Programme-level Evaluation, 12 July 2011.

2.6 Timing and limitations

This evaluation was commissioned in the context of broader political and policy discussions on the Commission's proposal for the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020⁸, stocktaking of the 2007-2013 Framework, as well as on a replacement for the Instrument for Stability for the period 2014-2020.⁹ The evaluation was carried out during September to December 2013. The evaluation did not include a review of project budgets.

2.7 Consultant

The evaluation was carried out by a ten-person consultant team provided by a consortium led by Italtrend.

⁸ COM (2011) 500 final of 29 May 2011

⁹ COM Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, OJ L 77/1, 15.3.2014.

3 Methodology

3.1 Approach

In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToR), the overall methodology was based on the guidance developed by EuropeAid Evaluation Unit and specifically guided by the following:

- The evaluation questions were based on the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria: **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **impact** and **sustainability**, with the addition of two ToR-defined criteria, namely 3Cs (*co-ordination, complementarity and coherence*) and EU added-value, and one evaluation team-defined issue termed '*partnerships and knowledge creation*'. Each of the criteria provided a necessary part of the answer to whether and how the IfS Crisis Preparedness component had delivered results. The combination of these criteria also allowed for a critical analysis of why some results had fallen short of expectations and how they could be improved upon.
- The inception report set out how the key concepts were defined for this evaluation. This provided a common understanding with the European Commission (EC) and EEAS, the parties under evaluation, and within the evaluation team.
- In order to strengthen the validity and reliability of the evaluation findings, each project was analysed through three types of data (documents, interviews and an online survey), which are triangulated, where feasible. These detailed data provided a baseline for further monitoring and evaluation of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.
- The evaluation was carried out in a step-wise fashion, with each phase concluding with a deliverable that informs the following phase. The four phases were:
 - Inception phase: Case study selection, evaluation and thematic question development;
 - HQ Phase: Interviews and document research; online survey design;
 - Field Phase: Field visits and data collection in 13 countries, online survey process; and
 - Synthesis phase: Compilation and analysis of findings.

3.2 Thematic areas

Within the evaluation approach outlined above, the consultant considered the four thematic areas, while also putting special emphasis on the cross-cutting issue of gender mainstreaming. Each evaluation phase addressed the key issues pertaining to the thematic areas covered by the projects under evaluation.

The EU has developed policy frameworks in three of the thematic areas and one is emerging also on natural resources. To assess Crisis Preparedness component support for the EU vision inherent in each policy framework, the evaluation developed an indicator for project contribution. Questions relating to these indicators have been asked along with the evaluation questions (detailed in Annex VI - Interview Guide)

3.3 Case study selection

Following detailed exchanges with FPI, the consultant evaluated **23 case studies** implemented in **13 countries world-wide**, selected according to the criteria below:

1. The relative importance of IfS support in the country/region
2. Broader learning potentials
3. The political context (stable, fragile, post-conflict)
4. The presence of an IfS Regional Crisis Response and Planning Officer (RCRPO) or of an IfS Project Manager
5. Field mission safety
6. Maximise coverage of four thematic areas

7. Coverage of five geographic regions and Headquarters
8. Mix of a) multi-country and b) single country projects
 - a. Allows comparison of same project in several countries
 - b. Allows for comparison of different projects in same country context
9. The beneficiary type (Local NGO, International NGO, International organisation)
10. Project management mode (centralised vs. de-concentrated to EU Delegations)
11. Building on previous achievements and lessons learned (closed projects and similar recently launched projects)
12. Number of projects in country (more projects in single country make it a more likely destination)
13. Maximum five projects and three countries per mission team.

While selected according to the criteria above, the case studies were not representative samples of all regions or all types of projects and implementation modalities. They were selected to maximise opportunities for studying replicable models, learn about success stories and provide recommendations.

Table of case studies (Annex IV provides more detail):

Region	W Africa	E/C Africa	Latin America	Asia	Mid East	HQ
Country 1	Liberia	Zimbabwe	Bolivia	Timor-Leste	Lebanon	
Country 2	Guinea Bissau	Chad	Guatemala	Nepal	Jordan	
Country 3	Senegal	Kenya	El Salvador			
Theme 1	Capacity-bldg.	Capacity-bldg.	Capacity-bldg.	Capacity-bldg.	Capacity-bldg.	Capacity-bldg.
Theme 2		Mediation	Mediation	Mediation	Mediation	Mediation
Theme 3	Women	Women	Women	Women		Gender mainstreaming
Theme 4		Natural resources				Natural resources
Project titles (Reference numbers)	<p>Mindjeris i força di Paz (Les femmes sont une force de paix) (46)</p> <p>Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations (64)</p> <p>UN WOMEN, UNDP and EU JOINT Programme on Women, Peace and Security: Enhancing Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Planning in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo (75)</p>	<p>Preventing inter-community conflicts in East Africa (7)</p> <p>Enabling Capacity Programme II (ECP II) Zimbabwe (32)</p> <p>Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations (64)</p> <p>FAM, « Femmes Actives en Médiation »(42)</p> <p>«Communiquer pour prévenir» (43)</p> <p>Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation (66)</p>	<p>Ayudando la implementación de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica en sus componentes de combate al delito y prevención relacionados con armas pequeñas y ligeras y violencia armada (35)</p> <p>Fortalecimiento de los pueblos indígenas y originarios de Bolivia en la administración de la justicia plural y mecanismos de solución de conflictos (36)</p> <p>Desarrollo de Capacidades y Procesos de Mediación para la Transformación Pacífica de los Conflictos Sociales y Políticos de Bolivia (37)</p> <p>Reparación del tejido social comunitario con jóvenes en alto riesgo.(61)</p> <p>Fortalecimiento de los mecanismos de acompañamiento y atención integral a víctimas de la violencia social, para el impulso de su participación en los procesos de diálogo y construcción de paz social en El</p>	<p>Early Warning Systems: from analysis to action (23)</p> <p>Toward Enhanced Security and Community Resilience in Timor-Leste through the Expansion and Consolidation of the Early Warning and Response System (31)</p> <p>Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations (64)</p> <p>Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation (66)</p> <p>UN WOMEN, UNDP and EU JOINT Programme on Women, Peace and Security: Enhancing Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Planning in Liberia, Timor-Leste and</p>	<p>Policy Lab on mediation and dialogue to address violence in Jordanian universities (49)</p> <p>Conflict sensitivity, prevention and peace building in Jordan (50)</p> <p>Peace Puzzle: Community Theatre and Capacity building towards Community Conflict Prevention (53)</p> <p>Towards an inclusive and responsible Media in Lebanon (54)</p> <p>Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon (57)</p>	<p>Preventing inter-community conflicts in E. Africa (7)</p> <p>Early Warning Systems: from analysis to action (23)</p> <p>Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations (64)</p> <p>Strengthening United Nations Capacities to Support Mediation (65)</p> <p>Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation (66)</p> <p>Provision of European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) (67)</p> <p>EU-UN Partnership on Natural Resources and Conflict – Phase 3: strengthening capacities and knowledge of civil society for the consensual and sustainable management of land and natural resources (71)</p> <p>Property rights and artisanal diamond development (PRADD) (72)</p> <p>UN WOMEN, UNDP and EU JOINT Programme on Women, Peace and Security: Enhancing Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Planning in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo (75)</p>

			Salvador (62)	Kosovo (75)		
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4 Findings: Thematic areas

4.1 Capacity building for CSOs

CSOs have played a crucial role in the implementation of the IfS. The 2012 EC Communication 'The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations'¹⁰, recommends, *inter alia*, to i) adopt a strong focus at country level but also support CSOs in regional and global settings; ii) include civil society participation in public policy processes and in policy dialogues; iii) adapt EU funding to local and regional needs.

The 2009 External Stocktaking and scoping on the future strategic direction of the Crisis Preparedness component¹¹ (in the report called the PbP) recommended the expansion of the scope of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) capacity-building projects. As a result of the stocktaking, the EC also sought to delegate calls for proposals to Member States (MS) but this was later abandoned due to lack of interest from relevant MS agencies. Subsequently, FPI sub-delegated the management of more projects to EU Delegations. This allowed a better local/regional focus, increased cooperation with local CSOs as beneficiaries, and aimed at achieving tangible results in country and at grassroots level rather than in Brussels or at international level only.

All projects covered by this evaluation have CSO capacity building as a core activity. The results have varied and the focus has been on either individual, CSOs or CSO networks, or a combination of both.

The HQ-led project on preventing inter-community conflicts in East Africa (7), for example (see Annex 4), focused on two levels of capacity building. The evaluators concluded that when the action is implemented across three countries and targets numerous communities, difficulties can be faced in increasing multi-stakeholder dialogues, improved participation of CSOs in domestic policies or in EU or international processes as well as in creating strong CSO networks. In Chad, the project 'Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation' (66) focused on creating a lasting space for dialogue, mediation and conflict prevention for CSOs, as well as political parties and state institutions where individuals have been the predominant focus of the activity.

By contrast, in Timor-Leste, the implementer of the Early Warning and Early Response project (31) managed to develop its own capacities in conflict analysis, project management, research and early warning.

Similarly in Bolivia, the project 'Desarrollo de Capacidades y Procesos de Mediación para la Transformación Pacífica de los Conflictos Sociales y Políticos de Bolivia' (37) put emphasis on increasing capacity for mediation and dialogue within indigenous communities and organisations. 'Fortalecimiento de los pueblos indígenas y originarios de Bolivia en la administración de la justicia plural y mecanismos de solución de conflictos' (36) also contributed to increased capacity of indigenous CSOs in traditional justice and conflict resolution through social lobbying, advocacy and institutional dialogue with justice bodies and public services institutions. Additionally, CSOs have improved their capacities to implement appropriate forms of traditional justice and conflict resolution, which aids self-governance in remote communities through a complementary judicial system. In other projects, there are

¹⁰ COM (2012) 492 final

¹¹ *Stocktaking and scoping of Peacebuilding Partnership*, August 2009. *Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union's Instrument for Stability*,

various different actors who receive capacity building such as students and journalists, for example in the Lebanon project 'Peace Puzzle: Community Theatre and Capacity building towards Community Conflict Prevention' (53). In Guinea Bissau, the implementer of FAM, 'Femmes Actives en Médiation' (42) works with potential female mediators and the women's political platform and capacities are reinforced through specific training and coaching. Around 30 women have now been trained as skilled mediators and building on 14 years of experience FAM have been giving training on domestic violence issues to 800 teenagers (boys and girls) as the next generation and agents of change.

In Zimbabwe (32), the project 'Enabling Capacity Programme II' supports CSOs implementing national and local healing and reconciliation and focuses on establishing and strengthening the capacity of partners, community individuals and structures, including a range of actors such as traditional leaders, local government, women and youth. Their actions have been deemed successful in contributing towards increasing and enhancing the capacity of local CSOs and their participation in domestic policies, as well as contributing to a greater CSO effort in the country.

In Jordan, all relevant stakeholders of the project 'Policy Lab on mediation and dialogue to address violence in Jordanian universities' (49) agree that the capacity of Jordanian CSOs – large or small - to apply mediation and dialogue skills is severely limited, with civil society actors generally lack sufficient understanding of the processes, tools and techniques for successful mediation, whereas needs are rapidly growing in a context of social, economic and political crisis. This particular project, however, did realise some results but it was limited to the immediate 108 project beneficiaries across the civil society organizations and universities concerned. The investment in CSO capacity building to receive and host Syrian refugees in the project 'Conflict sensitivity, prevention and peace building in Jordan' (50) paid off as improved conflict prevention skills have been acquired and applied within respective CSO management structures and at field level helping to improve working directly with host and refugee communities.

PbP projects can act as 'catalysts for change' at micro level and their positive impact needs to move beyond direct beneficiaries. A significant potential for impact on political dynamics and societal relationships could be achieved if results were further capitalized upon – via geo instruments for example (DCI, ENI).

The evaluation found that capacity building of civil society is a prominent issue sought after by the EU and it should continue to be mainstreamed throughout IfS Crisis Preparedness actions. The evaluation recommends, however, that it is re-oriented as a cross-cutting issue across the component.

4.2 Mediation and dialogue

As a peace project since its inception, the EU has long had conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue as part of its internal make-up. More recently, the *2009 Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities* clarified EU ambitions and constituted the policy basis for the EU's involvement in international peace mediation.¹² It established mediation as "a tool of first response to emerging or on-going crisis situations" and declared the EU's ambition to

¹² Council of the European Union, *Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities*, Brussels, 10 November 2009.

become more directly involved in mediation and facilitation, while also better at supporting mediation and facilitation efforts led by others.

Importantly, the 2009 Concept paper also established a broad definition of mediation, which encompasses facilitation of political dialogue processes at various levels. This means that for the EU, mediation is not just about high-profile and high-level mediation of formal peace talks, but also about engaging in informal political dialogue and supporting other international or local actors who are better placed – or more acceptable to the conflict parties – to facilitate or mediate talks in a specific context.

There are almost no circumstances in which the EU works alone in the area of mediation. Identifying who is best placed to support a process and how the EU can best add value is often the first step in developing a strategy to support a peace process. The majority of EU engagements in mediation are thus indirect and less visible. As the EU Concept paper affirms, these roles – working alongside and in support of the United Nations (UN), regional organizations, international Non-Governmental Organisations (INGO), local civil society or direct parties to the conflict – are equally important as its direct engagement in high-level mediation.

Mediation and dialogue appears in all Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) in some form since 2009, and in recent years it is more explicitly mentioned. Mediation and dialogue covers from high-level, track 1 diplomacy to diplomacy at lower levels in conflicts around the world. The EU has also been able through the United Nations Department of Political Affairs' (UN DPA) Mediation Support Unit (MSU) project 'Strengthening United Nations Capacities to Support Mediation' (65) to provide mediation support for certain conflict zones of strategic interest to the EU. Mediation and dialogue is also a feature of other projects – such as the project implemented by UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) "Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation" (66) – where the aim is to identify and build the capacities of local mediators in third countries to be able to deal directly with problems on the ground. The theme therefore offers the opportunity to work across various levels and with multiple actors working in this field, something also reflected in the recent 'European Resources for Mediation Support' (ERMES) project (67).

In Zimbabwe, there is evidence of contribution and impact of activities of the project 'Enabling Capacity Programme II' (32), in particular through peace-building dialogue meetings, peace rallies, consultative meetings with local and traditional leaders, and rural workshops focusing on dialogue around critical peace building issues. Implementers worked with civil society, as well as state institutions trying to build a dialogue in a polarised situation with positive results. In Bolivia, the project 'Desarrollo de Capacidades y Procesos de Mediación para la Transformación Pacífica de los Conflictos Sociales y Políticos de Bolivia' (37) aimed to train leaders to identify ways to cover conflict and understand the characteristics of mediation and dialogue and accompany mediation experiences to develop new skills. In Jordan, mediation and dialogue activities proved their value as approaches in mitigating tribal tensions where conflicts have recently spilt over into university campuses. Beneficiaries of the project 'Policy Lab on mediation and dialogue to address violence in Jordanian universities' (49) as well as of project 'Conflict sensitivity, prevention and peace building in Jordan' (50) have successfully performed mediation actions – although at a small scale – both within their organisations and with the target groups, notably Syrian refugees (see also above under 4.1). In El Salvador, although the project 'Reparación del tejido social comunitario con jóvenes en alto riesgo' (61) is directly related to the thematic area of youth, one of its important components is the facilitation of dialogue with young people and empowering victims to engage in a direct dialogue with

concerned state institutions. Some multi-country initiatives, such as 'Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation' (66), aim to be replicable through training of trainers. In Chad, through the project 'Communiquer pour prévenir' (43), local conflicts are being dealt with through the radio, particularly in the defence of human rights, in raising awareness towards resource-based conflicts, and in the monitoring of the oil extraction.

The evaluation finds that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component provides the EU with some good project examples upon which to begin implementing the 2009 Concept on mediation theories. The component also helps the EU to establish a solid political partnership with the UN while providing key support to civil society activities. Consequently, the EU has quickly established itself as a key player in the mediation and dialogue field.

The evaluation recommends a review of the specific sub-areas where the component can produce the greatest added value for the EU.

4.3 Natural resources and conflict

In the last sixty years, at least forty per cent of all intrastate conflicts have had links in some form with natural resources, and the presence of natural resources makes conflicts twice as likely to recur.¹³ In addition, growing global competition over access to scarce resources in developing countries, many of which are prone to economic and political instability, is likely to increase conflict risks.¹⁴ In particular, due to competitive pressures some minerals have increased their value, which, in combination with governance challenges, further adds to economic and political fragility.

Projects focused in this area are helping to build EU knowledge, as well as advancing the theme at a policy level, which is of growing concern for developing countries.

As the question on natural resources and conflict is debated across Europe, a number of organisations and research reports question whether the EU has been tackling the issue effectively. One concern raised in a 2012 report was that the "*EU draws on a broad but often inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated range of tools to manage natural resource-related security and conflict challenges*".¹⁵ These tools include the EU's trade, security, diplomatic, climate change and development instruments. As highlighted in the recent EEAS/EC Joint Communication on the Comprehensive Approach, by integrating these responses into a strategic framework, however, the EU could help to guarantee a more secure international arena and "*transform the EU from a security and policy actor with great potential into a player able to credibly align and effectively apply its available policy instruments and resources*".¹⁶

The natural resources thematic area first emerged in the AAPs in 2008 and projects have been included as part of annual programming in 2011, 2012 and 2013. In the 2012 AAP, the theme was linked with climate change.¹⁷ In 2013 the thematic area was allocated a larger proportional budget (€4 million) and a key project was the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development (PRADD) (72), implemented through a service contract in cooperation with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

¹³ *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: the Role of Natural Resources and the Environment*. United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), 2009.

¹⁴ See, for example, *Mining for Smartphones: The True Cost of Tin*. Friends of the Earth, November 2012.

¹⁵ *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: the Role of Natural Resources and the Environment*. United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), 2009.

¹⁶ See, for example, *Mining for Smartphones: The True Cost of Tin*. Friends of the Earth, November 2012

¹⁷ A theme that now appears to be specifically covered under the IfS long-term component relating to threats to law and order, to the security and safety of individuals, to critical infrastructure and to public health.

At the global level, the 'EU-UN Partnership on Land, Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention, Phase 3' (71) project aims at reducing conflicts over land and natural resources in post-conflict and conflict-prone regions, with particular focuses in the Great Lakes Region, i.e. the Democratic Republic of Congo - DRC, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. The PRADD project (72) aims at bringing greater quantities of alluvial diamonds into the legal chain of custody and improving the livelihood options of local populations.

Natural resources and conflict has featured as a thematic area in the following cases subject to the evaluation. In East Africa, the project 'Preventing inter-community conflicts in East Africa' (7) focused successfully on enhancing operational capacities of CSOs, whereas in Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan the aim was to prevent and manage natural resource-based conflicts. In Chad under the project 'Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation' (66) transmission of skills in mediation and dialogue were shown to be important in tackling conflicts related to land use/rights and community discussions on natural resources. . In Bolivia, project 'Desarrollo de Capacidades y Procesos de Mediación para la Transformación Pacífica de los Conflictos Sociales y Políticos de Bolivia' (37) also addressed tensions between indigenous organisations and the state over land reform issues. In this case, however, the primary focus was CSO capacity building and development of their mediation and dialogue skills rather than addressing the natural resources and conflict directly.

Natural resources and conflict is an emerging area, as evidenced by the recently launched initiative of the High Representative (HR) of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht for an integrated EU approach to stop profits from trading minerals being used to fund armed conflicts. Projects in this area are helping to build EU knowledge as well as advance policy discussions in the area, thanks to knowledge materials developed with EU support. The evaluation recommends therefore that the EU invests further in this theme in order to create dividends from earlier efforts and keep bringing fresh perspectives, and therefore added value to new policy initiatives.

4.4 Women, peace and security

The key element of the EU policy on women, peace and security is the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security, adopted in 2008. This Comprehensive Approach includes a commitment to develop, on the basis of the relevant 'Beijing + 15' indicators elaborated in 2008, indicators for progress regarding the protection and empowerment of women in conflict settings and in post-conflict situations. On 26 July 2010, the Council adopted a set of 17 indicators to follow up this commitment, to cover both the EU institutions and EU MS. The purpose of the indicators is to provide a framework with which to examine the progress that the EU and EU MS are making on the subject of WPS. These indicators were designed to work in a complementary fashion with the global UN indicators on UNSCR 1325. The First Report on EU progress under these indicators was published on 11 May 2011¹⁸.

The IfS focuses on women, as gender inequality is a root cause of conflict and conflicts have particularly harmful effects on women.

