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**THIS ACTION IS FUNDED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**ANNEX III**

to the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the annual action plan for the Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and Crisis Preparedness part of the thematic programme Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention for 2023

**Action Document to help build capacities of relevant actors to enhance trust between local populations and security forces**

This document constitutes the annual work programme within the meaning of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation, within the meaning of Article 23 of the NDICI-Global Europe Regulation.

1 SYNOPSIS

1.1 Action Summary Table

<b>1. Title CRIS/OPSYS business reference Basic Act</b>	Help Build Capacities of Relevant Actors to Enhance Trust between Local Populations and Security Forces OPSYS: ACT-61703 ; JAD 1158009 Financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe)/ Overseas Association Decision/European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation Regulation
<b>2. Team Europe Initiative</b>	No
<b>3. Zone benefiting from the action</b>	The action shall be carried out globally.
<b>4. Programming document</b>	Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for the Thematic Programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention 2021-2027
<b>5. Link with relevant MIP(s) objectives / expected results</b>	Priority 3: Supporting peace processes and transitions of conflict-affected societies/ communities, including stabilisation and peacebuilding efforts
<b>PRIORITY AREAS AND SECTOR INFORMATION</b>	
<b>6. Priority Area(s), sectors</b>	Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention
<b>7. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</b>	Main SDG : 16 Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies Other significant SDG: 5 Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
<b>8 a) DAC code(s)</b>	15210 Security system management and reform 15220 - Civilian peace building, conflict prevention and resolution
<b>8 b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	21000 International non-governmental organisations (NGO) 51000 University, college or other teaching institution, research institute or think-tank

<b>9. Targets</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Climate <input type="checkbox"/> Social inclusion and Human Development <input type="checkbox"/> Gender <input type="checkbox"/> Biodiversity <input type="checkbox"/> Education <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Human Rights, Democracy and Governance			
<b>10. Markers (from DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective @</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Disaster Risk Reduction @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Inclusion of persons with Disabilities @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Nutrition @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Biological diversity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>11. Internal markers and Tags:</b>	<b>Policy objectives</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Digitalisation @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	digital connectivity digital governance digital entrepreneurship digital skills/literacy digital services	<b>YES</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>NO</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	/
	Connectivity @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	digital connectivity energy transport health education and research	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	/	
	Migration @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reduction of Inequalities @	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
	Covid-19	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>BUDGET INFORMATION</b>					
<b>12. Amounts concerned</b>	Budget line: BGUE – B2023-14.020230-C1 – STABILITY AND PEACE Total estimated cost: EUR 3 429 740 Total amount of EU budget contribution EUR 3 429 740				
<b>MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION</b>					
<b>13. Type of financing</b>	<b>Direct management</b> through: Procurement <b>Indirect management</b> with with a pillar assessed entity; the entity is to be selected in accordance with the criteria set out in section 4.3.1.				

## 1.2 Summary of the Action

Conflicts, insecurity and instability lead to loss of human lives and devastation, impair development and have a direct and indirect impact on all segments of societies. Security and justice institutions are commonly one of the primary interfaces between states and the populations they are meant to serve and provide the foundation for provision of other basic services such as health and education.

Moreover, non-respect of the rule of law and fundamental rights often occurs where security sector actors interfere with political life, commit abuses and human rights violations or are unable to provide security services for the population and to counter threats such as terrorism and organised crime.

Improving governance and reform of the security sector is therefore a key element to prevent conflicts and to contribute to sustainable peace, state-building and development.

The proposed action will help build capacities of relevant actors in improving trust between local populations and security forces. It will improve capacities of security sector actors to deal with security and corruption challenges and hold them accountable through better oversight and inspection to prevent impunity and contribute to the good governance of the defence and security sectors, restoring and strengthening access to security and justice.

The action will support and sustain inclusive national Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Security Sector Governance (SSG) processes including dialogue on security sector governance and reform in conflict, post-conflict and fragile countries. It will improve service provision of security forces and law enforcement agencies towards the civilian population, and greater civilian understanding of the respective roles. Particular attention will also be placed on support to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of former combatants (DDR) in line with the dedicated EU policy<sup>1</sup>, where relevant and appropriate, while maintaining the differences and specificities of SSR and DDR.

