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# UPDATE OF THE 2015 PERCEPTION STUDY:

## Annexes

2021




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# **UPDATE OF THE 2015 PERCEPTION STUDY:**

## **Annex I: Literature Review**

2021



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## List of abbreviations

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AA: Association agreement

ASEAN: Association of South Asian Nations

BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CANZUK: an anglophone alliance of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK

CEPA : Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

COP24 : 24th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

COVAX: the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the World Health Organization

DEVCO: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

EEAS: European External Action Service

EHEIs: European higher education institutions

EPA: Economic partnership agreement

EUPOP: EU Policy Outreach Partnership

EUREN: EU-Russia Expert Network on Foreign Policy

FPI: Service for Foreign Policy Instruments

FTA: Free trade agreement

IADB: *Inter-American Development Bank*

ICRC: *International Committee of the Red Cross*

IDAHOT: International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia

IFFs: Illicit financial flows

IOM: *International Organization for Migration*

JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

LGBTI+: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex+

MERCUSOR: trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay

PDO/PGI logos: Protected Designation of Origin/ Protected Geographical Indication

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

RST: Research, science and technology

SDS: Fifth Security and Defence Symposium

SPA: Strategic partnership agreement

UN: United Nations

UNFCCC: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

## Executive summary

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The Literature Review spans over the **last five years of research – 2015-2021** – into the perceptions of the EU and Europe in the thirteen key partners of the EU: Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Republic of Korea and the US. The thorough review of contemporary research follows the set of indicators used in the 2015 Baseline Study to ensure a valid comparison of perception trends over time and adds several new indicators to reflect on the EU's critical junctures in the last five years and on the advances in the scholarship of EU perceptions. The Literature Review also overviews key public diplomacy initiatives and programmes of the EU in 2015-2021 and compares them to the findings in the Literature Review.

The Literature Review offers six **core findings** from the review of the relevant literature:

1. Economy and trade are leading themes in all locations.
2. Strong pull of *location-specific* drivers behind EU perceptions, including higher visibility of EU political actorness.
3. Limited visibility of themes other than economy/trade and politics.
4. *Location-specific* and *global* factors create new dynamics in regions and influence EU perceptions.
5. Absence of one definitive trend in the evolution of attitudes and evaluations assigned to the EU.
6. Persistent low level of awareness among the general public and limited attention to the perceptions of the EU among young people.

Drawing on a sketchy research body with limited comparability, the Literature Review provides an identification of core themes, trends and research tools and compares them over time to inform EU public diplomacy. The Literature Review of the Update Study 2021 confirms the 2015 finding that “Europe” and the “European Union” are used interchangeably in the relevant literature.

Similar to the Baseline Study 2015, the Update Study 2021 shows that EU public diplomacy initiatives continue to prioritise economic, cultural and education relations, however in contrast to the Baseline Study, the five-year period and a new cycle in programming (2017-2019) also highlight other priority themes where the EU is now seeking high visibility in a prominent way: climate/environment and inclusive society. EU public diplomacy initiatives are now increasingly characterised what we call a “blended” character, i.e. when the public diplomacy initiatives are designed to “weave together”, in a creative way, inputs from several key themes, involving staff from different divisions within EU Delegations, and, in the strongest difference to 2015, showcasing a more confident synergy between the EU and EU Member States within the “Team Europe” framework established in 2020. Moreover, EU public diplomacy initiatives have become more sectoral, specific and, at the same time, “blended” wherein sectorial initiatives are combined under the framework of a common event or policy. This is different to 2015, when only the economy had major visibility in EU public diplomacy and when the EU public diplomacy initiatives were often seen as competing with EU Member States public diplomacy initiatives. In the 2021 Study, one other major factor is different and unique for public diplomacy initiatives, namely the Covid pandemic. The pandemic has turned out to be a major “game changer” for EU public diplomacy initiatives. On the one hand, it has curtailed face-to-face human contacts and experiences central to public diplomacy. On the other hand, it has required flexible and fast-paced adaptability of public diplomacy initiatives planning and fast-forwarded design and implementation of digital diplomacy tools and means to extend the outreach to ensure people-to-people contacts in public diplomacy domain during the major health crisis.



# Introduction

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Reviewing the state of the art in research on perceptions of the EU/Europe between 2015 and 2021 in the thirteen key partners of the EU: Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Republic of Korea and the US, the Literature Review covers a five-year time frame which includes several key events for EU Foreign Policy. Among those are the adoption of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, the appointment of the new European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen and a new EU HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell in 2019. This period also includes several critical junctures for the EU, such as Brexit that took place between 2015 and 2020, the peak of the irregular migration crisis in 2015-2016, terrorist attacks and threats to the EU's domestic security, the rise of populist and far-right political movements in Europe, and the Covid-19 pandemic (ongoing since 2019 at the time the Final Report is submitted). The EU's foreign policy has faced challenges linked to the four-year tenure of US President Trump, including the demise of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, a rapidly declining relationship with Russia, continued conflicts in Syria and Libya, and the 2021 "diplomatic storm" between the EU and China – exchange of sanctions threatening a non-ratification of the EU-China investment pact sealed in December 2020.

The reviewed literature includes academic studies, articles, reports, monographs and opinion polls covering 13 countries in English and national languages. Country Expert teams based in the 13 countries are supported by the PD-PCF UC team, which is in charge of the Literature Review.

The systematic analysis is structured along *three sets of pre-defined parameters*:

- a) The EU's nine *main themes and their sub-themes* representing: economy and trade; politics (internal and external to the EU); research, science and technology (RST); energy; development and assistance; climate and environment, social, culture and health [*the last theme is new in the 2021 Study*];
- b) *Key research criteria* (modes of impact: visibility, actorness, effectiveness, cognitive resonance and normative power)<sup>1</sup> and;
- c) *Explanatory variables* (local conditions: history, culture, political context, training/ education, translation).<sup>2</sup>

The Literature Review also overviews and compares **key public diplomacy initiatives and programmes of the EU in 2015-2021** to the literature and in reflection of the findings of the 2015 Baseline

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<sup>1</sup> Drawing on terminology used in perception research, *visibility* measures the extent to which the EU/ Europe is visible and how this visibility is perceived; *actorness* measures whether the EU/ Europe is perceived as active and its actions are perceived as cohesive or non-cohesive. *Effectiveness* is the extent to which the EU is perceived as successful/unsuccessful in reaching its intended goals. *Cognitive resonance* is the extent to which perceptions differ when the EU is portrayed as acting towards itself vs acting towards the country concerned, or its neighbouring region. "Normative power", "Norm setter", "Soft power", "Collaborative public diplomacy actor", "Geopolitical power" are actor categories and add a horizontal dimension.

<sup>2</sup> Cultural differences/ similarities can lead to a preference for/ indifference towards/ rejection of EU policies; specific cultures might be more open towards "learning from the outside" than others. Translation refers to differences/ similarities in language/ connotation and translation that can lead to smooth or malfunctioning comprehension/ communication. History can have an impact on what is perceived as well as how. Training/ education/ Personal exposure to Europe can shape perceptions based on experiences. The political context is important to understand the environment in which the EU policies are being implemented/ adopted/ rejected / contested.

Study. The main source of data (proposed and approved by the Steering Group) is a series of one-hour interviews with EU public diplomacy practitioners from FPI (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments) and EEAS (European External Action Service) sections of EU Delegations in the 13 selected countries and one interview with a regional EU public diplomacy lead (in total, 14 interviews with 43 practitioners). The interviews took place between March and May 2021. The interview data intake is complemented for each country by information from the EU Policy Outreach Partnership (EUPOP) report, as well as other relevant EU documents provided by the Client and, in some cases, by the EU Delegations.

The systematic analysis is structured along *five sets of pre-defined parameters* (see also Final Report):

- a) Nine *main themes/sub-themes* and activities under public diplomacy initiatives between 2015-2021 (as listed above)
- b) Key audiences
- c) *Obstacles* (institutional obstacles; perceived lack of information about/understanding of the EU in locations; deficit of effectiveness and different degree of “like-mindedness” of the partners, other obstacles (Covid pandemic)
- d) *Main gaps* (institutional and programmatic gaps of the public diplomacy; research gaps; gaps in cross-cutting policy recommendations)
- e) Future outlook.

## 1.1. Core findings

The Literature Review provides six central findings:

### 1) ECONOMY AND TRADE ARE LEADING THEMES

Literature between 2015 and 2021 highlights the dominant visibility of the EU as an economic/trade partner in reflection of a series of trade agreements, either concluded in the last five years, or currently under discussion. Trade agreements with the EU – bilateral, trilateral, regional, FTAs and Association Agreements (AA) – surface as a major driver behind perceptions of the EU and their visibility, intensity, evaluation and evolution. In their context, the EU is typically seen as an effective actor and a trustworthy beneficial partner (even if some negotiations are considered laborious or difficult) among local stakeholders, e.g. civil society in Mexico or the business community in Canada, Japan and South Africa. Striking a trade agreement with the EU is perceived as a boost to the third countries’ relations with the EU and a recognition of the status of their relationship. Occasionally the trade agreement frameworks reinforce existing, negative perceptions of the EU (e.g. the EPA between the EU and Nigeria in the context of the revision of the Cotonou Agreement).

The literature points out that the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis is no longer the main reference point for the EU in the economic issue-area. However, Brexit is considered a potential disruptor and challenger to the third countries’ economic and trade relations with the EU. External partners anticipate that the EU may become either a less effective actor in light of its internal disagreements (e.g. in the US, China), or a more protectionist actor by losing a major, successful economy such as the UK (e.g. in Brazil). The most recent literature reports that these expectations have not been substantiated. The literature does not find the perceptions of the EU in this issue-area to deteriorate significantly, and it perceives the UK’s economy to lose most after the UK’s exit from the EU.

### 2) STRONG PULL OF LOCATION-SPECIFIC DRIVERS BEHIND EU PERCEPTIONS, INCLUDING HIGHER VISIBILITY OF EU POLITICAL ACTORNESS:

The literature in the last five years argues for perceptions of the EU to be highly *location-specific*, including increasingly visible *political* profiles of the EU that are linked to local political priorities, events and personalities.

In contrast to the Baseline Study, perceptions of the EU as an actor in the *political* issue-area are more pronounced in the 2015-2021 literature. EU-specific multiple crises (and Brexit in particular) contribute to the change in EU visibility patterns. Literature typically finds crises to trigger more visible profiles of the EU as a *political* actor albeit prone to negative assessments. In some locations, Brexit has solidified perceptions of EU Member States as primary interlocutors in political dialogues (e.g. in the US and India). In other locations, perceptions of Brexit are noted by literature to be a factor that adds to location-specific internal political polarisation (e.g. among political establishment in the US and to lesser extent Canada).

Yet, *EU-specific* factors are not at all exclusively responsible for shaping perceptions of the EU in general, and as a *political* actor specifically. Instead, literature highlights in particular the role of *location-* and *global-specific* factors and alludes to *region-specific* factors in some cases. In these instances, the literature observes a wider range of evaluations. Conclusions of a major political agreement (e.g. PCA with Canada and Indonesia, or SPA with Japan) is a powerful *location-specific* factor. The EU's political actorness in security, and especially in peace-building and humanitarian processes, creates more positive perceptions with a pronounced normative profile (e.g. in Colombia and Nigeria). The literature also observes negative perceptions triggered by *location-specific* factors. For example, in the US, literature observes a negative decline in the perceptions of the EU linked to the foreign-political priorities in the tenure of President Trump in 2016-2020. In Russia, relevant literature explores how the EU's sanctions following the Russia-Ukraine conflict after 2014 and sanctions following the "Navalny case" in 2021 are among leading *location-specific* inputs that influence how the EU is perceived in Russia, at least among policy- and decision-makers. In China, its growing self-perception as a rising and capable actor has led to a growing perception of the EU as a less capable and influential power.

Evaluation-wise, while positive and negative images might be location-specific, the EU also seems to be perceived critically through *global* factors or *EU-specific* factors such as Brexit with less counterweight in positive perceptions that are not related to the country. Literature analyses points to local cognitive resonance in the context of the most recent temporal frames (2015 and onwards) and a more recent period (2000-2015) to be the leading driver in re-shaping EU perceptions.

### 3) LIMITED VISIBILITY OF THEMES OTHER THAN ECONOMY/TRADE AND POLITICS

Following the lead trend identified in the Literature Review of the Baseline Study, the Update Study finds that the literature published between 2015 and 2021 pays less systematic attention to themes other than *economy/trade* and *politics*. This includes relatively low visibility of themes that are important to the EU and in areas where the EU sees itself in a leadership position and where it is proud to carry out successful activities. Specifically, this concerns the themes *climate/environment* and *research/science/innovation*. Literature in the last five years does feature more robust research into perceptions of the EU in the *energy* field, yet such insights remain marginal.

Some other themes may be more visible in some locations than in others depending on local priorities and domestic strategic interests. In Brazil and China, literature has followed perceptions of the EU in the *energy* issue-area more intensely than in other locations given Brazil's interest in biofuel trade and access to the EU's energy market and China's interest in promoting its energy efficiency policies as well as sustainable development. In Japan the *normative/human rights* issue of the death penalty is seen as a sensitive issue-area. In India the literature observes perceptions of the EU in *cultural* and *normative* issue-areas. Local priorities to curb climate change and overcome energy poverty in India trigger an increasing awareness of the EU in the priority areas of smart city projects, infrastructure development, transport, green energy and renewables. In Indonesia, local concerns with deforestation and palm oil issues increase attention to EU actorness in the *environment* theme. It follows that the EU's perceived actorness and a perceived impact of the relevant EU initiative and instruments in these specific issue-areas become a direct function of the local priorities and policies.

#### 4) LOCATION-SPECIFIC AND GLOBAL-SPECIFIC FACTORS CREATE NEW DYNAMICS IN REGIONS AND INFLUENCE EU PERCEPTIONS:

Literature analysis points to another factor in shaping perceptions of the EU and their evolutions in individual countries in 2015-2021, namely *region-specific* developments in third countries' immediate geostrategic neighbourhoods. These inputs have become more visible in the literature over time, if compared to the Baseline Study. The literature finds that trade agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR has impacted perceptions of the EU in Brazil and Mexico in a positive way, and specifically in the context of trade. The literature finds that the perception of the EU in Nigeria is influenced by the EU's relations with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), with a focus on security, humanitarian assistance programmes and migration. Literature see EU-ASEAN relations to influence perceptions of the EU in Indonesia and specifically in the political issue-area in the context of bilateral cooperation with the EU. In this case, the literature reports that this regional cooperative framework is used to increase trust between the EU and a selected country, where perceptions of the EU have been historically negative. And while there is no regional organisation in Northeast Asia, perceptions of the EU in Republic of Korea are sometimes articulated vis-à-vis other major regional players in the region – China, Japan and North Korea. For Mexico and Canada, the US remains a constant factor in shaping perceptions of the EU. For Russia, the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the immediate region provides the main source of influence shaping the EU's perceptions in Russia and explaining changes to the images of the EU among policy and opinion leaders/makers and the general public.

However, it appears that *region-specific* factors are only a secondary factor to *location-specific* factors converging with *global* ones. The Update Study finds that the literature observes that the dominant *location-specific* and *global* factors dynamically interact in regions and influence local images of the EU in turn. For example, literature argues that the Trump Presidency has moved Canada and the EU closer together, however this relevance results from the interaction between *location-specific* factors (Canadian interests) with the geopolitical implications and foreign-political stances taken by the Trump Administration. Research about Russia's perceptions of the EU point to a strong link between Russia's national interests (*location-specific* factors) and the images of the EU when it is acting together with the US (*global* factor) (often in the context of NATO's activities in Europe). The literature also observes that the presence of alternative international actors (such as China and Japan in South Africa, Nigeria, India and Indonesia) and alternative cooperative alliances (BRICS, South to South cooperation) play a role in shaping EU external perceptions, and these factors remain *location-specific* in interaction with *global* factors. It is important, then, that the most significant changes in perceptions are oftentimes driven by *location-specific* and *global* factors, which are not necessarily perceptions the EU will be able to control. Such complex dynamic requires further attention in the field of EU perceptions research.

#### 5) ABSENCE OF ANY SINGLE DEFINITIVE TREND IN THE EVOLUTION OF ATTITUDES AND EVALUATIONS ASSIGNED TO THE EU:

Literature in the Update Study reports various patterns in the evolution of attitudes towards and evaluations of the EU. Importantly, the dynamics of evaluations assigned to the EU as an actor in different issue-areas remain highly *location-specific*. The *EU-specific* events – and multiple crises specifically – have created a negative “background noise” for the images of the EU in the last five years. But the most emotively charged attitudes and evaluations – positive and/or negative – surface in reaction to the *location-specific* filters applied to process events that are seen to affect the EU either on its own, or the EU's bilateral relations and policies towards the country in question and its region.

In terms of location-specific trends, the literature observes a decline in attitudes towards the EU in Russia, China as well as in the US in the last five years (in both cases this trend is caused by major clues on foreign policy priorities and attitudes projected by respective political leaders). Literature in Brazil and Indonesia finds fluctuating patterns in 2015-2021. In Brazil, it depends on the government in charge; in Indonesia, it depends on the issue at stake but also on the negative historical experiences

with Europe. In Japan, literature observes a neutral-to-positive perception of the EU, yet with the most recent trend of growing negativity registered by the latest research on the EU handling the pandemic. Research in Colombia, Mexico and Canada puts perceptions of the EU closer to the positive end of the perception continuum. Literature in some countries observes an ambivalent to negative outlook (India, Nigeria and South Africa), while research in other countries reports a predominantly neutral attitude (Republic of Korea).

#### 6) PERSISTENT LOW LEVEL OF AWARENESS AMONG THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND LIMITED ATTENTION TO THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE EU AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE

The literature stresses a very low level of awareness of the EU among the general public as a dominant feature of perceptions of the EU in all countries. The “complex beast” EU continues to challenge broader international publics in cognitive terms. This finding confirms the trend identified by the Literature Review in the 2015 Baseline Study. Another common trend noted by the literature in all countries is a heightened level of awareness and interest among several cohorts of decision-, policy- and opinion-makers: politicians, business leaders, media and civil society. Opinions on perceptions of the EU among young people – a key audience of the EU Public diplomacy – varied. In most locations, the literature does not engage with perceptions of the EU among youth, although literature in some countries analyse a positive predisposition of youth towards the EU (e.g. the US and Japan). As such it remains difficult to analyse the state of perceptions and their evolutions among youth in 2015-2021.

### 1.2. Assessment of the state of EU perceptions research

The 2015 Baseline Study noted that literature focused on media analyses. The Literature Review 2015-2021 demonstrates a wider range of research methods and sources to assess perceptions. While some research continues to explore media frames of the EU/Europe (and indeed in some countries it remains the dominant type of research on EU perceptions, e.g. Republic of Korea), other locations undertake studies that examine opinions among decision-, policy- and opinion-makers from political, civil society and media cohorts. In contrast, systematic studies of the general public opinion and specific groups in the general public (e.g. young people) remain scarce. The field is increasingly interested in images of the EU that appear not only in traditional media but also in social media (especially China and Republic of Korea). The diversification in the samples, research methods and approaches follow the major trends in the growing field of EU external perceptions research alongside the introduction of new tools and methods (see Elgström & Chaban, 2015; Chaban & Elgström, 2021a;b for reviews). The field is increasingly characterised by a mixed – qualitative and quantitative – approach.

Despite the advances of the field in the last five years, the research of perceptions of the EU in the 13 countries remains uneven (this finding echoes the 2015 Study). There is a deficit of research in the three new locations (Colombia, Indonesia and Nigeria) where there is a lack of a well-established tradition of EU external perceptions research. In contrast, the 2015-2021 research in other locations has been relatively active (please see the list of resources accompanying this report) – not lastly owing to the activities of the national experts and a number of trans-national research networks (many supported by the EU within various programmes). The Baseline and the Update Studies prove to be powerful facilitators of creating and sustaining an active transnational network of leading experts in the field.

In summary, the comparison over time highlights several *continuous* features:

1. Similar to the Baseline Study, the literature on perceptions of the EU in 2015-2021 registers dominant perceptions of the EU as an *economic* and *trade* actor.
2. Similar to the 2015 Study, the literature continues to overlook themes such as culture, research, science and technology, climate, environment, development and assistance and social issues.
3. Similar to the 2015 Study, there is a limited scope of key audiences – the studies are mostly limited to policy-makers, government decision-makers, business leaders and media.



4. Overtime, literature continues to report that the general public explicates low levels of awareness of the EU.
5. Youth and social media influencers are rarely explicitly studied, despite their crucial role in current and future policy decision-making processes in partner countries.
6. The geographical imbalance remains. Most of African and Latin American countries remain beyond the scope of research in EU perceptions.

There are several points of difference:

1. Different to the 2015 Study, perceptions of the EU as a *political* actor are now more visible.
2. *Energy* is one topic that appears to be more visible, but only in certain locations where this topic is of national priority in dealings with the EU and due to the focused research projects.
3. Academia and the think tank community are studied more frequently and increasingly considered a key audience group of opinion-makers who influence foreign-political decision-making processes. Civil society also attracts attention albeit patchy.
4. In contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study, in which most studies from previous years focus on Asian countries, the 2021 Literature Review observes a growing interest towards EU external perceptions around the world, albeit unevenly.

The comparability of studies remains bound by an uneven geographical spread and is limited by mixed methodological approaches, a confined number of key audiences and the dominance of economy and trade as a leading theme. There remains an additional lack of research into perceptions of the EU in individual countries in Africa and Latin America, the field in general also demonstrates limited research into EU perceptions in many countries of Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods and Central Asia.

### 1.3. Outlook

Summarising existing literature on perceptions of the EU in 13 countries in 2015-2021, the Update Study finds certain continuity in images when compared to the Baseline Study – the EU continues to be perceived as a powerful player in a multipolar world in economic and trade relations. In contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study, the 2015-2021 literature also portrays the EU as a more visible political actor. Literature points to a complex combination of *location-, region-, EU-, and global-specific* factors in each country. Yet, a number of themes important to the EU – with perceptions of the EU in the theme of climate change among them – receive modest consideration in the literature in the last five years.

The review of the EU public diplomacy initiatives (2015-2021) (see Section 3 of this report) maps public diplomacy initiatives onto the relevant literature in each country. It demonstrates what aspects in location-specific perceptions resonate with EU public diplomacy priorities and shows how EU public diplomacy armed with a deeper understanding of the local conditions in third countries in which EU policies are communicated, uses tailor-made public diplomacy instruments and initiatives to communicate the EU and its policies.

Drawing on a sketchy body of research with limited comparability, the Literature Review of the Update Study provides a first identification of core themes, trends and tools. These will be further refined in the forthcoming analyses within the scope of this research project, including traditional and social media analyses, a public opinion survey, focus groups with young people (higher education students), individual interviews with influencers and multipliers and policy recommendations.

## Analysing perceptions studies (2015-2021)

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The Literature Review is an important element in the overall architecture of the project. The Literature Review analyses research on external perceptions of the EU and Europe in 2015-2021 with a focus on 13 countries: Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Republic of Korea and the US.. In total, we analysed 186 sources.

**The first objective** of the Literature Review is to identify general patterns in the distribution of themes, attitudinal trends and factors shaping perceptions of the EU and driving their evolution in the last five years.

**The second objective** of the Literature Review's is to *compare perceptions and images of the EU across time*. Accordingly, Literature Review in 2021 features a number of comparisons to the 2015 Baseline Study. It produces a concise update of the findings of the 2015 Study through research and analysis of perception studies and opinion polls carried out in the countries of the 2015 project. The Literature Review also overviews EU external perceptions research in the three new countries since 2015, while considering the key landmark studies carried out before 2015 on the perceptions of the EU when/if relevant. The Literature Review looks at the various critical junctures that the EU has undergone and factors in the considerable advances by perception studies as a discipline in the last five years. The focus on the developments of the last five years allows the comparison of how perceptions of Europe, the EU and its flagship policies might have shifted, what the literature focuses on and which central themes emerge and have emerged. This includes an analysis of which perceptions continue and persist, which perceptions change, and where the literature places drivers of the evolution in perceptions of the EU.

Literature Review *systematically maps, analyses and synthesises the findings of existing works* on the perceptions of Europe and the EU and its policies along the pre-defined parameters from the external perspective of its partner countries. The Literature Review follows the existing scheme of analysis established and tested in the Baseline Study in 2015. However, is also adds several *new indicators* to reflect on the EU's critical junctures in the last five years and on the advances in the scholarship of EU perceptions, in order to track the evolution of EU images reported by the relevant works. Similar to the Baseline Study, the terms "European Union" and "Europe" have been used interchangeably throughout most of the studies in 2015-2021; the Literature Review attempts to use the terms in a differentiated manner.

**The first part** of the Literature Review features an *aggregated analysis* of the main trends and patterns, as well as gaps, key audiences and evolutions. This part consolidates and synthesises the results of existing works published between 2015 and 2021 into a single study while building on the Literature Review results of the 2015 Study. The sample under analysis includes academic publications, relevant outputs by think tanks and government agencies, policy evaluations, opinion polls -- research that has analysed traditional media, social media, elite and public opinions.

The **second part** of the Lit Rev features the *horizontal overview of the public diplomacy initiatives* analysed across 13 countries for main themes and activities between 2015-2021, key audience groups, obstacles and main gaps as well as a future outlook. This sections also features comparison of the public diplomacy initiatives' analysis to the key results of the review of the relevant literature on EU external perceptions in 13 countries and across time. In the comparative part of the section (public diplomacy initiatives vis-à-vis literature), the Literature Review compares how literature and public diplomacy initiatives interpret key audiences of EU public diplomacy and highlights the identified gaps in the literature on EU external perceptions (the *receiver of public diplomacy* perspective) as well as obstacles as identified by EU public diplomacy practitioners (the *sender of public diplomacy* perspective).

**The final part** of the Literature Review features *country reports* overviewing the relevant literature and public diplomacy initiatives between 2015 and 2021. Location-specific analyses and reports were undertaken by the country experts as they are among the most active authors on images and perceptions in their locations. Such experts know the key authorities in the field and they understand the location-specific nuances in findings and proposed recommendations as those are key in the development of public diplomacy actions sensitive to local interests and priorities.

The Literature Review synthesises information on three key elements:

1) Gaps in the relevant literature and public diplomacy initiatives

First, the Literature Review summarises the **persisting gaps though time** as pointed out by the literature and interviews with EU public diplomacy practitioners. The identification of gaps is crucial to better assess (1) risk and opportunities for the EU public diplomacy in selected countries, (2) the effectiveness of EU policies and public diplomacy measures, (3) their contribution to improving images of Europe, the EU abroad or to reduce misconceptions.

2) Reflections on the key audiences, institutions and individuals

Second, the Literature Review systematises relevant reflections by relevant literature and public diplomacy initiatives on **key audiences, institutions and individuals** with high multiplier capacities in the selected countries and regions. Their systematic identification is crucial (1) to engage with them in a more meaningful way and increase the EU's outreach capabilities in various policy areas, including the EU's multi-stakeholder public diplomacy or (2) to modify perceptions of local audiences, institutions and individuals in response to specific actions or developments.

3) Reflections on the evolution of EU perceptions with a focus on drivers of change and continuity in short-, medium- and long-term frames.

The Literature Review ends by tracing **the evolution of perceptions of the EU in the selected countries including drivers of continuity and drivers of change**. Tracking the evolution of perceptions (1) provides a better understanding of which events, policies, outreach measures and capabilities influence change in perceptions of the EU (2) can identify how events, policies, outreach measures and capabilities can be opportunities for specific stakeholder and policy engagement in the future.

The integrated analysis of the Literature Review and mapping of the public diplomacy initiatives creates a baseline for up-to-date policy recommendations in the Final Report which will analyse the EU's and Europe's soft power capacities and capabilities needed for an effective integrated public diplomacy strategy.

## Main themes

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### 3.1. Economy and trade

Following the leading trend identified in the 2015 Study, the EU continues to be predominantly viewed as an economic and trading partner. National decision- and opinion-makers consider this theme among the most important. Yet the findings of the 2021 Update Study reveal some key differences.

The Update Study's analytical innovation – namely, the consideration of the *endogenous* and *exogenous* factors shaping perceptions of the EU and their evolutions – helps to identify a particular pattern in perceptions in the issue-areas of trade and economy. In contrast to the Baseline Study, the 2021 Study observes that literature between 2015 and 2021 does not find *EU-specific* critical junctures such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and Brexit to impact the EU's perceptions as an economic and trading



power in a major way (despite concerns about uncertainties especially around Brexit). While these two critical developments in the EU do carry some negative undertones and influence images of the EU, *location-specific* images of the EU, linked to bilateral and regional trade agreements, raise the EU's visibility among different cohorts of decision-, policy- and opinion-makers and carry the emotive charge. The perceived negative impact of the Eurozone debt crisis is not registered by the literature.

Different to the 2015 Baseline Study, in the 2021 Update Study, a lion's share of perceptions of the EU in the economy issue-area is linked to the EU in the context of *trade agreements* (either recently completed, or currently in progress) with strategic partners. The literature agrees that bilateral and regional trade agreements (including FTAs, EPAs, CEPAs, AAs) between the EU and third countries have the potential to enhance the EU's image, specifically among policy- and decision-makers and in the media. These agreements also trigger a range of attitudes across the countries: positive (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico), neutral (India), negative (e.g. Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, Republic of Korea), and mixed (e.g. Canada, China, Japan, Nigeria, the US). Negative perceptions are rooted in perceived unfair treatment, protracted negotiation, problems in regulatory convergence and/or clashes of interest. The literature reports positive perceptions of the EU when the EU projects an image as a strategic commercial partner through *bilateral trade* frameworks. For example, Colombia is understood to benefit from the current trade agreement as it opens new markets for Colombian products. Mexico sees in the EU an alternative to the US trade market and investment (Dominguez & Crandall 2019). Moreover, this perspective is shared by the Mexican public, who considers that economic powers such as China or the EU could be allies and that they offer new markets for Mexican goods (Senado de la República 2016, Maldonado et al., 2018).

*Regional* trade frameworks are also visible in the perceptions of the EU in trade and economy. In Brazil, expectations regarding the conclusion of the negotiations of the EU-MERCOSUR agreement cast a positive light on perceptions of the EU, especially among government officials and businesses. This positive perception has been steady as Brazilian stakeholders have generally perceived the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations as positive since the early 2000s (Lucarelli, 2007). The literature also considers the modernisation of the EU-Mexico Agreement as a trigger for positive perceptions of the EU in Mexico (Dominguez, 2020a; 2020b).

The literature reports that as a trading partner, the EU appears to remain attractive across numerous locations. It is recognised as one of the largest trading partners for India (almost on par with the US in terms of trade volumes). Studies in India also report on the EU's perceived importance for India's national economic initiatives introduced by the current government such as "Make in India", "Skill India", "Smart Cities initiative", etc. Likewise, for Japan, images of the EU as a major global economic power and an economic partner have been dominant. The conclusion of the EPA between Japan and the EU has led to an increased appreciation of this new framework of economic relations between the two partners despite a perception of somewhat frustrating negotiations at first. The benefits associated with the EPA for Japanese businesses have improved the image of the EU (Endo, 2020; Tsuruoka, 2019).

Differently, Canadian literature observes somewhat *mixed perceptions* in the context of CETA. Earnscliff Strategy Group (2019) finds that despite limited awareness of the treaty's detailed provisions, larger producers tend to welcome the agreement, while smaller producers fear European competition: CETA is perceived as favouring European over Canadian exporters, especially in agriculture (Hage, 2020). However, the literature also argues that Canadian perceptions of the EU have generally become more positive over the past few years (Chaban, 2020), especially in light of the Trump Presidency (Bendiek et al., 2018).

Put in context and contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study, Canada is one of the only two cases in the 2021 Update Study that assigns major visibility to the issue-area of *agriculture* in assessing the perceptions of the EU. The other country is South Africa where poultry export has become an issue of concern and has triggered mostly negative images of the EU's perceived aggressive exportation of chicken which undermines South African producers (Ward, 2017).

Researchers also find *mixed perceptions* of the EU's role in the field of economy and trade (China, Republic of Korea, the US). Perceptions of the EU as an economic (and particularly trade) actor dominates the literature in the US in the last five years, with public and expert opinion prioritising this role of the EU (Góra, 2019). However, the literature also points to negativity assigned to the EU's image in this issue-area – not least because of President Trump's critical stance on the EU. These stances also extend to the perceptions of individual EU Member States, which are framed as both partners and rivals (Szabo, 2018).

Literature in China also reveals mixed attitudes. On the one hand, the EU is portrayed as an economic powerhouse and trading bloc, and Chinese scholars see it as a strategic partner of China, specifically in the field of globalisation, international economic development and cooperation. On the other hand, Chinese perception of the EU as an influential regional bloc and economic superpower has reduced, as 'the necessary political-economic backing to justify the EU's normative mission is lacking from the Chinese point of view' (Chang and Pieke, 2018, p. 323). The literature reports that China also sees EU Member States as very different in their socioeconomic development and regional characteristics. It has accordingly introduced sub-regional cooperation platforms such as the 17+1 initiative for Central and Southern Europe as well as China's cooperation with the Nordic region – both seen as 'useful tools' to complement EU-China relations (Chang and Pieke 2018, p. 324).