¹⁸ Report on the EU-indicators for the Comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security Council UNSCRs 1325 & 1820 on Women, Peace and Security (document 9990/11)

In line with the EU policy on gender, significant effort has gone into supporting specific strategic actions targeted at protecting, supporting and empowering women, in particular to strengthen IfS' partners capacity to address gender issues through crisis preparedness measures. 'WPS/Gender equality' is one of the priority thematic areas of focus within FPI.2 facilitated by the appointment of a specific gender focal point coordinator. FPI is represented in the Informal EU Task Force on UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 that aims to increase inter-institutional coordination, as well as co-ordination with EU Member States, and to promote a coherent approach to gender-related issues.

Of all the themes, WPS/Gender has arguably the strongest network – the informal task force for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 – between civil society, Member States, international organisations and the EU (ECHO/FPI/DEVCO/ELARG/JUST). While this is a good example of a comprehensive approach, such links are informal and not yet fully systematised. Recently the EEAS women's network has been also launched at the level of Directors and Heads of Division. Additionally, EU inter-service meetings are regularly arranged, also including UN Women who has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the EU in 2012, in order to strengthen collaboration through policy dialogue, joint advocacy and joint programming. One of the thematic priority areas of this MoU is Women, Peace and Security.

More generally, the role of gender focal points is not fully resolved within the EU architecture. Often this position is allocated to staff with several other roles so they cannot dedicate their time fully to gender-related work.

The projects cover a broad range of situations where women's needs have to be addressed specifically. In El Salvador, project 'Reparación del tejido social comunitario con jóvenes en alto riesgo' (61) deals with women gang members, although most of the women associated with the gangs are also mothers, wives, sisters or partners who suffer double discrimination as a result. Women receive training on mediation and conflict resolution through the multi-sector dialogues and they are very slowly becoming an active part of reconstructing the social fabric of their communities through mediation activities efforts. In Guinea Bissau, project 'Mindjeris i força di Paz (Les femmes sont une force de paix)' (46) has been supporting potential women mediators through the provision of specific and beneficiary-targeted training methodology focusing on conflict prevention and resolution and female leadership. It is hoped that female mediators will liaise between the traditional and formal justice systems, including for GBV cases, although they are currently involved in domestic violence issues as well.

In Timor-Leste, under project 'UN WOMEN, UNDP and EU JOINT Programme on Women, Peace and Security: Enhancing Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Planning in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo' (75), the objective is to enhance a coherent and comprehensive approach using the comparative advantage of each institution. The goal of the programme is to ensure greater participation of women in peace building and post-conflict planning. The programme is implemented in Kosovo, Liberia and Timor Leste and globally. At the policy level, in both Liberia and Timor-Leste, there have been challenges to a comprehensive approach highlighting the complexity of inter-institutional working on the ground in country. .

The evaluation finds that women, peace and security is a theme common to – and popular among – many development agencies, and is increasingly attracting international actors' attention. The evaluation recommends that the EU refines its focus of the IfS Crisis preparedness component, specifying which aspect of this broader topic could best be addressed.

4.5 Gender mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming cuts across all thematic areas, allowing gender equality to be potentially included in all activities, and at all levels while also serving as a specific purpose of an individual project. This can be most clearly witnessed in the partnership between EU and UN Women, which contains regular plans for joint activities with regard to the issue of gender in the context of conflict prevention and peace-building. The parties collaborate on the EU plan of action on gender equality and women's empowerment in development (2010-2015). While progress has been made to include gender mainstreaming, external stakeholders stress that it needs continued effort and strong support at all levels of the hierarchy is required.

The evaluation found that gender mainstreaming has been identified in some projects and there is evidence of increased gender concerns addressed in several actions.

There have been some interesting developments in gender mainstreaming such as the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Zimbabwe through the security sector. Women's organisations have successfully managed to penetrate the security institutions and have managed to hold training sessions that included both male and female police officers. Results of their work include an increased focus on gender in the Code of Conduct around violence in elections and a significant input with regard to women's participation in the constitution making process. They also established a women's situation room and created a network of 200 female observers during the 2013 elections. Conversely in Timor-Leste (75) the government does not yet have the capacity to integrate UN resolutions 1325 and 1820 in the state institutions and relevant ministries on its own and so they still require external expertise which UN Women/UNDP is well placed to offer.

The evaluation found that issue of gender mainstreaming has figured in some projects allowing gender concerns to be addressed as part of actions focusing on other themes. For example, project 'Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation' (66) in Nepal has - with comparatively small financial support - addressed effectively and efficiently the role of women leaders in Nepal and in peace and security topics, providing relevant women NGO networks with much needed leadership and advocacy skills.

5 Findings based on evaluation questions

5.1 Internal Relevance

5.1.1 Crisis Preparedness component match with overall EU objectives

The IfS Regulation (2006) (and the Crisis Preparedness component specifically) is intended to provide support “[...] for long-term measures aimed at building and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors in relation to their efforts in: (a) promoting early warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions; (b) improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery.” These same policy objectives are also further strengthened by their inclusion within the scope of the Lisbon Treaty - Treaty on European Union under Article 21 (c): “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security”. This article also states that: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations [...] It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.” In two fundamental aspects: peace-building and conflict prevention pre- and post-crisis; and working through support for the multilateral system, the IfS Article 4.3 Crisis Preparedness component is fully coherent with the objectives of the EU external action as set out in Title V of the Treaty on the European Union.

5.1.2 Strategy paper match with Crisis Preparedness component objectives

The IfS strategy paper 2007-2011 outlines as a priority the need to “build capacity within the EU and the international community for effective crisis response”. The need to ensure an upstream investment in the response capacity is fully consistent with the objectives of IfS article 4.3. The 2012-2013 IfS Strategy Paper sought to ensure a continuation of the previous strategy rather than aiming at a major overhaul. The strategy built on lessons identified and the objective now also included moving “away from an ‘ad hoc’ fragmented approach towards promoting integrated regional networks or platforms.”¹⁹ This was also consistent with the IfS Regulation and pointed to the need for coherence across EU actions.

5.1.3 Multi-Annual Indicative programmes match with Strategy papers

The multi-annual indicative programmes (MIPs) for 2007-2013: 2007/08; 2009/11; 2012/13 broadly focus on mobilising “the capacity inherent in the relevant target groups active in the field of peacebuilding: non-state actors; relevant international organisations (including regional and sub-regional organisations); and relevant Member States’ agencies” (from the 2009/11 MIP). The European Parliament underlined the importance of inclusivity in terms of involving all potential partners within the reach of Crisis Preparedness component, For this reason, the proportional share of civil society actors benefiting from IfS support under Article 4.3 cumulatively increased over the five year period a reaching 53% of IfS funds in between 2007-2013.

Given the breadth of projects funded under the Crisis Preparedness component – including those managed from HQ – the evaluation finds that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component is successfully addressing a cross-section of target groups active in the peacebuilding field, as directed by the IfS strategies.

¹⁹ Instrument for Stability, Thematic Strategy Paper 2012-2013, p.6

5.1.4 AAPs match the multi-annual indicative programmes

Since 2007 the AAPs have gradually become more targeted, and recent AAPs reflect the four themes highlighted in this evaluation while gender mainstreaming has increasingly become a cross-cutting issue.

As per the EU Financial Regulation and implementing rules, the AAPs action fiches specifically mention projects that are jointly programmed with international organisations through Contribution Agreements for those organisations covered by the Financial Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) – such as support to the UN Mediation Support Unit - MSU (project 65). The AAPs therefore often are a result of a combination of project driven (bottom up) and policy driven (top down) processes. This reflects the distinct but complementary mandates of EEAS.K2 and FPI.2.²⁰

Internal stakeholders noted that the design of projects tends to be a combination of provision of strategic policy guidance by EEAS as well as the pursuit of thematic areas of interest by FPI2 in a cyclical manner with view to maximising the quantity of themes covered in collaboration with partners. Since 2011, the AAPs action fiches have been drafted in consultation with the EEAS and then launched in formal inter-service consultation involving the latter and other relevant Commission services, e.g. DG DEVCO, DG ECHO, DG ELARG, DG JUST, DG BUDG. Moreover, the drafting of AAPs are preceded by a public consultation with CSO, International Organisations and EU Member States.

The evaluation found that there is a good match between AAPs and the MIPs, partly due to the continued collaboration between EEAS.K2 and FPI.2 (in consultation with any other relevant EC/EEAS services or stakeholders): K2 formally is the penholder for the IfS strategy and the MIPs, whereas FPI.2 develops the AAPs. This relationship is discussed further under section 5.6 on efficiency below.

5.2 Intra-EU relevance

5.2.1 Crisis Preparedness component match with demands of Delegations

Since 2010, the IfS has provided sub-delegated funding to EUDs who can issue local/regional calls for proposals (CfP) to build the capacity of CSO in certain thematic areas. In 2010, only few Delegations requested funding. In 2013, however, 19 Delegations requested a total of EUR 27 million (although only EUR 9 million was available).

This move to devolved or ‘de-concentrated’ implementation and funding is very welcome and requires further refinement to ensure that the regional and thematic benefits are achieved. The 2009 Stocktaking study of the IfS 4.3 component, noted “*the majority of the projects are country specific (as opposed to enhancing the understanding of thematic and transversal issues)*” [and] “*their potential to build international and regional capacity and be of value to the peacebuilding sector as a whole is open to question.*”²¹ By 2010, the EC had already responded to this concern and sought to address the recommendation that “*funding could thus more effectively be concentrated on adding value to existing in-country support under other instruments by targeting for example regional, multi-country and cross-sector activities, than*

²⁰ This is a recent and post-Lisbon Treaty situation and it does not reflect the period 2007-2010 where the two were united under RELEX.

²¹ *Stocktaking and scoping of Peacebuilding Partnership, August 2009*. Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union’s Instrument for Stability, p. 7.

diluting impact by distributing a small amount of disparate country-specific grants."²²

A regional CfP, which is an option open to EU Delegations, aims to create broader impact, in line with the recommendation above. In the case of the AAP component 'Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations' (64) for example, crisis planning increases the potential for co-ordination, complementarity and coherence and thus added value to the EU. The challenge will indeed be to ensure a light enough implementation structure that avoids the administrative shortcomings of the HQ centralised global projects and yet delivers results that have more impact than the individual, single country projects that remain the norm for de-concentrated calls for proposals.

The evaluation found that this funding opportunity has created high competition among several EUDs. In response, since 2010, FPI has set up a thorough selection process which involves close consultations between the relevant FPI, EEAS and DEVCO services, and which takes into consideration the merit of the EUDs' proposals; the appropriateness of the amount requested in light of the priorities and activities identified by each EUD; and the overall geographical coverage.

The evaluation found that the Crisis Preparedness component strategic vision can sometimes be compromised by difficulties in linking project-driven demands from the field with policy driven demands deriving from various EU commitments. Combined with, and possibly caused by, these diverging demands, the component does not have clear indicators for success. The evaluation recommends that, alongside the objectives set forth in the Strategy Paper, IfS defines success indicators for each thematic area, for example by identifying a range of optimal outcomes for specific interventions.

5.2.2 Crisis Preparedness component complementing EU's other external actions and policies

The IfS aims to establish linkages with the thematic and geographic instruments and helps to fill funding gaps in countries where, due to conflict or natural disasters, long-term instruments cannot be used.

The evaluation did not find any evidence of an operational mechanism to ensure IfS complementarity with thematic or geographic instruments. This may, however, be addressed to some extent by the recent EEAS/EC Joint Communication on the Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises. The IfS Crisis Preparedness component represents a distinctive funding modality that deserves and requires a strong integration with other instruments in order to deliver its full potential.

The evaluation found that given the circumstances in which the IfS works achieving coherence is challenging and might not always be possible at Headquarters level. Given the persistent challenge this represents, this evaluation recommends that, as a matter of strategic planning routine, EU Delegations systematically draw linkages to IfS activities and opportunities.

5.2.3 EU Value Added of the Crisis Preparedness component

In sum, the IfS Crisis Preparedness component is unique in scope and as such it is highly valued by EU Delegations, partners and beneficiaries. There are no other budget lines dedicating resources to capacity building activities for crisis preparedness. The EU has identified a gap that it is filling through the IfS Crisis Preparedness component and adding value and complementarity to other instruments.

²² Ibid, p. 8.

5.3 Extra-EU relevance

5.3.1 Crisis Preparedness component match with EU's international commitments

Article 4.3 states that “measures under this point shall include know-how transfer, the exchange of information, risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, early warning systems and training.” This is also articulated under priority 3 of the IfS 2007-11 strategy, as an “upstream investment in the response capacity” which is achieved through networking and partnerships that are fostered under the Crisis Preparedness component. This focus is critical because it helps articulate EU policies and instruments to address the challenges in fragile contexts and conflict zones. It also helps to develop relationships and contacts that can be activated to respond to a crisis, thus facilitating crisis preparedness.

External stakeholders noted that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component also provides opportunities for the EU (institutions or Member States) to build its own capacity. For instance, support provided to enhance the UN Mediation Support Unit (project 65) also provided an indirect opportunity for EU HQ staff to also benefit from mediation training, while this was admittedly an unintended outcome. Similarly, in the thematic area of women, peace and security, EU staff members benefitted from training under the UN Women project (75). Finally, the ‘EU-UN Partnership on Land, Natural Resources and Conflict Prevention’ project (71) allows the EU to build its own and others capacity at a policy level on the interplay of use of natural resources and the occurrence and or mitigation of conflict. Whilst some capacity has been built up within the EU, certain stakeholders noted that it could be further optimised.

5.4 Regional/Country and Local Relevance

5.4.1 Regional/Country needs and priorities

Overall, all projects demonstrate a high degree of relevance to the regional and country needs and priorities. The geographic location of the actions is consistent with the aim to work in fragile and/or conflictive environments and the countries prioritised in the sub-delegated CfPs are good examples, such as project (64). The types of conflicts covered by the IfS Crisis Preparedness component are wide-ranging from land rights issues (projects 7 and 31) and traditional justice (36), to GBV (31, 46 and 75) and youth groups (31, 61) as well as structural conflict issues such as state-society breakdown (32).

The evaluation survey results found that nearly 80% of EU Delegations considered IfS Art. 4.3. to be (*fully/ almost fully*) flexible enough to remain relevant to changing *country* and *regional* circumstances. However 80% of the implementers considered the implementation procedures to be *almost fully* or only *partially* flexible to remain relevant to changing *local* circumstances,

In Central America the regional project ‘Apoyando la implementación de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica en sus componentes de combate al delito y prevención relacionados con armas pequeñas y ligeras y violencia armada’ (35) fully meets national and regionally - defined needs in terms of chosen theme. It also meets the needs and priorities as defined by national and regional authorities, which are also largely supported by civil society. The project also helps meet EU objectives of supporting regional institutions and their role in regional integration and security cooperation in the region. The regional sub-delegated CfP project (64) ‘Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations’ covering seven EU Delegations (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) supports a variety of actions aimed at women, children and youth affected by conflict across various countries and incorporating regional bodies.

5.4.2 *Locally defined needs and priorities*

Many of the projects funded demonstrate a strong understanding of the local needs and priorities. The vast majority of projects are also using local CSOs or experts in the field as implementers. The evaluation survey of EUDs shows a good match between the projects and locally defined needs (71%). This figure is even higher for implementers who feel the projects are really relevant and respond to local needs (93%). While the survey results may be skewed in certain cases by self-interest, responses received indicate that project dynamics are determined by needs on the ground, making them highly relevant in terms of supporting (local) civil society.

These survey findings were corroborated by the field missions. Some projects showed interesting innovations pertinent to local needs. In Bolivia, project (36) 'Fortalecimiento de los pueblos indígenas y originarios de Bolivia en la administración de la justicia plural y mecanismos de solución de conflictos' aimed to document rapidly disappearing knowledge of traditional justice mechanisms for conflict resolution that are being lost as the traditional community structures are disintegrating. In Guinea Bissau, project (46) 'Mindjeris i força di Paz (Les femmes sont une force de paix)' aimed to reinforce the capacity of civil society organisations to promote human rights, women's leadership in conflict management and resolution and prevent GBV²³ While project (42) in Chad 'FAM, Femmes Actives en Médiation' was originally intended to address natural resources and women, female mediators trained through the project's activities have been working more often with conflicts related to domestic violence and gender discrimination.

5.4.3 *Resources and implementation*

The Crisis Preparedness component portfolio is allocated up to 5 per cent of the total funding under the IfS; for the period 2007-2013 this amounted to EUR 103 million. With the multi-country/global projects (7/23/66/75) the EU may limit impact on the ground due to the small budgets available but it benefits in terms of EU policy orientated partnerships (65/66/71/75).

5.5 Effectiveness

5.5.1 *IfS programme outputs*

The majority of the projects funded under the IfS Crisis Preparedness component have achieved their stated outcomes through outputs in the thematic areas. In natural resources and conflict: projects have ranged from global policy issues to land rights issues in East Timor (31) and Chad (43). In mediation and dialogue, there have been mediation outputs (65 & 66) as well as an early warning system (31), policy outputs (7), and the establishment of local peace committees (32/66). With regard to WPS, projects have ranged from specifically supporting space for dialogue enabling women to engage in peace-building in Kosovo, Liberia and Timor-Leste (75) to building the capacity of women's CSOs in Guinea Bissau (46). In some cases, projects have covered all themes (65) appointing members of the UN DPA stand-by team of mediation experts (via earmarked EU support) in the areas of natural resources and wealth sharing; mediation and dialogue process and design; and gender issues.

In the majority of the projects, both those managed by HQ and by EU Delegations, capacity building has been included using different methods: from training of trainers (50 and 66) to strengthening CSO skills in advocacy (71); policy development (7 and 23) as well as supporting CSO infrastructures; and resources at national level (32/64). WPS has been a priority in some

²³ Training modules run in this project were adapted to the Guinean context based on a study developed by a local human rights advocate.

evaluated projects (75) and there is evidence of the participation of women in many other evaluated projects (32/37/42/66) although not in all (49/50/53/54).

In sum, the IfS Crisis Preparedness component projects have proved effective overall. There have been variations in the effectiveness of the implementers, however. For example, projects led by UN Agencies and managed at the HQ level (65/66/75) have been very effective at the international level in terms of policy development, with in some cases difficulties to achieve direct outputs on the ground. In contrast, projects led by international NGOs managed by HQ have had effective outputs at the international level as well as on the ground (7 and 23).

5.5.2 IfS project outputs

In the projects visited by the evaluators during the field phase that were midway or close to finishing (projects 31/36/37/42/43/50/53/54), the objectives are broadly on target. The outputs of these projects, run mostly by local CSOs, vary, ranging from training local CSOs in Guinea Bissau and Jordan (42/50) to the establishment of a unique and highly effective EWER system in Timor-Leste (31). The outputs also cover a wide range of topics within the main thematic areas such as, for mediation for example: strengthening traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in Bolivia (36); or building local mediation capacity (37); using local radio to help raise awareness and prevent violence over land rights (43); using community theatre for conflict prevention in Lebanon (53); conflict training for journalists and media training (54); or developing conflict resilient communities in Lebanon (57).

What is clear from some of the projects is that a good design has helped ensure their effectiveness. In Timor-Leste (31) the EWER system was developed in close cooperation with Columbia University's Centre for International Conflict Resolution (CICR). Its design was based on 'lessons learned' and 'good practices' taking into account other (international) EWER systems. In Jordan (53) the project has also been designed according to lessons learned and best practices from previous projects. In Zimbabwe (32) the project builds on the previous project successes in terms of increased focus on advocacy and peacebuilding skills for CSO networks, which is supported through a sub-granting scheme for €1M.

In Bolivia (36) other good practices include undertaking a thorough conflict analysis at the beginning of the project that revealed judicial reform as a potential and existing source of conflict that could destabilise relations between the state and its indigenous citizens if not managed under the new framework of the Constitution. The design of the project therefore has as its central focus legal resolution practices as well as an exchange of cultural knowledge specifically on how and why indigenous systems of justice exist and function, to be collated in a database. In El Salvador (61), although the project has only recently started, it has already secured a good base with NGOs in terms of achieving confidence and trust with the 'pandilleros' (gang members) working in areas where most state and civil society actors are afraid to operate.

In several cases, the designs and methodologies have been instrumental in achieving results (23) but there are also project examples where the methodology has been overly complex with inconsistencies in the design (49). There have also been innovative and creative approaches to working with communities in conflict such as promoting joint skills-learning or sporting activities (7). The Minority Rights Group (MRG) has used high quality early warning briefings at the international level as an effective lobbying tool (7).

Regional actions influence the effectiveness in both positive and negative ways. While they contribute to a broader, interlinked regional approach, they also lower the number of results due to the complexity of involving more stakeholders and the EUDs in several locations in a region.

