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ANNEX I

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the 2023 annual action plan for the global threats part of the thematic programme on peace, stability and conflict prevention

Action Document for Counterterrorism

ANNUAL PLAN
This document constitutes the annual work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, within the meaning of Article 23 of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation.

1. SYNOPSIS

1.1. Action Summary Table

1. Title CRIS/OPSYS business reference Basic Act	**Counterterrorism** OPSYS/CRIS[1] number: ACT-61666 Financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe) Regulation			
2. Team Europe Initiative	No			
3. Zone benefiting from the action	The action shall be carried out worldwide.			
4. Programming document	Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention Thematic Programme 2021 – 2027			
5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives / expected results	NDICI-Global Europe – Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention Thematic Programme (2021-2027) Area of intervention: Global, trans-regional and emerging threats Priority 4 – Counterterrorism, including preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalisation Specific objective 1: Support multilateral action in the fight against terrorism and the effectiveness of relevant regional and multilateral counterterrorism bodies and fora.			
PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION				
6. Priority Area(s), sectors	Global, trans-regional and emerging threats 152 - Conflict, Peace & Security			
7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)	Main SDG: 16 (Promote Peace and end violence) Other significant SDGs and targets: 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls)			
8 a) DAC code(s)	15210 – Security system management and reform - 100 %			
8 b) Main Delivery Channel	PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTIONS – 10000			
9. Targets	☐ Migration ☐ Climate ☐ Social inclusion and Human Development ☒ Gender ☐ Biodiversity ☐ Education ☒ Human Rights, Democracy and Governance			
10. Markers **(from DAC form)**	**General policy objective @**	**Not targeted**	**Significant objective**	**Principal objective**
	Participation development/good governance	☐	☐	☒

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[1] Depending on the availability of OPSYS at the time of encoding, a provisional CRIS number may need to be provided.

	Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
Aid to environment @	☒	☐	☐
Gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment	☐	☒	☐
Trade development	☒	☐	☐
Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	☒	☐	☐
Disaster Risk Reduction @	☒	☐	☐
Inclusion of persons with Disabilities @	☒	☐	☐
Nutrition @	☒	☐	☐
RIO Convention markers	**Not targeted**	**Significant objective**	**Principal objective**
Biological diversity @	☒	☐	☐
Combat desertification @	☒	☐	☐
Climate change mitigation @	☒	☐	☐
Climate change adaptation @	☒	☐	☐

11. Internal markers and Tags:	**Policy objectives**	**Not targeted**	**Significant objective**	**Principal objective**
	Digitalisation @	☒	☐	☐

		YES	NO	
	digital connectivity	☐	☒	
	digital governance	☐	☒	
	digital entrepreneurship	☐	☒	
	digital skills/literacy	☐	☒	
	digital services	☐	☒	

	Connectivity @	☒	☐	☐

		YES	NO	
	digital connectivity	☐☐	☒	
	energy	☐	☒	
	transport	☐	☒	
	health	☐	☒	
	education and research		☒	

		Not targeted	Significant objective	Principal objective
	Migration @	☐	☒	☐
	Reduction of Inequalities @	☐	☒	☐
	Covid-19	☐	☒	☐

BUDGET INFORMATION	
12. Amounts concerned	Budget line(s) (article, item): BGUE-B2023-14.020230 – STABILITY AND PEACE - GLOBAL AND TRANSREGIONAL THREATS Total estimated cost: EUR 29 000 000 Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 29 000 000
MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION	
13. Type of financing	Project Modality **Direct management** through Procurement and grants **Indirect management** through contribution agreements

1.2. Summary of the Action

This action aims at disrupting terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism and bringing terrorists to justice in full respect of human rights and the rule of law, and enhancing the resilience of vulnerable people and communities to violent extremism and terrorist recruitment, while bearing in mind the challenges and risks of this commitment in many states with autocratic or authoritarian regimes.

In particular, the action will contribute to compliance in line with the recommendations of the 2022 EU Council Conclusions on Counterterrorism[2] that, recalling its conclusions on EU priorities in UN Human Rights Fora of 17 February 2020[3], underline that "all counterterrorism measures must be conducted in full compliance with EU core values including the rule of law, and in full compliance with international law, in particular international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law."

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[2] EU Council Conclusions on Counterterrorism (9545/22)
[3] Council Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights Fora in 2020 (5802/20)

Component 1: This component **(Global Facility on Counter Terrorism Financing (CFT) Anti-Money Laundering (AML)** will continue the assistance provided to partner countries aimed at supporting efforts to put in place effective AML/CFT frameworks in compliance with EU requirements, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions on AML/CFT.

Component 2: This component **(CT CLOSE)** will continue to enhance local capacities in terms of information collection, analysis and counter terrorism reinforcing national administrations in selected countries. The action focuses on technical assistance to strengthen resilience to the threat of terrorism promoting a rule of law–based response to terrorism. The action is expected to **enhance capacities of relevant entities** to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate with each other at national and regional levels.

Component 3: This component , continuing the work under the present action **LEICA**, will contribute to improving criminal justice responses to terrorism, with a global scope including a particular focus on **Central Asia** and possibly the Caucasus**,** in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law, with a particular focus on developing law enforcement capacities, enhancing judiciary procedures and strengthening regional CT cooperation in cross border intelligence – led investigations and prosecutions.

Component 4: The CT Information Exchange and Criminal Justice Responses **(CT INFLOW)** will support partner countries across the globe along the criminal justice / administrative chain (law enforcement, judiciary, correction services, customs authorities, border police, state security services) to promote international standards and good practices for the exchange of information and analysis, including the use of new technologies, in particular on foreign terrorist fighters and individuals suspected of planning or carrying out terrorist offences. The component will have four strands; one on information sharing and networking, the second one on adoption of international standards in financial/special investigation techniques; the third on strengthening the criminal analysis capability on terrorism, fourth on limited equipment provision.