Finally, in Republic of Korea, the literature finds local media in particular to attach negative connotations to the EU's economic/trade images, which feeds into an existing critical frame of the EU in terms of its economic status. Between 2015 and 2021, Korean media has reported on the difficulties in the EU-Republic of Korea FTA referencing EU-Korea ILO (International Labour Organisation) disputes or EU-US trade disputes under the Trump Administration. Interestingly, the negative coverage of the EU's economic performance does not seem to negatively affect the general public's evaluation of the EU in Republic of Korea; it is merely found to increase the EU's visibility, while the public's perception of the EU remains predominantly neutral.

On the more *negative* end of the perception continuum are Nigeria, Russia and Indonesia. The context of EPA negotiations in preparation for the re-negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement has reinforced existing, negative perceptions of the EU among Nigerian decision- and policy-makers and civil society stakeholders (Osegbue, 2017). In this context, the EU is seen to use its influence over West African countries to sign a largely unfair trade agreement that does not serve the country's interests (Isaac & Bellonwu-Okafor, 2016). Russian experts argue that the economic cooperation between Russia and the EU is mired by political interests and power-political agendas. Importantly, it is the economic sector, where experts see a potential for the improvement of EU-Russia relations and accordingly EU perceptions. However, they argue that it is on the EU to initiate such a dialogue (Zverev & Rogozar, 2016). Negative perceptions of the EU as a trade partner also surface in Indonesia, as authors in the field argue that both sides disagree over how to approach trade standards (Schmitz, 2015; Robertua, 2019; Sicurelli, 2020). Notwithstanding that the literature showcases attempts to minimise such differences, they do create a negative perception towards the EU in this issue-area. The country has been negotiating CEPA with the EU since 2016.

In general, the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis do not feature prominently in the literature between 2015 and 2021: it appears that the crisis is becoming a somewhat distant memory for the EU's global partners (see Chaban & Lucarelli, 2021).

Further, the analysis of the literature published between 2015 and 2021 demonstrates a minimal negative effect on the perceptions of the EU in the issue-areas of economy and trade in the context of Brexit despite the potential of corresponding narratives of the EU's demise as an economic powerhouse and trading giant. Certainly, Brexit has attracted negative news headlines (e.g. in Republic of Korea and South Africa): in some locations, businesses mostly fear its consequences (e.g. in India, where businesses have close links to the UK market and concerns in Japan that Brexit will hurt Japanese companies operating in the UK). Literature in Brazil further fears that the EU will become more

protectionist because of Brexit (e.g. Brazil, see Lazarou et al., 2020). However, the overall view on Brexit is more nuanced and ambivalent. South African businesses see Brexit as an opportunity vis-à-vis the UK and a possible threat to business interests in the EU (Kotsopoulos, 2020), and a more neutral image of the UK is emerging in Mexico after the UK has struck its interim trade agreement with Mexico in 2019. The literature in India also considers that Brexit has triggered the need to search for alternative solutions, as represented in an increase of economic interests in two EU member states: Germany (India's "No.1" European trading partner over years), and France (increasingly a leading European partner in military and security issues – see Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2020). Of special note is the visibility of some EU Member States as preferred trading interlocutors across locations, with perceived actorness on par with the EU, dominantly Germany and France.

### 3.2. Politics

In parallel to the 2015 Baseline Study, the 2021 Update Study finds that while the EU is mostly perceived in terms of its economic and trading profile, substantial visibility is assigned to the EU as a political actor. A common feature is that perception studies rarely address the state of affairs within the EU. Even when in reference to the EU's domestic issues (such as multiple crises), the main research focus is on how these developments resonate with the local contexts of strategic partners, affect their interests, the state of bilateral cooperation with the EU, or how they speak to broader and more global shifts in the architecture of the international system. In contrast to the Baseline Study, the Update Study observes that external partners assign a greater range of political roles to the EU in the last five years, and with a wider range of attitudes across and within countries. The latter sometimes reflects on internal political divides within these countries. Relevant literature published between 2015 and 2021 increasingly argues for a complex melange of *EU-, location-, region-specific* and *global* inputs into shaping perceptions of the EU as an actor in political affairs.

Literature finds *location-specific* factors trigger both positive and negative EU perceptions. Progress with bilateral agreements (e.g. the modernisation of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement) facilitates *positive perceptions* of the EU in Mexico, including those of institutional and diplomatic bilateral relations. The literature does stress that in some areas, the negotiation on the agreement between the EU and Mexico was difficult (e.g. in public procurement), yet the perceptions of the agreement turn out to be neutral and positive across business groups (Blanco & Bruno, 2018) and political parties (European Parliament, 2020). In Colombia, the presence of the EU in the political dialogue in country triggers positive perceptions of the EU linked to its role as a facilitator of national institutions through dialogue with government and civil society, including through productive (civil society) projects in various regions of Colombia. Importantly, these images of the EU are closely connected to its image as a facilitator of economic development. In Japan, the conclusion of the EPA has coincided with signing the Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2018, and this combination of top-level agreements has raised the visibility of the EU not only as an economic but also as a political actor. In these perception scenarios, the EU and the location in question are seen to collaborate with each other in a location-focused setting.

Yet, the literature also observes *negative perceptions* triggered by the *location-specific* inputs. The literature reports that the foreign policies of Brazil and the US under the respective administrations of Bolsonaro and Trump have not favoured the EU. In the former case, the ruling elites prefer to distance themselves from the EU's position on issues such as climate change, human rights and regional integration. In the US, President Trump's attitude to Europe fed into a distancing and critical sentiment towards the EU among the Conservatives vs. the Democrats (Speyer et al., 2020). A similar trend of polarisation of the domestic political arena in relation to the perceptions of the EU is noted in Canada post-Brexit referendum (Hurrelmann, 2020). While not as definitive as their counterparts in the US, Conservatives in Canada tend to be more aligned with the UK, while Liberals eye continental Europe, and are usually more critical of Brexit (Hurrelmann, 2020). Domestic political balance proved important for EU

perceptions and the state of cooperation with Canada for a different reason as well: with a Liberal Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, in power, Canada has moved closer to the EU due to the shared liberal, multilateral agenda (Bendiek et al., 2018). In South Africa, Brexit is perceived as another example of a shifting global order, reflected in the narrative of the *zeitgeist* of the West, where the EU is part of a declining Western-based power (Global North) and South Africa is part of Global South. South Africa sees itself as an important player in the African Union and the BRICS, and these global alliances are perceived to provide South Africa with alternatives for international alliances vis-à-vis alliances with the Global North (and the EU as a part of it).

On the account of various factors, certain congruence of minds and ideologies serves as another ground for positive perceptions of the EU among certain domestic groups. For example, in Japan, where policy-makers prefer the EU to abstain from a discussion on the issue of the death penalty, local audiences that argue for the abolition of the death penalty in Japan see the source of support to their case in the EU and, thus, share positive views about the EU as a normative leader (Bacon & Nakamura, 2021). Another “invisible” profile for the EU in the political arena can be observed in Republic of Korea, where relevant literature notes a deficit of attention towards the EU as a political actor which has persisted for longer than the five years of the observation period (Yoon & Chung, 2021).

The second group of perceptions in the political issue-area relate to *EU-specific factors* – and the EU’s multiple crises in particular. The 2015 Baseline Study Literature Review cited numerous examples of the EU-specific crises as drivers behind negative or worsening perceptions of the EU across the 10 Strategic Partners with a particular focus, then, on the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The literature in the 2021 Update Study demonstrates a similar trend. Multiple crises of the EU continue to capture the attention of perception scholars in this period, and these critical junctures often highlight negative perceptions of the EU in the political arena. Republic of Korean media uses EU crises as a provocative topic in order to attract the attention of their potential readers. The irregular migration crisis and the rise of illiberal democracies in Europe have negatively impacted Brazilian perceptions of the EU’s international role and the EU as a model of integration for Latin America (Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2020; Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2016).

But perhaps the most influential crisis for the EU’s perceived political roles is Brexit. In the past five years, Brexit has been undoubtedly perceived as a major crisis for Europe and the EU as a political actor in many locations. For India, Brexit has signalled a particular set of perceptions of the EU – still not a coherent foreign policy actor although with an important role in world affairs. The literature in China reports that Chinese decision-makers already had doubts about the EU’s normative power, but Brexit has revealed the EU’s lack of internal solidarity and inability to carry out necessary structural reforms further compromising its image of a normative actor and even economic power in China (Chang and Pieke, 2018; Jin & Kirchner, 2020). In the US, Brexit generates a perception that the EU lacks unified leadership and is challenged by bureaucracy. The US also reflects on the EU as an ineffective actor during the migration crisis (Góra, 2019). Many EU institutions and EU Member States are seen in the US to have clashing interests during crises – a situation which is seen to undermine the EU’s effectiveness to cope with the crises. In Russia, the literature considers Brexit as a turning point for EU images in Russia (although not the extent of the Ukraine crisis), but experts cannot agree on the dominant narrative of Brexit: some see it as the “domino effect” similar to the events that led to the collapse of the USSR; others see in it the EU’s consolidation or flexible integration; and some describe it as a “loose” union (Ananieva, 2020). The perception of the EU as a weak and unreliable international partner is emphasised further by research that stresses the EU’s dependence on the US (Shestopal et al., 2016).

Further, regional hegemons often tend to “overshadow” the images of the EU as a political actor in a given location. In Republic of Korea, regional powers (China, Japan and North Korea) are perceived to have more political impact on Republic of Korea than the EU. The US remains a leading political influencer of perceptions of the EU in this issue-area in the Americas (Brazil, Canada, Colombia,



Mexico). In the broader Asia-Pacific, China is seen as a main political player, where the EU as a political actor is often perceived in the context of connectivity (e.g. in India and Japan). In fact, a more favourable way of looking at the EU in India emerges through wider consultations on the subject of connectivity (Sachdeva & Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2020).

Finally, the Literature Review highlights the external perceptions of *EU Member States as major political interlocutors* vs. the EU. For example, in India, the EU/Europe still does not rank very high on the list of India's most significant partners, whilst its engagement with the EU is seen to be generally based on a case-by-case approach and often based on the relationships with individual EU Member States (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2020). This is against the background that India recognises the importance of Europe in shaping and sharing the global political outlook (Jain, 2019; Sibal, 2019), but Indian policy-makers rarely see the EU as a foreign policy force (Jain, 2019). In the US, literature notes how the EU's complex architecture of reactions to crises led the US to bypass the EU and engage directly with EU Member States, depending on the issue at hand (Marsh, 2018). In Japan, the 2015-2020 period (under the leadership of the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe) was marked by strengthened cooperation with Europe — both with the EU and bilaterally with individual EU Member States.

### 3.3. Security

In contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study, the Literature Review of the 2021 Update Study finds a more pronounced security-related theme emerging. While the EU is generally not perceived as a traditional security actor, relevant works note new accents in the visions of the EU in this issue-area.

Between 2015 and 2021, in several locations, the literature reports positive perceptions of the EU as a security actor in *location-specific* contexts. In Colombia, dominant positive perceptions are framed by the theme of peace, and specifically the EU's role in the Colombian Peace Process and in post-conflict processes at political and financial levels (Tremolada, 2019). For Colombia, the EU is a fundamental international actor and supporter of the Peace- and Post-Conflict Process, acting on par with influential international actors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations (UN) and the US. In India, similar perceptions of the EU are assigned to its presence in the Indo-Pacific, where both actors share an interest in closer cooperation on international peace and security, maritime security, regional connectivity towards peacebuilding and conflict management (Sachdeva & Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2020; Mohan & Xaveir, 2017). China also sees the potential in strengthening ties with the EU in the field of security. In Nigeria, the EU is perceived as an important actor in initiatives positioned to mitigate insecurity, for example, in fighting terrorism in the country. The EU is also perceived as one of several key actors who support various programmes aiming to improve the security capacities of sub-regional organisations (in this case, ECOWAS, in which Nigeria is a major player). Yet, when it comes to terrorist organisations, literature registers somewhat critical perceptions among civil society representatives in Nigeria who agree that the EU as a security actor has a role to play in the humanitarian area and has done relatively well in this area but could do more (Hogerndorn, 2018).

Departing from the *location-specific* contexts, literature in Brazil, Mexico and India registers positive perceptions of the EU in the context of *global* security and counter-terrorism. In India specifically, a perception of the EU's fragmented foreign policy assigns it with a role of a partner who allows a greater degree of "independence" to India in comparison to the US or Japan — as part of India's strategy to diversify its suppliers and creating a defence export industry of its own (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2015). Yet in terms of importance, the EU trails behind the US, China, Japan and Russia (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2014) and is less attractive in the defence sector than individual member states such as France (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2020).

Relevant works in the US note negative and ambiguous perceptions of the EU as a security and defence actor. Linking the EU to NATO, President Trump lamented the EU's weak security and defence capabilities which triggered perceptions of the EU as taking advantage of the US' generous support for NATO (Riddervold & Newsome, 2018; Brattberg & Whineray, 2020). However, at the same time, autonomous EU defence capabilities outside NATO are also viewed as detrimental to US interests (Rees, 2017). In contrast, literature in Russia registers a negative attitude towards a growing presence of the US/NATO in Europe and their cooperation with the EU. Altogether this is perceived as a threat to Russia's national interests and security positions in the region.

### 3.4. Human rights and other normative themes

The last five years demonstrate a range of perceptions of the EU as a human rights champion – from strongly positive to negative – echoing a similar finding of the 2015 Baseline Study. In this section, we consider literature which deals with these two themes outside of the migration crisis of 2015-2016 as these will be addressed in the subsequent section.

*Positive images* of the EU as a normative actor are observed in Mexico, Colombia and to a limited degree in Japan and Indonesia. In Mexico, literature observes visible and positive images of the EU as a normative actor in democracy, human rights, and environmental protection wherein the EU is seen as a like-minded partner to Mexico (Garcés, 2017). In Colombia, the literature reveals a positive perception of the EU as a peacebuilding promoter, human rights defender and humanitarian aid provider. The EU's participation in local dialogues is seen as a gateway to promote European values. In Japan, the EU and the EU-led survey on the death penalty has influenced Japan's domestic discussion on the future of the death penalty (Bacon & Nakamura, 2021). The moral authority of the EU is recognised in this case even if local leaders are not changing relevant policies. In Indonesia, the literature also registers positive perceptions of the EU in the context of capacity building of civil society and good governance (Schmitz, 2015); yet these positive outlooks are in a peripheral position.

Literature on EU perceptions in Brazil, Russia, China, and Nigeria reports different images in this issue-area. In Brazil, perceptions of the EU in 2015-2021 are affected by the priorities of the Bolsonaro government which clash with those of the EU, particularly in the environment and human rights (Lazarou et al., 2020). Similarly, Russia's reversal towards traditional values' discourse and sovereign democracy under President Putin are seen as the main domestic factors shaping negative attitudes towards the EU in the field of democracy promotion (Headley, 2018; Foxall, 2017) and human right (specifically LGBTQIA+ – see Verpoest, 2018). In China, the EU's normative power is widely seen as a reflection of double standards when it is applied to the evaluation of human rights issues in China. Negative perceptions in some cases come in reflection to *EU-specific* and *location-specific* factors. In Nigeria, the focus on trade and negotiations, security and migration has diminished any emphasis on supporting democracy or gender rights. Meanwhile, in India, human rights are referenced in the context of EU-India dialogue and the migration crisis and receive mixed attitudes. On the one hand, India still perceives the EU as a normative actor promoting human rights and rule of law; on the other, the EU is seen as preaching the world about democratic values but not practising them (the case of the migration crisis is referenced here) (Mukherjee, 2020a;b; Sharma, 2020).

### 3.5. Migration

In the area of migration, data is less visible than images of the EU in the areas of economy and politics. However, in contrast to the 2015 Study, the Update Literature Review registers more intense attention to the perceptions of the EU in this issue-area due to the irregular migration crisis “peaking” in 2015-2016. Perceptions in this issue-area are complex, often overlapping with the theme of human rights

(discussed above) or multiculturalism, and typically negative. The intensity of negative evaluations assigned to the images of the EU in this context correlate with each country's relation to the crisis.

The Literature Review of the 2015 Baseline Study features reflections on only a few studies that examine perceptions of the EU's migration policy. Among those are occasional media reports of this EU policy area (Chaban et al., 2009 on Japan), rare comparative studies of opinion on the EU among potential migrants to the EU (EUmagine, 2013; Timmermann et al., 2014), or critical reflections on the perceived ineffectiveness of these policies (see Gulyaeva (2018) on Russia). While the EU's irregular migration crisis of 2015-2016 had captured the attention of the Baseline Study of EU perceptions, the Literature Review of the 2015 Baseline Study finished before the migration crisis unravelled. In comparison with the 2015 Study, the Literature Review of the 2021 Update Study registers pronounced research focus on perceptions of the EU's migration policies in reflection of the crisis albeit less frequent than those of the EU's performance in *economic* and *political* themes.

Relevant literature in the last five years discusses how the migration crisis and its focus on the human drama and tragedy have attracted major media attention around the globe, and particularly in the countries of the EU's key global partners (see e.g. Chaban & Holland, 2018). Research on the Canadian press demonstrates how the migration crisis caused atypical "peaks" in the coverage of the EU, attracting strongly negative descriptions. In the US, where the crisis also captured the media spotlight, it illuminated a particular image of the EU as an ineffective actor (Góra, 2019), with multiple institutions and EU Member States which could not agree on the course of action thus undermining the effectiveness of this supranational organisation in coping with the crisis. In Brazil, the images of the EU dealing with irregular migration have also negatively impacted Brazilian perceptions of the EU's international role and the EU as a model of integration for Latin America (Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2020; Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2016). Meanwhile, a different take on negative perceptions comes from Russia. In Russia, literature reports a solidifying frame for the EU's migration policy as a "weak link" accentuating its incapability to deal with migrants in the Mediterranean and juxtaposing the EU's performances in this issue-area to Russia's successful handling of its migrants (Gulyaeva, 2018). Meanwhile, Indian perceptions combine several trends. In India, the crisis is seen as a challenge to the EU domestic consolidation over human rights and values espoused by Europe (Mukherjee, 2020a;b; Sharma, 2020). At the same time, the EU's response is deemed inadequate in comparison to India's handling of a similar problem with a much larger number of refugees (Sharma, 2020).

Relevant literature observes perceptions of the EU in this issue-area from different viewpoints. Some countries see migration from a more distant position (Republic of Korea) and some other countries have more immediate experiences with EU migration policies, in the context of the crisis and beyond it (India and Nigeria). The literature in Nigeria detects more negative perceptions of this policy area, not lastly owing to first-hand negative experiences with the EU's migration regime. Literature reports how Nigerian policy-makers want the EU to normalise migration pathways for Africans (Bisong, 2019; Arhim-Sam, 2019) challenging the EU's one-sided approach to simply "return" Nigerian citizens to Nigeria. Another negative perspective emerges when Nigerian stakeholders reflect on the EU undermining regional migration policies (Bisong, 2019) by leveraging its powerful position in West Africa (ECOWAS). For some scholars, the EU's migration regime is considered hostile (Ezemenaka, 2019).

### 3.6. Climate and environment

The increasingly visible (identity) narrative of the EU as a champion for the environment and the fight against climate change and the EU Green Deal launched by the new European Commission have built expectations to see substantial literature engagement with perceptions of the EU in this field. Despite a rising global profile as a climate champion – and in some cases a desire for cooperation with the EU as an actor in this issue-area, the perceptions literature in 2015-2021 only modestly considers external

perceptions of the EU's leading roles in international environmental and climate diplomacy. While positive recognition of this role is in place (noted especially among political and civil society stakeholders), relevant literature continues to overlook perceptions of the EU in this thematic area. This trend echoes the 2015 Baseline Study.

In Russia, bilateral cooperation with the EU in the field of the environment has been reported only in one source although positively. The EU appears as a leader in climate change and environmental protection in China, even though the studies do not focus on this issue and mention it briefly. While research on EU perceptions in tackling climate change is absent in Canada, a general opinion survey (Nanos & Carleton University, 2019) demonstrates that the general public in Canada supports a strong policy partnership with the EU, in tackling climate change (in addition to, energy policy, trade and security). In India, climate change is also seen as an area of the EU's strategic interest for cooperation with like-minded countries (Chaudhuri, 2020a;b). In Colombia, the EU's actorness in the theme of environment and climate is overshadowed by its role in peace and trade, while in Republic of Korea it appears in the background of media studies (Yoon & Chung, 2021). Only the literature in Indonesia provides more context to bilateral cooperation in this field by pointing to diverging approaches to illegal logging and palm oil exports between the EU and Indonesian officials (Schmitz, 2016; Robertua, 2019; Sicurelli, 2020). Although some attempts to bridge the regulatory and conceptual gaps are marked, persisting negative perceptions towards the EU among Indonesian decision-makers remain.

With an increasingly global perception of the relevance of these issues, the EU may also become increasingly recognised and the rhetoric and visibility of the EU Green Deal might feature more prominently in future years of research as the theme of *climate/ environment* has not yet trickled down into the area of perception studies.

### 3.7. Energy

In contrast to the 2015 Study, the field of EU external perceptions in 2015-2021 has featured the first comprehensive attempts to study perceptions towards the EU's energy policy and of the EU as a global energy governance actor towards BRICS.

The Update's Literature Review observes an increase in publications studying perceptions in this thematic area. Many of these publications came to life within the framework of the Jean Monnet project "External images of the EU as a Normative Energy Power: BRICS vis-à-vis the EU" (EXIE) concerned with the EU's energy policy and global energy governance and external perceptions on it, focusing on five strategic partner countries of the EU: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Chaban, Knodt & Verdun, 2017). Relevant literature examines influential media discourses on their framing of the EU's place in the global energy landscape. Literature also profiles publications that combine the data from the EXIE project with the data from another transnational project: "Challenges of European Energy Governance with Emerging Powers" (EnergyGov, TU Darmstadt – see Knodt et al., 2015), which analysed the EU-Emerging Powers dialogues with Brazil, India, China and South Africa. The latter project provided access to data from 75 in-depth interviews in BRICS countries and Brussels and from the surveys of respective energy dialogues with 143 participants (Knodt, Chaban & Nielsen, 2017). The findings highlight that due to its strategic constraints and the securitisation of energy policy, the EU is challenged in building cooperation with emerging powers and establishing multipolar energy relations. Additionally, the EU fails to examine, reflect and communicate its external energy policy, in particular towards the BRICS (Chaban, Knodt & Verdun 2017). Chaban and Knodt (2016) pinpoint the incoherence of information flows within EU institutions as a problem for the establishment of effective and meaningful energy diplomacy.

BRICS' ambivalent perceptions of the EU in energy governance are widely discussed in the framework of the above projects (Fioramonti, 2017; Guimarães & Piefer 2017; Gulyaeva, 2017; Lai and Shi, 2017;



Chebakova et al. 2017; Knodt et al., 2017). In South Africa, relevant literature examines the diffusion of EU norms in a competitive sector, in which South Africa increasingly has alternative options, not lastly through its interactions with the BRICS partners (Fioramonti, 2017). In Brazil, the literature registers a positive outlook on the EU as a sustainable energy actor (Guimarães & Piefer 2017; Knodt et al., 2017). In addition, the specific issue-area of biofuels received special, somewhat ambivalent attention in Brazil with both hopes for the access to the EU's market through the EU-MERCOSUR agreement (Gregory & Sardelli Panzini, 2020; Afionis & Stringer, 2020) and negatively perceived challenges over regulatory standards and certification (Afionis & Stringer, 2020). The analysis of EU perceptions in India highlights an increasing awareness of the EU in smart city projects, infrastructure development, transport, green energy and renewables.

Outside of the EXIE project, the literature in Canada discusses the general public survey which indicates that energy policy and climate change can and should be used as one of the foundations to build a strong policy partnership between Canada and the EU. In the Russian literature, energy appears in the context of EU-Russia relations at large prompting the discussion of political interests and conflict (Tichý, 2019, p. 215; Chaban, Knodt & Headley, 2018). Nonetheless, energy is also seen as the area of potential improvement for EU-Russia relations. A potential for cooperation is also registered in China given its interest in promoting energy efficiency and sustainable development. The EU represents a cooperative partner for China and a 'norm-setter' in sustainable energy development (Lai and Shi, 2017, p. 178). EU actions in the energy sector (especially energy efficiency and renewables) are framed positively (Lai and Shi, 2017; Knodt et al., 2017).

### **3.8. Research, science and technology**

This theme is not prominent in the literature. If at all mentioned, research and innovation are usually in the context of publications about energy as well as climate and environment.

### **3.9. Development assistance**

The Literature Review in the 2021 Update Study finds the EU's development and assistance engagement to be among the least visible themes. Literature in only some countries – mostly receivers of EU development assistance – reflect on perceptions in this issue-area. Whenever mentioned, assessments of the EU vary across the spectrum from appreciation to anti-imperialist and anti-colonial resentment. For example, in Nigeria, the EU's actorness in development and assistance is one of three main themes in the academic literature. This perception is often linked to the EU actions towards Nigeria in the fields of democratic consolidation and humanitarianism (in particular in the north of the country (Martinelli & Udo, 2012)). The literature's focus however gradually shifts from the theme of development and assistance towards the EU's impact on migration and the replacement of the Cotonou Agreement. In other country cases, perceptions of the EU in the development and assistance issue-area receive limited to no analysis.

### **3.10. Social**

The Literature Review in the 2021 Update Study does not register any specific references to EU social issues that are not related to migration, EU internal politics or other themes.

### 3.11. Culture

Resonating with the findings of the 2015 Baseline Study, the 2021 Update Study finds limited focus on the EU as an actor in the cultural issue-area. According to the literature, the EU's cultural diplomacy initiatives of the last five years receive very low recognition among third-country stakeholders. Nevertheless, both decision-makers and the general public tend to hold positive perceptions about Europe's cultural cache.

The EU is increasingly perceived as an example in the areas of education and research in India as well, although this perception is not dominant. The literature in Colombia and Brazil briefly points to education programmes of European agencies in a positive light. The EU's cultural richness is also perceived positively in Brazil and China. The most elaborated role of the EU in the culture issue-area comes from India, where a lot of attention is paid to cultural similarities between India and the EU and the challenges they share, such as handling migration (Chaudhuri, 2020a;b; Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2014; Sharma, 2017; 2020). However, the US is of more interest to young Indians than the EU (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2014). Nevertheless, the EU is seen positively in the field of multiculturalism and as a successful actor in managing cultural diversity, and this perception has persisted notwithstanding the challenge of the migrant crisis to the existing EU policy framework (Sharma, 2017) with a potential for this issue-area to bridge the gap to other fields, such as tackling radicalisation and terrorism (Mukherjee, 2020a;b). Cultural diplomacy is also seen in Russia as, potentially, 'the only channel to engage with the Russian public' for the EU (Valenza & Bossuyt, 2019, pp. 5, 9). Finally, culture plays a role – although connected to the social issue-area – in Europe's colonial past. For example, in Indonesia, Europe's colonial past has cast shadows over the perception of the EU and has negatively affected the EU's and Europe's image in the long-term (Fitriani, 2015). Meanwhile, the student-led protest movements against education inequality and the vestiges of the apartheid regime in South Africa also invoke negative connotations and are easily connected to a broader conceptualisation of the EU as part of the Global North. Overall, EU perceptions in the cultural field reveal no general trend and are strongly location-specific.

### 3.12. Health

The thematic category of health did not exist as a separate category in the 2015 Baseline Study. Health is given a different structural priority in the 2021 Update Study because of the Covid-19 pandemic and the major global attention to Europe as one of the epicentres of the pandemic and as one of the leading actors in vaccinations. The most recent literature on EU perceptions emerging in 2020-2021 indicates a rather ambivalent perception of the EU, linked to the poor performance in curbing the pandemic in 2020. An opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center (Huang & Silver, 2020) discovers that favourable views towards the EU have decreased in Canada, Japan, Republic of Korea and the US. Japan is one of the most noticeable cases with a drop of favourable views towards the EU from 60% in 2019 to 47% in 2020 and thus the biggest decline (13 points) among major non-EU countries. According to Pew Research Center (Huang & Silver, 2020), 34% of respondents in Japan and only 19% in Republic of Korea agree that the EU has done a "good job" in dealing with the pandemic. Republic of Korean media images of the EU in the context of Covid-19 feature strong negative evaluations, while literature in China see the pandemic as part of other EU crises and, thus, assign it with a negative role in the EU's overall image. As such, we observe a combination of *global* and *EU-specific* factors driving the change of perceptions of the EU. The literature in other countries has not yet reflected on the influence of Covid-19 on the images of the EU in a substantial manner but might be considered more frequently as the pandemic is taken up by perception research in the future.

### 3.13. Key research criteria (modes of impact)

This section addresses key research criteria as modes of impact, i.e. the performance of EU policies in third countries. The EU and Europe are perceived in terms of pre-defined parameters drawn from the most prominent academic discussions: visibility, actorness, effectiveness, cognitive resonance and normative power. In the following section, the findings relating to studying the body of research along these key research criteria or impact modes summarise the perceived impact of hitherto EU foreign policy.

#### 3.13.1. Visibility

Across all studies and regions, the research criterion “visibility” is reflected the most.

Reflecting on the wide-ranging set of data from cross-country analyses, the EU is a very visible actor in terms of *economy and trade*, and also increasingly visible in *political* issue-areas compared to the 2015 Study. The EU’s political role is the second, or, in some locations, the dominant perception.

The EU’s social policies (other than migration), climate change and environment, health, development and assistance, human rights, energy, RST, culture and education are only visible to a limited extent in media and among multipliers. This assessment differs by the country – some of these policies gain more visibility when they resonate with a country’s policy priorities.

#### 3.13.2. Actorness

Studies deal with the criterion “actorness” especially with respect to the issue-area of economy and trade in which the EU is frequently considered an international leader and beneficial interlocutor.

Perceptions of the EU are largely situated within a broader outlook of the EU’s roles in the respective location. Literature across countries reflects on media frames, key audience perceptions and general public opinion research demonstrates the overall perceived strong actorness of the EU in the area of *economy and trade*. Due to a series of EU trade agreements (bilateral and regional) leading in relations with the EU in 13 countries between 2015 and 2021, the EU is overall perceived as particularly active and increasingly consistent. The sovereign Eurozone crisis is no longer perceived to curb the EU’s economic or trading activities. In the political sphere, the EU is perceived as internally active (coping with the consequences of the irregular migration crisis, Brexit and later the pandemic) and externally (engaging in the dialogue on political issues relevant for a third country, e.g. promotion of human rights and democracy, peacebuilding, and/or striking major bilateral political agreements). In some locations, the EU is perceived as a normative actor, sometimes acting to benefit the location (e.g. in peace, democracy and humanitarian issue-areas – in Colombia, Nigeria, Mexico) and sometimes contesting local values (e.g. in the issue-areas of environment protection, equality, good governance, rule of law – in Brazil, China, Indonesia and Russia). The EU is also expected to act in a protectionist manner as a consequence of Brexit. EU actions in the area of health governance have started attracting attention with mixed evaluations but there is a lack of substantial academic literature on this issue. Actorness is also addressed in terms of EU policy and institutional coherence but is generally evaluated rather negatively as highlighted in the Baseline Study. EU actorness in the areas of *development and assistance, climate change and environment, energy, RST, culture and education* is perceived as active on a case-by-case basis – more so in countries where these policy areas are priorities in their internal and foreign policies (Brazil, Russia, China). Finally, growing multipolarity means the EU is often seen as an important actor but as one of many.

### 3.13.3. Effectiveness

The EU's effectiveness continues to be assessed ambivalently: trade and economy are areas that are widely perceived as successful examples of EU strengths, with a growing number of successful examples in the political sphere vis-à-vis perceptions of the EU as promoting trade, energy, human rights, climate, or environmental standards by using political pressure in third countries.

Once more, economy and trade are examples for successful EU policy-making and implementation. Outcomes of the EU's negotiations and conclusions of trade agreements (bilateral and regional) feed into this perception as an effective and credible partner. The conclusion of major political agreements between 2015 and 2021 is an additional strong factor in images of the EU as an effective and successful policy-maker, this time in the international political arena. Increasingly (albeit slowly), the EU's policies in climate change, environment and energy governance are perceived as effective inside Europe and as worth emulating internationally. Yet, EU policy-making gauges a range of perceptions where the EU is occasionally considered ineffective and inconsistent, even self-interested, hypocritical and non-credible. This assessment of the EU's effectiveness draws on perceptions in the areas where the EU for instance promotes trade, energy, human rights or environmental standards but is seen as politically pressuring others. EU internal decision-making processes and institutional competencies are sometimes perceived from a critical point of view, and specifically in health governance (in the context of the Covid pandemic) and migration (in the context of the irregular migration crisis). Relevant studies observe that despite initial predictions, Brexit has not detrimentally impacted the perceptions of the EU's internal decision-making processes and institutional competencies. It has questioned the EU's unitary actorness – even if it might not translate into long-term negative perceptions – and has stirred questions around economic uncertainty in relation to the EU as an effective economy and trade actor.