<sup>1</sup> Joint Communication: an EU strategic approach in support of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of former combatants | EEAS Website (europa.eu) - [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-eu-strategic-approach-support-disarmament-demobilisation-and-reintegration\\_en](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-communication-eu-strategic-approach-support-disarmament-demobilisation-and-reintegration_en)

This will be achieved by providing technical expertise to support and underpin national policy planning, implementation and dialogue on SSR, and ensuring that SSR dialogue and planning processes are gender responsive in order to meet the long term security needs and rights of women, men, girls and boys. The Action will build upon the positive results and lessons identified from the past performance of the project “Security Sector Governance Facility” initially launched in 2016.

Corruption and poor governance undermine the development of societies and the institutions responsible for the protection of civilians and defending national sovereignty. They destabilise countries/regions and increase the complexity of every security challenge that governments and populations face, undermining any sustainable peace. Democratic accountability, translated into the NATO concept of Building Integrity (BI) will be addressed as another means of strengthening good governance reforms and prevention of corruption and security risks. In line with the reinforced current framework for EU-NATO cooperation (as highlighted in the three Joint Declarations, 74 common proposals and forthcoming strategic documents ), the Action will support the NATO BI Strategy in NATO partner countries outside the EU with a specific approach to defence and security sectors.

## 2 RATIONALE

### 2.1 Context

Instability, emerging and full-scale crises are on the rise across the world, not least in the EU's direct neighbourhood. Security and justice institutions are commonly one of the primary interfaces between states and the populations they are meant to serve. However, poor governance and lack of integrity can leave the door open for conflict to escalate.

For this reason, support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) is an essential feature of conflict prevention, in which the EU can contribute to strengthening institutions in partner countries to better meet the security needs of their populations. The *Elements for an EU-Wide Strategic Framework to security sector reform*<sup>2</sup> Joint Communication developed by the European External Action Service and the European Commission in 2016 continues to guide the EU in its efforts. Ensuring the sustainable reform of the security sector in conflict, post-conflict and fragile countries and regions is critical for the long term success of EU efforts to promote peace and security globally.

In addition, DDR has significant interlinkages with SSSR and plays an important role in stabilisation and building lasting peace. In 2021, the Joint Communication on an EU strategic approach in support of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of former combatants sets out an EU strategic approach to support DDR of former combatants, and proposes means to frame and deliver supports to DDR in affected countries and regions, in a coordinated, conflict-sensitive manner that is in line with international law, directly and in tandem with partners, including the UN, the World Bank, regional organisations and third countries. Such an approach assessed relevant connections of DDR with the situation of the security sector in a given countries and will ensure synergies and complementarity in close link with any Security Sector Reform process, as appropriate.

Finally, transparent and accountable security and defence institutions under democratic control are fundamental to stabilisation objectives. To respond to this need, NATO has developed a ‘Building Integrity’ policy (BI) to contribute to improving national and regional resilience to security risks posed by corruption and poor governance. BI is therefore fully in line with the EU Security Sector Reform policy adopted in 2016, which stresses the importance for all security bodies and institutions, including the military, to fully comply with good governance principles and fundamental values. EU support to SSR must first and foremost target this objective. NATO’s BI policy and action plan are focused on enhancing institutional capacity and resilience through improved governance of the defence and security sector. BI specifically targets the defence sector, for which NATO has a demonstrated expertise whereas the EU security sector reform is more centred around non-military security actors. BI supports NATO partner countries to promote good governance and implement the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability, in the defence and related security sector and, as such, is wholly complementary to SSR/SSG principles.

<sup>2</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0031&from=EN>

## 2.2 Problem Analysis

Conflicts have become increasingly complex and protracted, affecting low-, middle- and upper-middle-income countries alike, involving state and non-state actors, including violent extremist groups that increasingly operate transnationally, occupy territories and threatening entire regions. New modes of operating, by terrorists and other disruptive agents, such as cyber-attacks, hybrid warfare, the use of bio agents, drones and new forms of improvised explosive devices are underpinned by diverse and increasingly sophisticated sources of conflict financing, including money laundering and other illicit financial flows often linked to transnational organised crime. Increased globalisation and improved infrastructure in many parts of the world can facilitate illicit flows, making it easier for organized crime groups to operate transnationally. Not least, the impact of the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition are a key enabler of armed violence and conflict, contributing to insecurity, facilitating violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and impeding humanitarian access.