Component 5: This component will provide support to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (**GCERF**), a multi-stakeholder global fund that works with local partners to strengthen community resilience to violent extremism. As an independent public-private partnership, GCERF directs resources to support initiatives led by, and benefiting, local communities that empower all and more specifically, persons living in vulnerable situations. GCERF focuses on local communities because they suffer the most from violent extremism, and because they are optimally situated to understand and act upon the drivers of violent extremism.

All components will be implemented in full complementarity with bilateral and regional programmes and in coordination with EU Delegations and relevant units in the Directorates-General for International Partnerships (INTPA) and Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR).

2. RATIONALE

2.1. Context

Terrorism and violent extremism, in all their forms and irrespective of their origin, continue to pose a major challenge for all of us. Despite a decrease in terrorism as evidenced in the latest Terrorism Index, the threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism to international peace and security is on the rise.

In many parts of the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated already unsustainable socio-economic conditions that led to increased levels of uncertainty, growing inequalities and deepening social fractures. Violent extremist and terrorist groups have promptly and opportunistically used these conditions to mobilize sympathizers, to amplify conspiracy theories, spread disinformation and to incite to violence, including through increased use of social channels and virtual platforms and networks for radicalisation and recruitment. The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has similarly fuelled extremists' beliefs and attitudes.

Because terrorism is a transnational threat, information needs to be shared both within and between nations and multilateral bodies considering cyber security issues as well. Improving prevention and counterterrorism measures requires investment in building capacities and capabilities in priority partner countries: as the upsurge in terrorist activity in Europe since 2015 has demonstrated, security threats abroad can have a direct and violent impact on security at home.

In line with the **Strategic Compass for Security and Defence**, the EU recognises that terrorism and violent extremism, in all their forms and irrespective of their origin, continue to pose a major challenge in a strategic environment already impacted by multiple geopolitical shifts, growing instability and the return of power

confrontation.

The Council stresses the enduring relevance of the assessment and commitments emanating from its June 20, **2022 Conclusions Addressing the External Dimension of a constantly Evolving Terrorist and Violent Extremist Threat**. Together with previous Conclusions and in line with the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies, and the July 24, 2020 EU Security Union Strategy[4], and the December 9, **2020 Counter-Terrorism agenda for the EU[5]**, they represent a sound and consistent political framework for an ambitious European engagement on the global stage. Furthermore, the European Union has recently assumed the co-Chair of **the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)** for the next two years. By taking on a leading role in the GCTF, the EU will seek to promote values such as respect for human rights, respect for the rule of law and gender equality, which will be central to the EU's co-lead of the forum. Our engagement with civil society organisations will also be assured. In this framework the EU is committed to continue its support to the three GCTF-"inspired" institutions– the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) and the Hedayah Center – as well as other partners, in seeking to strengthen the GCTF's impact around the globe.

Terrorism and counterterrorism initiatives have a direct link with cybersecurity and digital aspects. The United Nations Global Counterterrorism Strategy[6] highlighted the increased use by terrorist groups of information and communication technologies for planning and perpetrating terrorist attacks. Risks exist also with regards to the potential use of emerging technologies by terrorist entities. A significant part of the fight against radicalisation leading to terrorism needs to be conducted online, at a time when international terrorist organisations and extremist groups are heavily relying on digital tools for spreading their propaganda, recruiting, and expanding their footprint on the Internet. While the adoption of the Regulation on Addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online[7], and the adoption of the Digital Services Act[8] have placed the EU at the forefront of this fight, technical developments continue to present vulnerabilities which terrorist groups have shown every intent to seize in order to maintain their presence online. On the other hand, new technologies offer potential to tackle the terrorist threat. The EU Council Conclusions on EU External Action on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism, encourages capacity building and exchanges with partner countries to maximise the benefits of new technologies for security services and to counter terrorists' misuse of new technologies.[9]

There is a particular importance and urgency for effective measures to prevent radicalisation in prisons and implement rehabilitation and reintegration strategies in the light of the risk posed by the growing number of terrorist and violent extremist offenders or offenders radicalised while serving time in prison.

No area is immune from extremist tendencies and as a result, any coherent response must be tackled globally with actions in every society. The use of violence to further extreme ideological platforms, be they political, religious, and nationalist or other, is not a new phenomenon.

For years, however, counter-extremism and P/CVE strategies did not address far-right extremism as a threat requiring concerted policy and security attention. The spread of violent extremism over recent years poses a significant threat to the international community's efforts in promoting peace and security, as well as undermining progress made towards fostering sustainable development and upholding human rights.

Mitigating the appeal of all form of violent extremism amongst communities and vulnerable groups, particularly in these times of converging crises, is becoming a high priority for many countries around the world.

The international community's understanding of the terrorist and violent extremist threat has evolved in important ways over the past twenty years, yet, the lack of policy attention and targeted prevention efforts on far-right extremism and ethno-nationalist extremism is increasingly being recognized as a security gap.

2.2. Problem Analysis

Short problem analysis:

EU Fundamental Values

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[4] The EU Security Union Strategy (COM/2020/605 final)

[5] A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond (COM/2020/795 final)

[6] https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/291

[7] Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on addressing the dissemination of terrorist content

[8] REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC COM/2020/825 final

[9] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44446/st08868-en20.pdf

The action is built to support partner countries to address terrorism from a criminal justice perspective and addresses particularly compliance with human rights and the rule of law.

The action will contribute to ensuring and enhancing compliance with the recommendations of the EU Council Conclusions that, recalling its conclusions on EU priorities in UN Human Rights Fora of 17 February 2020, underline that "all counterterrorism measures must be conducted in full compliance with EU core values including the rule of law, and in full compliance with international law, in particular international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law. To this end, the EU will continue to proactively support and promote human rights and the principles of international law, in all aspects of the global counterterrorism efforts and in all its strategic partnerships, including in the regular reviews of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy". The EU will also be mindful of the risks and challenges of implementing its CT agenda in partner countries where Rule of Law is weak and where justice systems are not fully independent. The EU Human Rights Action Plan 2020-2024 also flags the risks related to shrinking spaces for civil society and related criminalisation of human rights defenders, journalists, independent media and so on. These actors may be unduly tagged and persecuted as terrorists under problematic CT national laws.