### 3.13.4. Cognitive Resonance

The extent, to which EU policies are felt to resonate with local and regional issues and priorities and have an impact on domestic policies, is another major indicator shaping images of the EU.

Literature between 2015 and 2021 demonstrates a complex combination of *location-specific*, *EU-specific*, *region-specific* and *global* factors that shape perceptions of the EU. *Location-specific* factors – informed by local issues and priorities which most impact domestic policies – are in the lead. Importantly, *location-specific* factors work as the main filter to process EU-specific inputs (including crises), *regional* factors (in the immediate geo-strategic region) and *global* inputs. Literature also demonstrates that *location-specific* factors may “team up” with *EU-specific*, *region-specific* or *global* factor in patterns which are unique to each location. In contrast to the 2015 Study, the Update Study argues that this indicator is of major importance, not lastly given the evolving global context of a multipolar world and a deepening rift between Global North and Global South, contestation among Western-based powers (with the EU being one of such powers) and increased “soft power” competition.

### 3.13.5. Normative Power

The EU's normative power is particularly viewed in a political context and in relation to the EU's promotion of its fundamental values. In contrast to the 2015 Study, however, it is increasingly assessed to be part of many policy areas the EU engages in.

The EU's normative power has been subject to an ongoing debate in academia (Manners, 2002; Börzel & Risse, 2011; Nicolaidis & Whittman, 2013). In general, Larsen (2014) finds that literature on EU external perceptions identifies the EU as a normative power only to a limited extent depending on the geographical area and the EU's image as a strong economic power remains prevalent (Larsen, 2014).

The literature between 2015 and 2021 continues to observe that perceptions of the EU in the normative issue-area are ambivalent. The EU's promotion of human rights, democracy, environmental policies, humanitarian assistance and rule of law may trigger either positive or negative reactions among third countries on a continuum of adoption, adaptation, resistance and rejection (Björkdahl et al., 2015). There is no single "universal" country pattern in perceptions, although countries with colonial experience are more likely to have a negative approach towards the EU's projection of normative power. Importantly, an individual country's reaction to EU normative projections could be positive in one area and negative in another. This more nuanced understanding of the EU's normative power – building on more recent scholarship in the field – is new in the Update Study. It also follows the vision of the EU Global Strategy (European Union External Action Service, 2016), and specifically its leading premise of *principled pragmatism* informing the EU's foreign policy.

### 3.14. Explanatory variables (local conditions)

Location-specific, local conditions such as history, culture, education and personal exposure to Europe/the EU represent important factors that influence how specific policies of the EU are perceived and which themes are considered important. Drawing on the 2015 Baseline Study, these explanatory variables aim to give an indication as to the extent and local conditions future public diplomacy initiatives have to consider.

Following the 2015 Baseline Study, the 2021 Update Study finds that across the literature, historical ties are addressed as important factors that shape the perceptions of third country citizens towards EU policies. A combination of more short-, mid- and long-term historical inputs into shaping the perceptions of the current relations with Europe and the EU matters. The colonial pasts of European states continue to cause resentment along the general public around the world. This perception may lead to scepticism towards EU public diplomacy initiatives and programmes. The impact of culture is also acknowledged: for instance, in the area of human rights, the distinctiveness of cultural norms and priorities, leads to a clash of positions among Asian, African and European policy-makers (for example, with their Japanese counterparts on the death penalty question). This is particularly visible in EU-China and EU-Russia relations. Education, training and personal exposure are the third set of influential aspects: a lack of education and knowledge of the EU and lack of direct personal experience causes a notion of lack of transparency and incoherence of EU decision-making processes among the general public. However, educational ties with Europe, for example through studying in the EU, and personal contacts with Europeans are seen to carry the potential to shape a positive, comprehensive image of the EU, although this finding is not clear cut and difficult to substantiate given the lack of data. The political context of a country, and its internal polarisation in particular, is accentuated when explaining why and how opinion-makers and the general public perceive the EU's roles. Furthermore, countries that have undergone a dramatic experience (a violent conflict, a change of their political regime) will perceive the EU differently than those who live in peace, especially when the EU engages in dialogue with these countries. Differences in socio-historically conceptualisations of key terms such as democracy, sustainability, resilience might lead to challenges as to finding common conceptual grounds (translational issues) but are not mentioned in the literature.



# Main public diplomacy initiatives

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## 4.1. EU public diplomacy

This section provides a thematically listed review of key public diplomacy initiatives and programmes of the EU in the last five years (2015-2021). Given the high number of individual initiatives, the following list is not exhaustive. It serves as a groundwork to inform the Final Report's "Best Practises Report", the Final Report's aggregated analysis and its policy recommendations. The main source of data (proposed and approved by the Steering Committee) is a series of one-hour interviews with EU public diplomacy practitioners from EU Delegations in the 13 selected countries. The interview data is complemented by information from the EU Policy Outreach Partnership (EUPOP) report and other relevant EU documents provided by the Client and, in some cases, by the EU Delegations. The overview of the public diplomacy initiatives that took place in each location between 2015 and 2021 draw comparisons to the Literature Review (see Section 3 of this report). Where applicable, the aggregated summary of the public diplomacy initiatives also compares the 2021 findings to the findings of the 2015 Baseline Study.

This section of the Literature Review starts with an official definition of EU public diplomacy and continues with an analysis of EU public diplomacy initiatives along the key research criteria and explanatory variables. Complementing the findings on perceptions of the EU from the Literature Review, this section provides an overview of existing public diplomacy initiatives contributing to the discussion on the EU public diplomacy and its programming globally and in the 13 selected countries specifically.

## 4.2. EU public diplomacy: definitions and evolution of the concepts and trends

The 2015 Baseline Study uses the EU's official definition of EU public diplomacy according to which EU public diplomacy aims 'to raise awareness of the foreign policy goals and also to positively influence the perceptions of the EU as an active and effective player on a global level' (Davies Cross, 2013, p. 1 as cited in the Baseline Report), to promote the EU values 'based on delivery of peace, security and prosperity' (Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations 2012, p. 4). The 2015 Baseline Study reflects on three major innovations of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, namely the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the conversion of the European Commission Delegations around the world into European Union Delegations with a status as fully-fledged Embassies, and the creation of the office of the High Representative of the EU.

Since its creation in 2010, the EEAS has been the main EU institution in charge of communication and coordination of EU public diplomacy, in coordination with the Commission and Directorate Generals with an external mandate, and soon after the Service of the Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) of the European Commission. The EU Delegations became central to the implementation of EU public diplomacy abroad, not only by distributing information about the EU but also promoting the EU's narrative and success stories (Rasmussen, 2009). Despite such progress, Duke (2013) identifies a core challenge of EU public diplomacy post-Lisbon – the conflict between internal and external aspects of EU public diplomacy. The reason for this is that the internal narrative of the EU is an on-going process, and, thus, it can hardly be employed in foreign relations. Duke (2013) adds that the competition with EU Member States – who often viewed public diplomacy as part of their national diplomacy and did not see the benefits of contributing to an EU public diplomacy (for example, in the promotion of culture)

– is also well reflected in the 2015 Baseline Study. The earlier scholarship in the field of EU public diplomacy stresses that at the core of every public diplomacy initiative are questions around what should be communicated and how this communication can be coordinated to send a coherent message across borders (Henrikson, 2006). Later scholarship – especially around strategic narrative research – further mirrors Duke’s analysis in arguing that the EU ‘despite significant integrative steps since the end of the Cold War’, ‘still struggles to offer a coherent narrative – both internally and externally, thus potentially hampering the EU’s strategic impact’ (Miskimmon, 2017, pp. 85-86).

In an attempt to communicate the EU more clearly to partners abroad, the creation of the Partnership Instrument (PI) for cooperation with third countries in 2014 acknowledges the importance of public diplomacy for the EU’s foreign policy. It specifically mentions the objective of enhancing:

widespread understanding and visibility of the Union and of its role on the world scene by means of public diplomacy, people-to-people contacts, cooperation in educational and academic matters, think tank cooperation and outreach activities to promote the Union’s values and interests’ (Regulation (EU) No 234/ 2014, Article 1.2(d)).

The main idea is to promote:

political values, and political systems, such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, the EU’s commitment to universal values; civil diplomacy of state building, of reform through engagement; economic diplomacy, the weight of the largest trading bloc, the most densely integrated market with its 500 million extremely wealthy consumers and businesses, EU as a force to be reckoned with in new fields, such as climate change, energy, smart development (Kimunguyi & Polonska-Kimunguyi 2013, p. 141).

To achieve this far-reaching task, sophisticated communication strategies, including the use of media, are seen as key to provide global access to information on Europe and the EU and to create new ways of interactive engagement with global audiences (Grincheva, 2012). The 2015 Baseline Study forms part of a consultation process in the preparation for the EU Global Strategy (European Union External Action Service, 2016) and outlines the EU’s strategic directions in the changing world, assigning a special place to public diplomacy:

The EU will enhance its strategic communications, investing in and joining up public diplomacy across different fields, in order to connect EU foreign policy with citizens and better communicate it to our partners. We will improve the consistency and speed of messaging on our principles and actions. We will also offer rapid, factual rebuttals of disinformation. We will continue fostering an open and inquiring media environment within and beyond the EU, also working with local players and through social media (online)

A set of public diplomacy initiatives, initiated centrally serve a proof of the evolving status of EU public diplomacy. Among those are the EU’s Cultural Diplomacy Platform within the EU’s strategy to international cultural relations (European Commission, n.d.), the launch of the first survey on the EU’s external perceptions – EUROBAROMETER 2017 by the European Commission (2017) and the launch of this 2021 Update Study in 13 countries following the Baseline Study 2015 in 10 Strategic Partners – all aiming to improve EU public diplomacy outreach and contribute to the discussion about new instruments and approaches in the new cycle of EU public diplomacy programming.

Importantly, the EU public diplomacy is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a global evolution of public diplomacy practices in response to a changing world, characterised by the growing multipolarity, increased competition and contestation, a transition from a rules-based order, proliferation of actors on the global stage (state and non-state), on-going globalisation, technological breakthroughs, environmental and climate catastrophe and a communication revolution characterised by the dominance of new media with its immense scope, speed and transparency of information flows and horizontality. As such, new visions of public diplomacy are of growing relevance for EU public diplomacy as they interact with a changing landscape yet seek to promote and forge a common

narrative of the EU in the world. Relevant literature describes “new” public diplomacy more suitably as a diplomatic process aiming to ‘understand, engage, and influence publics on a wide range of other issues relating to governance, economic growth, democracy, the distribution of goods and services, and a host of cross-border threats and opportunities’ (Gregory, 2008, p. 276). These are actions ‘leaving the traditional zone of diplomatic work and entering two-way communication and direct engagement not only with foreign governments, but also with other foreign audiences directly and/or via nongovernmental partners’ (Jelisić, 2012; cf. Fitzpatrick, 2007). Major new inputs for the EU public diplomacy 2021 vis-à-vis 2015 lead to a number of differences in EU public diplomacy initiatives over time, such as the proliferation of multiple stakeholders keen to participate in the international discourse and on the international stage, a sharpening competition between many assertive international actors for global “soft” power influence and a rapid acceleration of digital means in diplomatic practice.

- Communication strategy

In contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study, the current overview of the EU public diplomacy initiatives in 13 countries follows the first round of programming of EU public outreach within the EU Policy and Outreach Partnership (EUPOP) project, completed in 2019. As such, EU Delegations report that their public diplomacy initiatives are firmly guided by communication strategies that outline the priorities formulated by Brussels. This is different to the 2015 Baseline Study. EU Delegation interviewees in the 2021 Update Study point to a strategically driven, coordinated character of their work. While this may delay the speed of reaction to public diplomacy *force-majeures*, it also ensures a more consistent approach in producing and delivering EU public diplomacy initiatives based on EU values and the communication of these values.

- “Polyphonic” character of the EU public diplomacy initiatives

Another major difference is a much more “polyphonic”<sup>3</sup> character of EU public diplomacy initiatives. It is explicated by: a) more internal cooperation within EU Delegations among different departments and divisions; b) a much more visible “Team Europe” effort; c) increasingly sophisticated “blending” of the themes; and d) exploring a regional approach across national borders.

a) Many posts report that public diplomacy initiatives are designed in collaboration with multiple sections in the EU Delegations, but also with other sections contributing when they can/want (e.g. working with DG INTPA – the Directorate General for European Commission’s Department for International Partnerships, former DG DEVCO (the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development), DG NEAR – the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, DG TRADE – the Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, DG CLIMA – the Directorate General for Climate Action, etc.), in support of the EU’s long-term vision and needs.

b) More “polyphony” in contrast to 2015 is observed in the “Team Europe” approach through which EU Delegations form close and mutually beneficial cooperation with EU Member States, multiplying messages, combining resources and tapping into themes, means, networks and geographies potentially overlooked in the past owing to resource constraints. All 13 EU Delegations report that they work closely and regularly with EU Member States. EU public diplomacy initiatives tend to happen in good synergy with public diplomacy initiatives undertaken by larger Member States that have their own public diplomacy programming (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia). EU public diplomacy initiatives often offer opportunities for smaller Member States with limited resources and staff. In this case, the EU Delegations’ efforts “loop” smaller Member States in, in a very systematic way (Canada, Republic of Korea). In Mexico, the EU Delegation’s activities synergise with EU Member

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<sup>3</sup> i.e. when many voices and themes create a harmony, in contrast to “cacophonic” when many voices and themes clash



States' activities through "The Annual Action Plan for Joint Public Diplomacy", but Mexico is not an exception here. By defining key audiences, activities and shared messages on campaigns, the EU Delegations and their Heads coordinate with EU Member States' Ambassadors, devise which event to run jointly or separately and who appears in various public events (including online events at times of Covid). Coordination goes beyond syncing the schedules. Some examples include the alignment of messaging on what the EU does, specifically in the realm of key themes (e.g. climate change, Covid pandemic, etc.), or to offer communication packages and templates that EU Member States can use (Brazil, Japan). Coordination is also taking place on major events and reactions to crises. For example, in Nigeria and under the banner of "Team Europe", the EU assisted in the fight against Covid with 5mn EUR and with a lot of social and traditional media profiling of the EU and EU Member States working together. In the view of the EU Delegation, this has strengthened the image of the EU as a strong and trusted partner.

c) The 2021 Update Study clearly demonstrates an increasingly complex architecture of public diplomacy initiatives with EU Delegations often designing events that pursue a number of key themes/objectives in a logical and effective synergy.

d) The interviews with the public diplomacy practitioners in North and South Americas also reveal an increasing exploration of regional clustering and logic of EU public diplomacy initiatives, specifically for Latin America. This regional approach, implemented in six Latin American countries, is instrumental for developing synergies in the region and sharing best practices meaningful for the region. A more peculiar situation in this regard refers to the Asian region. While the EU has its own Delegation to the ASEAN, this Delegation does not collaborate with EU Delegation to Indonesia yet. Moreover, a member of the ASEAN Indonesia is not included in reports on EUPOP in the ASEAN.

Another difference to the 2015 Baseline Study is the EU Delegations' conscious reflection and effort to reach broader audiences and in more diverse locations. All 13 countries in the Update Study 2021 have complex and extensive geographies, and similar to the 2015 Study, EU public diplomacy practitioners report it as a challenge, specifically vis-à-vis limited resources. In this summary we stress that the new public diplomacy initiative of the "roadshow" allow for a more systematic, nuanced, comprehensive outreach to the territories and provinces outside of the usual "bubbles" where the EU Delegations tend to be more active, i.e. the respective capitals and the major urban centres. This is an innovative public diplomacy initiative that unites the EU and EU Member States and showcases the EU across a number of key themes (political, economic, social, cultural, climate, etc.). In addition to the roadshows, the EU Delegations report a broad range of public diplomacy initiatives designed to reach to provincial audiences (e.g. regional media outreach in India, or EU Film Festival outside the capital in Russia, etc.). Covid realities and the necessity to move public diplomacy initiatives online mean that outreach to provinces and peripheries has intensified. Digitally-executed EU public diplomacy initiatives now can involve audiences in locations previously untapped.

Finally, all interviewed EU Delegations recognise that EU public diplomacy efforts have become different after the outbreak of the Covid – particularly in terms digitalising their activities. Certainly, digital means in the public diplomacy had been increasingly important before the Covid. The use of social media for communication more broadly and for diplomatic purposes specifically has been a hallmark of the public diplomacy efforts. The EU had embarked on this innovation in public diplomacy communication, yet, as the 2015 Baseline Study shows, there remained space for improvement. The circumstances of Covid meant that this change had to happen in a short span of time.

The lack of face-to-face contacts so critical for successful public diplomacy means that EU Delegations had to revise their tools to ensure a two-way engagement with the audiences and the execution of the public diplomacy in the full sense of the word. The EU public diplomacy initiatives in all 13 countries showcase an increase in the use of virtual platforms during the pandemic. Moreover, the EU Delegations offer many innovations in this context. Among these innovations are social media campaigns run by the EU Delegations in cooperation with EU Member States. The virtual format also

means that more high-profile participants can “attend” EU events, which also facilitates the outreach mentioned above. One successful example is the “EU Education Fair” popular in many countries, which is currently run in the virtual format, as it can now attract more young people on a different geographical scale.

Opportunities presented by e-diplomacy mean a significant increase of the EU’s outreach at a lower cost and through more efficient online options to which many audiences (and younger people specifically) are increasingly open to. It is not surprising that the EU Delegations recognise an opportunity to reach to more and geographically diverse audiences through online communication and will use these lessons after the pandemic is over. EU Delegations are keen to continue with such “hybrid” events. However, it is also very clear that digital public diplomacy cannot substitute face-to-face contacts that build the backbone of public diplomacy, especially in the consolidation of networks and for building trusting and close relationships. This more personal, direct mode of communication remains crucially meaningful for the outreach to local audiences, particularly policy-, decision- and opinion-makers and even youth. The EU Delegations report that the ongoing lack of direct communication with these cohorts is a worrisome trend for EU public diplomacy in the future, and in some locations (where “side-line” meetings are a powerful way to engage) it could even be detrimental.

### 4.3. Main themes and corresponding initiatives

A range of initiatives and programmes has been implemented, across the main themes identified for this Study. In the 2015 Baseline Study most activities happen in the area of economic relations, culture and civil society relations. While these areas remain leading in the 2021 Study, the public diplomacy initiatives in the areas of climate and environment, education and inclusive society/transition are now also very visible. Public diplomacy initiatives in RST and information/communication are also increasingly realised. Further, an emphasis on the training element of the public diplomacy initiatives as well as the growing role of (social) media are new in comparison to the 2015 Study.

The comparative assessment of the public diplomacy initiatives vs. the academic literature on EU external perceptions in the 13 countries demonstrates that the respective literature lags behind the assessment of how the images of the EU are changing alongside the changing thematic priorities of EU public diplomacy. Economic and political themes get most of the reflection in the studies on perceptions of the EU. This dissonance is likely driven by a variety of factors:

1. The thematic change of public diplomacy initiatives took place within the last round of programming starting in 2017 – a rather recent date to affect the perceptions and images (especially as cognitive constructs are rigid and infamously resistant to change);
2. The academic literature, to be published, goes through a lengthy review process (often up to a year). Some more recent works that reflect on the perceptions of the new themes may still be in review when this report goes public;
3. Literature Review points to large numbers of event-driven research, with publications being instigated by crises, conflicts and/or problems in EU relations with external partners, while public diplomacy initiatives cannot anticipate such events. Moreover, the EU public diplomacy effort focuses on building durable partnerships as opposed to be purely event-driven;
4. Covid has interrupted and re-directed many research projects, including those on perceptions of the EU;
5. There is still a lack of systematic comparative research on EU external perceptions among the key partners of the EU, and the 2021 Update Study is a welcome change to this *status quo*.

In contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study, the 2021 Update Study finds that many public diplomacy initiatives cross thematic boundaries and address key themes in a more comprehensive manner. Activities have become increasingly “blended”. Importantly, the initiatives are also becoming more

sectoral and more thematic (e.g. in such sectors as energy, mining, agriculture, for example, in Colombia, India, Canada, Republic of Korea), and this only increases their effectiveness when several such initiatives are merged, or “blended”. In other words, “blending”, or ‘broadening’ is when EU public diplomacy initiatives engage ‘people semantically specialised’ in sectorial fields in one event, thus, ‘widening the circle from outward, from the Delegation’ (EUIndo1).

Such an approach allows to increase the EU’s visibility in those issue-areas and among audiences that would have otherwise remained indifferent to other areas apart from the field of their interest. While “blending” allows to deliver a more comprehensive multi-faceted initiative, it also explains a visible connection between the declared goals of the EU public diplomacy initiatives and EU norms and values observed in this Study.

In summary, themes have become more varied and interconnected in the 2021 Update Study as the examples below will show. We present all themes alongside their key initiatives, with clear indicators why they are presented under a particular thematic rubric in the report despite the interconnected nature of themes and initiatives in the 2021 Update Study.

### **4.3.1. Economy and trade**

The 2015 Baseline Study outlines that business cooperation with the strategic partners of the EU is at the core of each strategic partnership (Cirliq, 2012, p. 4). The Baseline Study also quotes Sonia Lucarelli (2007, 2013) who argues that the EU’s perception as a global trading power is firmly established across its partner countries. Even though the Eurozone debt crisis impacted the global image of the EU as a leading economy and trade actor negatively, its effect has not been detrimental (see Chaban & Lucarelli, 2021). The 2021 Update Study substantiates these arguments. Since 2015, a number of countries in the sample have concluded major trade agreements with the EU (e.g. CETA in Canada, the EPA in Japan, a regional six-country agreement in Latin America). In some locations, trade negotiations are still ongoing (e.g. China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria). Hence, the main aim of the public diplomacy initiatives in this issue-area is to manifest and maintain the Union’s position and to open further avenues of cooperation with strategic partners. EU public diplomacy initiatives in these countries often feature high level-events opening the dialogue of the EU with strategic key audiences, such as businessmen and chief executives – to speak about the trade agreement, the opportunities and the benefits, and recently, linking all these with the EU Green Deal (e.g. in Colombia).

The 2015 Baseline Study references the following activities as part of EU public diplomacy initiatives in the field of economic cooperation: cooperation with business associations and chambers, organising roundtables, support of European businesses in establishing new collaborations and setting up exchange programmes for current and future business leaders. Some of these instruments have been mentioned in the interviews with public diplomacy practitioners in 2021 as well, but other public diplomacy initiatives appear to be new or more prominent initiatives in this sector: roadshows; a wider range of formal and informal networking events with high-profile business leaders; educational events, sectoral dialogues and outreach to the broader public. Importantly, the Covid pandemic has impacted the scale and reach of the face-to-face public diplomacy initiatives in this thematic area, and specifically with high-profile key business leaders and decision-makers. In summary, the focus of EU public diplomacy initiatives in the field of economy and trade correlates with the reflections of the relevant literature on EU perceptions.

#### ***EU roadshows***

Roadshows have been a prominent feature of the EU public diplomacy initiatives in Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia and Mexico. This comprehensive initiative is difficult to classify under a specific thematic rubric as it targets both political and economic themes and often addresses other key themes to convey the message as well (e.g. education, climate/environment, RST, energy, culture, etc.). The roadshows are designed to address the most pertinent topics in EU bilateral relations with the strategic partners,

including more “technical” aspects of economy, trade, business, investment, finances, industry or agriculture. Such issues usually link to trade agreements or an implementation of specific EU projects on the ground. However, roadshows also feature a strong socialisation element aiming to reach out to the broader public (local authorities and businesses, but also civil society, media, universities, youth and the general public) as well as to increase the EU’s visibility in the provinces and regions.

The roadshows are driven by Heads and Deputy Heads of EU Delegations and EU Member States Embassies, accompanied by EU Delegation staffers who use this opportunity to communicate the EU through face-to-face meetings, social media as well as regional traditional media. In this public diplomacy initiative, the EU Delegations combine efforts with Embassies of EU Member States who may choose to profile their cultural or other messages and actors during these events. The EU and EU Member States representatives meet with local and regional authorities, stakeholders (including business-people), students and media. Such a comprehensive approach allows local audiences to understand the EU and its Member States in a more comprehensive way, where economy and trade are important facets of the EU but also are a part of a bigger, more complex picture of strategic cooperation.

In the eyes of the interviewed public diplomacy practitioners, the roadshows experienced a major setback when Covid led to limited contacts and curtailed travel in many countries. Due to the complexity of this public diplomacy initiatives design and importance of direct contact with many key stakeholders on the ground, virtual formats must be developed further and continuously tested to ensure a true engagement of multiple stakeholders.

#### *A wider range of networking events with the leaders of business sphere (formal and informal)*

The 2015 Baseline Study points to networking events with business leaders (formal and informal) as a means to support the image and reputation of the EU as an effective global actor in the economy and promote direct exchanges between business and industry officials and representatives of the EU and its Member States. Differently to the findings of the 2015 Baseline Study, public diplomacy practitioners in the 2021 Study more frequently mention formal high-level events with business leaders and authorities, and specifically in areas where there are controversies or even conflicts between the EU and the partner country. One of the sensitive areas for a dialogue between the EU and third countries have been geographical indications in the context of the major trade agreements (more specifically CETA in Canada, the EPA in Japan, or the EU-China agreement protecting geographical indications). To facilitate the dialogue on geographical indications, the EU Delegation organised the “EU-Canada Policy Dialogues Support Facility” on geographical indications with a focus on the benefits of CETA (success story videos, market access guides for European companies, etc.). In Japan, the EU Delegation organised events with the parliamentarians, as well as other stakeholders, to address the most difficult topics during the EPA negotiations. In 2019, “Networking Reception on Geographical Indications” and a working lunch and workshop on geographical indications were organised as part of such events. In Republic of Korea, earlier public diplomacy initiatives targeted the issues of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, while the more recent ones aim at raising overall awareness of the economic cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the EU.

The new trend of “blending” the key themes is prominent in the field of economy as well. Here, cooperation in trade/business is discussed in the context of other issues, such as climate change, RST and more. For example, in Colombia, the EU Delegation engages with businesspeople and CEOs to discuss the opportunities and benefits of the trade agreement and the Green Deal. The EU public diplomacy initiative “Engaged Europe” in Russia also “mixes” climate change, trade, health and digital topics to engage leading stakeholders. To a lesser extent, “blending” can be also assigned to the notion of connectivity in Japan which merges the SPA (Strategic Partnership Agreement) with the EPA with the aim to further promote bilateral partnership beyond ‘just economics and trade’ (EUJap4).

#### *Business Associations and Chambers*

The 2015 Study stresses EU public diplomacy engagement with practitioners such as EU-focused business associations and chambers, which facilitate the exchange of the EU and its members with the strategic partners and seeks to increase EU visibility. The 2021 Study does not register the establishment of new business associations beyond existing ones.<sup>4</sup> However, it marks the continuous work in this sector. public diplomacy practitioners in Indonesia mention that they invite the European Chamber of Commerce to locally organised events and also cooperate with the Chamber of Commerce and the Ministry of Commerce of Indonesia in the field of economy and investment. EU Delegations in Canada and Mexico run presentations and information sessions with the representatives of European and local investment associations and chambers of commerce.

### *Roundtables, seminars and conferences*

The 2015 Study considers roundtables to be a crucial part of networking events in the issue-area of the economy. The 2021 Study reveals that roundtables remain an important element of EU public diplomacy initiatives in the area of the economy. In 2019, EUPOP Russia organised two seminars on economic themes attracting 115 experts to discuss the trade relations between the EU, Russia and China as well as Russia's economic development. In Canada, a series of CETA information sessions organised for EU Member States consuls and honorary consuls, and other key stakeholders from various investment associations and chambers of commerce, brought together over 60 participants from four Canadian cities. The EU also has an annual presence at the PDAC convention (Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada) in Canada. The EU Delegation to Mexico held a Presentation on the EU-Mexico Global Agreement to the Nuevo León business community, including chambers of commerce, international companies and SMEs focusing on the role of business and civil society in the Agreement. The "Business Round Table on Trade and Investment" in Indonesia brought together over 60 participants, including Indonesian business representatives, members of the European Parliament and a Swedish delegation. The event focused on the course of EU-Indonesia Free Trade Negotiations – ahead of the third round of talks planned to start in September 2017 – and represented an opportunity to voice concerns and opinions and draw recommendations for the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) negotiations. Public diplomacy initiatives in Japan also focused on specific issues related to the EPA and its implementation. Three events were held in order to promote the EU messages in the Geographical Indications policy area and to increase understanding of it among key stakeholder groups: a seminar on geographical indications and the EPA and the EU Geographical Indications Networking Reception.

### *Events with elements of education of local business community*

While networking events are designed to support dialogue with key informed decision-makers, the EU Delegations also design and organise events where they aim to educate local business communities about the EU as an economic/trading actor. For example, the EU Delegation to Brazil ran executive business trainings with internal or external panellists. In Colombia, public diplomacy initiatives included diplomatic and executing trainings and think tank networks targeting various audiences – businesses among them (this initiative is another example of the sectorial approach and "blending"). Think tank networks were also prominent in India and Mexico. The EU Delegation to Canada ran training sessions on EU policies (including but not limited to CETA). In India, the EU Delegation

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<sup>4</sup> Some of these organisations are long and well established. For example, EUCOCIT, the *EU Chamber of Commerce in Toronto*, was founded in 1995 and has developed into an umbrella organisation for 25 EU Member States bilateral Chambers of Commerce and Business Associations and 3 associate members from other European countries. EUCOCIT aims to promote the EU and Europe as a whole as a strong and effective economic partner. In a similar fashion, the *EU Chamber of Commerce in China* (EUCCC), established in 2000, has now more than 1,800 members operating in 9 Chinese cities with the goal of establishing a common voice for the various business sectors (see the Baseline Report 2015)



supported conferences and research papers addressing the EU-India TTTI. In Japan, EUPOP ran a policy seminar on geographical indications in the EU-Japan EPA improving the understanding of the geographical indication systems and the latest policies in the field as well as the Workshop on public procurement, which familiarised participants with electronic public procurement.

Arguably, the format of the trainings allows to reach particularly motivated local stakeholders who invest into learning about the EU, with the element of discussions within trainings being important as it prevents the EU to appear as a “top-down” communicator, especially in the sensitive area of trade. In the 2015 Study roundtables are considered as a dominant platform for dialogue in this issue-area rather than trainings for members of the business community, which does not feature in the 2015 Study.

### *Sectorial dialogues*

In comparison to the findings of the 2015 Baseline Study, the EU Delegations appear to engage more actively in sectorial dialogues with specific industry sectors. A respondent from the EU Delegation to India argues that they have shifted to a ‘more sectoral, more thematic sphere’ in bilateral relations and, thus, a more specific approach to dialogue as opposed to more general, political messaging (EUInd1). EU public diplomacy initiatives in India specifically engage sectoral Counsellors, who cover issues that are important to local audiences – energy, climate change, standardisation in information and communication technology. In Colombia, the EU Delegation engages with the mining and energy sector and continues the dialogue with the agricultural sector to incentivise businesses to decarbonise and find opportunities in the EU market. As such, the EU Delegations use the opportunity of the sectorial dialogues for “blending” the themes of business/industry with climate/environment. Sectoral projects in India cover topics such as the circular economy, on climate change, clean energy, migration and standardisation in information and communication technology.

### *Exchanges*

The 2015 report also stresses exchanges between established and future business leaders wherein personal experiences with and in the EU and Europe are seen a major factor that shape the perceptions of the EU and its policies in a more positive way (Stumbaum et al., 2015), not reflected, however in the 2021 Study with one of the drivers likely being Covid.

### *Reaching out to broader audiences*

Another trend in the 2021 Study different to the 2015 Study, is the EU Delegations’ attempt to reach out to the general public in the issue-area of economy, including by providing more information on the EU dialogue with the respective strategic country. For example, the EU Delegation to Republic of Korea issued the EU-Korea trade “Fact File” devoted to the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the EU-Korea FTA to raise awareness of EU-Korea economic relations. The EU Delegation to Japan marked the second anniversary of the EPA and issued the Geographical Indication Information Pack in order to raise awareness of PDO/PGI logos (Protected Designation of Origin/ Protected Geographical Indication) and their meaning for Japanese audiences (both businesses and general public). Public diplomacy practitioners also launched a “Cooking with EU GI (geographical indication) Products” video series which sought to raise awareness among Japanese consumers and encourage European products. However, such events are not common.

## **4.3.2. Politics**

The 2021 Update Study demonstrates a range of public diplomacy initiatives that address various political issues in the bilateral dialogues – in contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study. The arsenal of public diplomacy initiatives in 2021 is diverse: roadshows, various activities to promote EU norms and values, roundtables and workshops on the current political issues (of local and international relevance), work with young politicians and civil society leaders and networking with leading political practitioners.