In this context, helping (re-)build trust between local populations and security forces, including by restoring or strengthening access to security and justice for all, reforming the security sector (SSR) and its governance, supporting DDR, strengthening democratic accountability and civil society oversight over corruption are important activities where the EU can contribute to conflict prevention and conflict to peace transitions while also strengthening institutions in partner countries for the improvement of the human security of their populations.

Due to the transnational nature of many security challenges, in addition to national approaches, SSR engagement in cross-border or sub-regional security issues is relevant. Moreover, in view of these global challenges, focusing on institution and state centric approaches to SSR could limit the impact of conflict prevention. More attention to analysing and monitoring drivers of conflict related to the security and justice institutions – including identifying entry points where those institutions can actively help reduce the drivers – but also start to apply a more bottom up approach to SSR in programming, with an inclusive participation of relevant community actors, should be addressed by this action.

In the context of DDR, facilitating accountable exit opportunities, political processes sequenced with development initiatives, transitional justice, and alternative livelihoods for those involved in conflict is essential to prevent further instability. Well-coordinated and conflict sensitive DDR processes can prevent further exploitation of grievances and instability stirred by armed groups. DDR engagements are thus an integral part of the EU's contribution to the non-reoccurrence of violence and to broader stabilisation, as it addresses the risks posed by armed groups and supports the transition from armed confrontation to political engagement and inclusive governance. For this reason, any DDR process may be considered in a broader security reform assessment.

Women's increased full and equal participation in all matters related to peace and security is a priority for the EU. There is a broad recognition that peace building and conflict prevention, including security sector reform and DDR, should be gender- and age-responsive, addressing and responding to intersectional dimensions of exclusion. The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda explicitly refers to SSR and recognises that SSR should help achieve women's protection from violence, women's participation and women's access to justice. Furthermore, the security and justice sector is identified through the UN Security Council Resolutions on WPS as being of critical importance to peace and security from a gender perspective. Indeed, only a security sector that effectively responds to the different and non-homogenous human security needs of women and girls, as well as of men and boys, can be described as well governed. Gender responsive SSR and DDR processes can enable a sustained decrease in violence, and in particular violence against women, increase the representation of women at all relevant decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms, provide a better understanding of the diversity of roles that different groups and individuals may have in terms of their association with armed groups, and of their roles in conflict and in peace. Ultimately, they are more likely to lead to sustained peace and compliance with human rights standards.

Deploying the right expertise at the right moment will have a significant impact in supporting these efforts. In addition, the provision of technical assistance services will be a practical tool to help implement the EU-wide strategic framework for SSR support and the Joint Communication on DDR. In this respect, this action will proactively promote, in liaison with the EU Delegations and within the context of the political and policy

dialogues, the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, while underpinning discussions on human security, gender responsiveness and conflict sensitivity as well as global challenges in a holistic manner.

While some progress has been made, in terms of reforms in Southern and Eastern Neighborhood countries, experience on the ground confirms that corruption and poor governance in the defence and security sector represent security challenges that undermine democracy, rule of law and economic development. This negative spiral erodes public trust and wastes limited public sector resources. While support for defence and security represent a considerable investment by national authorities and international donors, efforts to enhance capabilities have often focused on enhancing operational capabilities and corruption has been viewed as a financial loss. NATO BI strategy complements efforts led by EU in SSR and promotes awareness of corruption as a security risk with the provision of practical support to change national structures, policies and practices to strengthen transparency, accountability and integrity in the defence and related security sector. This Action will support NATO's BI approach as complementary to SSR and of relevance in NATO partners countries.

**Identification of main stakeholders and corresponding institutional and/or organisational issues (mandates, potential roles, and capacities) to be covered by the action:**

The main stakeholders are all relevant national stakeholders, state and relevant non-statutory security actors of the security, defence and justice sector. This includes security and justice providers such as law enforcement agencies, courts and tribunals as well as those responsible to manage and oversee these providers such as the Ministries of Defence, Internal Security, Justice, Parliaments, Ombudsman's Offices, Human Rights Commissions, women's associations, youth and community associations, and other relevant civil society organisations.

