

# NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

Recovery and  
Peace Building Assessment

Volume I  
Synthesis Report



THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA



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Peace Building Assessment

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THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA



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This Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) for North-East Nigeria is a collaborative product by the Federal Government of the Republic of Nigeria and the State Governments of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. The assessment was prepared with support from the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and the World Bank (WB).

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# Table of Contents

VII	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
VIII	FOREWORD
IX	MESSAGES FROM THE SIX STATES OF NORTH-EAST NIGERIA
XII	ACRONYMS
01	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
01	<b>Objectives</b>
02	<b>Methodology</b>
02	<b>Recovery Strategy and Framework</b>
03	<b>Financial Impacts and Needs from the Crisis</b>
04	<b>Cross-cutting Issues</b>
04	<b>Critical Success Factors for Implementation and Financing</b>
05	<b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>
05	<b>Recovery Financing and Public Expenditure Management</b>
05	<b>Next Steps</b>
06	RATIONALE AND SCOPE
06	<b>1.1. Background and Objectives</b>
07	<b>1.2. Objectives and Vision of the Assessment</b>
09	<b>1.3. Assessment Approach</b>
11	<b>1.4. Methodology, Assumptions and Constraints</b>
13	<b>1.5. Report Structure</b>
14	CONTEXT ANALYSIS
14	<b>2.1. Background</b>
16	<b>2.2. Government Response</b>
17	<b>2.3. The International Humanitarian Response</b>
20	<b>2.4. Factors behind the Crisis</b>
22	<b>2.5. Dynamics of the Conflict</b>
23	<b>2.6. Emerging Risks and Scenarios for RPBA Implementation</b>

25	A FRAMEWORK FOR RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING PRIORITIES
25	3.1. Humanitarian Context
26	3.2. Basic Principles and Values for Recovery and Peace Building
28	3.3. Prioritising and Sequencing Recovery and Peace Building Efforts
29	3.4. An Integrated and Holistic Response
30	3.5. Strategic Framework for Recovery and Peace Building
36	SUMMARY OF RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING NEEDS
36	4.1. Overview of Impacts, Needs, and Financial Requirements
38	4.2. Peace Building, Stability, and Social Cohesion
38	4.2.1. Impacts of the Conflict on Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion
39	4.2.2. Overview of Needs for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion
42	4.3. Infrastructure and Social Services
42	4.3.1. Impacts of the crisis on infrastructure and social services
44	4.3.2 Strategic Approach for Infrastructure and Social Services
46	4.3.3. Overview of Needs and Financial Requirements for Infrastructure and Social Services
49	4.4. Economic Recovery
49	4.4.1. Introduction
49	4.4.2. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Impacts
50	4.4.3. Impacts on Private Sector, Trade and Financial Sector
50	4.4.4. Livelihood and Employment
52	4.4.5. Recommended Interventions for Economic Recovery
53	4.5. Cross-cutting Issues
53	4.5.1. Gender
56	4.5.2. Human Rights
57	4.5.3. Explosive Remnants of War
58	4.5.4. Youth
59	OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND FINANCING
59	5.1. Institutional Challenges
59	5.1.1. Horizontal Coordination
60	5.1.2. Vertical Alignment
61	5.1.3. Front Line Institutional Set Up
61	5.2. Guiding Principles for Institutional Effectiveness
63	5.3. Options for Implementing Recovery and Peace Building Interventions
64	5.4. Critical Core Functions of an Enabling Institutional Framework
64	5.5. Monitoring Framework
65	5.5.1. Improving Existing M&E Systems
65	5.5.2. Mainstreaming Third Party Monitoring and Social Accountability Mechanisms

66	<b>5.6. Financing Strategy and Modalities</b>
66	5.6.1. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Public Spending
68	5.6.2. Resource Mobilisation
68	5.6.3. Ensuring Transparency and Accountability of Public Spending
69	OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
86	REFERENCES
88	ENDNOTES

## List of Figures

10	FIGURE 1	<b>Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Timeline</b>
15	FIGURE 2	<b>North-East Nigeria: Conflict fatalities by LGA and displacement by ward</b>
16	FIGURE 3	<b>Fatalities Related to the Boko Haram Violence and Other Conflicts in Nigeria: 2009 to 2015</b>
18	FIGURE 4	<b>Timeline of the Boko Haram Crisis<sup>10</sup></b>
46	FIGURE 5	<b>Damages to Infrastructure (top); Infrastructure and Service Delivery Needs by sector (bottom)</b>
51	FIGURE 6	<b>North-East Region - Consolidated Revenue and Expenditure (Billions of Naira) and Budget Balance (Percent of Total Revenue, 2007-2015)</b>
52	FIGURE 7	<b>Distribution of the employed labour force, by employer for wave 1 (2010/11) and wave 2 (2012/13); Estimates based on GHS 2010/11 and GHS 2012/13</b>

## List of Boxes

12	BOX 1	<b>Definitions of Damages, Needs and Building Back Better</b>
28	BOX 2	<b>Do-No-Harm Approach</b>
29	BOX 3	<b>Benchmarks for the Safe, Voluntary and Dignified Return of Displaced Populations</b>

# List of Tables

03	TABLE EX 1	<b>Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component</b>
08	TABLE 1	<b>Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Component Breakdown</b>
20	TABLE 2	<b>Main factors of the conflict in North-East Nigeria, by type and field</b>
30	TABLE 3	<b>Strategic Recovery Framework</b>
37	TABLE 4	<b>Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component (US\$ million)</b>
40	TABLE 5	<b>Estimated Needs for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion by State</b>
41	TABLE 6	<b>Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion</b>
43	TABLE 7	<b>Estimated damages related to Infrastructure and Social Services (US\$ million)</b>
47	TABLE 8	<b>Estimated needs for infrastructure and social services (US\$ million)</b>
48	TABLE 9	<b>Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Infrastructure and Social Services</b>
50	TABLE 10	<b>Macroeconomic impacts by State</b>
52	TABLE 11*	<b>Estimated Needs for Economic Recovery by State</b>
54	TABLE 12	<b>Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Economic Recovery</b>
63	TABLE 13	<b>Comparative advantages of different institutional framework for recovery</b>
64	TABLE 14	<b>Indicative distribution of core functions across tiers of government for implementation of recovery and peace building strategy</b>



## PREFACE

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The Government of Nigeria Core RPBA Team consisted of Dr. Mariam Masha, Senior Special Assistant to the President on Internally Displaced Persons and Focal Points from the six states, including: Maurice Vunobolki (Adamawa); Mohammed Aminu Ibrahim (Bauchi); Dr. Baba Gana Umara (Borno); Aliyu M. Kamara (Gombe); Jeji Williams (Taraba); and Muhammad Yusufari (Yobe).

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## FOREWORD

# **Professor Yemi Osinbajo SAN, GCON** **Vice President, Federal Republic of Nigeria**

Since 2009, insecurity in the North-East of Nigeria has led to the loss of over 20,000 lives and the displacement of over 2 million people. Throughout the region livelihoods have been disrupted, and homes, public buildings and infrastructure destroyed. In a part of Nigeria where 80% of people rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, much has been lost. People have been forced from their land and livestock has been killed. In many areas, land mines and other remnants of war bring challenges for safe and voluntary return.

While Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States bore the brunt of the direct impacts of the conflict, the three neighboring states of Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi have taken in scores of people who have been displaced, taxing their communities, economic resource, social services and infrastructure. Schools have been damaged, health clinics destroyed and many people have been left vulnerable by this crisis. The Government of Nigeria has made great strides in retaking and stabilising large portions of the North-East, but the work to restore the lives of those affected is just beginning.

This assessment, led by the Government of Nigeria and supported by local, national and international partners, has helped quantify the physical, social and economic impacts of the crisis in the North-East, and will inform the process of stabilisation, peace building and recovery in the region. The RPBA is a necessary tool that will help us gather the resources and develop the capacities to address these challenges. The results will help reduce suffering in affected communities, restore a sense of normalcy and regain the trust of people in the region.

## MESSAGES FROM THE SIX STATES OF NORTH-EAST NIGERIA

### **Mr. Muhammadu Umaru Jibrilla Bindo**

#### **Governor of Adamawa State**

In May 2013 a State of Emergency was declared in Adamawa as a result of the conflict with Boko Haram. Recent advances by the military have made the State more secure and allowed some of the 136,000 displaced people to begin returning home. In many cases, they found their homes and farmlands destroyed and remnants of war, including mines, have further hampered transition back to their pre-existing agricultural lifestyle. Because of the stable security situation in Adamawa and the will of its citizens to return home, full-scale reconstruction can and must begin quickly. The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment has broken barriers and introduced a whole new paradigm in Nigeria for systematic crisis impact assessment, recovery needs assessment and planning proportional to impact recovery programmes based on objective criteria. We hope that this process will be a model for other countries that may face similar crisis in the future.

### **Barrister Mohammed Abubakar**

#### **Governor of Bauchi State**

Throughout the conflict with Boko Haram, Bauchi has served as host to many displaced people. It was the first place violence occurred. However, through hard work, this violence was driven from the State, allowing a refuge for neighbors looking for safe haven. Surveys show that 75% of displaced people want to return home and the RPBA is helping us develop programmes to assist in that return while providing tools to strengthen host communities. The RPBA is an example of a global good practice for the development of institutional delivery mechanisms for recovery. The report provides the pros and cons of various options for exploring and conceiving the right recovery model, allowing all six states to come to a unanimous agreement on a hybrid institutional model for managing the recovery process.

### **Alhaji Kashim Shettima**

#### **Governor of Borno State**

Since 2009, Borno State has been embroiled in a serious conflict leaving 1.4 million people displaced within its borders. The violence has been overwhelming, destroying homes, farmland and infrastructure, as well as leaving thousands dead and many more incredibly vulnerable. Two-thirds of all of the reported physical impact from this conflict has occurred in Borno. The RPBA has helped us quantify the true extent of the damages which reach nearly US\$6 billion dollars. With such a staggering amount of need, special attention will be needed to ensure the right human resources and funding mobilisation is put into place. The process has also been mindful of the current security situation, allowing for incremental and prioritised implementation. This recovery process will continue to be inclusive and led by the states, as it has since the beginning, ensuring the most urgent needs of our communities are met. Recovery strategies in the assessment also focus on Building Back Better and Smarter, looking at a range of improvements on the pre-crisis situation to help address some of the underlying causes of the conflict. In view of the foregoing, Borno State Government is urging for an expedited implementation with a view to alleviating the suffering of millions of the people affected by the conflict.



# Alhaji (Dr.) Ibrahim Dankwambo OON

## Governor of Gombe State

In Gombe, the main impact of the conflict has been social and economic as the State works to cope with the significant needs of displaced people. The State also suffered collateral damage to infrastructure, including to roads and bridges as transportation was diverted from conflict areas. The RPBA is significant because it includes both direct impact and recovery needs assessments, as well as displacement-related impacts and needs analysis allowing each state to develop the right recovery interventions based on local needs, priorities and the security situation. Currently, there is relative peace in Gombe State, allowing for quick action to address the needs of both those directly impacted by the conflict and the additional impacts on the host communities. These quick interventions will prevent further deterioration of relationships between displaced people and host communities.

# Arch Darius Ishaku

## Governor of Taraba State

Taraba is hosting internally displaced people from both Boko Haram related violence and communal violence. This has increased pressure on the social cohesion of the State. By using the RPBA to develop programmes that increase social cohesion and focus on peace building, as well as generating economic growth in the region, Taraba will have a better chance at ensuring long-lasting peace within its borders no matter what the source of the conflict is. The RPBA process had continuous leadership and engagement from the states and we must ensure that the post-RPBA phase builds upon the tremendous drive and momentum created by the assessment to translate into quick, efficient and effective mechanisms for delivering much needed recovery support to people affected by this crisis.

# Alhaji Ibrahim Gaidam FCNA

## Governor of Yobe State

The conflict in Yobe has been characterised by extreme violence and gross human rights abuses, including mass killings, abductions, gender based violence and forced displacement. After Borno, Yobe State has been the most significantly damaged by the conflict. The three tiered approach of the RPBA captures vital information on social services, economic needs, infrastructure damage and service delivery gaps, and will now allow for an integrated recovery strategy across all of these sectors. A central crisis analysis is the underpinning of the assessment, identifying the structural drivers of the crisis as well as common strategic objectives for stabilisation and recovery. Information provided in the RPBA will encourage citizen engagement in the recovery process, ensuring those left vulnerable by the crisis are actively involved in rebuilding their lives and communities. This engagement will ultimately lead to greater social cohesion and commitment to peace, as we rebuild Yobe for future generations.



## JOINT FOREWORD OF THE

# European Union, United Nations and World Bank

Nearly fifteen million people have been affected by the insurgency of *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*, also known as Boko Haram, and the resulting military operations in the North-East of Nigeria since 2009. The human, social, and economic losses of the conflict, and the investments needed for the recovery, peace building, and reconstruction of the North-East are overwhelming. Damage to education and health facilities, to markets and farms, the loss of job opportunities and the psychological impacts of the crisis are all adversely affecting an entire generation of Nigerians. The conflict has triggered a humanitarian crisis, with increasing food insecurity and destruction of social services, infrastructure and the environment, all of which has exacerbated already existing socioeconomic disparities. This is not just a problem affecting the North-East of Nigeria, but ultimately the economic stability and social fabric of the whole country, with spillover impact in the region.

As the Government of Nigeria makes progress in securing significant parts of the North-East, much of the region remains fragile. The North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) was conducted by the Government of Nigeria, with the support of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) within the framework of the 2008 Joint EU-UN-WB Declaration on Post Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning.

The assessment report provides a shared understanding between the Government of Nigeria and its local and international partners on the peace building and recovery needs of the North-East. The report also sets a framework that could bridge the operational gap that can exist between humanitarian relief and recovery programmes, further encouraging a holistic approach to stabilisation efforts in the North-East. The Government will use the RPBA to help improve, expand and refine its overall strategic framework for recovery and reconstruction of the North-East. Findings and recommendations provide an empirical evidence base and reliable data for informed decision-making. The result of these efforts will hopefully help prioritise development programmes, the implementation of which will bring about reconciliation in the region and lead to overall violence prevention in the future. The partners are committed to helping the region not only recover from this crisis but also develop programmes to build a prosperous and peaceful Nigeria for future generations.

## PREFACE

# Acronyms

<b>ACLED</b>	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project	<b>RPBA</b>	Recovery and Peace Building Assessment
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civilian and Military Coordination	<b>RPBS</b>	Recovery and Peace Building Strategy
<b>CJTF</b>	Civilian Joint Task Force	<b>SALW</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>CM-COORD</b>	Humanitarian Civilian Military Coordination	<b>SBMC</b>	School-Based Management Committees
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisations	<b>SEMA</b>	State Emergency Management Agencies
<b>DTM</b>	Displacement Tracking Matrix	<b>SGBV</b>	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
<b>EPA</b>	Environmental Protection Agency	<b>SME</b>	Small and Medium Sized Enterprise
<b>ERW</b>	Explosive Remnants of War	<b>UASC</b>	Unaccompanied and Separated Children
<b>EU</b>	European Union	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>FEWSNET</b>	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	<b>UNHAS</b>	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
<b>FGN</b>	Federal Government of Nigeria	<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
<b>FMOH</b>	Federal Ministry of Health	<b>UXO</b>	Unexploded Ordnance
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index	<b>VAT</b>	Value Added Tax
<b>HRP</b>	Humanitarian Response Plan	<b>WASH</b>	Water and Sanitation
<b>ICT</b>	Information and Communication Technology	<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons		
<b>IEC</b>	Information, Communication and Education		
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device		
<b>IGR</b>	Internally Generated Revenue		
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration		
<b>IS</b>	Islamic State		
<b>LGA</b>	Local Government Areas		
<b>MDA</b>	Ministries, Departments and Agencies		
<b>MNJTF</b>	Multi-National Joint Task Force		
<b>MRRR</b>	Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement		
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation		
<b>NEMA</b>	National Emergency Management Agency		
<b>NEST</b>	North-East States Transformation Strategy		
<b>NDHS</b>	Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey		
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisations		
<b>ONSA</b>	Office of the National Security Adviser		
<b>PCNI</b>	Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative		
<b>PHC</b>	Public Health Centres		
<b>PINE</b>	Presidential Initiative for the North-East		

# NORTH-EAST NIGERIA RECOVERY AND PEACE BUILDING ASSESSMENT

## Executive Summary

*Since 2009, nearly 15 million people have been affected by the violence of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, also known as Boko Haram and the resulting military operations in North-East Nigeria. The fighting became particularly intense from 2014, leading to the loss of an estimated 20,000<sup>1</sup> lives and the displacement of 1.8 million people directly attributed to the violence,<sup>2</sup> while further aggravating the weak economic development of the North-East with an estimated infrastructure damage of US\$ 9.2 billion and accumulated output losses of US\$ 8.3 billion.*

The government response to the crisis has primarily been a nationally based security and humanitarian response, with limited and unsuccessful attempts at negotiation, and some actions aimed at preventing and addressing radicalisation. Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), in coordination with State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) and in partnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), has been monitoring Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs) movements and providing a range of humanitarian relief support to affected communities.

The Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016 has requested US\$ 248 million and is 7 percent funded, as of 16 March 2016. Currently 62 partners are providing urgent multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected people in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe. Humanitarian assistance is defined as support that addresses the urgent life-saving needs of the affected people and in these states currently includes food, water and sanitation, health and hygiene services, shelter and non-food items, education, protection (including targeted responses for children and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) survivors), early recovery activities, and livelihoods. The State Governments and some 20 national Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) operating in the North-East are playing a critical role in the delivery of

assistance, especially in areas where international actors are not present or have no access.

On 21 August 2015, the Government of Nigeria requested assistance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and crisis recovery. Support has been provided in accordance with the 2008 Joint European Union (EU) – United Nations (UN) – World Bank (WB) Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning. A Recovery and Peace Building Assessment was initiated and findings are presented in this report. The assessment was launched with a workshop in Abuja on 25-26 January 2016, which was attended by more than 250 participants representing Federal and State Governments, the WB, EU, UN, CSOs, IDPs and other stakeholders.

### Objectives

The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) informs a collective vision and strategy on peace building and recovery, and provides a framework for coordinated and coherent support to assist conflict-affected people in the North-East. The assessment covers the six states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi, and provides an overarching framework for stability, peace building and recovery.

The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution to the conflict in the North-East requires addressing the structural and underlying drivers of violent conflict. This understanding has also underpinned the identification and prioritisation of needs presented in this report.

As in other complex crises, there are many factors contributing to the violent conflict in the North-East. The violent repression of what was initially an ideological non-violent movement played a central role to turn an extremist movement into extreme conflict. The Boko Haram armed conflict is further taking place in a setting characterised by a number of factors, which include poverty and inadequacies in governance, poor social and economic outcomes, high income inequality, perceived social injustices, low accountability and legitimacy of State, low levels of human security, human rights abuses, lack of economic infrastructure, climate change and environmental degradation.

## Methodology

The assessment has been prepared and implemented jointly by the Federal Government, led by the Vice President's Office, the six affected states, and supported by the World Bank, United Nations, and European Union. The assessment builds on initiatives incorporated in the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE) and the North-East States Transformation Strategy (NEST), and on the substantial activities already being undertaken in the North-East in response to the on-going humanitarian needs. The RPBA supplements the PINE and NEST by providing: (a) a systematic analysis of the impact of the crisis and displacement and its distribution across states and sectors of the economy; (b) the means for the sector, geographic and temporal prioritisation of needs in PINE and NEST; and (c) a detailed analysis and quantification of the corresponding short to medium term needs for stabilisation and recovery to complement longer term development.

A multi-stage consultation process was followed for the development of the assessment methodology, collection and validation of data and progressive corroboration of results. This entails: (a) the September 2015 scoping mission to agree on the geographical, sector, and temporal scope of the assessment; (b) the inaugural workshop in January 2016 to agree on the methodology and data collection templates with the State Governments; (c) field visits over February 2016;

(d) consultations over sector recovery strategies between sector teams, and discussions over preliminary findings with State focal points in a combined technical meeting in February 2016; and (e) validation and consensus building workshops with a wider range of stakeholders over March-April 2016. Consultation and validation of the RPBA findings took place throughout the process and culminated in a workshop from 31 March-1 April 2016. The event brought together State and Federal Government authorities, civil society representatives, the private sector, and other stakeholders in Abuja. The purpose of these efforts was to facilitate validation of RPBA's results, and a more granular understanding of inter- and intra-State differences.

The assessment is divided into three main components: Peace building, stability and social cohesion; Infrastructure and social sectors; and, Economic recovery. See the breakdown of component structure in Table 1 on page 8.

## Recovery Strategy and Framework

The RPBA confirmed the need for recovery and peace building efforts, to be carried out in tandem with the on-going scaling up of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the Recovery and Peace Building Strategy (RPBS) will need to be closely coordinated with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in order to build on the HRP's achievements and avoid overlaps.

The basic principles and values to be upheld in the process of recovery include humanitarian principles; human rights; national leadership and ownership at Federal, State and Local levels; engagement of civil society and private sector; conflict sensitivity; and building back better and smarter. It is imperative that the most vulnerable segments of affected populations (which include women, children, youth, widows, elderly and the disabled) are targeted. Efforts should include a bottom-up approach, broad-based participation, and effective communication.

Careful and coordinated sequencing of the RBPA and subsequent support will be critical in view of the fluidity of the security environment, and the marked variation in security within and among the six states. Priorities should be carefully assessed on a continuous basis, and adjusted as needed in light of the prevailing situation on the ground. In some areas, a humanitarian response combined with stabilisation will be needed, while in other areas, the context will permit more substantial movement towards recovery.



**An integrated and balanced approach to recovery is essential.** As peace building and social cohesion form the backbone of the assessment, it is crucial to properly balance peace building, stability and social cohesion interventions with other interventions aimed at reconstructing or rehabilitating social, physical and productive assets. Peace building, stability and social cohesion interventions will ensure the sustainability of recovery interventions on the ground and lay the foundation for human security to prevail.

**The assessment sets out four strategic outcomes for recovery and peace building:**

- Outcome 1: Contribute to the safe, voluntary and dignified return and resettlement of displaced populations.
- Outcome 2: Improved human security, reconciliation and violence prevention.
- Outcome 3: Enhanced government accountability and citizen engagement in service delivery.
- Outcome 4: Increased equity in the provision of basic services and employment opportunities.

## Financial Impacts and Needs from the Crisis

**The assessment indicates that the economic impact of the crisis is substantial, reaching nearly US\$ 9 billion across all six North-East States.** Two-thirds of the damages (US\$ 5.9 billion) are in Borno, the most affected state; damages in Adamawa and Yobe account for US\$ 1.6 billion and US\$ 1.2 billion respectively. Three-quarters of the overall damages are on agriculture (US\$ 3.5 billion) and housing (US\$ 3.3 billion). The conflict resulted in more than 400,000 dam-

aged and destroyed housing units, 95 percent of which are located in Borno.

**The total need for recovery and peace building across the three strategic areas of interventions in both the stabilisation and recovery phase is US\$ 6.7 billion, as shown in Table EX1.**

**Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion require substantial resources estimated at US\$ 151 million.** Interventions include:

- strengthening the resilience of host communities, supporting safe and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced populations;
- social cohesion and violence prevention, including sexual and gender based violence (SGBV);
- local governance and citizen engagement; and
- justice, small arms control and community security.

**The Infrastructure and Social Services interventions are estimated at a total of US\$ 6 billion.** The highest needs are for the reconstruction of houses (US\$ 1.2 billion), followed by agriculture (US\$ 881 million), and education (US\$ 721 million). Infrastructure sectors of energy, information and communication technology (ICT), transport and water and sanitation require US\$ 1.2 billion for reconstruction, constituting over 20 percent of total needs. In addition a provision for community infrastructure and non-formal services has been taken into account.

**The overall estimated needs for macroeconomic and fiscal recovery total US\$ 473.5 million.** Interventions focus on the private sector, trade and finance, job-creation, livelihood support and facilitating economic restoration.

TABLE EX1

### Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Federal/Regional<sup>1</sup></i>	<i>Total</i>
Peace building and social cohesion	27.5	37.8	22.5	13.6	19.4	23.9	5.7	150.5
Infrastructure and social services	594.9	3933.3	668.3	129.1	144.9	202.9	94.7	6040.1
Economic Recovery	37.6	68.8	30.7	22.3	27.7	41.4	245	473.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>4040</b>	<b>721.5</b>	<b>164.9</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>268.2</b>	<b>345.4</b>	<b>6664.1</b>

## Cross-cutting Issues

Reconciliation and sustainable peace can only be achieved through a human rights-based response, which addresses both the root causes of the conflict as well as its impact. Violence in the North-East has contributed to the rise in abduction, mainly of women and children, while men and boys are targeted for killings, forced recruitment and forced conversions. Addressing SGBV and other forms of violence is critically important, and to that end, all interventions will take key gender-related issues into account. Urban and rural youth need urgent training and skills development as artisans and technicians. Youth engagement will be considered in all interventions to enable youth-led development. Through a mix of emergency actions and capacity development, the Government of Nigeria, the security forces and development partners should undertake a mine action program in line with international standards.

## Critical Success Factors for Implementation and Financing

The recovery and peace building process will be highly demanding for the limited capacity at every level of government. There may be need for significant strengthening of policy, programme and project implementation capacity to enhance the effectiveness of scarce public spending and revenue mobilisation efforts. However, there is the opportunity to enhance the government's ability to use evidence and data to inform policy and implementation decisions, as well as to strengthen accountability mechanisms.

**Strong government leadership can help to ensure coordination across stakeholders, with representation from the wide range of actors at different levels of government, as well as NGOs and beneficiaries.** The institutional set up will have to strike the right balance between strategic integration and decentralised implementation. It is important to build on existing government capacity and structures



where possible, while ensuring an effective division of responsibility between the core institutional functions of the three tiers of government; Federal, State and Local.

**Based on a review of international good practices, the following institutional options can be considered for implementing the recovery and peace building programme:** (a) ad hoc set up such as the establishment of a discrete implementing agency; (b) existing government capacity and structures of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and; (c) a hybrid framework built on both existing government structures and where possible, while ensuring an ad-hoc organisation. The pros and cons of these three options have been discussed in the report together with the effective division of responsibilities between the core institutional functions of the three tiers of the government.

## Monitoring and Evaluation

**Robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are needed to inform the implementation of the recovery strategy that covers the whole value chain from financial inputs to outputs.** The implementation of the recovery strategy will require both the mobilisation of existing M&E systems across sectors and the triangulation of information from different sources. Social accountability mechanisms such as grievance redress could also be mobilised to help monitor the impact of the recovery strategy on the conflict situation and affected population.

## Recovery Financing and Public Expenditure Management

**Recovery will entail a significant increase of capital expenditure and calls on all tiers of the Nigerian government for considerable improvements in public investment management in the North-East.** The effectiveness of allocated funds for the implementation of the recovery strategy needs to be ensured through adequate financial management at Federal, State, and Local levels.

**Revenue mobilisation calls for coordinated efforts among the three tiers of the Nigerian government.** Establishing a financing strategy involves three key steps: (a) agreeing on a set of priorities within the overall cost envelope of the RPBA; (b) mapping the various financing sources; and (c) identifying the range of specific financing instruments.

## Next Steps

**This assessment is a step towards implementing interventions, which are critical to the future stability and recovery of the North-East.** A number of further steps will need to be undertaken in support of implementation. It is important that the RPBA is now translated into (a) an action plan including the prioritisation and sequencing of integrated community-based interventions; (b) an institutional framework that will include coordination structures at Federal, State and Local levels, and implementation arrangements at State and Local levels; (c) a monitoring and evaluation system that will also be the “home” of the data base set-up during the RPBA at the appropriate levels; and (d) financing modalities, including the allocation of national and external resources and a resources mobilisation strategy.