### *Roadshows*

EU roadshows (discussed above) stress, among other objectives, the EU's dialogue with political leaders on the national and sub-national levels (provinces, municipalities). The public diplomacy initiative aims for a direct dialogue with local authorities, as well as mediated dialogue (through traditional and social media). This public diplomacy initiative sends a message about the EU's readiness to engage with local stakeholders and audiences. One example of the roadshow led by political themes is the roadshow in Colombia where, in the context of Peace Process, the EU Delegation organised roadshows in prioritised territories during which they involve local authorities, civil society from the region, media and journalists and EU Member States. The EU Delegation to Mexico has run roadshows since 2018 and focus on the Modernisation of the Global Agreement and provide an opportunity for the EU Delegation to meet with mayors, local leaders and business communities. In Indonesia, roadshows focused on the economic cooperation development initiatives with South Sulawesi Province and the City of Makassar (an important logistical hub) and multiple EU priorities such as the CEPA framework/instrument, human rights and climate change.

### *Activities to promote norms and values*

Political messaging of the EU Delegations seeks to introduce and inform about the EU's foundational norms and values. Moreover, EU norms are usually embedded in the public diplomacy initiatives irrespective of the area-issue. While this may be in part explained by the "blended" character of the public diplomacy initiatives in this Study, interviewed public diplomacy practitioners also confirm that the promotion of EU norms and values is a crucial aspect of their work.

Keeping in mind that such messages are very sensitive and potentially controversial, the public diplomacy initiatives demonstrate a range of approaches which are often location-specific. For example, in Brazil, the EU Delegation ran a social media campaign delivering information about human rights, with awards given to participants. The campaign, "The EU from A to Z" also disseminates messages about the EU's political profile and normative principles. In Canada, the EU Delegation facilitates the "EU-Canada Civil Society Forum and Policy Dialogues Support Facility". The EU Delegation in Mexico organises annual seminars which led to "dialogues" – a platform where the Mexican government, the EU Delegation, and civil society in Mexico and the EU to discuss human rights issues. The EU-Mexico "Think Tank Dialogue Initiative" promoted better knowledge and understanding among opinion-makers and policy-influencers on the key topics and priorities for the EU bilateral relationship, such as democracy, trade, migration, security and law, and sustainable development. As a part of public diplomacy actions, the EU Delegation to Mexico also issues public statements on when Mexican human rights defenders or journalists disappear or get murdered. The EU Delegation to China also held think tank meetings with Françoise Godement and Asia Centre on the EU side on EU-China relations. EUPOP in Japan organised a series of four events devoted to climate change problems for Japanese lawmakers, while EUPOP in Colombia held a seminar/workshop of EU practices in reference to the bill on the modernisation of the information and communication technology sector in order to influence the definition of Colombian Law with EU best practices on the topic.

With some countries, the EU conflicts over norms and value, and the EU Delegations address such conflicts as well. For example, the EU Delegation to Japan regularly engages in the debates on the death penalty in Japan. It has also supported a project with Crime Info (at Monash University in Australia) to raise awareness about this issue as a part of its public diplomacy effort. In the US "World Day Against the Death Penalty Panel Discussion" (2017) brought together key US stakeholders in the fight to abolish the US death penalty.

In Russia, the EU Delegation runs journalist trainings with a focus on the freedom of speech, freedom of media, support for minorities and human rights. In Indonesia, a seminar "Tackling Hate Speech and Fake News" took place in 2018 in collaboration with the EU's Media4Democracy project. The seminar attracted 100 top law and policy-makers and leading opinion-shapers from the media, social media,

think-tanks and academia allowing them to then share best practices and formulate recommendations for their respective legal and policy environments.

*Workshops, seminars and roundtables on the current political issues (local and international)*

EU Delegations also organise various fora to discuss the most pertinent political topics in domestic or international politics. The format invites to a frank exchange of opinions and dialogue, and the theme of the event depends on the interest and political context at the time.

Here, economic issues are the most prominent theme in EU public diplomacy initiatives while resonating closely with the political theme. In Russia, the 2019 seminar on trade relations between the EU, China and Russia combined political and economic aspects based on two elements: a by invitation-only lunch with high ranking EU officials and EU experts and an expert roundtable. Another prominent public diplomacy initiative for high-level dialogue in Russia was the establishment of the EU-Russia Experts Network on Foreign Policy (EUREN) as a new platform that brought together 40 prominent foreign policy experts and think tanks from Russia and EU Member States to discuss a broad range of topics relevant to EU-Russia relations. A broad format of events is also featured by EU public diplomacy initiatives in Mexico, where a series of webinars “Conectando con la Unión Europea” launched in 2019 focuses on key issues in EU-Mexico relations, namely the modernised Global Agreement; export to the EU; scientific cooperation and innovation in the EU-Mexico Global Agreement; circular economy; youth and climate action; urban mobility; the new European Commission; and how the EU deals with fake news and disinformation.

More visibly the economic component of political dialogue stood out in Indonesia and South Africa. The Business Round Table on Trade and Investment in Indonesia brought together over 60 participants, including Indonesian business representatives, members of the European Parliament and a Swedish delegation. The event focused on the course of EU-Indonesia Free Trade Negotiations – ahead of the third round of talks planned to start in September 2017 – and became an opportunity to voice concerns and opinions and draw recommendations for CEPA negotiations. In South Africa, policy-orientated seminars and panel discussion on Fighting Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) highlighted the role of the international community and the G20 on the issue of IFFs, providing EU perspectives.

*Security-related public diplomacy initiatives*

Another thematic area in the EU public diplomacy initiatives that involves high-level engagements is security – prominent in the EU public diplomacy initiatives in Canada, India, Nigeria and the US. The EU-India workshop on securing the maritime commons brought together senior officials and leading experts from the EU and India as well as security practitioners (more than 100 participants overall). The EU Delegation to the US also held the EU “Security and Defence Washington Symposium” in 2018 gathering senior European and US defence experts and transatlantic security stakeholders to address opportunities for stronger defence policy coordination, NATO-EU cooperation and joint EU-US efforts and partnership. EU representatives in the US also took part in the National Conference for State Legislatures Summit (2019). EU Delegation staff engaged with more than 4,500 US lawmakers, legislative staff members and lobbyists vis-à-vis individual conversations on a variety of topics and desk-style briefings with visual aids. In addition, the EU hosted a well-attended (35-person) session on the abolition of the death penalty, distributed state-specific trade infographics directly to legislators and their staff as well as other interested parties from business and civil society. It also engaged well with the US audience, including through side meetings with key lawmakers. EU Delegation to Canada has gathered almost a hundred stakeholders by organising the “Fifth Security and Defence Symposium” (SDS). The event informed key Canadian stakeholders about the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and its relationship with NATO, encouraging future dialogue and providing a key networking opportunity. The EU Delegation also seeks to promote peace and security and mobilises EU Member States to act in supporting humanitarian action in Northeast of Nigeria.

The connectivity between Europe and Asia is a new agenda for public diplomacy initiatives as highlighted in the context of the SPA in Japan and also mentioned in India. While this area has not yet received a lot of attention in the current public diplomacy initiatives, it may become more visible in time.

#### *Diplomatic training and networking with top political practitioners (diplomats in particular)*

Similar to the networking with high-profile business individuals (discussed in the field of economy), EU Delegations also undertake public diplomacy initiatives to network with high-profile political actors and the civil service. Before Covid hit, lectures of the Head of EU Delegation at the Diplomacy Academy in New Delhi were a big success. Young Diplomats training was a pilot activity carried out by the EU Delegation to India. The EU also runs diplomatic and executive trainings in Colombia. The “Colombian Diplomatic Academy” provides an annual intensive College of Europe training for future diplomats to improve knowledge of the EU.

In 2019, more than 150 diplomats and other federal government officials from Canada attended training sessions on the topics reflecting key elements of the SPA, namely EU policies, institutions and practices on trade, security and defence, the environment and energy, development and humanitarian assistance, sanctions, and human rights. In addition, the Fifth SDS organised by the EU Delegation to Canada provided an opportunity to reach out to new Canadian contacts, notably those in the Department of National Defence and at Public Safety.

#### *Work with young politicians and civil society leaders*

With young people as a priority audience in EU public diplomacy, EU Delegations often initiate public diplomacy initiatives that target young professionals. In the political issue-area, one of the more successful public diplomacy initiative was a study tour for young Indian diplomats to EU institutions. The EU Delegation to Canada facilitates Youth Transatlantic Civil Society Dialogues projects. In Nigeria, the focus is on future professionals, i.e. university students. Here, a project on support of the democratic government (2018) saw the EU Delegation working with students in six local universities to get youth more involved in political life and be more aware of the domestic relevance of democratic governance. The Ambassador of the EU in China has also spoken at universities on EU-China relations to maintain relations with academics and future decision-makers.

### **4.3.3. Climate and environment**

Climate change, its mitigation and adaptation is a key theme that captured the attention in Europe and around the world when the 2015 Baseline Study took place. But despite the emphasis on climate change and environmental cooperation and the perception of the EU as an environmentally aware actor (e.g. Torney, 2013), the 2015 Baseline Study finds that programmes and public diplomacy initiatives in the strategic partner countries remain limited. Since then, the EEAS has promoted its Climate Diplomacy (for more information, see [http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/index_en.htm)) emphasising the urgency and importance of this theme. Most recently the Foreign Affairs Council has renewed the EU’s commitment to climate action at the heart of the EU’s external policy. The 2021 Update Study demonstrates a clear priority assigned to climate- and environment-related public diplomacy initiatives in all 13 EU Delegations. EU Delegations are increasingly cognizant of the severe effect of climate change on the livelihood of societies in all partner countries, putting stress on the availability of food, water, raw materials and energy and the impact on the relationship with the EU and in the partner country.

#### *Dedicated major events and individual initiatives*

The 2021 Study registers a number of Climate Diplomacy Weeks. In Mexico, they were held twice, in 2017 and 2018, and the 2018 Climate Diplomacy Week combined two events: the discussion about global desertification and climate change by EU and Mexican experts as well as a series of seminars

organised and led by the EU Member States diplomatic missions in Mexico (integration between science, education and public policy; climate funding for local governments; the technical aspects of the Emissions Trading System in Mexico). The Climate Diplomacy Week in Indonesia also featured strong cooperation between the EU Delegation and EU Member States Embassies. Among more pointed events, the EU Delegation to Nigeria made renewables a theme of its Europe Day celebration. In 2018, the EU Delegation to the US staged a gallery exhibition showing the impact of climate change on national parks and ran panel discussions on the topic with 192 visitors. The EU Delegation to Russia ran a number of events during the EU Green Week (2019), such as Europe Green Talks and the ECOCUP Green Documentary Film Festival. The latter is an example of a “blending” key themes, the EU Delegation to Russia introduced Russian audiences to the most important non-fiction green films of the decade delivering the message about climate change and environment by means of culture.

A number of individual initiatives also took place in other locations: the EU Delegation to Republic of Korea promotes specific policies, such as the EU Green Deal and the EU-Korea Climate Action project, and in parallel engages broader public and particularly youth through a set of one-off events (Beach Clean Up; Upcycling Maskbook Competition) and social media campaigns (“Be the wave”). Meanwhile, public diplomacy initiatives in other countries are less broad in scope. The EU Delegation to Canada facilitated the EU-Canada Policy Dialogues Support Facility on clean technologies and cooperation in the Arctic. The public diplomacy project in Brazil together with the City of Curitiba, organised seminar on Circular Economy and Low Carbon to exchange practices in the areas of waste management, food waste, sustainable public transport and green financing. Thematic session on plastic pollution took place in New Delhi in 2018. Meanwhile, in Bali the 5th “Our Ocean” conference was organised as part of raising awareness of EU marine environment policies. A Short Story Award Ceremony was held as part of this event praising the top 10 winning stories on the topic of ocean protection. The EU Delegation received a total of 251 short fiction stories of participants between the ages from 6 to 26. The EU Delegation to the US organised the event “IceBox Challenge panel and interactive experience of passive house building standards” (2018) as part of a visibility campaign to promote climate action. EU staff and partner volunteers coordinated by a contractor talked to more than 200 people at an information stand. The event resulted in media coverage in local TV, magazines, blogs and a diplomatic corps newspaper.

#### *“Blending” the key themes, with climate & environment in the centre*

As discussed above, climate and environment themes very often inform the EU public diplomacy initiatives which may have a range of additional topics in focus. For example, addressing the topic of sustainability, the EU Delegation to Brazil organised a public diplomacy initiative on sustainable design featuring the Italian Institute of Design and the Universidade de Brasília intertwining the themes of climate and environment, education and culture. In Canada, the EU Delegation organised high-level events with key partners, such as businesspeople and chief executives, to discuss the trade agreement and the Green Deal. The EU Delegation to Canada also engaged in sectorial dialogues with the agricultural sector to incentivise businesses to decarbonise while still see the opportunities in the EU market. Demonstrating a combination of political and climate themes, the Head of the EU Delegation to Japan produced, together with EU Member States, a joint Op-Ed on the EU’s climate action (as one of the regular joint high-visibility outreach activities by the EU and EU Member States). In Russia, the EUPOP organised Europe Green Talks in cooperation with the Heinrich Böll Foundation and the US Embassy. The initiative included film screenings, lectures by experts and discussions as well as a student competition in total reaching about 4800 participants.

#### *Workshops, roundtables, panels with high-profile multipliers and influencers*

More specific events that target practitioners and experts are also visible. In Mexico, the EU Delegation works with civil society groups aiming to explain the EU’s significant policies, particularly in those areas where there are different perspectives between the EU and the Mexican government, such as the EU Green Deal. In Russia, the EU Delegation organised a high-level climate conference which was

considered successful as it did not deal with a “politicised” topic, thus, bringing opportunities for resolution and cooperation. In Japan, EUPOP organised four events devoted to climate change challenges for Japanese lawmakers: a) study session on EU Climate Action Policy (February 2018); b) policy dialogue on greenhouse gas reductions (January 2019) which also involved a discussion about the challenges and opportunities for the EU and for Japan in transitioning to a low-carbon society; c) study session on the role of cities in tackling climate change (February 2019); d) policy study Session on the state of international climate change negotiations (March 2019) – following the 24<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC (COP24), focusing on the outcomes of COP24 and the remaining work to secure implementation of the Paris Agreement globally.

In some other locations plastic waste and pollution are more visible focus themes in the field of climate and environment. For example, EU Plastic Waste Reduction Workshop (2019) in Hong Kong focused on sharing EU experience in reducing single-use plastic waste. The event gathered almost 100 people from government officials, business and industry leaders, journalists and opinion makers, NGOs, academics, social entrepreneurs and diplomats. In India, the EU Delegation organised a one-off thematic workshop on plastic pollution and climate change.

Since 2015, the EU has increasingly claimed an international leadership position in this issue-area and initiated the Green Deal policy seeking to become the world’s first climate neutral continent. The latest literature on EU external perceptions features positive images of the EU in the field of climate mitigation and environmental protection across all audiences. This emotive profile suggests incredible potential for EU public diplomacy. Yet the visibility of this topic in the published research in the 13 studied countries remains low and has yet to catch up with the EU public diplomacy initiatives in the field and, ultimately, the policies themselves.

#### **4.3.4. Energy**

The 2015 Study stresses that the area of research and innovation is closely connected to energy and climate and the environment (especially in China and India), and the 2021 Study confirms this trend. Interviewees in the 2021 Study stress that many initiatives in the area of RST link specifically to the EU in the area of green energy and climate. In China, the “Europe-China Clean Energy Centre”, established in 2010, offers a holistic approach (technical solutions, policy and regulations) to promote the introduction of clean energy technologies. It additionally supports the energy transition of the Chinese economy. In the Update Study, the EU Delegation to India carries out a number of sectoral projects in various fields, climate change and clean energy being among them. In Nigeria, in 2019, the EU Delegation held thematic events devoted to renewable energy, with a focus on solar energy involving youth and aiming to inform young people in Nigeria about the EU’s innovative know-how in the field of renewable energy as well as leadership in climate mitigation. In Mexico, the EU Delegation seeks to explain the EU’s green energy policies to local authorities. Across a number of locations (China, Colombia, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Republic of Korea), the promotion of the EU Green Deal is a core aspect of local public diplomacy initiatives, where energy appears as part of the “blended” initiatives devoted to the environment and climate change.

#### **4.3.5. Research, science and technology**

The 2015 Baseline Study noted that the issue-area of RST closely links to the development of business relations, but also broadening the key audience groups to academia and research institutions. The Baseline Study also notes that the public diplomacy initiatives in RST are closely related to the theme of energy and the environment, and the 2021 Update corroborates this finding. However, this Study further points to the link between the public diplomacy initiatives in RST and the issue-areas of (green) energy (closely related to climate change mitigation and environment – to be discussed in the relevant section) and education (when research and academic mobility are concerned).



Both the 2015 and 2021 Studies reveal certain continuity in public diplomacy initiatives in the field of RST. Supporting innovation in research and technology is a core goal of the EU's foreign policy (EU Commission COM(2014) 567), and it is carried out through a set of instruments. Among the mechanisms highlighted by 2015 Study are large-scale, international projects and cooperation with EU Member States and partner countries. For example, the Baseline Study mentions the large-scale funding framework *Horizon 2020*, which emphasises the importance of innovation, science and research. Importantly, *Horizon 2020* is referenced by some public diplomacy practitioners in the 2021 Study as a tool of 'enormous outreach' (in Japan – EUJap4). In Colombia, *Horizon 2020*, carried out together with the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, brought together local researchers and European companies. Finally, the EU-Korea Research and Innovation Day, marked by the 2015 Study, continues to be held annually and is one of the key RST initiatives according to local public diplomacy practitioners. This EU Delegation also promotes *EURAXESS Korea* that supports research collaboration and mobility for researchers in Korea with Europe. In Russia, similar initiatives took place in 2019: for example, study visits of young Russian researchers to Belgium and study visits of representatives of the 14 EU information centres in Russia to Brussels – both aiming to develop academic and professional networks of young scientists. The workshops, studies and research activities also took place in Japan.

However, different from the 2015 Study, in other locations, the public diplomacy initiatives in the area of RST appear to have a more "blended" character. For example, in Canada, the EU Delegation facilitated the EU-Canada Policy Dialogues Support Facility on clean technologies and cooperation in the Arctic. The EU Delegation in India supported dialogue on standardisation of information and communication technology with local civil society. Here, the Chennai Press Conference on the EU-India Strategic Partnership (2019) highlighted cooperation on clean energy, research and innovation, education and culture under the EU Strategic Partnership. It also promoted EU projects in this issue-area, such as electric auto-rickshaws and received extremely high visibility in local media (25 print and online publications). In Colombia, a seminar to share EU practices was held in support of a new bill on the modernisation of the information and communication technology sector in 2018. In the US, the EU Delegation participates in the South by South West festival (EU@SXSW). Furthermore, a 2021 online conference promoted the EU's strong collaboration with the US on themes from "digital transformation" to "greening economies". In Mexico, the theme of RST appeared in the context of Climate Diplomacy Week (2018) through the discussion on integration between science, education and public policy and the technical aspects of the Emissions Trading System in Mexico drawing on EU expertise in this field. EUPOP also organised European Science Diplomacy Week in Mexico the same year (2018). Its flagship event was carried out at the Museum of Modern Art in Mexico, reaching 111 participants and focusing on energy, information and communication technology, health and gender equality in research and innovation. In Brazil, the EU Delegation organises information events on different topics. One of such events, "Coffees with Europe", is devoted to different topics such as research and innovation. Finally, in Japan, a series of online webinars have attracted numerous participants. The topics varied, with some of them discussing climate change, energy, and connectivity. The EU Delegation to Japan also initiated a social media campaign on International Women's Day about European female scientists, with Member States contributing to the campaign.

#### 4.3.6. Development and assistance

In 2021, as in the 2015 Baseline Study, development and assistance have very limited visibility as a theme for public diplomacy. One exception is Nigeria where the EU and EU Member States provide assistance – financially and with equipment – in the fight against Covid, with much of it going to rural communities. According to the practitioners, this has resulted in higher visibility, helped to build trust and raised the profile of the EU. The EU was seen to work in sync with the EU Member States in this public diplomacy initiative.



### 4.3.7. Social

EU public diplomacy initiatives collected across all locations, demonstrate that the EU Delegations are aware of the critical importance of addressing social issues, which vary depending on the needs of location in focus. While the 2015 Baseline Study points to some activities of the EU in this field (education and exchange programmes, multisectoral civil society programmes), the 2021 Study reveals that the scale of these initiatives has grown and now includes a range of activities presented below.

#### *Outreach to civil society*

EU public diplomacy initiatives directed at civil society engage representatives from NGOs, academia and think tanks, social and grassroots movement and is similar to the 2015 Study. EU public diplomacy initiatives in this area cover topics ranging from education, development and sustainability of livelihoods to governance, human rights and health. For example, the EU Delegation to Mexico developed an informal Europeistas network of the local academic community specialised in EU affairs that includes 47 participants in Mexico City and Guadalajara. Europeistas training sessions held in 2019 provide an update on the EU institutions and EU affairs, the EU-Mexico relations, and the EU instruments and funding opportunities for academia.

In addition, the 2021 Update Study registers a specific focus on think tank dialogues and initiatives that allow to address both political and social issues. For example, India features a number of public diplomacy initiatives in this field: EU-India Think Tanks Twinning Initiative workshop and public symposium on EU-India relations (2018), the EU-India Think Tanks Annual Conference (2019), and the EU-India Experts' Day and Think Tank Twinning Initiative (2019), which gathered 35 leading scholars and EU officials – all adding towards a discussion as to further support for EU-India relations. The EU-Mexico Think Tank Dialogue Initiative was also carried out throughout 2019-2020 and focused on five key priorities in EU-Mexico relations, such as democracy, trade, migration, security and law, and sustainable development.

Civil society exchanges represent another crucial tool in the EU's outreach to civil society and particularly networking. For example, the "EU Civil Society Exchange, EU Networking Visit" initiative in Republic of Korea (2019) targeted over 80 Korean NGOs working on the rights of women, migrants, disabled people and the LGBTI+ community. Seven of the NGOs nominated "ambassadors" took part in the first exchange event. In South Africa, the dialogue "Discussion on Human Rights and Corruption" (2017) focused on the impact of corruption on human rights, and increased awareness of the need for civil society, business, government and other societal formations to collaborate and work towards a common purpose. EUPOP in Russia ran a two-year initiative on the prevention of domestic violence "Prevention of Domestic Violence Russia", which are mainly educational trips for Russian social workers and NGO employees to the EU (2017-2019) that organised two large conferences in Moscow and two trips for Russian social workers and NGO representatives to Sweden and France.

#### *Inclusive society public diplomacy initiatives*

Individual public diplomacy initiatives that target human rights and inclusive society are some of the widest in thematic scope. The EU Delegation to Nigeria has launched Human Rights Dialogue and a set of events preceding the Human Rights Day. One of the more specifically targeted issues in the area of human rights is the empowerment of women. A number of EU Delegations have engaged in social media campaigns devoted to International Women's Day (Japan, Nigeria, Republic of Korea) and even more in raising awareness of gender-based violence, an issue that has notably increased since the Covid pandemic across multiple locations and as registered by the EU Delegations. This theme in Mexico secured high-level contacts and major media visibility. The EU Delegation to Republic of Korea promoted the "International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women", and one of the biggest thematic events took place in Russia – the conference on "Preventing and Combating Gender Violence" gained attention of 300 participants and enjoyed extensive media coverage with a reach of

50,000 people. A podcast on violence against women that launched as soon as the quarantine took place in Russia and reached millions of people.

The EU public diplomacy initiatives also facilitate programmes for disabled people in Russia (“The Rights and Well-being of People with Disabilities in Russia and the EU”, 2019) and Republic of Korea (Pyonchang Para-Olympics). In Republic of Korea, the work of the EU Delegation with civil society focuses on human rights but thematically prioritises various topics, e.g. rights of elderly people, rights of people with disabilities, discrimination issues, gender equality, etc. Activities in the area of demographics are also part of the EU public diplomacy initiatives in Japan. Finally, the EU Delegation to Russia additionally stresses rights for minorities and children.

The rights of LGBTI+ are also recognised in a number of EU public diplomacy initiatives such as the promotion of IDAHOT (International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia) and LGBTQIA+ Queer Festival (Seoul) in Republic of Korea and the international Conference “LGBTI Rights and Freedom of Religion in Hong Kong S.A.R. and the European Union” (2016) held in Hong Kong. The latter gathered religious leaders, experts, legislators, LGBTI activists and civil society from Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, Taiwan and Hong Kong and included approximately 150 participants including the general public.

In South Africa, a number of public diplomacy initiatives addressed racism and the legacy of apartheid, namely the “EU Inspiring Thinkers Series, Racism: A Threat to Democratic Societies” (2017). Approximately 128 people participated in the activities. It was effectively promoted in social media as well as traditional media.

### *Education*

The Baseline 2015 Study observes large-scale education programmes that take place across EU strategic partners and beyond. One strongly promoted policy is the *Erasmus+* programme that strengthen the visibility of the EU through education and training. The visibility of this programme in EU public diplomacy initiatives remains strong in the 2021 Update Study. Education public diplomacy initiatives are firmly among the flagship public diplomacy initiatives. The Erasmus grantees, the Marie Curie grantees are ‘considered to be the main possible potential multipliers’ of EU messages (EUInd1). EU public diplomacy has been invested in several key initiatives: outreach to tertiary (and increasingly secondary) students and a range of activities in the Erasmus+ related sphere including outreach in the Jean Monnet Programme networks.

According to the academic literature, images of the EU as an actor in the education sphere attract positive evaluations, indicating a high potential resonance for EU public diplomacy initiatives in this issue-area. However, the EU’s visibility in this issue-areas in terms of perceptions appears to be low.

#### *a) Outreach to students*

EU public diplomacy initiatives facilitate events with students (typically tertiary-level, but increasingly secondary-level) both as part of roadshows and other large-scale events as well as more specific events held at universities. Among the latter, Model EU and Council simulations remain popular. In 2019, this type of events gathered 60 students from 17 universities in Brazil, 250 participants in Republic of Korea and 200 students in Colombia. “EU Goes To School” is run in Republic of Korea and the US and focuses specifically on school students. Other events include public diplomacy Week (Republic of Korea), a series of EU Days in various universities and cities (India), “Creating the Next Generation of Transatlanticists” (US), EU Study Week (Russia), youth engagement and education around elections (Nigeria).

Among some of the most effective in terms of student outreach public diplomacy initiatives are education fairs (India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea). In 2018, the European Higher Education Fair in Indonesia attracted 19,000 visitors and enjoyed considerable media coverage (45 articles with an estimated collective circulation of 35 million). In India, the European Higher Education Virtual Fair was

extremely popular. It featured 21 EU Member States (Germany and the Czech Republic being the most active ones) with 55 EHEIs (European Higher Education Institutions). In total 54,219 Indian students registered for the Virtual Fair in India. Due to Covid, the Fair has moved online, and its virtual format allows for a wider geographical scope of this public diplomacy initiative in large Indian cities.

*b) Webinars, trainings and public lectures*

Digitalisation as part of post-Covid reality has been prominent in other public diplomacy initiatives that try to engage students and academia. For example, the EU Delegation to Japan runs webinars linking to the “European Specialist” Network in Strategic States (2019) with a focus on academia and students. The EU Delegation to Mexico also held Diplomatic Training on EU Affairs and EU Diplomacy in 2018 providing Mexican experts in EU affairs (Europeists) with a deeper understanding of the EU foreign policy and interests, EU institutions and policies. Finally, the 2019 EU Public Lectures series in China featured 10 prominent European speakers to deliver lectures on topics related to the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation at 5 Chinese universities. Between 30 and 150 students per session attended the lectures and engaged in discussions.

*c) Erasmus “Universe”*

The Erasmus+ programme for university students is visible in a number of countries in the focus of the 2021 Study. For example, prior to the Covid pandemic, the EU Delegation to India and Nigeria ran pre-departure orientation events for Erasmus exchange students and a series of webinars (“Connecting Erasmus”) was held in Mexico. It reached a total of 262 participants, both members and non-members of the Erasmus Mundus Association in Mexico.

Erasmus+ alumni are in focus of public diplomacy initiatives in Colombia and Mexico. In Colombia, the EU Delegation hosts “Instagram Live” with the Head of Delegation, ministers, cultural influencers, academics and beneficiaries of the Erasmus scholarship talking about academic and cultural cooperation. In Mexico, the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Erasmus Programme has been celebrated with Erasmus alumni through Erasmus Talks, Euro Posgrados in Puebla, and the Erasmus Forum. A series of webinars “Conectando con la Unión Europea” was also set up in 2019 and is still running targeting Erasmus Alumni in Mexico. public diplomacy activities in education have helped create the Erasmus alumni network in Mexico and expand the contact with universities through academic events and EU student simulations.

Erasmus+ outreach is often complemented by other thematically-related initiatives. In Russia, education-oriented public diplomacy initiatives within Erasmus+ are complemented by the activities of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC); EU info-centres and the EUREN network that brings together EU and Russian academic experts. In the US, Schuman-Fulbright Fellowships are visible.

*d) Jean Monnet networks*

Within Erasmus+, a special place belongs to the Jean Monnet programme that support academics and scholars who focus their research and teaching on the EU. The Jean Monnet support recipients form a valuable resource for EU public diplomacy initiatives both for individuals and various networks. Their value for EU public diplomacy initiatives was noted in Brazil, Colombia, Canada, the US, Republic of Korea. In 2019, EUPOP in Brazil organised a series of activities in support of the Jean Monnet Programme, as part of the Programme’s 30th anniversary celebrations.

***Media and information***

The Baseline 2015 Study does not single out this rubric for EU Delegations in the public diplomacy field. However, the Update Study observes that several locations have public diplomacy initiatives in this sphere, often drawing on digital tools. The websites of the EU Delegations now frequently include Member States messages multiplying the channels to “communicate Europe” and demonstrate synergies to local audiences. For example, the EU POP initiative in Japan, “Cooking with EU GI

Products” video series, was designed for distribution on social media channels, and for use on display monitors at events such as conferences and expos.

Social media events have also become a prominent feature of the more recent public diplomacy initiatives, particularly in light of the pandemic – for example, in celebration of the Europe Day/Month. EU Film Festivals now run online increasing the outreach to local audiences (e.g. Brazil, Canada, Russia, etc.). The same pertains to events linked to the issue of environmental protection. Thus, the EU Delegation to Brazil ran social media campaigns on green recovery, green economy and green capitals; EUPOP in Brazil also organised a dedicated social media campaign (2019) in support of the Jean Monnet Programme. In Colombia, the online format of Europe Day came with a focus on the Green Deal. In Nigeria, the EU Delegation organised a Climate Diplomacy message for Europe Day on YouTube. In Mexico, a 10-day long digital campaign on the European Science Diplomacy Week reached over 400,000 people on Facebook and Twitter. The “IceBox” Challenge panel and interactive experience of passive house building standards” (2018) held by the EU Delegation to the US earned media coverage in local TV, magazines, blogs and the diplomatic corps newspaper with 685,000 views on social media and 1,708 unique visits.

Apart from the “digitalisation” of EU public diplomacy initiatives, a distinct segment is new in contrast to the Baseline Study, namely an emphasis on (mis)information, media and training for journalists. These events represent another group of “blended” initiatives. For example, in Indonesia, a seminar on “Tackling Hate Speech and Fake News” engaged media and policy practitioners informing them about the EU policies in the field. In addition, University Communication weeks were held in Indonesia the same year engaging 520 students in discussions on the EU and disinformation, EU Guidelines of Freedom of Expression and European restrictions on the propaganda for war and hate speech. The EU Delegation to India also organised roundtables with the media in different regions as part of the EU days in Indian universities.

EU public diplomacy initiatives in Russia notably include large conferences with EU and Russian journalists and media professionals, individual trips for Russian journalists, an alumni network of young Russian journalists invited to events, and Summer Schools for Young Russian Journalists. To date, EUPOP has supported the participation of Russian journalists (approximately 12 in each) in three summer schools and two trips to the EU (France, Greece, Italy, Ireland). In Mexico, an EU Training was organised for 16 junior journalists with the aim to promote the EU’s media coverage. Among the themes in focus were the role of the EU in the international context, internal EU challenges (populism, migration and Brexit), how to tackle disinformation, communication tools for the EU institutions and the EU-Mexico relations.

#### **4.3.8. Culture**

The 2015 Baseline Study points to cultural diplomacy as a core part in EU public diplomacy, citing the resolution of the Council of the EU in 2007 on a European Agenda for Culture (Official Journal of the European Union (2007/C 287/01)) and by the European Parliament in 2011 on the cultural dimensions of the EU external action, calling for the development of a visible common EU strategy on culture in external relations (European Parliament (2010/ 2161(INI)). International networks, such as the European Expert Network on Culture, involved in all partner countries and beyond, as well as events organised by the EU Delegations often in cooperation with the Member States, aim to meet the requirement of an intensified use and display of culture to connect with the publics abroad, for example through the “More Europe” initiative, which connects Member State governments, civil society actors and EU institutions to support and reinforce the role of culture in EU external relations. A new development over the last five years has been to include the culture theme into comprehensive multifaceted EU public diplomacy initiatives (similar to the climate/environment theme). For example, as discussed above, roadshows in addition to political, economy and trades themes, typically feature cultural events and actors, often organised by the EU Member States.