Within the EU, relevant stakeholders would be the EU Delegations, EU Member States, Common Security Defence Policy Missions, the members of the EU permanent informal inter-service task force on SSR and other relevant COM services such as INPTA and NEAR". Other international donors are likewise key actors, in addition to universities and think-tanks, as well as wider international civil society actors.

The final beneficiaries are the populations of countries at risk of or affected by conflict or on post-conflict situation.

### 3 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

The overall objective of this action is to prevent conflicts and contribute to sustainable peace, by enhancing trust between local populations and security forces, improving good governance and reform of the security sector and integrity of security actors.

The Specific Objectives of the action are to:

1. To help (re-)build trust between local populations and security forces, supporting and sustaining inclusive national SSR and DDR processes;
2. To contribute to improving national and regional resilience to security risks posed by corruption and poor governance.

The Outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objective 1 are:

- National and regional policies and strategies are being discussed, drafted, approved in a transparent manner and considered relevant to beneficiaries and based on local contextual analysis;
- Improved transparency and inclusivity of and public confidence in national and regional SSR processes, as well as civilian and democratic oversight of them;
- Improved coordination within the partner country's government or regional organisation on the planning, scheduling and implementation of SSR processes, as well as amongst international partners' support to SSR/DDR processes;
- Improved quality and relevance of assistance measures and action framework in the area of SSR/DDR support;
- More effective DDR support in affected countries and regions, in a coordinated, conflict-sensitive manner that is in accordance with international law.

The Outputs to be delivered by this action contributing to the corresponding Specific Objective 2 are:

- Supported national good governance and integrity reforms in the defence and related security sector in NATO partner countries;
- Specific tools developed within the BI to assist participating institutions in reforming or building sustainable free defence and security institutions;
- Strengthened linkages between integrity / good governance and other crosscutting domains, such as and gender/Women, counter-terrorism, small arms and light weapons and the private defence sector;
- Promoted principles of integrity, transparency and accountability with the societal resilience concept.

### 3.1 Indicative Activities

Activities related with Specific Objective 1 are:

- Provide expertise on the design and development of national and regional policy planning frameworks for structural and inclusive SSR and/or conflict sensitive DDR;
- Assist the partner countries or regions with the development of security needs assessments, security perception surveys, security sector assessments to better serve the populations concerned;
- Support inclusive national consultation processes;
- Support the development and capacity of national/regional accountability mechanisms, and oversight institutions (ministries, parliament, human rights commissions) and bodies (media, civil society organisations and platforms, universities);
- Support the integration of gender issues in SSR processes, both in terms of more equal representation in the security and justice sectors and in terms of gender-sensitive delivery of security and justice services; and
- Provide expertise and other capacity-building efforts that support the design and planning of DDR engagements and contribute to coordination with SSR and other peacebuilding processes and initiatives.

Activities related with Specific Objective 2 are:

- Provide training to national authorities in partner countries on good governance and integrity reforms in the defence and related security sector.
- Develop specific tools to assist participating institutions in reforming or building sustainable free defence and security institutions.
- Develop approaches to improve links between integrity/good governance and other crosscutting domains such as gender/Women, Peace and Security (WPS), counter-terrorism, Small Arms and Light Weapons, climate, environment, natural resources and biodiversity, as well as the private defence sector.
- Organise promotion and advocacy activities on the principles of integrity, transparency and accountability as a way to enhance societal resilience.

### 3.2 Mainstreaming

#### **Environmental Protection & Climate Change**

There is a role for security actors for addressing climate, environmental degradation and security at community level with preparedness and protection, with mainstreaming of environmental protection and climate change into SSR and DDR interventions.

#### **Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls**

As per the OECD Gender DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as G1. This implies that gender concerns will be included within SSR dialogue and planning processes, including DDR, in order to different and non-homogenous long term human security needs and rights of women, men, girls and boys.

### **Human Rights**

The EU is committed to promoting human rights throughout its support to SSR processes. EU efforts must be fully in line with and supportive of the principles of international human rights and humanitarian law, and must contribute to fighting impunity for human rights violations.