The difficulties linked to holistic and comprehensive approaches in projects dealing with layers of societies and at different levels (international, national, regional and local) are commonplace in global/multi-country projects such as those implemented by UN agencies. This is mainly due to the internal functioning of international agencies (compared with international NGOs), particularly their need to involve internal relevant services and/or affiliated agencies. One example is UNDP (66). The agency has been working to develop national stakeholder internal dialogue and negotiation skills in nine²⁴ pilot countries through training of trainers programmes, the building of infrastructures of peace (in some cases with support from UNDPA for Peace and Development Advisors - PDAs), and ensuring women's participation in the programme and developing knowledge and guidance. The project had a slow start due to the difficulties of identifying the pilot countries (on which all the internal relevant services, affiliated agencies and EU services needed to agree). Other complications in delivering part of the programme on the ground were linked to the inevitable delays in securing commitment from both UNDP agencies and all involved EU Delegations. In addition, in one country (Chad) the agency had a turnover of three PDAs in 18 months.

UN Women (75) works particularly well at the EU-UN level through a MoU that defines the partnership providing a framework under which the EU and UN Women establish regular joint activities on gender perspectives and how they conduct their external activities. One project is linked to three locations, including Timor-Leste. In this particular case, the Timorese government has agreed to implement a national action plan on Resolution 1325 opening the possibilities for new policy developments for women in the country. The project has delivered results at national level while its effectiveness among beneficiaries has been partially hampered by the multi-layered composition of the project.

In some countries the enabling environment in which CSOs operate has been a factor affecting their effectiveness (32/42), which in the case of Zimbabwe (32) also affected projects outputs due to the political complexities and tensions in the run up to elections.

5.5.3 Risk management in the IfS projects

At the HQ level, the EU-UN Partnership has been very collaborative and helpful in developing projects (65/75). In some projects (66/75), FPI.2 worked very hard to ensure the participation of EU Delegations and avert the risk of project failure. In the majority of the projects, some elements of risk management appear to be included such as risk assessments and contingency plans. Risk management was actively implemented to ensure effectiveness by pre-empting potential problems within two projects (7/53). In Bolivia, the risks of political fragmentation and polarisation among indigenous organisations in the aftermath of the *Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécuré* (TIPNIS) march were not anticipated by the EU Delegation or by the implementers. Nevertheless, the project remained engaged with indigenous organisations and possibly increased its effectiveness as a result (37).

In Bolivia, both implementers and EU Delegations managed the risks together (36/37) with the Delegation closely monitoring the project and organising monthly meetings to ensure the project moved forward. In El Salvador (61), a project only recently started, one of the risks identified was the regular intrusions of the police into the bakery and the destruction of resources and supplies that the youth workers, supported through the project, need for their baking production. Multiple incursions have meant that the bakery is now being moved to another area of the community in the hope that the police will no longer harass participants. These risks are

²⁴ 10 were originally envisaged however problems in country identification and participation reduced the final number to 9.

understood by the EU Delegation and project implementers who are tackling the problem through concerted political effort and pressure from the EU and other international donors on the government and state institutions to monitor and control these spoilers within the system. These kinds of joint efforts by both implementers and EU Delegations to tackle and manage risks demonstrate good practice in the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.

5.6 Efficiency

5.6.1 Cost effectiveness of projects

In the online survey, the majority of the EU Delegations (77%) considered the respective projects' outcomes to have been *almost fully* or *partially* achieved with allocated resources and within the time frame. Overall 73% of the implementers considered their projects to have *fully* achieved or *almost fully* achieved the outcomes. This response concurs with the broad findings established by the evaluation team in the field.

While the evaluation sought to assess the results relative to other programming, the comparison of in-country actions with other projects was difficult due to the uniqueness of the projects. The EWER system in Timor-Leste (31), for example, is unique and cannot be compared with others. In Bolivia (36) the project to date has almost fully achieved the outcomes with its allocated resources within the established time frame although it is difficult to compare with other projects. In Jordan (50) the project has achieved its outcomes within the established time frame and allocated resources. Here again, comparison is not possible as the project is the first of its kind in Jordan.

In some projects such as in Lebanon (57) the evaluators noted that project resources are insufficient to meet the objectives and the project duration was relatively short to deliver the key outputs. However, they noted that the implementers were at least able to kick-start these processes. Some projects have lacked human and financial resources to efficiently achieve their overall outputs and consequently requested no-cost extensions (75).

5.6.2 Management of the projects

For global projects, implementer difficulties in project management were principally due to reporting requirements and to partnerships management issues (23/66/75). In the majority of the projects evaluated in the field, staff resources in the Delegations seemed stretched in terms of overseeing the projects. This was also confirmed in the online survey where the majority of the EU Delegations consider staff resources only partially adequate for project management. In some projects (36), the officer in the Delegation manages a large portfolio of politically sensitive projects and requires more time to dedicate to overseeing the latter. In other projects (37/50) EU Delegation staff resources were considered to be only partially adequate with only 0.75d/month time allocated to the project and shared between two staff persons. In contrast, the implementer staff resources were considered sufficient for many projects, which facilitated efficient outcomes.

There are currently 24 regional IfS programme managers who support and help EU Delegations with the implementation of IfS actions including those under Article 4.3. A few of them also ensure regional coherence and assist, as necessary with regional calls for proposals. Regional actions are highly time-consuming for EUDs (35/64) but given that these are relatively new implementation modalities their added value will be better assessed at a later stage.

In the online survey, most implementers expressed a more positive view regarding their staff resources (*almost fully* or *fully* adequate). The number of staff from the implementers involved in the project varies between 2 to 11, with time allocation extremely variable in accordance with

project scope and duration. In some projects, implementers encountered problems with staff resources (49/66) where resignations or failure to recruit staff caused delays. This in turn, impacts upon timely implementation of actions resulting in recourse to no-cost extensions (49/75) in order to complete the project. In other cases, the lack of staff resources means the project cannot move forward and therefore will not meet its objectives affecting both effectiveness and efficiency (66). In Zimbabwe (32) a no-cost extension was requested for a project due to the tense political situation ahead of a new constitution.

There are some examples of innovative practice in managing projects and making them efficient (61) where the final beneficiaries of the project are directly involved in the critical decision-making. In Timor-Leste (31) the EWER system relies on 86 well-trained and motivated volunteers.

5.6.3 Efficiency of communications

Communication between the EU Delegations and the implementing partner varies between countries. In some cases, communication is on a weekly basis (36) although more often communication with the Delegation and the implementing partner is on a monthly basis (37/53/54). In Jordan, (50) the communication between the EU Delegation and the implementer is conducted on a needs basis. The online survey reveals communication between the EU Delegation and the implementer is perceived as more frequent by the implementers (monthly for 60%) rather than by the EU Delegations. In general, both EU Delegations and implementers would like to see *more* communication or maintain the *status-quo*.

In Timor-Leste (75) the complicated lines of communication as well as the different reporting systems meant that time was lost fine-tuning the programme between the main stakeholders at headquarters level (EU Brussels, UN Women and UNDP New York) and the stakeholders in the pilot countries (the EU Delegations and the UN Women and the UNDP offices in Kosovo, Liberia and Timor Leste). One lesson learned from this project is that with a complex project management structure, buy-in from all stakeholders is required early on in order to ensure efficient communication at all levels.

The online survey revealed that nearly 60% of EU Delegations considered communication with the HQ to be rare (in some case, because projects were managed by HQ) and at least half of the correspondents would like to maintain this status-quo. EU Delegations expressed a desire to discuss how to capitalise on the outcomes of the project experiences. In Lebanon (53/54) the EU Delegation encourages regular interaction with other IfS Crisis Preparedness component partners, and implementers would also value increased information sharing on peace-building efforts in the country. Other implementers expressed the need for further support to improve understanding of EU compliance requirements.

The evaluators noted that the efficiency of communication can help projects' effectiveness. For example in, Timor-Leste (31), the EWER system relies on volunteers with whom the implementer has regular meetings to discuss problems they face. However in some projects (31) communication amongst donors and other stakeholders in the area of conflict mitigation should be strengthened and have clearer protocols to limit overlapping and increase overall efficiency of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.

Communication between EEAS K2 who is responsible for strategy and FPI.2 who covers implementation is critically important. These units were formerly united under RELEX and now need to coordinate policies and operations. Within the portfolio division at FPI.2, the four thematic areas covered by this evaluation are covered by focal points having corresponding focal points in EEAS to ensure discussion and exchanges on the substance of the issues. This relationship, however, is based on informal relations rather than a formal structure. FPI.2 recognises the benefits of involving all concerned thematic and geographic colleagues in their

work from other EU services but acknowledges difficulties since one single theme is usually covered by different divisions within the EEAS and also by different Commission DGs. If the theme is accompanied by a specific geographic focus in an action, DEVCO/ELARG and EEAS country and regional desks also need to be involved. If the action targets a specific organisation for which a focal point exists, this focal point also needs to be involved. Although much of this consultation takes place, these processes are informal and are person-dependent. The high turnover caused by the mobility rules and the definite working period for contract agents within EU institutions does not ensure continuity in these consultation processes.

5.7 Impact

5.7.1 Theory of change in the projects

The evaluation methodology ambitiously aimed to define theories of change for each project and the overall component. It also asked evaluators to assess whether baseline data were obtained and whether project assumptions were clearly defined.

No procedure requires explicit theories of change for the IfS Crisis Preparedness component. FPI.2 staff noted that projects were developed without explicit programme theories, aiming first to test ideas and approaches with the new instrument. However, each project normally includes a relevant logframe, which indicates how the project's activities are expected to meet its objective.

In several projects there was evidence of baseline studies, either from existing or new data collected at the start of the project (7/23/36/53/61). Some projects also developed theories of change (7/23/36/61) alongside the baseline studies. In Lebanon (53) the baseline information collected will be shared with all stakeholders at the local level of the project, including teachers, parents and other children using a participatory approach. The theory of change developed in this project focused on using a participatory methodology (particularly to include the beneficiaries) to measure the social impact, which is an innovative approach that could contribute to transformative thinking and impact upstream. However, in some countries encompassed under globally managed projects, there was a lack of clear baseline studies or theories of change 'Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation' (66).

5.7.2 Evidence and contribution of projects

The evaluation sought to find evidence that projects did indeed produce impact despite that peace-building is generally acknowledged as an area that requires long-term activity to have a deep impact.

Some projects (7/23/31/32/36) produced positive changes to the local and national environment with clear evidence. In Timor-Leste (31) the EWER system has had an impact at international non-governmental as well as international government levels (i.e. the EU Delegation as well as the UN agencies) since the EWER data is being used at all levels for policy briefings, security briefings and progress reports. Additionally this project has had an impact at the state level where the two Ministries: Ministry of Security, National Directorate for Community Conflict Prevention (NDCCP); and the Ministry of Social Solidarity's Department for Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion (DPBSC), indicated that they actively used data from the EWER system for their field teams. The most significant impact appeared to be in reinforcing community preparedness and responses to emerging conflict and inter-community tensions toward preventing the escalation of violence. The evaluation took note of reports of a significant decrease in the number of conflicts after the application of the EWER system. Moreover, the

most significant contribution of this project is its potential for cross-fertilization as a replicable model for other countries to develop a EWER system. In Bolivia (36), successful contributions and changes have taken place in some municipalities where the project has been operational and there has been an upswing in the effective implementation of traditional justice and resulting referrals to the ordinary judicial system. Discussions between the state and indigenous actors are easier within some of the municipalities that have received training. An indication that the dialogues are functioning is that previously the indigenous community was not sitting down together with state authorities and joint dialogues could not be held. The impact of this project is the fact that it addresses a key- and often marginalized target groups, which is at greater risk of coming into conflict with the state. The project itself has also the potential to be replicated in other countries and it is clearly an area that would not be likely to receive funding from other sources. In Chad (43) the project has had an impact at the local level where local mediation committees have been put in place and evaluators learned that incidence of conflicts have significantly decreased. The project demonstrates that much can be done and resolved locally through broadcasting programmes and announcements in the capital city where the herd owners live and local authorities are based thereby reducing conflict risks. This project also has the possibility to be replicated in other countries.

In other projects that are still on-going, impact has been felt in terms of building capacity such as in Bolivia (37) where trainees are raising awareness in their communities about the importance of dialogue and mediation to prevent and address conflict (so far about 400 people in the communities have benefitted). In Jordan (50), evaluators found evidence of improved conflict prevention and resolution skills being acquired and applied within the management structure of CSOs dealing with the impact of Syrian refugees. In Timor-Leste (31) local civil society organizations have developed and strengthened their capacities for social lobbying, advocacy and institutional dialogue with justice bodies and public services, potentially contributing to the strengthening of democratic institutions and strengthening their roles as independent actors for development. In Zimbabwe (32) CSOs noted an improved environment for elections in 2013 (versus the violence seen in 2008) to which this project positively contributed. The sub-granting scheme is also a significant impact for CSO networks as a whole and the fact that it has been developed from lessons learned over consecutive funding periods has strengthened impact in this project.

In some projects, however, impact has been less successful or harder to measure. In Lebanon one of the lessons learned of the projects 'Peace Puzzle: Community Theatre and Capacity building towards Community Conflict Prevention' (53) and 'Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon' is that peacebuilding requires long-term commitment, something that is difficult to achieve with short-term project cycles. In addition, awareness raising and capacity building require long-term engagement to maximise impact. Generally, societal change is a slow process depending on many different factors and some conflicts are deep-rooted and complex, making impact more difficult to measure due to a lack of clear indicators. Finally, project staff shortages and recruitment issues can also adversely affect project implementation. These are some of the challenges that the evaluators have encountered when seeking to evaluate the impact of projects implemented in crisis or post-crisis situations, where their relative success is directly influenced by the complex processes and consequences generated by the crisis itself.

One aspect the evaluators specifically noted where better project design could translate into greater impact was the inclusion of SMART specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timely – indicators at project design stage. In addition, short-term projects can frequently operate as 'catalysts for change' and can have a deep impact if followed up by longer-term programmes.

5.7.3 Unintended consequences

Some unintended consequences were identified in the projects which further enhanced their impact in a wider context. In Timor-Leste (31), the EWER system created supplementary mechanisms between Timor's CSOs and the Timorese government, partly as watchdogs and partly as extension workers. Although this was not the project's primary goal, this specific relationship promotes democratic practices and strengthens the role of civil society in the context of nation building. In Zimbabwe (31) although the engagement of the project was short, it appeared to be part of wider support through other EU instruments (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights-EIDHR/ Non State Actors-NSA/Local Actors) in supporting civil society in the wake of the 2008 electoral violence and trying to reconcile contending state and civil society perspectives.

In some other projects, there have been interesting developments. In Bolivia (36) the project focus on the understanding of ordinary law and its application based firmly on a foundation of human rights highlighted other elements of violence and abuse such as familial violence, something which was not visible or addressed before. In some of indigenous communities, they now effectively "see" the rights of those who traditionally remained relatively invisible within society such as the rights of the disabled and their access to justice as now rightfully within the scope of both traditional and ordinary justice systems. This is a direct impact of the training and dialogues held within the communities where they realised these elements were missing in the past.

In El Salvador (61), still in the early stages of the project, one consequence of the project design which focuses on economic projects for gang-affiliated youth (all male) was a demand from the women in the communities to help them address their economic needs as well. They explicitly expressed this because they consider themselves as part of the 'at-risk group', as well as victims, as they are raising the children and meeting the economic needs of the households.

5.7.4 Impact for IfS Crisis Preparedness component

The evaluation considers that the considerable number of individual outputs of the component contribute the IfS Crisis Preparedness component as a whole. Projects with effective results at the international and national levels (7/23/31) have contributed to effective conflict prevention in their respective countries through dialogue, briefings and inclusion of minorities. Other projects have contributed to themes such as natural resources and conflict, which are not being covered by any other EU instruments. Other projects have been innovative (31/36) or they have covered target groups that are emerging or who have no access to other sources of funding (46/61).

5.7.5 Future impact

One of the issues for future impact is sustainability. Learning lessons and capitalising on them is one way to ensure impact upstream, as the IfS support in Zimbabwe (32) demonstrates as its implementation built on lessons learned since the elections in 2008. In Chad (43) in addition to the training of mediators, this project provides an important contribution to the sensitization of both girls and boys in schools about gender discrimination and violence against girls and women, which may yield an upstream (or downstream) impact. One factor in maintaining impact upstream lies in reaching the decision-makers – especially in terms of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity. In one of the global projects (7) a limitation on future impact has been noted where the project was more successful in promoting and supporting initiatives at grassroots level to successfully address conflicts and in building capacity of CSOs in peace-building, than in reaching out to and developing relationships with decision makers.

Human resource capacity (sufficient personnel) is also a key issue in sustaining future impact where some projects have demonstrated that their ambitions have been thwarted by under-estimating this issue (7/49).

5.8 Sustainability

5.8.1 Future benefits

It is clear that the projects funded under the Crisis Preparedness component have produced key sustainable outputs at the organizational and technical capacity levels as well as strong contributions to realising the aims and objectives of the Crisis Preparedness component (31/32/36). In particular, sustainable outcomes in terms of building capacity should be noted in the projects from training of teachers (53) to manuals, materials and other tools for advocacy, mediation and other skills (7/23/54). Future benefits can be noted in the projects strengthening the partnerships between the EU and the UN. On the other hand, some less sustainable elements were those networks and partnerships that have been built up under the projects (7/23) which cannot be sustainable without further access to further funding.

Donor funding is a big issue in the sustainability of the CSO projects (7/31) since peace-building and conflict management require consistent sustained support for longer-term success and sustainability. Whilst the Crisis Preparedness component initiates processes, it is important to maintain - as some projects have done - clear sustainable objectives written into the project design to avoid overly ambitious or unrealistic expectations.

CSOs tend to have difficulties in maintaining their own infrastructure (human resources/ running costs) in some fragile and conflict environments which deeply affects the sustainability of implementing partners in some countries (7/37/42). CSOs therefore often need to find other donors to take on projects, even if they are shown to be successful, when EU funding comes to an end; something which is not always guaranteed. (31/49). This can sometimes force CSOs to come up with new initiatives to find funding in the conflict mitigation field as donors change priorities (31/36). This means good initiatives inevitably may be lost as a result.

Other factors affecting sustainability may be changes in communities or the enabling environment where possible changes in elected persons and/or the re-allocation of local authorities and police forces may jeopardize the trust built in certain communities (32). Short implementation periods can also jeopardise peacebuilding and reconciliation activities especially when it involves building trust in relationships between CSOs and state institutions (32).

5.8.2 Resilience to risk

In Timor-Leste (31) the project has helped the governmental counterparts to increase their capacity and especially their understanding of conflict potentials and drivers in the country. They have been sensitized for the necessity of early warning (and especially also early response to conflictive situations) - something which will increase their resilience to risk.

Many projects have managed to create structures and outputs that will allow activities to continue into the future after the end of the project. However the next steps for future project activities require the application of knowledge and research to be incorporated into relevant policy documents, which is not evident (7/23). In Timor-Leste (75) the products of the project include a mapping of WPS initiatives (describing key UNSCR 1325-related national actors, bi-lateral cooperation agencies, international NGOs and UN actors), a review of the national-level activities related to UNSCR 1325, as well as an overview of key national policy frameworks

linked to UNSCR 1325. These kinds of products will be very useful after the end of the project in providing some resilience to risk in the future.

MoUs between various institutions can also be an element in ensuring resilience to risk by ensuring sustainable and on-going future working collaborations for the projects (49/54/75). Synergies can be created between projects such as strengthening the role of traditional authorities as mediators within their communities in Bolivia who benefit from the trainings on dialogue and mediation provided by the other Crisis Preparedness component-funded projects (36). This also helps to mitigate risk as synergies can help to strengthen the sustainability of projects.

5.8.3 Ownership of projects

In many projects securing ownership is a key element in their effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability since beneficiary engagement is key. Engaging communities in particular has helped secure project ownership (7/32). In Bolivia, there are been various methodologies in which projects have secured ownership such as joint reflection (37) or consolidating the power of traditional leaders and placing them at the same level as judges (36) - a symbolic gesture to ensure ownership that is not lost with respect to the community or those representing the state law and order system.