The European Commission and the United Nations will therefore ensure that measures are implemented in accordance with international law, including international human rights and international humanitarian law, and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2024)[10]. A clear human rights perspective will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (elaboration of the project documents; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) and relevant information will be included in the regular reporting.

Counterterrorism

Component 1-4:

A constantly evolving international terrorist threat calls for sustained and coordinated action. Da'esh and al-Qaeda and their affiliates continue to represent the most prominent terrorist threat worldwide. Despite the loss of its territorial control over parts of Iraq and Syria, as well as the neutralisation of a significant part of continuous and significant hits on its leadership, Da'esh has purposely reverted back to a clandestine harassment strategy and underground insurgency while seeking to further destabilize both countries, liberate its imprisoned affiliates fighters, maintain its influence and hold on local supporters, consolidate and preserve its funding sources, and eventually reconstitute a threat projection capability.

Africa continues to experience a particularly concerning expansion of the threat posed by both groups, their affiliates, as well as other violent extremist and terrorist groups. The terrorist threat is especially expanding in the Sahel, with a risk of spill-over towards West-Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.

The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan raises significant concerns and constitutes a major security challenge for the EU in the fight against terrorism, with a potential regional spill-over effect in an already destabilised regional environment.

The unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation constitutes a major security challenge for the EU. It notes the subsequent instability resulting from the conflict and the possible flow of fighters from the EU and from third countries as well as risks related to trafficking of firearms largely available in the area, might lead to elevate the terrorist threat in the long term and need to be closely monitored.

Component 5: Drivers of violent extremism are predominantly context specific and require local approaches. While there is a growing consensus that factors such as marginalisation, injustice, alienation, weak state-society relations, and social exclusion contribute to violent extremism, the specific combination of factors that result in violent extremism is less clear and can differ substantially between geographies and populations. When communities are more resilient to violent extremism, the risk of violence is reduced, contributing to a society that is peaceful and inclusive. Community actors are best situated to strengthen resilience as they are closest to, and understand, the particular local challenges in more detail. Local actors understand what drives recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism in their communities and may know some of the elements for an effective solution, but are often unable to access adequate funding to make a difference. Local P/CVE initiatives may be overlooked by traditional development funding, or they may lack the capacity to access and manage international donor funds where they are available. Traditional development donors have tended to focus on communities at risk of poverty, not at risk of recruitment and radicalisation to violent extremism – and often these communities are not the same.

Key cross-cutting issues

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[10] eu_action_plan_on_human_rights_and_democracy_2020-2024.pdf (europa.eu)

Human rights, gender equality, conflict sensitivity and resilience, Rule of Law, management/leadership, justice, policing, capacity building, P/CVE and youth responsiveness multi-actor and multi-stakeholder referral mechanisms.

Do No Harm approaches and human rights due diligence will be applied to the areas of actions as required by NDICI-GE requirements and the EU Action Plan on Human Rights 20202-2024. For example, risks of doing harm should be considered when working on criminal justice systems in authoritarian and autocratic states, where often human rights defenders, journalists and even some legal operators, are labelled as terrorists and persecuted as such. Relevance and credibility of Partner Country's/Regional Policies and Strategies

Counterterrorism cooperation with EU partner countries is essential to improve the security of the EU and to protect its citizens. The Council has called for further strengthening of the EU's external counterterrorism engagement with a focus on the Western Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, other African countries where terrorist activities are increasing, and on key regions in Asia. Such engagement can help Member States in their work against terrorist activity, as well as working at a global level to combat terrorist organisations that span across regions and continents. The actual selection of countries to be included in the Global CT Mechanism will require continued support from the CT/Security experts' network in EU Delegations especially in facilitating cooperation and political buy-in as well as promoting its implementation on a political level.

The proposed interventions will support the strategic objectives of targeted national governments to prevent and countering violent extremism. In particular, the actions will contribute to the implementation of national PVE action plans at the local level where existing.

EU added value

The EU has identified terrorism and violent extremism as one of the major threats facing the Union and Member States in the European Agenda on Security (2015) and the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (2016), as well as in the EU Council Conclusions on Addressing the external dimension of a constantly evolving terrorist and violent extremist threat (2022), in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (2022) and in the EU CT Agenda (2020). The latter recognises that "international engagement across all four pillars facilitating cooperation and promoting capacity building" is essential to improve security inside the EU.

The EU recognises that terrorism is both a crime against the right to life, to physical integrity and to property, and a security threat to freedom, security, justice and economic development that particularly affects groups in more vulnerable situations, including women and children. It also recognises that counter-terrorism needs to be anchored in criminal justice, rule of law and human rights and Do-No-Harm approaches.

Because terrorism and violent extremism are a transnational threat, information needs to be shared both within and between nations and multilateral bodies. Improving counter-terrorism and P/CVE requires investment in building capacity and capability, including with a gender responsive perspective, in priority partner countries: as the upsurge in terrorist activity in Europe since 2015 has demonstrated, security threats abroad can have a direct and violent impact on security at home. The EU recognises that new technologies offer the potential to tackle the terrorist threat, and calls for capacity building with partners to maximise the benefits of new technologies in counter-terrorism activities.[11] For example, the EU Action Plan on Human Rights also calls on countering disinformation, hate speech, violent extremist and terrorist content, including by strengthening civil society organisations' and independent media's capacity to detect, expose and raise public awareness on disinformation and information, while supporting independent and credible fact checking and research, investigative reporting and journalism, as well as an independent judiciary.