The action will promote human rights, including children's rights, rights of indigenous groups and ethnic minorities, non-discrimination, inclusivity, gender equality and empowerment of women.

### **Disability**

As per OECD Disability DAC codes identified in section 1.1, this action is labelled as D0. While not significant, concerns related to people with disabilities should be addressed across the specific objectives to the extent possible, especially in DDR contexts. People with disability participation in SSR processes will be assessed when appropriate and relevant for the objectives of each project.

### **Reduction of inequalities**

The EU support to Security Sector Reform aims to create a secure environment that is conducive to reduction of inequalities, as its overall objective is to ensure the security of individuals. This involves upholding their fundamental freedoms and properly assessing, in a participatory way, the security needs of different groups, including the most vulnerable.

### **Democracy**

Security sector reform (SSR) is a transformative process of a country's security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for democratic principles and practices.

### **Conflict sensitivity, peace and resilience**

The support provided under this action will take into account local conflict dynamics, the do no harm principles and conflict sensitivity mainstreaming and will maximise opportunities to make positive contributions to build peace and resilience at all levels, while at the same time mitigating risks of unintended negative impacts.

The initiative will ensure a Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus approach, ensuring coordination, coherence and collaboration in order to reduce overall vulnerability of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities, build resilience and address root causes of conflict.

### **Disaster Risk Reduction**

Projects to be funded in the framework of this action should take into account any risks of environmental degradation, climate change and natural disasters overall and aim to reduce those risks, especially when constituting an opportunity to strengthen State, societal or community resilience or achieving peacebuilding and security objectives.

## 3.3 Risks and Lessons Learnt

<b>Category</b>	<b>Risks</b>	<b>Likelihood</b> <b>(High/ Medium/ Low)</b>	<b>Impact</b> <b>(High/ Medium/ Low)</b>	<b>Mitigating measures</b>
1	Lack of political will at senior decision making levels within the governments of partner countries.	<b>M</b>	<b>H</b>	EU Delegations and CSDP Missions will provide good offices to lobby government counter-parts, include SSR in their political dialogue and engage other international actors including the UN system to support the goals of the project and related EU initiatives.



1	<p>Distrust, suspicion and possible lack of involvement by the national stakeholders and difficulties with engagement.</p> <p>The security sector is particularly sensitive and the governments of partner countries may be reluctant to engage in cooperation in this sector with external actors. Credibility, trust and partnership are the result of a long dialogue and collaboration process that cannot easily be achieved with short term missions.</p> <p>There is no clear national ownership and commitment to DDR processes</p>	<b>M</b>	<b>H</b>	<p>The implementing partner will not only require a high degree of SSR/DDR expertise, but also a high level of credibility with many partner countries including established channels of contact (directly or through regional organisations such as the AU).</p>
2	<p>Lack of collaboration with other international SSR support actors, which would negatively impact the objective of donor coordination.</p>	<b>L</b>	<b>L</b>	<p>The implementing partner needs to establish a significant level of credibility and legitimacy among EU and international actors such as the UN, regional organisations and bilateral donors. It will also ensure a sound mapping of existing support and support in pro-active donor coordination.</p>
2	<p>Lack of security and high levels of instability in focus countries.</p>	<b>M</b>	<b>M</b>	<p>EU Delegations will consult closely with CSDP Missions, if any in the Country, or other International Partners, e.g. the UN Department of Security and Safety and other security actors to ensure that project partners and beneficiaries minimise any potential security risk that would jeopardise the activities to be</p>

				implemented.  The implementing partner will foresee security related measures according to the security context and level of threat.
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**Lessons Learnt:**