In Lebanon (57) the project has a strong participatory character, including local actors in the design and implementation phases of peace-promoting initiatives. The project builds where possible on existing structures and initiatives, and includes key individuals who are already involved in local mediation and reconciliation. This approach reinforces the level of ownership by the foreseen target groups and can be seen as a good practice element of the project. In general, participatory approaches in the projects help to secure ownership (75) although in Lebanon (53) evaluators noted that CSO efforts are still largely restricted to Beirut, meaning that geographically and socially marginalized groups are often excluded from activities.²⁵

5.8.4 Community of practice

Community of practice examples exist within some projects although they are not necessarily developed as communities of practice (31/32/61). More clarity is to be sought on the concept of a community of practice, how it may be organized and how it would be sustained (50).

5.9 Monitoring and measuring

5.9.1 Current systems

Overall monitoring and evaluation of projects in the Crisis Preparedness component is variable and the lack of good monitoring and evaluation in a project affects impact. However, there are many examples of funded projects that have good baselines (7/23/31), sound analysis (36) and nearly all implementers were able to comment on the log frames which help monitor and evaluate progress to achieve the desired impact. Overall HQ and the EU Delegations manage to retain an overview of the projects although at the EU Delegation level follow-up can be variable. Some of the Crisis Preparedness component projects (7/23/32), particularly those managed by CSOs internationally or locally, have had their own independent evaluations which points to good practice for continuous learning and improving design in subsequent projects.

²⁵ "Local actors are regularly omitted from the designing and implementing phases of peace-promoting initiatives. This often means that projects implemented suffer from a chronic lack in ownership by the foreseen target groups. By disregarding local needs assessments, specificities and requests, most of the so-called peace-building efforts result into an inflexible approach to disseminate standardized concepts and practices. This also automatically entails a lack of sustainability of these actions". Conciliation Resources on Reconciliation in Lebanon, Issue 24 (2012)

5.9.2 Measuring impact

The Delegations and the implementers met during the field missions did not offer new ways to assess the impact of the Crisis Preparedness component projects. At the project level, the consultant recommends the use of standard impact assessments or evaluations.²⁶ At the Crisis Preparedness component level, it would be useful and welcome if guidance were to be provided to implementers on how to establish a baseline and conduct outcome-based monitoring.

Where impact appears evasive, this is due to measurement difficulties given the nature of the projects and the contexts in which they operate, as reconstructing a counterfactual situation is usually not possible. However, this evaluation highlights the importance of being able to measure impact by using best practice, e.g. designing projects using participatory methodologies; managing projects effectively through regular monitoring and evaluation; strategic long-term planning alongside short-term project activities to maximise impact upstream; and maintaining a coordinated and comprehensive approach with other partners and donors.

5.9.3 Learning lessons

Few projects showed evidence of lessons learning among the EU Delegations. In the online survey most respondents noted that they had not capitalized on previous achievements. Some lessons from previous projects, however, have helped to improve the design and impact of the current projects (23/31/32). In addition, in some projects the IfS Crisis Preparedness component funding has been used to seize opportunities to support newly opened up areas of engagement (32/42/62), which represents good practice.

In the absence of a tool to collect and systematise lessons learned and success stories, capitalizing on lessons learned is a very difficult task, especially given the high turn-over of EU personnel and the consequent volatility of institutional memory.

5.10 3Cs - Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence

5.10.1 Coordination

Overall in many projects the coordination between MS and the EUD has been effective (31/32/50/61/62). There was a good example of broad coordination between EUDs, regional bodies (African Union - AU) as well as MSs and UN Agencies (7). However coordination can be improved in some projects between Member States and EUDs (46) and between some EUDs and UN Agencies (66/75).

5.10.2 Complementarity

Some projects demonstrated good complementarity with other EU initiatives (32), whereas others could improve their synergy with other EU activities in the country (42/66) to be more comprehensive. Creating synergy with EU activities in country is a particular challenge for regional projects.

5.10.3 Coherence

In some projects the coherence in the country has been good (31/75), whereas in others the division of labour between the EU Delegations and MS has been poor (37/62), thereby affecting

²⁶ Impact evaluations are generally designed to establish a counterfactual or valid comparison to the intervention in question. For such evaluations the objective is to measure the net impact of the intervention, which in theory is the difference between outcomes of the intervention environment and a comparable non-intervention environment. See also *Impact Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions*, World Bank, Evaluation Group, June 2013.

the coherence internally within the country. In some regions there has been a lack of coherence between the MS and UN Agencies (36/37/42/43/75). In some cases, projects have been part of a wider CSO effort (32) in the country, which gave them added impact.

5.11 EU added value

5.11.1 Coverage of projects

A few projects funded by the Crisis Preparedness component are truly unique, including most notably the EWER project in Timor-Leste (31). In addition, some thematic areas have received funding not otherwise available; for example WPS, also in Timor-Leste (75). Another example is the inclusion of victims in El Salvador (62).

In some cases without the IfS Crisis Preparedness component important initiatives would not be funded by the MS in the country (50/46).

5.11.2 Catalytic effect

Some projects have been used to support newly opened up areas of engagement (32/42/62) which is a good practice element in the programme. In the online survey 55% of the EU Delegations' considered that the projects *inspire new ideas* and 27% feel they *inspire new projects*.

5.12 Partnership and knowledge creation

In general, there are some good outcomes for Delegations such as Guidance Notes (66) or new areas that are being funded (61/62). There have been good methodological outputs benefitting implementers and EU Delegations alike (7/50/61). There are sustainable outputs such as a database (31) or shared conflict analysis (62) that benefit both implementers and EU Delegations. However, weak monitoring and evaluation systems are a lost opportunity for capturing lessons and adding to knowledge creation within EU Delegations and at the HQ level (37/43). Additionally capitalizing on lessons learned to enhance the learning at the EUD level appeared limited from the projects evaluated. Projects implemented by UN agencies have strengthened or created the partnership between the EU and the UN.

5.12.1 Project collaboration

At HQ level the EU-UN partnership is quite strong in terms of design, management and monitoring (65/66/75). Yet, at EU Delegation level this is less noticeable. In EU Delegation-managed projects, the collaboration tends to be mixed with some projects requiring more support from EU Delegations (61) and some considering the collaboration is fruitful (54/57) and beneficial for their own learning experience. In some cases it was noted that projects need local, rather than international partners (53) in order to collaborate effectively.

5.12.2 Partnership impact on knowledge

The evaluation found that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component was weaker in terms of collecting and advancing knowledge created in project partnerships with the exception of projects implemented by the UN. In the case of local CSO projects, at the end of EU funding, the unique and innovative experiences for the EUD and implementers may risk being lost when a project finishes (31/36).

6 Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 Overall

The evaluation **concludes** that IfS Crisis Preparedness projects have built or strengthened the capacity of organisations to contribute to peace-building efforts. Although attribution is difficult in fragile and conflict affected settings, several projects are likely to have helped reduce actual violence, and there is evidence of greater capacity for conflict prevention across all thematic areas.

Given the flexible, unique relevance of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component in support of the EU's ambitions globally, the evaluation **recommends** that funding should continue and be increased for the IfS Crisis Preparedness component.

6.2 Thematic areas

The evaluation **concludes** that the thematic areas serve as a useful tool to categorise projects and focus attention on specific EU policy frameworks or initiatives. Capacity building of civil society is a prominent issue sought after by the EU that should continue to be mainstreamed throughout IfS Crisis Preparedness actions. The evaluation **recommends**, however, that it is re-oriented as a cross-cutting issue across the component. Gender mainstreaming has been identified in several projects and there is evidence of increased gender concerns addressed in several actions. Natural resources and conflict is an emerging thematic area, and the evaluation **recommends** that the EU invests further in this theme in order to create dividends from earlier efforts and bring substance to new policy initiatives. Women, peace and security is a theme common to – and popular among – many development agencies, and is increasingly attracting international actors' attention. The evaluation **recommends** that the EU refines its focus of the IfS Crisis preparedness component, specifying which aspect of this broader topic could best be addressed. A more organised division of labour between the different EU services involved in this policy may help the IfS Crisis preparedness component to lead on more specific sub-thematics, such as for example Gender-sensitive transitional justice, Gender in crisis management, Women's leadership in conflict prone areas, Sexual and Gender Based Violence in conflict affected areas. Through the IfS Crisis Preparedness component the EU has quickly established itself as a key player in the mediation and dialogue thematic area. Also here the evaluation **recommends** a review of the specific sub-areas where the component can produce greatest added value for the EU.

6.3 Relevance

The evaluation found that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component is highly relevant to the general objectives of the EU and its international commitments, particularly by funding actions in fragile states for peace-building and conflict prevention pre- and post-crisis. Further to the findings of the 2011 *Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union's Instrument for Stability*, the present evaluation **concludes** that the IfS Crisis Preparedness component is an indispensable element of the comprehensive EU peace, security and development architecture and should be fully embedded into this structure.

Within the EU architecture, the component aims to create coherence by facilitating support for identified funding gaps and providing a bridge for a longer term funding perspective, whether from the EU or other sources. The catalytic or seed funding is intended to kick-start work in areas that eventually complement longer-term work through the themed and geographic EU instruments. Based on findings, the evaluation **concludes** that in some cases, the intended catalytic effects and the opportunities for coherence were achieved. This assessment echoes the finding of the 2011 IfS evaluation and, given the persistent challenge this represents, this

evaluation **recommends** that, as a matter of strategic planning routine, EU Delegations are encouraged to draw linkages to IfS activities.

The IfS strategic vision that drives its Crisis Preparedness component is compromised by difficulties in linking project-driven demands from the field with policy driven demands deriving from various EU commitments. Combined with, and possibly caused by, these diverging demands, the component does not have clear indicators for success. The evaluation **recommends** that, alongside the objectives set forth in the Strategy Paper, IfS defines success for each work stream, for example by identifying a range of optimal outcomes for specific interventions.

In addition the regional projects awarded through sub-delegated Calls for Proposals, have sometimes lacked coherence and have not always met the needs identified by the EU Delegations in the region they are intended to cover.

6.4 Effectiveness

The evaluation **concludes** that the component has selected good implementing partners, who are key actors in their field, have relevant initiatives and who are effective project implementers. The effectiveness of cooperation with UN agencies has, however, been identified as an issue as certain projects have not been managed optimally on the ground, resulting in a lack of coherence and coordination with EU Delegations.

The evaluation **concludes** that support from EU Delegations, especially in the initial stages, is crucial for making projects more effective. That was equally the case for HQ-managed projects. The evaluation **recommends** that IfS, in consultation with its UN partners, re-assesses how they engage in order to align expectations of processes and outcomes.

6.5 Efficiency

The evaluation **concludes** that most projects were on target to achieve the project outcomes within the allocated financial resources and time frame and the evaluation thus judges the IfS Crisis Preparedness component efficient. While this conclusion has internal validity, the evaluation found it difficult to establish the external validity due to the unique nature of many projects.

Where projects were less efficient, the evaluation **concludes** this was primarily due to timing issues, lack of adequate resources and poor communication. Some no-cost extensions were granted to implementers for failure to complete activities in the given time-frame. The evaluation found that the EU human resources devoted to the IfS Crisis Preparedness component and project management was generally of a very high calibre but often insufficient in volume. At both HQ level and in the EU Delegations, too little staff time is allocated to manage the various aspects of the IfS Crisis Preparedness component. Meanwhile, the role of the Regional Crisis Response and Planning Officers (RCRPO) has not been fully developed and has occasionally caused further challenges to the reporting lines.

6.6 Impact

Certain projects lack ways of measuring results, thus leading to difficulties in ascertaining impact. Nevertheless, some projects have established baselines either from existing data or by conducting new studies at the start of the project. Projects that most clearly coincide with demonstrated changes to the environment include an early warning system in Timor-Leste, a radio station in Chad, and support toward violent-free elections in Zimbabwe. Positive changes were also recorded in a traditional justice project in Bolivia.

In certain other cases, impact has been more difficult to measure or has been absent. The evaluation **concludes** and validates a general lesson that peacebuilding needs a long-term commitment in order to produce sustainable impact.

Some projects were positively affected by unintended consequences, including marginalised groups gained a voice through the IfS support in Bolivia.

6.7 Sustainability

Some projects funded under the IfS Crisis Preparedness component have produced sustainable outputs at the level of organizational-technical capacity, yet the evaluation **concludes** that several of the networks and partnerships built up under the projects will not be sustainable and the results are likely to evaporate without further financial support.

The evaluation also **concludes** that the concept of a broader IfS community of practice does not resonate with component partners, although some projects did establish local communities of practice in their field of work.

6.8 Monitoring and measuring

The evaluation **concludes** that project monitoring and evaluation is variable with only a few strong examples of baselines and sound ex post analysis. Follow-up at the EU Delegation level is incomplete. The evaluators note that weak monitoring and evaluation systems are a lost opportunity for capturing lessons, increasing accountability and building on successes. The evaluation **recommends** that the component projects are required to report on a minimum set of indicators, tailored to each thematic area, allowing HQ managers to identify in a comprehensive fashion the most critical successes and failures.

6.9 3Cs - Coordination, Complementarity and Coherence

Evaluation survey results, combined with interviews, indicate that coordination between MS and the EU Delegations has generally been effective. HQ led projects help deliver the 3Cs at the global level, which for some projects results in greater coherence across a thematic area. Yet, the evaluation **concludes** that better coordination between EU Delegations and UN agencies at country level would likely have improved the impact of some projects.

Complementarities with other EU initiatives is regularly lacking, and the evaluators found that IfS Crisis Preparedness projects are only receiving limited attention from non-IfS staff in EU Delegations, thereby reducing the opportunity for linkages and allowing component projects to feed into broader EU country initiatives.

6.10 EU added value

EU's particular added value includes the ability to support valuable projects which has no other donor. The evaluation **concludes** that in some cases the IfS Crisis Preparedness component was indeed a unique funding opportunity.

The evaluation survey found that 55 per cent of the EU Delegations consider that the projects 'inspired new ideas' and 27 per cent felt they 'inspired new projects.' The evaluation also found that despite a limited budget, the IfS Crisis Preparedness component contributes to fulfilment of EU commitments related to women, peace and security and mediation and dialogue.

6.11 Partnership and knowledge creation

The evaluation **concludes** that relatively few knowledge products have been generated and captured by the component's projects, thus questioning the broader return on investment and the sustainability of lessons identified. The evaluation **recommends** that the IfS consider seminars


or platforms to capture lessons learned, discuss difficulties and promote continuous learning within the EU.

Project collaboration at HQ level is quite strong for the EU-UN partnership in terms of design, management and monitoring. This relationship, however, is more variable at the level of EU Delegation.

Annexes

- I. Intervention logic**
- II. Informants met (Inception and HQ phases)**
- III. Key documents (Inception and HQ phases)**
- IV. Overview of projects assessed**
- V. Terms of Reference**
- VI. Interview guide: Evaluation and thematic questions**
- VII. Delegation survey questionnaire**
- VIII. Implementer survey questionnaire**

Annex I – Intervention Logic



Annex II – People met during Inception and HQ phases

Date	Name	Title	Organisation
19/10	Genoveva Ruiz Calavera	Head of Unit	FPI.2, European Commission
19/10	Ronan Mac Aongusa	Crisis Preparedness component team leader	FPI.2, European Commission
19/10	Corinna Valente	Crisis Preparedness component Manager in charge of CSO and Gender focal point (FPI.2)	FPI.2, European Commission
19/10	Federica Petrucci	Evaluation Officer	DEVCO Evaluation
20/10	Daniele Senzanonna	Crisis Preparedness component Manager in charge of Mediation and Natural Resources & Conflicts (FPI.2)	FPI.2, European Commission
20/10 by phone	Cedric Pierard	IfS RCRPO Dakar, former Crisis Preparedness component Manager	EU DEL-Dakar
20/10	Andrew Byrne	Policy officer, former Crisis Preparedness component team leader	K.2, EEAS
22/10 & 24/10	Daniele Senzanonna	Crisis Preparedness component Manager in charge of Mediation and Natural Resources & Conflicts (FPI.2)	FPI.2, European Commission
22/10	Tomas Henning	Mediation Support Team	K2, Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation Instruments, EEAS
22/10	Mireria Villar Forner	Senior Policy Advisor	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP, Brussels
22/10	Frank Pichel	Land Tenure and Rights Officer	USAID, New York
23/10 by phone	Robert Dann	Head of Unit, MSU	Mediation Support Unit (MSU, UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), New York (NY)

23/10 by phone	Julian Davies	Political Affairs Officer	MSU, DPA, NY
23/10 by phone	Elizabeth Schaffer	Gender Focal Point	MSU, DPA, NY
23/10 by phone	Lone Jensen	Gender Focal Point	MSU, DPA, NY
23/10	Annick Hiensch	Liaison Officer	UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security. Departments of Peacekeeping, Political Affairs and Field Support. Brussels Office
23/10	Florian Bruyas	Program Manager	BCPR, UNDP, NY
24/10	Corinna Valente	Crisis Preparedness component Manager in charge of CSO and Gender focal point (FPI.2)	FPI.2, European Commission
24/10	Guy Banim	Mediation and Gender focal point	K2, EEAS
24/10	Dagmar Schumacher	Director	UN WOMEN, Brussels Office
24/10	Laurence Gillois	Programme and Resource Mobilization Specialist	UN WOMEN, Brussels Office
28/10	Vesna Markovic	Programme Manager	BCPR, UNDP, New York
28/10	Phil Vernon	Director of Programmes	International Alert, London
30/10	Andrew Byrne	Policy officer (former Crisis Preparedness component team leader)	K2, EEAS
31/10	Heino Van Houwelingen	Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Mediation	K2, EEAS
31/10	Genoveva Ruiz Calavera	Head of Unit	FPI.2, European Commission

Annex III – Documents consulted in Inception and HQ phases

IfS Crisis Preparedness Component Strategy papers 2007-2013

IfS Crisis Preparedness Component Multi-annual Indicative Programmes

Annual Action Programmes 2007-2013

Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities (2009)

Council conclusions on conflict prevention (2011)

Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010)

CION proposal for an IfS regulation (2011)

Impact Assessment accompanying the IfS Regulation (2011)

Draft IfS Strategy 2014-2020 (only part related to the Crisis Preparedness component)

2011 evaluation of the IfS Crisis Response and Crisis Preparedness components (Articles 3 and 4.3)

2009 Stock-taking and scoping study on the PbP

EC communication ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations’ (2012)

Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security’ (2008)

1st report on EU progress on the subject of the protection and empowerment of women in conflict settings and in post-conflict situations (2011)

Annex IV – Overview of projects assessed

Country	Project	AAP	Theme	Project title	Organisation	Starting date	End date	EU contribution (€)
HQ	7	2007	CSO - Natural resources	Preventing inter-community conflicts in East Africa	Minority Rights Group	01/01/2009	01/01/2012	683.794,00
HQ	23	2008	CSO - Early Warning	Early Warning Systems: from analysis to action	International Alert	01/07/2009	30/06/2012	1.500.000,00
HQ	64	2013**	CSO - Women, Youth Employment, Children, CSR, Mediation	Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations	NA	NA	NA	9.000.000,00
HQ	65	2011	Mediation	Strengthening United Nations Capacities to Support Mediation	UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION	01/01/2012	31/12/2013	1.996.860,00
HQ	66	2011	Mediation	Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	02/02/2012	01/01/2014	800.000,00
HQ	67	2013**	Mediation	Provision of European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES)	NA	NA	NA	3.000.000,00
HQ	71	2011	Natural resources	EU-UN Partnership on Natural Resources and Conflict – Phase 3: strengthening capacities and knowledge of civil society for the consensual and sustainable management of land and natural resources	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	01/01/2013	31/12/2014	1.500.000,00
HQ	72	2012**	Natural Resources; Kimberley Process	Property rights and artisanal diamond development (PRADD)	Service-provider (+USAID)	NA	NA	1.000.000,00
HQ	75	2011	Women	UN WOMEN, UNDP and EU JOINT Programme on Women, Peace and Security: Enhancing Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Planning in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo	UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION	01/02/2012	31/01/2014	1.500.000,00

Latin America

Bolivia	36	2010	CSO - Justice, conflict resolution	Fortalecimiento de los pueblos indígenas y originarios de Bolivia en la administración de la justicia plural y mecanismos de solución de conflictos	Fundacion Construir	13/12/2011	02/01/2015	761467
Bolivia	37	2010	CSO - Mediation	Desarrollo de Capacidades y Procesos de Mediación para la Transformación Pacífica de los Conflictos Sociales y Políticos de Bolivia	Universidad Catolica Boliviana San Pablo	13/12/2011	30/06/2014	426077
El Salvador	62	2012	CSO - Women, Children, Youth	Fortalecimiento de los mecanismos de acompañamiento y atención integral a víctimas de la violencia social, para el impulso de su participación en los procesos de diálogo y construcción de paz social en El Salvador	Spanish Red Cross	Sep-13	Sep-15	169,528.00
El Salvador	35	2010	CSO - Security	Apoyando la implementación de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica en sus componentes de combate al delito y prevención relacionados con armas pequeñas y ligeras y violencia armada	Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible Asociacion	13/12/2011	31/12/2014	650000
El Salvador	61	2012	CSO - Women, Children, Youth	Reparación del tejido social comunitario con jóvenes en alto riesgo.	Fundacion de Estudios para la Aplicacion del Derecho	15/07/2013	14/07/2016	282812
Guatemala	35	2010	CSO - Security	Apoyando la implementación de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica en sus componentes de combate al delito y prevención relacionados con armas pequeñas y ligeras y violencia armada	Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo Sostenible Asociacion	13/12/2011	31/12/2014	650000