# Rationale and Scope

## 1.1. Background and Rationale

Since 2009, nearly 15 million people have been affected by the conflict with Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, and the resulting military operations in North-East Nigeria. The conflict became particularly intense from 2014, leading to the loss of an estimated 20,000 lives and the displacement of 1.8 million people. While many of the displaced people have remained within the three conflict-affected states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, the rest are scattered through Northern and Central Nigeria. Over 170,000 more have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. The human, social, and economic losses of the conflict, and the consequent need of investment for recovery, peace building, and reconstruction of the North-East, are overwhelming. Damage to education and health facilities, and attacks on markets and farms, closure of cattle markets, and restricted access to lands with consequent negative impact on livelihoods, are adversely affecting the developmental outcomes of an entire generation. The conflict has triggered a humanitarian crisis, with increasing food insecurity, and increasing pressure on already overstretched and damaged basic social services. This has exacerbated already existing socioeconomic disparities in the North-East, further straining a population already among the most underdeveloped and vulnerable in the country. Furthermore, social cohesion has been deeply eroded, and with social interaction becoming increasingly challenging in an atmosphere of violence which has followed, due to communal, property and land disputes, and retaliation for conflict-related violence.

**The conflict in the North-East cannot be viewed as a regional issue as it is having a significant impact on both the economic stability and social fabric of Nigeria. Therefore, it merits a national strategy and Federal leadership to ensure stabilisation and lasting peace.** The region has suffered an accumulated output loss of Naira 1.66 trillion, driving significant inflation and ultimately reducing the welfare of many residents of the North-East. The crisis has also increased the

budget deficit from 2.8 percent in 2011 to 31 percent of the total revenue in the North-East in 2014. With the loss of markets, damage to trade infrastructure, and the impact on agriculture and livelihoods, the North-East will continue to feel the economic impact of the crisis for years to come. This decline in growth will ultimately impede national developmental progress and have a major impact on poverty reduction efforts and the growth of the national economy. In addition to the financial impacts, the Boko Haram conflict has had a significant impact on the national psyche and overall sense of well-being of the citizens of Nigeria. Until the region is stabilised the entire country will continue to feel both the economic and psychological impacts of the violence.

**On 21 August 2015, the Government of Nigeria requested assistance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and crisis recovery.** This support has been provided in accordance with the 2008 Joint EU-UN-WB Declaration on Post Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning. The assessment was launched with a workshop in Abuja on 25-26 January 2016, which was attended by more than 250 participants representing Federal and State Governments, the WB, EU, UN, CSOs, IDPs), and other stakeholders.

**This synthesis report and the detailed component and state reports contained in volume II and III represent the findings and recommendations of the RPBA.** It identifies needs and priorities for short term stabilisation and in support of medium term recovery. The remainder of this report is structured as follows: Chapter 1 explains the purpose and approach of the RPBA and the constraints and limitations of the assessment; Chapter 2 outlines the context, impact, and underlying drivers of violence in the North-East and the response to date; Chapter 3 develops and explains the prioritisation framework that was developed as part of the analysis; Chapter 4 details needs, priorities, and associated costs across the stabilisation and recovery phases; Chapter 5 outlines the implementation financing options based on international good practices.



## 1.2. Objectives and Vision of the Assessment

The joint (Government of Nigeria and international partners) Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) will guide efforts towards peace building and sustainable recovery in the North-East. The proposed assessment will build upon initiatives (at Federal and State levels) including the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE) and the North-East States Transformation Strategy (NESTS). The overall objectives of the assessment are to: (a) inform the development of a collective vision and strategy on peace building and recovery in North-East Nigeria, including the short to medium term needs of the conflict affected populations; and (b) provide a framework for coordinated and coherent provision of support from development and humanitarian partners in order to assist conflict-afflicted people, and peace building and recovery in the North-East.

The RPBA is structured around three components: peace building, stability and social cohesion; infrastructure and social services; and economic recovery. These components and the sub-components / sectors are shown in the diagram on page 5.:

The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution to the conflict in the North-East requires that the structural and underlying drivers of conflict are addressed. This understanding has also underpinned the identification and prioritisation of needs presented in this report. Any meaningful effort to recover and develop the six states cannot focus on reconstruction of damaged infrastructure alone. Rather, recovery will need to start by addressing the deep-rooted and evolving grievances of the population, through a combination of investments and broader national governance and peace building reforms in order to establish the foundations for lasting peace and prosperity.

TABLE 1

**Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Component Breakdown**





### 1.3. Assessment Approach

The assessment was guided by the **2008 Joint Declaration on Crisis and Post-Crisis Assessments**. The RPBA started with a joint scoping mission exploring the objectives, methodology, and approach for the assessment in September 2015. The assessment commenced with a workshop in Abuja on 25-26 January 2016, attended by more than 250 participants, representing Federal and State Governments, the WB, EU, UN, CSOs, and continued through to early March, when State and Federal Government focal points and development partners drew together available data and analysis to determine the government's priorities and needs for recovery and peace building.

The extraordinary scale of social, infrastructure, and economic impacts caused by the protracted crisis in the six affected states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe in North-East Nigeria required a methodological approach tailored to the local context. This demanded an unparalleled level of baseline and impact data collection across the six affected states, in over 20 subcomponents. Consequently, quantitative data of the entire economic, social, and physical infrastructure in these six states – often broken down to the Local Government Areas (LGA) level – was compiled and document-

ed by the State Governments. Significantly, this includes social sector, peace building, and private sector assets and infrastructure, which traditionally have not been well documented; available data on such assets remains patchy and dated. Nevertheless, this compilation of data was a monumental effort that was done very swiftly, by the collective mobilisation of over 100 Federal and State sector focal points responsible for data collection across all issues covered by the assessment.


**Two streams of data collection and needs identification were formed:**

- (a) vertical linkages between the Federal and State Governments; and
- (b) horizontal linkages between various State sectoral experts, coordinated by State focal points. The identification of recovery needs has required the development of sector strategies that provide consistent criteria for damage determination, classification, quantification and validation across multiple datasets on impacts and needs across the three components. This in turn required considerable dialogue to verify the findings of the assessment. The resulting quantification in the assessment of recovery and peace building needs in each sector is generally based on agreed policy parameters and sector strategies between the Federal and State Governments and partner agencies.

FIGURE 1  
**Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Timeline**

2015

2016




The RPBA process required considerable data validation. Firstly, pre-crisis asset and infrastructure baseline data was gathered by State and Federal governments and validated by sector teams through desk review. The States then provided inventory based, post crisis damage data for most sectors, and where necessary, worked with sector experts to collectively determine percentage based damage for certain sectors and some geographical areas (such as housing). Thirdly, sector teams validated damage data using techniques and plausibility checks such as relative-to-baseline, cross-sectoral, and cross-regional comparisons of relative/percentage damage. This was complemented and deepened through the use of different survey tools, a review of existing literature produced by credible agencies with on-the-ground presence, and field visits to the six states. Field missions visited all six states in the North-East over a two week span (1-12 February 2016) and collected data through interviews with focal points from key Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) related to the different components of the RBPA, representatives of CSOs, international NGOs, and con-

flict affected people. Remote sensing capabilities were also engaged, using a combination of satellite imagery, social media analytics, and information received from partner networks to fill in information gaps identified in certain sectors and geographical regions. This approach also helped to validate and augment the findings of on-the-ground assessments where information is scarce or access not feasible.

**A multi-stage consultation process has been followed for the development of the assessment methodology, collection and validation of data and progressive corroboration of results.** This entailed: (a) the September 2015 scoping mission to agree on the geographical, sectoral, and temporal scope of the assessment; (b) the inaugural workshop in January 2016 to agree on the methodology and data collection templates with the State Governments; (c) field visits over February 2016; (d) consultations over sector recovery strategies between sector teams, and discussions over preliminary findings with State focal points in a combined technical meeting in February 2016; and (e) validation & consensus building workshops planned with a





wider range of stakeholders over March-April 2016. Consultation and validation of the RPBA findings took place throughout the process and culminated in a workshop from 31 March-1 April 2016. The event brought together State and Federal Government authorities, civil society representatives, the private sector, and other stakeholders in Abuja. The purpose of these efforts was to facilitate validation of the assessment findings, and to refine the prioritisation of the proposed actions based on a more granular understanding of inter- and intra-State differences.

## 1.4. Methodology, Assumptions and Constraints

**In order for the assessment – which would inform policy-financing decisions – to be completed in a timely manner, a number of boundaries were agreed.** As mentioned above, some spatial and temporal boundaries had to be placed on the assessment, such as using 2010 as the base-line

and only focusing on the six states of the North-East Region, even though the impact of the crisis has had spillover impacts throughout the country.

**Spatial and temporal boundaries were applied to the assessment.** It covers states in the North-East directly affected by the Boko Haram conflict, and the resulting mass displacement of people, as well as states not directly affected by the conflict, but largely affected by displacement. The six directly affected states are Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and Bauchi. The assessment focuses on needs related to factors directly attributable to the Boko Haram crisis, and does not include impacts and needs arising out of other causes of displacement and physical impact. In terms of timeframe, the assessment uses 2010 as the pre-crisis baseline year for comparative data analysis. This is based on the assumption that the conflict worsened significantly in 2011 (as is explained further in Chapter 2). In instances where the assessment was constrained by access to areas, where conflict was ongoing, different methodologies were used, such as remote sensing, qualitative data, and verification with focus groups, to triangulate and verify the estimations.

## BOX 1

**Definitions of Damages, Needs and Building Back Better**

**Damages:** Damages refer to direct and indirect damages and losses from the crisis, such as physical damage, human capital loss, economic losses, service delivery disruptions, and additional burden of service delivery capacity, resulting from the conflict, e.g. due to forced displacement. The quantification of damage to infrastructure caused by the conflict is made relative to baseline stock, while factoring in additional budgeted or actual recurrent expenditure arising out of stresses and strains induced by forced displacement, such as increased operations and maintenance or additional periodic rehabilitation of existing infrastructure.

**Needs:** Needs refer to the interventions and resources required for crisis recovery in terms of social recovery, peace building, economic recovery, and the restoration of service delivery and reconstruction and rehabilitation of physical, social and productive assets and infrastructure. This can also include: (a) spending needed to maintain pre-crisis quality and access to public services; (b) additional spending needed for 'Build Back Better and Smarter', including the possible 'right-sizing', 'right-siting' and structural improvement of pre-crisis assets and infrastructure; (c) any additional budgeted capital expenditure that is deemed necessary for immediate crisis recovery; (d) additional establishment, salary and management costs; (e) additional spending needs due to loss of livelihoods and stresses on service provision caused by inflow of IDPs, and for bringing about qualitative shifts in the types/modalities of service provision; and (f) quantification of software and capacity development needs.

**Building Back Better and Smarter:** For the purposes of this assessment, Building Back Better and Smarter (BBB/S) is a reference to the range of improvements, on the pre-crisis situation, that have been recommended in the recovery strategies and needs analyses under the various components. Although it may be difficult to encapsulate

these BBB/S measures into specific categories, these can generically be considered to include the following range of measures across the three components:

- **Social Cohesion and Peace Building:** (a) strengthen community cohesion through the process of reconstruction, including improved consultation and participation of all segments of the population, and in particular of the most vulnerable; (b) apply a user-centred approach to design and implementation to ensure physical and cultural accessibility and enhancing user-friendliness of services and facilities; (c) ensure planning and implementation at the closest level to the local population; (d) adequate resettlement of impacted population; (e) redress of grievances that may arise through the process of reconstruction.
- **Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Service Delivery Restoration:** This is proposed to incorporate the key principles of sustainable and resilient recovery including: (a) 'right-sizing' and 'right-siting' of pre-crisis assets and infrastructure based on current demographic needs; (b) improved building standards and structural improvements as per present sector developmental norms; (c) improved service delivery standards as per present sector developmental norms; and (d) the human resources and skills development required to manage such improvements in service standards.
- **Economic Recovery:** (a) sustainable rebuilding of lives and livelihoods, including short term employment generation programs complemented by skill development and incentives for small enterprise development and entrepreneurship; (b) diversification of the regional and local economies; and (c) improved macroeconomic and fiscal management.



**The needs assessment was carried out by considering short and medium term needs, assuming gradual improvement of the security situation in the country.** The first two years will focus on stabilisation. For the purposes of the assessment, stabilisation denotes the period during which initial recovery interventions commence and start taking effect while ongoing humanitarian operations continue. These initial recovery interventions will build upon humanitarian support and avoid duplication. The following two years will focus on recovery, during which time the initial stabilisation interventions continue, while further medium term recovery and reconstruction activities take shape and scale up. It should be noted that the above phases are more notional, designed to ensure consistency of recovery planning, but do not constitute a linear process across all components and all states.

**The systematic and rigorous costing of needs undertaken for this assessment reflects an improvement upon past assessments.** The key features of the costing approach are as follows:

- (a) Development of a comprehensive, multi-level cost model that integrates intervention, sector, component and aggregate level needs into a cohesive whole;
- (b) Detailed costing of social cohesion, peace building and economic recovery needs across seven subcomponents/sectors based on:
  - (i) the distribution of LGAs impacted in each state, or based on distribution of IDPs across the six states, and;
  - (ii) the identification and quantification of tangible programmatic interventions employing consistent unit rates across the states for consulting services, capacity development initiatives, social mobilisation activities and other interventions;
- (c) Detailed costing of infrastructure rehabilitation and service delivery restoration needs across 11 sectors, based on: (i) the physical impacts caused by the crisis and the added impacts of forced displacement on infrastructure and service delivery; (ii) differentials for building back better and smarter, and; (iii) rationalisation and corroboration of unit rates for reconstruction and rehabilitation provided by the various states, differentiated by state in some sectors and kept uniform in others.

**The assessment only focuses on the recovery and peace building needs of the North-East Region related to Boko Haram conflict and not the other lower intensity conflicts throughout the country.** However, there are many common underlying drivers contributing to the violence. This disaggregation became a challenge when identify-

ing the number of IDPs related to the Boko Haram crisis, compared to other crises. Assumptions were made, based on the best possible information and a combination of local and international expertise.

## 1.5. Report Structure

This report contains three volumes as follows:

- **Volume I** - Synthesis Report: This volume introduces the objectives, timeline and methodology of the assessment; provides a detailed context analysis that focuses on the factors behind the crisis and the likely risk and recovery scenarios faced in the future. It articulates an overall strategic framework for recovery and peace building based on the context analysis and provides a summary analysis of needs for social, infrastructure and economic recovery. Options for the implementation of the assessment are also explored, concluding with a matrix of the needs identified in the 18 subcomponent analyses in an Operational Framework for Recovery and Peace Building.
- **Volume II** - Component Reports: This volume provides detailed and more granular impact and needs analysis with respect to each of the three components, disaggregated down to the level of the subcomponents. It includes the distribution of impact and needs, corresponding costing, and modalities for implementation across the six states. More granular details can be found in the subcomponent reports, which while not part of this package, remain available to policy makers and implementers for more comprehensive subsequent planning and implementation.
- **Volume III** - State Reports: This volume disaggregates all impacts and needs data with respect to each component and subcomponent, in the form of separate State Reports. This is for ease of reference and use by the respective states and other stakeholders for subsequent recovery planning and implementation.

# Context Analysis

**This chapter analyses the main political, historical and social factors that help to explain the rise of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad, also known as Boko Haram, in North-East Nigeria.** *It goes on to map out possible scenarios of crisis evolution and prospects for peace for the future, with a view to identifying the strategic and operational implications of the potential unfolding of these scenarios towards the implementation of the recovery strategies and interventions proposed under the RPBA. This context analysis has guided the development of the framework of strategic outcomes and priorities for recovery which are in turn based on the need to start to address the structural drivers of crisis identified in the context analysis. This has been a governing consideration behind the formulation of sector recovery strategies and needs analysis, and has also provided the means for the prioritisation and sequencing of the needs identified in the three components of the assessment.*

## 2.1. Background


The Boko Haram conflict has affected nearly 15 million civilians and left widespread devastation in North-East Nigeria on a level unprecedented since the civil war of 1967-1970.<sup>4</sup> An estimated 20,000 people have lost their lives, and nearly two million people are displaced internally or across international borders<sup>5</sup> and an estimated 2,000-7,000 people have gone missing, including abducted children and women.<sup>6</sup> While the governments of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger recognise the need for concerted action and have established the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), and the Nigerian military has successfully regained territory, the tactics of Boko Haram have shifted back to those of asymmetrical warfare, and serious con-

flict and insecurity persist. Figure 2 shows conflict-related fatalities by area and the locations of IDPs in North-East Nigeria.

**In Northern Nigeria, there has been a long history of protest movements and reformist jihads dating back to the early 19th century.** Such movements have sought to challenge rulers perceived as unjust and corrupt and seek to purify society based on ideological beliefs. Boko Haram had similar origins, and came into wider public attention in 2003, when it began to challenge the Nigerian State. The movement was not violent at the outset and initially received some local support. Today, it is a multifaceted network with evolving strategies shaped by a diverse set of ideological, political, societal, and criminal aspirations.

FIGURE 2

## North-East Nigeria: Conflict fatalities by LGA and displacement by ward




Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project, accessed on 01/30/2016 (Conflict data); International Organization for Migration (IOM) - Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 7, as of December 2015 (Displacement data); ESRI (Geo-data for background map).

The precursor to Boko Haram first arose in Borno State in the 1990s, under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf built a considerable local following preaching against what he held to be a corrupt and un-Islamic government, while advocating the establishment of a pure Islamic State based on Shari'a law. In July 2009, following deadly clashes between Mohammed Yusuf's followers and the police, Mohammed Yusuf was killed extra-judicially while in police custody. Conflict between the group and State security forces then dramatically escalated, and nearly 1,000 of Yusuf's followers were killed in confrontations. These marked the beginning of a spiralling campaign of violence by the group.

Boko Haram violence broadened from revenge attacks on the Nigerian police and security forces, to attacks on public servants, poli-

ticians, moderate imams, and civilians, targeted through bombing and shooting attacks on schools, churches, mosques, markets, government installations and other public places. As Figure 3 shows, fatalities have soared in the last two years. Suicide bombings began in 2011, and since mid-2014 many young women and girls have been systematically used as suicide bombers. Boko Haram has also abducted people: between January 2014 and April 2015, the group abducted well over 2,000 women, girls and boys. Many girls have been abducted, forcibly 'married' to Boko Haram fighters, are being systematically raped, and forced to carry out caretaking duties. In April 2014, 200 schools girls from Chibok in Borno State were abducted and the majority remain in captivity. Large numbers of abducted women and girls have been taken to Boko Haram outposts and remote communities under Boko Haram control.<sup>7</sup>

FIGURE 3

**Fatalities Related to the Boko Haram Violence and Other Conflicts in Nigeria: 2009 to 2015**

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), accessed on 01/30/2016.

**In addition to continuous sporadic attacks on rural communities, Boko Haram started to consolidate control over territory, most of which has by now been recaptured by the government.** The group established what its leader, Abu Bakr Shekau, allegedly referred to as a ‘caliphate’, which would extend across national borders.<sup>7</sup> In 2014, Boko Haram affiliated groups held a territory the size of Belgium, in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States.<sup>8</sup> The massacre at Baga, on the shores of Lake Chad in January 2015, drew international attention to Boko Haram’s trans-boundary capabilities, and from February 2015 onwards, the MJTF, a coalition of troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger (with Benin subsequently joining in), undertook joint military operations and recaptured most of the territory taken by Boko Haram. However, attacks continue throughout the North-East region. These include suicide bombings in urban areas, of which at least 32 were reported in the region between 1 November 2015 and 15 January 2016, where the majority of bombers were allegedly female.<sup>9</sup>

**Although originating in Nigeria, the conflict has a regional dimension, with incursions into and recruitment in neighbouring countries.** In 2015 alone, there were 1,335 Boko Haram related casualties in Cameroon, 936 in Niger, and 412 in Chad.<sup>11</sup> In March 2015, Abu Bakr Shekau

declared formal allegiance to Islamic State (IS) that was accepted a week later.<sup>12</sup> The group subsequently changed its name to Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province of the Islamic State) although they are still widely known as Boko Haram. The move may lead to closer ties between the two movements, although its precise implications still remain unclear. There are indications that Boko Haram has benefitted from IS media and communication tactics, with reports that IS may have either sent media producers to Nigeria or that Boko Haram media footage was sent elsewhere for production and editing.<sup>13</sup> Boko Haram appears to have a wide range of sources of funding, including bank, livestock and other robberies, extortion through kidnapping, and (perhaps now predominantly) the sale of arms, illicit drugs and other smuggled goods.

## 2.2. Government Response

**The government response to the crisis has primarily been a nationally-based security and service delivery response, with limited attempts at negotiation, and some broader actions aimed at countering conflict.** On two occasions, a State of Emergency was declared in December 2011, in parts of Yobe, Borno, as well as Plateau and Niger, and in May 2013, for the whole of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.

In the second instance, the State of Emergency was accompanied by upward spirals of conflict. More recently, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) developed a more integrated approach to counter-terrorism in the form of a Countering Conflict Programme. Meanwhile, attempts to negotiate have been unsuccessful. That said, it is important to acknowledge how challenging it is to coordinate the necessary elements of comprehensive response to a complex emergency such as in Nigeria's North-East.

**The military response of the Nigerian government has continued to encounter challenges.** There have been challenges in coordination, coherence and clarity of roles and responsibilities among the many government agencies involved in responding to the crisis. The enormous humanitarian and protection needs of IDPs and affected communities are far from being fully met. From late February 2015, the MNJTF, under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, launched a military offensive against Boko Haram, expelling the group from almost all of the 25 or more LGAs that had been occupied. According to official government reports, by April 2015, Boko Haram had lost most its held territories in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States, except for its stronghold in the Sambisa forest in Borno State. Although the Nigerian Government regained territory, as Boko Haram was pushed back, these actions caused further displacement and exposed additional humanitarian needs, without fully enabling humanitarian access.

**In April 2015, Nigeria's incoming president, Muhammadu Buhari, declared that he would take a hard line on Boko Haram, while understanding and tackling the drivers of the crisis.** One of his first moves upon taking office was to order the immediate relocation of the military command centre from Abuja to Maiduguri; he also committed to addressing the reports of misconduct by the Nigerian security and military forces. Following the relocation of the Military Command HQ to Maiduguri, the actions of government security forces in the region have been more successfully coordinated. At the developmental level, the government has formulated regional initiatives in the form of the Presidential Initiative for the North-East (PINE), and the North East States Transformation Strategy (NESTS). However, the recent sharp fall in the price of oil will likely dramatically reduce the fiscal space for the government's response to the crisis, whether military, humanitarian, or developmental.


**Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), in coordination with State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs), has been monitoring IDP movements and providing a range of relief support to affected communities.** Food, access to clean drinking water, and other emergency supplies have been provided to IDPs living in camps and many of those staying with host families in the North-East as a result of the Boko Haram conflict. NEMA has strategically stockpiled emergency supplies in warehouses in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States to cater to the needs of the IDPs. NEMA has taken the lead in camp coordination and management and has deployed personnel to provide technical support to SEMAs and the Nigerian Red Cross, to manage the IDP camps in the North-East. Emergency education for displaced children became a major priority after unprecedented Boko Haram attacks on students, teachers, and school infrastructure. A Safe Schools Initiative (SSI) has also been established, whereby school safety and security is improved and in some cases students are transferred (in agreement with parents) to other schools in states not affected by the fighting.

**The government leads humanitarian coordination efforts,** and the international community encourages State ministries to lead sectoral working groups in the North-East, while NEMA and the SEMAs continue to be overall humanitarian coordination partners.

## 2.3. The International Humanitarian Response

**The international humanitarian response in Nigeria's North-East has provided life-saving assistance to IDPs and host communities.** This support aims to ensure a dignified existence as they wait for durable solutions to resolve their current situation. A Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) was prepared in November 2015 and presented the latest analysis of humanitarian needs foreseen in 2016 and includes a country strategy in the (post-) conflict and forced displacement situation, as well as operational response plans for Adamawa, Borno, Gombe and Yobe states. It covers a range of immediate life-saving needs including; health, food, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, non-food items, education and protection of civilians. US\$ 248 million has been requested for projects listed under the plan. As of 16 March 2016, US\$ 16 million has been received for projects listed in the HRP and US\$ 6 million for humanitarian projects not listed in HRP: US\$ 9.9 from the Central Emergency Response Fund, US\$ 5.8 million from the European Commission, US\$ 4.5 million from Japan and US\$ 2.2 from Germany.<sup>15</sup>

FIGURE 4  
**Timeline of the Boko Haram Crisis<sup>10</sup>**




Despite widespread insecurity and limited resources, aid agencies continue to scale-up their presence and activities in Nigeria’s North-East in line with humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The geographical scope of the response has also expanded, with humanitarian hubs now established in Damaturu and Yola, and most importantly, in Maiduguri, the epicentre of the crisis. UN agencies are now relocating a number of Abuja-based staff to these locations to better understand and respond to the humanitarian crisis, and to be closer to State level authorities and partners. At the same time, bottom-up coordination mechanisms that feed into central decision making mechanisms are serving to improve the humanitarian response, and increasingly, local NGOs are participating in sectoral coordination mechanisms at the State level.

Currently 62 partners are providing urgent multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected people in the most affected

states in the North-East. This includes food, water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and hygiene services, shelter and non-food items, education, protection – including targeted responses for children and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) survivors, early recovery activities and livelihoods. Some 20 national CSOs and NGOs operating in the North-East play a critical role in the delivery of assistance, especially in areas where international actors are not present or have no access.

During 2015, the humanitarian response expanded rapidly to address the urgent and growing needs of the affected population in the North-East. The number of IDPs recorded by the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) increased by more than five times, from around 390,000 in December 2014, to 2.2 million in December 2015.<sup>16</sup> The unpredictable nature of IDP numbers, as demonstrated by the rapid increase in the number of displaced who now reside in





Maiduguri (1.6 million), is a challenge for the government and the international humanitarian community to address. The 2016 Humanitarian Response Plan was crafted to address the fluidity of the IDP situation, and to ensure a level of predictability in the response of the humanitarian community.

**An estimated three million affected people in 26 LGAs cannot be regularly accessed by international humanitarian partners as a consequence of the ongoing insecurity.** They urgently require multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance and protection services. Many of these LGAs have not been accessed by humanitarian partners in over a year. Understanding the needs of these people is often based on anecdotal information coming from recently displaced IDPs and government agencies. There are reports of a dire humanitarian situation in many of these areas, with malnutrition, food insecurity and negative coping strategies widely reported.

**In 2015, humanitarian access improved due to a significant number of national NGOs that joined the response** – immediately adding value through their knowledge of local civil society and communities. This extended the reach of the response, enabling assistance to reach people in areas previously inaccessible to the international humanitarian community. For example, improvements in humanitarian access have allowed the assessment teams for the Displacement Tracking Matrix to expand the scope of the assessment in Borno State from zero access in December 2014, to accessing 10 LGAs in December 2015. These 10 LGAs are currently housing 67 percent of the total number of IDPs, and 79 percent of people displaced by the fighting. Also, civil-military coordination has been boosted with the location by the UN of a Civil-Military Coordination Officer to Maiduguri in 2016.

TABLE 2

**Main factors of the conflict in North-East Nigeria, by type and field**

	<i>Structural / Root Factors</i>	<i>Intermediate/ Proxy Factors</i>	<i>Triggers</i>	<i>Crisis Dynamics</i>
<b>Social</b>	Poor social and economic outcomes (poverty, health, nutrition employment); high inequality; perceived social injustice; lack of social service provision.	Declining trust and eroded social cohesion; political manipulation of society and patronage.	Social polarization; openness to radicalisation; revenge.	Changing gender and intergenerational relations; sexual and gender-based violence; displacement; inter-communal violence.
<b>Political / Governance</b>	Elite political settlement excluding majority; historic marginalization of North-East as a region; poor performance of government institutions; low accountability and legitimacy of State.	Accusations of corruption and impunity; non-State actors fill governance and service void (e.g. community and religious associations); traditional institutions eroded.	Parties take to the street in the absence of effective or trusted channels for re-dress, justice, or political change.	Fractured social contract; lack of transparency and poor accountability creates a spiral of violence.
<b>Security</b>	Low levels of human security as a result of poorly performing State security services; porous borders in an insecure wider region.	Supply of unemployed and disaffected youth, proliferation of arms create conditions for recruitment and growth of armed groups and criminal opportunism.	Unlawful acts by State and non-State actors; Human rights and humanitarian law violations drive sense of injustice and persecution.	Excessive use of force by elements of the security establishment legitimizing rebellion, vigilante groups (Civilian JTF) fill security vacuum with mixed consequences.
<b>Economic</b>	Lack of economic infrastructure, access to markets, and effective policies to support agriculture and industry; high levels and poverty and food insecurity.	Lack of jobs and opportunity; large population of unemployed and poorly skilled youth.	Collapse of Northern Nigeria industrial base; recruitment of armed fighters from labour force incentivizes violence.	Military expenditures thwart development spending; Low human development outcomes heighten risk of ongoing or renewed conflict.
<b>Cultural / Ideological</b>	Religion as source of political legitimacy; History of (sometimes violent) religious radicalism challenging the State.	Political manipulation of religion; sharia implementation results in disillusion.	Escalating conflict (widening targets; suicide attacks).	Religious factionalism and competition; rise and internationalization of conflict.
<b>Environmental</b>	Climate change and environmental degradation: drought, desertification, contraction of Lake Chad Basin.	Lack of demarcated grazing lands, cattle routes and water sources for livestock, agriculture and fisheries.	Competition over land and natural resources, especially between agriculturalists and pastoralists.	Lack of effective natural resources and conflict management.