Some Delegation-specific events link to the collaborative approach in building cultural networks, such as the Festival of Europe (Europe Day), which some Delegations prolong into “European Month”. The festival usually presents music, art exhibitions, film screening and lectures to evoke interest in the EU and Europe. For example, the EU Delegation to the US holds the EU Film Showcase as part of the “European Month of Culture”, while “Europe Month” in Indonesia included an exhibition showcasing European Islamic art and a respective discussion with 59 Indonesian students. In Colombia, Europe Day came with a focus on the Green Deal, with 2,000 people joining the celebration, which featured a clean energy fair, a street art contest, music and DJ with solar panels, cycling to create energy, debates on biodiversity, climate change and the promotion of sustainable development, EU cooperation projects on peace.

Cultural events in general are broad in scope and deemed attractive to the public. European bazaars, where EU Member States promoted culture and food are popular in Brazil. The EU-China International Literary Festival is a flagship initiative that was held annually between 2017 and 2020 and featured more than 160 authors from the EU and China in six Chinese cities. In 2017, 7,000 people joined the event with another 400,000 viewers following it online. Europe Street Event Outside is another EU flagship event held in China. Europe was also selected as a focus region for the 2018 Performing Arts Market in Seoul. This event attracted about 2,500 participants promoting Europe’s cultural diversity and creativity to the public and the professionals in the performing arts sectors in Republic of Korea. Film Festivals are also a popular tool of public diplomacy initiatives, particularly, in Russia and Republic of Korea. The EU Film Festival in Republic of Korea was co-hosted by the EU Delegation and the Korean Film Archive (KOFA) in 2018. Some others include EUNIC Film Festival and the EU networking event at the Busan Film Festival. Film Festivals in Russia are also organised across various regional centres, increasing the EU Delegation’s regional outreach. Virtual Museum Tour in China and the Young Talent Architecture Award in Republic of Korea are other examples of public diplomacy in the cultural field.

In Russia specifically, a lot of public diplomacy initiatives focus on culture and historical memory and have a broader scope, targeting audiences beyond the capital and major cities. In 2019, a large cultural project – the International Mobile Symposium “Nemoskva” – was carried out in 12 Russian cities on the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway Network and were attended by 1,400 participants. The event represented a set of lectures by leading specialists from the EU in the fields of humanities and art who informed audiences on the development of modern culture. A series of public lectures on historical memory “Over the barriers” connected public intellectuals from different EU countries in partnership with Russia’s oldest human rights NGO “International Memorial”. The series has been running successfully since 2017, with 6 speakers visiting every year and participating with two or more events in Moscow and more than 10 other Russian cities, reaching approximately 740 participants. The same collaboration allowed to organise study visits of Russian history teachers to Germany and Poland in 2018-2019. Exchanges were also featured in Canada, where the “Frenergy Tour” brought together the EU Youth Orchestra and the National Youth Orchestra of Canada for a series of concerts. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, these events did not take place in a face-to-face mode in most locations and most of the cultural initiatives were moved to distant and blended regimes.

#### **4.3.9. Health**

The Covid pandemic has created a new distinct issue-area for EU public diplomacy initiatives absent in the 2015 Baseline Study – however, with yet limited reflections. For example, the EU support for Nigeria has further created the opportunity for an increased EU visibility through the “Team Europe” approach across audiences and regions. Thematically, EU activities through COVAX facility is something that most of EU public diplomacy practitioners claim should be emphasised, especially in locations where such EU initiatives remain practically invisible to local audiences (China). Meanwhile, in other locations the pandemic has caused divided views. It is seen as a strong obstacle for people-to-



people contacts and, thus, a crucially negative factor for EU public diplomacy initiatives (China). Alternatively, it has brought new channels of communication, which were emphasised primarily due to Covid restrictions.

The perceptions literature features limited reflections on the image of the EU at times of Covid. These early reflections capture a rather negative image of the EU. Future research and future public diplomacy initiatives will have to assess the impact of the EU's handling of the pandemic inside Europe and internationally to the image of the EU and factor it into future public diplomacy initiatives.

## Summary and comparisons: main themes and trends across research and initiatives

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When contrasting literature and public diplomacy initiatives thematic foci, the main difference pertains to those perceptions of the EU as defined in academic research are location-driven even in the contexts that concern EU-specific factors. EU public diplomacy initiatives have to tackle this aspect in their activities while promoting an EU-specific agenda. Analysis of the relevant literature and EU public diplomacy initiatives reveals that economy remains an important theme across research of perceptions both in the 2015 and 2021 Studies. However, when it comes to the public diplomacy initiatives, in contrast to the 2015 Baseline Study, the economy, while very important, is not the only priority in a number of locations. The political theme for the public diplomacy initiatives is more prominent than in 2015, closely followed by the themes of climate and environment, social issues in the context of inclusive society, education, and then culture. Perhaps the most pronounced change observed over time is a distinct priority assigned to the public diplomacy initiatives with a focus on climate/environment/green technologies following the EU Green Deal policy and reflecting on consistent projections of the EU as a leader in climate mitigation and environmental protection in the international arena. Another change concerns the growing focus on (social) media in both literature review and the review of public diplomacy initiatives. "Blending" the key themes (for example, economy, political, climate/environment and social affairs) within public diplomacy initiatives correlates with the literature which often considers interactions between the key themes.

### 5.1. Economy and trade

Economy has been one of the leading themes across research into the perceptions of the publics as well as decision-makers in all strategic partner countries both in the 2015 and 2021 Studies. The relevant literature portrays the EU as international economic power. Perceptions of the EU in this issue-area are often shaped by the pace of negotiation of bilateral and/or multilateral trade agreements – public diplomacy initiatives reflect on these trends. The 2021 Study even reveals a more focused approach by the EU Delegations in tackling specific issues in trade negotiations (such as geographical indications). Economic cooperation with the EU remains a priority for all locations in focus, and expectations of its benefits drive perceptions of the EU in these countries. Here, a crucial task for the EU public diplomacy is to meet local expectations and address potentially controversial issues when trade deals may be seen by local decision-makers to disadvantage locations in question.



## 5.2. Politics

Literature reviews of both 2015 and 2021 Studies demonstrate that the perceptions of the EU as an important political actor vary among its partner countries. The 2021 Study further points to certain dynamics in how politics and economy overlap in shaping the EU's external image. Thus, the EU's economic power may be accounted for either as an advantage for perceptions of the EU in the political field (the EU's is an important international actor) or a disadvantage (the EU is an economic power but not a political one). The analysis of public diplomacy initiatives also proves that politics and economy are often combined in bilateral negotiations and particularly in the context of strategic partnerships. As such, politics-related public diplomacy initiatives seek to also improve bilateral cooperation in other issue-areas – particularly, economy and social affairs, both being incredibly tightly linked to the EU's normative promotion whether these are trade regulations or EU values such as human right, democracy or freedom of expression. Furthermore, the 2021 Study reveals that the focus of EU public diplomacy initiatives in the political issue-area attempts to “translate” EU norms and policies to local needs of the partner countries while simultaneously promoting its own agenda (a flagship policy of the 2021 review is the EU Green Deal). This refers both to the choice of specific thematic fields for “blended” events or a more strategic outlook on bilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, the political theme remains the key area, where differences in values and political stances between the EU and its partner countries are most visible. Hence, this theme requires more effort from the EU public diplomacy as a whole. Noteworthy, the relevant literature has also picked up a more pronounced perception of the EU as a political actor in many locations in this Study over the last five years.

## 5.3. Climate and environment

The literature between 2015 and 2021 shows that the EU is generally positively perceived with regard to its actorness in climate change policy and environmental initiatives which is also reflected in the growing number of public diplomacy initiatives within this theme. However, research in this area remains limited. The EU's international leadership in this field has increased in the last five years – specifically in the context of the EU Green Deal as well as the EU's commitment to the Paris Agreement (in contrast to the US under the Trump's Administration). For the EU public diplomacy, environment and climate are recognised as major themes with the EEAS promoting the EU Climate Diplomacy, but also in conjunction with other themes (economy, politics, social issues, RST, energy). Climate change is expected to become an even more relevant focus area for events and public diplomacy initiatives among EU Delegations across key partners with significant potential for future collaboration.

## 5.4. Energy

EU energy policies do not catch much attention in research on external perceptions in the past, but the Literature Review 2021 sees a slight increase in the last five years owing to the dedicated projects in the field. The EU's greater emphasis on energy cooperation means that programmes and initiatives between the EU and its strategic partners are now growing in the field of energy policy, in contrast to the 2015 Study. They include public diplomacy initiatives projecting the EU's key message of “going green”. Such public diplomacy initiatives are received positively in many locations.

## 5.5. Research, science and technology

In both 2015 and 2021 Studies, RST is seen by the literature as an area where perceptions of the EU are primarily positive but where its visibility remains low. In comparison to the 2015 review of public

diplomacy initiatives, their number and scope in the 2021 Study have increased significantly – in part due to their connection to themes such as the climate change/ environment, energy, research cooperation and scientific exchange. RST is also linked to strategic priorities, such as connectivity, thus, reflecting on the findings of the 2015 literature review, which points to a growing interest in the EU's transfer of green technologies and research expertise in those locations that are interested in connectivity (India, Japan, Indonesia).

## 5.6. Development and assistance

The perceptions of the EU's development policies and actions in the 13 countries are rarely featured in literature both in the 2015 and 2021 Studies. This mirrors public diplomacy efforts, which rarely have a developmental agenda. One distinct exception in the 2021 Study is Nigeria, where EU public diplomacy initiatives are informed by development and humanitarian themes, and specifically in the context of assisting in fighting Covid and fighting sexual and gender-based violence.

## 5.7. Social

Social issues are one of more visible profiles of the EU tracked by the relevant literature on EU perceptions 2015-2021. Important in this context is that the EU's multiple crises have led to somewhat mixed perceptions of the EU in this issue-area (particularly with the migration crisis). At the same time, EU public diplomacy initiatives in this area are even more prominent in the 2021 Study compared to 2015. Initiatives are linked specifically to the themes of an inclusive society (gender equality, minority rights, racism, protection of the vulnerable members of the society), and in contrast to perception studies that remain very limited in the context of social issues and inclusive society. EU Delegations to Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia and South Africa have a range of public diplomacy initiatives in this thematic area. Moreover, these public diplomacy initiatives often engage local civil society organisations (particularly in the field of human rights and media freedom).

Within the social theme, education occupies a distinct position as one of the leading inputs into public diplomacy initiatives across all locations (except for Japan). While very popular for public diplomacy initiatives, this issue-area has received minimal attention in the studies of perceptions as documented by the Literature Review.

## 5.8. Culture

Literature in the 2015 Study pointed to diverse perceptions of the EU in the field of culture, predisposed by attitudes to the EU and Europe as a whole. The findings of the Update Study confirm this observation. Culture drives perceptions of the EU as Europe in historical terms, which may lead to negative connotations associated with colonialism (Indonesia, South Africa). However, in this issue-area, EU public diplomacy initiatives focus largely on the positive side of the continuum. Cultural activities are at the heart of many outreach programmes such as Europe Day celebrations, EU Film Festivals or food fairs. They are often carried out in close collaboration with EU Member States pointing to their strong synergy and receive positive feedback. Overall, perceptions of the EU in this issue-area are neutral to positive. Further, in some locations the EU's cultural diplomacy is seen as an important (India) or even the only way to engage local audiences "safely" (Russia).

## 5.9. Health

Health is a new theme in 2021 in response to the Covid pandemic. While perceptions research has only started to look into this topic (through public opinion polls particularly in Japan and Republic of Korea), EU Delegations across all locations already had to react to this development. While the pandemic has largely affected the mode and the scope of EU public outreach, in some locations, informing local audiences about Covid or assistance with the handling of the pandemic has become one of the initiatives that increased the EU's visibility (Japan, Nigeria).

## Summary and comparisons: key audiences

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This section identifies and compares the most relevant and most receptive key audiences and key audiences across the key global partner countries along a pre-identified list of groups – business, policy-makers, media, civil society, university (academia) and think tanks, young people and the general public among in the literature and in the eyes of EU public diplomacy practitioners. The list of key audiences remains the same as in the Baseline Study, and the findings of this Literature Review and public diplomacy initiatives resonate with those of the 2015 Baseline Study.

In the 2021 Literature Review, government and businesses are the key audiences. They are referenced as highly aware of EU policies given their continuous engagement in bilateral political dialogues and trade negotiations. Depending on the location, academia, think tanks and the general public are among the next research priorities, but these groups differ in the degrees of their engagement with the EU. While the relevant literature depicts academia and think tanks as highly aware of/engaged with the EU in the areas of their expertise, youth and, with few exceptions, civil society (Mexico) remain generally underrepresented. Finally, the general public is unanimously deemed to have low awareness of the EU across all locations. Even in cases where the general public reveals positive attitudes towards the EU, relevant literature still references low awareness of and sometimes indifference towards the EU (e.g. Canada, the US, Japan). And while views of the EU have become more negative since 2013 in countries such as Brazil, Russia and Indonesia, this may 'be the result of more people declining to offer *any* opinion about the EU, rather than increasing negative views' (Devlin, 2019, italics in original).

The degree of awareness appears to affect perceptions among various audiences in different ways. While a higher level of awareness of the EU tends to lead to more positive perceptions among civil society and broader public, the same does not pertain to business leaders and policy-makers. In contrast, several countries (the US, Canada, Indonesia) reveal domestic fragmentation over the perceptions of the EU among highly informed audiences. The fields of expertise, personal experiences, interests and ideas/ideologies shared with the EU (for example, on human rights or climate/environmental issues) remain the key factors behind more positive attitudes towards the EU at the individual level (Canada, Japan, Mexico).

For the public diplomacy initiatives, key audiences correspond with the theme of the event. Similar to the 2015 Baseline Study, the 2021 analysis shows that some policy fields enjoy more public engagement, while in other areas the EU needs to pursue selected policy- and decision-makers (security, politics, economy). High-level meetings remain outside the "blending" practice, and EU Delegations are in the search for a balance between prioritising "core" audiences (think tanks, education, media, diplomats, civil society leaders, university students) and addressing a broader public. Approaching both leads to a question of available resources and, accordingly, priorities. Other balances to consider are audiences that are aware of the EU vs. those who are non-aware, as well as positive, supportive or like-minded vs. sceptical, hostile or adversarial. Outreach strategies and communication tools will depend among other things on the type of the key audience that they seek to address.

Across the EU Delegations, students, civil society, and public at large, occupy an increasingly prominent place in the public diplomacy initiatives. These key audiences have moved increasingly to the centre since 2015.

## 6.1. Business

The literature references businesspeople primarily (if not solely) in the context of trade relations between the EU and its strategic partners. Positive views among the audience refer to the conclusion of regional and bi-, tri- and multilateral trade agreements (Brazil, Indonesia) with a positive outlook on facilitated cooperation in the trade and investment sector (Mexico). Interest in economic cooperation corresponds with hopes of the EU's continuous support of liberal trade policies notwithstanding Brexit (Brazil) and the Covid-19 pandemic (Japan). The most invested and informed audiences are private organisations and companies, who are directly involved in trade relations with the EU (Colombia, Japan) or EU-led economic initiatives (India).

In some locations, business communities indicate mixed attitudes (Canada, South Africa) although these can improve through time, for example, when Partnership Agreements have proven themselves (Japan). Among those actors and institutions that are stated in the literature are chambers of commerce, business and industry associations and unions, trade organisations and specialised producer unions. Notably, literature in China and Russia overlooks attitudes among local business-makers despite a pronounced local interest in economic cooperation with the EU.

For public diplomacy initiatives, the 2015 Study finds the business community to be among the most relevant audience for public diplomacy initiatives. Public diplomacy initiatives in Canada, Japan, Mexico and Brazil continue to assign major importance to this key cohort, correlating with the choice priority themes and Literature Review findings. Importantly, all EU Delegations engage with established and upcoming business elites to strengthen economic ties and seeking to secure investments. However, the Update Study shows that this cohort is still important in the bigger "architecture" of public diplomacy in each location, despite increasingly sharing the central position for public diplomacy initiatives in all EU Delegations with other key cohorts.

## 6.2. Policy- and decision-makers

In the literature review, policy- and decision-makers (parliamentarians, diplomats and representatives of various ministries and political parties) reveal a range of perceptions towards the EU with a strong emphasis on the domestic contexts and priorities behind their bilateral cooperation. The literature points to high awareness of the EU and a positive attitude towards it among policy-makers in Colombia, India and Mexico. Meanwhile, some countries, such as the US and Canada, reveal fragmentation and/or polarisation along political lines. Attitudes among their decision-makers have changed with respective administrations (Brazil, the US). In Indonesia, policy-makers adopt a more assertive stance in economic negotiations with the EU with a more negative attitude towards the implementation of EU norms in the environment and on palm oil exports. In Russia, negative attitudes towards the EU among Russian officials are driven by the perceived lack of respect and equal treatment by the EU.

In the public diplomacy initiatives, policy-makers from national and local government-levels are addressed through traditional diplomatic tools such as "Track I" government consultations or political leader summits. The 2015 Baseline Study finds that EU public diplomacy in this issue-area provides additional tools to create an atmosphere increasingly receptive to the EU and its policies among policy-makers, for example through roundtables and conferences. Different from the Baseline Study, the 2021 Update Study reveals that EU Delegations in all locations have intensified their public diplomacy

initiatives with this cohort, putting a new emphasis on engaging with regional and local political figures, in addition to national-level policy-makers. More efforts also engage with the young generation of political leaders (e.g. with young diplomats, see section on youth below).

A reinforced focus on policy-making cohort correlates with the Literature Review findings which demonstrates how perceptions of the EU as a political actor have become more prominent in the last five years, often triggered by location-specific factors, especially in locations such as Brazil, Canada, Russia and the US.

### 6.3. Media

For perceptions literature, media is a popular topic, while representatives of media as an audience are believed to have medium (India, Indonesia) to high (Colombia, Mexico) levels of awareness of the EU with a potential for promoting EU discourses (Indonesia). While in some locations, the EU receives only basic coverage (Brazil, Canada) with a positive framing of its actions in limited areas (for example energy in Brazil), in others, EU news largely concern “popular” topics which are easier to “sell” to audiences, such as the EU’s multiple crises (e.g. Republic of Korea). In such instances, reports on the EU increase its visibility and the negative projection of images but they do not necessarily translate into an increase of negative perceptions (e.g. predominantly neutral coverage of the EU crises in Republic of Korea).

For public diplomacy in all locations, media – traditional and social – are important distributors of the information about the EU as well as messages by the EU Delegations to explain the EU to the general public. However, outreach to media depends on the interests of media professionals in EU topics and policies, which varies dramatically across the 13 countries and across outlets within 13 countries. The 2015 Study finds a limited range of public diplomacy initiatives directed at media professionals with, for example, only few exchange programmes for journalists to increase knowledge of and sensitivity to EU topics (see Canada and Japan). The 2021 Update Study finds instead that all EU Delegations now assign importance to the outreach to media professionals. There is a growing focus on working with social media influencers (see Canada, Republic of Korea, China). Further innovations include public diplomacy initiatives that reach out to traditional regional media, in addition to national-level media (India) and working with young media professionals (Brazil, Japan, Russia, Indonesia). Outreach to media also include a focus on disseminating strong normative messages (Colombia, Russia).

The Update Study Literature Review finds that social media influencers are rarely explicitly studied, despite EU Delegations acknowledge their role in shaping opinion on current and future politics. Media and social media are increasingly “weaved” in the structure of EU public diplomacy initiatives in all locations, in part driven by the pandemic, by their public outreach in general and the possibility of increase geographical outreach.

### 6.4. Civil society

The Literature Review offers a spectrum of EU perceptions among civil society which vary across locations from being invisible in the existing studies (Canada) to prominent in specific sectors (energy in Brazil, the death penalty in Japan). However, their perception appears to depend on the information available on the EU within the subgroups. Relevant literature reports an average awareness among civil society (India, Colombia) vis-à-vis visible support of European norms and cooperation with the EU (Mexico). Literature in Nigeria suggests that an increasing inclusion of grassroots and civil society organisation could be an important means for further cooperation, whereas literature in Indonesia argues for the inclusion of people-to-people contacts in building trust between the EU and Indonesia.



For EU public diplomacy, the work with civil society is more complex because of the broad diversity of this group. This challenge remains similar in comparison to the 2015 Baseline Study. Another similar feature is continuous engagement in social (education) and cultural themes. However, the 2021 Study reveals a more focused approach in the choice of the audiences and themes. The selection of civil society actors for public diplomacy initiatives depends on the messages that the EU wants to promote and is based on the local context and the specific area of engagement of civil society actors and organisations. As of 2021, the EU Delegations continue to approach theme-oriented networks of civil actors for this purpose (Brazil on EU-MERCOSUR; Russia on gender, culture, human rights and media; Canada on culture; Nigeria on gender-based violence). Further, the EU Delegations in Canada and the US engage in transatlantic civil society dialogues – a practice which may well serve as a future-oriented means to create a global dialogue between different stakeholders within the civil society space. In India, however, the focus on civil society in public diplomacy activities has shifted away, with The Directorate-General for International Partnerships stepping in more actively into this area of outreach.

In summary, the 2021 Study finds that the attention of the literature towards the perceptions of the EU among civil society does not match the EU Delegations' broad engagement of this audience.

## 6.5. University and think tanks

In the literature, members of academia are deemed to be highly informed about the EU and its policies, not least because of the nature of their work. Many of them are receivers of EU public diplomacy in education programmes (e.g. through Erasmus+, Jean Monnet, Horizon 2020, etc.) as well as of similar EU Member States public diplomacy programmes. The Literature Review observes contributors and institutions in the field of EU politics and international relations to be highly aware of the EU (Republic of Korea, India), share EU values or observe the impact of EU actions in the country, while being positively inclined towards the EU (Colombia, Japan). Russia is an exception as Russian domestic experts, albeit highly aware of the EU, are critical of the EU's approach towards Russia, even though they see potential for the improvement in EU-Russia relations. Another exception concerns Indonesia, where low awareness of EU policies appears in the context of environmental governance, and Canada, where think tanks remain on the periphery of academic attention in the field.

Consistent over time, universities and think tanks are often main partners in outreach activities of the EU Delegations – these cohorts have a great number of like-minded and supportive partners, especially those who have benefitted from the Jean Monnet programme or other support or exchange schemes with the EU and EU Member States. These two cohorts can be active promoters of EU and Europe-related cultural activities and are more inclined to communicate political messages and social agendas of the EU to broader publics, including their students. Work with alumni of these programmes is increasingly a feature in the public diplomacy initiatives in different countries in the 2021 Study.

In contrast to the 2015 Study, the Update Study 2021 highlights that the relevant literature is now more active in researching EU perceptions among academics and think tanks although not to the extent they are present in EU public diplomacy initiatives.

## 6.6. Young people

Similarly, to the 2015 Baseline Study, young people remain understudied in 2021. In those cases when they are, different attitudes are being registered. Surveys in Japan and Mexico reveal more positive attitudes towards the EU among youth in comparison to other age groups but do not explain the reasons behind this difference. In other locations, young people either have low awareness of EU actions (Colombia) or the studies on youth are lacking in general (Mexico, Canada). Finally, research into youth attitudes in Russia reveals mixed understanding of EU values, while, in South Africa, youth



protest movements are argued to be indicative of a shifting balance between “Global North” and “Global South” and as such reflective of an evolving perception of the EU among the next generation of South Africa citizens.

In terms of public diplomacy initiatives, the 2021 Update Study identifies that apart from reaching out to university students there is a growing focus on high school students and in some cases even pre-school children (US) (although some EU Delegations find it more difficult to reach youth below 18). Another difference with the 2015 Study is a more pronounced focus on reaching professional youth, including young diplomats (India, Colombia) in Delegation-facilitated sessions at national diplomatic academies; future journalists (Brazil, Mexico, Japan); and the younger civil society (Canada). The possibility of outreach activities – especially with diplomatic academies – rests in part on the political contingencies of each location. However, and a more hostile government in terms of its perception of the EU (Brazil) will make it more difficult to directly access future decision- and policy-makers, especially in the future civil service.

In Summary, future policy- and decision-makers across all partner countries are in focus of EU public diplomacy initiatives, while youth remaining generally overlooked by the relevant perception literature.

## 6.7. The general public

The overall lack of awareness of the EU among the general public is a key trend captured by the literature across many locations. The overall lack of awareness is also connected to an increasing lack of interest (in Brazil – see Pew Research Center (Devlin, 2019)), ambivalent perceptions (equal distribution of attitudes between positive and negative as in Russia) or lack of clarity on attitudes (Mexico, Nigeria). Here, Canada stands out because Canadians seem to have replaced the perceived indifference towards the EU (Rayroux, 2018) by more supportive views in light of Brexit and Trump (Nanos & Carleton University, 2019). In Japan and Republic of Korea, the most recent Covid-19 events have challenged the general public’s image of the EU, with the surveys registering a sharp decline in positive views of the EU and a rise in negative perceptions; yet this impact is still to be confirmed.

The EU Delegations mirror the literature. Similar to the findings of the 2015 Study, they share the concern of low levels of awareness about the EU among the general public and sometimes the lack of interest towards the EU (e.g. in Republic of Korea). Traditionally, cultural diplomacy initiatives have been in place to reach to the wider public. With many of these public diplomacy initiatives shifting to online platforms, the engagement with and impact on the general public will need future reflections. Apart from cultural events, the 2021 Study registers public diplomacy initiatives with clear thematic priorities that correspond with local needs, e.g. in Nigeria on gender-based and election-specific violence; in Mexico and the US on marginalised groups, minorities and women. To increase the public interest in the EU, the EU Delegation to Colombia engages with Goodwill Ambassadors as an activity cutting across the themes linking to audiences on the themes and building on personal experiences with Europe.

## Main obstacles

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This report identifies main obstacles to the EU’s effort to communicate its policies through the public diplomacy initiatives (as identified by the EU public diplomacy practitioners). The findings of the 2021 Study encompass similar categories to the 2015 Baseline Study: institutional obstacles; perceived lack of information, deficit of effectiveness and different degree of “like-mindedness” of strategic partners.

While the categories are the same, the 2021 Study finds updates to the topics that constitute these categories. Moreover, the 2021 Update Study presents a new obstacle for EU public diplomacy, namely the Covid pandemic and related to it an unprecedented challenge of curtailed of human contacts – a backbone of public diplomacy. Below are the key perceived obstacles to a successful implementation of EU public diplomacy initiatives across the partner countries – as drawn from the interviews with EU public diplomacy practitioners in these locations.

### 7.1. Perception of institutional issues: external and internal communication, capacities

Below are the findings of the Update Study as compared to the challenges from the 2015 Study:

a) the missing “grand strategy” of what the EU wants to communicate precisely to its Strategic Partners – remains partially.

EU public diplomacy practitioners refer frequently to the existing communication strategy resulting from new public diplomacy programming and its priorities formulated by Brussels as a crucial instrument of *what* the EU want to communicate. However, what the EU wants to communicate *to its key partners* remains less clear. Communication strategy represents a helpful guidance for public diplomacy practitioners, but ensuring its successful implementation on the ground faces challenges (obstacle c).

b) the ‘expectation – capability gap’ of how the EU perceives itself and how it is seen from outside – not detected.

Despite the fact that the most recent research into perceptions of the EU points to problematic mismatches between the EU’s self-visions in its public diplomacy vis-à-vis external perceptions of the EU as a public diplomacy actor (Chaban & Elgström 2020; 2021a;b), this issue escapes reflections from EU public diplomacy practitioners. Meanwhile, the literature on EU external perceptions has only limited research into the comparison between EU self-visions vs. its external perceptions.

c) internal communication among the EU institutions in foreign policy is not perceived to be efficient, effectively coordinated or having a strong leadership – remains partially. New obstacle.

The Update Study does not confirm this as a persisting obstacle. On the contrary, the efforts of the headquarters in this area are acknowledged and appreciated (e.g., 24/7 headquarters support in case the EU Delegation to China). The challenge is that it is difficult for EU Delegations to swiftly adapt/adjust communication on the ground. This problem is especially pertinent at times of highly emotive or significant events that increase the EU’s visibility (the Eurozone debt crisis, Brexit, Covid) overlapping with the challenge below.

**New obstacle** – a reactive rather than proactive position in EU external communication.

d) decentralisation of foreign policy making as a complication to the establishment of a clear strategy – not detected.

The 2021 Study points to a collaborative dynamic, with EU Delegation staff members increasingly collaborating in the public diplomacy initiatives and communication campaigns crossing institutional boundaries within the EU Delegations.

e) coordination with the Member States is required – not detected. New obstacle.

The complex coordination the EU Delegations undertake with EU Member States is seen as part of organising public diplomacy initiatives rather than a challenge. The main rationale cited in 2021 is to avoid duplication and ensure that the actions of European actors on the ground complement each other. The 2021 Study is marked by the prominence of the “Team Europe” approach in EU public diplomacy

initiatives in all locations. This approach has been reinforced by the *force majeure* circumstances of the Covid pandemic when EU actors had to collaborate, rather than compete. Practitioners report a better use of synergies, multiplication of communication channels and support to smaller Member States by the EU Delegations. Here, coordination with the Member States is seen as instrumental in promoting the EU as a diverse but united entity. Cooperation has been well established in some areas, for example culture and education, but in the last five years the “Team Europe” approach allowed to extend the joint impact to other issue-areas such as politics, economy and climate/environment.

**New obstacle** here is that the participation of EU Member States in EU Delegations activities sometimes depends on whether they have capacities and resources and/or whether the issue-area of the public diplomacy initiative is in their interests or a policy priority.

f) coordination and communication between the EU and strategic partners seen as lengthy and time-consuming

The 2015 Study found another obstacle – a lengthy and time-consuming coordination and communication between the partner countries and the EU Delegations. The 2015 report mentioned that the two sides were looking for online means of communication to facilitate their exchanges and to provide better visibility to EU actions. The 2021 Study did not find this obstacle. Online communications are now a “new normal”, and Covid has facilitated this transition. Virtual communication tools and channels are now a routine part of the communication practices for EU Delegations and their local partners. Some EU Delegations share stories of organising successful events with their local partners ad hoc and point to stronger, more durable collaborations based on capacity-building.

The Update Study has also registered other new obstacles for EU public diplomacy:

g) limited resources (financial and human) for public diplomacy which impact negatively the scope and scale of the EU public diplomacy outreach to the partner countries (often sizeable and with diverse populations).

It is difficult to build and maintain meaningful connections with local stakeholders beyond the traditional “bubbles” where the EU Delegations have established their presence – namely the capitals and major cities. The limited resource also impacts how EU public diplomacy initiatives can achieve a ‘two-prong’ approach of linking to the ‘core’ audiences of multipliers and influencers in an in-depth way, yet at the same time outreaching to broader publics to raise their awareness of the EU.

h) the lack of a coherent approach to build on research in the field of EU perceptions and integrating its latest findings into public diplomacy activities.

While EU Delegations in many locations are aware of the 2015 Baseline perceptions study and run their own research into public attitudes, their own efforts are often ad hoc, event-based, not comprehensive, irregular and lacking methodological support. Public diplomacy practitioners call to organise such research reflections in a more structured and strategic way. This, however, will require funding and analytical support (obstacle g).

## 7.2. Perception of lack of information

The 2015 Baseline Study found two key obstacles in context of lack of information.

a) the perceived lack of understanding and detailed knowledge of EU representatives on local issues and contexts in the partner countries which mirrors the perceived lack of information distribution and outreach activities – Not detected

See Sections ‘Main public diplomacy initiatives’ and ‘Summary and comparison: key audiences’

b) **the perceived non-transparent and complex institutional system of the EU** that makes it hard to engage with to local decision-makers and audiences in the strategic partners – **Not detected**.

EU public diplomacy practitioners point to difficulties they are facing in reaching out to key audiences.

In light of the latter, the Update Study has detected several persisting patterns or obstacles for EU public diplomacy in the field of information:

c) the lack of knowledge about the EU - remains

Local influencers in the key sectors sometimes lack nuanced information about the EU and its actions in a partner country. The general public are also unaware of the EU's presence or its specific policies/activities. This low level of awareness is an obstacle that persists since the 2015. Further, public diplomacy practitioners report the public's lack of interest in the EU, often due to the perceived irrelevance to the location in question. The limited information input from the general media about the EU is often cited in these cases.

d) the challenge to communicate the EU - remains

Due to the *complex nature of the EU*. It is not easy to communicate a multinational *sui generis* organisation to international audiences. The complex institutional system of the EU and decision-making process are difficult for outsiders to comprehend.