For all components under this Action Document, the Commission will ensure that measures are implemented in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law and in accordance with the EU Strategic Framework and the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, as well as the operational guidance which was developed to ensure that human rights due diligence is taken into consideration in the design and implementation of counter-terrorism assistance.

Complementarity with EU and other Donors/Partners

For the purpose of ensuring complementarity, synergy and coordination, the Commission may sign or enter into joint donor coordination declarations or statements and may participate in donor coordination structures, as part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union.

In order to enhance efficiency, avoid duplications and address potential gaps, any actions undertaken by Components 1-5 will be defined in complementarity and close coordination with actions covered under geographic, other thematic

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[11] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/44446/st08868-en20.pdf

and rapid response pillars of the NDICI and other financial instruments. Furthermore, all actions will be closely coordinated with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) operations wherever relevant.

Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action: The IIJ has an extensive expert and alumni network, established relationships with many states which would be invited to leverage the mechanism, and a peer-peer learning methodology.

GCERF works with governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) to implement activities as outlined in their respective countries National CVE Strategies and Action Plans and will build on existing trust relationships to facilitate the implementation of their projects.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

3.1. Objectives and Expected Outputs

The Overall Objective (Impact) of this action is to disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights, gender equality and the rule of law.

Component 1 (AML/CFT): The Specific Objective is to reduce access to funding for terrorist organisations through increased compliance with FATF recommendations and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions in partner countries.

The expected outputs are:

Output 1.1: increased compliance of national AML/CFT frameworks with relevant UNSCRs, FATF recommendations and EU legislation on CFT/AML.

Output 1.2: enhanced national, regional and international cooperation on CFT/AML.

The specific countries to be targeted will be defined according to emerging priorities, listing processes and based on political engagements, such as the EU political dialogues.

Component 2 (CT CLOSE): The specific objective is to continue to improve analysis, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases by relevant entities and cooperation at the national and regional levels.

The expected outputs are:

Output 2.1: Enhanced capacities of relevant entities to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate with each other at national and regional levels, in compliance with human rights standards and Rule of Law.

Output 2.2: Improved capacities in selected security services to fight against terrorism with a rule of law perspective.

Component 3: The Specific Objective is to improve criminal justice responses in Central Asia and possibly the Caucasus to terrorism in compliance with international human rights standards and rule of law, with a particular focus on developing law enforcement capacities, enhancing independent judiciary procedures and strengthening regional CT cooperation.

The expected outputs are:

Output 3.1: Support to strategic and operational exchanges on CT between the European law enforcement community and partner country authorities.

Output 3.2: Strengthened law enforcement and judicial authorities' capacities to address the terrorist threat.

Output 3.3: Increase in cooperation at regional and global level between law enforcement agencies that address problems associated with terrorism.

Component 4 (CT INFLOW): The specific objective of this component is to support partner countries in line with the EU political dialogues, to improve international cooperation and sharing of best practices on the exchange of information, criminal analysis, cross-border investigations and prosecutions, in particular about foreign terrorist fighters and individuals suspected of planning or carrying out terrorist offences.

The expected outputs are:

Output 4.1: Improved institutional capacity on information exchange of selected countries, enabling the swift and user-friendly exchange of terrorism related information whilst maintaining a high standard of data protection and data security as well as the right to information to ensure accountability.

Output 4.2: Improved institutional capacity on adoption of international standards on special, financial and digital investigations, as well as human rights.

Output 4.3: Improved institutional capacity to develop strategic and operational criminal analysis at regional and international level.

Output 4.4: Availability of limited IT equipment for capability development.

The specific countries to be targeted will be defined according to emerging priorities and based on political engagements, such as through EU CT dialogues.

Component 5 (GCERF): The Specific Objective is to increase the resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas in countries where the threat and need are greatest.

The expected outputs are:

Output 5.1: Community focused and driven initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported, including in a gender and youth responsive way.

Output 5.2: Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.

Output 5.3: Awareness and knowledge of good practices in P/CVE is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries, including in a gender and youth responsive way.

GCERF is solutions oriented. Funding is provided to help launch, reinvest in, and extend successful local initiatives to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas. As the reach of GCERF funding expands, the lessons learned in particular from our monitoring and evaluation of PVE initiatives will contribute to good practices in this currently undeveloped, complex, and highly challenging field.

3.2. Indicative Activities

Component 1 (AML/CFT): Activities related to all Outputs include but are not limited to:

−   awareness raising and practical training on AML/CFT issues identified in relevant UNSCRs, international standards and EU requirements on AML/CFT.
−   support to all relevant stakeholders of the AML/CFT chain.
−   series of trainings on identifying and providing information that could facilitate the implementation of relevant UNSCRs, international standards and EU requirements on AML/CFT
−   Legislative drafting assistance to support the implementation of relevant CFT AML standards
−   explore support to deploy and implement "goAML", the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) standard software system available for Financial Intelligence Units to counter Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering or other relevant tools that allow for the handling of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs).
−   Research and analysis on trends and risks related to financing of terrorism and money laundering globally.

Component 2 (CT CLOSE): Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

Output 2.1:

−   supporting the update of relevant legal and regulatory frameworks regulating intelligence services and related cross governmental cooperation.
−   support for ensuring legal and human rights compliance into the business practices of the entire intelligence cycle, notably in the development of key intelligence methodologies and doctrines in the intelligence cycle.
−   support for using and protecting intelligence in investigations and prosecutions including the development of intelligence (also financial intelligence) into evidence.
−   support for capacity building in the field of analysis of information including the identification of required technologies and the use of related technologies/software tools e.g. for data processing, filing etc including related training of personnel.
−   support to develop human resources policies and training of relevant CT actors, including on human rights and gender sensitivity.

Output 2.2:

− Tailored made capacity building, including mentorship, in selected countries to allow them to increase their effectiveness across the Counterterrorism related cycle.