Logistical developments saw the establishment of a regular United Nations Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) flight service, which now provides rapid and efficient access to areas in the North-East, which would have entailed a two-day journey by road.

## 2.4. Factors behind the Crisis

**As in other complex crises, there are many factors contributing to the conflict in the North-East.** Structural factors, such as economic and political marginalisation, poverty and poor governance, can create conditions for the emergence of crisis, by stoking frustration and a sense of injustice. Intermediate factors may exacerbate structural factors over the medium term, while triggers are short term, perhaps

unforeseen, incidents which provoke violence. Table 2 groups these factors contributing to conflict in the North-East into six broad categories and summarises some of the dynamics arising from them. Key points for each category of driver are also touched on below.

**A context of underdevelopment and inequality:** Despite its status as the economic giant of Africa,<sup>17</sup> social and economic indicators in Nigeria are very low, and those in its North-East region are generally the poorest. The country ranks 152 out of 187 in the Human Development Index (HDI), which is well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. The country has a quarter of the continent's extreme poor, and comes third internationally, after India and China. Nigeria now has 10 percent of the world's out-of-school children, 10 percent of the

world's child and maternal deaths, and 25 percent of global malarial cases. Nationally, 33 percent of the population is below the poverty line, while in the North-East, the figure is 50 percent, increasing between 2012 and 2013.<sup>18</sup> Access to education is also very low with 52 percent of children being out of school in the region. Of those who attend school, 72 percent are unable to read upon completion of grade six. In Borno, with the lowest rates of any State in the country, only 35 percent of female and 46 percent of male adolescents are literate (compared to 98 percent for both genders in Imo State in the South-East). Under-five mortality rates in the North-East are as high as 160 deaths per 1,000.

**Governance and political conditions:** Weak governance is a cause of poor development outcomes, a driver of conflict, and a constraint on effective responses to both conflict and displacement. Financial mismanagement undermines the effectiveness of policy and program implementation, and deprives citizens of access to essential services. For example, about 40 percent of people surveyed claim that they have had to pay a bribe to enrol their children in school or get medical attention in health facilities. North-East States, given their weak economies and conflict-generated disruptions to economic activities, tend to have few means of generating internal revenue, and are thus particularly dependent upon transfers from the centre. States have wide responsibilities in the fields of service delivery, including education, health, and infrastructure. At the state level, political power is effectively centralised in the hands of governors, with weak accountability and very low capacity and autonomy at the LGA level. Government performance, in terms of governance and service delivery, is uneven among states. The Northern Governors' Forum fosters policy dialogue across Northern States and can contribute to emulation of good practices and successful initiatives. Traditional institutions and local associations have demonstrated resilience and managed to uphold and promote social solidarity within local communities, while providing local-level conflict resolution and other services. These institutions are, however, affected directly by the hostilities as well as being subject to less inclusive cultural norms (notably the low levels of women's representation), and the long-term erosion of their legitimacy through the politicization of traditional authority.

**Security:** Low levels of human security in North-East Nigeria are both a cause and an effect of the conflict. Military intervention has been the dominant response of the government to Boko Haram with allegations of violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law. The alleged use of the civilian joint task force

(CJTF) by the government, expressly or tacitly, to enforce local level security, has been problematic with human rights abuses attributed to them. Boko Haram continues to spread violence and insecurity throughout the region through sustained attacks on soft targets, such as markets, using girls in particular as suicide bombers. Their "hit and run" attacks on settlements including those of returnees exacerbates challenges of recovery and return. Boko Haram related conflict and military response by the Nigerian armed forces and other armed groups has severely affected civilians, particularly vulnerable groups.

**Economic development:** Economic infrastructure in the North-East is limited, and the industrial base of Northern Nigeria (mostly located outside the North-East regional zone in Kano and Kaduna) has largely collapsed in recent decades. Rural livelihoods in agriculture, pastoralism, and fisheries have been badly eroded as a result of a combination of limited government support, poor management, and limited access to new technology and inputs. The lack of employment and livelihood opportunities, in particular for young people, is one of the major causes of frustration and discontent with government, and a possible 'push factor' in the incitement of individuals to violence.

**Culture and ideology:** For centuries, religion has been central to the identity of the State in Northern Nigeria. As with many other sources of identity, religion has been mobilised at times as a source to gain political legitimacy. Manipulation and exploitation of religious fault lines for political purposes, such as provoking conflicting views over the imposition of sharia law, have been used as ploys to divert attention from issues such as inadequacies in governance and financial mismanagement. This is one of the key factors contributing to the rise of radicalisation and violent extremism in North-East Nigeria among numerous other underlying causes and trigger factors, including the rise of international networks of extremists. Attacks have increasingly shifted from purely religion-based targeting to a general proliferation of targets irrespective of religion. Changes in social values and erosion of moral standards have been reported as a consequence, with economic standing and wherewithal replacing education and honesty as social merits, leading to a rise in politically-connected criminal activity, and a general societal disdain towards the rule of law.

**Environmental challenges:** The natural environment in North-East Nigeria is fragile, especially in the area immediately surrounding Lake Chad. This fragility undermines food security and drives environmental out-migration. Climate and weather variability play a part in this environmental degradation, exacerbated by man-made stressors

such as irrigation and dam construction. For herders and pastoralists, the scarcity of surface water has added to the difficulties of watering animals, causing them to encroach on agricultural resources. Meanwhile, agriculture has expanded into areas previously used for grazing, rendering the remaining herding sites increasingly exposed to overgrazing. In addition, the reduction in the size of Lake Chad and associated water-flow reduction have had considerable negative impacts on small-scale fishing throughout the Basin. Overall, the diverse and interdependent livelihood systems that make up the productive sector in the Lake Chad Basin are faced with increasingly inadequate supplies of water and are therefore under strain.

**These categories of drivers combine to create conditions for the emergence and spread of conflict.** The circumstances and motivations leading to participation in Boko Haram related conflict vary considerably between individuals. ‘Pull factors’ may be ideological, or material; recruitment may also be the direct result of coercion.

## 2.5. Dynamics of the Conflict

**One of the furthest-reaching effects of the conflict is the vast scale of forced displacement that it has caused, ranking Nigeria as the country with the third largest number of IDPs in the world, after Syria and Colombia.** As government military operations intensified in 2015 and Boko Haram fighters were pushed out of towns and into rural areas, displacement increased further and food production was disrupted. IDPs face challenges in accessing basic services and humanitarian assistance in most areas. Forced displacement creates a range of serious secondary effects, including physical and psychological trauma, and social and economic hardship, as well as the conditions for possible radicalisation and polarisation. Displacement exacerbates the already existing conditions of poverty and deprivation and its effects are felt not only by the displaced themselves, but also in the communities in which they take refuge. Some 92 percent of those displaced by the armed conflict have been taken in by host communities who share space, resources, and services with them, all of which are generally already overstretched and increasingly under severe strain. The economic dislocation caused by the fighting adds further to hardship. Most IDPs remain in Borno (67 percent), followed by Adamawa and Yobe (six percent each). It is estimated that an additional three million people remain trapped in insecure areas. They may also be displaced and when the area they are trapped in becomes secure they may also move to urban areas to seek immediate

humanitarian assistance.<sup>19</sup> The unfolding situation in the region will further exacerbate the pre-existing conditions of poverty and development deficit.

**Conflict-related psychological trauma is widespread, while mental health services are limited.** Psycho-social support and mental health interventions are needed, including special care for survivors of SGBV and child abuse and children who have been retained by armed groups. There are only three mental health facilities in the region and no referral mechanism to link the affected population to these facilities, and there are insufficient free-of-charge psychotropic drugs available.<sup>20</sup> Such widespread psycho-social needs, especially when left unaddressed, can have serious impacts on health, wellbeing, employability, and the emergence of new patterns of violence, including domestic violence and SGBV, long after the current conflict ends.

**With the intensification of conflict, the prevalence of SGBV has escalated dramatically in the North-East.** Women and girls are vulnerable to rape, exploitation, and forced marriage due to the conflict and resulting displacement, adding to already high rates of domestic violence and early marriage. Women and girls abducted by Boko Haram (estimated to be at least 2,000) are often raped, forced into marriage/labour/religious conversion, physically/sexually/emotionally abused and are highly vulnerable, exposed to sexually transmitted diseases, and often impregnated by their captors.<sup>20</sup>

**The current conflict and displacement, combined with longer-term social processes, have undermined gender norms and child rights and created a power shift between generations.** Conflict and displacement have broken communities and families, throwing up large numbers of unconventional households (e.g. headed by women, children, or the elderly). There are serious implications for future stability as the human capital of upcoming generations is compromised. North-East Nigeria faces an emergency in terms of access to education, where 600 teachers have been murdered, 19,000 teachers displaced, and 1,200 schools damaged or destroyed. This has resulted in 600,000 children losing access to learning since 2013. In IDPs camps, 75 percent of children do not attend school. In host communities where as many as 92 percent of the displaced have found refuge, already thin educational resources are being stretched even further. Currently, 1.4 million IDP children urgently require child protection services.<sup>20</sup>



**Social cohesion has been deeply affected by the Boko Haram conflict in the North-East.** The wide geographical spread and high levels of conflict, combined with the limited effectiveness of formal and informal mechanisms to prevent and contain violence, have resulted in widespread levels of suspicion, mistrust, and stigmatisation along ethnic, religious, political and geographical lines. The social fabric in the North-East has been deeply damaged, eroding social relations between citizens and government, ethnic clans, communities and even extended families. Economic, ethnic, religious, political and geographical divisions have hardened, affecting the way in which any recovery effort is perceived. Restoring social cohesion and trust is the most critical precondition to recovery and peace building, but also the most difficult, given the deep impact of the conflict. Any type of recovery and stability intervention needs to be designed with due consideration of its impact on social cohesion and trust.

**More generally, the repeated but unpredictable incidences of violence have led to fragmentation along religious, ethnic, or other cultural fault lines.** The authority of traditional institutions and community-level conflict management mechanisms (such as Local Government councils, local courts, and religious institutions) has been eroded. As security is restored and communities are resettled, it will be essential to address the capacity gaps of these institutions.

## 2.6. Emerging Risks and Scenarios for RPBA Implementation

**Due to the fluid nature of the conflict situation at present, three possible scenarios have been considered in the RPBA.** The actions set out in the RPBA are based on the assumption that the situation will stabilise over the next 2-4 years, but this will vary from state to state and community to community. Boko Haram has shown itself capable of adapting to adverse conditions, accessing diverse resources, and switching tactics. While its relatively brief period of holding territory in 2014-2015 may be over, Boko Haram has nevertheless demonstrated its capacity to revert to asymmetrical tactics (waves of suicide bombers and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks) to continue perpetrating conflict in Nigeria and to regroup in neighbouring countries, in particular Cameroon. The future course of the conflict will be a major factor affecting the scope for reconstruction and peace building, and vice versa, the scope of reconstruction and peace building will be a major factor affecting the future course of the prevailing conflict. In considering the scenarios, it should be borne in mind that the situation is by its nature unstable and unpredictable, and that there is likely to be marked variation in conditions between

and across states and LGAs. The three scenarios considered in this assessment process are explained below.

**Scenario 1) Status Quo:** Boko Haram retains the ability to periodically stage attacks in the North-East and occasionally further south or Abuja. While return of IDPs and reconstruction are possible in some areas, the threat and reality of local attacks continue to undermine the revival of agriculture and economic life, and the establishment of a stable peace. Urban areas are likely to be more secure than rural ones, despite the likelihood of continued bombings. Pressure on IDPs might be brought by the government to encourage returns before security can be assured. Significantly, this scenario is not a stable one, since it is relatively easy for Boko Haram to regroup and adapt. Hence, in the absence of concerted success on the part of the government, the tendency may be for this scenario to deteriorate into the worst-case scenario. **Operationally**, the security situation would constrain the re-establishment of infrastructure, social services, and production, especially in rural areas, and necessitate a flexible and coordinated approach by RPBA and others to respond to unpredictable threats. Displacement would continue. There will be limited scope for reconciliation.

**Scenario 2) Best-Case Scenario:** Working with international and regional partners, through military means coupled with successful Government and/or State level negotiations/peace talks with Boko Haram, and increased attention to addressing the underlying socio-economic factors of the Boko Haram conflict, the government is able to limit the frequency, intensity and scope of attacks in the North-East. Such improved military and political performance on the part of the government would promote trust in the eyes of communities, including elements that may have previously been sympathetic to Boko Haram. The level of success of this enterprise will determine the geographical areas in which return and resettlement, recovery and peace building efforts can be pursued in a sustained way. This could result in large parts of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa being accessible for reconstruction and development interventions and the restoration of economic activities, creating a positive cycle of development which would augment stability and security. **Operationally**, this scenario provides favourable conditions for the implementation of the RPBA, wider recovery, and a positive spiral of development, reconstruction, peace building, and return and resettlement of the displaced. The challenging but essential tasks of reconciliation and reintegration will be a priority.

**Scenario 3) Worst-Case Scenario:** Boko Haram is resurgent as the government is unable to address weaknesses in its response to the conflict. A heavy-handed military approach, coupled with weak and uncoordinated political measures among stakeholders at the Federal, State and Local levels produces further disillusionment from which Boko Haram benefits. The government again loses control of parts of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, which is where Boko Haram targets areas of Nigeria further to the south, while a vicious cycle of security, economic, social, and political, and international factors lead to a descent into chronic violence. **Operationally**, insecurity will both make physical reconstruction impossible and further exacerbate social tensions at all levels. Displacement will increase and become chronic, and humanitarian needs would predominate.

**The RPBA has generally and consistently applied the Status Quo Scenario for the development of the needs analyse and recovery strategies.** However, the recovery and implementation strategies proposed in the this assessment also remain cognisant of the risks faced in the potential unfolding of the worst-case scenario. The incremental implementation approach would allow the recovery and peace building process to build upon potential opportunities that may manifest in the eventual and desirable realisation of the best-case scenario.

# A Framework for Recovery and Peace Building Priorities

This chapter provides guidance for identifying the overarching objectives and strategic outcomes to be pursued over a period of four years. *A clear distinction is made between this four-year period and the longer-term development agenda. Strategic guidance is provided for implementing stabilisation and recovery interventions in an integrated, sequenced, and incremental manner. Interventions will be determined on a case-by-case basis by the specific conditions and capacity of the six States, respective LGAs and Wards, including the prevailing security environment.*

## 3.1. Humanitarian Context

The RPBA confirmed that humanitarian assistance would need to be provided and be scaled up during the forthcoming period. Indeed, despite all the efforts currently displayed by national authorities with the support of local and international humanitarian actors, much still needs to be done to cater for the basic human needs of the displaced populations and hosting communities alike, until the security situation allows for the commencement of recovery interventions. The impact of the Boko Haram conflict on IDPs, on communities currently hosting IDPs, and on communities that will be receiving them, has only exacerbated the dire situation these populations were already facing before, overstressing their already limited incomes, resources and assets, and the capacities of the existing social service delivery systems. Moreover, new displacements of populations have been reported following the regular attacks conducted by Boko Haram and the ongoing military operations.

The Recovery and Peace Building Strategy (RPBS) will therefore need to be closely coordinated with the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) in order to build on its achievements and avoid overlaps. This is espe-

cially relevant with regards to the early recovery interventions undertaken wherever possible by the humanitarian actors as an integral part of their response to the crisis. Returns organised too early may only postpone the start-up of early recovery interventions, increase the suffering of the people involved and consequently extend the scope and cost of recovery needs (please refer to Box 3: Benchmarks for the Safe, Voluntary and Dignified Return of Displaced Populations). It is crucial that there is robust engagement with existing coordination mechanisms to ensure that:

- (a) The Humanitarian Civilian and Military Coordination (CM-COORD) mechanism is regularly consulted to understand in real time the progress made for accessing wards, LGAs and states;
- (b) A smooth and gradual transition is in place to ensure an effective and efficient link between humanitarian interventions, including early recovery response and recovery interventions;
- (c) The incremental added value between recovery and humanitarian interventions effectively contributes to the human security of the affected populations on the ground.

## 3.2. Basic Principles and Values for Recovery and Peace Building

**The RPBA process offers an opportunity to galvanize a collective momentum towards peace and stability:** Restoring social cohesion and trust is the most critical precondition to recovery and peace building, but also the most difficult, given the deep impact of the conflict. Hence, any type of recovery and stability activity should carefully assess and take on board its impact on social cohesion and trust across different social groups and between the State and the citizens. The strategy could bring together government, civil society, and the private sector around a set of common principles and objectives towards peace and stability. The strategy will promote a cohesive approach that mobilises renewed efforts on the part of the government and civil society to form a new, stronger partnership, promoting trust and reducing the underlying drivers of the current crisis.

**Humanitarian principles, standards and values must be upheld and implemented:** Nigeria adheres to the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa, known as the Kampala Convention. The Kampala Convention provides standards to governments to protect the rights and well-being of people forced to flee their homes due to conflict, violence, natural disasters and human rights abuses. The international partners of the RPBA welcome the recent efforts initiated by the Government aiming at legally protecting the rights of IDPs, and are committed to advocate, together with the humanitarian community, the ratification of the Kampala Convention in the national laws.

**Human rights:** Will be upheld throughout the implementation of the RPBS, and beyond. Likewise, the pride, dignity, and resilience of the affected populations should be highlighted and traditional culture, values and practices should be respected.

**National leadership and ownership:** The process will rely on the demonstrated leadership of the Government of Nigeria at Federal, State and LGA levels, and that of national institutions and organisations, including civil society, religious and traditional leadership structures and the private sector. The Government of Nigeria has the ultimate responsibility to ensure successful implementation and allocation of adequate resources. Dedicated skills development initiatives will further enhance the absorptive capacity of national organisations and institutions for engaging and coordinating non-state actors as well.

**Involving civil society and private sector in the recovery effort and decision-making:** CSOs, including youth organisations, women's groups, faith based organisations, cultural and traditional groups, and the private sector are important actors, who have the ability to mobilise sizable funding and social capital, and can often be sources of valuable expertise. CSOs often have well-cultivated links to the affected communities that can prove valuable in project implementation. Creating space for CSOs and the private sector will foster a more inclusive and locally-owned recovery process, and bring in expert resources to help guide the recovery process. This may also include creating, or building upon forums already established, for involving civil society, technical institutions, academia, private sector and affected communities. Such forums can play a significant role in facilitating community dialogue, consensus-building, and strengthening ownership of sector recovery programs at all levels. They also facilitate the direct involvement of community stakeholders, including women and youth groups in recovery planning and programmes.

**Building back better and smarter:** In view of the economic and social situation in the North-East, the recovery and peace building process will not just aim to restore the physical, productive and human assets to the status quo situation that prevailed before the crisis. The RPBS will be guided by the imperative of going beyond the ex-ante crisis situation (or baseline scenario), in order to address some of the underlying drivers of the crisis. By building resilience into the recovery and peace building efforts, other potential shocks such as climate change, natural disasters, health, nutrition and economic crises will also be considered.<sup>21</sup>

**Targeting the most vulnerable segments of affected populations and using a bottom-up approach:** Attention will be given to the specific needs of the most vulnerable segments of the affected population: women, youth, widows, elderly and people living with disability who have found their situations exacerbated by the crisis. While youth is a driver of development and progress in the North-East, some youth may be most inclined to join Boko Haram sympathizers and require hands-on support. A bottom-up approach is required to support individuals and communities in recovery and rebuilding in accordance with their own priorities, within certain guidelines. Cash support for IDPs and host communities will be paramount, and finding an appropriate mechanism to channel funding down to the communities that most need it in a transparent and fair way will be a key implementation challenge.





**Conflict sensitivity:** A conflict analysis was carried out to inform the development of the priorities and interventions recommended in the RPBA. This analysis, summarised in Chapter 2, will need to be regularly updated in light of the evolving situation on the ground, to redirect or adjust priorities and interventions as may be needed. In order to avoid or mitigate the occurrence of new or existing crisis, the response will address both the needs of the displaced populations and those of the host and receiving communities. Sources of conflict existing prior to the crisis will be given due consideration and be integrated in the response in order to mitigate or reduce their occurrence. These principles should be thoroughly applied in the subsequent phases of the recovery programming and project development, including rigorous risk analysis.

**Broad-based participation and effective communication:** A transparent, consultative and participatory approach to the RPBA has been used both during the assessment and to validate the findings and recommendations. Consultations have been organised with a broad range of Federal, State and Local stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental, including the private sector) in the assessment of needs and definition of recovery and peace building priorities. Clear and effective communications and grassroots outreach have been a critical part of the assessment to ensure that progress is effectively conveyed, findings and recommendations understood, and expectations managed.

## BOX 2

**Do-No-Harm Approach**

While well intended, recovery efforts in conflict affected areas may end up causing more harm than good, if conflict dynamics, local context, and linkages among these and programming are not thoroughly understood, and programming is not adapted to these realities.<sup>23</sup> Ensuring that interventions do-no-harm entails:

- (a) Understanding the context of conflict: this includes the geographic, demographic, cultural, ideological and institutional drivers of the conflict, and sources of social cohesion and resilience, and the way in which these factors relate to the proposed intervention. This includes the geographic and thematic areas covered by it, its targeting mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation, and grievance redress mechanisms.
- (b) Identifying and analysing conflict triggers and conflict resolution mechanisms: this entails the identification of specific factors that tend to trigger violence, as well as those mechanisms used to manage tension when it arises.
- (c) Identifying and analysing the details of the proposed recovery programme and its linkages with the context and conflict triggers. Programme details should be carefully identified, paying equal attention to large and small programming details, as they all may impact the success of the initiative.
- (d) Analysing the assistance programme's impact on the context of conflict by identifying the areas in which programme details and drivers/triggers/social cohesion and resilience sources/conflict resolution mechanisms impact each other positively or negatively. This includes not just technical aspects of the project, but also social perceptions by the different stakeholders. Risks and adequate prevention/ mitigation measures should be then identified, including communications strategies that are sensitive to the context.
- (e) Revisiting programming options: Alternative programming options should be identified if the risk analysis identifies elements of the recovery programme that has a negative impact on drivers/triggers/social cohesion and resilience sources/conflict resolution mechanisms, so as to mitigate conflict drivers and triggers and strengthen sources of social cohesion and resilience and conflict resolutions mechanisms.
- (f) Adopting an iterative approach to programming design and implementation: testing, learning and adapting should be a continuous process in areas affected by conflict as conditions continuously evolve.

**3.3. Prioritising and Sequencing Recovery and Peace Building Efforts**

**The prioritising of the recovery and peace building interventions will be carefully assessed on a continuous basis, and adjusted as need according to the prevailing situation on the ground** and following the “Do-No-Harm” approach set out in Box 2. There is wide recognition that the military action led by Government (and by the sub-regional coalition) has improved the security situation, but this will not suffice to further stabilise the North-East. Security incidents continue to occur on a regular basis albeit with different levels of intensity across the North-East. At the national level a harmonised approach will need to be developed that will include differentiated support in the six states, down to the LGA level. The main factors that will guide this differentiated approach include:

- (i) The volatile and unpredictable security situation in the North-East due to the asymmetric warfare that is being conducted by Boko Haram and their capacity to react to the government's efforts;
- (ii) The level of effective access to LGAs and communities in the most affected areas and progress made over time with the gradual and incremental implementation of interventions.
- (iii) The extent of the physical damages and human impact in the respective states and LGAs. The six states have been affected by the crisis in very different ways and at different levels of intensity:<sup>22</sup>
  - Borno, the epicentre of the conflict, is the most directly affected state, immediately followed by Yobe and Adamawa;
  - Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba can be considered at this stage as being stabilised to some extent, as they are affected mainly by receiving IDPs;
  - The nature and extent of human and physical damages in the LGAs can differ significantly between states and within each state.
- (iv) The careful monitoring of the “Do-No-Harm” principles will also guide the adjustment of priorities as needed.

**Therefore, careful sequencing of recovery and peace building interventions will be critical in view of the fluidity of the security environment, and the marked variation within and among the six states.** In some areas, the context for implementation will be one of continuing insecurity, and a humanitarian response combined with

stabilisation will likely continue to be a priority for a number of years. In other states the context will permit more substantial movement towards recovery and development. This implies:

- (a) the need for rigorous ongoing security assessment at a local (likely LGA) level, including the capacity of Local Governments to contribute to enhancing and maintaining security conditions, by bringing together a range of stakeholders including civil society and communities in this assessment;
- (b) the appropriate combination and sequencing of immediate short term support with medium term solutions; and
- (c) assessments of partners' institutional capacity, particularly at LGA level.

### 3.4. An Integrated and Holistic Response

**Peace building, stability and social cohesion are the backbone of the assessment, and of the response.** It is crucial to closely integrate peace building, stability and social cohesion interventions with other interventions aimed at the physical reconstruction or rehabilitation of social, physical and productive assets, or the resuscitation of livelihoods opportunities on their own merits. Peace building, stability and social cohesion interventions will ensure the sustainability of recovery interventions on the ground and lay the foundation for human security to prevail. They will be instrumental for allowing the affected populations to start:

- (i) feeling more confident and secure for returning home (or other places); and
- (ii) healing from the fear, physical and psychological trauma they have endured for several years now. Peace building and recovery interventions will need to be addressed at the same time and on a geographical basis across the three main components of the response.

**An integrated approach is key to ensuring a comprehensive and durable sectoral response.** For example, the re-deployment of a sufficient number of skilled human resources (to be trained or retrained) that will manage the social delivery systems and their recurrent costs, need to go hand-in hand and be integrated at the outset when planning and implementing the physical reconstruction/rehabilitation/equipment of the corresponding basic social infrastructure.

#### BOX 3

### Benchmarks for the Safe, Voluntary and Dignified Return of Displaced Populations

The following elements constitute a checklist of key considerations for the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced populations, developed by the Protection Sector Working Group in February 2016.<sup>24</sup>

#### Safe Return:

- **Physical safety**, or the absence of threat to life, liberty and integrity of the person, including physical violence and verbal threats and intimidation; freedom of movement; safe routes, housing and livelihood areas free of mines, booby-traps and unexploded ordnances.
- **Legal safety**, namely, the presence of adequate law enforcement mechanisms and access to justice, particularly as regards recovery of property and housing.
- **Material safety** that is notably equal access in the early phases of return to means of survival and basic services, such as potable water, food, housing, health and nutrition services.

#### Voluntary Return:

- **Absence of coercion:** This includes not only direct coercion through, among others, physical force, harassment or intimidation; but also indirect coercion including the provision of erroneous information, and denial of basic services or closure of IDPs camps or facilities without an acceptable alternative.
- **Clear expression:** IDPs must express in a clear and unambiguous way their willingness to return. In principle, the decision must be individual. However, in many cases there may be a group-based decision-making process. Authorities must ensure that all groups have been consulted, and that options are available for those with valid reasons not to return.

#### Dignified Return:

- **Promote respectful treatment of IDPs** by authorities and humanitarian actors, through sensitisation programmes and trainings.
- **Ensure representation** of IDPs groups in decision-making.
- **Conduct proper consultation** with IDPs in all stages of the return process, considering different views. This would include an intention survey that considers the obstacles for return and the conditions IDPs would like to see improved before returning.