- Over the years of EU support to SSR a number of programme specific or thematic evaluations<sup>3</sup> and reviews have been conducted covering a wide range of EU instruments and tools. These evaluations and reviews have called for among other things the need for increased national ownership, better gender mainstreaming in design and implementation and better anchoring of SSR support in the wider governance, democratisation, state-building and poverty reduction contexts. National ownership is the most important factor to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of SSR support. A priority of EU SSR support should therefore be to support national stakeholders to develop policies, strategies and action plans in a transparent and inclusive manner and, by doing so, to provide a platform on which international partners should align their support.
- SSR efforts should have the explicit objective to ensure the delivery by the justice and security institutions of tangible benefits to the whole population, women, men, girls and boys, including addressing their security concerns. This requires a "bottom-up" approach to security, complementary to a top-down institutional approach, starting from the identification of security needs as perceived and experienced by the population, discussed among local stakeholders and between communities and local and national authorities as well as among security forces. Building comprehensive approaches will ensure that SSR efforts are linked to local violence prevention initiatives such as those working to support economic livelihoods which serve to underpin both economic and physical security.
- SSR should be anchored in the wider governance, democratisation, state-building and poverty reduction context to ensure its sustainability and effectiveness, rather than considering security issues as separate from the overall political and developmental context. Lessons learned show that SSR processes are fundamentally political and involve a wide range of actors from security and justice sectors (state and relevant non-statutory security actors).
- There is a need to link women’s peacebuilding efforts to the formal security sector actors such as police officers and local magistrates thereby allowing for the identification of security threats faced by women and girls to devise and propose solutions to security sector actors.

The performances of the project “Security Sector Governance Facility” (SSGF) was evaluated from January 2021 to August 2021 by two independent experts. The main conclusion were the followings:

- The SSGF was highly relevant with EU policies and with the priorities of the Instrument Contributing to Peace and Stability. The project were also relevant to the needs of the EU Delegations (EUD).
- The Facility has been efficient and has good capacity for rapid reaction. An value-added of the SSGF was its flexibility (i.e. its ability to adjust its focus in the course of the assignment and its ability to maintain contact with beneficiaries during a long period of time). This flexibility in some cases has been an important factor for the establishment of trust between beneficiaries and the Facility.
- Overall, the evaluators estimate that almost half of the assignments had medium to high potential to generate tangible impact in terms of increased SSR awareness among EU staff or beneficiaries. In several cases the assignments permitted to directly support partner countries in developing new projects or initiatives aligned to EU SSR principles while in other cases, the assignments permitted to directly influence/change the perception of final beneficiaries on issues related to SSR.
- Finally, it was considered that the impact of the facility goes beyond the impact of the assignments. The support provided by the facility in the drafting of the TORs of the assignments acted as a capacity-building exercise for EUD staff. It increased their awareness of EU SSR strategy and skills in drafting SSR compliant initiatives. Also, the SSGF improved the perception of the EU as a global security actor.

<sup>3</sup> Such as the Thematic Evaluation of European Commission Support to Justice and Security System Reform of November 2011.

### 3.4 The Intervention Logic

The underlying intervention logic for this action is that:

Conflicts, insecurity and instability lead to loss of human lives and devastation and have a direct and indirect impact on all sectors of development. In many cases, conflicts and instability are generated by problems in the security sector of the partner countries. Moreover, non-respect of the rule of law and fundamental rights often occurs where security sector actors interfere with political life, commit abuses and human rights violations or are unable to provide security services for the population and to counter threats such as terrorism and organised crime.

Improving governance and reform of the security sector is therefore a key element to prevent conflicts and to contribute to sustainable peace, state-building and development.

Reform of the security sector must be based on democratic governance principles and on a people-centred approach to justice and security. It should also be inclusive, sustainable and gender-responsive, ensuring that gender concerns are fully met within SSR dialogue and planning processes in order to meet the long term security needs and rights of women, men, girls and boys. The EU will contribute to it not only by promoting these principles through political dialogue, but also by supporting the national stakeholders to implement (in the case of security management institutions), monitor (in case of oversight institutions) and promote (in case of civil society organisation) their mainstreaming and application.

In line with the EU-wide SSR framework, SSR and DDR can be closely intertwined in some contexts. Actors may condition their engagement in one process on the adversary's credible commitments to the other process, as SSR might be perceived as weakening states' uniformed forces and DDR as undermining armed groups

It is assumed that deploying the right expertise at the right moment will have a significant impact in supporting security sector reform efforts and DDR processes, as well as building integrity, if this expertise will be able to gain the trust and confidence of the national partners.