West Africa								
Liberia	75	2011	Women	UN WOMEN, UNDP and EU JOINT Programme on Women, Peace and Security: Enhancing Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Planning in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo	UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION	01/02/2012	31/01/2014	1.500.000,00
Guinea Bissau	46	2011	CSO - Women	Mindjeris i força di Paz (Les femmes sont une force de paix)	Stichting SNV Nederlandse Ontwikkelings Organisatie	01/02/2013	31/01/2015	359.372,00
Senegal	64	2013**	CSO - Women, Youth Employment, Children, CSR, Mediation	Support to in-country actors to prevent and respond to crisis in fragile and conflict-affected situations	NA	NA	NA	9.000.000,00
East Africa								
Chad	42	2011	CSO - Women	FAM, « Femmes Actives en Médiation »	UFEP/Cellule De Moundou	01/03/2013	28/02/2015	228.812,86
Chad	43	2011	CSO - Media	«Communiquer pour prévenir»	Radio Fm Liberte Association	01/12/2012	31/05/2014	153.033,00
Chad	66	2011	Mediation	Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	02/02/2012	01/01/2014	800.000,00
Zimbabwe	32	2010	CSO - Reconciliation	Enabling Capacity Programme II (ECP II) Zimbabwe	Private agencies collaborating together inc non profit corp	21/12/2011	21/12/2013	2.000.000,00
Kenya	7	2007	CSO - Natural resources	Preventing inter-community conflicts in East Africa	Minority Rights Group	01/01/2009	01/01/2012	683.794,00

Asia

Nepal	23	2008	CSO - Early Warning	Early Warning Systems: from analysis to action	International Alert	01/07/2009	30/06/2012	1.500.000,00
Nepal	66	2011	Mediation	Equipping National and Local Actors in Internal Conflict Management Processes with Skills for Dialogue and Constructive Negotiation	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME	02/02/2012	01/01/2014	800.000,00
Timor Leste	75	2011	Women	UN WOMEN, UNDP and EU JOINT Programme on Women, Peace and Security: Enhancing Women's Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Planning in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Kosovo	UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION	01/02/2012	31/01/2014	1.500.000,00
Timor Leste	31	2010	CSO - Early Warning	Toward Enhanced Security and Community Resilience in Timor-Leste through the Expansion and Consolidation of the Early Warning and Response System	BELUN Fundacao	26/12/2011	31/12/2013	400.000,00

Middle East

Lebanon	53	2011	CSO - Mediation	Peace Puzzle: Community Theatre and Capacity building towards Community Conflict Prevention	War Child Holland	01/03/2013	31/08/2014	199.994,40
Lebanon	54	2011	CSO - Media	Towards an inclusive and responsible Media in Lebanon	Maharat Foundation	01/02/2013	31/07/2014	199.889,02
Lebanon	57	2011	CSO - Mediation	Establishing Conflict Resilient Communities in the North of Lebanon	Partners of Democratic Change International - PDCI	01/01/2013	30/09/2014	200.000,00
Jordan	49	2011	CSO - Mediation	Policy Lab on mediation and dialogue to address violence in Jordanian universities	Mercator Fund Europe	27/12/2012	26/06/2014	123.992,00
Jordan	50	2011	CSO - Mediation	Conflict sensitivity, prevention and peace building in Jordan	Human Relief Foundation	21/12/2012	20/12/2013	136.958,00

SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE
Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability
Crisis Preparedness Component (2007-2013)
FWC BENEFICIARIES 2009 - LOT 12: Humanitarian Aid,
Crisis Management and Post-Crisis assistance
EuropeAid/127054/C/SER/multi

1. BACKGROUND

Since 2000, the EU has adopted a set of policy commitments on conflict prevention and peace building: Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement (2000)¹ dealing with peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution, the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (2001)², the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts adopted at the European Council in Göteborg (June 2001)³, the Commission Communication on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development strategic framework (2001)⁴, the 2003 European Security Strategy⁵ (and in particular the 2008 review of its implementation), the Commission Communication on Policy Coherence for Development (2005)⁶, the European Consensus on Development (2005)⁷, the Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2007)⁸, the Communication Towards an EU response to Fragility (2007)⁹, the Council Conclusions on Security and Development (November 2007)¹⁰.

There is no one single definition of peace building within the EC, however the 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention is considered by many practitioners as providing the ongoing strategic framework and intervention logic for the EC's approach to conflict prevention and peace building.

The policy identifies three main objectives: 1) To adapt long-term EU instruments to address the root causes of conflict; 2) to improve the EU's capacity to react quickly to address conflict risks or seize opportunities for prevention and; 3) to promote co-operation with international partners. This approach encompasses a broad 'multi-sector' range of activities and can be viewed as promoting both 'long-term' approaches to peace building and conflict prevention and 'short-term' approaches peace building.

In 2001, the EU adopted the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. The Programme sets out concrete commitments covering four areas: political priorities for preventive actions; early warning, action and policy coherence; EU instruments for long- and short-term prevention; and co-operation and partnerships.

¹ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/documents/devco-cotonou-consol-europe-aid-2012_en.pdf

² Communication of 11 April 2001, COM (2001) 211 final

³ EU Programme for the Prevention of Conflict, Doc. 9537/1/01 REV 1, 7 June 2001

⁴ Communication of 23 April 2001, COM (2001) 153 final

⁵ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

⁶ Communication of 12 April 2005, COM(2005) 134 final

⁷ December 2005, OJ 2006/C 46/01

⁸ December 2007, OJ 2008/C 25/01

⁹ October 2007, COM(2007) 643 final

¹⁰ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/97157.pdf

With the launch of the IfS in 2007 as a follow up to the Rapid Reaction Mechanism¹¹, the European Commission has considerably intensified its work in the area of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace building.

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, has, for the first time, set up common overarching principles and objectives of the EU's external action, among which :

*“to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN charter [...]”*¹².

These objectives apply to all external policies and instruments of the Union, including its development cooperation as well as its economic, technical and financial cooperation with third countries, which are the two Treaty legal bases of the IfS Regulation (Articles 209 and 212 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).

2011 was the first year that EU foreign policy was guided and coordinated by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The HR/VP repeatedly stressed that conflict prevention should be “a silver thread” which runs through all of the work of the EEAS. The same year also saw important developments in the field of peace building policy. The World Bank's *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* includes valuable new data and analysis as well as policy recommendations on how the international community should adapt the way it provides development assistance to countries which have experienced or are currently facing political or criminal violence. In addition to the Council Conclusions on conflict prevention (2011)¹³, the European Commission (EC) presented the results of the thematic global evaluation of support to conflict prevention (including crisis resolution) and peace building (including its demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration)¹⁴ over the last ten years which provides useful recommendations as to how the conflict prevention and peace building potential of the EU can be increased.

¹¹ Launched in 2001 by the European Commission with the intention of allowing the EC to respond quickly and effectively to conflict and crisis situations around the globe.

¹² Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union

¹³ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122911.pdf

¹⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2011/1291_vol2_en.pdf

The Instrument for Stability (IfS)

The Regulation (EC) N° 1717/2006¹⁵ establishing an Instrument for Stability (hereafter referred to as the IfS Regulation) covers the period of the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives.

The IfS was created as part of the reform of Community external financing instruments in 2007 to provide the European Union with a new strategic tool to address security and development challenges and as a mechanism for rapid, flexible and adequately funded initial responses to situations of political crisis or natural disasters in third countries (under Article 3) and to develop international capacity for peace building (under Article 4.3).

Crisis response projects under the IfS (Article 3) focus on a wide range of issues, such as support to mediation, confidence building, interim administrations, strengthening rule of law, transitional justice or the role of natural resources in conflict. These IfS activities can be supported in situations of crisis or emerging crisis, when timely financial help cannot be provided from other EU sources. The IfS has been used to date to finance a large number of crisis response projects worldwide. The largest share of funds was given to projects in Africa, Asia-Pacific, the Balkans, followed by the Middle East and Latin America and the Caribbean.

The IfS (Article 4) also enables the EU to help build long-term international, regional and national capacity to address pervasive trans regional and global threats and to support conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building.

The IfS is however just one of a range of strategic tools and approaches at the disposal of the EU in relation to peace building. Therefore, it is helpful to understand where it fits into the broader context of the EU's emerging policy approaches and operational toolbox for preventing conflict and building peace.

In July 2011, an independent consultancy prepared and published the findings of the overall programme level evaluation on the Instrument for Stability. The report summarises that “the IfS had significantly contributed to enhancing the overall relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of EU crisis response and preparedness action”. It concluded that “*the IfS makes a significant contribution to the coherence of the EU peace, security and development architecture – and to global peace and stability*”.¹⁶

¹⁵ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:327:0001:0011:EN:PDF>

¹⁶ International Conflict and Security Consulting: ‘Evaluation of the Crisis Response and Preparedness Components of the European Union’s Instrument for Stability’, July 2011

The IfS Crisis preparedness component

As referred to in Article 4.3 of the Instrument for Stability¹⁷, the overall objective of the European Commission's Crisis preparedness component is to :

“provide support for long-term measures aimed at building and strengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub-regional organisations, state and non-state actors in relation to their efforts in promoting early warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter-community tensions as well as improving post-conflict and post-disaster recovery.

Measures under this point include know-how transfer, the exchange of information, risk/threat assessment, research and analysis, early warning systems and training. Measures may also include, where appropriate, financial and technical assistance for the implementation of those recommendations made by the UN Peacebuilding Commission falling within the objectives of Community cooperation policy.”

Under the Crisis preparedness component (programmable) of the Instrument for Stability (Art 4.3), the European Commission has established the so-called 'Peace-building Partnership' (PbP) to develop the capacity of its potential partners to respond to crisis situations worldwide.

The PbP was established at the request of the European Parliament to strengthen civilian expertise for peace-building activities and to deepen the dialogue between Civil Society and the EU institutions. It addresses, in particular, Civil Society organisations and think-tanks, but also the UN and other international/regional organisations and EU Member States involved in stabilisation missions.

In August 2009, an external stocktaking and scoping on the future strategic direction of the PbP was carried out drawing lessons and recommendations with particular regard to the funding of capacity-building actions carried out by non-state entities (Civil Society actors), although some attention was also given to the other elements of the partnership. The recommendations made by the evaluators mainly related to the adoption of as wide as possible a definition of peace-building and to preference for thematic or transversal issues or areas that work across a range of geographical contexts.

Up to 2012 some 60 crisis preparedness projects, comprised of both on-going and newly-launched activities, were developed to respond in a timely and effective manner to building capacity for crisis preparedness and peace in pre- and post- conflict scenarios and to advance EU political priorities and strategic interests as identified in close cooperation with the European External Action Service.

All actions foreseen under the Annual Action Programme 2013 and some under the Annual Action Programme 2012 are currently in the contracting phase¹⁸.

¹⁷ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:327:0001:0011:EN:PDF>

¹⁸ Only the programming of these actions will be assessed in the framework of this evaluation.

More information on the PbP and above referred activities is available on the FPI website - http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-we-do/instrument_for_stability_en.htm and the EEAS website - http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/pbp_en.htm.

A detailed narrative description of the actions carried out through the support of the PbP from 2007 - 2013 is enclosed as Annex I.

A summary of the IfS PbP Annual Action Programmes from 2007 to 2013 is attached as Annex II.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

➤ Global objective

There is sufficient wealth of experience now to reflect more thoroughly on the IfS Crisis preparedness component accomplishments since the IfS creation in 2007. The global objective of this assignment is thus to assess what has been achieved through the IfS Crisis preparedness component and to put forward recommendations on how results achieved so far can be enhanced, also in light of the opportunity of a greater contribution of the IfS Crisis preparedness component to the IfS crisis response component objective and, if appropriate to other EU instruments with complementary goals.

While awaiting the outcome of the on-going discussions with respect to the Multi-annual Financial Framework 2014-2020, which will determine the shape of EU external action instruments after 2013 as well as of the new IfS Regulation, FPI envisages to assess under this evaluation what has been achieved so far through the IfS Crisis preparedness component (Article 4.3, PbP) in four main thematic areas:

- **Capacity-building of Civil Society** in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building: The IfS PbP has a strong record of working with Civil Society and in particular of supporting the capacity-building of Civil Society both inside and outside Europe
- **Mediation and dialogue:** The IfS PbP has focused much attention on mediation as a tool for crisis preparedness and is increasingly integrating it into its conflict prevention strategies. The PbP has developed a number of tools to support peace mediation outside EU's borders
- **Natural resources and conflicts:** PbP efforts help countries and international actors identify, prevent or transform tensions over natural resources as part of conflict prevention and peace building programmes
- **Women Peace and Security / Gender mainstreaming:** The strong commitment of the EU in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 is concretely shown in several IfS PbP actions. Great effort has been also put in mainstreaming gender throughout PbP thematic areas such as for example Mediation and dialogue, Natural Resources and Conflict.

This substantive evaluation aims to:

- a) review the overall implementation of the IfS Crisis preparedness component and its results as an instrument for conflict prevention and peace building worldwide and
- b) provide both lessons learned and recommendations for the future.

The evaluation will benefit from and draw upon from the findings of the Stocktaking and scoping exercise carried out in 2009 and the overall IfS Programme-level evaluation published in July 2011 and will inform about the achievements and areas to be enhanced to maximise impact of funding.

➤ Specific objective(s)

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess to what extent the IfS Crisis preparedness component has been relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable in contributing to conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building. It should also assess the coordination and complementarity with other donors and actors, the coherence with the relevant EU policies and activities as well as with relevant international legal commitments.

To establish a feasible scope for the evaluation, it has been agreed that it shall focus on the support targeted to **four main thematic areas** of the IfS Crisis preparedness component relating to:

- Improving the capacity of Non-State Actors¹⁹ in conflict prevention, crisis preparedness and peace-building²⁰
- Natural resources and conflicts
- Mediation and dialogue
- Women, peace and security / Gender-mainstreaming

PbP projects falling into these thematic areas are listed in Annex III.

The evaluation should cover the period 2007-2012 (2013 for programming).

The criteria used for selecting the locations where the targeted thematic areas will be evaluated²¹ should be: 1) the relative importance of IfS support in the country/region; 2) broader learning potentials; 3) the political context (stable, fragile, post-conflict, etc); 4) the presence of an IfS Regional Crisis Response and Planning Officer²² or of an IfS Project Manager²³ in selected locations will be an added value.

On this basis, the review will establish an overview of the IfS Crisis preparedness component intervention, including overall and specific objectives, intended results and impact, for each of the four targeted thematic areas.

A specific approach for each thematic area should be developed, by addressing the following seven evaluation criteria: **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **efficiency**, **outcome/impact**, **sustainability**, the **3Cs** (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence) and the **EU value added**. The first five criteria correspond to the traditional practice of evaluation of development aid and have been formalised by the OECD (DAC). The last two apply to all EU policies.

¹⁹ with a particular focus on the development of the approach to improving the capacity of Non-State Actors from 2010

²⁰ Mediation and dialogue, transitional justice and reconciliation; Security; Children, Youth, Women Peace and Security; Fragility and Conflict; Security Sector Reform, Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, Disaster Risk Reduction, Early warning, Media

²¹ Targeted locations will be decided during the inception phase (see paragraph 'Inception Phase').

²² currently in 6 Regional EU Delegations : Colombia, Senegal, Kenya, India, Thailand, Kazakhstan.

²³ currently in 21 EU Delegations: Bolivia, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Haiti, Japan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Soudan, Syria, Thailand, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, Zimbabwe.

The evaluation shall lead to **conclusions** based on objective, credible, reliable and valid findings and shall provide the EU with a set of operational and useful **recommendations** addressing at least the following issues. Additional aspects may be suggested by the evaluation team based on the progress of their work.

- **Relevance:**
 - a) **Political Relevance of the IfS Crisis preparedness component:** this includes both 1) relevance to the general objectives of the EU and relevance to international commitments into which the EU has entered and 2) relevance to the EU External Actions activities and policies.
 - b) **Design and consistency²⁴ of the intervention:** this mainly concerns the extent to which the resources made available were adequate in relation to the objectives set out in the programming documents.
 - c) **Consistency of the implementation in relation to the strategy:** the evaluation team shall verify the extent to which the work plan, schedule and implementation of the activities were consistent with the strategy. They shall demonstrate who were the real beneficiaries, direct or indirect, of the intervention and compare them to the target population(s) in the programming documents. The evaluation team shall assess whether the instrument was sufficiently flexible to respond to changes in the situation.
- **Effectiveness / achievement of the main objectives:** the evaluation team shall identify all recorded **results and impacts**, including any unintended ones, and compare these to the intended results and/or impacts drawn from the overall objectives and strategic plans. The evaluation team will also identify the changes, which occurred in the areas in which EU programmes were supposed to produce an impact.
- **Efficiency of the implementation:** for the activities which were **effective**, it will be necessary to question to what extent funding, human resources, implementation modalities and partners, regulatory and/or administrative resources contributed to, or hindered the achievement of the objectives and results.
- **Sustainability of (i) the action:** an analysis of the extent to which the interventions are likely to be maintained over time, notably having in mind that financing peace building interventions is extremely expensive and very difficult to plan ahead; and **(ii) the effects:** an analysis of the extent to which the results and impacts are being, or are likely to be maintained over time.
- **The 3Cs (co-ordination, complementarity and coherence):** co-ordination/ complementarity with other EU instruments, with EU Members States and other donors; coherence with EU policies (including the Member States' own policies).

²⁴ The notion of consistency should be understood here as follows: (i) correspondence between the different objectives of a strategy, implying that there is a hierarchy of objectives (with lower level objectives logically contributing to the higher level ones); (ii) extent to which the resources foreseen are adequate in relation to the objectives set out in the strategy.

- ***Value added of the EU interventions:*** The criterion is closely related to the principle of subsidiarity and relates to the extra-benefit the activity/operation generates due to the fact that it was financed/implemented through the EU budget.

A number of specific evaluation questions (maximum 10) will be elaborated²⁵ to assess the aforementioned issues. These questions serve firstly as a way of articulating the key requirements of the evaluation, secondly to articulate the key strategic issues of the IfS PbP, and thirdly as a means of ensuring that the relevant objectives, obligations and activities in the PbP field are covered.

²⁵ A set of evaluation questions will be elaborated during the inception phase (see paragraph ‘Inception Phase’)

➤ Requested services and suggested methodology

The evaluation will include a comprehensive Headquarter phase followed by case studies to be decided during the inception phase following suggestion of the evaluation team. These locations cannot be seen as a representative sample of the different regions or of all partner countries where IfS support has been provided. Rather they should illustrate different experiences in peace building and conflict prevention and different country contexts. Therefore, they will be selected in order to maximise the lesson learning opportunities which the evaluation aims to create and sustain.

The evaluation will be divided in four phases – an *Inception Phase*, mainly devoted to structuring and preparing the evaluation approach and methodology, a *Headquarters Phase*²⁶, focusing on gathering and analysing existing data and information (through literature/document reviews and interviews), a *Field Phase*, including the preparation and conduct of field missions, a *Synthesis Phase*, focusing on drafting the Final Report.

Evaluation phase	Methodological Stage	Deliverables	Deadline
Inception Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structuring of the evaluation 	Inception Report	End-September 2013
Headquarters Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection Analysis 	Written Summary Notes on Headquarters Phase	Mid-October 2013
Field Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data collection Verification of the hypotheses 	Oral debriefing to EU DELs	Mid-November 2013
		Oral debriefing to EU HQs	
		Written Summary Notes on field visits	
Synthesis Phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analysis Judgements 	Draft Final Report	Beginning December 2013
		Final Report	Mid-December 2013
		PowerPoint Presentation	Mid-December 2013
		Report executive summary translated into FR and ES	End-January 2014

An **indicative time** and an **activity schedule** are attached as Annex IV and Annex V.

²⁶ The Headquarters Phase is to be understood as a Desk Phase mainly taking place in Brussels, Belgium, where the Headquarters of the IfS are located, by opposition to the Field Phase.