The *sheer size of some of the key partners and their internal diversity* present another major challenge for the EU's communication efforts on the ground. Some EU Delegation practitioners see the challenge in explaining the EU and opportunities it presents for potentially receptive but largely unaware audiences of how concrete cooperation with the EU actors is possible, in what frameworks and with what support.

Another obstacle is the vagueness around a more general principle of *what type of audiences to engage with* – like-minded/receptive vis-à-vis less friendly; a limited group of 'core' influencers/multipliers vis-à-vis wider key audience groups/the general public; aware vis-à-vis unaware of the EU. While some practitioners support the idea of a wider and broader outreach, others point to a more crucial role that stakeholders with the multiplication effect have vis-à-vis other audiences. Moreover, in some locations the general public are seen as having no impact onto political decision-making.

Another obstacle is oversaturation with information and public events in the capitals and major cities. In some locations, this translates into a competition for attention from local media – e.g., the EU vis-à-vis other international actors and even the EU vis-à-vis EU Member States. One solution to overcome this obstacle proposed and increasingly undertaken by EU public diplomacy practitioners is to engage even more actively with the provinces, where local media are keener to learn about and engage with the EU in a prominent way.

e) the role of media - evolving

In some countries, EU public diplomacy communication strategies have to factor *state control* of communication flows and *censorship of media*.

The growing role of *social media*, while increasing the potential for the EU's wider outreach, presents a challenge in many other aspects:

- It is often challenging to engage with relevant social media influencers due to their lack of interest in the EU.
- Social media are used by local influencers who may disseminate counter-narratives and conspiracy theories to sizeable audiences in their echo-chambers.
- The use of social media is marked by a growing generational gap, often reflected in the social media use in general, and in the use of particular social media channels by different age groups.
- In the context of social media use, young people are not a homogenous group either.

In addition, social media landscapes in some countries are controlled by the state. This presents certain challenges for EU public diplomacy efforts on the ground, especially at times of physical distancing and current dominance of e-diplomacy.

### 7.3. Perceptions of lack of actorness and effectiveness

a) the EU is perceived incoherently in its efficiency and actorness across issue-areas – not detected.

The nature of collected data does not allow for a comprehensive evaluation. However, EU Delegations across all locations increasingly attempt to measure the receptiveness of their audiences.

b) a perceived lack of legitimacy of the EU in sensitive areas for the partner countries – remains.

Communication with some partner countries remains challenging in the areas where they reject external engagement. In some cases, this obstacle overlaps with the lack of “like-mindedness” with these partners (addressed in a greater detail in the next section).

c) lack of visibility – except for its economic leadership – remains partially.

The 2021 Study shows that public diplomacy initiatives go far beyond outreach to decision-makers in the economy/trade and politics. The diversification of the themes and key audiences of public diplomacy initiatives – and specifically a major attention to the climate, environment and inclusive society – means that public diplomacy initiatives are projecting the EU’s actorness across a wider range of issue-areas and key groups/audiences. A more active engagement with social media (if compared with 2015) also means a different scale and speed of reaching to key audiences. Yet, the lack of recognitions/awareness among wider publics has triggered a vision on somewhat limited effectiveness by public diplomacy initiatives towards the broader public.

d) the US is perceived as being far more dominant than the EU in most areas – remains partially.

The US dominant position was mentioned in interviews with all EU Delegations to American countries (Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Colombia), and, to a lesser degree, in Japan and India. A contrasting perspective that the EU can function as a possible counter-weight to the US dominance (noted in 2015) was not observed in 2021. In fact, US public diplomacy resources were cited as more substantial if compared with EU public diplomacy resources as such it was difficult to compare the EU and the US in the field of public diplomacy. Other international public diplomacy actors were mentioned rarely.

e) the EU is often perceived as being overshadowed by its own Member States – not detected.

The recognition that the big Member States are well established abroad and with their own resources for public diplomacy programming is present among EU public diplomacy practitioners, but there is a clear vision of the EU Delegations and Member States combining efforts in reaching to the key audiences (with EU Delegations often helping smaller Member States to increase their outreach through public diplomacy initiatives), and especially under the constraints imposed by the pandemic.

### 7.4. Like-mindedness of key partner countries

The 2015 Study did not mention specific categories in this group of obstacles, but they could be grouped as follows:

a) cultural filters make it difficult to ‘translate’ some of the EU messages to local contexts, especially if they are normatively-laden – remains. New obstacles.



*Differences in values* sometimes translate in difficulties in political communication. For example, Chinese officials see human rights issues in China as China's internal issue. The EU faces some hostile reactions from the Japanese regarding the EU's stance on death penalty – an issue traditionally perceived by Japan as an internal sovereign issue.

On a *policy level*, the EU and Mexico have the opposing views regarding energy policy or human rights. The palm oil issue framed as an environmental issue remains a sensitive area for the EU's dialogue with Indonesia (new obstacle).

*Language barrier* and knowledge of the local cultural codes are crucial issue for engaging with the local public more broadly and communicating in a way that leads to more positive reception of the EU (new obstacle).

b) memory of colonial history – remains.

In some countries, such as South Africa, Nigeria and Indonesia, the memory of colonial history is alive and strong, and visions of the EU and its actors and actions in the neo-colonial light presents another obstacle for EU public diplomacy.

c) political differences and domestic political contexts – new obstacle.

Each country in the 2021 Study has a unique political and socio-cultural profile. In some cases, a combination of such factors creates a specific political context that challenges EU public diplomacy. For example, in Colombia, a lot of people are sceptical about the peace process and its implementation as well as around the transitional justice and the institutional system. In Mexico, the current administration (2018-2024) demonstrates little interest in foreign policy in general which limits the attention to international actors such as the EU. In Brazil, the government led by Bolsonaro does not see the EU as a priority of Brazil's foreign policy. In South Africa, since President Ramaphosa has taken office, the government's inclination towards the EU has improved, but is also challenged by and in competition with actors such as China. The EU-Russia relations are marked by political disagreements about the nature of the Ukraine crisis, sanctions and the Navalny case. In the US, due to increasing polarisation and the desire to avoid public controversy, the EU Delegation is careful to avoid any perception of bias so it attempts to approach audiences. The EU Delegation in China has also to be weighted in its position in light of China's censorship and growing nationalism. Here, the Covid pandemic has become a crucial obstacle that has impacted political communication in general, and of the EU in particular.

## 7.5. Other obstacles

The Covid pandemic has become the major obstacle of the EU public diplomacy since 2020.

- Many events with well-developed and tested templates and networks had to be reimaged/re-designed.
- The loss of human contact, cross-cultural personal experiences and inter-personal communication is a major obstacle which will implicate EU public diplomacy activities going forward in the nearest future and arguably long-term for some key audiences (e.g., young people who are currently missing on inter-cultural contacts with Europe in their formative years).
- Covid, however, has put a massive break on youth exchange programme impacting a generation of future multipliers and influencers depriving them of first-hand experiences of Europe – at least for now.
- The virtual tools of public diplomacy also have a psychological limit, and the “webinar fatigue” has been cited in the interviews a lot.

- The pandemic has started to affect the external image of the EU – the EU’s handling of Covid inside Europe and internationally (namely, the alleged “vaccine nationalism”) have attracted negative perceptions reflected in the latest literature on perceptions of the EU.
- Meanwhile, the EU’s support to COVAX programme remains barely visible.

Despite all the negatives, the Covid pandemic was observed to trigger some positive outcomes for EU public diplomacy. The Covid pandemic has offered opportunities to reach out to different audiences and groups in a different way mostly utilising the tools of e-diplomacy and moving many events online, including wide-reach social media campaigns. EU Delegations see benefits to virtual formats as they allow to bring in more high-profile participants and engage with broader audiences across regions. New tools for public diplomacy introduced in a very short period of time will stay, as they demonstrated ways to reach out to more distant and less typical audiences. However, many of these tools will need further fine-tuning, and especially when “hybrid” public diplomacy initiatives are to be conceived and carried out in the future.

## Main gaps

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### 8.1. Gaps in the Literature Review

In the Baseline Study 2015 we found that the literature indicated ‘substantial gaps regarding regions and countries’, ‘a lack of scope, timeliness and quality of data’, further a ‘fragmented’ review of themes and ‘thematic blind spots’, and lastly a ‘lack of studies on perceptions of academia’ and different age cohorts (PPMI, NCRE & NFG, 2015, p.40). Drawing on the findings of the Baseline Study, the data collection for this literature review identified such persisting gaps in the analysis of published material from 2015 to 2020 on perceptions of the EU and its specific policies in all selected countries, focusing in particular on (1) country-focused gaps; (2) theme-focused gaps; (3) group/audience-focused gaps; and (4) method-focused gaps.<sup>5</sup> The gaps that are most dominantly mentioned in the literature in all selected countries are country-focused gaps; theme-focused gaps and method-focus gaps (which do, however, link closely to group/audience-focused gaps).

It is important to caveat that research on perceptions of the EU and its policies – with the notable exception of Russia in this Literature Review – remains an understudied field in all countries, although some improvements in broadening research into new thematic areas and cohorts have taken place. The regional disparities persist, however. In our sample, Africa, Southeast Asia and South America remain heavily understudied, particularly in terms of location-specific perception research, even when a broader regional perceptions research exists. More generally, the mix of methodologies and approaches makes the comparability of existing research difficult – both geographically and temporally.

#### 8.1.1. Country-focused gaps

Country-specific gaps persist and remain in place when compared to the Baseline Study. Likewise, a lack of up-to-date data and deficit of systematic empirical research persist.

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<sup>5</sup> Please, note that theory focused gaps, while examined in the Literature Review, are not a part of this final report as they are of specific value to academic rather than practitioner community

Almost all countries in this Study report that country-focused perception research remains too limited, although different countries and regions face different challenges. South American countries report that the lack of location-specific perception research mitigates the means by which perceptions research can speak to country-specific needs and contextual factors. For example, Brazilian literature suggests that more research is needed on the effect of the Bolsonaro government on EU perception (Lazarou et al. 2020). Literature argues the Trump Administration's effect on EU perceptions in the US (Belin, 2019; Devlin, 2019; Riddervold & Newsome, 2018). As such, country-specific perspective is necessary to explain perceptions of the EU and their evolution, especially where different types of governments may forge an understanding of the EU for a particular political gain.

The literature in African countries lacks systematic studies of how individual countries and their publics perceive the EU. For example, research in Nigeria focuses largely on EU-Africa/EU-Nigeria relations rather than Nigeria's perceptions of the EU. As such, it is difficult to understand the trajectory of Nigerian perceptions of the EU given the lack of systematic studies.

In the last five years, literature in South Asia (India) and East Asia (Japan, Republic of Korea, China) as well as Russia has featured more country-specific studies into perceptions of the EU than works in other locations. This is not lastly due to the established tradition in the scholarship of external perceptions of the EU in those countries. Other countries report limits in the scope of literature – in terms of up-to-date studies, breadth and depth of systematic empirical research and the scope of audiences under consideration. Moreover, the differences in the methods of empirical analysis and difficulties in accessing the needed data make it problematic to compare perception research among the selected countries. We conclude that the trend of country-specific gaps in perception research follows similar trends to the 2015 Study.

### 8.1.2. Theme-focused gaps

Similar to the 2015 Baseline Study, this Literature Review points to that “blind spots” persist in studies on perceptions of the EU in areas where it sees itself as leading. Themes such as energy, RST, environment and climate remain underrepresented but are increasingly recognised as gaps which may indicate a trend for these themes to play a greater role in the future. There is also a lack of studies on how key global actors perceive internal political dynamics that take place in Europe/the EU in the context of the EU Green Deal and the Covid-19 pandemic. In both cases, the lack of literature on EU perceptions may be caused by the relatively recent timeline. Moreover, yet “underrepresented” themes are also referenced in the context of strategic interest of the EU partner countries.

In contrast, themes popular in the literature often link to areas in which the country and the EU are seeking to work together (Afionis & Stringer, 2020; Hage, 2020; Knodt, Chaban & Nielsen, 2017), or over which there are difficulties in forging a common path (Fitriani, 2015; Bacon & Nakamura, 2021).

In countries where perception research indicates ambivalent views of the EU or where relations between the EU and the country are either neutral, strained, negative, or not yet fully developed (Brazil, Indonesia), the literature commonly identifies the thematic gap of RST. In other cases, the literature indicates thematic-gaps where there might be country-specific interests in certain issue-areas, such as energy (Brazil) or a potentially shared agenda on issues such as climate change and the environment (Canada, China).

Development is another area in which EU perception studies are lacking, particularly in Russia, Brazil, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, China and Indonesia. Culture (Nigeria, the US, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, China), social affairs (Nigeria, the US, Republic of Korea) and politics (Nigeria, Canada) also feature as thematic gaps for specific locations. It is noteworthy that in those countries where the political relationship with the EU remains difficult (Russia, Indonesia, Brazil), economic themes will sideline underrepresented political themes. More generally, trade and economy remain dominant themes in the

literature in all locations, which might have implications for how the EU projects itself, its policies and the themes that it seeks to champion in the selected countries.

### **8.1.3. Key audience-focused gaps**

The Update Study discovers similar gaps to the ones found by the Baseline Study. Perceptions studies focusing on youth, opinion-makers and civil society remain underrepresented across all locations, while, in fewer locations, the gaps in research concern the general public. One major gap in relation to key audiences is a lack of studies on key audience groups (for example, professional young people, social media influencers, think tanks). Youth as a cohort remains under-researched despite this key audience group being at the heart of multiple public diplomacy initiatives. Moreover, systematic perceptions among key audience groups such as civil society and, in some cases, policy- and decision-makers as well as businesspeople remain altogether scarce.

### **8.1.4. Method-focused gaps**

The methodological approaches to studying perceptions of the EU remain inconsistent and differ widely, which makes a more comprehensive comparison of the field of EU perception research across all countries difficult.

Method-focused gaps also demonstrate a variety of cross-country differences in how perception research on the EU is approached methodologically. Literature in Canada (Ipsos Mori, 2016; Nanos & Atlantic Brücke, 2019; Nanos & Carleton University, 2019), the US and Japan, for example, draws mostly on public opinion surveys and constitutes almost half of the country-specific resources, whereas there are still no country-driven public opinion surveys on EU perceptions in the case of India and China (the 2017 Eurobarometer survey where they feature was initiated by the EU – see TNS Political & Social, 2017), or lack of up-to-date opinion polls in the cases of Colombia and Brazil.

The differences in methodological approaches also link to the overall lack of systematic analysis of EU perceptions. While expert interviews appear to be used in countries such as Nigeria, the US, and Indonesia (Fitriani, 2015), Republic of Korea, China and Japan note the lack of qualitative data which makes it difficult to examine EU perceptions more closely. Indonesian literature notes a more general lack of analyses on media images and public perception of the EU and thus mirrors the literature's assessment in Mexican literature. Further, Mexican public opinion surveys (Maldonado et al., 2018; Senado de la República, 2016) which include one or more questions on the EU remain infrequent. With only a few more regional and cross-country analyses that use the same methodological approaches, it is difficult to compare research findings, especially when such cross-country attempts do not necessarily focus on EU perceptions per se (e.g., Pew Research Center – Devlin (2019); Huang & Silver (2020)). In contrast, Russia's sizeable sample demonstrates a range of methods in action, including media analysis, public opinion polls and analyses of multipliers' opinion focusing on various key audience groups, including youth. A range of methods is also employed by scholars studying perceptions of the EU in India. Yet, even in these locations, there is a lack of a systematic cross-cohort research.

### **8.1.5. Further perspectives on gaps in the literature on EU perceptions**

Concluding the section on gaps as pointed by the relevant literature, it is important to stress three additional perspectives that could benefit studies of the EU's external perceptions among its key external partners as well as the EU public diplomacy.

1. Only rarely does the literature on perceptions of the EU engage with “mirror” perception protocols and findings, i.e., how the EU is perceived by a third country vis-à-vis how the country is perceived by

the EU and/or EU Member States. While there are some exceptions,<sup>6</sup> this research approach remains an understudied field. Such a “mirror” is important, however. This approach will assist EU public diplomacy to undertake truly collaborative multi-stakeholder diplomacy as it allows to identify divergences and convergences between *Self*-images and images held by *Others* and areas of common interests (Chaban & Elgström, 2020; 2021) and can help inform more country-specific approaches.

2. While studies of perceptions of the EU among the 10 Strategic Partners and the three new key external partners is a sizeable and incrementally growing field (as demonstrated by the country-specific literature reviews above), there is also an emerging tradition examining perceptions of the EU in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. Despite the shared research subject and the potential of learning from each other, the cross-fertilisation between the two areas within the scholarship on EU external perceptions is limited. Research into perceptions of the EU in the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy may provide additional tools, concepts and arguments to enrich the field of EU perceptions studies in the 10 Strategic Partners, the three new key external partners and other key global partners.<sup>7</sup> Innovations from the projects in the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy can also contribute to increasing comparability between countries when deployed more systemically. They may also facilitate shaping a consistent message across different EU divisions that are involved in the EU foreign policy dialogues and public diplomacy outreach close to and far away from EU borders.

3. Further, recent work has compared systematically the perceptions of the EU vis-à-vis perceptions of other global actors in the same location (e.g., image of the EU vis-à-vis China in Africa (see Keuleers, 2016; 2021). However, this perspective remains in stark deficit in the field of EU perception studies in the 10 strategic partners and the three new key partners, although crucially important given the significance of global-specific factors that drive perceptions of the EU. Such an approach could help to clarify the EU’s messages in the context of the increased competition for “hearts and minds” between major global actors in an increasingly multipolar world, including in the areas of mis- and dis-information.

## 8.2. Gaps in public diplomacy initiatives

This section will group and outline the gaps identified in the *de facto* implementation of EU public diplomacy policies, which, in addition to the gaps identified in the literature, provides a comprehensive approach and comparative insight into the complex dynamic between scholarly analysis and practical

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<sup>6</sup> Knodt, Chaban and Nielsen (2017) study “mirror” perceptions between BICS and the EU in the field of global energy governance; Chaban and Elgström (2020; 2021a;b) explore “mirror” perceptions between Ukraine and the EU in the context of the ongoing violent conflict and public diplomacy; Camroux and Srikandini (2020) explore EU perceptions on Indonesia.

<sup>7</sup> For example, in the area of EU public diplomacy around critical conflicts and crises, the Jean Monnet Network studied perceptions of and narratives about the EU in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine (C3EU, 2015-2018, online, see also Chaban, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2019; 2021; Chaban & Zhabotynska, 2018). Especially the focus on crises and critical diplomacy can enhance learning in a context in which the EU – at least in the short-term – is perceived by and through the crises it faces and through critical geopolitical contexts. The Jean Monnet Project E-YOUTH (2018-2021, online) studies “mirror” perceptions of the EU among Ukrainian and the Baltic youth. The TU Darmstadt-led project on perceptions of the EU in the Eastern Neighbourhood demonstrates the importance of region-specific inputs for how EU perceptions in individual Eastern Partnership countries shape (Chaban, Knodt & Headley eds., 2018). Quantitative tools to study sentiments of the the general public towards the EU in MENA countries (Isani and Schlipphak, 2017a,b; Schlipphak and Isani 2018). Perceptions of the EU as a normative actor in Israel in the context of conflict are dissected by Pardo (2015).



implementation. EU public diplomacy practitioners identify (i) institutional and programmatic gaps of the public diplomacy; (ii) gaps in research; and (iii) gaps in cross-cutting policy recommendations. This set of gaps will also inform the future development of applicable and effective policy recommendations as envisaged by Update Study.

### 8.2.1. Institutional and programmatic gaps

In the 2015 Baseline Study, the main institutional and programmatic gaps were the following: a few key audience groups, the lack of instructions and handbooks such as the *Information and Communication Handbook*, and the limited use of e-diplomacy.

a) most public diplomacy initiatives target only one or a few key audience groups – remains partially.

The Update Study registers the diversification of key audience groups for EU public diplomacy initiatives: economic and business leaders, policy-makers, civil society, academia, think tanks and young people (tertiary and secondary level students and young professionals). However, EU public diplomacy initiatives give a more limited consideration to university students from majors other than EU studies, political science, international relations and diplomacy or those who do not have immediate access to EU-run initiatives, despite best efforts to reach as many students as possible, or as diverse a range of students as possible. With few exceptions, majors that are important for communication and opinion-shaping (e.g., media, communication, data management) and those important for domestic politics in the areas where the EU sees itself as an international leader (e.g., climate and environment, human geography, engineering, science, etc.) remain under-addressed.

Despite the expansion of key audiences, *the need to diversify audiences persists*. There is a location-specific factor, as different EU Delegations see a different value in attracting different sectors within society. There is also challenge around striking a balance between reaching out to “core” multipliers, influencers and specialised audiences in an in-depth and highly personal manner and engaging with wider audiences across different cohorts to raise the awareness of the EU. Additionally, EU Delegations’ practitioners find it difficult to balance engagement with like-minded or receptive audiences vs. less receptive or hostile audiences. Diversifying key audiences is now not enough, and there is a need to diversify the themes and channels of interaction alongside, especially as the challenge of communicating the EU and its policies comprehensively persists.

b) handbooks such as the joint EEAS-DEVCO Information and Communication Handbook – not detected.

The nature of collected data does not allow for a comprehensive evaluation. However, EU Delegations across all locations increasingly attempted to engage broader public by printing their factsheets and brochures

c) the use of e-diplomacy under its possibilities – not detected.

While online communication tools had been developing since 2015, Covid has fast-forwarded the use of e-diplomacy in the last year and a half. This breakthrough allowed to reach to new constituencies, geographies and cohorts and engage with (international) high-profile participants and broader audiences. The new level in e-diplomacy comes with a need for trainings in new e-tools, a different new level of support to effectively manage engagements, evaluative tools, a catalogue of the best e-practices as well as innovative solutions to optimise online mechanisms to avoid “virtual fatigue”. E-diplomacy is to stay after the pandemic, and “hybrid” diplomacy will present a new frontier in public diplomacy practices, in addition to “pure” e-diplomacy.

### 8.2.2. Gaps in research

This section of the 2015 Study follows the categories highlighted in section ‘Gaps in the Literature Review’. As such, substantial gaps in research prevail over time, with significant effect on public diplomacy in all locations. First, perceptions of the EU in some locations, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil, remain under-researched. Second, there is a lack of comparative research across regions and third, a lack in thematic scope (e.g., research is fragmented, for example in the fields of RST, climate, education, culture and other areas where the EU sees itself as very strong and leading and they remain thematic “blind spots”). Fourthly, there is a lack of systematic studies on perceptions of academia or youth. For EU public diplomacy initiatives the gaps of research are meaningful, as they preclude knowledge on attitudes and thus an incorporation of this knowledge into the planning of public diplomacy activities. Further, where there is lack of understanding how receptive audiences are, it is difficult to understand where activities might be “fruitless” because audiences are already “set” in their opinions, or where there is scope for influence.

Additionally, EU Delegations lack established instruments that could produce location-specific information about the perceptions of the EU and its public diplomacy on a regular basis. If existent, perceptions studies initiated by EU Delegations are non-systematic and typically minor in scope or focused on specific events. There are only very few integrated cross-country analyses that use the same methodological approaches and tools. The mix of methodology and approaches makes the comparability of the existing research difficult. The EU Delegations also lack on research into what their audiences are interested in or how they would like to be engaged.

EU Delegations are also in need of in-depth systematic evaluations of specific public diplomacy initiatives. Comprehensive, methodologically resonating evaluations could help to identify gaps, understand their depth and develop country specific strategies. The lack of tailored and regular evaluation of EU public diplomacy initiatives impedes the assessment of the effectiveness of EU public diplomacy and ability to change perceptions. However, as one diplomat has cautioned, it is important to keep in mind that not all success can be measured immediately and quantitatively. It follows that in assessing public diplomacy initiatives effectiveness, EU Delegations will have to be able to benefit from multi-method, and complex and long-term research rather than more simplistic or solely quantitative tools.

### 8.2.3. Lack of cross-cutting policy recommendations

The 2015 Baseline Study constitutes an important input into the fine-tuning of EU public diplomacy. Beyond the Baseline Project, policy recommendations for the EU are only rarely applicable to more than one country or in a regional context. It is important to have country specific strategies and goals, and general recommendations would be useful for developing a clear strategy for improving perceptions, complementing location-specific insights. Several EU Delegations also mention that best practices in other locations could help their work, especially around engaging in more complex political contexts, or with a wider range of audiences, including key groups of multipliers and influencers across generations.

# Short country summaries

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## 9.1. Brazil Country Report

### 9.1.1. Literature review

The EU-MERCOSUR agreement carried high expectations for the improvement of Brazilian perceptions of the EU, particularly concerning greater market access to Brazilian goods, but these have been undermined by Bolsonaro's government, whose stance on climate change, human rights and regional integration diverge from those of the EU, and a general lack of awareness about the EU. Brazilian mixed perceptions of the EU in the issue-area of energy, particularly biofuels, appeared in a prominent way.

#### 9.1.1.1. Overview

Brazilian perceptions of the EU fluctuated between 2015 and 2020. Media analyses undertaken during Brexit negotiations revealed fears in Brazil that the EU could become more protectionist without the UK. Mixed images of the EU as an actor on the issue-area of energy and particularly biofuels received special attention in the literature, especially among those studies that addressed perceptions drawing on empirical methods more systematically, instead of authors' own interpretative assessment. Expectations regarding the conclusion of the EU-MERCOSUR agreement, in 2019, after 20 years of negotiations, were mostly encouraging, casting a positive light on the perceptions of the EU, especially among government officials and businesses. However, a few sources expected that the perceptions of the EU among policy-makers might worsen given Jair Bolsonaro's government (from 2019) priorities, which clash with those of the EU, particularly regarding climate change and human rights. Other problematic trends registered by the relevant studies are a general lack of awareness about the EU in Brazil and increasing lack of interest among the general public as indicated by one of the few existing surveys in this period (Devlin, 2019).

#### 9.1.1.2. Main documented perceptions

The main perceptions of the EU in Brazil according to the literature covering the period of 2015-2020 prioritise the visions of the EU as an important trade and investment actor and partner. The main themes that appeared in the literature were the EU-MERCOSUR trade deal, followed by EU-Brazil energy dialogue and relations, trilateral cooperation on biofuels, Brazilian perceptions of the EU after Brexit and changes in Brazilian government's perceptions of the EU across different administrations. Regarding the evaluation of perceptions, the results were mixed. On the one hand, most of the literature depicted positive views among government and business sectors on the prospects of concluding the EU-MERCOSUR agreement as well as after it was concluded in 2019, including for the issue-area of biofuels, due to greater market access for Brazilian ethanol (Gregory & Panzini, 2020; Afionis & Stringer, 2020). Negative views in this issue-area were documented only with regards to EU actions before the conclusion of EU-MERCOSUR agreement, when the lack of EU certification of Brazil's second-generation biofuels according to EU standards prevented Brazilian biofuels from accessing EU markets (Afionis & Stringer, 2020).

In addition, the EU is seen in a positive light with regards to global security, trade, welfare systems, living standards, educational achievements, cultural richness and as a sustainable energy actor. However, Sandrin and Ribeiro Hoffmann (2016) and Ribeiro Hoffmann (2020) argue that the EU crises (Eurozone, irregular migration, democracy) negatively impacted Brazilian perceptions of the EU's international role and the EU as a model of integration for Latin America among the public and the

media. Lazarou, Theodoro, Coutto & Coutto (2020) report on fears in Brazil that the EU could become more protectionist without the UK. The implementation of triangular cooperation was considered disappointing, leading to negative perceptions (Saraiva, 2017). Some sources mention the low level of awareness regarding the EU among Brazilian media, and the general public (Pew Research Center (Devlin, 2019)), but higher level of awareness of the EU and EU-Brazil relations among public, business and non-state actors with a stake in the energy sector (Knodt, Chaban & Nielsen, 2017). Finally, Santander and Saraiva (2016) assess the EU-Brazilian partnership up to 2016 as limited due to the mismatch of Brazilian and the EU's visions of one another's role in the world and interests in key issues of regional and international politics such as trade, and environment.

#### **9.1.1.3. Main gaps**

The main gaps documented in the literature include the lack of theoretically-informed and systematic empirical analysis, appropriate concepts on meso- or micro-levels, and up-to-date data, including Brazilian perceptions of the EU during the government of President Bolsonaro. Finally, the literature also mentioned a lack of research on the particular issue–area of energy, particularly biofuels, and for these areas, a lack of comparative studies of perceptions of the EU and other actors such as the US, China and other Latin-American countries. These latter gaps identified by the literature, however, have been filled by studies such as Knodt, Chaban & Nielsen (2017) and Afionis & Stringer (2020) which focus precisely on energy, biofuels and comparative perceptions.

#### **9.1.1.4. Key audiences**

The main key audience groups mentioned in the publications are government and businesses, although the general public and non-state actors are also mentioned by some of the literature. The key institutions mentioned are the Brazilian Presidency, Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Development, Industry and Commerce, BNDES, Petrobrás, Sugar Cane Producers' Union (UNICA), Brazilian Confederation of National Industries (CNI), São Paulo Federation of Industry (FIESP), University of São Paulo (USP), and Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV). The key individuals mentioned are the former foreign ministers Celso Amorim, Antonio Patriota, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, Mauro Vieira, José Serra and Aloysio Nunes; Former Presidents Lula, Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer; Director of International Relations and Foreign Trade of FIESP Thomaz Zanotto. One publication (Knodt, Chaban & Nielsen, 2017) mentions a high level of awareness of public and non-state actors of the EU as an energy actor and EU-Brazil energy relations and dialogue, which is contrasted by the low visibility of these issues in media coverage and among the general public. This research also reveals that non-state actors are more enthusiastic than public actors with regard to the EU-Brazil energy dialogue.

#### **9.1.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

Very few publications mention or explain the evolution of perceptions systematically. One source (Lazarou et al., 2020) mentions the continuity of perceptions and argues that Brexit has not significantly changed the perception of the EU among Brazilian policy- and decisions-makers and media, apart from trade aspects (fears that the EU would become more protectionist without the UK). However, another source identifies changes in Brazilian government's perceptions of the EU based on discourse analysis of inauguration and farewell speeches of Brazilian Foreign Ministers (Marinho Silva & Mattos Moreira, 2019).

The changes in perceptions are credited mostly to location-specific factors, particularly the ideological preferences of parties in power, a factor also highlighted by Saraiva (2017). For example, during the Worker's Party government (PT) (2003-2016), the EU was either neglected (because Brazil tried to diversify its international partners and prioritise BRICS and South-South cooperation) or confronted (mainly due to the EU's "double standards" in international trade). However, during Michel Temer's term (2016-2018), relations with the developed world were prioritised and, hence, a more positive view of the EU gained prominence among foreign policy circles in Brazil. Lazarou et al. (2020) expect that

the perceptions of the EU among policy-makers might worsen given Jair Bolsonaro's government priorities, which clash with those of the EU, particularly regarding the environment and human rights. Yet, when it comes to the issue-specific perceptions, Afionis & Stringer (2020) argue that overall Brazilian perceptions of the EU on biofuels remain relatively constant over the period analysed and the main reasons relate to the perceptions of EU legitimacy, the coherence of its policies, and its negotiating style. Finally, a Pew Survey (Devlin, 2019) revealed a puzzling decrease in the percentage of respondents which have a “somewhat favourable” and “somewhat unfavourable” opinion of the EU in the period between 2010 and 2019 and a sharp increase in the number of respondents who refused or didn't know how to answer the question (from 17 to 31%). This might indicate a decrease in EU visibility in Brazil in the past decade and/or an increasing lack of interest in the EU among the general public.

### **9.1.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Brazil**

EU public diplomacy activities in Brazil are firmly intertwined with the communication strategy of the Delegation and informed by the priorities formulated in Brussels. Public diplomacy initiatives are designed in collaboration with the political section, in support of the EU's long-term vision and needs. EU public diplomacy in Brazil got a boost as a result of the Lisbon Treaty and the Strategic Partnership. The (current) public diplomacy project has been implemented in six Latin American countries, and the EU Delegation works closely and regularly with EU Member States. The green, digital and inclusive transition is becoming the “brand” of the EU in Brazil influencing EU public diplomacy actions.

#### **9.1.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives**

The main themes of public diplomacy for 2021 are the post-Covid recovery, the EU Green Deal, multilateralism and the EU's digital agenda. Other areas of public outreach are science, culture, youth and education. In the literature review, the main themes addressed were energy and biofuels, the EU-MERCOSUR agreement and Brexit. It follows that the main overlap is energy to the extent that it is related to climate change and the Green Deal. Main public diplomacy initiatives include: business breakfasts (more informal), executive trainings (debate fora with internal or external panellists), Council simulation by students, and EU roadshows usually led by the Head/Deputy Head of EU Delegation and Member States Embassies, but sometimes at a more technical level, and in states and municipalities. Further activities include the network of Jean Monnet scholars, Europe Month (with various activities and some in collaboration with Member States, such as the European Bazaar – with EU Member States promoting culture and food; Coffees with Europe - promoting debates on topics such as architecture in 2020, and sustainable design in 2021, featuring the Italian Institute of Design and the University of Brasilia; a green diplomacy prize for young people up to 25 years; and the HR prize for civil society organizations. Given the pandemic, the Europe Month focused on social media campaigns such as on green recovery, EU from A to Z, and the film festival. Joint work with Member States is organised via the Culture and Communication Group and “Team Europe”. The literature does not address these initiatives.