Component 3: Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

− assistance in developing and implementing rule of law based criminal justice practices to counter terrorism under a human rights-based approach, while integrating a gender perspective, based on gender analysis.
− assistance for the development of procedures for counter-terrorism law enforcement and/or the identification, documentation and dissemination of good practices on judicial as well as operational information.
− Assistance for improved and human rights-compliant judicial capacity, international judicial cooperation and MLA.
− Strengthened CT stakeholder's ability to undertake complex investigations (forensics, cyber…).
− Assistance for improved resilience in management of terrorism incidents (reporting and alert phase, reaction, command & control).
− assistance on the establishment and implementation of border controls related to the control the issuance of identity papers and travel documents through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.
− assistance for making better use of INTERPOL databases on stolen and lost travel documents; and international exchange of information by law enforcement and intelligence agencies aimed at preventing the commission of terrorist acts and bringing terrorists, including FTFs, to justice, including by sharing of operational information, especially regarding actions of movements of terrorist persons or networks.
− support to promote international cooperation (police and judicial) between the States concerned in order to ensure consultation and responsiveness in the response to terrorism.
− support to promote international cooperation at institutional and technical level between the EU and the States concerned.
− Support the increase of women's and youth participation and strengthening the systematic integration of a gender perspective based upon gender analysis in CT strategies, policies, training and practices.

Component 4 (CT INFLOW): Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

− Support for the development of communications systems and tools for the exchange of sensitive and restricted information between regional Law Enforcement agencies based or inspired on the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) model in partner countries.
− Support for the standardisation in human rights compliant data processing and strategic / operational criminal analysis of CT related data feed, taking into consideration big data challenges (volume, velocity, volatility) with a specific focus on procedure, tools and standards to process FTF related data.
− Support for the potential roll-out of a system inspired from SIRIUS countries (a secure web platform for law enforcement professionals, which allows them to share knowledge, best practices and expertise in the field of internet-facilitated crime investigations, with a special focus on counter-terrorism);
− Support for the improvement of judicial cooperation and mutual legal assistance;
− Establishment of networks of experts;
− Support for interoperability in special, financial and digital investigations;
− Support developing and implementing rule of law based criminal justice practices to counter terrorism under human rights based approach in line also with human rights law and international humanitarian law;
− The specific activities will be defined in the inception phase in coordination and following the recommendations of the thematic and geographical assessments produced by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED).

Component 5 (GCERF): Activities related to Outputs include but are not limited to:

− Provide small grants to community-level, grassroots initiatives that address the local drivers of violent extremism and strengthen resilience against violent extremist agendas, in a gender and age responsive way.
− GCERF aims to fill a funding gap in a sound and sustainable manner, including investing in building the capacity of local initiatives to better serve their communities, to improve their potential to access and manage donor funds in the future, and to secure innovative partnerships that reinforce their stability. Sustainability is ensured first through successive rounds of investment in each beneficiary country, and second by providing capacity development support for example in preparing budgets, monitoring and evaluation, and financial management, to enable communities to raise their own funds in due course.

- GCERF is solutions-oriented. Funding is provided to help launch, reinvest in, and extend successful local initiatives to build community resilience against violent extremist agendas, in a gender and age responsive way. As the reach of GCERF funding expands, the lessons learned in particular from our monitoring and evaluation of PVE initiatives will contribute to good practices in this currently undeveloped, complex, and highly challenging field. Dissemination workshops will also be organised to this purpose.

3.3. Mainstreaming

Environmental Protection & Climate Change

In line with the European Commission's CT Agenda, the European judicial strategy for 2021-2024 particular attention will be paid to the environmental costs of such actions and to the use of modern and digital training methods to guarantee a lower environmental impact, sustainability, high-quality, effectiveness and robust monitoring and evaluation.

Gender Equality and empowerment of women and girls

GCERF will continue to support gender-responsive actions, thriving for gender-equality in line with the Women, Peace and Security Agenda and the Youth Action Plan. Conducting needs and strengths assessments during the identification phase of any project and the design of tailored activities as per needs and strengths identified. Gender equality is key to the success of efforts geared towards peace and security.

Human Rights

A clear human-rights-based approach will be incorporated throughout the different stages of the project cycle (project design/formulation; monitoring of implementation; evaluation) on the basis of the operational guidance developed to this end by the European Commission.[12] Any potential flow-on risk on the respect of human rights should be constantly monitored and mitigating measures need to be foreseen, including in relation to the human rights record of security and intelligence actors, issues of gender responsiveness and possible lack of independence of the criminal justice system. Also, Pillar IV of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy reaffirms that the promotion and protection of human rights is essential to all measures against terrorism. It also recognises that counterterrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but rather complimentary and mutually reinforcing. The use of API/PNR systems and data presents special challenges with respect to the rights to privacy, the protection of personal data, the right to non-discrimination, and, the presumption of innocence. The project includes several activities designed to assist partner countries in the protection and promotion of human rights. Namely, a Guidance Note to address pertinent human rights issues, such as data protection and privacy concerns; and Model Legislative Provisions to guide the development of legislation on API/PNR data transmission, use, sharing and retention. In the case of GCERF, respecting human rights is central to the code of conduct signed with every recipient of GCERF funding.

Youth and gender mainstreaming throughout GCERF will be important, as a democratic and demographic imperative. Young people should have a say and be involved as much as possible in the programme/project cycle and be consulted meaningfully at all stages.

Conflict sensitivity, peace and resilience

Do No Harm implications should be considered in all contexts where there is rule of law weakness, a criminal justice system that is not independent, a poor human rights record of security and intelligence forces, a gender-oppressive system and a growing authoritarianism and persecution of human rights defenders (under the label of 'terrorists'). Conflict sensitivity should be implemented across all contexts affected by fragility and conflict.

Grantee beneficiaries under GCERF and Hedayah shall integrate a conflict-sensitive approach into the design and implementation of GCERF-supported activities so that they do not cause harm or exacerbate conflict, and aim to address and mitigate potential root causes of conflict.