### 3.5. Strategic Framework for Recovery and Peace Building

The overall vision of this process is to provide a framework of support to assist conflict-affected people, and peace building and recovery in North-East Nigeria. Four key strategic objectives have been identified as necessary to achieve lasting peace and sustainable recovery:

- (1) Contribute to the safe, voluntary, and dignified return and resettlement of displaced persons;
- (2) Improve human security, reconciliation, and violence prevention;
- (3) Enhance government accountability and citizen engagement in service delivery;
- (4) Increase equity in the provision of basic services and employment opportunities.

These strategic objectives have informed the development of a Strategic Recovery Framework presented below in Table 3, as well as a more detailed Operational Framework for Recovery and Peace Building, which can be found on page 67.<sup>25</sup> The relationship between the strategic and operational recovery frameworks must be clearly understood. The strategies and the broad strategic elements/pillars required to achieve these objectives have been mapped against specific outcomes in the Strategic Recovery Framework. This in turn has been translated into a much more detailed Operational Framework for Recovery that maps all of the needs identified in the 18 sub-component analyses against the same set of strategic outcomes. The Operational Framework also provides more granularity in terms of an indicative sequencing of these interventions across the stabilisation and recovery phases, as well as key indicators for measuring progress and performance towards the achievement of these outcomes at the subcomponent level during the implementation phase.

These frameworks will be further developed through more detailed planning and programming during the post-RPBA phase, at Federal, State and LGA levels, and in close coordination with partners and stakeholders. Chapter 5 proposes an Institutional Coordination Framework, wherein clear roles and responsibilities are identified to ensure timely, efficient and effective implementation.

TABLE 3

#### Strategic Recovery Framework

### Vision Statement

*Provide a framework for coordinated and coherent provision of support to assist conflict-affected people, peace building, and recovery in North-East Nigeria.*

#### Strategic indicators:

- (1) Improved socio-economic resilience of communities affected by conflict and forced displacement through the provision of integrated, holistic and sustainable solutions to needs and impacts of the conflict.
- (2) Community security and social cohesion strengthened in communities reached by reconciliation, violence prevention and community security initiatives.
- (3) Social fabric in the North-East strengthened by building trust in government institutions through improved governance capacities, mechanisms and practices, and enhanced transparency, accountability and citizen engagement.
- (4) Reduced service delivery and livelihoods gaps between individuals and communities affected by conflict and displacement and those not affected by them.

#### Process indicators:

- (1) Alignment between RPBA identified priorities and government and partner programming.
- (2) Improved coordination and complementarity with humanitarian efforts.
- (3) Strengthened national leadership and ownership.
- (4) Enhanced participation and involvement of key actors including government, traditional and religious authorities, civil society and the private sector in recovery and peace building efforts.
- (5) Effective targeting of the most vulnerable segments of the population including IDPs and returnees, women, children, youth, elderly and people with disabilities.
- (6) Improved conflict sensitivity of operations.

**Objective:**

Contribute to the safe, voluntary, and dignified return and resettlement of displaced population

<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Pillars of the strategy</i>
Urgent needs of displaced populations are met	Risk analysis and rapid provision of services to meet displaced populations' needs	<p>Food Assistance:</p> <p>(a) General food assistance for emergency and famine phases of food insecurity</p> <p>(b) Supplementary food assistance for most vulnerable for 4 months</p> <p>(c) Short-term food assistance (for 6 months) for less directly affected states</p> <p>Establish of temporary education space during reconstruction</p> <p>Provide solid waste management collection service to displaced populations</p>
Integrated and holistic approach to address identified needs of displaced persons unable to return, populations already returning, and host communities	Risk analysis, framework and programs to ensure safe, orderly and voluntary return or resettlement of displaced persons	<p>Establish a policy and operational framework to ensure safe and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced persons, including the deployment of human right monitors and legal aid counsellors</p> <p>Support and strengthen broader access to basic needs at local level for newly displaced persons, and displaced population with no intention to return in short to medium term</p> <p>Provide psycho-social support to displaced persons, returnees, and host community members</p> <p>Develop livelihood initiatives for displaced persons, host communities, and those who stayed behind</p> <p>Provide compensation to service providers of displaced population, including hardship allowances for government employees returning to conflict-affected areas</p> <p>Support prevention of gender-based violence in host communities and camps</p> <p>Conflict prevention and mitigation training in host communities and camps</p> <p>Violence prevention programming</p> <p>Specific programming for people with disabilities, men, women and children</p>

**Objective:**

Improved human security, reconciliation, and violence prevention

<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Pillars of the strategy</i>
Physical security for both host communities and displaced persons	De-mining and mine awareness campaigns	<p>Reduce risks related to Explosive Remnants of War (ERW)</p> <p>Develop mine action coordination mechanism</p> <p>Implement mine action emergency risk education campaign</p> <p>Conduct mine action integrated survey of hazardous areas with risk education and explosive ordnance disposal</p> <p>Conduct mine action victim assistance needs assessment and individual rehabilitation response</p>

<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Pillars of the strategy</i>
Governments and communities are better equipped and more aware of peace building and violence prevention measures	Establishment of peace building funds; conduct community trainings and awareness programs	<p>Social fund for CSOs to support peace building</p> <p>Community participation on security/small arms and light weapons (SALW); awareness and reduction in the North-East enhanced through provision of advocacy and sensitisation the dangers of SALWs</p> <p>Reconciliation, Peace Building and Countering Conflict Training</p> <p>Violence prevention programming</p>
	Capacity building and development of legislative frameworks for peace building and violence prevention	<p>Justice, Community Security, and Control of Small Arms:</p> <p>(a) training</p> <p>(b) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for case management</p> <p>(c) Model/pilot projects to promote model police stations and legal aid institutions</p> <p>Legal and regulatory frameworks required for sustained fight against SALW</p> <p>Programmes and facilities for de-radicalisation</p> <p>Capacity of security apparatus in the North-East strengthened through the provision of best practices in border security and stockpile management</p> <p>Reconciliation, Peace Building and Countering Conflict Training</p> <p>Violence prevention programming</p>
Sustainable reintegration	Training and programs for sustainable reintegration of defectors from all armed groups	<p>Disarmament and reintegration technical assistance</p> <p>Assessments and studies:</p> <p>(a) Mapping of available trauma response services</p> <p>(b) Trauma Survey</p> <p>Micro-grants/credits for reconciliation, peace building, and countering violence</p>
Prevention and mitigation of SGBV	Programs to address and prevent SGBV	<p>Further assessments and studies:</p> <p>(a) Study on SGBV</p> <p>(b) Initial needs assessment</p> <p>(c) Mapping of available services</p> <p>Train available mental and medical services personnel to address SGBV, and provide immediate attention to victims</p> <p>Establish sexual assault referral centres</p> <p>Create safe spaces and provide psycho-social support to victims</p>
	Comprehensive planning for SGBV victims' needs; strengthening legal and social provisions for victims	<p>Comprehensive programming on SGBV, including immediate attention to victims of SGBV, as well as prevention initiatives</p> <p>Legal and social protections for women and children affected by SGBV</p> <p>Specific programming for children borne out of conflict</p>
Psycho-social support is available for affected populations	Capacity building of service providers	<p>Train service providers working among conflict-affected populations in psycho-social support and peace building</p> <p>Psycho-social support to populations exposed to high level of violence</p>

**Objective:**

Enhanced government accountability and citizen engagement in service delivery

<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Pillars of the strategy</i>
Government has strengthened capacity to effectively manage the recovery and peace building process	Comprehensive capacity development	Capacity development programme for recovery and peace building
		Promotion citizen engagement and strengthening accountability at local level
		Promotion of community radios and community outreach programmes fostering community engagement
Communities are empowered to engage with government	Awareness raising and public campaigns for citizen engagement	Health risk mitigation awareness campaigns
		Water and sanitation promotion campaigns including distribution of information, education and communication (IEC) materials to the affected areas plus the host communities
		Outreach and advocacy to communities/civil society for enhanced community engagement
Government engages with citizens	Capacity development, and technical assistance to community-based organisations	Develop capacity of School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs), e.g. to conduct enrolment drives, monitor enrolment
		Establish a community based grievance redress mechanism
		Strengthen systems at community level for improved management of water and sanitation facilities
	Capacity building among Local and State Governments to strengthen participation, accountability and transparency in their systems	Form and train community based structures for implementation and monitoring of sanitation and hygiene promotion activities
		Establish and support community platforms
		Local governance and citizen engagement training for Local Governments
		Local governance and citizen engagement, policy dialogue, and mentoring for State Governments

**Objective:**

Increased equity in the provision of basic services and employment opportunities

<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Pillars of the strategy</i>
Basic service delivery infrastructure, equipment and systems are equitably accessible and operational	Planning for reconstruction	<p>Formulate debris management plans for each of the conflict affected states</p> <p>Formulate state wide solid waste management plans</p> <p>Establish mechanism to implement the housing reconstruction programme through home owner driven processes</p> <p>Technical assistance for initial water and sanitation assessments, strategic planning and capacity building on project management</p> <p>Complete assessment of educational and vocational facilities damaged in six states</p> <p>Complete assessment of land resources for agricultural purposes</p>
	(Re)construction/repair of service delivery infrastructure	<p>Reconstruct and repair of agriculture and irrigation facilities</p> <p>Reconstruct or rehabilitate, refurbish and re-equip of educational facilities</p> <p>Reconstruct electricity distribution substations</p> <p>Reconstruct electricity distribution lines</p> <p>Reconstruct electricity transmission substations</p> <p>Reconstruct electricity transmission lines</p> <p>Promote the use of renewable energy and off-grid access to energy for conflict affected communities</p> <p>Reconstruct or rehabilitate Primary Health Care facilities</p> <p>Reconstruct or rehabilitate referral facilities (secondary hospitals)</p> <p>Repair or reconstruct damaged houses</p> <p>Refurbish damaged infrastructure for telecommunication: mobile phone base stations and towers</p> <p>Repair and reconstruct public buildings</p> <p>Rehabilitate Federal roads, and State roads and bridges</p> <p>Repair, reconstruct and rehabilitate all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) boreholes in communities and piped schemes in small towns and urban centres</p> <p>Repair, reconstruct and rehabilitate all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) boreholes in public places (excluding schools and health facilities)</p> <p>Replacement/Rehabilitation of damaged sanitation infrastructure in public places (excluding schools and health facilities)</p> <p>Replacement of all damaged protected dug wells with hand pump boreholes</p> <p>Construct new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and network extension in small towns and urban centres in affected areas as well as in select host communities</p> <p>Construct new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and sanitation infrastructure in public places in the affected areas as well as in select host communities</p> <p>Onetime provision of water and sanitation equipment and logistics support (vehicles, office equipment, furniture, ICT infrastructure, etc.)</p> <p>Operational support for fuelling of water and sanitation vehicles, purchase of chemicals, working tools and office expendables</p> <p>Replacement of lost solid waste management infrastructure</p> <p>Replacement of community infrastructure, such as community buildings or small pathways or bridges</p>
	Removal of debris/ensuring access	<p>Clear debris from areas where it hampers access or reconstruction</p> <p>Remove debris aggregations from areas of human settlement</p> <p>Recycle, reuse, or reprocess as much debris as possible, especially through sustainable small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)</p> <p>Safe disposal of unusable debris</p>



<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Pillars of the strategy</i>
	Rehabilitation of existing service delivery methods, and expansion of service delivery to meet crisis needs	<p>Cash transfer/scholarship to address financial barriers to enrolment in educational institutions</p> <p>Increase availability and utilisation of essential health services including deliveries attended by skilled personnel and increased coverage of immunisations</p> <p>Restore of health system functions: training of community health workers</p> <p>Restore of government health sector early warning and response functions</p> <p>Expand coverage of the social protection measure of the forthcoming National Social Safety Nets Programme to unconditional top-up for first 2 years</p> <p>Provide social protection measures such as old age and disability allowance</p> <p>Targeted social protection subsidy of Community Based Social Health Insurance Programme for children under 5, lactating mothers, and pregnant women</p> <p>Restore public transport</p> <p>Community led total sanitation approach in rural areas</p> <p>Capacity building of Social Protection institutions at the Local Government</p> <p>Establish / strengthen of water and sanitation institutions at the State and LGA level</p> <p>Reactivate Local Emergency Management Agencies (LEMAs) at local level</p> <p>Re-establish community infrastructure and non-formal services</p>
Equitable employment opportunities are available and accessible in the North-East	Skills training to boost employment opportunities that meet crisis-related needs in the North-East	<p>Public employment scheme as a social protection measure</p> <p>Labour force skills developed including: (a) rehabilitation of existing facilities and addition of new facilities; (b) skill development training; and (c) skill development outreach using mobile teams</p> <p>Women and youth empowerment through skills training for employment including (a) professional skills trainings relevant to the communities; (b) adult literacy and continuing education; (c) life skills training/peace education; (d) distribute start-up kits; (e) identify employment; (f) set up micro-enterprises; and (g) build up cooperatives</p> <p>Strengthen institutional capacity of state employment centres and related institutions</p>
	Sector economic recovery to boost employment opportunities	<p>Reinforce existing waste management and resource recovery livelihood sector</p> <p>Private sector recovery including: (a) support to youth entrepreneurship including in the agro sector; (b) reopening of border stations; and (c) recovery of markets</p> <p>Increased access to financial services for micro, small, and medium enterprises</p> <p>Private sector recovery to create jobs in (a) formal private sector: small and medium enterprises; and (b) informal private sector: micro-enterprises</p> <p>Agriculture based Value Chains and agro processing centres established and strengthened.</p> <p>Develop and commercialise natural resource based and solid minerals value chains and enterprises for sustainable broad based local economic recovery</p> <p>Strengthen agriculture and irrigation related services value chains for increased food security and agricultural productivity</p> <p>Employ displaced persons in procurement of forthcoming national school feeding program</p>

# Summary of Recovery and Peace Building Needs

**Building on the guiding principles laid out in the overall Strategic Recovery and Peace Building Framework in Chapter 3, this chapter summarises the impacts, needs and recovery and peace building requirements for the three components: (a) peace building, stability and social cohesion; (b) infrastructure and social services; and (c) economic recovery. Cross-cutting issues including gender, human rights, explosive remnants of war and youth are also discussed. For more depth see Volume II of the RPBA which contains detailed component reports.**

## 4.1. Overview of Impacts, Needs, and Financial Requirements

**The conflict in the North-East has had devastating impacts on the population.** While the impact on the component peace building, stability and social cohesion is hard to financially quantify, the crisis has affected 14.8 million people and resulted in massive displacement within Nigeria and across the border to Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, since 2009. By December 2015, the number of IDPs reached 1.8 million, of which nearly 80 percent were women, children, and youth. In addition to the destruction of infrastructure and interruption of basic services, the city of Maiduguri, with a 2007 resident population of 1.2 million, is hosting 1.6 million IDPs, with some sheltering in public buildings and schools. During the conflict, more than 600 teachers were killed, 19,000 teachers displaced, and 1,200 schools destroyed.<sup>27</sup>

As the government regains control over some areas that were taken over by Boko Haram and the recovery process starts, signs of social fragmentation, based on ethno-religious, social, and other divisions, including between IDPs and hosts, are evident in some areas.

**The rapid deterioration of the conflict, and vacuum of law enforcement mechanisms to contain and control conflict, resulted in widespread levels of suspicion, mistrust and stigma along ethnic, religious, political and geographical lines.** The social fabric in the North-East was deeply damaged, eroding social relations between citizens and government, down to ethnic clans, communities and even extended families. Economic, ethnic, religious, political and geographical divisions have hardened, affecting the way in which any recovery effort is perceived, while new divisions have emerged. The sequentially overlapping phases of humanitarian, early recovery and development assistance need to incorporate confidence and trust-building, collaboration and mutual understanding. Social impacts of efforts are central considerations in all proposed interventions in such a fragile social system.

**The impact of the fighting on infrastructure and service delivery is substantial.** This assessment estimates nearly US\$ 9 billion in damages across all six states. Two-thirds of the damages (US\$ 5.9 billion) are in Borno, the most affected State; damages in Adamawa and Yobe account for US\$ 1.6 billion and US\$ 1.2 billion, respective-

TABLE 4

**Overall Recovery and Peace Building Needs by Component (US\$ million)**

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Federal/ Regional<sup>B</sup></i>	<i>Total</i>
Peace building and social cohesion	27.5	37.8	22.5	13.6	19.4	23.9	5.7	150.5
Infrastructure and social services	594.9	3933.3	668.3	129.1	144.9	202.9	94.7	6040.1
Economic Recovery	37.6	68.8	30.7	22.3	27.7	41.4	245	473.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>4040</b>	<b>721.5</b>	<b>164.9</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>268.2</b>	<b>345.4</b>	<b>6664.1</b>

ly. Three-quarters of the overall impacts are on agriculture (US\$ 3.5 billion) and housing (US\$ 3.3 billion). The conflict resulted in more than 400,000 damaged and destroyed housing units, 95 percent of which are located in Borno. Also, private enterprises, transport, energy and water infrastructure, as well as health and education facilities were damaged or destroyed during the crisis.

**The Boko Haram conflict and insecurity has prevented households from pursuing their livelihoods and regular economic activity.** The crisis has further deteriorated the already weak economies of the North-East. It is estimated that the region suffered from an accumulated output loss of US\$ 8.3 billion between 2011 and 2015.<sup>26</sup> Borno suffered from the largest loss as State output fell by US\$ 3.5 billion between 2011 and 2015, while food prices rose by nearly 7.5 percent.<sup>27</sup> The combination of output loss and increase in prices implies a significant reduction in welfare of the people. During the crisis, poverty rates rose from 47.3 percent in 2011, to 50.4 percent in 2013. Restrictions on food availability and access to farms and markets in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe have generated a localised crisis of acute food insecurity during the lean period. Food insecurity has increased drastically among IDPs, host communities and states most severely affected by the conflict.

**The recovery and peace building process requires a holistic approach,** which promotes peace, stability and social cohesion, addresses the rehabilitation of infrastructure and services, and also addresses underlying macro-economic issues to overcome the nexus of instability, conflict and deteriorating development. Lessons from other conflict and crisis contexts highlight that rebuilding trust and cohesion are as essential as the restoration of services and reconstruction, economic revitalisation and rebuilding livelihoods.

**The total needs for recovery and peace building across the three components in both the stabilisation and recovery phase is US\$ 6.5 billion,** of which Borno would require US\$ 4 billion, Yobe, US\$ 721 million and Adamawa, US\$ 660 million. Table 4 provides a summary of the needs across states and components.

**Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion require US\$ 151 million for durable solutions.** The approach ensures that the return and resettlement of displaced persons are voluntary and conducted in a secure and dignified manner.<sup>29</sup> Further priorities include building trust within communities, among different groups, and between citizens and government, as well as preventing conflict at community level by reducing violence in the context of Boko Haram hostilities. For a sustainable stabilisation and recovery, it is crucial to increase access to effective justice and redress, and strengthen local governance to support service delivery and accountability. Flexibility in implementation is important in response to changing circumstances and to the scale of the challenge.

**The Infrastructure and Social Services interventions total US\$ 6 billion.** This is mainly due to the high costs of infrastructure and building rehabilitation, and the needs for restoring basic services in both areas directly affected by the conflict as well as those areas that have received a large influx of IDPs. The highest needs are for the reconstruction of houses (US\$ 1.2 billion), followed by agriculture (US\$ 881 million), and education (US\$ 721 million). Infrastructure sectors require US\$ 1.2 billion for reconstruction, making up over 20 percent of the total needs.

**The overall estimated needs for Economic Recovery total US\$ 473.5 million.** Key interventions include the recovery of private sector and markets, reopening international borders, addressing long term cross cutting issues (finance and investment climate), developing youth entrepreneurship, livelihood support and the provision and establish-

ment of a small grant funding programme coupled with initiatives to strengthen business management skills and the diversification of employment opportunities. Strengthening the institutional capacity of State Employment Centres to implement skill training and job placement initiatives would further support employment creation.

**Mainstreamed across the three components, the RPBA addresses four key cross-cutting issues: gender, human rights, explosive remnants of war and youth.** All interventions need to pay particular attention to the specific position of women and girls. Other vulnerable groups to focus on include unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), unemployed youth, child heads of household, elderly people and people with disabilities. Reconciliation and sustainable peace can only be achieved through a human rights based comprehensive response, which addresses the root causes of the conflict, as well as its impact. A dedicated mine action programme with emergency risk education reaching all the population, especially those working in potentially dangerous zones, is of utmost importance.

## 4.2. Peace Building, Stability, and Social Cohesion

**The peace building, stability and social cohesion component addresses four inter-linked sub-sectors:**

- (a) Safe and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced persons;
- (b) Reconciliation, peace building and community cohesion;
- (c) Local governance and citizen engagement;
- (d) Community security, justice, human rights, mine action small arms control.

**Rebuilding trust and cohesion are as essential as restoration of services and reconstruction, economic revitalisation, and building livelihoods.** Lessons from other conflict and crisis contexts highlight the importance of rapidly addressing relationship and trust building, reconciliation, peace, access to justice, citizen participation, citizen security, and psycho-social recovery as these are fundamental elements of a sustainable recovery and peace building process.

### 4.2.1. Impacts of the Conflict on Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion

**The population has been exposed to multiple forms of violence and human rights abuses, including extreme and barbaric violence perpetrated by Boko Haram.** The group has targeted civilians, includ-

ing school children and teachers: more than 600 teachers have been killed, hundreds of pupils kidnapped or killed and over 1,200 schools destroyed.<sup>30</sup> Girls and young women have been kidnapped for sexual abuse and forced marriage. Men and young boys are often killed especially when they refuse to join the group, with many reporting having witnessed mass murders of male family and community members.<sup>30</sup>

Trauma is widespread in the population. Forty-one percent of vulnerable households surveyed in Borno had witnessed killing/violence. Children and adolescents suffer disproportionately from psychological trauma, are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, and lack tools with which to access support.

**The number of IDPs has risen from 1.2 million people in February 2015 to an estimated 2.1 million people in December 2015, of which 1.8 million are directly displaced by Boko Haram conflict and hostilities.** Women, children, and the youth bear the brunt of forced displacement, accounting for nearly 80 percent of affected populations. Of the 1.8 million identified IDPs nationally, 53 percent are women, and 57 percent are children (of which 28 percent are five or younger).<sup>30</sup>

**Borno, at the heart of the crisis, hosts 67 percent of all IDPs.** The population of Maiduguri, the State's capital, has more than doubled due to displaced persons. The scale of displacement in other parts of Borno is unclear due to continuing instability and inaccessibility. Yobe and Adamawa also share large IDP burdens, hosting 130,000 and 136,000 respectively, or around 6 percent in each State. The Displacement Tracking Matrix VII reported that 94 percent of IDPs expressed the intention to return, but conditions are not yet in place that would allow them to do so. The majority of IDPs live in host communities with only 8.5 percent in camps and camp-like sites. Already poor, host communities have been sharing resources with IDPs for over 24 months with little external support, and are now reliant on negative coping strategies.

**Displacement has affected every aspect of people's lives.** Individuals and families fled from conflict and lost all their productive assets, homes, and possessions, relegating many of them into extreme poverty overnight. Traditional livelihoods have been destroyed, rendering people food insecure and dependent on external support to cover their needs. Services previously available in their places of origin are also affected, shutting off and limiting access of entire communities to health, education, justice and other social services. In the process of

displacement, families and communities became separated, severing crucial social ties and safety nets, all of this translating to an increased level of vulnerability, particularly on the part of unaccompanied children, women heads of household, and older people. As entire communities have been displaced community social support was lost, limiting the availability of coping mechanisms for affected people.

**Displacement has also increased vulnerability in many ways, including to SGBV.** There is evidence from humanitarian agencies that sexual abuse of women and children is widespread. There is little concrete data, as social stigmatisation hampers the reporting of SGBV; however, the National Demographic Health Survey in 2013 reported that 30 percent of women said they had suffered from sexual abuse. Girls and women who have experienced sexual violence from Boko Haram members are stigmatised by their communities, especially when they become pregnant. In these situations, the mother and her children often become detached from their communities and families, putting them at further risk of poverty and abuse. Men and boys also confront a range of threats, including violence, abduction, forced recruitment by Boko Haram and vigilante groups, and detention on suspicion of militancy sympathies.

**Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMAs) of the six affected states have served as the coordination and response mechanism to provide life-saving support to IDPs.** NEMA and SEMAs have also coordinated responses across agencies and line ministries, clarifying roles and responsibilities in the aftermath of the displacement crisis.

**Given the scope of the displacement crisis and understanding that Nigeria has not dealt with a displacement situation of this magnitude in the past, the country should formulate a regulatory and policy framework on forced displacement.** Although a signatory country of the Kampala Convention,<sup>32</sup> this legal framework has not been domesticated and sanctioned in Nigeria. The magnitude of the crisis calls for coordination and accountability mechanisms that allow for a comprehensive and holistic response to the specific needs and challenges of forcibly displaced populations. In the absence of this system, support would become scattered, roles and responsibilities diffused and lines of accountability too vague, putting most of the burden of displacement on host communities, increasing social tensions and deepening a sense of abandonment by the Government, undermining peace and stability efforts.

**In most of Borno, and in parts of Yobe and Adamawa, the majority of police stations have been destroyed and officials have fled with the population to safe areas.** This has resulted in a breakdown of security, law and order in some areas. The traditional authorities who would normally provide grievance redress to the majority of the population have been weakened due to a combination of being targeted by Boko Haram, decreasing legitimacy, and changing generational dynamics. This has led to an increase in recourse to violence when disputes arise, further intensifying the crisis. The already low quality of local governance further deteriorated during the conflict. Boko Haram has deliberately targeted public institutions and officials, in order to force out Local Government officials.

**Human rights violations have been committed on both sides of the conflict.** With violations by all sides going unreported or not fully addressed by State authorities, a climate of impunity may have been fostered. The proliferation of cheap and easily available small arms and light weapons has fuelled the violence, while the presence of mines and undetonated explosives adds to the risks for the population. Weak governance and the lack of provision of justice and security by the State constrain effective responses for addressing violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, impunity for the rule of law, armed conflict and displacement. Improving governance and justice provision is therefore essential to address immediate challenges and support the return of stability and peace.

#### 4.2.2. Overview of Needs for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion

**The total needs for the peace building, stability and social cohesion component are estimated at US\$ 151 million as shown in Table 5.** Needs are greatest in the subcomponents of safe and voluntarily return of IDPs (costing US\$ 48.7 million) and local governance and citizen engagement (costing US\$ 49.7 million). Critical needs for the safe and voluntary return and resettlement of IDPs such as housing, service delivery and economic activities are accounted for under the infrastructure and social services and economic recovery components. Addressing the needs in a holistic and integrated manner is critical for success, and seen as a precondition for stability and key for sustainable recovery.

**The situation in the North-East differs within and among the six States affected by the Boko Haram related crisis.** Borno, along with parts of Yobe and Adamawa, remains very seriously affected by insecurity, displacement, and acute humanitarian needs. Borno State has the greatest needs estimate for this component, amounting to US\$ 37.8 million.

TABLE 5

**Estimated Needs for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion by State**

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Federal</i>	<i>Total</i>
Safe and Voluntary Return of IDPs	9	11.3	7.5	5.2	7.1	8.6	0	48.7
Reconciliation, peace Building and Community Cohesion	3.7	4.7	3	1.9	2.8	3.5	0	19.5
Local Governance and Citizen Engagement	9.3	11.9	7.5	4.9	7.1	8.8	0.2	49.7
Community Security, Justice, Human Rights, Mine Action and Small Arms Control	5.6	9.8	4.6	1.7	2.5	3	5.6	32.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>37.8</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>19.4</b>	<b>23.9</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>150.5</b>

The recommended interventions under peace building, stability and social cohesion lay the foundations for the effective implementation of sustainable recovery for all components. Many issues addressed in the recommended interventions are preconditions for future stability. Interventions are therefore closely interrelated in terms of both priority needs and timelines. Due to the rapid nature of this assessment and the lack of quantitative data in some areas, the RPBA does not provide detailed location-specific analysis or recommendations. General recommendations are made for conflict and displacement affected communities in the six states and at national level. This initial set of recommendations needs to be complemented by a more detailed and targeted set of interventions designed on the basis of further and deeper analysis.