#### **9.1.2.2. Key audiences**

Key target audiences are academia in general, professors and students (especially in journalism) and youth (18 to 25/28; audiences below 18 are more difficult to reach out to), as well as civil society and businesses involved in the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations.

#### **9.1.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps**

The main obstacles are the continental size of the country and the diversity of population, as well as limited public diplomacy resources (financial and human). The Covid pandemic has offered opportunities to reach out ‘to different realities in a different way, which has been working pretty well’ (EUbra1). However, a ‘webinar fatigue’, and a loss of the ‘human dimension’ will implicate public



diplomacy activities going forward (EUbra1). Another obstacle is the lack of knowledge about the EU despite Brazilian key audiences being receptive, constructive, and friendly to EU policies and with cultural references and family connections to Europe. The latest political situation in the country is also mentioned as an obstacle to relations and dialogue. Obstacles and gaps pointed out in the literature, focus instead on the lack of theoretically-informed and up-to-date empirical research.

#### **9.1.2.4. Future outlook**

The EU Delegation (contingent on resources) seeks to diversify audiences and reach out to less receptive or “unaware” audiences. Youth is a firm focus. EU Delegation further plans to optimise online mechanisms avoiding “virtual fatigue”. Moreover, there is an effort to make connections of the specific local activities with regional and global levels, such as in activities involving students (Model European Union), think-tanks and academics, in order to ‘shape the global conversation on global challenges’ (EUbrus1).

## **9.2. Canada Country Report**

### **9.2.1. Literature review**

To some extent, the advent of the CETA in 2017, the four years of the US Trump presidency (2016-2020), and a liberal government in Canada have brought Canadians closer to Europe. The literature on perceptions however remains scant, which makes it hard to draw trends on how Canadian perceptions evolve in the current context.

#### **9.2.1.1. Overview**

When the 2015 baseline Perceptions Study was published, the literature review concluded that research on Canadian perceptions of the EU was limited and since then it has not drastically increased. This perceptions literature largely reflects the evolutions of the historical context between Canada and the EU since 2015. First, at the domestic level, Canada has been governed by a Liberal Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, during the whole period. Trudeau’s multilateral foreign policy agenda – with a strong focus on G7/G20 and climate diplomacy – has led Canadian policy-makers to view Europe as a close partner on these topics (Bendiek et al., 2018). Second, at the regional level, the EU-Canada relationship was also impacted by the four years of Trump presidency in the US. Several scholars note that the protectionist and nationalist turn in the US under Trump presidency brought Canadians closer to Europe (Verdun, 2019), as both elites (Hage, 2020) and public opinion (Nanos & Atlantic Brücke, 2019) increasingly viewed the EU as a reliable partner to defend the rules-based international order and international peace. Third, at the bilateral level, Canadian perceptions of the EU have been impacted by the implementation of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) beginning with 2017. CETA – which remains much better known to the public than the SPA – has reinforced the dominant perception that Canadians mostly view the EU as a trade partner. However, the regional geopolitics of Canada-US relations has somehow given a boost to perceptions of the EU also as a like-minded partner to defend international rules, norms and multilateralism.

#### **9.2.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

Rayroux (2018) and Chaban (2019) have come up with the most comprehensive mapping of Canadian perceptions of the EU after 2015. These and other publications reflect the general observation that the EU remains primarily seen as a trading partner for Canadians, but that the EU has made some inroads into being regarded as a trusted geopolitical partner too, especially regarding norms and international rules. In general, the literature also notes that there continues to be a significant discrepancy between

the level of awareness of the EU and its policies among the public. More recently, a new theme emerged in Canadian perceptions of the EU – Brexit. Here, the general public in Canada mostly expressed a supportive view of Europe and a negative view of Brexit (Nanos & Carleton University, 2019). At the level of policy-makers, there seems to be an emerging polarisation. Conservatives tend to be more aligned with the UK, while Liberals align more with continental Europe, and have been more critical of Brexit (Hurrelmann, 2020). On the conservative side one can witness some temptations to perceive Brexit as an opportunity to revive the anglosphere through the idea of CANZUK – an anglophone alliance of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. This idea however has little traction in the media and broader public opinion (Bell & Vucetic, 2019).

While perceptions of the EU in general are quite positive, occasional peaks of negative perceptions stand out. This is the case especially in the context of the EU migration crisis of 2015, which was quite extensively covered by the Canadian news media, usually in a negative way – stressing the EU's inability to solve the crisis (Chaban et al., 2018). Also, and looking at the CETA, recent surveys and interviews with food producers have demonstrated that large producers have a positive perception of the agreement, but smaller producers fear European competition. The general feeling is also that CETA has left the EU better off than Canada (Earnscliff Strategy Group, 2019).

#### **9.2.1.3. Main gaps**

As already mentioned at the onset of this brief summary, there is only limited original research on the topics of Canadian perceptions of the EU. Rayroux (2018), Chaban (2019), and Hurrelmann (2020), are the exceptions that confirm the rule. This makes it difficult to generalise trends in the literature on that topic. Most available data on Canadian perceptions comes from public opinion surveys (Ipsos Mori, 2016; Nanos & Carleton University, 2019; Nanos & Atlantic Brücke, 2019), which may point to some renewed interest that the academic literature might pick up on in the future. At the same time, we find no publications that rely on more qualitative data (interviews, focus groups), and also no recent media analysis. In addition, and as already flagged in the 2015 Baseline Study, several topics which are an important component of the Canada-EU policy dialogue (Hage, 2020), remain notably absent from the literature on perceptions. These include: the environment, energy policy, AI data privacy, the Arctic. It is further surprising that there is a lack of academic focus on how Canadians perceive internal political dynamics taking place in Europe, for example, populist movements. Finally, there is nothing in the perceptions literature that mentions public diplomacy initiatives that may have been implemented by the EU in Canada since 2015. The impact of the EU diplomatic involvement remains largely invisible in these studies.

#### **9.2.1.4. Key audiences**

There is so significant change in key audiences, as compared to the 2015 Study. Rayroux (2018) notes that the Canadian public in general remains positive, but in reality, mostly indifferent, to the EU. Only thanks to a series of recent large opinion polls conducted in Canada, we do have some up-to-date primary data to rely on. Some experts in policy and economic circles still have a fairly good and nuanced understanding of the EU and its political dynamics, and the media (mostly the print press) continues to ensure a basic coverage of EU news (Chaban et al., 2018). However, some Canadian audiences, such as civil society organisations and youth, remain invisible in the existing studies. Think tanks have also remained on the sidelines, with the notable exception of Hage's (2020) comprehensive policy paper on Canada-EU relations, and some policy work on the CETA.

#### **9.2.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

The main contribution to the evolution of perceptions of the EU in Canada comes from Chaban (2019), who states that Canadian perceptions of the EU have generally become more positive over the past few years. This is in large can be attributed to the CETA implementation, but above all the US unilateral and protectionist turn. This is reflected for instance in a recent public opinion survey (Nanos & Atlantic

Brücke, 2019) that shows that Europe (especially the UK and Germany) now top the US in terms of Canadians' preferred international partners.

As a contrast to Chaban (2019), Hurrelmann (2020) argues that it is mostly endogenous factors that drive the evolution of Canadian perceptions, rather than exogenous, Europe-based factors. These Europe-based moments such as the EU migration crisis may create short-lived waves of negative perceptions within the Canadian elites, but they do not fundamentally shift perceptions. However, Hurrelmann (2020) observes a nascent trend of polarisation between conservatives and liberals, where conservatives grow more critical of the EU in general. Finally, several deep-seated trends in the literature on Canadian perceptions of the EU have remained very stable over the past few years. Above all, the EU remains largely seen as a trading partner for Canada, much more than a security partner (Rayroux, 2018).

## **9.2.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Canada**

Public diplomacy initiatives in Canada have been numerous and diverse, and they go far beyond outreach to policy and economic decision-makers in the context of the economic and trade agreement CETA. Many of these public diplomacy initiatives – especially those that target youth or civil society – are not reflected in the literature, which predominantly deals with policy and economic leaders, trade or geopolitics. However, the effectiveness of many public diplomacy initiatives towards the broader public in particular, remains difficult to measure and assess.

### **9.2.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives**

Public diplomacy initiatives in Canada prioritise themes of the economy, politics, education, culture, and to a smaller extent social issues, energy and the environment. Of those, the economy is by far the one area that resonates most in the academic literature on Canada-EU relations. On the other hand, a lot of public diplomacy initiatives fall under the broad umbrella of people-to-people contacts, which has not been reflected at all in this literature. EUPOP represents the main tool of the EU public outreach in Canada, with its first-round programming completed in 2019. It included direct engagement with stakeholders, such as training sessions on EU policies (including CETA) as well as regular security and defence symposia. On the cultural side, the EU Delegation highlighted the success of the “Freenergy Tour”, which brought together the EU Youth Orchestra and the National Youth Orchestra of Canada for a series of concerts. Besides EUPOP, other long-standing public diplomacy initiatives include Jean Monnet program activities, annual Europe Day celebrations, the EU Film Festival, the EU-Canada Young Journalist Fellowship and the coordination of member state cultural diplomacy programs under the network of the European National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) in Canada. More recent public diplomacy initiatives have also included youth transatlantic civil society dialogues projects, the EU-Canada Civil Society Forum, the EU's annual presence at the PDAC convention (Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada), and events undertaken in the context of the EU-Canada Policy Dialogues Support Facility (PDSF) on e.g., the Arctic, migration cooperation, clean technologies, geographical indications. Public diplomacy initiatives tend to happen in good synergy with Member States. While larger Member States have their own public diplomacy programming, smaller Member States with limited staff particularly welcome the EU Delegation's efforts to involve them in a systematic way.

### **9.2.2.2. Key audiences**

In addition to the general public, various public diplomacy initiatives in Canada have targeted the four categories of stakeholders that the EU's FPI maps: policymakers and influencers; academics and students; civil society organisations; and cultural operators. As much as the EU Delegation has observed that several of these audiences (students, civil society, public at large) have not been extremely receptive to public diplomacy initiatives, they continue to occupy a significant place in the public diplomacy programming. As a matter of fact, they are probably more central than they were in 2015,

thanks to a series of more structured and multi-annual FPI-funded projects, such as EUPOP or PDSE, which did not exist before. This has allowed to multiply the number of initiatives and events.

#### **9.2.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps**

In general outreach to specialised audiences and stakeholders (e.g., civil servants) has been more effective than outreach to the broader public (e.g., students). This somewhat echoes the academic literature in that decision- and opinionmaker perceptions of the EU are better informed and more opinionated (usually positively, but sometimes negatively too) than those of the public. Indeed, and though there is a general positive inclination of the public towards the EU, for reasons of historical, cultural proximity and like-mindedness, there also remains a significant lack of awareness because of limited information in the media. Besides, a central obstacle in Canada has traditionally been its geography: given its size, it is extremely difficult to build meaningful connections with stakeholders beyond the traditional bubbles where the EU Delegation has some presence, namely Ottawa, and to a smaller extent Montreal. The literature rarely if ever focuses on this geographical dimension of EU perceptions in Canada. Covid has changed a lot of things in this regard with events moving online, it has become much easier to reach out to more distant and less usual audiences.

#### **9.2.2.4. Future outlook**

The future outlook for public diplomacy initiatives in Canada is for the most part a continuation of what has been implemented thus far, though a few novel directions and priorities also emerge. When looking at the mandate of the second round of EUPOP - which is the main EU public diplomacy project in Canada, the list of forthcoming initiatives includes the continuation of EU and CETA-related training sessions for officials, exchanges of Canadian and European journalists, staff exchanges between the European Parliament and the Parliament of Canada, support to ongoing cultural diplomacy programmes, and increased engagement with the research community and Jean Monnet initiatives. None of these are fundamentally new. This being said, one also notes a stronger focus than before on engaging with key stakeholders at the municipal level, with social media influencers and multipliers, and with youth/future leaders. This falls within one of the EU public diplomacy strategy and priorities globally, namely engage in a battle of narratives to inform the public about the EU's policies and added-value, in a distorted communication environment. Some of these forthcoming public diplomacy initiatives reflect the EU Delegation's willingness to boost its social media presence and digital diplomacy. Finally, when looking beyond EUPOP, it is also noteworthy that public diplomacy initiatives that relate to climate change, clean technologies or energy transition have gained ground. Again, this clearly aligns with one of the overall EU public diplomacy strategic priorities, namely boost the EU's Green Deal and climate change diplomacy. As such, this public diplomacy trend is presumed to continue to grow in the future, also because the EU can find a receptive ear in the government of Canada's commitment to the green economic recovery.

### **9.3. China Country Report**

#### **9.3.1. Literature review**

The perceptions literature in China portrays the EU as one of China's major economic partners and an important political player internationally. However, it also reveals that Chinese observers have mixed perceptions towards the EU post 2015 largely in light of the EU's multiple crises. Literature reports that when compared to other major global actors (for example the US), the EU appears to be less influential, but it is perceived more favourably than the US, Russia or Japan.

### 9.3.1.1. Overview

The literature on Chinese perceptions of the EU published since 2015 is very diverse in content. It examines the framing of the EU in traditional (newspapers, TV channels) and social media (Tencent, Sinaweibo, etc). It also studies perceptions of the EU among Chinese policy-makers, diplomats, academia and the general public through interviews and surveys. Overall, the EU is seen as an important, yet not *the* most influential international actor in China. Moreover, the literature reports a dramatic shift in perceptions of the EU among Chinese decision-makers. The EU's internal crises such as the sovereign debt crisis, the irregular migration crisis, the rise of populism and Brexit have weakened the EU's image in China as an influential global power and international actor. The literature reports that Chinese decision-makers already had doubts of the EU's normative power prior to these events, but the EU's lack of internal solidarity and inability to carry out necessary structural reforms have further compromised its image of a normative actor and even economic power in light of Brexit (Chang and Pieke 2018; Jin and Kirchner 2021). The literature points to that despite the challenges faced by the EU, potential for the development of EU-China relations especially in the economy remains. China and the EU are seen as two mutually indispensable and increasingly interdependent actors and, thus, strategic partners.

### 9.3.1.2. Main documented perceptions

Overall, the EU is often described as one of the important 'poles' in a multi-polar world (Zhang 2016, 2020; Lai 2019; Chang and Pieke, 2018). The literature portrays the EU as an active player and an important partner in international economic development, a leading actor in environmental protection and climate change, and highly capable in innovation and high technology. However, it is not seen as a very influential global political actor in China. The literature registers how the EU's multiple crises and particularly Brexit have compromised the image of the EU as of a powerful actor in China. Moreover, the EU's normative power is widely seen as a reflection of double standards in the evaluation of human rights issues in China. The perceived difference in values among the EU and China have also pertained to other areas making it difficult to negotiate China's market access to the EU, lifting arms embargo or granting market economy status to China. The literature reports that China also sees EU Member States as very different in their socioeconomic development and regional characteristics. It has accordingly introduced sub-regional cooperation platforms such as the 17+1 initiative for Central and Southern Europe as well as China's cooperation with the Nordic region – both seen as 'useful tools' to complement EU-China relations (Chang and Pieke 2018, p. 324). Despite the above obstacles registered by the literature, China still values the EU as a strategic partner with whom Beijing is willing to build long-term and stable relations. Among the perceived areas of common concern are globalisation, free trade and climate change; China also sees the potential in strengthening ties with the EU in the fields of security and trade (Chang and Pieke 2018). The EU is generally considered attractive due to its diverse cultures, innovative technologies and as an attractive destination for immigration.

Research into the images of the EU in Chinese traditional and social media seems to highlight similar trends as in the political field. The EU is portrayed as an economic powerhouse and trading bloc, yet much less visible in roles as an effective and unified political actor or a norms exporter. Among more specific themes are the EU's internal politics, economic status and social roles, external relations, advanced technologies in healthcare, automotive industry and environmental protection (Liu and Xu 2016). Thematically the EU stands out slightly more in the field of energy, given China's interest in promoting its energy efficiency policies and sustainable development (location-specific factor). The EU thus represents a cooperative partner for China, a 'norm-setter' in sustainable energy development (Lai 2017, p. 178), and EU actions in the energy sector (especially energy efficiency and renewables) are framed positively (Lai 2017; Knodt et al. 2017). However, as a global energy actor, the EU has limited visibility and China seems to value bilateral cooperation on energy sector with EU Member States more (Lai 2017, p.178). It is noteworthy that the perceptions of the EU in Chinese social media follow the



patterns discovered for Chinese mainstream media (news agencies, state-owned TV channels), especially regarding political and economic issues.

#### **9.3.1.3. Main gaps**

Most of the literature in focus investigates Chinese perceptions of the EU's political, economic and cultural roles. In contrast, research looking at Chinese perceptions towards specific internal policies of the EU as well as its actorness in areas such as climate change, development policy or global security is lacking. The research also overlooks opinions of business people and are limited when perceptions of the Chinese youth and the general public are concerned. A longitudinal study regarding the image of the EU in Chinese social media platforms is also lacking.

#### **9.3.1.4. Key audiences**

EU perception studies in China that concern decision-makers focus on academic circles and policy-makers. Media analyses investigate the EU's coverage in *People's Daily*, *China Daily*, *Global Times* and *21st Century Business Herald*. Among social media platforms, Sinaweibo and Tencent WeChat are of dominant research interest, but they do not provide an insight into the profile of their users.

#### **9.3.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

In the recent years, Chinese perceptions of the EU have witnessed a striking shift from the previously positive attitudes to a more neutral and somewhat negative stance as a result of the various crises in the EU (EU-specific factor). The EU's credibility as an influential regional bloc and emerging economic superpower has reduced, as 'the necessary political-economic backing to justify the EU's normative mission is lacking from the Chinese point of view' (Chang and Pieke, 2018, p. 323). When contrasted to the findings of the 2015 Study, the EU's international role as a regional integration model has also become dubious. The perception of the EU's norm diffusion in other countries, however, remain to be negative. While these conditions refer to EU-specific factors, China's growing self-perception as a rising, and capable actor has also affected this change (location-specific factor). Although the EU has lost some reputation in China, it is still perceived as a partner with which it can build a long-term and stable strategic relationship as a counterweight to the influence of the US, and potentially that of Russia (global factor). Overall, 'the EU pole remains geopolitically important to Beijing' (Chang and Pieke, 2018, p. 322).

### **9.3.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in China**

The EU Delegation to China aims to promote EU values in the country but does it primarily through "depoliticised" public diplomacy activities in education, environment and cultural diplomacy. In light of the EU-China debate on human rights, EU public diplomacy initiatives led by political themes remains challenging.

#### **9.3.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives**

EU public diplomacy activities in China generally cover issue-areas such as cultural diplomacy, education, the environment and human rights. The last area focuses on gender, diversity and anti-discrimination and its themes and emphases are typically "weaved" into the fabric of other initiatives. Two flagship events are represented by the cultural diplomacy public diplomacy initiatives: the Europe Street Event Outside and, since 2017, the EU-China International Literary Festival. Virtual Museum Tour is a new cultural diplomacy initiative. In the field of education, a series of public 'EU Lectures' featured 10 prominent European speakers to deliver lectures on topics related to the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation at Chinese universities of various visibility over the country. The EU Ambassador has given a speech at the capital-based Tsinghua University, and the EU Delegation supports Model EU and Model UN simulation events across Chinese universities. Another public diplomacy area is cooperation with local CSOs and think tanks: the EU Delegation has organised a

think tank meeting with Françoise Godement, a French historian, specialist of China and international relations in East Asia, and Asia Centre. The EU Delegation is also raising the visibility of the EU Green Deal and runs events highlighting the theme of environmental protection which is of great interest to local audiences.

Some of the events held by the EU Delegation to China combine various thematic foci. For example, the Literary Festival not only seeks to highlight the EU's multiculturalism and diversity but also provides EU authors with an opportunity to appeal to the Chinese market. Other than flagship events (Europe Street Event Outside and Literary Festival), EU public diplomacy initiatives include EU Day festivals as well as content-driven online campaigns. Such events are run in close cooperation with EU Member States, with the EU Delegation trying to get all Member States on board and providing additional support to smaller EU Member States. Participations of EU Member States depends on whether they have resources and/or (national) interests at stake. Close involvement of EU Member States means they, together with EU Delegation, contribute content, technical support and profile public diplomacy initiatives on their communication platforms.

#### **9.3.2.2. Key audiences**

The key audiences for the EU public diplomacy initiatives in China are academia and experts, including local think tanks and civil society organisations, business, decision-makers, academia and youth. Chinese officials from the ministries as well as local officials often take part in EU public diplomacy events. The EU Delegation to China actively engages not only with the most prestigious universities in the country but also with universities in various regions and provinces of China. Among the young people involved are students who are more exposed to EU policies either in the course of their studies in international relations and EU programmes or in the fields of high priority to the EU (urbanism, climate, etc.). These are future policy- and decision-makers or crucial experts in the fields. School exchanges were also popular before Covid.

#### **9.3.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps**

In the last five years, and especially in the course of the last year, the focus of public diplomacy initiatives has changed from 'looking at the EU and China as strategic partners' in politics, security and trade to the issues that are received less controversial by the Chinese interlocutors, namely promoting the Green Deal, the GI agreement, food and culture (EUChi1). State control is the key obstacle in this regard. This refers to censorship, control over media and the presence of the party cells in organisations. Communicating with local audience on themes that touch on norms and values (e.g., human rights, democracy) is complicated. The Covid pandemic has become the major obstacle in this regard, because Covid-related restrictions have started in China earlier than in other countries and have disrupted the EU Delegation's face-to-face contacts with key audiences. For example, Study Tour for journalists to Europe have been cancelled as a result of Covid. The knowledge of local contexts but especially language and cultural codes is critical. Translation work and translation of EU messages from EU headquarters to local conditions is time- and resource-consuming. Social media landscape in China is extremely difficult to navigate, and the EU Delegation needs more research and support in this area. EU actions in China need more visibility. For example, the EU's support to COVAX is practically unknown to the Chinese audiences.

#### **9.3.2.4. Future outlook**

In light of obstacles such as Covid and state regulations, more support is needed for the EU Delegation to China. Coordination with EU Member States and local partner organisations is essential. The events that are held on an annual base appear to increase the EU's visibility. The number of participants in the Literary Festival has grown from 2,000 visitors in 2017 to 7,000 in 2020. Online events also increase visibility: 400,000 viewers attended the broadcast of the Literary Festival.

## 9.4. Colombia Country Report

### 9.4.1. Literature review

The perceptions of the European Union (EU) in Colombia among policy-makers, business leaders, media, academia, and civil society, are described by the relevant literature as informed and positive in general terms. However, a significant share of the general public has no awareness of EU actions in the country.

#### 9.4.1.1. Overview

Generally, Colombian perceptions of the EU in the last five years have been positive and dominantly framed by the themes of peace and trade. Literature links EU perceptions to its role in the Colombian Peace Process as a supporter in the construction of a stable and lasting peace, and in post-conflict processes at the political and financial levels. The EU is also seen as a strategic commercial partner in the context of the current Trade Agreement between the EU and the country which has opened new markets for Colombian products.

The key audiences and groups identified in the analyses available are: policy-makers, including government officials from different regions of the country, who are reported to be well aware of the relations and work between the EU and Colombia; business leaders from private organisations, who are directly involved with the trade sector; media and opinion-makers, who constantly follow the activities of and relevance of the EU for Colombia; members of academia, who are observing the evolution of the impact of the EU actions in the country; and finally, civil society, which is composed by non-government organisations (NGOs), other civil organisations, youths and the public in general.

#### 9.4.1.2. Main documented perceptions

The image of the EU in Colombia is mainly linked to the role of the EU as a trade partner to Colombia and a supporter of the Colombian peace and post-conflict process and carries positive connotations more broadly. The collaboration on local productive projects, the presence of the EU in rural areas in the peace process, and trade exchanges between Colombian companies and EU member states creates direct contact with the local civil society, businesses and government institutions. Such direct interaction positively influences the perception of key audience groups in Colombia.

The recognition of the EU as a strategic trade partner for the country enhances the positive perception of the EU among diverse key audience groups. The literature reports that the perception of the EU in key areas is mostly positive within all the key audience groups (Cifras & Conceptos, 2017). However, the available literature has not explored perceptions of the EU in other issue-areas beyond peace and trade). This review found only few brief references that discussed perceptions of the EU in environment and education issue-areas in relation to programmes of the European agencies.

Dissecting the acknowledgement of the EU as an actor, the literature reveals perceptions of the EU's main role as a promoter of peacebuilding and defender of human rights. In this context, EU cooperation with the different national institutions in Colombia and the presence of the EU in a dialogue with organisations of the civil society, are seen as means to promote European values and communicates a scenario of hope and peace. This vision of the EU is strongly associated with concepts such as economic development, humanitarian aid, promotion and defence of human rights, creation of productive projects (civil society projects) in some country regions and cooperation with government institutions as well with civil society organisations (Cifras & Conceptos, 2017).

#### 9.4.1.3. Main gaps

The main gap on EU perception is the lack of studies of EU perception in the country. There are no studies/analyses made specifically for Colombia, and the existing perception studies are developed for Latin America as a bloc, with Colombia being only one of many case studies. A further gap in literature

relates to the lack of studies that would allow a comparison of perceptions over time and across various cohorts. The lack of methodological consistency as well as accuracy and quality of acquired data prevent the existing research from such a comparison.

Another important gap relates to the thematic focus. The literature review reveals a lack of information of the perceptions of EU actions and policies around topics that are not associated with the economy (Trade Agreement) and politics (peace process and/or post-conflict scenarios). Topics such as social affairs, education, environment, energy, culture, health as well as science, research and technology are not frequently mentioned in the news, opinion and/or perceptions analysis in relation to the EU.

#### **9.4.1.4. Key audiences**

Key audiences, as mentioned above, are policy-makers, business elites, media, academia and civil society. For policy-makers and government officials, their perceptions of the EU are positive. From their point of view, the EU has played an important and active role in the peace and post-conflict process (Presentation from Cifras & Conceptos to Delegation of the EU to Colombia, 2017). This perspective is also shared by the media, which highlight the role of the EU as a supporter of these processes. For business leaders, the perception of the EU is also cited as positive, with businesspeople considering the EU as an important ally in promoting the country's trade strategy through the Trade Agreement. Academics, even though positively inclined, share concerns about Colombia being perceived in some instances as part of Latin America as a bloc, and in other cases as an individual country (Tassara, Costa & Tremolada, 2019) and thus suggest a more "tailored" approach to Colombia around the establishment of regional dialogues.

The level of awareness of these key audiences is high, due to a deeper knowledge of the actions and roles of the EU in Colombia through the years. Importantly, this level of awareness is in reference to actions that link the EU to the peace process and the Trade Agreement.

For civil society, there is a difference of perceptions that varies depending on the information available about the EU within the subgroups. NGOs and other civil organisations that are informed about the EU, tend to have positive opinion of the EU, in contrast with the youth and the broader public who are usually unaware of EU actions. In the last subgroup, the rating of the relation between the country and the EU and the opinion of the EU is *very good/good*, however, almost the same percentage responded 'don't know' (Latinobarometro, 2017; 2018).

#### **9.4.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

Despite the deficit of studies of Colombia's perceptions of the EU, the relevant literature indicates that country perceptions of the EU have been continuously positive. The EU is perceived as always having been an important international cooperation partner and has become more relevant through the years. The literature does not argue for any change in perceptions, but instead shows a continuity of the positive perception among similar key audience groups over the years.

The evolution of perceptions remains focused on the themes of peace and trade. There are new themes, such as environment and education in the last years, but they are of poor visibility and with no systematic scholarly consideration, and therefore no change or advance can be identified.

### **9.4.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Colombia**

The innovative and creative actions of the EU Delegation to Colombia sit under the framework of EUPOP. The EU's support for the Colombian Peace Process and Post Conflict strengthens the impact of its public diplomacy actions by the EU Delegation.

#### **9.4.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives**

The EU Delegation to Colombia employs public diplomacy instruments such as roadshows, diplomatic and executive trainings and think tank networks, as well as visits to prioritised territories according to the EU's Cooperation Projects. They increase the visibility of the EU Delegation actions for a broader audience. The themes of the EU Delegation activities are diverse: economy, politics, energy, climate change/environment, education, culture, social, gender, development/assistance, science, technology and research thus including a broader variety than the literature on perception studies in Colombia. In the economic theme, the EU Delegation has worked through high-level events (roundtables and conferences) with strategic partners, such as businesspeople and CEOs to discuss the trade agreement and the Green Deal. At the same time, they are starting sectorial dialogues with the mining and energy sectors and continue the dialogue with the agricultural sector to incentivise businesses to decarbonise and seek opportunities in the EU market. On education and culture, the EU Delegation hosts "Instagram Live" with the Head of the EU Delegation, Ministers, cultural influencers, academics and beneficiaries of the Erasmus scholarship who talk about academic and cultural cooperation. During the pandemic the EU Delegation organised the Europe Day online with a focus on the Green Deal. They also carry out Model EU for school students. The EU Delegation works with journalists to increase knowledge about the EU, including a partnership with a digital portal, a digital national award and regional workshops on peace, communication, information and disinformation. The EU Delegation also works with the Colombian Diplomatic Academy in providing an annual intensive College of Europe training for future diplomats to improve knowledge of the EU. As part of EU support to the Peace Process and the implementation of the Peace Agreement through the European Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia, the EU Delegation organizes roadshows on prioritized territories during which they involve local authorities, civil society from the region, media and journalists and EU Member States. Health – apart from the effects of the pandemic – has not been explicitly mentioned either by the literature or the EU Delegation. Public diplomacy initiative of "Goodwill Ambassadors" cuts across themes linking to audiences and building on personal experiences with Europe.

#### **9.4.2.2. Key audiences**

The EU Delegation works with businesspeople, journalist/influencers, national and local politicians, and young people, including students of diplomacy and journalism and school students. This choice is a result of a more thorough analysis through smaller perceptions studies. The public and broader groups of young people, however, are not part of the key audience. Participants in public events appear to be very receptive towards the EU, despite the fact that Colombians in general do not show much interest in or knowledge of the EU.

#### **9.4.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps**

Currently, the main obstacle for EU Delegation's activities is Covid as events had to change to virtual events and social media activities. Another obstacle is the lack of information about the EU and EU actions in Colombia including among important groups such as future diplomats. The EU Delegation also gives little consideration to university students from majors that may become important for domestic politics in the future, such as engineering, climate/environment, law, social sciences. A recurrent obstacle is Colombia's political situation and remaining scepticism around the Peace Process and its implementation, and around the transitional justice and the institutional system more generally. There is a gap in the communication of the EU and its actions, and the EU Delegation believes it can improve in the future.

#### **9.4.2.4. Future outlook**

As part of its future initiatives in Colombia, the EU Delegation seeks to engage over the long-term with their current partners and turning today's key audiences into future partners. The Delegation wishes to improve, multiply and enhance cooperation among the networks that they are building today. The Peace Process and the Post Conflict Process as well as the Trade Agreement will continue to be one of



the most important country-specific factors that will influence the EU Delegation actions in Colombia – despite and because of existing scepticism. The EU seeks to ally with strategic partners, although starting with more general work on informing about the EU and what the EU is, because the knowledge and perception of other countries such as the US and international organizations such as the UN is higher among the general population. The comparatively higher awareness of the US and UN is a location- and region-factor that can be an obstacle for the future of the visibility of EU Delegation activities.

## **9.5. India Country Report**

### **9.5.1. Literature review**

Indian perceptions of Europe and the EU have not been fundamentally altered by Brexit or more generally over the past five years. The EU continues to be seen as a key strategic economic partner and a significant pole in world affairs. However, despite some improvements in perceptions towards the EU in areas of greater cooperation such in security or education and research, the relationship between India and Europe is still best defined through a bilateral framework with individual member states rather than with the EU as a whole.

#### **9.5.1.1. Overview**

Although India was one of the first countries to establish a diplomatic relationship with the EU in 1962, almost sixty years ago, the bilateral relationship has not yet translated into a full-fledged perception of Europe as a core geopolitical partner for India, despite some improvements in the last few years. In part because of the Brexit crisis, the EU is still not seen as a coherent foreign policy actor although it remains an important pole in world affairs.

The EU is, however, increasingly positively perceived as an example in areas of education and research, smart city projects, infrastructure development, transport, green energy and renewables, and the literature points to further areas of closer engagement, in security, counterterrorism and connectivity. Relevant literature reflects on the fact that the EU remains the largest trading partner for India despite Brexit. Studies of perceptions in India also report on the EU's importance in relation to Indian economic initiatives such as Make in India and Skill India.