3.4. Risks and Lessons Learnt

Category	Risks	Likelihood (High/ Medium/ Low)	Impact (High/ Medium/ Low)	Mitigating measures

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[12]   (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/operational-human-rights-guidance-eu-external-cooperationactions-addressing-terrorism-organised_en).

1	The lack of political buy-in from partner countries for CT and P/CVE activities	Medium	Medium	Making the facility demand-driven ensures that actions will only occur when political buy-in has been obtained and plan according to COVID measures per country.
1	EU support to CT capacity building strengthens the repressive rule of authoritarian regimes; the lack of independence of the justice system, etc.	Medium	Medium	With a strong focus on International Law, human rights, and the rule of law, it is essential that all capacity building relies on European/International norms and values.
1	The lack of absorption capacity in partner countries	Medium	Medium	By providing tailor-made assistance, the Facility ensures complementarity to existing programmes and thereby reducing the risk of lacking absorption capacity.
2	Working in unstable security environments poses a risk to implementers (especially if the situation worsens)	Medium	Medium	The previous/extensive experience of implementing partners of working in unstable security environments will be essential. Implementers will be required to provide contingency plans.
2	The risk of doing more harm than good, including lack of context-specific gender awareness, human rights violations by security forces and persecution of political opponents and human rights defenders..	Medium	Medium	The "Do No Harm" principle is key to all EU CT and P/CVE programming. Comprehensive and rigorous assessments (be they on conflict sensitivity, human rights, gender equality, etc.) will be carried out prior to commencing any work, ensuring that implementers and recipients will be in line with this key principle.
2	Overlapping mandates, initiatives and lack of coordination of various technical assistance providers to end violence against children, including both boys and girls, within the same region.	Medium	Medium	The Facility will establish close working relationships with all relevant stakeholders and counterparts including international, regional and national stakeholders to maximise use of resources and avoid duplication of efforts.
5	Courses are not viewed as competitive with other Training institutions	Low	High	The outputs will be tailored to target groups, supported by practical and comprehensive resource materials, designed and delivered by top international experts and will provide practitioners with a training opportunity that brings value to their work.
2	Gender participation is unbalanced	Medium	Medium	In the preparations for the delivery, partners will actively seek balanced participation as much as possible..
3	General instability in countries of operation	High	High	Implementers will continually assess risk states in the countries of operation. They will work with security officials to ensure safety of the project team and participants in project activities during project implementation. If risks are considered too severe, alternative locations or methods of implementation will be considered. This will be done in consultation with the EU.

Lessons Learnt:

A recent evaluation of the EU external engagement on CT and P/CVE (2022) found that the EU has become a major actor in CT and P/CVE external assistance, and the scale and speed of investment (from a standing start in 2011) has been impressive. In addition to its global actions, the EU's CT and P/CVE interventions financed via the external instruments cover around 40 countries in all high-threat regions and many areas where the threat may be lower, incipient or in abeyance, but significant nonetheless. The EU succeeds in balancing operational priorities and opportunities with comprehensive coverage. The evaluation has confirmed that the EU continues to be a major donor and implementer of CT and P/CVE actions across the globe, and is seen in the field as a 'player', not only a 'payer'. Substantial, ongoing investments have yielded significant results over the years and this evaluation found positive evidence against all of the criteria examined (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, added value and impact). Some weaknesses were identified on monitoring and evaluation (including ensuring evaluability in programme design), gender sensitivity, and the EU's dependence on a small number of implementing agencies.

Recent external evaluations on individual CT programmes consider the "facility approach" as highly relevant in the context of EU policies and strategies and call for continuity and reinforcement. For the EU cooperation to be successful in this area in unstable regions facing multi-faceted CT PCVE challenges, it is critical that the EU is equipped with effective tools able to rapidly

respond to emerging threats.

The proper identification of weak links in the chain will therefore be essential for this action and will require the mobilisation of the full range of CT expertise available to the UN and the European Union, including CT experts and other colleagues in EU Delegations, EU Member States' subject matter experts, practitioners and researchers.

There is need for complementarity and coordination with related actions implemented by other Commission actors. Experience shows that CT actions, especially at local/community level, must be supported by accompanying measures: improving access to basic services, supporting local governance, etc.

Component 5: Main lessons learned from previous EU programming on P/CVE call for this to be evidence-based, tailored according to the local context, and adopting a multi-disciplinary approach. These aspects have been taken into account in the design of the two components. In addition, the proposed components seek to develop further knowledge throughout the implementation to facilitate learning in this complex and challenging domain, and to ensure that steps taken are coherent with the other endeavours and interventions. The proposed component builds on the good practices and lessons learned identified during past work in focus communities with EU support among others.

3.5. The Intervention Logic

This is based on the assumption that

• IF actions are successfully implemented,

• THEN partner governments will 1) strengthen their criminal justice responses to terrorism, 2) enhance their capacity to address recruitment to violent extremism 3) increase the resilience of communities and vulnerable people against violent extremist agendas,

• RESULTING in a reduction of the terrorist threat and a contribution to increased stability in the geographical areas in which the activities have been implemented, and abroad.

The action assumes there is sufficient support and willingness from the relevant public authorities to engage with the EU in CT and P/CVE issues and to adopt and implement relevant international CT legal provisions, standards and best practices.

The design of the Action assumes also that key state and non- state actors are willing to address child recruitment and exploitation in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law, as enshrined in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UN Charter and the UN's P/CVE Action Plan. This will be monitored throughout the implementation as well as assessed through regular policy dialogue with the partner countries. The programme builds on the experience and lessons learned acquired by the EU in the field of CT and P/CVE and strong emphasis is put on capacity building as a key element for sustainability.