**Specific measures that facilitate confidence and trust building can be directly linked to community involvement in recovery measures.**

The sequentially overlapping phases of humanitarian, early recovery and development assistance need to incorporate these principles. This report identifies a number of priority interventions that would begin immediately and expand over the next four years. Recommendations also reflect international experience, which demonstrates that there cannot be any meaningful or lasting peace or recovery without addressing and resolving grievances and root causes of conflict via a process that involve all affected groups. In addition, this cannot happen without a national policy framework that underpins regional and local interventions.

**A phased implementation strategy, divided into a stabilisation phase and a recovery phase, forms the basis for peace building, but flexibility in implementation in response to changing circumstances and to**

**the scale of the challenge is important.** While more detailed assessments at sub-State level are needed to develop further disaggregated and targeted programmes, this should not diminish the urgency of the response. Further analysis is to be the first step of implementation. The phasing and prioritisation of interventions should also consider: (a) the return patterns of IDPs; (b) approaches to working in highly insecure contexts; and (c) a tailored strategy for the cluster of States (i.e. Borno, Yobe and Adamawa; and Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba), taking into account their specific needs. The principles of engagement will remain the same, but the interventions will need to be demand driven.

**As a general principle, the assessment adopts an integrated approach to recovery, in particular to address displacement and return needs, instead of the traditional sectoral approach.** A gradual or incremental implementation strategy is recommended, taking into consideration the security situation, the extent of the human and physical damages faced by the population, and the specificities of each state. Table 6 provides a summary of the estimated needs and recommended interventions.

**For the recommended interventions to be effective, local ownership and community participation needs to be ensured throughout the stabilisation and recovery process.** Decisions on return and resettlement need to be taken in close consultation with key stakeholders and beneficiaries. Given such an integrated, multi-stakeholder and community-based approach, it will also be necessary from the outset to clarify the mandates of key actors and establish appropriate but flexible mechanisms and processes.

TABLE 6

**Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion**

<i>Areas of intervention</i>	<i>Recommended Interventions</i>	<i>Cost</i>
<p><b>Safe and Voluntary Return and Resettlement of Displaced Persons</b></p> <p><b>Objectives:</b> To meet the basic needs of displaced people and people unable to return due to security constraints in the short-to-medium term, while simultaneously providing holistic and integrated support to people willing and able to return and resettle</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop and implement a policy and operational framework to determine how and when displaced persons can be supported to return</li> <li>• Enhance institutional arrangements and apply and enforce existing international legal frameworks regarding safe, dignified and voluntarily return and resettlement</li> <li>• Develop a holistic, integrated programmatic approach targeting displaced persons and host communities concurrently to avoid new or recurring conflicts, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Broader access to basic needs and support of displaced persons</li> <li>• Development and implementation of protection interventions, such as psycho-social support to affected populations and targeted provision of basic services to the most vulnerable</li> <li>• Integration of Mental Health and Psycho-social Support (MHPSS) into primary health care in order to enhance accessibility and opportune response</li> <li>• Strengthen prevention and response mechanisms in camps, camp-like settings and host communities ensuring services are provided in integrated manner</li> <li>• Livelihoods and skills initiatives and training</li> <li>• Implementation of tailored interventions to support unaccompanied and separated children (UASC)</li> <li>• Programs to address the needs of unattended elderly focusing on provision of care and livelihoods</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Scale up existing livelihoods initiatives in camps, camp-like sites and host communities particularly those focused on vulnerable populations;</li> </ul>	48.7 million
<p><b>Reconciliation, Peace building and Community Cohesion</b></p> <p><b>Objectives:</b> To promote peace building, social cohesion, truth and reconciliation, while working towards reduced numbers of Boko Haram sympathizers/ members through demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating CJTF and vigilante groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training of key stakeholders (village leaders, religious leaders, teachers, etc.) in particular in areas with high numbers of IDPs and where returns of displaced persons are likely</li> <li>• Technical assistance for implementation of 'safe corridor' policy, legal and policy frameworks and programmes for reintegration of former Boko Haram members</li> <li>• Development and implementation of a communications strategy and outreach campaign aimed at local population and potential Boko Haram members</li> <li>• Comprehensive survey to determine the extent of trauma and establishment of specific psycho-social support programmes, for children (including former child combatants), women, and youth</li> <li>• Support to civil society through capacity building and the establishment of a social fund for CSOs to contribute to peace building initiatives in the affected States</li> <li>• Prevention and mitigation of SGBV</li> </ul>	19.5 million
<p><b>Local Governance and Citizen Engagement</b></p> <p><b>Objectives:</b> To strengthen Local Government capacity, participation, accountability and transparency, improving local democracy, and supporting the return of displaced governments and governments hosting IDP communities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rapid needs assessment in settlements of IDPs, stakeholder mapping and building of a bottom-up planning model</li> <li>• Establishment of community platforms to identify community needs, grievances and security challenges at village level</li> <li>• Capacity building for Local Governments on project implementation including budgeting, planning, monitoring and reporting, and on judicial and extra-judicial referrals (including to legal aid providers) and conflict resolution</li> <li>• Capacity building for local CSOs on community planning, independent monitoring of service delivery and recovery programme implementation, community-based targeting of beneficiaries for social protection programmes and for core coordination groups on community mobilisation;</li> <li>• Mentoring and on-the-job training on revenue mobilisation IRG, PFM, accountability and transparency and policy implementation capacity (including targeting mechanisms for social protection) at Local Government levels</li> <li>• Support for political advocacy and policy dialogue between local stakeholders, including on anticorruption mechanisms</li> </ul>	49.7 million
<p><b>Community Security, Justice, Human Rights, Mine Action and Small Arms Control</b></p> <p><b>Objectives:</b> To re-establish security and rule of law, including the monitoring and punishment of human rights abuses, and to reduce risks of proliferation of small arms and presence of mines</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support to police (equipment, rehabilitation of police posts/offices, training) to strengthen and re-introduce policing in areas of need, e.g. IDP camps</li> <li>• Strengthen justice systems through capacity building for judiciary, prosecutors and court staff, provision of materials (stationary, law books, forms, etc.) and establishment of mobile justice in locations without courtrooms</li> <li>• Mine action, including emergency risk education, survey of hazardous areas and explosive ordnance disposal, assessment of victim assistance needs and individual rehabilitation response</li> <li>• Strengthen oversight bodies to monitor police, security forces and judicial conduct</li> <li>• Capacity building for CSOs and community stakeholders on human rights and gender sensitive dispute resolution</li> <li>• Strengthen traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and increase female participation in decision-making fora</li> </ul>	32.6 million

Given that there is no indication that a peace process will take place in the immediate term, certain interventions will need to take place within this framework. This includes the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, and transitional justice systems. While not included here, these activities remain highly relevant to the North-East context, and should be considered a priority should a formal peace process eventually take place.

### 4.3. Infrastructure and Social Services

The Infrastructure and Social Service Component estimates the impact of the crisis on physical infrastructure and social services as well as the corresponding recovery needs. The following sectors were considered:

- Physical sectors: Energy, Environment, Information and Communication Technology, Transport
- Social Sectors: Education, Health and Nutrition, Housing, Public Buildings, Social Protection, Water and Sanitation
- Productive Sectors: Agriculture, Private Enterprise

The sustainable restoration and improvement of infrastructure and social services is crucial to stabilising livelihoods and economic recovery and is a prerequisite to create an environment for the return of those displaced. In addition to the 'brick-and-mortar' damage to infrastructure, the loss of equipment, the exodus of employees and a drop in staff capacity in the directly affected regions are challenges that need to be addressed. Ensuring provision of social services in indirectly affected areas is further complicated by the influx of displaced people.

#### 4.3.1. Impacts of the crisis on infrastructure and social services

This section provides a summary of the direct and indirect impacts of the conflict in the different sectors, identified by representatives of the Federal and State Governments and technical experts in early 2016. The impact on the physical infrastructure and related social services can be divided into four broad categories:

- (a) damages caused by armed conflict;
- (b) the loss of facilities;
- (c) damages to service provision and supply infrastructure that prevent services from reaching the affected population; and
- (d) lack of human resources/staff since many have left the areas directly affected by the conflict, or have been killed as stated elsewhere.

The total impact of the conflict on infrastructure and social services is estimated at US\$ 9.2 billion. Three quarters of the damages are in Borno (US\$ 6.9 billion), the state most affected by the crisis, followed by Yobe (US\$ 1.2 billion) and Adamawa (US\$ 828 million). The impact on the other three states and at the federal level is less than three percent of the direct damages and impacts. Table 7 below provides a detailed overview of estimated damages to each sector by state.

The impact varies substantially across sectors the sectors. The most affected sectors were agriculture (US\$ 3.7 billion) and housing (US\$ 3.3 billion), which together account for three quarters of the overall impacts. The physical sectors account for 8 percent of damages, the social sectors account for 42 percent, and the productive sectors account for 50 percent of the damages. Below brief damage descriptions are given for each sector.

#### Physical sectors: Energy; Environment; Information and Communication Technology (ICT); Transport

- **Energy:** Transmission lines and the electricity distribution network were in parts destroyed.
- **Environment:** The impact on the environment was mainly caused by damaged and destroyed solid waste collection facilities, the burning of forests (including Sambisia forest), the impacts to wetlands and private orchards and the high use of natural resources (including wood for fires) in areas of increased population density due to communities hosting IDPs.
- **ICT:** Telecommunications infrastructure was heavily targeted, particularly base stations or base transceiver stations, used for creating a mobile phone network. Roughly 480 base stations, or 1.6 percent of stations, in the region have been reported as damaged.
- **Transport:** Roads and bridges have been damaged extensively by explosive devices, while the movement of military vehicles damaged many roads.

#### Social Sectors: Education; Health and Nutrition, Housing; Public Buildings; Social Protection; Water and Sanitation.

- **Education:** The conflict had a particularly high impact on the education and vocational system. Schools were damaged and destroyed, teachers were threatened and in some cases killed, and schools were transformed into shelter for IDPs. At least 50 schools in Borno State host IDPs.



TABLE 7

**Estimated damages related to Infrastructure and Social Services (US\$ million)**

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Federal</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Physical Sectors</b>								
Energy	31.9	16	4.3		7		129.5	188.7
Environment	1.2	2.9	0.6	0.2	0.8	<0.1		5.7
ICT								25.1
Transport	73.8	306.1	116.9	29				525.8
<b>Social Sectors</b>								
Education	58	143.8	47.3	2.1	10.2	11.6		273
Health/Nutrition	21.1	59	32.9	0.4	6.5	27.8		147.7
Housing	25.8	3179	118.3	2.9	2.8	1.2		3,329.9
Public Buildings	2.3	15.3	14.5	1.1		2.3		35.5
Social Protection								N/A
Water & Sanitation	7.3	35	3.6					46
<b>Productive Sectors</b>								
Agriculture	457.9	2377.7	868.7	4.9	12	7.6		3729.7
Private Enterprises	149.8	763.6	<0.1	2		<0.1		915.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>828.9</b>	<b>6898.5</b>	<b>1207.2</b>	<b>42.5</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>50.5</b>	<b>129.5</b>	<b>9221.5</b>

- **Health and Nutrition:** Health facilities have been systematically targeted, leading to damage and destruction of facilities. Out of 788 reportedly damaged facilities (including 21 hospitals), 45 percent were destroyed. The already weak health infrastructure has further deteriorated. In 2014, the North-East states recorded more than 35,000 cholera cases.
- **Housing:** The impacts on housing were substantial with 431,842 units fully destroyed (68 percent) or partially damaged (32 percent). Borno was particularly affected, accounting for 95 percent of the damaged housing units. Damages were caused by bomb blasts, shelling and fire.
- **Public Buildings:** In the conflict affected areas, nearly 700 public buildings were impacted by the conflict, of which 94 percent were fully destroyed or dysfunctional.
- **Social Protection:** Damages in this sector were measured in terms of the households' well-being, as no physical damage was incurred. Comparison of household characteristics pre- and post-crisis showed that school attendance of children decreased, health expenditure per household increased, while food expenditure decreased. These negative developments cannot only be attributed to the crisis, as some of these indicators have worsened in the non-affected states as well. Nevertheless, one can confidently assume that the crisis has had a negative impact on the well-being of the households.
- **Water and Sanitation:** The conflict has seriously damaged water and sanitation infrastructure. Additionally, the increase in population in some areas due to inflow of IDPs has placed additional burden on already strained water and sanitation facilities.

#### Productive sectors: Agriculture and Private Enterprises

- **Agriculture:** The impact on agriculture is estimated to be US\$ 3.7 billion, mainly affecting Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. Impacts include the destruction and loss of livestock, irrigation facilities, machinery, seeds, fertiliser, farm roads, offices, and veterinary health facilities. In addition, a large part of the population fled the area leaving their land fallow. Farm labourers were not able to work on fields, substantially reducing production and increasing food insecurity.
- **Private Enterprises:** The commerce sector was particularly affected by the high number of damaged and destroyed businesses, estimated at 1.3 million units, including mainly small shops, petrol pumps and other commerce infrastructure.

### 4.3.2 Strategic Approach for Infrastructure and Social Services

The guiding principles for prioritisation and phasing upon which the implementation of the infrastructure and social service recovery is built include:

**Securing areas that have been inaccessible:** Reconstruction and recovery activities in conflict-affected areas require a careful approach with regard to the clearance of the remnants of war, such as unexploded ordnances, mine removal, clearing of hazardous waste and debris removal. Ensuring that these issues are taken care of by specialised and certified entities before construction (e.g. of roads and bridges) commences is crucial and a prerequisite for any intervention.

**Stabilisation:** In the stabilisation phase, the focus will be on the reconstruction of essential and basic infrastructure, health and education facilities, while promoting farmer-driven recovery through the provision of seeds and fertilizer, as well as homeowner-driven reconstruction of houses for the most vulnerable population. This stabilisation phase will also focus on restoring basic services and providing social safety nets.

**Recovery:** In the recovery phase, the longer term recovery and reconstruction of infrastructure is envisaged including the reconstruction of the transport network, irrigation and agricultural infrastructure, rolling out housing reconstruction through all areas, and rebuilding education and health facilities. The service provision in all sectors would be restored and public buildings reconstructed.

All sectoral initiatives should be conceived, designed, and implemented to strengthen social cohesion and resilience of conflict and displacement affected communities. In the first instance interventions should support displaced populations and their host communities, better protect conflict-affected populations, promote reconciliation and strengthen community safety and access to justice where conditions allow.

The intervention actions proposed under this component are briefly described below and include important actions in the area of institutional capacity building and reform, transparency, and governance of natural resources.

#### Physical Sectors

- **Energy:** Effective energy sector recovery is expected to constitute a complex mix of public sector-led implementation and regulation and facilitation of private sector recovery interventions.
- **Environment:** Removing hazardous waste, managing debris and solid waste and restoring the natural environment require the collective efforts from Federal and State levels, together with communities and the private sector. State-specific solid waste management plans should be formulated to identify the most effective approach in dealing with solid waste, safe disposal, and recycling. Similarly, specific debris management plans should be formulated.
- **ICT:** The availability and affordability of high-quality telecom services, including broadband and mobile phone services, are seen as a necessary precondition of economic development, job creation, recovery and peace building. Recovery of the ICT sector will require strengthening the enabling environment and reconstructing telecommunications infrastructure.
- **Transport:** The recovery strategy for the transport sector primarily aims to promote mobility of goods, services and people. The implementation of large transport infrastructure rehabilitation programmes requires the collaborative effort of State and Federal Government and dedicated institutions managing the design and implementation of these programmes. The reconstruction of critical infrastructure, such as bridges and Federal roads would be given priority.

#### Social Sectors

- **Education:** In order for the reconstruction and recovery of the education sector to occur as efficiently as possible, a concerted effort




across Federal, State, and Local Government actors will be necessary. School based management committees would be involved, with the participation of displaced population representatives to support the rehabilitation of the sector together with different actors at State, including State Universal Basic Education Board, and Federal level, including Universal Basic Education Commission and NEMA (as they are supporting IDPs access to education).

- **Health and Nutrition:** The recovery strategy is composed of two complementary approaches: ensuring access to essential health and nutrition services for target groups, and restoring critical health system functions. Recovery planning for the public health sector needs to involve all Federal, State and local Government with the State Primary Health Care Development Agency being central to health and nutrition recovery efforts. Long-term reforms should be aligned with the Nigeria Health Strategy, with overall support for management, human resources and capacity development.
- **Housing:** The housing recovery strategy consists of repairing and rebuilding damaged and destroyed housing units. Considering the extent of the housing recovery needs and inadequate institutional capacity of states to design and implement the program, it is recommended the reconstruction needs should be phased at the level of different LGAs, based on impacts and social needs. The reconstruction should be designed in two stages, targeting first the 25 percent most vulnerable families and critical housing needs.
- **Public Buildings:** In order to restore and improve the social contract between the population and the government, damaged gov-

ernment facilities should be restored at the earliest. The reconstruction of public buildings requires a two-phased approach, where first the reconstruction policies and standards would be defined and build back better and smarter guidelines established; and then the damaged administrative and police buildings reconstructed as soon as possible.

- **Social Protection:** In the crisis context, the programme would be paced giving priority to areas with a high number and influx of displaced populations. It would be important to establish a clear and transparent targeting mechanism to reach the most vulnerable population with clearly defined and transparent criteria for vulnerable groups, and to establish a workable identification mechanism. The institutional arrangements for establishing and scaling up of social protection programmes need to be carefully thought through, and should build upon the National Social Protection Policy and related instruments.
- **Water and Sanitation:** Water and sanitation recovery needs entail repair and rehabilitation of damaged water supply and sewage infrastructure, increasing the capacity of water supply and sewage systems to accommodate IDPs, and institutional support and capacity development support. The different actors responsible for water management at the policy level (Federal Ministry of Water Resources), river basin level, Urban State Water Agencies (USWA) as well as Rural and Small Town Water Supply and Sanitation Agencies, need to come together effectively restore the water supply and provide sanitation facilities in the affected areas.

FIGURE 5  
**Damages to Infrastructure (top); Infrastructure and Service Delivery Needs by sector (bottom)**



**Productive Sectors**

- **Agriculture:** Successful rehabilitation of the agricultural production and of the value chain requires a community-led recovery involving the different ministries and agencies at Federal, State and Local levels as well as farmer associations and irrigation water user associations. In the stabilisation phase, support to food security, the provision of seeds and fertilisers, and emergency employment programmes especially for youth will be important, while irrigation, veterinary clinics and extension facilities would be addressed in the recovery phase.

**Community infrastructure and non-formal services are important for local communities, but it is challenging to make an exact estimation of needs.** Therefore a contingency has been added to cater for community infrastructure and non-formal services, which is particularly relevant for the education, health and nutrition, public buildings, transport and water and sanitation sectors. This accounts, for example, for non-formal or traditional education and schools as well as locally managed community infrastructure, such as community centres or local pathways, which are not yet specified in the assessment. It also accounts for a security premium, which, for example, relates to higher costs for construction material due to security premiums charged by traders. The contingency is estimated as a ten percent premium over the above-mentioned sectors.

**4.3.3. Overview of Needs and Financial Requirements for Infrastructure and Social Services**

This section provides an overview of the costed strategic options and scenarios for recovery and reconstruction for the different sectors. This includes a qualitative assessment of infrastructure, service delivery, capacity and human development needs as well as quantification of resources required to reconstruct needed infrastructure and restore social services. Need estimations respond to the damages reported and also consider (a) the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure to improved standards; (b) restoration of service delivery and the replacement of facilities; and (c) the provision of social services to displaced persons. The needs are prioritised according to the principles laid out in the RPBS.

The key objective of ensuring the equitable delivery of infrastructure and social services in conflict-affected areas has been incorporated in various sector needs assessments. Further recommendations to mainstream displacement issues in terms of recovery and peace building include the following: (a) ensuring schools, health care fa-

TABLE 8

**Estimated needs for infrastructure and social services (US\$ million)**

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Regional / Federal</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Physical Sectors</b>								
Energy	31.9	15.9	3.3		3.4		92.5	147
Environment	10.6	235.9	15.9	15.6	34.4	2.7		315.1
ICT								272.1
Public Buildings	40.3	295.9	22.7	2.7	5.8	6.7		374.1
Transport	74.5	337.5	126.7	37				575.8
Water & Sanitation	25.9	115.3	17.2	3	4.7	5.8		171.9
<b>Social Sectors</b>								
Education	83	513.6	77.1	6.8	17.4	23.5		721.4
Health & Nutrition	50.6	481.7	86.2	4	12.7	29.3	2.2	666.7
Private Housing	15.7	1097.4	46.6	1.8	2.2	0.7		1164.4
Social Protection	93.8	180.3	69.6	34.3	30.6	91.1		499.5
<b>Productive Sectors</b>								
Agriculture	141.1	485.4	170	18.5	29.7	36.6		881.4
<b>Contingency</b>								
Community Infrastructure	27.4	174.4	33	5.4	4.1	6.5		250.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>594.9</b>	<b>3933.3</b>	<b>668.3</b>	<b>129.1</b>	<b>144.9</b>	<b>202.9</b>	<b>94.7</b>	<b>6040.1</b>

cilities, water and sanitation systems are supported to accommodate new demand associated with the presence of IDPs; (b) ensuring equal and adequate access by displaced population and host populations to rehabilitated services so as not to engender conflict between them; (c) involving both displaced persons and hosts communities in the process of identifying rehabilitation priorities in communities from the beginning of the recovery process; (d) weighing-in displaced persons' return options, surveying return intentions and needs in order to prioritise the rehabilitation of infrastructure and social services that will enable and sustain return; and (e) employing displaced persons and local vulnerable population skills in public works in the recovery process.

**Table 8 provides an overview of the recovery needs for the Infrastructure and Social Services interventions, with the total an esti-**

**mated US\$ 6 billion.** The highest needs arise for the reconstruction of houses (US\$ 1.2 billion), followed by agriculture (US\$ 881 million), education (US\$ 721 million), health (US\$ 667 million) and social protection (US\$ 500 million). The physical sectors account for 21 percent of needs, the social sectors account for 60 percent, and the productive sectors account for 18 percent. An additional contingency catering for community infrastructure and non-formal services has been added, estimated at US\$ 251 million.

**Nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of the needs are required for Borno, while the lesser affected states like Adamawa and Yobe still account for 22 percent and 9 percent respectively.** The states that were involved to a lesser extend in the conflict and are mainly affected through their roles as hosts to the influx of IDPs account for just 4 percent of the needs. Less than 2 percent of needs are related to the

TABLE 9

## Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Infrastructure and Social Services

<i>Sectors</i>	<i>Recommended Interventions</i>	<i>Costs</i>
<b>Physical Sectors</b>		
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restoration of key transmission and distribution infrastructure in the most affected States (Borno, Taraba)</li> <li>Restoration of medium and low voltage infrastructure in less affected States and subsequently in Borno and Taraba</li> <li>Reconstruction of buildings related to the energy infrastructure</li> <li>Provision of solar panels and diesel generators to overcome urgent energy shortages</li> </ul>	147.0 million
<b>Environment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Safe removal of ERW, clean up of polluted areas and hazardous waste</li> <li>Mine risk education, UXO disposal, State wide debris management plans need to be put in place</li> <li>Debris clearing, transport, disposal, recycling</li> <li>Rehabilitation of solid waste management infrastructure and provision of services for IDPs and host communities</li> <li>Restoration of community wood lots</li> <li>Extensive, long-term restoration of protected areas</li> </ul>	315.1 million
<b>Information and Communication Technology</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refurbishment of damaged infrastructure for mobile phones base stations and towers</li> <li>Modernisation of weak and deteriorated mobile phone networks</li> </ul>	272.1 million
<b>Public Buildings</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reconstructing key government facilities, offices, and police stations across all affected States based on a build-back-better approach</li> <li>Reconstruction of government facilities, such as post, election, and audit offices based on a build-back-better approach</li> </ul>	374.1 million
<b>Transport</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clearing and controlling roads of mines and UXO</li> <li>Reconstruction of destroyed and damaged bridges and trunk roads based on a building back-better approach</li> <li>Reconstruction of damaged roads at State and Local Government level based on a build-back-better approach</li> <li>Rehabilitation of public transport infrastructure (buses) in affected States and improvement of transport facilities for conflict and displacement affected areas</li> </ul>	575.8 million
<b>Water and Sanitation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recovery of water supply and sewage infrastructure in communities and institutions</li> <li>Increasing capacity of water supply and sewage systems to accommodate displaced persons in host communities and return areas</li> <li>Engaging displaced population in hygiene and health promotion</li> <li>Capacity development and institutional support</li> </ul>	172.9 million
<b>Social Sectors</b>		
<b>Health and Nutrition</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensuring access to essential services for target groups including IDPs, host and receiving communities</li> <li>Restoration of critical (primary) health system functions</li> <li>Provision of free health care services addressing maternal health, childhood diseases, nutrition, malaria prevention, and HIV/Aids</li> <li>Upgrading existing health care facilities in areas with high IDP workload, upgrading existing structures to FMOH standards</li> <li>Secondary referral structures as a priority for safe areas</li> <li>Redeployment and training/retraining of sufficient health staff to manage health delivery systems</li> </ul>	666.8 million
<b>Private Housing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Home owner driven reconstruction and rehabilitation of houses based on the build-back-better approach</li> </ul>	1,164.4 million
<b>Social Protection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expansion of the National Social Safety Nets Project to reach the 10 percent of the poorest households in the affected areas</li> <li>Public employment scheme focusing on displaced persons, widows and stigmatized women, children heads of household and vulnerable population in host communities combined with cash assistance and support for school feeding programmes</li> <li>Old age and disability allowance</li> <li>Subsidy for community based social health insurance program, with specific access for lactating mothers, children under the age of five and pregnant women</li> <li>Capacity building for policies and implementation</li> </ul>	499.5 million

Sectors	Recommended Interventions	Costs
<b>Productive Sectors</b>		
<b>Agriculture</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Food security interventions across all States, with a particular focus on IDPs and host communities building upon ongoing humanitarian interventions</li> <li>• Clearing and preparation of farm land, support to herders, and provision of fodder through emergency employment programs, especially for at-risk youth</li> <li>• Capital support for rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure, earth dams, boreholes, buildings, and other agricultural infrastructure</li> <li>• Rehabilitation of veterinary clinics, extension services, and institutional infrastructure</li> <li>• Replacement of agricultural machinery and equipment</li> <li>• Technical assistance for extension services, facilitation of growth schemes, and capacity development</li> <li>• Support on land tenure issues, especially for returning IDPs who have abandoned their land due to the crisis</li> </ul>	881.4 million
<b>Contingency</b>		
<b>Community Infrastructure and Non Formal Services</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contingency (10%) for community infrastructure, including non-formal services (such as non-formal or traditional education systems) and security premiums in the education, health and nutrition, public building, transport, and water sectors</li> </ul>	250.8 million

Federal level, mostly related to the rehabilitation of key energy infrastructure. Table 9 provides an overview of the different recommended interventions by sector.

## 4.4. Economic Recovery

### 4.4.1. Introduction

The Boko Haram related conflict and hostilities have negatively affected the productive capacity, employment and livelihoods of over six million people in the North-East. The economy of the region has suffered as the output level plummeted, increasing prices and food insecurity. The six states have been unevenly and differently affected. Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have experienced significant physical destruction and massive movements of displaced persons, which undermined their local economies and livelihoods. Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba have been affected by the spillover of IDPs into their administrative boundary, which have imposed a large economic burden on the host state.

The economic recovery interventions proposed include supporting: (a) livelihoods and employment; (b) private sector development, trade, and finance; (c) institutional capacity building for economic recovery strategy; and (d) skills development for economic recovery strategy. Overall, livelihood activities will be implemented using a three-track approach with a differentiated time horizon.<sup>33</sup> Track A would consist of livelihood stabilisation, through emergency em-

ployment and/or enterprise recovery, which would be optimally implemented over the next year. Track B would involve enterprise development and support in rebuilding enterprises, which would be implemented over the short to medium term horizon. Finally, Track C would support policy formulation and implementation, which would take place in medium to long term horizon. The focus for the current programme is on Track A and Track B activities.

### 4.4.2. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Impacts

Prior to 2010, the performance of the North-East economy continuously lagged behind the national average and has deteriorated further between 2011 and 2015, as measured by GDP, inflation, and food prices. It is estimated that the region suffered an accumulated output loss of Naira 1.66 trillion (US\$ 8.3 billion) Borno suffered from the largest loss as output fell by Naira 708.18 billion (US\$ 3.54 billion). At the regional level, prices for all items rose by 5.4 percent annually during 2011-2015, while prices for food items rose by 7.5 percent annually. Prices for food and for all items rose in four states, except in Bauchi and Taraba.<sup>34</sup> The combination of output loss and increase in prices implies a significant reduction in the welfare of residents in the region.