3.5 Logical Framework Matrix



PROJECT MODALITY (3 levels of results / indicators / Source of Data / Assumptions - no activities)

Results	Results chain (@): Main expected results (maximum 10)	Indicators (@): (at least one indicator per expected result)	Baselines (values and years)	Targets (values and years)	Sources of data	Assumptions
<b>Impact</b>	Prevent conflicts and contribute to sustainable peace, by enhancing trust between local populations and security forces, improving good governance and reform of the security sector and integrity of security actors	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The intervention contributes to a multilateral approach to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and stabilisation in the given context of the action (not at all, limited degree, medium, significant, fully)</li> <li>2. The intervention minimised risks and maximised positive outcomes on peace and security (Y/N)</li> <li>3. Number of persons directly benefiting from the intervention (M/W/B/G)</li> <li>4. Percentage of the population who consider lack of security to be the most serious problem they face (M/W/B/G)</li> <li>5. The Action scores 'High' or 'Medium' on the conflict-sensitivity index? (Y/N)</li> </ol>	To be defined	To be defined	Final report	<i>Not applicable</i>

<p><b>Outcome 1</b></p>	<p>Help to (re-)build trust between local populations and security forces, supporting and sustaining inclusive national SSR and/orDDR processes;</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Extent to which roles and missions of Security Sector services are clearly defined</li> <li>2. Number of proposals from the civil society taken up by security policy-making process</li> <li>3. Public perception of security after disarmament operations (M/W)</li> <li>4. Number of government policies developed or revised with civil society organisation participation through EU support - in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)</li> </ol>	<p>To be defined</p>	<p>To be defined</p>	<p>Final and assignment reports</p>	<p>The expected impact will not be achieved if the national stakeholders will not have the will and/or the capacity to implement the adopted legislation/regulations/procedures that the assignment has contributed to establish.</p>
<p><b>Outcome 2</b></p>	<p>To contribute to improving national and regional resilience to security risks posed by corruption and poor governance</p>	<p>Combined Level of perception of policymakers' and civil society actors on status of corruption and governance in the Defence and security sectors (detailed per country).</p>	<p>To be defined</p>	<p>To be defined</p>	<p>Final report</p>	<p>The expected outcome will not be achieved if there is no real political will to improve/reform the security system.</p>
<p><b>Output 1 of specific objective/outcome 1</b></p>	<p>Expert technical advice is put at the disposal of partner countries to support SSR processes.</p>	<p>Indicators should be identified for each assignment. They should be related to person/day of expertise, consultations organised facilitated, participation to experts meeting, national staff trained, studies carried out, and inputs in relevant documents.</p>	<p>To be identified for each assignment.</p>	<p>To be identified for each assignment.</p>	<p>Assignment reports</p>	<p>The expected outcome will not be achieved if there is no real political will to improve/reform the security system.</p>

<b>Output 1 of specific objective/outcome 2</b>	Supported national good governance and integrity reforms in the defence and related security sector in NATO partner countries.	Number of additional/revised National Integrity Plans adopting NATO BI recommendations by countries.	To be defined	To be defined	Annual Progress Reports and Final Report	Partner countries are interested and willing to engage in NATO BI. Partner countries are committed towards the Self Assessment and Peer Review Process.
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## 4 IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

### 4.1 Financing Agreement

In order to implement this action, it is not envisaged to conclude a financing agreement with the a partner country/territory.

### 4.2 Indicative Implementation Period

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 3 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Financing Decision.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's responsible authorising officer by amending this Financing Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

### 4.3 Implementation Modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures.<sup>4</sup>

#### 4.3.1. Direct Management (Procurement)

##### **Procurement:**

Action under Output 1 will be implemented through a service contract with a service provider. The purpose of the service contract is to improve security sector actors' capacities and hold them accountable through better oversight and inspection to prevent impunity and contribute to the good governance of the security sector and sustainable transitions from conflict to peace. This will primarily be achieved through provision of technical expertise. Various activities are foreseen, including deployment of relevant experts, provision of training and capacity building activities to national authorities and regional/international organisations, information sessions for EU entities, etc.

#### 4.3.2 Indirect Management with a pillar assessed entity

One part of the action (outcome 2) may be implemented in indirect management by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The envisaged entity has been selected based on their mandate and expertise in implementing a Building Integrity Strategy with partner countries.

In case the envisaged entity would need to be replaced, the Commission's services may select a replacement entity using the same criteria of expertise in democratic accountability and anti-corruption. If the entity is replaced, the decision to replace it needs to be justified.