3.6. Logical Framework Matrix

Results	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
Impact	To disrupt terrorist networks and the activities of recruiters to terrorism, cut off terrorist funding and bring terrorists to justice while continuing to respect human rights, gender equality and the rule of law.					
Outcome 1	Enhanced resilience of States facing a dynamic and persistent terrorist threat and increased capacities of selected states to develop capacities to detect, prevent, counter, investigate and respond to this evolving threat and emerging terrorist modi operandi, while ensuring respect for international law, human rights and the rule of law.	Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined	To be defined	Project internal and external monitoring system (M&E)	Necessary political will at the national and regional level No substantial deterioration in the current security/ post pandemic situation
Outcome 2	Improved analysis, investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases by relevant entities and cooperation at the national and regional levels.	Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined	To be defined	Project internal and external monitoring system (M&E)	Necessary political will at the national and regional level
Outcome 3	Improved criminal justice responses to terrorism in particular in Central Asia in compliance with international Human Rights standards and the Rule of Law, with a particular focus on developing law enforcement capacities, enhancing judiciary procedures and strengthening regional CT cooperation.	Number of counter terrorism cases in which terrorists were brought to justice and sentenced	To be defined	To be defined	Project internal and external monitoring system (M&E)	Necessary political will at the national and regional level
Outcome 4	improved international cooperation and sharing of best practices on the					

	exchange of information, criminal analysis, cross-border investigations and prosecutions, in particular about foreign terrorist fighters and individuals suspected of planning or carrying out terrorist offences.					
Outcome 5	Resilience of vulnerable communities against extremist agendas is increased in countries where the threat and need is greatest.				To be defined in the inception phase	
Output 1 related to Outcome 1	Increased compliance of national AML/CFT frameworks with relevant UNSCRs, FATF recommendations and EU legislation on CFT/AML.	– Number of countries with improved CFT AML regimes				
Output 2 related to Outcome 1	Enhanced national, regional and international cooperation on CFT AML.					
Output 1 related to Outcome 2	Enhance capacities of relevant entities to more effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases and to cooperate with each other at national and regional levels	– Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined		To be defined	
Output 2 related to Outcome 2	Tailored made capacity building, including mentorship, in selected countries to allow them to increase their effectiveness across the Counterterrorism related cycle.	– Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined		To be defined	
Output 1 related to Outcome 3	Support strategic and operational exchanges on CT between the European law enforcement community and relevant authorities are supported	– Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined		To be defined	
Output 2	Law enforcement and judicial authorities' capacities including in	– Number of counter terrorism cases in which terrorists were brought to justice and sentenced	To be defined	–	To be defined	

related to Outcome 3	Central Asia to address the terrorist threat is strengthened	− Number of Counter Terrorism staff of government ministries or agencies trained on investigative procedures (M/W) − Number of persons directly benefiting from the intervention (M/W)				
Output 3 related to Outcome 3	Cooperation at a regional level between law enforcements agencies, including in Central Asia, that address problems associated with terrorism is increased	− Number of countries supported with reinforced abilities to prevent and prosecute terrorism	To be defined	−	To be defined	
Output 1 related to Outcome 4	The institutional capacity on information exchange of selected countries is reinforced enabling the swift and user-friendly exchange of terrorism related information whilst maintaining a high standard of data protection and data security.		−	−		
Output 2 related to Outcome 4	The institutional capacity on adoption of international standard on special digital investigations		−	−		
Output 3 related to Outcome 4	The institutional capacity to develop strategic and operational criminal analysis at regional and international level.		−	−		
Output 4 related to Outcome 4	Availability of IT equipment for capability development		−	−		
Output 1 related to Outcome 5	Community focused and driven initiatives for the prevention of violent extremism in beneficiary countries are supported		− Number of men and women reached by the CSOs through local CVE actions (dis-aggregated by country and age) − Number of collaboration / partnerships with think tanks / major actors involved in	− Project progress reports; − GCERF reports	TBD in the inception phase	Security situation in targeted communities does not deteriorate and allows partners to operate appropriately

			P/CVE work and research established/ developed during the implementation.			
Output 2 related to Outcome 5	Community level civil society organisations in beneficiary countries have increased capacity for the sustainable prevention of violent extremism.		− Number of CSOs reporting increased capacities in PVE thanks to GCERF support. − % of CSO representatives trained by GCERF who can provide at least one example of using these skills & knowledge in their work within the following year	− Project progress reports and GCERF's financial document ation; − Survey of CSOs	TBD in the inception phase	CSOs at community level are free to participate in P/CVE capacity building activities and to apply new knowledge in their communities
Output 3 related to Outcome 5	Awareness and knowledge of good practices in the field of preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is increased in the target communities of beneficiary countries.		− number of stakeholders reached through workshops/events where findings/ good practices/ lessons learned where disseminated, disaggregated by sex, sector and country	− Database of event participa nts		A robust M&E system which allows for the identification of good practices and lessons learned is in place.

4. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

4.1. Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries.

4.2. Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Financing Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

4.3. Implementation Modalities (applicable for Project modality)

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures[13].

4.3.1. Indirect Management with an international organisation

Component 1 , 3 and 4: These components may be implemented in indirect management with EU member state organisations and Justice and Home Affairs agencies. This implementation entails to manage and be responsible for the execution of the programme.

This implementation is justified due to the combined nature of the continuation of activities foreseen under existing contracts (provision of capacity building and technical assistance to strengthen relevant actors against terrorism in accordance with the principles of rule of law as well as budget-implementation tasks), but also in order to reinforce the nexus between the internal and the external dimensions of the EU's security policy and to avoid duplication and overlap with similar activities.

The agencies, supported by other EU Member States agencies, are best placed to cover the wide range of fields of expertise required to perform interventions in the diverse fields of information sharing, capacity building, law enforcement, and regional cooperation.

The entrusted entities would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: acting as contracting authority concluding, monitoring and managing contracts, carrying out payments, and recovering moneys due; management of procurement procedures for hiring staff, purchasing goods and equipment, hiring consulting services, and any other relevant transactions.