The conflict has severely affected food production and agricultural productivity, particularly in the hardest hit states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The hostilities and conflict have resulted in numerous casualties and continued population displacements, preventing households from pursuing their typical livelihoods and interrupting

TABLE 10

**Macroeconomic impacts by State**

	<i>Adamawa</i>	<i>Bauchi</i>	<i>Borno</i>	<i>Gombe</i>	<i>Taraba</i>	<i>Yobe</i>	<i>Region</i>
GDP - Estimated Loss for 2011-2015 (Naira billion)	-314	-86.3	-708.2	-280.9	-49.1	-222.3	-1660.8
Inflation, All Items (%)	10.4	-4.5	10	12.7	-2.9	6.6	5.4
Inflation, Food (%)	9	-22.6	11.3	46.3	0	0.7	7.4

*Calculation based on the data provided by NBS and CBN (further details on methodology is provided in Volume II)*

trade and market functioning. In February 2016, markets have been closed in Borno and Yobe states by the authorities, including the cattle market in Maiduguri (one of the biggest in West Africa), to curb transactions with Boko Haram, which resulted in food price increases. Restriction on food availability and access to farms and markets in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa has generated localised food crises of acute food insecurity during the lean period.<sup>35</sup> As a result, food insecurity has increased dramatically among IDPs but also within the hosting communities.<sup>36</sup>

**The consolidated budget deficit for the region worsened during the crisis and is two times higher than the average pre-crisis budget deficit.** The aggregate fiscal deficit (as percentage of the total revenue) for the region increased rapidly prior to the crisis, largely due to an expansion of the state budgetary expenditure and to some extent, reflecting the impact of the global economic crisis. During the crisis period, the aggregate budget deficit increased from 2.8 percent in 2011 to 31 percent of total revenue in 2014 as the total revenue fell faster than the total expenditure, reflecting the declining statutory allocations. The level of deficit improved slightly in 2015, as spending declined, however the fiscal impact varies across states. Both VAT and Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) across all states decreased, but capital spending increased in the three states directly affected by the conflict, widening their budget deficit.

#### **4.4.3. Impacts on Private Sector, Trade and Financial Sector**

**Physical destruction affected the private sector by undermining the operation of small and medium enterprises and markets.** Markets have been regularly attacked and the army has also closed some mar-

kets for security reasons (to avoid attacks or to disrupt supplies to Boko Haram).<sup>37</sup> As of December 2015 (see Figure 7), most markets in Borno have minimal or no activity or are significantly disrupted with limited activities. In Yobe, around half of the markets have minimal or no activity and the other half have reduced activity. The situation has markedly improved in Adamawa between October and December 2015, with most markets having normal activities, except in the North-East of Adamawa, where markets face significant disruption.

**The economy has been significantly affected by reduced connectivity as people flee their villages, and others are isolated.** Trade has been significantly disrupted as mobility of humans and goods and services is curtailed by damaged infrastructure, continued insecurity and closed borders. Trade has long been strong in the North-East region and its contribution to the overall economy was especially pronounced in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The volume of trade severely diminished as all the major trade routes became inaccessible. Traders have taken alternative (longer) trade routes to reach Maiduguri, which has negatively impacted the roads and bridges in the states of the alternative routes.


#### **4.4.4. Livelihood and Employment**

**Prior to the crisis productive jobs were fewer in the North-East and have become far scarcer during the crisis.** The labour force participation was concentrated in agricultural activities (43 percent) and the largely informal, non-agricultural sector (39 percent). With the onset of the conflict, the proportion of labour participation in agriculture has reduced to 27 percent in 2012-2013, reflecting that the continuing conflict has limited access to land for crops and livestock, and has curtailed agricultural activities significantly. People in the region resorted to a range of income



FIGURE 5

### North-East Region - Consolidated Revenue and Expenditure (Billions of Naira) and Budget Balance (Percent of Total Revenue, 2007-2015)



Source: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)


generation activities, with unpaid household activities doubling from 11 percent (2010-2011) to 22 percent (2012-2013), indirectly capturing a large increase in de facto unemployment.

**The livelihood situation of IDPs is dire as they lack regular income sources, and competition of jobs is also putting strain on the host communities.** IDP households, who used to earn their income from farming, have no access to their own land or any land in their location of displacement; most households with other sources of livelihoods (traders, shop owners, artisans, etc.) lack access to infrastructure, tools, and most importantly customers with sufficient purchasing power. The only IDPs still able to access their income appear to be the LGA employees. Large-scale displacement also causes significant stress for the host communities and family members supporting IDPs, as more than 90 percent of IDPs live in host communities with relatives or friends or in accommodations they rent or can use free of charge. Jobs are scarce in the region as a whole,

and IDPs often end up competing with local host communities who are also desperately looking for income generation opportunities.

**Negative impacts on the local economy and livelihoods have undermined the well-being of the population in the region.** During the crisis, the poverty rate rose from 47.3 percent in 2011, to 50.4 percent in 2013, the highest in the whole country. Contraction of the local economy is most acutely felt in the area of price increases, particularly food prices, and subsequent food insecurity. It is noted that 2014-2015 main-season and off-season harvests came in well below average in Borno, central and southern Yobe, and northern Adamawa, the states worst impacted by the conflict.<sup>40</sup> The heavily impacted harvests have contributed to limited household own-production stocks as well as low market stocks, increasing food prices. Displaced people, who have limited access to farming, savings (left behind or used up), or other safety nets and jobs, are likely to suffer more from price increases and food insecurity.

FIGURE 5  
**Distribution of the employed labour force, by employer for wave 1 (2010/11) and wave 2 (2012/13); Estimates based on GHS 2010/11 and GHS 2012/13**



Calculation based on the data provided by NBS and CBN (further details on methodology is provided in Volume II)

#### 4.4.5. Recommended Interventions for Economic Recovery

Sustained livelihoods and economic stabilisation and recovery require the private sector, trade and financial activities to recover. Private sector recovery requires proactive interventions in both the formal sector (medium and small enterprises) and informal sector (micro enterprises) to support the development of high value chains in agri-businesses and solid minerals as well as youth entrepreneurship, in addition to employment promotion schemes focusing on women

and youth. Furthermore, reopening the border and recovering markets will increase trade activities both internally and cross-border, and increase jobs and the income of the population.

Recommendations for economic recovery are premised on an understanding that socio-economic recovery in troubled communities is strongly linked to job creation and economic restoration. In this regard, as an overarching approach to stabilisation and recovery, as in other components, it is recommended that economic recovery interventions coordinate with the on-going needed humanitarian as-

TABLE 11  
**Estimated Needs for Economic Recovery by State**

	Adamawa	Borno	Yobe	Gombe	Taraba	Bauchi	Federal/Regional <sup>41</sup>	Total
Private sector, Trade and Finance							245	245
Livelihood and local economic recovery	24.2	31.1	19.6	12.7	18.4	23.1		129.1
Employment	13.4	37.7	11.1	9.6	9.2	18.4		99.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>68.8</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>22.3</b>	<b>27.7</b>	<b>41.4</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>473.5</b>



sistance in the primary states (especially in Borno and Yobe), while enabling reconstruction efforts as much as possible. The employment and income generation should be designed and implemented with a ‘do-no-harm’ approach, in order to avoid deepening or creating further disputes or conflicts. In view of this, other recommendations for implementing potential interventions include an inclusive, pro-poor approach to economic recovery and tailored proposals for different groups of affected people: (a) general population in the North-East; (b) displacement affected persons; (c) host communities; (d) returnees; and (e) vulnerable groups, which include youth, older people and women. Lastly, these interventions should take a community-based approach to foster local ownership and facilitate a transparent and acceptable selection of beneficiaries. The estimated needs and recommended interventions identified for the economic recovery sub-components are presented in Table 12.

## 4.5. Cross-cutting Issues

A cross-cutting issue is one that dynamically interacts with all or a substantial number of sectors/sub-components and, therefore, requires a multi-sectoral approach. The RPBA has taken gender, human rights, explosive remnants of war and youth as key cross-cutting issues. It advocates for further development of the cross-cutting issues in the recovery strategy and implementation process to ensure effective integration of these issues across all of the interventions.

### 4.5.1. Gender

**In Nigeria, women are disadvantaged compared to men on all social development indicators.** In education and earnings for instance which are factors that greatly influence the health of women and children. Thirty eight percent of women age 15-49 have no formal education compared to 21 percent of men in the same age bracket. Lack

TABLE 12

## Estimated Needs and Recommended Interventions for Economic Recovery

<i>Interventions</i>	<i>Recommended Interventions</i>	<i>Costs</i>
Private Sector, Trade and Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private sector recovery in the North-East States</li> <li>Support to private sector development in high potential value chains – agribusiness and solid materials;</li> <li>Support Youth Entrepreneurship</li> <li>Reopening of border stations</li> <li>Recovery of markets;</li> <li>Improved Investment climate in the six North-East States;</li> <li>Increased access to financial services for micro, small and medium enterprises;</li> </ul>	245 million
Livelihood and Local Economic Recovery	<p><b>Stabilisation phase</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Immediate restoration of disrupted and destroyed livelihoods and economic assets, which can lead to the revitalization of the local economy in the medium term</li> <li>Immediate livelihood support through the provision of cash transfers, grant funds and case-for-work programs, coupled with initiatives to strengthen business management skills and low cost, quick return and needs-based activities.</li> <li>An assessment of existing and required vocational and professional trainings as well as of required skills, particularly in view of the immediate reconstruction needs</li> </ul> <p><b>Recovery phase</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishing agriculture-based value chains and agro-value addition centres, which can not only diversify employment opportunities but also contribute to cohesion and stability as different communities and individuals interact in value chains</li> <li>Development of natural resource-based value chains and enterprises, with public investment in exploring the potential of various natural resources and solid minerals;</li> <li>Skills training geared towards diversifying livelihoods</li> </ul>	129.1 million
Employment	<p><b>Stabilisation phase</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provision of professional or vocational trainings in a shorter duration (3-6 months), linked to a rapid job creation scheme (in particular for the youth) for deployment of qualified labour directly into the rehabilitation efforts during the immediate stabilisation phase or with provision of start-up kits and further assistance to establish businesses/enterprises</li> <li>Targeted training for youth and women, consisting of adult literacy, life skills (health and hygiene, legal issues such as access to land/finances/justice, SGBV protection, etc.) and vocational/professional skills that can lead to rapid income generation, in combination with peace education, counter-radicalisation and strategic communications, such as youth reorientation and de-radicalisation programs;</li> <li>Rehabilitation of the State and State level training and job centres, recruitment of staff and training of the existing staff and trainers</li> </ul> <p><b>Recovery phase</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strengthening of the institutional capacity of State employment centres and related institutions to implement skills training and job placement initiatives and to better match workers to new labour markets to increase (re)employment options</li> <li>A Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Program with (re-) built facilities and well-drafted curricula in alignment to Federal TVET programs;</li> </ul>	99.3 million

of education for women is higher in the North-East where more than 70 percent of women over 30 are illiterate compared to 34 percent in the South.<sup>41</sup> Nationally, the majority of women earn less than their husbands<sup>42</sup> and ironically, female heads of household are taxed more than their male colleagues.<sup>43</sup>

**Women and girls have significantly fewer opportunities to participate in decision making than men and boys, and violence compounds and reinforce this disadvantage.**<sup>45</sup> Women are also woefully under-represented in the political structure of Nigeria. During the 2015 elections, women in the North-East states constituted a huge voter population of 3,905,283 (11.9 percent of the national total of female voters) in the Voters Register yet in the entire North-East only eight women were elected.

**Women marry much younger than men, which limits women's educational and earning potential.** Married women have less control over their own lives than married men; nearly half of married women do not participate in decision making regarding their reproduction, personal health care, education of their children, major household purchase, or visits to family or relatives. In the North-East, 13.3 percent of females aged 15-24 have experienced physical violence, and 8.9 percent of married women and 23.5 percent of those who have never been married have had similar experiences.<sup>44</sup>

**The conflict has exacerbated the security situation of women and girls** A survey of 17,534 households indicated that 12,338 households (70 percent of respondents), reported incidents/risks of SGBV, including 2226 households with survivors of SGBV.<sup>45</sup> Women and girls are bearing a considerable part of the costs. The Boko Haram tactics increasingly include targeting women through gender-based violence, kidnapping, sexual slavery, and forced marriage, and most recently, using young girls as suicide bombers. Thousands of women and girls who are associated with perpetrators of the violence, or have borne children out of rape, risk stigmatisation by their communities.

**The conflict has contributed to the rise in targeting civilians particularly women and children.** Emerging in part in response to government detentions of women and children associated with the armed group in 2012, Boko Haram has increasingly targeted women for abduction. Women and girls face protection challenges including abduction, rape, torture, forced marriage and forced conversion. Several reports also noted prevalence of attacks against businesses owned by women, and of assault and violence against women and girls—including

ing throwing acid in their faces — for not following religious practices such as covering their heads or wearing sufficiently conservative clothing.<sup>46</sup> Women have also been used as instruments of war to lure opposing forces or to mobilise weapons.<sup>47</sup> While women and girls are strategically targeted for violence, there are several reports that note assaults and rape of men as well. While several incidents have garnered international attention including the kidnapping of 276 school girls in Chibok in 2014, fear of retaliation by Boko Haram or its adherents persist, contributing to a broader culture of silence that impedes reporting or help-seeking behaviour by survivors of conflict.

**Addressing SGBV and other forms of violence is critically important for survivors' medical, emotional and psycho-social well-being, and also for broader social cohesion and communal stability.** The developmental impacts of sexual and gender-based violence can be severe. Survivors often lack access to basic health services that address the physical and mental consequences of violence, whether due to the absence of or disruption in access to qualified personnel and services, or to restrictive socio-cultural norms that inhibit women's mobility and freedom of movement. Beyond the physical and psychological damage for the individuals involved, SGBV in particular also carries important social and economic costs. Moreover, survivors often face barriers to seeking redress that include a lack of knowledge within the community about their legal/justice options, some of which are costly and inaccessible, and a lack of understanding among officials of the unique support that SGBV survivors need. Impaired functioning, compounded by a climate of fear, impedes participation in social, political and economic life and survivors may further confront stigma and rejection by spouses, families and communities. In Nigeria specifically, incidence or fear of violence impedes girls' attendance at schools.<sup>46</sup> These factors ultimately undermine the development potential of women and girls, as well as erode trust at all levels of society, adversely affecting social cohesion.

**Displaced populations confront a range of severe protection challenges.** Among those displaced, 52 percent are female and 48 percent male, while children under the age of 18 account for nearly 60 percent.<sup>48</sup> The context of displacement often leaves affected populations, particularly women and children, particularly vulnerable to protection challenges, including varying forms of SGBV. While most security related incidents reported by IDPs in the North-East relate to tensions within displacement sites or with host communities, alcohol or drug abuse, or theft, there have also been reported incidences of



SGBV, including domestic violence, sexual exploitation, harassment and rape.<sup>49</sup> Child physical and emotional abuse has also been reported at multiple displacement sites.<sup>50</sup>

**Displaced males, and conflict-affected male youth more generally, confront a range of vulnerabilities as well.** In the context of protracted conflict, men and male youth often experience both economic hardship and social and psychological dislocation. Loss in assets, combined with lack of access to education, skills training and opportunities to earn an income, leave men and male youth unable to fulfil often exacting norms of manhood and masculine identity as protectors and as providers. High rates of trauma compound these vulnerabilities, manifesting in a range of often-negative coping behaviours including depression, addiction, and/or aggression. Rates of domestic/ intimate partner violence frequently increase under such conditions, as men seek outlets for feelings of frustration or dislocation. Others often engage in illicit behaviours, such as crime and violence or are more vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment into armed networks such as Boko Haram. A study noted that poverty, unemployment and disaffection render youth and destitute children vulnerable to manipulation by religious extremists, which in turn leaves them vulnerable to further exploitation.<sup>46</sup>

**Addressing gender issues is vital. All interventions will take into account key gender related issues including:**

- access to education and vocational training;
- information on SGBV and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA);
- representation in recovery and rebuilding planning;
- improved access to social, government and financial services;
- reintegration of stigmatised women and girls into their community.

#### **4.5.2. Human Rights**

**North-East Nigeria faces a human rights and protection crisis as a result of the Boko Haram related conflict.** In most of the directly affected communities, any semblance of rule of law institutions and government presence has been destroyed. The conflict has been characterised by allegations of human rights abuses and violations under international humanitarian law committed by Boko Haram, which includes killings, forced recruitment, the use of children in hostilities, abductions, and torture and ill-treatment, especially of girls and young women, including rape and forced marriage. There have also been reports of heavy-handed counter-insurgency response from

other actors including the national military and those of the neighbouring affected countries. Allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law by security agents, including extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and ill treatment, and arrests and detentions, have been reported.

**Human rights challenges include Boko Haram targeting men and boys for combat operation, while women face conflict-related sexual violence including stigmatisation of babies born from rape.** These challenges underline the need for enhanced psycho-social assistance to the victims and implementation of strategies to enhance community reconciliation and social cohesion. On their return, displaced persons will more likely than not face challenges over their rights to land and property, with women and orphans being at the greatest risk of not receiving redress from already weak dispute resolution mechanisms.

**A major challenge for IDPs from Borno state remains the lack of access to most of the areas outside Maiduguri due to the security situation.** While the Government is encouraging return, security remains a major challenge. It is imperative to ensure that recovery and return takes into account and is informed by the security situation in affected areas.

**Reconciliation and sustainable peace can only be achieved through a human rights based approach to address the root causes of the Boko Haram related conflict, as well as its impact.** The human rights standards that inform the recovery and peace building response are the promotion and protection of civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights of those who are most affected, marginalised, excluded and discriminated against as a result of the Boko Haram conflict. The guiding human rights principles applied are equality and non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, accountability and rule of law, addressing recovery and peace building complexities holistically, consideration of the connection between the populations and systems of authority/power expected to respect, protect and guarantee human rights, and create dynamics of accountability.

#### 4.5.3. Explosive Remnants of War

The threat from explosive devices, particularly in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, stems extensively from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), as well as mines and other unexploded ordnance. A

majority of the risk is from IEDs, including victim-activated IEDs that maim and kill indiscriminately and can be considered 'landmines'.

Additionally, some factory-made mines may have been used, but to date the available information on how extensively they have been used and their impact is very limited. Military activities, including aerial bombardment and the use of other munitions, have led to the proliferation of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) in areas impacted by the crisis. Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and IEDs can be found on roads, in abandoned houses and buildings including schools, and in agricultural fields; it is also possible that water sources were 'mined' by Boko Haram members.

**A mine action program in line with international standards does not exist in Nigeria. The Security Forces are taking great risks to identify and dispose of IEDs and to destroy 'bomb'-making factories.** NEMA/SEMA and the police have begun to warn people of the existing dangers and asked to be informed of any suspicious devices the public notices. To address the overall threat according to international standards and best practices, a significant scaling up of these efforts is needed.

**A joint undertaking of the Government of Nigeria, the security forces, and development partners is required to address the threat of mines, IEDs, and ERW, through a combination of emergency actions and capacity development.** Setting up an institutional and operational framework to allow such activities will require a concerted effort. Currently, a team to coordinate mine action at the Federal level is planned. To ensure access and a route of safe return for displaced persons, roads have to be assessed and de-mined. Additionally, a risk reduction mechanism for ERW needs to be in place to ensure removal of debris, and burning waste can be carried out safely.

**To allow for safe return, an emergency mine risk awareness education campaign needs to be implemented for all IDPs, refugees, and the local population, as well as those working temporarily in potentially dangerous areas.** A systematic survey coupled with risk education and explosive ordnance disposal in each conflict-affected LGA will provide the required data to formulate a response for de-mining action. The proposed action would consist of teams of four including explosive ordnance disposal specialists, de-miners, and medics, who are well trained both in the technical and non-technical interventions of a demining response. This team would also serve as community liaisons providing risk education to the population.



#### 4.5.4. Youth

Nearly 63 percent of the population in Nigeria is under the age of 24. Youth, in the 15-34 age group, are Nigeria's most important and dynamic human resource.<sup>51</sup> In North-East Nigeria young people account for many of those adversely affected by the conflict as it has disrupted their access to education and social services. Some have been subjected to overwhelming violence, including separation from family that will have a long-term impact on their psychological well-being. In many instances, young people are the sole providers for their siblings and wide family. In many instances all over the world, youth tend to be extremely vulnerable to radicalisation. Surveys, interviews, and focus groups discussions conducted in 2013, suggest that poverty, unemployment illiteracy and weak family structures contribute to this trend, and failure to address the needs of the youth may further push them to gravitate toward radicalised groups.<sup>52</sup>

**Even prior to the conflict, educational levels in the region were very low.** In Adamawa state alone, recent data show that over 75 percent of the youth are illiterate. The North-East states have among the lowest educational enrolment rates of girls in the world. But youth want to receive education; a 2016 survey found that education was the top priority for youth of both genders.<sup>52</sup>

**The average unemployment rate in Nigeria is 38 percent and much higher in the North-East States.** Many young people fall in the Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) category. A huge reservoir of unemployed urban youths, widespread poverty and disenfranchisement are factors used to explain the ready availability of

recruits for Boko Haram; however, youth unemployment does not directly lead to violence; nevertheless, it is an enabling factor and economic opportunities have a dramatic impact on durable peace and reconciliation.

**Revisiting the schooling system in the post-conflict environment is important.** Urban and rural youth need training and imparting of skills as artisans and technicians. Mainstreaming youth in post-crisis activities for recovery and reconstruction is key and youth should be considered in all three components intervention areas to enable youth-led development. In general, youth want to be viewed as pioneers as well as leaders of today, who have the ability to shape their own tomorrow. Addressing their rights and including them in the recovery and peace building process will insulate them against future instability, and bring energy and engagement to the stabilisation process.



# Options for Implementation and Financing

**Recovery will be highly demanding for the limited institutional, implementation and financing capacity at every level of the Government of Nigeria.** *The recovery and peace building process will require significant strengthening of policy, programme and project implementation capacity, enhancing effectiveness of scarce public spending and a coordinated and sustained effort at revenue mobilisation. Strengthening the use of evidence and quality data to inform implementation and strengthen accountability mechanisms, including through citizen engagement, would significantly strengthen the quality of the overall process.*

## 5.1. Institutional Challenges

**Recovery will require significantly enhanced institutional capacity and effectiveness.** This will include progress in horizontal coordination at each level of government as well as in intergovernmental cooperation with a specific focus on alignment between the Federal and State Governments. Several country specific institutional challenges may need to be addressed for the effective implementation of the Recovery and Peace Building Strategy (RPBS).

### 5.1.1. Horizontal Coordination

**A high number of public entities, line ministries, and executive agencies will be involved in the implementation of the RPBS at each level of the government (Federal, State and Local).** At the Federal level, several hundred Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) are operating and there is a realisation that this number may have to be streamlined to reduce the cost of governance and increase institu-

tional effectiveness. At State level, the Federal institutional set up is often replicated with State level executive agencies mirroring Federal ones (e.g. in education, health, etc.). The multiplicity of public entities undermines the coherence of public action, entails overlaps, duplication and conflicts of jurisdiction, and dilutes scarce institutional capacity and already weak chains of accountability: e.g. executive agencies are not legally or de facto accountable to parent ministries and regulatory authorities do not exercise effective oversight on State owned companies.

**In this context, effective horizontal coordination will be paramount to the successful implementation of the RPBS at Federal and State levels.** This integrative function will need to be exercised under the highest executive authority at Federal and State levels, i.e. at the Presidency and governorship respectively under the present constitutional set up. At Federal level, the role and institutional levers of the Presidential Committee on the North-East Initiative (PCNI) may need to be further clearly established.



### 5.1.2. Vertical Alignment

Most activities to be conducted under the RPBS, be it reconstruction, service delivery, social protection or peace building, fall under the concurrent responsibility of the Federal and State governments. Some of them also involve Local Governments (e.g. primary education and health, local roads, water supply and sanitation, etc.). As in any other Federal State, the exercise of shared responsibility by different tiers of government is often contentious and may result in conflicts of jurisdiction, which impede the effectiveness of public action and policy implementation.

Nigeria is endowed with collegial decision-making bodies that are meant to ensure policy alignment between the two upper tiers of the governments, such as the National Economic Council chaired by the Vice-President, or at sectoral level, the National Council on Education or Health. These collegial bodies can usefully be mobilised to ensure collective political leadership – including between the Presidency at Federal level and the Governors at the State level.

Interstate coordination fora, such as the Governors' Forum or the Northern Governors' Forum, also contribute to policy alignment across State Governments and at the Regional level. They can be usefully mobilised to monitor the implementation of the RPBS, to benchmark results and foster exchange of experience and the emulation of best practices across North-East states. Although they do not have any implementation capacity, these fora are critical for policy dialogue and consultation, and could help harmonise State level implementation frameworks.

At the State level, policymaking has not usually been devolved to Local Governments, which are de facto local branches of the State Government. Consequently, intergovernmental coordination within the States could be vested with the ministry of Local Governments, which is often responsible for traditional rulers-Chieftainship, allowing it to reach beyond Local Governments to community leaders.

In addition, intergovernmental coordination is key in areas that are beyond the concurrent responsibility of the different levels of gov-

**ernment such as security.** The lower tiers of government often step into areas of responsibility of the upper tiers of government when it is failing to exercise it or to complement its limited capacity. For example, State and Local Governments are funding and arming vigilante groups who complement or substitute for the police and the military, both falling under the exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government. Intergovernmental coordination could take into account such interventions at the lower levels of government, given their significant bearing on the overall success of the RPBS.

### 5.1.3. Front Line Institutional Set Up

**Capacity and accessibility constrains the responsiveness of Local Governments and communities when effective recovery and peace building needs mobilisation down to the village or settlement level.**

The North-East has only 112 Local Governments for an estimated population of 19 million people and a landmass of 276,000 square kilometres. On average, each Local Government is supposed to cater to the needs of a few hundred thousand people spread over an area of close to 50,000 square kilometres on average, and in rural areas scattered across small villages often far from the Local Government headquarters. Due to a lack of local elections, local communities are not represented at the Local Government level – as they would be if local councillors were elected at the ward level.

**This may call for the mobilisation of local communities down to the village or settlement level.** Informal institutions, such as village heads and community organisations, can be leveraged for that purpose by institutionalising their participation to decision making in the implementation of the recovery strategy (e.g. for local planning and monitoring). Stakeholders' representation and participation in local institutions at the community level could also help restore public trust in government and its responsiveness to public demands, needs, and expectations.

**At the community level, both formal and informal institutions may need to be mobilised to respond to people's needs.** The justice system, with lowest courts operating at district level at best, needs to be supported and complemented by informal conflict resolution mechanisms at the community level to address personal and collective grievances generated by the conflict situation, including population displacement and return, loss of property, etc.

**The Recovery and Peace Building interventions will need to be very closely coordinated with the Humanitarian Response Plan, and the coordination with humanitarian actors should be formalised.** This is of utmost importance to avoid duplication of efforts and to ensure that an incremental added value between humanitarian interventions and recovery interventions materialises and effectively contributes to the human security of the affected populations on the ground.

## 5.2. Guiding Principles for Institutional Effectiveness

Experiences from other crisis countries indicate the importance of institutional arrangements. Strong government leadership can help to ensure coordination across stakeholders, with representation from a wide range of actors at different levels of government, as well as non-governmental organisations and beneficiaries. It is therefore suggested that programme leadership and coordination be agreed upon and established at the three tiers of government. This mechanism would be cross sectorial, include different levels of the government (Federal and State levels), and to what extent possible, build upon existing structures. Where necessary, ring-fenced mechanisms could be considered to improve implementation effectiveness. Nigeria's track record of ad hoc implementation mechanisms (such as executive agencies) seems to be problematic and warns against the establishment of parallel structures or systems with weak accountability.