The **overall methodological guidance** should be based on the one developed by the EuropeAid evaluation unit, available on its web page under the following address:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/methodology/index_en.htm

The attention of the evaluators is drawn upon the importance of **obtaining concrete data** to avoid an evaluation which would look too theoretical or abstract. Special attention should be given to the **evaluation methodology developed by other international organizations, specialized in peace and security**, such as the UN, OSCE, and OECD. It is highly recommended that the evaluators link up with the UN DPKO Evaluation Division to get information on their evaluation procedures, especially on data collection in the specific field of peace and security, lessons learned and best practices, possible pitfalls, recommendations, etc.

The evaluators are also encouraged to refer to **past work** of good quality in this field, such as Professor Paul Collier's work; *Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*²⁷; *World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development*²⁸; *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities*²⁹; OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation and OECD DAC Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and their work on evaluating conflict prevention and peace building³⁰.

It is underlined that the quality check is of the responsibility of the evaluators. The Team Leader will be in charge of making sure that the methodology described in the Inception Report and agreed by the Contracting Authority is implemented throughout the evaluation. The Team Leader will have to carefully follow the whole evaluation, be informed, monitor and coordinate the activities of the evaluation team **at all stages** and be able to respond to any request from the Contracting Authority on the evaluation. The final quality control is the responsibility of the EU evaluation manager.

A **five-page proposed methodology** should be submitted with the offer, including the description of the Team Leader's role and the structure of the various outputs.

²⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2010/1277_docs_en.htm

²⁸ http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/a/c.html/world_development_report_2011/abstract/WB.978-0-8213-8439-8.abstract

²⁹ http://www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf

³⁰ DAC Network on Development Evaluation and DAC Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF): For their work on evaluating conflict prevention and peacebuilding, please refer to:
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluationofdevelopmentprogrammes/dcdndep/overviewofthenetworkscurrentworkonevaluatingconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.htm>

Inception Phase³¹

The Inception Phase will mainly be devoted to structuring and fine-tuning the evaluation approach and methodology.

Members of the evaluation team will participate in a **launching meeting** in Brussels, Belgium. This meeting focus on: (i) the evaluation team's understanding of the Terms of Reference, (ii) the proposed general approach to the work, including an upgrade of the methodology proposed in the Consultants' offer, scope, etc.

Following the launching meeting, the evaluation team will examine relevant key documentation on the past and current EU activities related to the IfS Crisis preparedness component, including data on the pertinent policy and instruments. This material would include data on the relevant Communications, strategy documents and instruments, evaluations, reports, outcomes of seminars and discussions with EU officials. The evaluation team will also held specific meetings/interviews – in Brussels or, when possible, through VTC – with a restricted number of interlocutors indicated by the Contracting Authority.

With the information obtained and no later than ten (10) days after the launching meeting, the evaluation team will submit by email a **Draft Inception Report** to the Contracting Authority³² for further transmission to the Inter-services Group³³, including, as a minimum, the following elements:

1. Set of **evaluation questions**, developing sub-questions, identifying provisional indicators and their verification means.
2. **Methodology** to be utilised, overall and for each of the main target thematic areas (update and upgrade of the methodology, including the role of the Team Leader; structure of the various outputs), including the identification of tools to be applied in the Field Phase.
3. Detailed **work plan and schedule**
4. Draft list of **potential interlocutors**
5. The **selection of the case studies and geographical areas**
6. The methodology to **ensure a common approach across the case studies**, and hence that the findings of the case studies can be easily synthesised.

If necessary, the report will also suggest modifications to contractual provisions *inter alia* for the final composition of the evaluation team; and the final work plan and schedule

³¹ During the Inception Phase, the Team Leader and the key Senior Evaluator are expected to work. When a reference is made to the evaluation team under sections Inception, Headquarter and Synthesis Phases, it should be understood as the Team Leader and the key Senior Evaluator.

³² The Draft Inception Note should be submitted at least three (3) days before the optional VTC with the Inter-Service Group.

³³ Composed of the Instrument for Stability staff members at Headquarters and EU Delegations and DEVCO.

If necessary, three (3) days after submission to the Contracting Authority, the draft Inception Report will be presented by the evaluation team to the Inter-services Group, if necessary by VTC. Following comments on the Draft Inception Report from the Contracting Authority collected from the members of the Inter-services Group, the evaluators will submit the **Final Inception Report** within three (3) days. The evaluation will not continue before the proposed approach and methodology³⁴ have been approved, in principle, by the Contracting Authority, as well as the Final Inception Report.

Headquarters Phase³⁵

The Headquarters Phase will mainly start after the Inception Phase and its purpose is to make sure that existing relevant information (including data) is gathered and taken into account in the evaluation and that necessary information is available to answer the agreed evaluation questions.

During the Headquarters Phase, the evaluation team will : carry out in-depth analysis of all relevant documents; identify – together with the manager and the Inter-services group – relevant stakeholders; and hold extensive face to face or VTC **meetings/interviews** with European Commission Services that are relevant to the IfS Crisis preparedness component (i.e. DEVCO; ECHO); EU Delegations (in particular with IfS Regional Crisis Response Planner Officers); the European External Action Service (EEAS); the European Parliament, Staff from Permanent Representations of EU Member States in Brussels; the offices of UN (and other International/regional Organisations) and civil society's representatives to complete the Headquarters Phase. **The very first meetings will be held with FPI staff working on the IfS Crisis preparedness component.**

At the conclusion of this work, the evaluation team will prepare a Written Summary Notes on the Headquarters Phase which will highlight preliminary findings and draft conclusions, as well as evaluators' proposed approach and methodology for the upcoming *Field Phase* of the evaluation. The evaluation team should send the Written Summary Notes to the Contracting Authority for further transmission to the Inter-services Group, no later than twelve (12) days after the approval of the Final Inception Report. Should the Contracting Authority have comments on the Written Summary Notes on the Headquarters Phase, the evaluation team will have two (2) days to incorporate them.

³⁴ The approved methodology becomes binding for the evaluation team.

³⁵ During the Headquarters Phase, the evaluation team is expected to work. When a reference is made to the evaluation team under sections Inception, Headquarter and Synthesis Phases, it should be understood as the Team Leader and the key Senior Evaluator.

Field Phase

Following satisfactory completion of the Headquarters Phase and the approval of the Final Written Summary Notes on the Headquarters Phase by the Contracting Authority, the evaluation team³⁶ will start a field phase to review the activities that were undertaken in the four aforementioned thematic areas.

The field phase will allow the evaluators to collect information, conduct interviews and hold meetings³⁷ with relevant stakeholders, including EU Delegations, EU member states, the UN and relevant donors in the area of peace and security, as well as representatives of the ultimate beneficiaries, in particular Civil Society organisations.

The evaluation team will undertake **field missions** to specific locations determined during the Inception phase. The purpose of field missions will be to review the project activities that were undertaken with respect to the aforementioned four main thematic areas. Field mission teams³⁸ should be composed and mobilised primarily to cover the four (4) main thematic areas of intervention and should be in position to travel to the relevant locations in parallel (e.g. at the same time). The choice of locations will be linked to the selected case studies that look at local, regional or international beneficiaries and will be specified in the Inception report.

Missions to 3-4 locations³⁹ covering 3-4 targeted thematics (15 man-days each) and two (2) missions (4 man-days each) covering 1-2 locations⁴⁰ can **indicatively** be estimated (at the maximum). An indicative list of the pertaining locations and maximum number of possible missions in question is included in Annex VIII.

The missions in the locations where the IfS Crisis preparedness component activities took/are taking place or where the Delegations and/or organisations in charge of the activities are located, aim to specifically provide the evaluators with first-hand information on the implementation and impact of these actions.

The missions undertaken in the framework of the field phase will be scheduled over a period of maximum four (4) weeks in total, including oral on-the-spot debriefings.

At the conclusion of each field mission, each field team will give an *oral on-the-spot debriefing to the relevant EU Delegation* on their provisional findings. In the week following their return from the field, the evaluators will give a *general oral de-briefing to EU Headquarters Services* through VTC⁴¹. The de-briefings will highlight preliminary findings, explain their link to the findings of the Headquarters Phase and propose a draft structure for the draft final report. The evaluation team should provide *Written Summary Notes on field*

³⁶ When a reference is made to the evaluation team under section Field Phase, it should be understood as the Team Leader, maximum four (4) Senior Evaluators and maximum four (4) Junior Evaluators.

³⁷ face to face or VTC. All face-to-face meetings implying travelling costs should be duly justified and receive an ex-ante approval by the Contracting Authority.

³⁸ for ex. field mission teams could be made up of two experts each (one Senior and one Junior experts) covering all thematics areas and required languages. The Field mission teams would be managed by the Team Leader from his/her place of origin.

³⁹ West Africa; Central/East Africa; Latin America and Caribbean; South Asia and Pacific

⁴⁰ Balkans; Lebanon/Jordan

⁴¹ Unless otherwise specified by the Contracting Authority, the evaluators should participate in the meeting. All experts' participation should however receive an ex-ante approval by the Contracting Authority.

visits to the Contracting Authority, no more than three (3) days before the general VTC *oral de-briefing to EU Headquarters Services*. The Summary Notes should be approved by the Contracting Authority. Should the Contracting Authority have comments on the *Written Summary Notes on field visits*, the evaluation team will have three (3) days to incorporate them.

Synthesis Phase⁴²

When all the field missions have been conducted and within twenty (20) days after the approval of the Summary Notes, the evaluation team will submit a **Draft Final Report⁴³**, in accordance with the agreed structure, taking due account of comments received during de-briefings and earlier meetings/email exchanges. The report should include clear answers to the evaluation questions, conclusions, recommendations, and an executive summary. The structure for the final report is included in Annex IV.

The evaluation team should submit the Draft Final Report to the Contracting Authority for further transmission to the Inter-services Group. On the basis of comments expressed by the Contracting Authority, the evaluation team should make the appropriate amendments and submit a revised version of the Draft Final Report to the Contracting Authority within five (5) days. Should the Contracting Authority still have comments further on, the evaluation team will be required to amend the Draft Final Report within two (2) days upon their reception of the Contracting Authority.

The evaluation team will be authorized to convert the Draft Final Report into the **Final Report**, only once the Contracting Authority has approved the Draft Final Report. The Final Report shall be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

Within five (5) days upon approval of the Final Report by the Contracting Authority, the evaluation team will produce a **PowerPoint presentation** on the findings of the evaluation.

The Contracting Authority may request the Team Leader to make an **oral presentation** of the Final Report and the key findings of the evaluation in Brussels.

Within thirty (30) days upon approval of the Final Report by the Contracting Authority, the evaluation team will translate the **executive summary of the Final Report executive summary in Spanish and French (maximum 6 pages)**. The translations of the executive summary of the Final Report shall be presented in a way that enables publication without further editing.

Within thirty (30) days upon approval of the translations of the Final Report executive summary by the Contracting Authority, the evaluation team will send to the Contracting Authority by standard post printed out copies⁴⁴ of the Executive summary.

⁴² During the Synthesis Phase, the evaluation team is expected to work. When a reference is made to the evaluation team under sections Inception, Headquarter and Synthesis Phases, it should be understood as the Team Leader and the key Senior Evaluator.

⁴³ The Draft Final Report should be submitted at least three (3) days before the meeting with the Inter-Service Group.

⁴⁴ 70 English, 25 Spanish and 25 French

➤ Required outputs

By the end of the assignment, it is expected that the evaluation team will have analysed in depth the overall implementation of the projects in the four target thematic areas and their results, the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, outcome / impact, sustainability, coherence, EU value added of the IfS Crisis preparedness component, and provided clear, complete and specific answers to the evaluation questions.

During the assignment, the evaluation team, under the overall coordination and responsibility of the Team Leader, will produce specifically:

- Inception Report;
- Written Summary Notes on HQ phase;
- Summary Notes on field visits;
- a Final Report including the translation of its executive summary into Spanish and French,
- a slide presentation on the findings of the evaluation;
- and possibly an oral presentation of the Final Report and the key findings of the evaluation by the Team Leader.

The aforementioned outputs will be submitted by email to the Contracting Authority. Meetings with the manager, with the Inter-services Group and with selected key stakeholders will be held through VTC, in Brussels and in the selected locations. In addition, at the conclusion of the field missions, the team will give oral de-briefings respectively to the European Commission HQ representatives and to each EU Delegation on their findings. The Team Leader may also be requested to make an oral presentation of the Final Report and the key findings of the IfS Crisis preparedness component Evaluation in Brussels.

The executive summary of the Final Report will be translated by the evaluation team in French and Spanish. 70 Copies of the English original version of the Final report executive summary, 25 copies each of the French and the Spanish translated version of the Final report executive summary will be provided by the evaluation team.

3. EXPERTS PROFILE or EXPERTISE REQUIRED

This evaluation is to be carried out by a multi-disciplinary team (1 Team Leader category Senior, max. 4 experts category Senior and max. 4 experts category Junior) with **solid knowledge both in practice and in theory to cover all fields pertaining to the crisis management, peace building and conflict prevention⁴⁵ and thematic areas targeted by this evaluation⁴⁶.**

The Team Leader (Category Senior) must possess demonstrated capacity for strategic thinking, and expertise in one or more of the above mentioned target areas. The composition of the team should reflect cross-thematic experience in conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building issues and in particular in the thematic areas targeted by this evaluation.

Consultants should also possess an **appropriate training and documented experience in evaluation methods and techniques for complex evaluations**, including field experience, and, possibly, of evaluation in the field of external relations. Consultants should also be fully familiar with the **methodological approach** set by the EC.

The team should comprise consultants with knowledge of the particular institutional structure and relationship of responsibilities between FPI and the European External Action Service

The team will have **excellent skills in English both in terms of writing and editing**. The Contractor remains fully responsible for the quality of the reports. Any report which does not meet the required quality standards will be rejected. The team will also have **good written and oral communication skills in French, Spanish and Portuguese** and full **proficiency in Microsoft Word and PowerPoint**.

A good combination of the aforementioned expertise, skills and qualifications is required for the evaluation team.

It is desirable that the team has knowledge of European Commission procedures, solid experience of working within and between multi-cultural teams, excellent interpersonal and communication skills, strong sense of diplomacy, capacity to deal with different sets of interlocutors, including senior figures from the public sector, government counterparts and civil society.

The team should demonstrate to have understood the intellectual challenges of this strategic evaluation. The team composition should be justified and the team coordination should be clearly described.

In addition to the skills required for the evaluation team mentioned above, the individual minimum requirement requested per expert are the following:

⁴⁵ Transitional justice and reconciliation; Human Security; Children, Youth, Fragility and Conflict; Security Sector Reform, Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration, Disaster Risk Reduction, Early Warning, Media

⁴⁶ Capacity-building of civil society; Mediation and dialogue; Natural resources and conflict; Women Peace and Security / Gender Mainstreaming

Category Senior:

Qualifications and skills

Education at least Masters Degree Academic level in one or more of international relations, development studies, political science, conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-building, civil society affairs or other relevant subject or equivalent professional experience of 5 (five) years more than required under the general professional experience.

General professional experience

At least 10 years experience in the sector(s) directly related to the fields relevant to the assignment.

Category Junior:

Qualifications and skills

Education at least Masters Degree Academic level relevant to the assignment or equivalent professional experience of 3 (three) years more than required under the general professional experience.

General professional experience

At least 3 years experience in the sector(s) directly or indirectly related to the fields relevant to the assignment.

The evaluation committee may interview the proposed experts during the offers' assessment to secure additional information and insights about the quality of the team that will carry out this evaluation.

Regarding conflict of interest, in order to guarantee an unbiased result of this evaluation, experts who have been responsible for the implementation of projects related to the four thematic areas targeted in this evaluation and funded by the IfS PbP in the last six (6) years must not be part of this assignment.

A breakdown of working days per expert should be provided.

It is expected the Team Leader and 1 (one) Senior Expert participate in all phases of the evaluation. The other team experts - maximum 3 (three) Senior and 4 (four) Junior additional experts - will only be involved in the Field visits.

The number of requested experts per category and total number of man-days can therefore be summarised as following:

Evaluation phases	Maximum number of requested experts	Max man-days
Inception Phase	1 Team Leader + 1 Senior expert	20
Headquarters Phase	1 Team Leader + 1 Senior expert	20
Field Phase	1 Team Leader + 4 Senior experts + 4 Junior experts	189
Synthesis Phase	1 Team Leader + 1 Senior experts	20

4. LOCATION AND DURATION

The assignment should commence as soon as possible and, in principle, no later than fourteen (14) calendar days after the Contract's signature.

The assignment should last approximately five (5) months, with the **Final Report to be finalised and approved by the Contracting Authority by the fourth (4th) month** and the translations into French and Spanish within the fifth (5th) month.

When possible, VTC will be preferred to face-to-face meetings.

An indicative time and activity schedule will be found in Annex IV and V.

Locations of assignment will be:

- Place of origin of the experts - Home office
- Brussels - meetings as described above
- Locations for the Field Phase to be selected during the inception phase

5. REPORTING

Concerning the content and the submission timing of the reporting, see section on requested services and outputs.

The quality of the final report will be assessed by the evaluation manager (in the EU Delegations or in Headquarters) using a quality assessment grid (see annexe VI). The explanation on how to fill this grid is available on the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/evaluation/methodology/egeval/guidelines/gba_en.htm

The reporting language is English. The Executive Summary of the Final Report must be translated into French and Spanish once the final draft versions have been approved by the Contracting Authority. All reports will be in font Arial or Times New Roman, respectively 11 or 12, single spacing.

Interim reports will be sent only by e-mail (both in word and pdf).

The executive summary of the final report should also be sent/delivered to the Contracting Authority in 70 printed copies in English, 25 copies in French and 25 copies in Spanish. The cost over 10 copies will be quoted under the Reimbursable.

An electronic version of the executive summary of the Final Report should be submitted in the three (3) languages (both in word and pdf).

An electronic version of the slide presentation, as an individual file, should also be submitted in English.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

A phone interview of the proposed Team Leader may be conducted within five (5)/ten (10) days following the reception of the offers.

The offer will be itemised to allow the verification of the fees compliance with the framework contract terms as well as of the contractual price breakdown model, whether the prices quoted correspond to the market prices.

The offer will be written in English (font Times New Roman 12 or Arial 11), single spaces.

ANNEXES:

The Contracting Authority reserves the rights to modify the annexes without prior notice.

Annex I - Description of the IfS PbP activities carried out in 2007 - 2012 and programmed for 2013

Annex II - Summary tables of the IfS PbP AAPs 2007-2013

Annex III - IfS PbP projects related to the four target thematic areas

Annex IV - Evaluation indicative time

Annex V - Evaluation activity schedule

Annex VI - Quality grid

Annex VII - Indicative outline structure of the Final Evaluation Report

Annex VIII – Indicative list of pertaining locations for the Field visits

Annex VI - Field mission guide

IfS Evaluation – Crisis Preparedness Component

11 November 2013

1. Purpose of this guide

This guide lists the key tasks, definitions and the thematic, cross-cutting and evaluation questions for the field missions. It aims to collect these elements in one place, thus ensuring that all field missions follow the same script. This will help us consolidate the findings into one final, coherent report.

Refer back to the Inception and HQ phase reports for further details, or simply call/write me!

2. Tasks

Each field mission is asked to do the following:

1. Prepare
 - a. Read documents
 - i. Terms of reference
 - ii. Inception report
 - iii. HQ Phase report
 - iv. Project documents (request from EUDs as only a limited selection is available on dropbox)
 - v. Other background documents you find useful (save on dropbox)
 - b. Arrange logistics
 - i. Visas, flights (covered by project)
 - ii. Hotels, local transport (covered by per diem)
 - iii. Arrange meetings (some EUDs will be helpful, some not. Accept if offered. They are not obliged to help)
 - iv. Forward evaluation and thematic questions to interviewees (where feasible)
 - v. Airport pick-up, local transport (arrange yourself)
2. Carry out
 - a. Receive online survey results (where completed; survey allows you to maximise time you for analysis and discussion, not tick box data collection)
 - b. Conduct interviews, using evaluation and thematic questions below, with
 - i. EUDs (schedule two hours for initial conversation)
 - ii. Implementers (schedule two hours for initial conversation)
 - iii. Beneficiaries (where feasible)
 - iv. Other observers (if feasible, necessary)
 - c. Mention purpose of evaluation
 - i. Lessons learning and preparing for IfS Strategy 2014-2020 (this is not an audit and we will not look at project budgets).
 - d. Offer confidentiality
 - i. "This is off the record, unless you request to be quoted."

- e. Describe audience
 - i. This evaluation process aims to help stakeholders; the more information you can share, the more the evaluation can help. Final report, including project reports will be shared with EU stakeholders only. The executive summary of the overall report will be available to all stakeholders in English, French and Spanish.