In case the envisaged entity would need to be replaced, the Commission's services may select another entity using the same criteria.

4.3.2. Direct Management (Grants)

Component 5: This Component will be implemented with a direct award to GCERF (direct management).

(a) Purpose of the grant(s): The purpose of the grant to be awarded under Component 2 is to work with civil society partners to develop and implement interventions that have a demonstrable impact on the threat posed by radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism.

As the main purpose of the actions under component 2 is to provide financial support to third parties no maximum amount for sub-granting will apply. The description of the action for this grant shall define the types of entities eligible for financial support and include a list with the types of activity which may be eligible for financial support. The criteria for the selection of the third party recipients of this financial support, including the criteria for determining its exact amount, shall also be specified in the Description of the Action.

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[13] www.sanctionsmap.eu Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

(b) Type of applicants targeted: GCERF was established as an independent legal entity formed under the law of Switzerland in 2014 and enjoys all privileges and immunities equivalent to those given to international organizations which can be granted by way of a Host State Agreement. GCERF is governed by a board which includes country representatives from both recipient and donor nations as well as other constituencies.

(c) Justification of a direct grant: Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the grant may be awarded without a call for proposals to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.

Under the responsibility of the Commission's authorising officer responsible, the recourse to an award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified by the specific characteristics of the action that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power (article 195f of the regulation 2018/1046 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union).

4.3.3. Direct Management (Procurement)

Component 2 will be achieved in direct centralised management, through the conclusion of a service contract with international and/or public organisations including not for profit organisations, or consortia thereof to achieve the results outlined above.

4.3.4. Changes from indirect to direct management mode (and vice versa) due to exceptional circumstances

In the interest of the programme, or if the negotiations with the selected entities fail, all parts of this action may be implemented in indirect management according to the same selection criteria as above.

4.4. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

4.5. Indicative Budget

	EU contribution (amount in EUR)
Component 1 Indirect management with member state organisation	8 000 000
Component 2 Service Contract (direct management)	3 000 000
Component 3 Indirect management with member state organisation	6 000 000
Component 4 Indirect management with CEPOL	6 000 000
Component 5 GCERF - grants (direct management)	6 000 000
Grants – total envelope under section 4.3.2	**6 000 000**
Evaluation, (cf. section 5.2)– Audit (cf. section 5.3)/Expenditure verification	Will be covered by another decision
Strategic communication and public diplomacy (cf. section 6)	N.A
Contingencies	0
Total	**29 000 000**

4.6. Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

The Commission will coordinate and lead the implementation of this action partly through the procurement of service and supply contracts and partly by entrusting tasks to international organisations in which case the Commission will be closely involved through a Steering and/or Coordination Committee.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

4.7. Pre-conditions

N/A

5. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

5.1. Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality). When training courses are delivered as part of the activities of a project, entry and exit tests will be done to assess the increased capacities of the trainees. The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

5.2. Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, evaluations of single components/projects are carried out via an implementing partner. The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake mid-term or final evaluations for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner. The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

5.3. Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

6 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Communication and visibility is a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to advertise the European Union's support for their work to the relevant audiences. To that end they must comply with the instructions given in the Communication and Visibility Requirements of 2018 (or any successor document), notably with regard to the use of the EU emblem and the elaboration of a dedicated communication and visibility plan, to be completed for every action at the start of implementation. These obligations apply equally, regardless of whether e actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, the partner country (for instance, concerning the reforms supported through budget support), contractors, grant beneficiaries or entrusted entities. In each case, a reference to the relevant contractual obligations must be included in the respective financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

Communication and visibility measures may be funded from the amounts allocated to the action. For the purpose of enhancing the visibility of the EU and its contribution to this action, the Commission may sign or enter into joint declarations or statements, as part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union. Visibility and communication measures should also promote transparency and accountability on the use of funds. Effectiveness of communication activities on awareness about the action and its objectives as well as on EU funding of the action should be measured. Implementing partners shall keep the Commission and concerned EU Delegation/Office fully informed of the planning and implementation of specific visibility and communication activities before work starts. Implementing partners will ensure adequate visibility of EU financing and will report on visibility and communication actions as well as the results of the overall action to the relevant monitoring committees.

APPENDIX 1 REPORTING IN OPSYS

An Intervention[14] (also generally called project/programme) is the operational entity associated to a coherent set of activities and results structured in a logical framework aiming at delivering development change or progress. Interventions are the most effective (hence optimal) entities for the operational follow-up by the Commission of its external development operations. As such, Interventions constitute the base unit for managing operational implementations, assessing performance, monitoring, evaluation, internal and external communication, reporting and aggregation.

Primary Interventions are those contracts or groups of contracts bearing reportable results and respecting the following business rule: 'a given contract can only contribute to one primary intervention and not more than one'. An individual contract that does not produce direct reportable results and cannot be logically grouped with other result reportable contracts is considered a 'support entities'. The addition of all primary interventions and support entities is equivalent to the full development portfolio of the Institution.

Option 1: Action level		
☐	Single action	Present action: all contracts in the present action
Option 2: Group of actions level		
☐	Group of actions	Actions reference (CRIS#/OPSYS#):
Option 3: Contract level		
☒	Single Contract 1	Contract with EU MS agency tbd
☒	Single Contract 2	Contract with EU MS agency tbd
☒	Single Contract 3	Contract with EU MS agency tbd
☒	Single Contract 4	Contract with CEPOL
☒	Single Contract 5	Contract with Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
☐	Group of contracts 1	

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[14] ARES (2021)4204912 - For the purpose of consistency between terms in OPSYS, DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI have harmonised 5 key terms, including 'action' and 'Intervention' where an 'action' is the content (or part of the content) of a Commission Financing Decision and 'Intervention' is a coherent set of activities and results which constitutes an effective level for the operational follow-up by the EC of its operations on the ground. See more on the concept of intervention.