**The mechanism for coordination and exchange with communities and civil society is critical and could at least consist of the following two elements:**

- **Community and civil society forum:** Community and civil society involvement is critical for the success of the recovery and peace building programme in North-East Nigeria. An active involvement in the programme design, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), while ensuring fair and transparent procedures for the implementation of the programmes, requires the establishment of a dedicated space for civil society. The community and civil society forum could contribute directly to the monitoring and evaluation process and conduct a critical review of the results achieved so far.
- **Grievance redress mechanism:** It is recommended that an independent grievance redress mechanism be established to ensure a fair and transparent handling of concerns before conflicts arise.

The Federal Government may consider appointing an independent Ombudsman tasked to respond to relevant concerns of citizens and communities in the six affected states, with the objective to mediate in disputes or complaints arising from the conflict situation. In abidance with international best practices, the grievance redress mechanism may provide the possibility to submit requests and complaints through different means of communication, including anonymous requests.

**The institutional set up will have to strike the right balance between strategic integration and decentralised implementation.** The RPBS is a process, which would be implemented in the six states, and to some extent at Federal level, according to the states' specific needs. While in Borno, stabilisation may first apply, other States might move faster to address recovery issues. The overall implementation structure would thus need to be adapted to the different States, their institutional context, and specific program and sequencing of interventions. This could bring together the different levels of government (Federal

and six North-East States) as well as civil society to ensure a successful implementation of the RPBS. Elements of such a framework may have already been established (such as PCNI at the Federal level, or the Ministry of Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (MRRR) in Borno State). Their role and functions, their modus operandi and institutional levers may still need to be clarified. The establishment of ad hoc institutions may or may not be required to ensure the effectiveness of the overall institutional framework for the implementation of the recovery strategy.

**The current situation calls for an approach that supports the existing government structures at the Federal and State levels to implement the recovery process.** At the same time, flexibility is needed to adapt to evolving needs and to provide additional, external capacity for a timely and effective recovery process. Successful implementation of the RPBS will require professional institutional arrangements, aligned and rapid disbursement of funds, and appropriate, transparent and clearly mandated implementation arrangements, in order to



achieve tangible results in the short term while providing lasting impacts. The specific institutional arrangements will need to be adopted and agreed upon by the Federal and State level governments, taken forward by the Federal and State level leadership, and build upon existing strategies, structures, and mechanisms, notably the NEST developed in 2015. In case of capacity gaps (for example in engineering, financial management, procurement or staffing) pooling existing capacity may be considered until they are adequately developed. In addition, a central programme coordination unit can provide support for implementation, communication and documentation, M&E, as may be required.

### 5.3. Options for Implementing Recovery and Peace Building Interventions

Based on a review of international good practices, the following institutional options can be considered for implementing the recovery and peace building programme:

- ad hoc set up such as the establishment of a discrete implementing agency;
- existing government structures (MDAs);
- hybrid framework built on both existing government structures and an ad hoc organisation.

The pros and cons of these options are listed below in Table 13. They are to be understood as virtual and highly contextual.

It should be noted that experience from other crisis situations has shown that a hybrid model can work very well once roles and responsibilities are clearly distributed. This hybrid model entails a dedicated coordination entity unit for policy setting and implementation support on the one hand, and implementation through existing line ministries on the other hand. The program coordination and day-to-day implementation of the program is ideally housed within or supported by an apex coordination entity, and builds upon strong collective leadership from the Federal and State Governments. The apex coordination entity would not implement programme activities directly, but support Federal and State Governments’ agencies to implement the programme in an effective and timely manner, and provide overall guidance on policies. Its overall tasks include providing support to the implementing agencies at Federal and State levels to complement their capacity in financial management and procurement, to elaborate on overall programme policies and implementation guidelines, to conduct M&E, to report to donors, and provide overall guidance and coordination of communication. The apex coordination entity needs to be flexible and responsive to quickly arising needs and demands, including for capacity development.

TABLE 13  
Comparative advantages of different institutional framework for recovery

	<i>Recovery Agency</i>	<i>Line Ministries</i>	<i>Hybrid Approach</i>
<b>Pros</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Facilitates coordination of recovery</li> <li>• Draws on resources beyond the civil service resource pool</li> <li>• Focuses on tasks specific to recovery</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respects and strengthens existing government structure and capacities</li> <li>• Avoids creating competition for resources and power</li> <li>• Facilitates transition from reconstruction to longer-term development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leverages existing government structure and capacities</li> <li>• Subsumes into regular structures upon completion of recovery through a sunset clause</li> <li>• Complements capacities of MDAs</li> <li>• Streamlines the distribution of responsibilities and the chain of accountability</li> <li>• Focuses on tasks that are specific to recovery</li> </ul>
<b>Cons</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risks potential jurisdictional conflicts with existing MDAs</li> <li>• Takes more time and resources to establish</li> <li>• Requires strong central government support</li> <li>• Creates sustainability issues</li> <li>• Risks bypassing and undertraining existing accountability systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strains further capacity already weakened by the crisis</li> <li>• Draws away MDAs from routine responsibilities</li> <li>• Reinforces the need for third party implementation</li> <li>• Lacks the capacity to focus on recovery</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relies heavily on MDAs for implementation</li> <li>• Risks lacking the political clout and convening power to coordinate MDAs and other important actors</li> <li>• Risks generating overlaps and confusion responsibilities</li> </ul>

TABLE 14

**Indicative distribution of core functions across tiers of government for implementation of recovery and peace building strategy**

<i>Functions</i>	<i>Federal</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Local</i>
Political leadership & strategic oversight	■	■	■
Programme management and implementation	■	■	■
Horizontal and vertical coordination	■	■	■
Policy setting & alignment	■	■	
Capacity development	■	■	■
Monitoring and Ensuring Transparency & Accountability	■	■	■
Community participation & outreach		■	■
Fiduciary integrity (fund flow management & procurement)	■	■	■
Environmental and social safeguards	■	■	■
Resources mobilisation	■	■	■
Public investment planning & management	■	■	■
Access to and quality of basic services	■	■	■
Monitoring and Evaluation	■	■	■
Conflict resolution & grievance redress		■	■
Safety and security (including demining)	■	■	■

■ *Important and leading role*      ■ *Minor role*

### 5.4. Critical Core Functions of an Enabling Institutional Framework

Most institutional functionalities are shared, even if each level of government contributes to their fulfilment differently. For example, for M&E, data collection would happen at Local level and be aggregated at State and Federal levels; evaluation can be handled at the Federal level provided it benchmarks outputs and outcomes at Local or State levels. Adequate implementation of the recovery strategy calls for an enabling institutional framework ensuring the following critical functions and their shared exercise to be disaggregated at the three tiers of government.

Table 14 shows an indicative distribution of core functions across the three tiers of government needed for recovery and peace building.

### 5.5. Monitoring Framework

The Recovery and Peace Building Operational Framework, presented in this assessment report in Chapter 6, could be used as a basis to monitor progress towards common targets. A Monitoring Framework would be a key management tool for the National and Local government authorities, as well as individual ministries, donors and implementing partners. Meanwhile, a Strategic Results Framework that builds on the Strategic Framework for Recovery and Peace

Building in Chapter 3 would be the foundation for a social contract between citizens and the State on recovery, by demonstrating to the population that recovery efforts are proceeding in the right direction and yielding tangible results. As such, it would be expected to be widely shared publicly and visibly discussed as part of periodic progress reviews. Experience in other conflict situations shows that this matters towards repairing the fractured social contract.

**Robust M&E systems are needed to inform the implementation of the recovery strategy that covers the whole value chain from financial inputs to outputs.** Existing M&E systems do not provide the kind of quality information that can be both relied on and operationalised to inform policy making and implementation. Despite their institutionalisation across the three tiers of the Nigerian government, existing M&E systems provide scant and inaccurate information and evidence to inform policy making and programme implementation. Administrative data is unreliable. Capacity and financial resources for M&E are scarce. Lack of intergovernmental coordination entails duplication of efforts, lack of standardisation of collected data, and reluctance to share data with other tiers of government.

**No existing M&E system covers the whole value chain from financial inputs to outputs (quantitative: such as the number of built or rehabilitated facilities, and qualitative: such as unit costs) and outcomes (such as beneficiaries' access to service and service quality standards).** In such conditions, measuring and benchmarking progress is both challenging in practice and politically sensitive. Paradoxically, a dense web of public institutions is mandated to monitor policy implementation across the three tiers of government and the institutional framework for M&E calls for significant streamlining.

### 5.5.1. Improving Existing M&E Systems

**These constraints call for two main remedies: (a) enhancing capacity for data collection; and (b) data validation.** For that purpose, third party monitoring needs be institutionalised across sectors. Successful initiatives to that effect need be mainstreamed across areas and sectors of intervention. An M&E capacity assessment can help determine the extent to which existing systems can be built on, and the extent to which they will have to be complemented. There is no dearth of monitoring mechanisms on service delivery in Nigeria and existing ones can usefully be operationalised (while probably streamlined).

**Accordingly, the implementation of the RPBS requires both the mobilisation of existing M&E systems across sectors of interventions and the triangulation of information from different sources (in-**

**cluding surveys of beneficiaries and third party monitoring).** Given the limited capacity of the three tiers of the Nigerian government in monitoring and evaluation of public action, the implementation of the recovery strategy cannot be informed by a comprehensive, three tiered, and regularly updated M&E system. But it will require that patchy and inaccurate administrative data be complemented and triangulated with other sources of information (provided by surveys and third parties). It will also call for the operationalisation of available data that is neither analysed, owned, nor collected by the public institutions in charge of the implementation of public policies and programmes.

### 5.5.2. Mainstreaming Third Party Monitoring and Social Accountability Mechanisms

**Access to public information is still scant in Nigeria and so is the reliance of the government on citizens' feedback.** Compliance with the Freedom of Information Act of 2011 by public entities is low, including when it comes to voluntary disclosure of information. Mechanisms to gather citizens' feedback are still rudimentary and not at scale. SERVICOM, which rolled out at Federal level in 2011 to improve quality of service, is practically defunct for lack of resources.

**Existing social accountability mechanisms, such as School-Based Management Committees (SBMC), can be usefully emulated and mainstreamed to monitor access to and quality of service at the bottom level of the delivery chain.** SBMCs have been operating in Nigeria since 2005, and are made up of representatives from local communities. They ensure transparency, efficiency, and performance in school management by regularly engaging with and reporting to and from local communities. Such social accountability mechanisms can be usefully mobilised to monitor the implementation of the recovery strategy and take account of feedback from beneficiaries (through users' survey) into its implementation.

**In instances where for security reasons direct monitoring by public entities may be impeded; local independent verification can usefully be relied on as experience has shown in other conflict situations.** Trained communities can ascertain, for example, the completion and quality of work in areas which are inaccessible to public officials or donor agencies. Third party monitoring can be relied on to monitor: (a) the actual delivery of goods and services (including social allowances); (b) the quality of service provision; (c) the use of funds; and (d) that recovery interventions do not exacerbate conflict in the affected states. There are a wide range of examples on the use of IT-

based solutions for monitoring in remote areas which are used in other countries, and which the recovery strategy can build on.

**Social accountability mechanisms, such as grievance redress, could also be mobilised to help monitor the impact of the recovery strategy on the conflict situation.** Conflict-sensitive indicators would provide early warning of potentially negative impacts of interventions, which may necessitate further mitigation strategies and adaptation. Conflict-sensitive indicators need to be crafted based on the conflict specifics. In order to measure the effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms, IT-based solutions, such as SMS, have proved effective to convey grievances in other countries.

**Recovery and peace building will be an adaptive process in tune with the evolving needs in North-East Nigeria.** This would be monitored to inform programme implementation. For example, as soon as areas still controlled by Boko Haram or under its threat are accessible, communities would be supported to benefit from the recovery and peace building programme. Over time, changes in the nature of the crisis as well as progress in the implementation of the programme or other issues might require a review of the policy framework. Available financing flows, priorities, and local needs may require a revision of the strategy. As certain interventions prove to be successful or less successful, the RPBS implementation should be adapted accordingly. In this regard, the programme could be reviewed every 12 months with a midterm review after two years at the juncture between the stabilisation phase (month 1–24) and the recovery phase (month 25–48). The overall review would be conducted by the programme coordination unit together with the states and the involvement of the communities and beneficiaries from the program.

**The responsibility for integrating information on programme implementation lies with the apex programme coordination unit.** However, data and information will be collected by responsible sector ministries, States and Local Governments. M&E would include the active involvement of beneficiary communities and civil society in the six states. Participatory processes that support the engagement of the population in the conflict-affected area would be promoted wherever possible. Community involvement could include community based mapping of results, for example, using simple cell phone based applications that provide location based information and photos from the progress (e.g. areas, where roads have been constructed, houses been completed and provided to local communities, or cash-for-work programs implemented). This requires the active mobilisation of the communities in North-East Nigeria, presence in the field and com-

munication in local language. A dedicated M&E team that works closely with the communities will therefore be required.

**The results framework would be publicly disclosed and made accessible to the local communities benefitting from the RPBS.** M&E related data and information should be geo-coded, to the extent possible, and made available in an open source and open data management system. Every effort should be made to disclose information that is accessible to and comprehensible by the local populations.

## 5.6. Financing Strategy and Modalities

**Available public resources are scarce at all levels of government, with limited effects on positive development outcomes and results.** With government expenditure amounting to less than 10 percent of GDP, recovery calls for (a) coordinated and sustained resource mobilisation to expand the narrowly limited fiscal space; (b) significant improvements to output effectiveness of capital expenditure; (c) enhanced allocative efficiency; and (d) the leveraging of private resources. Financial management systems (including the procurement of works and goods) will need to be significantly strengthened to mitigate the risk of leakages and inefficiencies. Transparency and accountability need to be institutionalised to help ensure fiduciary integrity in the management of fund flows from appropriation to disbursement, including the payment of benefits to targeted beneficiaries.

### 5.6.1. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Public Spending

**The effectiveness of allocated funds to the implementation of the recovery strategy needs to be ensured through adequate financial management at Federal, State and Local levels.** Since existing public finance management systems are weak and cannot be significantly improved in the short term, nor commensurate to identified financing needs, ring-fencing mechanisms are called for to shelter allocated resources from leakages and other inefficiencies. In parallel, existing fiduciary systems and capacity (e.g. accounting and reporting, internal and external auditing) need to be strengthened: financial reporting should be comprehensive and compliant with international standards (for cash based and accrual accounting); external auditing should also follow international standards and audit reports should be publicly disclosed; cash management should be significantly strengthened to improve budget credibility. Given the nature of public spend-



ing to be granted to the recovery (essentially capital expenditure and social allowances), fund flows will have to be tracked down to their intended purpose or beneficiaries.

**Since recovery and peace building in the North-East will entail a significant increase of capital expenditure, it calls for considerable improvements in public investment management in the North-East from all tiers of the Nigerian government.** Public investment management is notoriously poor across the country, at Federal, State and Local levels. Nigeria fares comparatively poorly on public investment selection and appraisal and post-evaluation. Planning, appropriation, and execution are also problematic. The lack of an adequate public investment and asset management framework (including that with which to inform budget preparation) affects the quality of capital expenditure. This results in a significant number of abandoned projects due to unavailability of cash and the accumulation of arrears, which features high in the budgets of each tier of government.

**Bottlenecks in the disbursement of capital expenditures need to be addressed for adequate implementation of the recovery strategy.** Capital expenditures amount to nearly half of State Government budgets across the country and in the North-East in particular, but

their disbursement rate is remarkably low (e.g. 36 percent in Adama-wa in 2014). It has recently been decreasing under the fiscal crisis and needs to be significantly improved if recovery funds are to be routed through government budgets. This would take significantly improved public investment management (e.g. project prioritisation, appraisal and budgeting) to ensure that available liquidities match commitments for capital expenditure through enhanced cash management.

**The recovery calls for strategic allocation of public expenditure.** This requires costed medium term sector strategies, adequate budget allocation and enhanced expenditure effectiveness based on robust impact evaluation. For security reasons, the implementation of the recovery strategy may need to rely upon ad hoc monitoring mechanisms of procurement transactions and contract management:

- Monitoring agents who would provide fiduciary assurance where required, by pre-screening bidding documents and contract awards of major contracts. The agent would raise issues to contracting agencies (and donors in case of externally-funded projects) for quick resolution.
- Local independent verification at delivery points to ensure the qualitative and quantitative compliance of contract execution,



including the identification of under- or over-invoicing or detect qualitative and quantitative deficiencies.

- Usage of technology may also be considered to remotely ascertain the delivery of commodities.
- Training of credible local NGOs and civil society organizations to check financial management and procurement aspects of the affected projects.

### 5.6.2. Resource Mobilisation

**In Nigeria public resources are comparatively scarce, with a tax/GDP ratio below 10 percent (compared to 20 percent on average in low income countries, and 30 percent in oil producing countries).**

This drastically limits the government capacity to allocate necessary public resources to the recovery.

**North-East States are highly dependent on fiscal transfers, and are suffering from their steep decrease as a result of the fiscal crunch.**

None of the North-East States have an Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) that amounts to more than 5 percent of total State Government revenue. In states directly affected by the fighting such as Yobe, revenue mobilisation has been directly impacted by disruptions to economic activities and tax collection. In Yobe, between 2010-2012, IGR collected by the State Government has decreased by 60 percent, and it has only partially recovered since then to 50 percent of revenue collected in 2010 (Joint Tax Board).

**Revenue mobilisation calls for coordinated efforts between the three tiers of the Nigerian government.** So far, tax competition has hampered adequate tax assessment and collection. The Joint Tax Board recently started to promote tax cooperation between the three tiers of government by promoting joint tax audits, streamlining the tax schedule, etc. These efforts need to be actively pursued to sustain the recovery even though IGR can only significantly increase with the resumption of economic activities.

### 5.6.3. Ensuring Transparency and Accountability of Public Spending

**Budget information is scant in Nigeria across the three tiers of government.** No budget information is publicly available for local Governments. In most Nigerian States, “the public does not have access to comprehensive and timely information needed to participate meaningfully in the budget process and to hold government to account. With some variation, this lack of transparency encourages inappropriate, wasteful,

and corrupt spending and — because it shuts the public out of decision making — reduces the legitimacy and impact of anti-poverty initiatives”.

<sup>55</sup> But the level of budget transparency across the states varies somewhat with a few states (including Adamawa, qualified as a “moderate performer”) standing out.

**Accountability of recovery operations calls for enhanced budget transparency across the three tiers of governments.**

Fiscal transfers from Federal, State and Local Government expenditures need to be accounted for and publicly disclosed to allow for necessary public scrutiny and third party monitoring of public expenditure effectiveness at the Local level. No audit report on Federal, State or Local Government budgets has been made publicly available despite the fact that legally, each of these budgets is to be audited.

**The implementation of the recovery strategy will mobilise different sources of public funding and calls for a concerted financing strategy.**

As Nigeria is Africa’s biggest economy and as a middle-income country, recovery financing is expected to come from a combination of regular budget allocations and loans, and only to a limited extent from grants.

**Pooling resources in a single financing instrument may be considered for expediency.**

A multi donor trust fund can help prevent duplication and fragmentation of activities, generate economies of scale, and facilitate collective action and risk management. Importantly, a pooled fund can provide a platform to finance those priority areas where collective focus and attention is absolutely critical, and/or where financing through country systems at the necessary scale seems particularly challenging (such as for specific capacity strengthening activities and projects focused on social cohesion, reconciliation, and peace building). A key consideration during the development of the RPBS will be to explore whether a critical mass of grant financing can be mobilised to justify the initial higher operating costs of establishing a pooled fund.

**Establishing a financing strategy involves four key steps:** (a) agreeing on a set of priorities (financing needs) within the overall cost envelope of the RPBA; (b) mapping the various financing sources that can be accessed to deliver on these priorities; (c) identifying the range of specific instruments needed for delivery (strategic allocation framework); and (d) establishing appropriate institutional arrangements, including governance and accountability mechanisms, to promote joint responsibility for outcomes.



## CHAPTER 6

# Operational Framework

**Strategic Objective 1:**

Contribute to the safe, voluntary and dignified return and resettlement of displaced population

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
<b>1.1 Rapid provision of services to meet displaced population's needs</b>					
<b>Food Assistance</b>					
(a) General food assistance for populations in emergency and famine phases of food insecurity	(a) Borno 600,000, Yobe 200,000, Adamawa 41,000	(a) % of IDPs and host community population in food insecurity provided food	(a) 86%	(a) 14%	Federal/State Government/ Development Partners/ other stake holders
(b) Supplementary food assistance for most vulnerable for 4 months	(b) Borno 420,000, Yobe 201,000, Adamawa 123,000	(b) % of most vulnerable provided supplementary food	(b) 86%	(b) 14%	
(c) Short term food assistance (for 6 months) for less directly affected States	(c) Bauchi 70,000, Gombe 30,000, Taraba 50,000	(c) % of IDPs and host community populations in food insecurity provided food during the lean period (March-August)	(c) 89%	(c) 11%	
<b>Establishment of temporary learning space during reconstruction</b>		number of temporary learning spaces established	100%		State Universal Basic Education Board
<b>Provision of solid waste management (SWM) collection service to displaced populations</b>	2 million people displaced, a large majority have not received SWM collection	number of people with regular (once a week min.) waste collection service within 100m of their home (according to international standards)	100%		EPA
<b>1.2 Framework and programs to ensure safe, orderly and voluntary return and resettlement of displaced population</b>					
<b>Policy and operational framework to ensure safe and voluntarily return and resettlement</b>	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>domestication of Kampala convention</li> <li>agreed policy and operational framework for safe and voluntarily return and resettlement</li> </ul>	25%	75%	
<b>Support and strengthen broader access to basic needs at Local level for new displaced persons and those with no intention to return in short to medium term</b>	number of IDPs and returnees who have access to food, WASH, education and health services in camps, camp-like sites and host communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of IDPs and returnees have access to food in camps/camp-like settings/host communities</li> <li>number of IDPs and returnees have access to WASH in camps/camp-like settings/host communities</li> <li>number of IDPs and returnees have access to education in camps/camp-like settings/host communities</li> <li>number of IDPs and returnees have access to health care in camps/camp-like settings/host communities</li> <li>number of elders, UASC, widows who have access to food, shelter, WASH, education and health services</li> </ul>			

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation &amp; Recovery</i>	<i>Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)</i>		<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
			<i>Stabilisation Year 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Year 3-4</i>	
Psycho-social support to affected population, including IDPs, returnees, and host community members		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of surveys implemented on the issue of trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</li> <li>number of initiatives undertaken to address trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder needs of displaced people and host communities</li> <li>number of beneficiaries of psycho-social support included UASC, widows, elders, survivors of SGBV in camps, camp like sites and host communities</li> <li>number of new staff trained to provide psycho-social support</li> <li>number of health care centres with specialised staff providing psycho-social support</li> <li>number of referral mechanisms put in place</li> </ul>			
Livelihoods initiatives for displaced persons, host communities, and those who stayed behind		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of initiatives that aim to provide livelihoods means to IDPs, returnees, host communities and communities who stayed behind</li> <li>number of safety nets programs implemented (i.e. conditional cash transfers, life skills training, tools, and inputs provided)</li> <li>number of market analysis undertook to support livelihoods programs</li> <li>number of IDPs/returnees/members of host communities receiving livelihood trainings</li> <li>number of IDPs/returnees/members of host communities receiving life skills training</li> <li>number of IDPs/returnees/members of host communities receiving in-kind or cash support for livelihood</li> <li>number of elderly, widows, UASC and survivors of SGBV included in livelihoods programs</li> </ul>			
Preventing SGBV in host communities and camps		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of comprehensive mechanisms put in place to identify survivors of SGBV</li> <li>number of cases of SGBV reported</li> <li>number of victims of SGBV supported</li> <li>number of female community discussion groups conducted</li> <li>number of trainings on SGBV conducted</li> <li>number of physical and psycho-social health personnel trained to support SGBV survivors</li> </ul>	60%	40%	
Compensation to service providers of displaced populations, including hardship allowances for government employees returning to conflict-affected areas		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of service providers of displaced persons; number of service providers returning to conflict areas</li> </ul>	50%	50%	

**Strategic Objective 2:**

Improved human security, reconciliation and violence prevention

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation &amp; Recovery</i>	<i>Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)</i>		<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
			<i>Stabilisation Year 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Year 3-4</i>	
<b>2.1 De-mining and mine awareness campaigns</b>					
Reduce risks related to ERW	N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>hectare handed over as safe to the Local Government;</li> <li>Information on suspicious items correctly reported by affected population (behaviour change indicator)</li> </ul>	100%		TBD – Army not capable according to humanitarian mine action standards
Mine Action coordination mechanism		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>coordination mechanism in place at Federal and State levels</li> </ul>	50%	50%	
Mine Action Emergency risk education campaign		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of LGAs</li> <li>number of initiatives</li> </ul>	75%	25%	
Mine Action Integrated survey of hazardous areas with risk education and explosive ordnance disposal		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of teams</li> <li>number of square meters surveyed</li> <li>number of LGAs</li> </ul>	100%	0%	
Mine Action Victim assistance needs assessment and individual rehabilitation response		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>injuries evidence mechanism established</li> <li>number of victims identified</li> <li>number of victims supported/referred</li> </ul>	100%	0%	
<b>2.2 Establishment of peace building funds; conduct community trainings and awareness programs</b>					
Social Fund for CSOs to support peace building		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of direct beneficiaries</li> <li>number of indirect beneficiaries</li> <li>amount disbursed increase in performance of CSOs (on-the-job evaluation)</li> </ul>	50%	50%	
Community participation on security/SALW awareness and reduction in the North-East enhanced through provision of advocacy and sensitisation the dangers of SALWs		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of people sensitised</li> <li>number of weapons collected</li> <li>number of communities/LGAs</li> </ul>	75%	25%	
Reconciliation, Peace Building and Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism Training		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of training modules</li> <li>number of people trained</li> <li>increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation)</li> </ul>	75%	25%	

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation &amp; Recovery</i>	<i>Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)</i>		<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
			<i>Stabilisation Year 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Year 3-4</i>	
<b>2.3 Capacity building and development of legislative frameworks for peace building and violence prevention</b>					
Justice, community security and control of small arms ICT for case management		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of courts</li> <li>number of cases processed</li> </ul>	0%	100%	
Justice, community security and control of small arms model/pilot projects to promote model police stations and legal aid institutions		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of model police stations</li> <li>number of advice lines for legal aid established</li> <li>number of beneficiaries of legal advice line</li> <li>number of mobile court sessions</li> </ul>	40%	60%	
Justice, community security and control of small arms training		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of training modules</li> <li>number of people trained</li> <li>increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation) by law enforcement and justice agents</li> <li>increase in level of services delivered by law enforcement and justice agents</li> <li>increase in quality of services delivered by law enforcement and justice agents</li> </ul>	60%	40%	
Capacity of security apparatus in the North-East strengthened through the provision of best practices in border security and stockpile management		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of facilities established with international standards/ammunition storage</li> </ul>	60%	40%	
Legal and regulatory frameworks required for sustained fight against SALW established		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>framework established in accordance with international standards</li> </ul>	50%	50%	
Programs and facilities for de-radicalisation programme		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of facilities built</li> <li>number of people placed in facilities</li> </ul>	100%	0%	
[Reconciliation, Peace Building and Countering Conflict Training		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of training modules</li> <li>number of people trained</li> <li>increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation)</li> </ul>	75%	25%	

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
<b>2.4 Training and programs for sustainable reintegration of defectors</b>					
Disarming and reintegration technical assistance to defectors		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of registration facilities established</li> <li>number of ex-combatants reintegrated</li> <li>number of sensitisation campaigns carried out in the communities</li> <li>number of defectors included in the programming</li> <li>number of defectors receiving livelihood training</li> <li>number of defectors receiving life skills training</li> <li>number of defectors receiving psycho-social support</li> <li>number of defectors engaging in income generation activities after the training program</li> </ul>	50%	50%	
Assessments and studies (a) Mapping of available trauma response services; and (b) Trauma survey		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>completion of assessments or studies</li> </ul>	100%	0%	
[Reconciliation, Peace Building and countering conflict] Micro grants (micro loans)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of direct beneficiaries, disaggregate by gender</li> <li>number of indirect beneficiaries, disaggregate by gender</li> <li>amount disbursed repayment rate</li> </ul>	40%	60%	
<b>2.5 Programs to address and prevent sex- and gender-based violence</b>					
Assessments and studies (a) Study on SGBV; (b) Initial needs assessment; and (c) Mapping of available services		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>completion of assessments or studies</li> </ul>	100%	0%	
Establishment of Sexual Assault Referral Centre (SARC), create safe spaces, and provide psycho-social support to victims		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of facilities established</li> <li>number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>	100%	0%	
Train available mental and medical services personnel to address SGBV, and provide immediate attention to victims		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of personnel trained</li> </ul>			
<b>2.6 Comprehensive planning for SGBV victims' needs; strengthening legal and social provisions for victims</b>					
Comprehensive programming on SGBV, including immediate attention to victims of SGBV, as well as prevention initiatives		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of programs developed</li> <li>number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>			
Legal and social protections for women and children affected by SGBV		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>			



Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
<b>2.7 Capacity building of service providers</b>					
Train service providers working among conflict-affected populations in psycho-social support & peace building		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of service providers trained</li> </ul>	100%		State Universal Basic Education Board
Psycho-social support to populations exposed to high level of violence		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of affected population that receives support</li> </ul>	100%		State Universal Basic Education Board

### Strategic Objective 3: Enhanced government accountability and citizen engagement in the delivery of services

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
<b>3.1 Awareness raising and public campaigns for citizen engagement</b>					
Health risk mitigation awareness campaigns	No activities of awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of LGA with budgeted plan for awareness campaigns</li> </ul>	20%	70%	
Water and sanitation promotion campaigns, including distribution of IEC materials to the affected areas, plus the host communities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of people reached with hygiene messages</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Outreach and advocacy to communities/civil society for enhanced community engagement		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of media campaigns</li> <li>number of community meetings</li> <li>number of NGOs involved in monitoring</li> </ul>	50%	50%	
<b>3.2 Capacity development, and technical assistance to community-based organisations</b>					
Develop capacity of school-based management committees (SBMCs), e.g. to conduct enrolment drives, monitor enrolment		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of SBMCs that conduct enrolment drive and monitor enrolment</li> </ul>	50%	50%	State Universal Basic Education Board
Establish a community based grievance redress mechanism	establish LGA level beneficiary identification and grievance redressal mechanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>establish Village Rehabilitation Committees to monitor housing assistance delivery mechanism</li> </ul>	Establish beneficiary auditing and technical auditing teams	Quarterly auditing/ Supporting uncompleted housing units to completion	Establish a North-East Housing Reconstruction Project/State Housing Ministry
Strengthen systems at community level for improved management of water and sanitation facilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of communities with active structures</li> <li>number of communities with water safety plans</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation &amp; Recovery</i>	<i>Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)</i>		<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
			<i>Stabilisation Year 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Year 3-4</i>	
Form and train community based structures for implementation and monitoring of sanitation and hygiene promotion activities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of communities with structures for hygiene and sanitation promotion</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Establish and support Community Platforms (CP)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of CPs established</li> <li>number of meetings on quarterly basis</li> <li>number of informal and formal leaders involved on permanent basis in CPs</li> <li>number of Local Government representatives involved on permanent basis in CPs</li> <li>implementation of decisions taken by CPs</li> <li>number of needs assessments conducted through CPs ratio of IDPs, returnees and host community members participating in CPs</li> </ul>			
<b>3.3 Capacity building among Local and State Governments to enforce participation, accountability and transparency in their systems</b>					
Local governance and citizen engagement training for Local Governments		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of training modules</li> <li>number of people trained</li> <li>increase in performance as a result of training (on-the-job evaluation)</li> <li>number of needs assessments conducted by LGAs</li> <li>level of implementation of needs assessments (projects)</li> <li>increase in level of services delivered by Local Governments</li> <li>budget delivery figures</li> <li>number of reports released by Local Governments to public</li> </ul>			
Local governance and citizen engagement, policy dialogue and mentoring at the State Government level		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>increase in performance as a result of mentoring (on-the-job evaluation)</li> <li>increase in fiscal allocations to Local Government</li> <li>increase in budget delivery</li> <li>State policies developed to address recovery needs across different sectors</li> <li>State policies developed to support rebuilding social cohesion across different sectors</li> </ul>			

**Strategic Objective 4:**

Increased equity in the provision of basic services and employment opportunities

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
<b>4.1 Planning for reconstruction</b>					
Formulate debris management plans for each of the conflict-affected states	No institutional framework for the management of debris	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of debris management plans formulated and adopted by State Governments to frame the management of debris in their jurisdiction</li> </ul>	100%		State Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Formulation of state-wide solid waste management plans	No waste management strategy available at the State level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of states with a formulated and adopted SWM management plan</li> </ul>	100%		EPA
Establishing mechanism to implement the Housing Reconstruction Program through home-owner driven processes	Establish North-East Housing Reconstruction Project/Gazette Operations Guidelines to design and implement home-owner driven Housing Recovery Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>open bank accounts by beneficiaries and share at least 10% of the cost in cash and kind</li> </ul>	publish the list of beneficiaries based on detailed assessments and open bank accounts by 100% beneficiaries	Establish Material Coordination Teams to ensure easy access to building materials by people	Establish a North-East Housing Reconstruction Project/State Governments/Lead Commercial Banks/Lead Micro Credit Institutions/Chamber of Commerce
Technical assistance for initial Water & Sanitation assessments, strategic planning and capacity building on project management		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>assessment report and capacity building plan available</li> </ul>			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
Education: complete assessment of facilities damaged in six focus states		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>survey completed with precise estimates of rehabilitation/reconstruction needs (building, furniture, equipment, learning materials, textbooks)</li> </ul>	100%		Complete assessment of facilities damaged in six focus states
<b>4.2 (Re)construction/repair of service delivery infrastructure</b>					
Reconstruction or rehabilitation of agriculture and irrigation facilities	60-100% destroyed by the crisis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of agriculture and irrigation facilities reconstructed</li> </ul>	-40%	-60%	Federal/State Government/ Development Partners/ other stake holders
Reconstruction or rehabilitation, refurbishment and re-equipping of educational facilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of facilities rehabilitated, reconstructed, re-equipped</li> </ul>	30%	70%	reconstruction or rehabilitation, refurbishment and re-equipping of educational facilities
Reconstruction of electricity distribution substations	28% destroyed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of substations</li> </ul>	60%	40%	Yola and Jos Disco  State Governments
Reconstruction of electricity distribution lines	29% destroyed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>km of lines rehabilitated</li> </ul>	60%	40%	Yola and Jos Disco  State Governments
Reconstruction of electricity transmission substations	16 substations destroyed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of substations</li> </ul>	60%	40%	TCN, FGN  State Governments

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)		Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery		Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
					Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Reconstruction of electricity transmission lines	257 km of lines destroyed		• km of lines rehabilitated		60%	40%	TCN, FGN  State Governments
Health: reconstruction or rehabilitation of PHC facilities	PHC facilities damaged		• % of PHC facilities reconstructed/ rehabilitated				
	Adamawa	7%		Adamawa	32%	75%	
	Bauchi	27%		Bauchi	18%	41%	
	Borno	46%		Borno	17%	70%	
	Gombe	1%		Gombe	100%	100%	
	Taraba	3%		Taraba	48%	100%	
	Yobe	46%		Yobe	27%	93%	
Reconstruction or rehabilitation of referral facilities (secondary hospitals)	hospitals damaged		• % of secondary hospitals reconstructed/ rehabilitated				
	Adamawa	33%		Adamawa	33%	100%	
	Bauchi	14%		Bauchi	67%	100%	
	Borno	21%		Borno	40%	100%	
	Gombe			Gombe			
	Taraba			Taraba			
	Yobe	25%		Yobe	100%	100%	
Rehabilitation (repair) and reconstruction of damaged houses	431,842 of the housing stock damaged during Boko Haram related conflicts		• 25% of total damaged houses (107,960 units) repaired and reconstructed in damaged affected LGAs as part of Operation Plan		25% of the Operation Plan target fully damaged units and 75% of partially damaged units	100% of the fully and partly damaged targeted units reconstructed  Phase 2 of the operational plan for 107,960 units kick starts based on the Phase 1 progress and conflict situations (US\$ 400 million)	Establish a North-East Housing Reconstruction Project Unit/State Governments/ Ministry of Reconciliation, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

<i>Needs</i>	<i>Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)</i>	<i>Indicators for Stabilisation &amp; Recovery</i>	<i>Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)</i>		<i>Responsibility for Implementation</i>
			<i>Stabilisation Year 1-2</i>	<i>Recovery Year 3-4</i>	
Refurbishing damaged infrastructure for mobile phone base stations and towers	Approximately 480 base stations damaged across six states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No repaired base stations and towers</li> </ul>	60%	100%	Relevant ministry at State and Federal level; private sector entities
Repair and retrofit partially damaged public buildings	706 public buildings are damaged;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All partly damaged public buildings are repaired and made functional</li> </ul>	All partly damaged Local Government (13) and ministry buildings (4), police stations/ barrack (7) and election office (1) are repaired and made functional;  (57% of total partly damaged buildings)	Remaining partly damaged building (19) are repaired and made functional;  100% of the partly damaged public buildings restored	Public Works Departments/State Governments
Reconstruct/rebuild fully damaged public buildings	662 public buildings are completely destroyed (non-functional) and need to be rebuilt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North-East Reconstruction Project (NERP) established</li> <li>All fully damaged public buildings are reconstructed and made functional</li> </ul>	25% of the total fully damaged Local Government and ministry buildings, police stations and barracks are rebuilt and made functional	100% of all fully damaged public buildings reconstructed and made functional	Establish a NERP/ Project Management Consultants (PMC)/ State Governments
Rehabilitate Federal roads	878 sq m of Federal road damaged	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>square meter of rehabilitated roads and bridges</li> </ul>	80%	100%	Federal /State Ministry of Transport
Rehabilitate State infrastructure (roads and bridges)	3326 sq m of State/LGA road damaged  11262 sq m of bridges damaged	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>square meter of rehabilitated roads</li> <li>square meter of rehabilitated bridges</li> </ul>	80%	100%	Federal /State Ministry of Transport

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Repair and reconstruction of all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) and boreholes in communities and of piped schemes in small towns and urban centres		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of water points restored</li> <li>number of schemes rehabilitated</li> <li>number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Repair and reconstruction of all damaged water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered) boreholes in public places (excluding schools and health facilities)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of water points restored</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Replacement of all damaged protected dug wells with hand pump boreholes		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of water points restored</li> <li>number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Replacement/rehabilitation of damaged sanitation infrastructure in public places (excluding schools and health facilities)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of water points restored</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Construction of new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and network extension in small towns and urban centres in affected areas as well as in select host communities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of new water points</li> <li>Additional population served by piped schemes</li> <li>number of beneficiaries</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Construction of new water facilities (hand pumps, motorised and solar powered boreholes) and sanitation infrastructure in public places in the affected areas as well as in select host communities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of new water points</li> <li>number of new sanitation facilities</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, Water Board, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Water and sanitation: One time provision of equipment and logistics support (vehicles, office equipment, furniture, ICT infrastructure, etc.)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of supplies delivered</li> </ul>			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
Water and sanitation: Operational support for fuelling of vehicles, purchase of chemicals, working tools and office expendables		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of functional WASH facilities</li> </ul>			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
Replacement of lost SWM infrastructure	15 vehicles destroyed and 8 damaged directly by the conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of vehicles replaced</li> </ul>	100%		EPA

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation		
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4			
<b>4.3 Removal of debris / ensuring access</b>							
Clear debris from areas where it hampers access or reconstruction	290,000 fully destroyed housing units, 135,000 partially damaged housing units	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of structures cleared of debris, ready for reconstruction</li> </ul>	100%		To be defined by State level Debris Management Plan. Likely State level EPA, potentially the Army in logistical support		
Remove debris aggregations from areas of human settlement	Up to 7.3 million cubic metres of debris generated from damage to the housing sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cubic metres of debris removed from areas of human settlement</li> </ul>	100%		As defined by debris management plans above, most likely EPA.		
Recycle, reuse, or reprocess as much debris as possible, especially through sustainable SMEs	Not quantifiable, some informal sector recovery occurring, as well as direct reuse on site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cubic metres of debris diverted from the disposal route through reuse or processing for recycling</li> <li>number of livelihoods supported in the process of recycling</li> </ul>	50%	50%	EPA, private sector		
Safe disposal of unusable debris	Current disposal sites are unmanaged and uncontrolled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of disposed debris which is disposed in a safe site, as described by International Solid Waste Association (ISWA) standards</li> </ul>	100%		EPA		
<b>4.4 Rehabilitation of existing service delivery methods, and expansion of service delivery to meet crisis needs</b>							
Cash transfer/scholarship to address financial barriers to enrolment		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of boys/girls who receive cash transfer/scholarship</li> </ul>	50%	50%	State Universal Basic Education Board		
Increased availability and utilization of essential health services, particularly provided through non-permanent structures: coverage of DPT3/Penta3	Coverage of DPT3/Penta3		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of children of 23 months or below immunized with DPT3/Penta3</li> </ul>				
	Adamawa	45%				Adamawa 60%	Adamawa 80%
	Bauchi	15%				Bauchi 50%	Bauchi 70%
	Borno	32%				Borno 50%	Borno 50%
	Gombe	24%				Gombe 45%	Gombe 75%
	Taraba	26%				Taraba 55%	Taraba 80%
Yobe	8%	Yobe 25%	Yobe 50%				

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)		Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
				Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Increased availability and utilisation of essential services: deliveries attended by skilled personnel	skilled deliveries per State		• % of deliveries attended by skilled personnel			
	Adamawa	38%		Adamawa 50%	Adamawa 65%	
	Bauchi	26%		Bauchi 45%	Bauchi 60%	
	Borno	29%		Borno 45%	Borno 60%	
	Gombe	47%		Gombe 60%	Gombe 70%	
	Taraba	33%		Taraba 45%	Taraba 60%	
	Yobe	9%		Yobe 20%	Yobe 40%	
Restoration of health system functions	None of the CHEWs has been trained in the provision of the essential package		• % of facilities with CHEW trained for the essential package of service	20%	60%	
[Health] Restoration of governance and resilience functions restored	None of the LGA/States has an operational EWARs		• % of LGA with operational Early Warning & Response System	10%	40%	
Expansion of coverage of forthcoming National Social Safety Nets Programme, unconditional top-up for first 2 years	Poverty incidence: 50.4% (2013)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Output indicator: number of households covered</li> <li>• Ratio of IDP/returnee to non-IDP beneficiary households</li> <li>• Outcome indicator: poverty incidence and poverty gap</li> <li>• Household income/expenditure</li> </ul>	50%	50%	
Old age and disability allowance	Poverty incidence of households with older persons: 57.9%		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Output indicator: coverage of older persons aged 65 years and above and PWDs, in terms of absolute numbers and share of total older persons/PWDs</li> <li>• Outcome indicator: poverty incidence and poverty gap</li> </ul>	50%	50%	
Social Protection: Targeted subsidy of Community Based Social Health Insurance Programme for children under 5, lactating mothers and pregnant women	Immunisation of children under 5: 43.4%		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Output indicator: number of total individuals covered</li> <li>• Individuals covered as share of total population in the North-East</li> <li>• Health expenditure per individual/household</li> <li>• child immunisation rates</li> </ul>	0%	100%	
Restore public transport			• restored public transport assets	60%	100%	Federal /State Ministry of Transport; Public Transport Corporations of Borno and Yobe



Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Implementation of community led total sanitation approach in rural areas		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of people in communities certified as 'open defaecation free'</li> </ul>			Ministry in charge of water, RUWASSA, STWSSA, LGA WASH Unit, WASHCOM
Capacity building of social protection institutions at the Local Government	Low institutional capacity to implement social protection schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Output indicator:</li> <li>number of LGA-level implementers receiving training</li> </ul>	100%	0%	
Water and sanitation: Establishment/strengthening of local institutions (MDAs) at the State and LGA level		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of States Institutions strengthened</li> <li>number of LGAs with WASH Units/ Department established and operational</li> </ul>			Federal/State Government and ESAs (WB, EU, UNICEF)
<b>4.5 Skills training to boost employment opportunities that meet crisis-related needs in the North-East</b>					
Social Protection: Public employment scheme	Poverty incidence: 50.4% (2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Output indicator: number of households covered</li> <li>Ratio of IDPs/returnee to non-IDPs beneficiary households</li> <li>Outcome indicator: poverty incidence and poverty gap</li> <li>Household income/expenditure</li> </ul>	50%	50%	Federal Government (Ministry of Labour & Employment, Ministry for Women etc.), State Commissioners for Employment, Reconstruction, and Women etc. Donor Organisations Implementing CSO (international and national), Community Representatives, Training Centre Staff Beneficiaries
Labour force skills development	% of unemployed persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of skills development facilities rehabilitated</li> </ul>	60%	40%	
Rehabilitation of existing facilities and addition of new facilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of training facilities newly constructed</li> </ul>	30%	70%	
Skill development training		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of trainings conducted in centres</li> </ul>	40%	60%	
Skill development outreach using mobile teams		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of trainings conducted by mobile teams</li> </ul>	50%	50%	

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Women empowerment through skills training for employment		• number of women trained for professional skills	40%	60%	
Professional skills trainings		• number of women participating in adult literacy	40%	60%	
Adult literacy & counting education		• number of women attending life skills/peace education	40%	60%	
Life skills training/peace education	% of unemployed women	• number of women placed in employment	30%	70%	
Start-up Kit distribution		• Start-up kits distributed	30%	70%	
Employment identification		• women enterprises built up	30%	70%	
Micro-enterprises set up		• numbers of women cooperatives built up	30%	70%	
Cooperatives building up					
Youth empowerment through skills training for employment		• number of youth trained for professional skills	40%	60%	
Professional skills trainings		• number of youth participating in Catch Up Literacy	40%	60%	
Adult literacy & counting education		• number of youth attending life skills/peace education	40%	60%	
Life skills training/peace education	% of unemployed youth	• number of youth placed in employment	30%	70%	
Start-up kit distribution		• Number of start-up kits distributed	30%	70%	
Employment identification		• number of youth enterprises built up	30%	70%	
Micro-enterprises set up		• number of youth cooperatives built up	30%	70%	
Cooperatives building up					
Strengthen institutional capacity of State Employment Centres and related institutions	% of employment centres and related institutions are damaged, destroyed or not functional	• % of employment centres rehabilitated	40%	60%	
		• % of employment centre staff trained	40%	60%	
		• number of new staff for employment centres recruited	30%	70%	
		• number of job seekers placed in new employment	30%	70%	
<b>4.6 Sector economic recovery to boost employment opportunities</b>					
Reinforcement of existing waste management and resource recovery livelihood sector	Unquantified number of SMEs informally supporting municipal SWM system through resource recovery activities	• number of livelihoods created within the SWM and DM resource recovery sector	50%	50%	EPA
Support to youth entrepreneurship	Limited youth entrepreneurship and high youth unemployment	• 500 business plans supported under You Win initiative	30%	70%	Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, SMEDAN

Needs	Baseline (Present State as of December 2015)	Indicators for Stabilisation & Recovery	Expected Implementation Framework (% completion)		Responsibility for Implementation
			Stabilisation Year 1-2	Recovery Year 3-4	
Reopening of border stations	All border stations in Borno State are closed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All border stations in Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, and Taraba are open</li> </ul>	60%	100%	Nigeria Customs Services, Federal Ministry of Finance
Recovery of markets	Market activities significantly affected by conflict, with markets destroyed and/or closed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All markets in the 6 North-East States are operational</li> </ul>	60%	100%	State Ministries of Industry, Trade and Investment, National Emergency Management Agency, State Emergency Management Agencies
Increased access to financial services for micro, small and medium enterprises	68.4% of adults financially excluded in the North-East	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10,000 micro, small, and medium enterprises have received a loan from a financial institution</li> </ul>	20%	80%	Development Bank of Nigeria, Financial Inclusion Secretariat
Private sector recovery in the North-East States Formal private sector: small and medium enterprises Informal private sector: micro-enterprises	Private sector activities significantly reduced because of the fighting (destruction, reduced mobility, reduced trade)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2,000 small and medium enterprises receive recovery support (matching grants)</li> <li>Support to micro-enterprises captured in Livelihoods component</li> </ul>	30%	70%	Federal and State Ministries for Industry, Trade and Investment; SMEDAN
Support to private sector development in high potential value chains: agribusiness and solid minerals	Small formal private sector, with few industries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>100 small and medium enterprises receive support in the agribusiness and solid minerals value chains</li> </ul>	10%	90%	Federal and State Ministries for Industry, Trade and Investment; SMEDAN
Agriculture based value chains and agro processing centres established and strengthened.	Significant reduction in human mobility thus limiting access to extension services and productive assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of returning IDPs/ returnee, youth, women and affected hosting communities members participating in along agricultural value chains</li> <li>number of people active at agro processing centres</li> </ul>	60%	40%	Federal/State Government/ Local Government/ Development Partners/private sector/other stake holders
Strengthening agriculture and irrigation related services value chains for increased food security and agricultural productivity	Significant reduction in human mobility thus limiting access to extension services and productive inputs/assets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of farmers IDPs/refugees with access to agricultural inputs and extension services</li> </ul>	60%	40%	Federal/State Government/ Development Partners/other stake holders
Natural resources based and solid minerals value chains and enterprises developed and commercialized for sustainable broad based local economic recovery.	<p>Not developed as much before conflict as farming was dominating</p> <p>Limited skills in artisanal mining, natural resources based production processing ( value addition and beneficiation )</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>number of community members including youth, women and men active along the developed value chains</li> <li>number of viable natural resources based and solid mineral based enterprises established and functional</li> </ul>	60%	40%	Government/ Local Government/ Development Partners/private sector/ other stake holders
Social Protection: Employment of IDPs in procurement of forthcoming national school feeding program		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Output indicator: number of IDPs/returnee employed in the forthcoming program</li> </ul>	70%	30%	

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# Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> UNOCHA, 2015 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). Note other sources indicate higher human tolls, however could not be verified for the purpose of this report.
- <sup>2</sup> IOM, NEMA, 2015, Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Round VII.
- <sup>3</sup> The Federal level pertains to assets and interventions of the Federal Government, while the Regional level pertains to needs that would require interventions across all States, or those activities that cannot be disaggregated by state.
- <sup>4</sup> UNOCHA, 2015, HRP.
- <sup>5</sup> IOM, NEMA, 2015, DTM Round VII.
- <sup>6</sup> UNOCHA, 2015, HRP.
- <sup>7</sup> NSRP, 2014a.
- <sup>8</sup> Chothia, F., 2015.
- <sup>9</sup> Nigeria Watch <http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?urlaction=evtStat>
- <sup>10</sup> UNOCHA, 2015, HRP.
- <sup>12</sup> ACLED, 2016.
- <sup>13</sup> BBC Monitoring Africa, 2015.
- <sup>14</sup> UNOCHA, 2015, HRP.
- <sup>15</sup> UNOCHA, 2016.
- <sup>16</sup> The number of LGAs that the DTM teams were able to access also increased over the same period.
- <sup>17</sup> In addition, 1 in 6 Africans is Nigerian. With up to 60 percent of its population under 24 of age, this represents a huge demographic left largely without education and represents a huge loss to economic and human development.
- <sup>18</sup> World Bank, 2014.
- <sup>19</sup> UNOCHA, 2015, Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO).
- <sup>20</sup> Human Rights Watch, 2014; Amnesty International 2015.
- <sup>21</sup> All six States are known to be exposed to natural disasters with various degrees of vulnerability.
- <sup>22</sup> Other factors should also be taken into consideration. For example, the main reason for the displacement of populations in Taraba State is due to communal conflicts. Also, the six States are vulnerable to natural disasters, albeit to various degrees.
- <sup>23</sup> OECD has produced guidelines for the implementation of do-no-harm approaches in conflict recovery programming along similar lines of those here described. For more information visit: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/do%20no%20harm.pdf>
- <sup>24</sup> Protection Sector Working Group (PSWG), 2016. PSWG provides the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and the National Humanitarian Coordination Forum strategic advice and ensures coordination of protection issues, including with the subsector working groups on child protection and SGBV. It is co-led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) together with National Human Rights Commission. For further information see <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/nigeria/protection>
- <sup>25</sup> The Operational Framework is contained in Chapter 6 of this Volume.
- <sup>26</sup> Estimated in Naira: 1.66 trillion.
- <sup>27</sup> Estimated in Naira: 708.18 billion.
- <sup>28</sup> Federal level pertains to assets and interventions of the Federal Government, while regional pertains to needs that would require interventions across all States, or those activities that cannot be disaggregated by state.
- <sup>29</sup> Critical needs for return and resettlement and peace building such as housing, livelihoods and service delivery are accounted for in Infrastructure and Social Services component and Economic Recovery component. Peace Building, Stability and Social Cohesion Component focuses only on needs that are not yet accounted for.
- <sup>30</sup> Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015 A/HRC/30/67.
- <sup>31</sup> IOM, NEMA, 2015, DTM Round VII.
- <sup>32</sup> The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa is known as the Kampala Convention, formulated to protect the rights and wellbeing of people forced to flee their homes by conflict, violence, and natural disasters, and human rights abuses. The Convention reflects the norms included in the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, while articulating the obligations and roles of African States and other key actors such as the African Union (AU), armed groups, international organizations and civil society, to prevent and respond to internal displacement. The Convention has the potential to make a significant contribution to improving the wellbeing of IDPs across Africa, depending on its effective implementation, and ratification by signatory AU member States.
- <sup>33</sup> UNDP, 2013; UN, 2009.
- <sup>34</sup> In fact, Bauchi experienced a cumulative decline in both prices, especially for food items. In contrast, Gombe experienced the highest cumulative increase in prices for all items and for food. Cumulative increases in prices for all items were much higher in the primary affected States, while in the secondary affected States, an increase in the price for food was slightly higher. It is noteworthy that it is significantly higher than a price increase for all items (23.8 percent compared to 5.3 percent).
- <sup>35</sup> Africa Growth Initiative Working Paper, 2014.
- <sup>36</sup> FEWSNET, 2015.
- <sup>37</sup> Daily Post, 2016.
- <sup>38</sup> FEWSNET, 2015.
- <sup>39</sup> Note: Population-weighted proportion. Questions used: "In your main activity, what is the employer in this job?" combined with "Have you received wages, salary or other payments either in cash or in other forms from this employment for this work?"
- <sup>40</sup> FEWSNET, 2015.
- <sup>41</sup> Federal level pertains to assets and interventions of the Federal Government, while Regional pertains to needs that would require interventions across all States, or those activities that cannot be disaggregated by state.
- <sup>42</sup> GHS, 2012/2013.
- <sup>43</sup> NDHS, 2013.
- <sup>44</sup> British Council, 2012.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup> Nigeria's Political Violence Research Network, 2013.
- <sup>48</sup> Zenn and Pearson, 2014.
- <sup>49</sup> IOM and NEMA, 2015, DTM VII.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> NSRP, 2014b.
- <sup>53</sup> United States Institute of Peace, 2013.
- <sup>54</sup> Awojobi, 2014.
- <sup>55</sup> NSRP, 2014b.
- <sup>56</sup> CIRDDOC, 2015 <http://www.internationalbudget.org/groups/civil-resource-development-and-documentation-centre-cirddoc-nigeria/>





*The North-East has suffered tremendously in the past six years. We have all been witness to the destruction of infrastructure, farmlands, businesses and trades, of schools and the loss of school years. Rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating what has been lost or damaged will cost money and time.*

*...the tasks before us are many and profound but paramount: to fix brick and mortar and to mend hearts and minds damaged by senseless, murderous violence.*




– His Excellency, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

### About the Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA):

On 21 August 2015, the Government of Nigeria requested assistance in assessing the needs associated with peace building and crisis recovery. Support has been provided in accordance with the 2008 Joint European Union (EU) – United Nations (UN) – World Bank (WB) Declaration on crisis assessment and recovery planning. A Recovery and Peace Building Assessment was initiated and findings are presented in this report.

The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) informs a collective vision and strategy on peace building and recovery, and provides a framework for coordinated and coherent support to assist conflict-affected people in the North-East. The assessment covers the six States of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and Bauchi, and provides an overarching framework for stability, peace building, and recovery.

The RPBA is founded on the recognition that a durable resolution to the conflict in the North-East requires addressing the structural and underlying drivers of violent conflict. This understanding has also underpinned the identification and prioritisation of needs presented in this report.



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