3. Report

- a. TL updates
 - i. Short Skype call with TL at end of each country visit (where feasible, otherwise short email with key issues, 1-2 paragraphs). Purpose is to learn and adjust as we go along; also for missions to learn from each other.
- b. EUD oral debriefing
 - i. Meeting /VTC / phone call with regional EUD focal point at end of regional field mission (i.e. after 2 or 3 countries in your region), presenting key findings and preliminary conclusions. No written presentation required.
- c. Field mission reports (also called field summary notes) within two days of mission ending (recommend writing it up as you collect findings; schedule fewer meetings to ensure time for write-up). See Annex for template.
 - i. Write up one report for each project reviewed, following format below. You can re-use/copy information, e.g. country context, from project to the next where needed.

Section title	Page number
1. Project data	1
2. Project results	1
3. Project background	1
a. Events context	
b. Policy context	
4. Logical Framework Chart	2
5. Thematic area 1	3
6. Thematic area 2	3
7. Evaluation questions	4
a. Relevance	
b. Effectiveness	
c. Efficiency	
d. Impact	
e. Sustainability	
f. 3Cs	
g. Value added	
h. Monitoring and learning	
8. Conclusions	6
9. Recommendations	6
10. Annexes	7
a. People met and location visited	
b. Schedule	
c. Documents consulted	

- ii. Utilise online survey responses to write up relevant questions.
- d. Field mission report revisions
 - i. Receive TL comments on field mission reports and modify until completed.

4. Writing style

While everyone will have their own style and the context will require adjustments, converge towards this style where feasible:

- Write in clear, concise English (short, simple sentences).
- Refer to evidence (facts, statements, statistics, examples) wherever possible.
- Make clear when it is a finding, and when it is analysis or conclusion.

Examples, quotations, anecdotes and success stories (eventually even pictures if possible) will be very useful. Try to include one for each project.

5. Definitions

Focus of evaluation

This evaluation covers the Instrument for Stability’s Crisis Preparedness Component, specifically for four thematic areas: capacity building for society, mediation and dialogue, natural resources and conflict, and women peace and security (WPS). It also reflects on gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue.

For this evaluation we call our focus area the Crisis Preparedness Component (CPC). Some interviewees and documents will refer to this as the *Peacebuilding Partnership (PbP)*, or the *IfS, Article 4.3 component*, or also *IfS long-term component (the one managed by FPI, not the one managed by DEVCO)*. They are nearly synonymous; except those three terms also cover other thematic areas such as youth, and there are some other minor definitional differences. Please use all four interchangeably in your conversations but only use CPC in your written reports.

Evaluation criteria

Different people will have different definitions for key concepts. While not wanting to be dogmatic, for our evaluation we have chosen to use these definitions (third column):

Criteria	Standard OECD-DAC evaluation definition	IfS Crisis Preparedness evaluation definition	Comment
Relevance	The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.	The extent to which the objectives and activities of the intervention(s) respond to the needs of beneficiaries and the ‘peacebuilding process.	This evaluation will benchmark against a context analysis, unlike a standard development aid evaluation that benchmarks against a needs analysis.

Criteria	Standard OECD-DAC evaluation definition	IfS Crisis Preparedness evaluation definition	Comment
Effectiveness	A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.	Whether an intervention has met its intended objectives with respect to its immediate and broader peacebuilding environment.	The evaluation will assess project effectiveness (output to outcome).
Efficiency	Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – in relation to the inputs.	The qualitative and quantitative outputs in relation to the inputs.	Where feasible the evaluation will compare alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.
Impact ¹	The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.	The positive and negative changes produced by the intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.	The evaluation will assess the effects of the intervention on the key driving factors and actors in the ‘conflict environment.’
Sustainability	Whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn.	Sustainability includes the probability of continued long-term benefits and resilience to risk over time, as well as lasting benefits. It also includes “ownership” of the peace processes.	The evaluation will assess long term benefits, resilience to risk and ownership.
Co-ordination, complementarity and coherence ²	Coordination refers to the extent to which development partners	Coordination is a measure of jointness, from information-	The evaluation will assess each of the 3Cs in accordance with

¹ By including the impact evaluation criterion this evaluation does not become an impact evaluation. Impact evaluations are generally designed to establish a counterfactual to the intervention in question.

² The principles of *coordination*, *complementarity* and *coherence* (3Cs) are enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, aiming for EU development cooperation to be more effective.

Criteria	Standard OECD-DAC evaluation definition	IfS Crisis Preparedness evaluation definition	Comment
	<p>jointly mobilise resources or harmonize their practices to improve effectiveness, and about division of labour: that is agreement about different areas of engagement within a sector to eliminate overlaps and crowding.</p> <p>Complementarity refers to the inter-relationship between the European Community and its member states in terms of how aid policy is executed in a way that enhances member states as a group, and the extent to which the Commission or Member States agree to share the lead in setting the aid agenda.</p> <p>Coherence can be defined as a sound alignment between policies and actions in a given field, and particularly that any development activity does not undermine a given policy.</p>	<p>sharing to joint programming.</p> <p>Complementarity is a measure of enhancing efforts through synergy.</p> <p>Coherence is a measure of alignment between policies and activities.</p>	<p>this definition.</p>
EU value added	The extra-benefit the activity/operation generates due to the fact that it was financed/ implemented through the EU budget, not only MS budgets.	The extra-benefit the activity/operation generates due to the fact that it was financed/ implemented through the EU budget, not only MS budgets.	The evaluation will assess EU value added in accordance with this definition (not defined by OECD-DAC).

6. Thematic questions

The evaluation asks a) **thematic**, b) **cross-cutting** and c) **evaluation** questions for each project. The field mission must select the thematic questions according to the thematic areas covered by the project, i.e., do not ask natural resource thematic questions for project that only cover capacity-building and mediation.

For each thematic area, please pose two questions, repeated three times across the thematic (where feasible):

- “How has this IfS project contributed to this policy vision?”
- “How does the contribution measure against this indicator?”

The policy vision is listed in the left column below. For a capacity-building project the question then becomes: “The EU aims to build a conducive environment for CSOs in partner countries. How has this IfS project contributed to this policy vision?”

The indicator is listed in the right column below. For a capacity-building project the question then becomes: “How many and what is the quality of the legal and regulatory frameworks that guarantee CSOs the right to operate independently and free from unwarranted interference (in the project area);” and “has the project contributed to this outcome?”

CPC Thematic area	EU Policy vision	Project indicators for contributing to policy vision
Capacity-building for civil society	A. A conducive environment for CSOs in partner countries.	Presence and quality of legal and regulatory frameworks to guarantee CSOs the right to operate independently and free from unwarranted interference.
	B. Meaningful and structured participation of CSOs in domestic policies of partner countries, in the EU programming cycle and in international processes.	Presence and quality of multi-stakeholder dialogues in country (timely, predictable and transparent)
	C. Increased local CSO capacity to perform their roles as independent development actors more effectively	Presence and quality of CSOs independent, representative and competent)
Mediation and Dialogue	A. Increase inclusiveness and a comprehensive approach to mediation	Diversity rating of actors in mediation projects (e.g. female relative to male participation)
	B. Mediation actions contribute to preventing conflict, and strengthening capacity to prevent conflict in country	Capacity-levels among mediator and civil society groups
	C. Expertise available on mediation processes and related thematic areas to	Quantity and quality of personnel and other resources made available.

CPC Thematic area	EU Policy vision	Project indicators for contributing to policy vision
EU-appointed and EU-backed mediators.		
Natural Resources and Conflict	<p>A. Civil society and governmental institutions are capable and motivated to implement national and regional policies and strategies that will create the basis for sound and sustainable management of natural resources.</p> <p>B. Best business practices that minimise environmental and conflict-related risks are adopted by private sector and governments through the development and implementation of internationally recognised standards (and where appropriate certification schemes) in all key natural resources related sectors.</p> <p>C. Supported CBOs have increased institutional, organizational and technical capacity and take active part in natural resources management and policy advocacy at their level</p>	<p>Number and types of policy advocacy and lobbying processes undertaken and their outcomes, e.g. integration of environmental measures in legislation, networks or coalitions created at various levels (CSOs, UN, G8).</p> <p>1. Number of CSOs participating in government-industry-civil society regular dialogue and overview processes at national and regional levels.</p> <p>2. Number of appropriate measures identified and implemented by govt, industry and civil society to tackle industry-related environmental and conflict risk concerns</p> <p>1. Organizational development level of CBOs</p> <p>2. Number of natural resource-related reported disputes peacefully resolved by CBOs</p>
Women, Peace and Security	<p>A. EU actions support the development and implementation of national action plans or other national policies to implement the UNSC resolutions on women, peace and security³</p> <p>B. EU actions support women mediators and negotiators and women’s civil society groups are engaged in formal or informal peace negotiation, and/or peacebuilding activities.</p> <p>C. EU actions reduce the number of women who are subject to gender based violence/sexual abuse and/or exploitation</p>	<p>1. Number of IfS dialogues and meetings that include specific attention to women, peace and security in outcome documents, conclusions and targets</p> <p>2. Number of WPS priority areas⁴ addressed through IfS crisis preparedness actions.</p> <p>1. Number of women negotiators or mediators in country</p> <p>2. Number of women’s organisations involved in (formal/informal) peace negotiations/peacebuilding</p> <p>1. Proportion of women subjected to abuse (local or national statistics)</p> <p>2. Type of vulnerabilities of women and girls identified in the country context</p>

³ Additional indicators are possibly reviewed at the component level.

⁴ Transitional justice, Women political participation and economic empowerment, Women's involvement in peace processes, Preventing sexual violence in conflicts.

7. Cross-cutting issue: Gender Mainstreaming

For each project, please ask:

- “How has this IfS project contributed to [insert policy vision A, B, and C]?”

Note that we are looking for the *type of answers* indicated in the indicator column.

	EU Policy vision	Project indicators for contributing to policy vision
Gender Mainstreaming	A. EU actions include gender as a cross-cutting issue ⁵	A. Number and types of activities that mainstream gender issues
	B. EU actions contribute to gender equality and women’s empowerment	B. Examples of changes in gender equality and women’s empowerment
	C. EU actions create synergy with initiatives at global, regional and national levels with international actors	C. Number and type of activities that are related/coordinated with other international actors

⁵ Additional indicators are possibly reviewed at the component level.

8. Evaluation questions

The ToR require us to answer this set of evaluation questions (EQs). You will have to reframe the questions to match the situation (the context and the interviewee). Not all questions must be asked to all interviewees. But try to answer all for each project, either through interviews or document research. You will have limited time to ask the questions and may need to pre-select which ones are most relevant for the particular interview.

Yellow text – HQ phase only. Field missions do not need to ask these questions. Answers should be in the HQ Phase report now.

Pink text – online survey. Field missions may follow up on these questions that have been posed in the online survey.

No colour text – field phase. Field missions should ask these questions. The indicators show what *type of answer* we are looking for.

Criteria	EQ	Evaluation questions	Indicators
Relevance	1	<p>A. Intra-IfS relevance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. How does the CPC match the overall objectives of the EU? ii. How does the Strategy paper match the CPC objectives? iii. How do the multi-annual indicative programmes match the Strategy paper? iv. How do the AAPs match the multi-annual indicative programmes? <p>B. Extra-EU relevance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. How does the CPC match the EU’s international commitments? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Evaluation team judgement of match between listed documents and FPI.2 and K2 officials perception of match. B. Degree of match with EU international commitments in the areas of peace and security and across thematic areas.
	2	<p>A. Regional/ Country/Local level relevance⁶</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Are the resources adequate in relation to the objectives set in the AAPs in terms of theme, geographical scope and stakeholders? b. Do the projects meet the country and regionally defined needs and priorities? c. Does the CPC allow for sufficient flexibility to remain relevant to the changing country and regional circumstances d. Do the CPC projects meet the locally defined needs and priorities in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. (Only few IfS and EUD will know how to answer this) Perception and degree of satisfaction of stakeholders⁷ and beneficiaries of projects meeting their objectives. b. Perception and degree of satisfaction of stakeholders in pursuing the defined needs and priorities at country and regional level. c. Perception and degree of satisfaction by stakeholders of the flexibility of the component.

⁶ While the IfS Crisis Preparedness component does not have any a priori geographic focus, this question seeks to determine whether the component and its projects are aligned with regional/country needs and policies. “Local” refers to geographic scope of the project, if implemented at a sub-national level.

⁷ Stakeholders refer to beneficiaries, implementers, EUDs and EU Brussels.

Criteria	EQ	Evaluation questions	Indicators
		<p>terms of theme, geographical scope and stakeholders?</p> <p>e. Are the resources adequate in relation to the objectives set in the project documents in terms of theme, geographical scope and stakeholders?</p> <p>f. Do the implementation procedures allow for sufficient flexibility to remain relevant to the changing local circumstances?</p>	<p>d. Perception and degree of satisfaction of stakeholders in pursuing the defined needs and priorities at local level.</p> <p>e. Perception and degree of satisfaction of stakeholders in allocating adequate resources to address particular issues.</p> <p>f. Quality of project monitoring and evaluation to ensure delivery of the strategy.</p>
Effectiveness	3	<p>A. Project effectiveness</p> <p>a. What are the project outputs?</p> <p>b. How well did the project achieve its stated objective?</p> <p>c. What were the main factors contributing to the outcome?</p> <p>B. Risks</p> <p>a. How well did HQ, Delegations and implementers anticipate and manage context-specific risks?</p> <p>C. Programme effectiveness</p> <p>a. How well did CPC achieve its stated objective?</p> <p>b. What were the main factors contributing to the outcome?</p>	<p>A. Project effectiveness</p> <p>a. List of project activities</p> <p>b. Perception by stakeholders</p> <p>c. Perception by stakeholders</p> <p>B. Risks</p> <p>a. Interventions included political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations; contingencies were built into programming to deal with unintended consequences.</p>
Efficiency	4	<p>A. Cost effectiveness</p> <p>a. Did the project achieve the outcomes with its allocated resources within the time frame set out?</p> <p>b. How do the results compare to other (comparable) projects</p> <p>i. Previously carried out in same country</p> <p>ii. In parallel thematic area</p> <p>iii. In other countries</p> <p>iv. By other organisations</p> <p>B. Management</p> <p>a. Communication</p> <p>i. How frequent is the communication between Delegation and implementer? What is the quality of the communication?</p> <p>ii. How frequent is the communication between Delegation and HQ? What is the quality of the communication?</p> <p>b. Reporting</p> <p>i. Are the reporting requirements for implementers</p>	<p>A. Cost effectiveness</p> <p>a. Timelines and budgets.</p> <p>b. Perception of stakeholders; evaluations/review of other projects (where are available); comparison to implementation of same project in different country.</p> <p>B. Management</p> <p>a. Communication</p> <p>i. Frequency; perception of quality by stakeholders</p> <p>ii. Frequency; perception of quality by stakeholders</p> <p>b. Reporting</p> <p>i. Perception of adequacy</p> <p>ii. Perception of adequacy</p>

Criteria	EQ	Evaluation questions	Indicators
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> adequate? ii. Are the reporting requirements for Delegations adequate? c. Level of authority <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Are decision-making and reporting tasks allocated to the most appropriate person in the project management cycle? d. Staff resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Are the staff resources (number, level, location) adequate for efficient programme management? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> c. Level of authority <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Perception by stakeholders; comparison to other (comparable) programmes d. Staff resources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Perception by EUDs and implementers; comparison to other (comparable) programmes
Impact	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Theory of change⁸ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What baseline was utilised to design the project? b. How did the designers envisage change (theory of change)? What inputs would lead to what outputs? And what outputs would lead to what impacts (in the broader environment)? B. Evidence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What changes have occurred in the environment targeted by the project? C. Contribution <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What CPC activities are likely to have contributed to the changes in the overall and specific environment? D. Unintended consequences <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What are the unintended positive consequences of the project? b. What are the unintended negative consequences of the project? E. Overall impact towards CPC vision <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Has the project contributed to developing a 'community of practice'⁹ among the stakeholders? F. Future impact <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. If the project has not (yet) delivered any impacts, what are likely 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Theory of change <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Evidence of data, context analysis, needs analysis b. Evidence of an explicit/ implicit programme logic (expected chain of results) B. Evidence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Perception of stakeholders; news report C. Contribution <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Perception of stakeholders D. Unintended consequences <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Perception of stakeholders; news report b. Perception of stakeholders; news report E. Overall impact <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Evidence of linkages between project stakeholders/ outcomes F. Future impact <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Forecasting by stakeholders

⁸ Theory of Change (ToC) here refers to the programme logic, or results chain, of each project. The evaluation will also look at the ToC for IfS Art 4.3 as a whole.

⁹ One overall objective of the Crisis Preparedness Component may be to develop, by building the capacity of organisations in peace-building, crisis management and conflict prevention, a community of practice among project stakeholders. This would allow past and present project stakeholders to engage more effectively when addressing conflict or disaster-related crises and to be more resilient.

Criteria	EQ	Evaluation questions	Indicators
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> future impacts? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Potential changes ii. Possible positive unintended consequences iii. Possible negative unintended consequences iv. Potential to contribute to a 'community of practice' 	
Sustainability	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Benefits <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What mechanisms will ensure that the project will continue to deliver benefits? b. What financial and other constraints are likely to diminish a sustained impact? B. Resilience to risk <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. How have the project stakeholders been prepared for risks? C. Ownership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Has/will the intervention transferred project ownership to others? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Institutional capacity ii. Physical assets iii. Norms and processes D. Will Delegation and Implementer seek to develop a 'community of practice' in its context? If yes, how? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Benefits <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Presence of alternative funding sources, organisational models that allow for continuation of project benefits b. Perception of future capacity gaps B. Resilience to risk <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Perception of project stakeholder's levels of resilience C. Ownership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Perception of increase in institutional capacity ii. List of physical assets transferred/ to be transferred. iii. Perception of range of norms and processes that have been (or will be) transferred/ adopted/ developed D. Level of development of community of practice (conceptually, in practice)
Monitoring and measuring	7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Current systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What monitoring and learning systems are in place for this project? b. How effective are current processes for capturing results and disseminating success stories and lessons learned? B. Shift from HQ-led to Delegation led projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What is the effect of EUD managing the calls for proposals instead of EC HQ (FPI.2 in Brussels managed the calls until 2010)? C. Measurement ideas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. How to best measure the – mostly intangible – impacts of conflict prevention efforts in the field? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Current systems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Processes of adjusting project log-frames and implementation modalities b. Quality of project reports and M&E during implementation B. Shift from HQ to Delegation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Quality of planned objectives and results of projects C. Measurement of conflict prevention <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Ideas from stakeholders

Criteria	EQ	Evaluation questions	Indicators
3 Cs	8	<p>A. Coordination</p> <p>a. To what extent does the EU and other partners jointly mobilise resources or harmonize their practices?</p> <p>b. To what extent does the EU and other partners divide labour?</p> <p>B. Complementarity</p> <p>a. To what extent does MS support EU efforts and let the EU lead in setting the agenda?</p> <p>b. How does the CPC complement the EU's other external actions and policies?</p> <p>C. Coherence</p> <p>a. To what extent is there coherence between the various EU instruments and policies?</p> <p>b. Do formal or informal coherence mechanisms exist to ensure a comprehensive approach between and within the relevant EU services?</p> <p>c. Did the CPC allow economies of scales and/or ensure a comprehensive approach to cross-cutting or transnational issues relating to peace-building?</p>	<p>A. Coordination</p> <p>a. Presence of coordination mechanisms (monthly meetings, workshops)</p> <p>b. Level of EUD and others participation in coordination mechanisms</p> <p>B. Complementarity</p> <p>a. Perception of stakeholders</p> <p>b. Perception of stakeholders</p> <p>C. Coherence</p> <p>a. Perception of stakeholders</p> <p>b. Evidence of internal EU mechanisms (meetings, reporting structures) to ensure comprehensive approach</p> <p>c. Perception of stakeholders</p>
EU value added and catalytic effect	9	<p>A. Coverage</p> <p>a. To what extent does this project represent a relevant but not otherwise funded action?</p> <p>b. To what extent has the sharing of roles between the EU and Member States contributed to optimise the impact of the support?</p> <p>B. Catalytic effect</p> <p>a. To what extent does this project capitalize on previous achievements ?</p> <p>b. What steps have been taken to ensure cross-fertilization with IfS Art 3 (Crisis Response) funded interventions?</p> <p>c. Is there evidence that the EU projects have had a catalytic effect?</p>	<p>A. Coverage</p> <p>a. Perception of stakeholders; Type/ number of projects Member States would have funded without EU presence</p> <p>b. Perception of stakeholders</p> <p>B. Catalytic effect</p> <p>a. Perception of stakeholders; References to previous EU / IfS funded projects</p> <p>b. Initiatives/ references to Crisis Response actions</p> <p>c. (Only few IfS will be able to answer this question) Evidence of a multiplication of same or other results; instigation of new thinking, partnerships</p>
Partnerships and	10	<p>A. Project collaboration</p> <p>a. Under the EU-UN partnership, how closely do the partners</p>	<p>A. Project collaboration</p> <p>a. Perception of EU and UN stakeholders</p>

Criteria	EQ	Evaluation questions	Indicators
knowledge creation		<p>collaborate in the design, management and monitoring of the project?</p> <p>B. Partnership impact on knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What has the Delegation learned through this project (new skills, knowledge, contacts)? b. How will this knowledge be sustained, transferred? c. What has the Implementer learned through this project (new skills, knowledge, contacts)? d. How will this knowledge be sustained, transferred? 	<p>B. Partnership impact on knowledge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. EUD perception b. EUD description; Number and type of new initiatives for EUD resulting from partnership c. Implementer perception d. Implementer description; Number and type of new initiatives for Implementer resulting from partnership

Project Title [maintain font (Times New Roman 12) and numbering]

1. Project data
2. Project results
3. Project background
 - a. Events context
 - b. Policy context
4. Logical Framework Chart
5. Thematic area 1
6. Thematic area 2
7. Evaluation questions (adding examples, quotes, anecdotes)
 - a. Relevance
 - b. Effectiveness
 - c. Efficiency
 - d. Impact
 - e. Sustainability
 - f. 3Cs
 - g. Value added
 - h. Monitoring and learning
8. Conclusions
9. Recommendations
10. Annexes
 - a. People met/location visited
 - b. Schedule
 - c. Documents consulted
 - d. Photos (If any. Please ensure consent to use for report)

Annex VII. Delegation survey questionnaire

9.1 Delegation questionnaire

IfS 4.3 Evaluation, Delegation survey, 4 Nov 2013

Do not respond to this Word version of the survey –
you will receive an email with the link to the online version

Thank you for participating in this survey. It contains 21 short questions and will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. A parallel survey has been sent to your implementing partners. The questions have been reviewed by Corinna Valente, FPI.2.