#### 4.3.3. Changes from indirect to direct management mode (and vice versa) due to exceptional circumstances (one alternative second option)

In case the selection of implementing partners as per the criteria and conditions set out above might not prove successful, changes from indirect to direct management mode, and vice versa, will provide the possibility to identify other types of applicants according to the same criteria. Specific expertise on on peace and security as well as security sector governance will be used as identification criteria to identify partners for either direct or indirect management.

<sup>4</sup> [www.sanctionsmap.eu](http://www.sanctionsmap.eu) In case of discrepancy between the legal acts published in the Official Journal and the updates on the website, it is the OJ version that prevails.

#### 4.5. Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply subject to the following provisions.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of services in the markets of the countries or territories concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where application of the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult (Article 28(10) NDICI-Global Europe Regulation).

#### 4.6. Indicative Budget

<b>Indicative Budget components</b>	<b>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</b>
<b>Implementation modalities</b> – cf. section 4.3	
<b>Provision of SSR expertise</b> composed of	2 000 000
Procurement (direct management) – cf. section 4.3.1	
<b>NATO Building Integrity Action</b> composed of	1 429 740
Indirect management with pillar assessed entity – cf. section 4.3.2	
<b>Evaluation</b> – cf. section 5.2	May be covered by another Decision
<b>Audit</b> – cf. section 5.3	
<b>Totals</b>	3 429 740

#### 4.7 Organisational Set-up and Responsibilities

The action is managed by the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) as contracting authority, in collaboration with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and relevant EU Delegations.

As part of its prerogative of budget implementation and to safeguard the financial interests of the Union, the Commission may participate in the above governance structures set up for governing the implementation of the action.

## 5 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

### 5.1 Monitoring and Reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process, and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partners shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (Outputs and direct Outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) and the partner's strategy, policy or reform action plan list (for budget support).

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

Roles and responsibilities for data collection, analysis and monitoring:

Data collection, analysis and monitoring will be the responsibility of, and carried out by, each project's



implementing partners and will be financed under the regular budget of each project. In the case of multi-country projects, implementing partners will be requested to present how monitoring and data collection will be operated.

## 5.2 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, an evaluation will not be carried out for this action or its components.

In case an evaluation is not planned, the Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake such an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the partner.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least 30 days in advance of the dates envisaged for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports may be shared with the partners and other key stakeholders following the best practice of evaluation dissemination. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, apply the necessary adjustments.

The financing of the evaluation may be covered by another measure constituting a Financing Decision.

## 5.3 Audit and Verifications

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audit or verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

# 6 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The 2021-2027 programming cycle will adopt a new approach to pooling, programming and deploying strategic communication and public diplomacy resources.

In line with the 2022 “Communicating and Raising EU Visibility: Guidance for External Actions”, it will remain a contractual obligation for all entities implementing EU-funded external actions to inform the relevant audiences of the Union’s support for their work by displaying the EU emblem and a short funding statement as appropriate on all communication materials related to the actions concerned. This obligation will continue to apply equally, regardless of whether the actions concerned are implemented by the Commission, partner countries, service providers, grant beneficiaries or entrusted or delegated entities such as UN agencies, international financial institutions and agencies of EU member states.

However, action documents for specific sector programmes are **in principle** no longer required to include a provision for communication and visibility actions promoting the programmes concerned. These resources will instead be consolidated in Cooperation Facilities established by support measure action documents, allowing Delegations to plan and execute multiannual strategic communication and public diplomacy actions with sufficient critical mass to be effective on a national scale.

## Appendix 1 REPORTING IN OPSYS

The intervention level for the present Action identifies as :

<b>Action level (i.e. Budget Support, blending)</b>		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Single action	Present action: all contracts in the present action
<b>Group of actions level (i.e. top-up cases, different phases of a single programme)</b>		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Group of actions	Actions reference (CRIS#/OPSYS#):
<b>Contract level</b>		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 1	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Single Contract 2	
	(...)	
<b>Group of contracts level (i.e. series of programme estimates, cases in which an Action includes for example four contracts and two of them, a technical assistance contract and a contribution agreement, aim at the same objectives and complement each other)</b>		
<input type="checkbox"/>	Group of contracts 1	