Purpose

This survey is part of the Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) Crisis Preparedness component 2007-2013 in four thematic areas: Capacity building of civil society in conflict prevention; mediation and dialogue; natural resources and conflicts; women, peace and security. The evaluation also covers gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue.

Participants

The survey is sent to one focal point within the EU Delegations in West Africa, East and Central Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East who participate in the evaluation.

Questions

Some questions may not offer an answer that fully suits your situation. Please choose the best fit and provide a comment in the box below.

Confidentiality

The individual responses to the survey and any follow-up conversations will be securely kept with the evaluation team. To be most useful, please answer the questions as factually correct as possible. Following analysis, the overall anonymised results will form part of the evaluation report.

Deadline

The earlier you can complete the survey the better informed are the evaluators. Kindly ensure that the survey is completed prior to the evaluation visit.

Thank you again,

Peter Brorsen

Evaluation Team Leader

Carina Franco

Evaluation Survey Coordinator

Please direct your questions on the survey to:

carina.franco@outlook.com

Page Heading	Question number and text	Multiple choices
Name and project	What is your first and last name?	Text box
	What is your title?	Text box
	What is the name of your organisation?	Text box
	What is the name of the project?	Text box
Relevance	1. Does the project meet the country and regionally defined needs and priorities?	1. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
	2. Does the IfS Art 4.3 allow for sufficient flexibility to remain relevant to the changing country and regional circumstances?	2. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
Efficiency	3. Did the project achieve the outcomes with its allocated resources within the time frame set out?	3. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
	4. How do the results compare to other comparable projects?	4. better, similiar, worse
Communication	5. How frequent is the communication between Delegation and implementer?	5. daily, weekly, monthly, rare, nonexistent
	6. Would you like more or less communication with the implementer?	6. more, less
	7. How frequent is the communication between Delegation and HQ?	7. daily, weekly, montly, rare, nonexistent
	8. Would you like more or less communication with HQ?	8. more, less
Management and reporting	9. How many Delegation staff are involved in management (directly or more remotely) of this project?	9. Indicate number of people involved
	10. How much staff time is allocated to management of this project?	10. Indicate total number of person days per <u>month</u> , e.g. 3.5 (1 person 3 full days, 1 person half day per month)
	11. Are the reporting requirements for Delegations adequate?	11. Fully, Partially, Not
	12. Are the staff resources (number, level, location) adequate for efficient project management?	12. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
Monitoring and learning	13. How much staff time is allocated for monitoring and learning systems for this project?	13. Indicate total number of person days per <u>month</u> , e.g. 3.5 (1 person 3 full days, 1 person half day per month)
	14. How effective are current processes for capturing results and disseminating lessons learned?	14. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
EU value added and catalytic effect	15. To what extent does this project represent a relevant but not otherwise funded action?	15. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
	16. To what extent does this project capitalize on previous achievements?	16. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
	17. What is the evidence that the project has/had a catalytic effect?	17. Greatly catalyzed ideas and activities, inspired some new projects, inspired some new ideas, has no effect beyond project

Annex VIII. Implementer survey questionnaire

9.1 Implementer questionnaire

IfS 4.3 Evaluation, Implementer survey, 6 Nov 2013

Do not respond to this Word version of the survey –
you will receive an email with the link to the online version

Thank you for participating in this survey. It contains 17 short questions and will take approximately 12 minutes to complete. A parallel survey has been sent to your focal point at the EU Delegations. The questions have been reviewed by the EC.

Purpose

This survey is part of the Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) Crisis Preparedness component 2007-2013 in four thematic areas: Capacity building of civil society in conflict prevention; mediation and dialogue; natural resources and conflicts; women, peace and security. The evaluation also covers gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue.

Participants

The survey is sent to the implementation partners of the projects managed by EU Delegations in West Africa, East and Central Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East who participate in the evaluation.

Questions

Some questions may not offer an answer that fully suits your situation. Please choose the best fit and provide a comment in the box below.

Confidentiality

The individual responses to the survey and any follow-up conversations will be securely kept with the evaluation team. To be most useful, please answer the questions as factually correct as possible. Following analysis, the overall anonymised results will form part of the evaluation report.

Deadline

The earlier you can complete the survey the better informed are the evaluators. Kindly ensure that the survey is completed prior to the evaluation visit.

Thank you again,

Peter Brorsen

Evaluation Team Leader

Carina Franco

Evaluation Survey Coordinator

Please direct your questions on the survey to:

carina.franco@outlook.com

Page Heading	Question number and text	Multiple choices
Name and project	What is your first and last name?	Text box
	What is your title?	Text box
	What is the name of your organisation?	Text box
	What is the name of the project?	Text box
Relevance	1. Does the project meet the country and regionally defined needs and priorities?	1. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
	2. Are the resources adequate in relation to the objectives set in the project documents in terms of theme, geographical scope and stakeholders?	2. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
	3. Do the implementation procedures allow for sufficient flexibility to remain relevant to the changing local circumstances?	3. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
Cost effectiveness	4. Did the project achieve the outcomes with its allocated resources within the time frame set out?	4. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
	5. How do the results compare to other comparable projects?	5. better, similiar, worse
Project management	6. Management - Communication: How frequent is the communication between Delegation and implementer?	6. daily, weekly, montly, rare, nonexistent
	7. Would you like more or less communication with the Delegation?	7. more, status-quo, less
	8. How many staff are involved in management (directly or more remotely) of this project?	8. Indicate number of people involved
	9. How much staff time is allocated to management of this project?	9. Indicate total number of person days per <u>month</u> , e.g. 3.5 (1 person 3 full days, 1 person half day per month)
	10. Are the reporting requirements for implementers adequate?	10. yes, partially, no
	11. Are the staff resources (number, level, location) adequate for efficient project management?	11. fully, almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all
Monitoring and learning	12. How much time is allocated for monitoring and learning systems for this project?	12. Indicate total number of person days per <u>month</u> , e.g. 3.5 (1 person 3 full days, 1 person half day per month)
	13. How effective are current processes for capturing results and disseminating lessons learned?	13. Very effective, partially effective, not effective

Online Survey – Evaluation of the Instrument for Stability Crisis Preparedness Component (2007-2013)

Methodology

The consultant conducted two parallel online surveys, one for EU Delegations and one for project implementers. The surveys were conducted from 6 November to 2 December 2013. An email invitation was sent out on 5 November, prior to the start of the evaluation field phase, requesting EU Delegations to fill in one survey for each project and forward the implementer survey to the relevant party. The survey questions were approved by FPI.2 and are listed in the HQ Phase report.

Out of the 19 projects under evaluation, 15 were surveyed online by EU Delegations (at least 1 EUD per project) and 14 by Implementers (at least 1 Implementer per project), corresponding to a response rate of nearly 80%.

Project	Country	By EUD	By Implementer	Comments
7	Kenya	Yes	Yes	
31	Timor-Leste	Yes	No	Response from EUD is incomplete (Q1-Q6 only)
32	Zimbabwe	No	Yes	
35	El Salvador & Guatemala	No	Yes	Response by the Implementer in Guatemala only
36	Bolivia	Yes	Yes	
37	Bolivia	Yes	Yes	
43	Chad	Yes	No	
46	Guinea-Bissau	No	Yes	
49	Jordan	Yes	Yes	
50	Jordan	Yes	Yes	
53	Lebanon	Yes	Yes	Three projects from Lebanon were surveyed jointly by the EUD
54	Lebanon	Yes	Yes	Three projects from Lebanon were surveyed jointly by the EUD
57	Lebanon	Yes	Yes	Three projects from Lebanon were surveyed jointly by the EUD
61	El Salvador	Yes	No	Response from EUD is incomplete, mainly because the focal point originally responded to the Implementer survey instead
62	El Salvador	Yes	Yes	Response from EUD is incomplete, mainly because the focal point originally responded to the Implementer survey instead
64	Senegal & Nepal	Yes	N/A	Response by the EUD in Senegal only
66	Chad & Nepal	Yes	Yes	Response by the EUD in Chad only (Q21 excluded as a result of multi-choice answer)

				Project in both countries surveyed jointly by the Implementer
75	Liberia & Timor Leste	Yes	Yes	Response by the EUD and Implementer in Liberia only

Relevance


Finding: Survey of EUDs show a good match between projects and needs and thus a high rate of relevance (71%). This is even higher for Implementers who responded to local needs relevance (93%).

Analysis: Crucially, the projects meet the needs and priorities at country, regional and local levels. Given the implementers' greater knowledge of and work in the local context and with the beneficiaries and/or local populations, the needs and priorities are perceived as relevant at a larger extent.


Q5: Does the project meet the *country* and *regionally* defined needs and priorities?

Q5: Does the project meet the *locally* defined needs and priorities in terms of theme, geographical scope and stakeholders?

EU Delegations



Implementers




Relevance

Finding: The majority of the Implementers (80%) considered the resources *fully* or *almost fully* adequate to the objectives set in the project documents (question not posed to EUDs).

Analysis: While in a few cases resources were inadequate for projects of broad geographical scope, the majority of the projects were designed with adequate funding and the CPC projects are thus considered adequate in terms of funding volume.

Q6: Are the resources adequate in relation to the objectives set in the project documents in terms of theme, geographical scope and stakeholders?



Relevance


Finding: Nearly 80% of the respondents at the EUDs considered IfS Art. 4.3. to be (*fully/ almost fully*) flexible enough to remain relevant to changing country and regional circumstances, whereas 80% of the Implementers considered the implementation procedures to be *almost fully* or only *partially* flexible to remain relevant to changing local circumstances.

Analysis: For implementers, the funding procedures are not fully flexible for the projects to remain relevant. The CPC scores much higher on flexibility among EUDs, however, possibly confirming that IfS is considered far more flexible than other funding instruments.


Q6: Does the IfS Art 4.3 allow for sufficient flexibility to remain relevant to the changing *country* and *regional* circumstances?

Q7: Do the implementation procedures allow for sufficient flexibility to remain relevant to the changing *local* circumstances?

EU Delegations



Implementers



Efficiency/ Cost Efficiency


Finding: The majority of the EUDs (77%) considered the respective project's outcomes only to have been *almost fully* or *partially* achieved with allocated resources and within the time frame, whereas 73% of the implementers considered their projects to have *fully* achieved or *almost fully* achieved the outcomes.

Analysis: It is expected that Implementers provide a positive assessment of the projects' achievement - even at early stages of implementation. Meanwhile,, EUDs expressed a more critical opinion, a difference which could be, in some cases, due to limited communication with the Implementers, or a more objective assessment. Most of the projects are at a very early stage of implementation; hence they are difficult to assess in terms of outcomes. The project and budget designs also make this assessment more difficult in cases where the reduced budget does not correspond to the larger scope of activities and when logframes are more activity rather than result-oriented.


Q7: Did the project achieve the outcomes with its allocated resources within the time frame set out?

Q8: Did the project achieve the outcomes with its allocated resources within the time frame set out?

EU Delegations



Implementers





Efficiency/ Cost Efficiency

Finding: The majority of EUDs and Implementers estimated the projects to have *similar* results (43% and 67% respectively) as compared to other comparable projects. Nearly 40% of the EUDs considered the projects to have *better* results (vs. 33% by Implementers). 15% of the EUDs estimated the projects to have worse results (this is partly due to a lack of comparable projects).

Analysis: The better assessment done by the EUDs seems to lie on the fact that EUDs did not find many comparable projects to compare their respective projects to or that the quality of the selected Implementer's work is considered as of more quality as compared to other local implementation partners.

Q8: How do the results compare to other (comparable) projects?

Q9: How do the results compare to other (comparable) projects?




Communication/ Project Management

Finding: Communication between the EUD and the Implementer is perceived as more frequent by the Implementers (monthly for 60%) than by the EUDs, with EUDs stressing the workload of the task manager has an important factor not permitting a more frequent and quality communication. EUDs and Implementers would like to see *more* communication or maintain the *status-quo*.


Analysis: The perception of less communication by EUDs is matched by their request for communication, as compared to Implementers. Moreover, in some cases, Implementers may have different focal points at the respective EUD (namely for contract/ finance issues) and thus have the perception of more regular contact with EUD than the EUD task manager with the Implementer.

Q9/Q10: How frequent is the communication between Delegation and implementer?

EU Delegations




Implementers




Q10: Would you like more or less communication with the implementer?

Comment: The status-quo option was not available for EUDs



Q11: Would you like more or less communication with the Delegation?



Communication



Finding: Nearly 60% of EUDs considered communication with the HQ to be rare (in some cases because projects are HQ-managed) and at least half of the correspondents would like to maintain this status-quo and few would like to see more communication, including for result sharing (question not posed to Implementers).

Analysis: While communication between EUDs and HQ in Brussels is usually rare, given the current settings for IfS management, including HQ-based management for some of the projects, the status-quo is perceived as the best option for the majority of the EUDs.

Q11: How frequent is the communication between Delegation and HQ?

Q12: Would you like more or less communication with HQ?

Comment: The "Status-quo" option was not available for EUDs; conclusions provided by EUDs' "Optional Comments".





Management and Reporting/ Project Management

Finding: Reporting requirements are considered *fully* or *partially* adequate by the EUDs and the Implementers, although Implementers have expressed more satisfaction with the requirements for Implementers than EUDs with the requirements for Delegations.

Analysis: Some of the EUDs have possibly responded based on requirements for reporting to their HQ; hence, pointing out the need for more information sharing, rather than the reporting provided by the Implementers. At the same time, while Implementers may show satisfaction with a more classical type of reporting provided by the current reporting format, the EUDs would perceive more clearly the need for a type of reporting which is more analytical and/or political.

Q15: Are the reporting requirements for Delegations adequate?

Q14: Are the reporting requirements for implementers adequate?



Management and Reporting/ Project Management

Finding: Staff resources are considered only *partially* adequate for project management by the majority of the EUDs, whereas most implementers expressed a more positive opinion regarding their staff resources (*almost fully* or *fully* adequate). At the EUD and/or EU HQ level, there is in average 1 to 3 persons involved in the management of the projects (usually ½ to 2 days per month allocated to the project). The number of staff from the Implementers involved in the project varies between 2 to 11, with time allocation extremely variable and mostly relative to the projects' scope and different time frames.

Analysis: While staff resources have been allocated on a project basis by the Implementers in their project proposals/budgets, corresponding more closely to the projects' needs in terms of human resources, the EUDs are clearly understaffed in most cases, with allocated staff sharing their time and workload between different projects (IfS and non-IfS) and current processes. This is likely to be more pronounced for EUDs involved with Call for Proposals which require larger human resource inputs.

EU Delegations


Q13: How many Delegation staff are involved in management (directly or more remotely) of this project?

1, 2 staff: 46% each; 3 staff: 8%

Q14: How much time is allocated to management of this project?

2% to 10% - answers not allowing to allocate exact percentages

Q16: Are the staff resources (number, level, location) adequate for efficient programme management?



Implementers


Q12: How many staff are involved in management (directly or more remotely) of this project?

3 staff: 27%; 2 staff: 20%; 4, 7 staff: 13% each; 5, 6, 8, 11 staff: 7% each

Q13: How much staff time is allocated to management of this project?

From 18% to 100% for managerial staff - answers not allowing to allocate exact percentages

Q15: Are the staff resources (number, level, location) adequate for efficient programme management?



Monitoring and Learning

Finding: Whereas implementers expressed their satisfaction with the current *processes for capturing results and disseminating lessons learned (very or partially effective)*, the assessment done by the EUD is rather negative and divided (*between almost fully, partially, almost not, not at all*). The Implementers responded by assessing their own monitoring and evaluation systems, with no links to the EUD. Implementers have either mobilized 1 to 30 staff for *monitoring and learning* tasks related to the project vs. 0 to 2 persons at EU level (with some EUD unaware of the existence of staff dedicated to these tasks) or drew upon broader programme systems without developing a separate learning system.

Analysis: Cases where there processes are “not at all” effective correspond to those cases where EUDs consider that processes are actually inexistent; one EUD focal point expressed need for specific training on this. Moreover, there are not systematised mechanisms at the level of the CPC and results vary considerably depending on the willingness and time devoted by the IfS programme manager to contribute to cross-fertilisation and exchange of experiences among the different projects funded under the IfS and the CPC in particular. Monitoring and learning systems have been particularly neglected, namely in terms of resource mobilization, particularly at the EU level.

EU Delegations

Q17: How much time is allocated for monitoring and learning systems for this project?

Person days/month: 2 persons = 23%; 0.1 to 1 person = 23%; 4 to 5 = 15%; 0 persons, do not know or not applicable = 38%



Implementers

Q16: How much time is allocated for monitoring and learning systems for this project?

Person days/month: > 29 persons = 33%; 10 to 12 persons = 25%; <10 persons = 42%.

Q18: How effective are current processes for capturing results and disseminating lessons learned?

Q17: How effective are current processes for capturing results and disseminating lessons learned?




EU value added and catalytic effect

Finding: Only 9%, corresponding to 1 EUD focal point, negatively assessed the relevance of the project. In other cases, projects are considered *fully* (27%) or *almost fully* (36%) relevant. (Question not posed to Implementers.)

Analysis: While some EUDs have possibly assessed relevance only based on needs and priorities without links to other potential funding for the same type of intervention, e.g. by EU Member States, the CPC currently constitutes, in many cases, the only EU envelope available at country level that focuses specifically on peace-building issues.

Q19: To what extent does this represent a relevant but not otherwise funded action?




EU value added and catalytic effect

Finding: The same percentage of respondents (27%) considers that the projects have *fully* capitalized and have *almost not* capitalized on previous achievements, thus indicating a marked spread of responses.

Analysis: While, in many cases, the projects are in line with the work already achieved at country or regional level and therefore the EUDs express the need to maintain the support to on-going processes, in other cases either the project's methodology does not have a precedent or lack a system for extracting lessons and building knowledge. This hampers the capitalisation of previous achievements, especially when there is also staff turnover at HQ or EUD levels.

Q20: To what extent does this project capitalize on previous achievements?



EU value added and catalytic effect

Finding: The majority of the EUDs (50%) considered the projects to *inspire new ideas* and 20% to *inspire new projects*.

Analysis: In most cases, since the projects are ongoing, it is not possible to achieve a relevant level of evidence, yet the finding on catalytic effect is relatively low and may point to a need for rethinking the purpose of CPC projects.

Q21: What is the level of evidence that the project has/had a catalytic effect?