#### **9.5.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

Over the past five years, Brexit has been seen as a major crisis for Europe and the EU, but it has not fundamentally altered India's interest in and perceptions of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Its engagement with the EU is seen to be generally based on a case-by-case approach.

Despite a perceived loss of economic clout, the EU is expected to remain India's main trading partner. One major concern here lies in the depth of the economic ties linking India with European markets through the UK (Chaudhuri, 2016). Thus, the impact of Brexit is much more pronounced in economic and geostrategic terms. Brexit has increased India's strategic interests in two partners: Germany, which was and still is India's first European trading partner, and France, which Indian defence experts, already before Brexit, have considered their most natural European partner in military and security issues (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2020; 2015).

Overall, India recognises the importance of Europe in shaping and sharing the global political outlook and is convinced that the EU's continued influence is relevant to the development of a multi-polar order and to India's own development (Jain & Pandey, 2019; Sibal, 2019). However, Indian officials rarely perceive the EU as a 'foreign policy force' (Jain & Pandey, 2019) as they primarily see their relationships

with the EU through relationships with individual member states. Furthermore, other authors argue that the nascent military arrangements India has invested into with the US and also Japan are mostly about security in the Indo-Pacific, where the EU is seen as playing a minor role (Chaudhuri, 2020).

Perceptions literature registers further expectations among policy- and decision-makers that EU–India cooperation will increasingly focus on consolidating a rules-based global order, security and regional connectivity. Both European and Indian perceptions have notably shown the importance of related Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and possibilities for a meaningful common understanding between the EU and India through wider consultations on the subject of connectivity (Sachdeva & Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2020). Other references include Indian perceptions of the EU in the field of energy tracked through perceptions of decision-makers and media framing (Knodt, Chaban & Nielsen, 2017). Finally, cultural diplomacy and increased strategic engagement in this area could also be of key significance for Indian perceptions of Europe (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2014; 2015).

#### **9.5.1.3. Main gaps**

The literature points to gaps in key audience groups such as the lack of studies on specific groups (the youth) and method-focused gaps with a lack of studies on media images and public perceptions in the fields of free trade and military cooperation. Other gaps that the literature identifies include possible areas for greater cooperation, such as cultural diplomacy, or thematic ones, such as the impact of Covid-19 on perceptions of Europe and the EU, which so far have not been covered in the literature. Finally, no systematic public opinion survey has been conducted on Indian perception of the EU in India yet.

#### **9.5.1.4. Key audiences**

The key audience groups are decision-makers in a range of policy fields, diplomats, leading policy think tanks, but also universities and research institutes; as well as media, opinion-makers and leaders, business and industry associations, civil society and non-governmental organisations. The review of literature tends to reflect a good level of awareness amongst diplomats, opinion leaders and policy makers in particular and increasingly amongst researchers and scholars.

#### **9.5.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

Views both of Europe and of the EU over the past five years have become somewhat more negative because of Brexit and the refugee crisis. Europe’s management of the refugee crisis led in particular to a perceived lack of coordination and unity between the member states. The literature further reflects a clear shift of strategic interest and focus towards continental Europe and the EU through India’s bilateral French and German partnerships as a consequence of Brexit. With the EU in foreign policy terms, Indian views indicate further scope to focus on concrete aspects of Indo-European cooperation, such as cybersecurity and wider themes pertaining to the Belt and Road Initiative, which have taken on a greater significance over the past five years. In the spheres where there have been asymmetrical relations between India and the EU since 2015, perceptions have either remained unchanged or worsened — for instance in bilateral trade negotiations.

Overall, the changes mentioned above in the perceptions of Europe/EU have been driven by a range of EU-related but also regional and global factors. Endogenous issues such as Brexit and the refugee crisis have played a key part. Indian perceptions of Europe and the EU have also been influenced by core exogenous factors, specifically the increasing challenges for India and for Europe raised by the Belt and Road Initiative since 2015, as well as India’s own economic and geopolitical development over the same period. This development is intertwined with a convergence of interests in specific areas as listed above. In those areas of potential further collaboration, perceptions have improved in the mid-term. In the long-term perspective, there is still a longstanding continuity in how Europe and the EU are seen in India because of the preferred prism of India’s bilateral relationships with individual member states and its case-by-case approach to the EU.

## 9.5.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in India

EU Delegation to India aims to enhance mutual understanding, advance EU-India relations and deepen cooperation in the areas of common concern. As a result, conducted public diplomacy initiatives are very diverse, vary in themes and audiences. They included workshops and conferences with senior officials and experts (think-tanks), events for the broader public and youth and finally roadshows that promoted specific policies under the broader strategic framework and combined diverse audiences.

EU Delegation in India has incorporated the findings of the 2015 Study with a view to fill in the gaps in visibility and in its public outreach to a wider audience and stakeholders. The Delegation further used a set of ad-hoc event-based studies to measure the response from the audiences it engaged with – be it the students, academia, think tanks or others – to understand if their participation in these events changed any aspect of their perception of the EU. Overall, the projects were considered successful in increasing the EU's visibility as a result.

### 9.5.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives

The focus of the EU Delegation to India is two-fold: strategic cooperation within connectivity, broader region, technology and innovations (particularly, in the field of energy and climate change) and education/youth. One set of initiatives involves senior officials and leading experts in the respective fields through events such as the EU-India Think Tank Twinning Initiative which covered the Belt and Road Initiative, maritime security and EU-India engagement with third partners as well as EU-India workshop on securing the maritime commons which focused on EU-India cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Another set of EU public diplomacy initiatives targeted research and higher education. The EU-India Think Tanks Annual Conference engaged experts from think tanks, academia and research institutions while a number of events were held with academic institutions and extremely popular with Indian youth and particularly students: a series of thematic EU Days in Indian universities with the participation of the EU Delegation sectoral councillors (with the focus on education or energy, climate change and standardisation in information and communication technology; the European High Education Virtual Fair; a Study Tour for young Indian diplomats to EU institutions; Erasmus+ pre-departure event; and one-off thematic workshops (on plastic pollution; renewable energy and water).

All the events featured strong synergy with various Member States (more resourceful ones such as Germany and also smaller ones Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Croatia, Czech Republic) – depending on their interest in the themes of the events. The rationale of the public diplomacy initiative is not to duplicate but to complement the actions pursued by the Member States and where the Member States would like the EU Delegation to be more engaged with India. Several events also moved to India's regions: Chennai Press Conference or EU Days in Kolkata and Manipal.

### 9.5.2.2. Key audiences

A limited number of think tanks, higher education (and specifically Jean Monnet students of political sciences/EU/international relations) and civil society were EU public diplomacy targets before 2017. The current period is characterised by a 'narrower segment', or the 'core audience': think tanks, education, media (particularly at the regional level), youth (in general and future diplomats), yet there is not much attention to civil society as other EU division target it (e.g., Devco). Advanced policy dialogues – and specifically on energy and connectivity - is seen as a prerequisite for effective dealing with civil society. Generally, the target groups mentioned above have been very receptive of the events organised.

### 9.5.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps

There is a huge deficit of knowledge about the EU, its presence and programmes in India. Further, the Covid restrictions have been detrimental for the celebration of the EU Days and for the Think Tank

Residency Programme. But there were also benefits because some virtual meetings have helped to bring in more high-profile participants and engage with broader audiences across India's regions.

#### **9.5.2.4. Future outlook**

With the civil society, much more could be done in areas of key strategic relevance in terms of policy dialogue (energy, connectivity, environment or water resource efficiency). New public diplomacy projects will be further adapted to the outcome of the last EU-India Summit held on 8<sup>th</sup> May in Porto with a focus on Indo-Pacific issues, connectivity, triangular cooperation, health, climate change or digital transition.

## **9.6. Indonesia Country Report**

### **9.6.1. Literature review**

In Indonesia, the EU is considered to play an important role in a multipolar world, although it is perceived much less as a coherent foreign policy actor. If visible, the EU is mainly referenced in economic terms and as a source of inspiration for technology and social-cultural innovation. The interaction between the EU and Indonesia is still developing. After the conclusion of the Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 2009, the next step of EU-Indonesia cooperation involves the negotiations of the Common Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2016 which are still ongoing. However, both implementation of the above agreements and the process of their negotiation have been affected by diverging views of the negotiating parties and negative images of Europe and the EU as part of Indonesia's experiences of Europe's colonial history.

#### **9.6.1.1. Overview**

The historical, cultural, and colonial encounter with Europe has decisively shaped and negatively affected Indonesian perceptions of Europe and the EU as exploitative powers (Luhulima, Panjaitan & Widiana, 2009; Fitriani, 2015): These perceptions have enhanced only in the course of bilateral interaction between Indonesia and several European countries (such as the Netherlands, Germany and France) as well as EC/EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation launched in the 1980s. Yet the literature on perceptions of the EU in Indonesia remains limited.

In fact, most of the literature focuses on EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations, where Indonesia is rarely mentioned. This was particularly the case until 2014, when the PCA came into, leading to more publications on EU perceptions. However, such publications are mostly limited to problems in EU-Indonesia relations in trade and environmental standards (Schmitz, 2015; Robertua, 2019; Sicurelli, 2020) and do not explore perceptions of the EU in Indonesia. Other publications more broadly explore EU-Indonesian strategic interests (Fitriani, 2015; Schmitz, 2015). Further challenges in the EU-Indonesia relationship, while exposed by the news media (printed, electronics, and digital), have not been sufficiently documented or systematically analysed.

#### **9.6.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

Since 2015, economic cooperation has become the main theme in the EU perceptions in Indonesia, followed by trade and development. Other themes such as good governance, environment (including climate change, palm oil and deforestation) and capacity building of civil society remain in the background of the relevant studies (Robertua, 2019). According to the literature, policy-makers have numerous concerns as to the impact of cooperation with the EU in specific areas which creates negative perceptions towards the EU. Differences in EU-Indonesia interests, trade barriers and miscommunication are named as the primary causes of that. For example, Indonesian officials see

national interests in fostering economic development and accessing new markets (Sicurelli, 2020). As a result, they perceive EU regulations towards palm oil exports as a political, protectionist tool by the EU (Robertua, 2019). The same refers to environmental regulations (“fight illegal logging”), which do not meet local needs (Schmitz, 2015).

Indonesian officials’ ‘more flexible and assertive’ approach in dealing with the EU is attributed to negative perceptions of Europe and the EU as exploitative powers (Fitriani, 2015, p.155). Due to large size of its domestic market and a progressive rise to BRIC status Indonesia is less dependent on international trade (Sicurelli, 2020; Camroux & Srikandini, 2020). It also views China and Japan as alternative and more important export destinations in comparison to the EU (Schmitz, 2016). As a result, Indonesia has the ability to assert its strategic interests despite EU pressures (Fitriani, 2015). The literature, however, argues for change towards more positive collaboration for the two parties through agreeing on the normative goals of cooperation and the EU’s ‘leaving freedom on the details for local players’ (Schmitz, 2015, p. 90). Prior experience of cooperation, transnational networks of Asian and European civil society and the domino effect of trade deals with individual countries should also advance to a more positive image of the EU and further facilitate cooperation with the region (Sicurelli, 2020). Here, cooperation under the regional framework and particularly ASEAN is a key factor that may lead to a positive change in EU perceptions.

#### **9.6.1.3. Main gaps**

The number of comprehensive studies about the EU in Indonesia is extremely limited and depends on the popularity of the issue in the period of the publication. While there has been an increase in perception studies following the ratification of the PCA and negotiation of the CEPA, the field in general remains underrepresented. The main focus is on economy, trade and development issues. Meanwhile, the importance of areas such as culture and social affairs for EU perceptions remain practically invisible in the literature. There is no systematic research on the exposure and role of various actors and stakeholders within Indonesia towards EU policies and programmes. The lack of a systematic publication and public opinion survey is also of concern.

#### **9.6.1.4. Key audiences**

The key audience groups mentioned in the literature are decision-makers (government, political parties, parliamentarians); leading public policy think tanks and research institutes; local journalists and media, opinion-makers/ leaders, business and industry associations (including academia at both leading private and public universities; civil society and non-governmental organisations and communities which engage in EU initiatives). Each group has various perceptions towards the EU. Meanwhile, youth and the broader public have not been addressed by the existing studies.

#### **9.6.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

In general, and historically, perceptions of Europe and the EU as exploitative powers in Indonesia have been negative (Luhulima, Panjaitan & Widiana, 2009; Fitriani, 2015). Despite an enhancement of such negative perceptions through the establishment of economic partnership frameworks and building trust between the EU and Indonesia through EU-ASEAN forums (Fitriani, 2015), disagreements remain in place in specific areas, such as politics, human rights, and post-colonial relations (Fitriani, 2015, p. 155), environmental standards and trade (Schmitz, 2015; Robertua, 2019; Sicurelli, 2020). Given the limitations owing to the existing lack of a comprehensive study on EU-Indonesian bilateral relations, it is difficult to evaluate the evolution of perceptions on the EU in Indonesia. However, it is important to underline that the historical, cultural, and colonial encounter with Europe has affected perceptions of the EU in the long-term (Luhulima, Panjaitan & Widiana, 2009), while the ongoing relationship shows opportunities for change. In this process, literature stresses the need for people-to-people contacts (Fitriani, 2015) and a more individualised approach towards local socio-cultural needs in Indonesia (Schmitz, 2015).



## 9.6.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Indonesia

Perceptions of the EU in Indonesia are rarely addressed by the relevant literature. Relevant studies focus on EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations rarely mentioning Indonesia. Indonesia is even not included in the EUPOP ASEAN Infographics of 2019. Therefore, the effort to strengthen EU Public diplomacy in Indonesia is necessary.

### 9.6.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives

The presence of EUPOP in Indonesia is a brand-new initiative that allowed to carry out public diplomacy activities in the fields of trade, media and education and provided an opportunity to explore other themes in EU-Indonesia relations. Prior to this initiative, the EU Blue Book of Cooperation was almost the only source reporting on the state of EU-Indonesia cooperation across various fields. The more recent literature still overlooks such topics as culture and social affairs and does not report on the EU public diplomacy initiatives in the country. However, several initiatives were carried out under the EUPOP Indonesia. In the field of environment these were 'Our Ocean' - short story contest for young people (2017) and the 5th 'Our Ocean' conference in Bali (2018). EUPOP also engaged academic audiences in discussion about media and human rights. In 2018, a series of academic events with Indonesian communication and media students was organised at universities in Jakarta and Tangerang. They are focused on the EU position and actions to counter disinformation, EU Guidelines of Freedom of Expression and European restrictions on propaganda for war and hate speech. A similar activity, 'Tackling Hate Speech and Fake News' took place in Jakarta, 2018 under the EU's Media4Democracy project. In addition, such popular events as the annual European Higher Education Fair and Europe Film Festival, "Europe on Screen", attract young people to know more about Europe and EU. These two events are held in several big cities in Indonesia (Medan, Jakarta, Bandung, Jogja, Balikpapan) in close cooperation with EU Member States who own their cultural centres and perform as donor organisations.

### 9.6.2.2. Key audiences

The key audiences for EU public diplomacy in Indonesia are decision-makers (government, political parties, parliamentarians); leading public policy think tanks and research institutes; local journalists and media, opinion-makers/leaders, academia, particularly youth; civil society and non-governmental organisations and communities which engage in EU initiatives. Each of them has various perceptions of the EU.

### 9.6.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps

The number of comprehensive studies about the EU in Indonesia is extremely low and focuses on the economy, trade and development overlooking culture and social affairs as opposed to the focus of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Indonesia. While academic literature investigates EU perceptions in a broader context of EU-ASEAN partnership, the ASEAN angle has not been visible in EU public diplomacy in Indonesia. The size of Indonesia also represents an obstacle for the dissemination of information about the EU. Additional media channels should be considered for communication and thus, an increase of people's understanding of the EU and engagement in EU public diplomacy activities.

### 9.6.2.4. Future outlook

In general, Indonesians' perceptions of the EU tend to be positive, although this only applies to certain issues/topics such as climate change, science and technology, trade and education, and specific actors (youth, academia and media). However, this limitation provides an opportunity for the EU: (1) to explore other key themes, such as education, culture and technology (e.g., green technology and communication), which can meet young Indonesians' aspirations; (2) to create more activities related to the public diplomacy initiative and to engage the other key audience groups besides the young

people; (3) to engage more actively online, especially due to the Covid pandemic; (4) to make use of EUPOP ASEAN platform to strengthen Indonesia EUPOP.

## **9.7. Japan Country Report**

### **9.7.1. Literature review**

Japanese perceptions of the EU have been generally favourable and relatively stable in the last five years. The EU and Japan remain strategic partners who share fundamental values, such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Some fluctuations in Japanese views on the EU in the recent years can be attributed to the uncertainties resulting from Brexit and the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic.

#### **9.7.1.1. Overview**

While the number of perceptions-related research on the EU in Japan has been limited in the past five years, various public opinion polls (Cabinet Office, 2019; Devlin, 2019; Huang & Silver, 2020) show that Japanese perceptions of the EU remain generally favourable. However, some respondents have less favourable attitudes towards the EU mainly due to the EU's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and economic uncertainties caused by Brexit. Yet, the EU-Japan relationship has developed substantially over the same period, exemplified by the conclusion of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in 2018. Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe (2012-2020) made great efforts in strengthening cooperation with Europe – both with the EU and bilaterally with individual EU member states. Though the EPA negotiations appeared frustrating for Japanese decision-makers (Bacon 2015; Bacon & Holland 2015), once in place, Japanese companies began to appreciate the new framework and benefit from it. Still, the consequences of Brexit adversely affected many Japanese companies operating in the UK (Japan External Trade Organisation, 2020).

#### **9.7.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

The main perceptions of the EU in Japan have traditionally prioritised visions of the EU as a major economic power in the world and an economic partner for Japan. This perception is giving way to more nuanced and informed perceptions in more recent studies. Bacon (2015) and Bacon and Holland (2015) show that Japanese interest in the EU as a promoter of human rights is rising, and Bacon and Nakamura (2021) have demonstrated how the EU and the EU-led survey on death penalty have influenced Japan's domestic discussion on the future of death penalty in Japan. Given the sensitive nature of this issue in Japan's domestic politics, the issue of death penalty is not usually seen as something that should be influenced by external actors like the EU. Yet, the case examined by Bacon and Nakamura (2021) sheds new light on the fact that to those who argue for the abolition of death penalty in Japan, the moral authority of the EU as an international champion of abolishing death penalty seems to be of great importance (even though this does not mean that the Government of Japan will abolish death penalty anytime soon).

Yet, the overall impression from the available literature is that different people pay attention to different aspects of the EU depending on their political stakes or business interests, resulting in different EU perceptions. These perceptions can be both favourable or unfavourable, irrespective of the level of awareness of or interest in the EU. For example, those who are interested in human rights or climate change tend to be interested in the EU, while those who strongly support the death penalty also need to pay substantial attention to the EU, because the EU has consistently criticised executions in Japan (and they would oppose such voices from the EU) (Bacon & Holland, 2015). Meanwhile, those who conduct business in the UK have been frustrated by how the UK government handles relations with

the EU, although they do not consider the EU to be “innocent” (Japan External Trade Organisation, 2020).

### **9.7.1.3. Main gaps**

One of the key findings in Japan’s literature review is that there exists only a limited amount of perception-related research. Half of the literature sources published between 2015 and 2021 are public opinion polls, with the remaining sources also focusing on surveys albeit more tailored to research needs. Apart from Endo (2020) - who engages in a thorough discourse analysis of the evolution of Japanese perceptions of the EU in light of Brexit - and Tsuruoka (2019), who builds on the 2015 Survey and covers Brexit and the Trump factor in Japan’s views on the EU, there is a lack of qualitative research in the studies on Japan’s perceptions of the EU that could explain attitudes among the Japanese public. If such studies exist, they focus on themes, such as human rights and economy (Bacon & Holland, 2015; Bacon & Nakamura, 2021; Fukui, 2015), while the rest of themes are underrepresented. Moreover, perceptions among individual key audience groups, such as youth and civil society, remain ill-attended by the reviewed literature.

### **9.7.1.4. Key audiences**

In surveys, the key audiences are mainly government officials, businesspeople, journalists and academics, but the general public does respond to more conventional opinion polls, such as the Japanese Government’s (Cabinet Office) regular polls on foreign policy. Importantly, Pew Research Center (Devlin, 2019) shows that young people in Japan view the EU more favourably than older generations do. While the overall favourable rating of the EU in Japan is at 60%, 72% of those aged between 18 and 29, 64% of 30-49-year-old and 56% of 50 and over have favourable views of the EU. However, the survey does not explain what the above differences in perceptions could be attributed to.

### **9.7.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

One of the most noticeable changes in Japanese perceptions of the EU, as marked by the relevant literature, occurred between 2019 and 2020. According to Pew Research Center (Huang & Silver, 2020), favourable views towards the EU decreased from 60% in 2019 to 47% in 2020, representing the biggest decline (13 points) among major non-EU countries, including the US, Australia, Canada and Republic of Korea. Though the reason of this decline is not asked in the poll, it appears that the Covid-19 pandemic has played a major role in this process – also evidenced by the fact that Republic of Korea also registered the second biggest decline of 10 points (Huang & Silver, 2020). Compared to many EU countries and the US, the number of Covid-19-caused deaths in relation to population remains much lower in Republic of Korea and in Japan. It is also telling that 34% of respondents in Japan and only 19% in Republic of Korea say the EU has done a “good job” in dealing with the pandemic (Huang & Silver, 2020). This suggests that Japanese perceptions of the EU have been affected by global-related factors as well as EU-related factors – meaning that how the EU has handled the pandemic, comparatively to other (regional) players, shapes Japanese perceptions.

Prior to the Covid-19, Brexit and the Trump Administration in the US were the two most significant factors influencing Japanese perceptions of Europe (Endo, 2020; Tsuruoka, 2019). While Brexit clearly damaged the image of the UK in the eyes of the Japanese policy-makers and experts, its impact on EU perceptions is mixed and yet remains to be seen. While experts were concerned about Brexit, the importance of the EU as a trade and economic partner has not diminished. Meanwhile, the position of the Trump Administration against multilateralism and free trade brought the EU and Japan closer to each other, which helped the two parties to conclude the EPA. As a result, Japan’s perception of the EU as an important international partner grew as well (Endo, 2020; Tsuruoka, 2019). Endo (2020) also cites China as a factor that has stimulated EU (Europe)-Japan security cooperation. Other than the above, there is no evidence-based empirical research that allows to draw further on the evolution or continuity of Japanese perceptions of the EU in the discussed period.

## 9.7.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Japan

The framework of EU-Japan Strategic Partnership informs EU public diplomacy initiatives aiming to raise awareness about the EU among the Japanese stakeholders and the general public thereby contributing to the strengthening of the relationship. The EU-Japan SPA and EPA constitute the basis for public diplomacy initiatives, making the use of foreign policy instruments, including people-to-people contacts. The EUPOP report, the website of the EU Delegation to Japan as well as other EU documents and interview with EU Delegation public diplomacy team offer an overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Japan.

### 9.7.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives

Since 2015, the EU Delegation to Japan has focused on conducting a series of events and outreach programmes, including those for parliamentarians as well as other stakeholders, particularly in three priority areas: (1) geographical indications, (2) climate change and (3) public procurement. Geographical indications and public procurement were among the most difficult topics during the EPA negotiations, and the EU Delegation is eager to promote the EU's positions vis-à-vis Japanese stakeholders. The EU Delegation is increasingly cooperating with Member States' Embassies in Tokyo for public diplomacy initiatives. Examples of this include: (1) social media collaborative postings marking the International Women's Day, featuring European female scientists; (2) op-eds to Japanese newspapers, written by the EU Ambassador, endorsed by all EU Member States' Ambassadors to Japan; (3) a series of webinars on health, climate change, energy and connectivity, which were well attended, taking advantage of the virtual environment during the pandemic. The EU Delegation to Japan regularly engages in the debates on the death penalty in Japan. It has also supported a project with Crime Info (at Monash University in Australia) to raise awareness about this issue as a part of its public diplomacy effort. However, themes in EU public diplomacy initiatives and those in the literature do not always match: whereas public diplomacy initiatives concern the EU's immediate and concrete (and primarily economic) interests, the literature tends to deal with more political aspects and opinion polls are often of general nature rather than on specific issues.

### 9.7.2.2. Key audiences

Projects on specific issues such as geographical indications and public procurement focus on stakeholders who are immediately affected or involved, such as the food business community (cooking professionals and restaurants) as well as consumers and media for the former, and central and local government officials for the latter. In more general terms, the EU Delegation is also making efforts to reach out to younger generations, by using social networks trying to reach "the wider net", because different social networks are used by different age groups and it is not realistic to tailor all the EU's messages to each social network.

### 9.7.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps

The Japanese audience is thought to be generally receptive to the EU's public messaging. Yet on some specific areas like public procurement, some stakeholders remain reluctant and unsure about the EU's intentions. The EU also faces some hostile reactions from the Japanese public regarding the EU's stance on death penalty, as it is considered by Japan as an internal sovereign issue. Cultural differences (including language) from time-to-time cause misunderstanding and miscommunication regarding public diplomacy initiatives. Some of the remaining challenges include reaching out to younger generations and beyond big cities like Tokyo and Osaka and coordinating efforts with Member States Embassies in Tokyo (some Member States Embassies are more connected to the Japanese government and society at large and possess more established institutional tools such as cultural centres and language schools).

#### **9.7.2.4. Future outlook**

The EU public diplomacy initiatives in Japan are generally well on track and have gained traction. The connectivity between Europe and Japan/Asia is a new agenda for public diplomacy initiatives as highlighted in the context of the SPA. It is the EU Delegation's view that the EU public diplomacy needs to be a "two-way street" rather than "one-way" from the EU, thereby establishing long-term engagement and establishing trust with local audiences. Also, according to the EU Delegation, public diplomacy cannot and should not be just a matter for the political and press section of the EU Delegation to deal with – science, not least in the context of Horizon 2020, will also be an important pillar in the coming years for the purpose of enhancing people-to-people engagement in Japan.

## **9.8. Mexico Country Report**

### **9.8.1. Literature review**

Perceptions of the EU have been neutral and positive in the themes related to EU-Mexico relations. In contrast, images of challenging events that the EU faces (slow economic growth, contestation to integration, anti-democratic developments) have been perceived negatively. Both general perceptions of the EU experience a nuanced variation with respect to the 2015 report: academic and civil society organisations have been slightly more critical of the EU than political and economic elites.

#### **9.8.1.1. Overview**

The main events that have shaped the perceptions of the EU in Mexico were the modernisation of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement (2016 to 2020), the departure of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU, and events related to the EU's governance (migration, economic growth, political polarisation). Mexican perceptions about the EU vary according to the topic and, to some extent, the audiences. According to the available literature, overall perceptions of the bilateral relations (Global Agreement, Strategic Partnership, and modernisation of Global Agreement) are neutral and positive. Political and business leaders have a positive outlook at the EU and focus on the EU's role as a robust trade and investment partner. On the other hand, while academic and civil society groups tend to be more critical, they emphasise the relevance of EU-Mexico cooperation and the EU's values.

#### **9.8.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

The main positive perceptions about the EU in Mexico are that it is a like-minded partner (Garcés, 2017), an alternative trade market and investment source to the dominant role of the United States (Dominguez & Crandall, 2019), and a normative model in democracy, human rights, and environmental protection. In contrast, negative perceptions can be found in news reporting erosion of democracy in some EU members, problems to accommodate migrants and contestations over European integration. In particular, the dominant media coverage of Brexit since 2016 permeated negative perceptions of the integration process, which slightly shifted to neutral as Mexico and the UK concluded an interim trade agreement in 2019 in preparation for the implementation of the Brexit agreement. In addition to the UK, other relevant EU members in Mexican perceptions were Spain, Germany, and France. The literature acknowledges existing asymmetries in Mexico's relationship with the EU and has engaged with perceptions on current bilateral institutional dialogues and cooperation mechanisms (Dominguez, 2021). The renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the modernisation of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement took place in parallel and speak to the consolidation of partnerships. Both started with the administration of a centre-liberal political party (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and were concluded with the government of a left-wing political party (National Regeneration Movement). While coming to an agreement in some areas of the



EU-Mexico negotiation was difficult (public procurement, for instance), the overall neutral and positive perceptions are seen across business groups (Blanco & Bruno, 2018) and political parties (European Parliament, 2020).

#### **9.8.1.3. Main gaps**

The significant share of literature focuses on the EU-Mexico relationship in general, and a more limited number of articles narrow the analysis to more specific topics. The more studied issues are related to EU-Mexico institutional, trade, and diplomatic relations, while environment, security, migration, and international cooperation received less attention. Specific studies which focus exclusively on the EU perceptions in Mexico or Mexican public opinion surveys that include one or more questions about the EU remain infrequent (Dominguez, 2019; 2020; Senado de la República, 2016; Maldonado, 2018). Overall, relevant works mainly focus on qualitative policy analysis, literature review, analysis of institutional relations and descriptive statistical analysis. The existing literature rarely engages with the general public opinion surveys and interviews with policy- and decision-makers. Opinion polls that include questions related to the EU are limited. The review of the debates and surveys published by CIDE between 2015 and 2021 (Senado de la República, 2016; Maldonado, 2018) shows that Mexican public opinion (leaders and the general public) is primarily focused on the United States and North America.

#### **9.8.1.4. Key audiences**

Key audiences are political and economic leaders, scholars and specialised audiences such as journalists. All of them have shown a significant level of awareness of the EU. Reports and journal articles (Ruano, 2018; Dominguez, 2020) that focused on the modernisation of the 2000 Global Agreement mainly target academic audiences and decision-makers, who tend to be receptive to the EU and its economic relations with Mexico. In addition, the CIDE survey (Senado de la República, 2016; Maldonado, 2018) found that economic powers such as China or the EU could be allies and offer new markets to Mexico. The level of awareness about the EU decreases when samples include the public in general. In 2016, the CIDE survey (Maldonado, 2018) indicated that less than half of the respondents (46%) could not name the common currency of the EU correctly. On the other hand, on a scale of 1 to 100, the best-evaluated organisations after UN were the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (65), NAFTA (60), the EU (59) and Amnesty International (58) (Maldonado, 2018). Political parties have also been supplied with technical information, and party members participating in the EU-Mexico Joint Parliamentary Committee meetings conveyed positive statements about the EU (EP, 2020). There is a lack of literature about the level of EU awareness of the general public, youth, and Mexican recipients of scholarships who spend time in Europe. More surveys and studies about the understudied key audience groups mentioned above would be necessary to expand the understanding of Mexican perceptions of the EU.

#### **9.8.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

Perceptions of the EU have been continuous regarding the themes and the actors involved in the past three decades. From the 2000s to the mid-2010s, the EU-Mexico General Agreement and the EU-Mexico Dialogues became a source of neutral and positive perceptions of the EU. In contrast, Mexican perceptions were negative towards the EU, when challenged by migration, economic crises, contestation of the EU's integration process and the rise of nationalist parties. Since 2015, the factors driving negative perceptions of the EU are international to the EU (EU-specific factors), the broader region (region-specific factors) and global developments (global factors). The combination of various EU crises, the negative stance on the EU by the Trump, right-wing political parties in Europe, and slow global economic growth are seen to have undermined the EU's role as a leading actor, able to shape the international and regional agenda. While these three factors projected a weak image of the EU, factors driving neutral and positive perceptions are location and inter-regionally related. First, Mexican perceptions of the EU have tended to be positive because of the conclusion of the modernisation of the EU-Mexico general agreement in 2020. Second, Mexican audiences perceive the EU positively in terms

of progress in the negotiations with MERCOSUR and the renewal of Chile's agreement as they show good improvement in inter-regional economic relations despite the fact that different processes obscure the convergence of regulatory bases in the common bi-regional agenda (Serbin & Serbin, 2018). In sum, Mexican perceptions of the EU have experienced continuity over the themes and actors while the themes' substance has changed over time.

## 9.8.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Mexico

The budget allocated to public diplomacy activities in the last five years in Mexico allowed to reach wider audiences (youth, think tanks, journalists, local governments), and improve the coordination of EU Delegation activities across different areas including increasing the use of virtual platforms during the pandemic and the use of social media for communication more broadly.

### 9.8.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives

While the literature about the EU in Mexico significantly focuses on the Global Agreement and economic issues, the activities of public diplomacy initiatives in Mexico cover a wide variety of areas that include education, cooperation, trade, civil society, environment, youth, rule of law and human rights. Based on public diplomacy initiatives, the EU Delegation has innovated its strategies to expand the visibility of the EU. The Roadshows on the Modernisation of the Global Agreement have provided an opportunity to meet with mayors, local leaders and business communities more widely across the country (2018 and ongoing). In education, public diplomacy initiatives have helped create the Erasmus alumni network (30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Erasmus Programme, November 2017) and expand the contact with universities through academic events and EU student simulations. The webinars "Linking to the EU" (2019 and ongoing) and the Enlargement of the "European Specialist" network in strategic states (2019) also focus on academia and students. Public diplomacy actions have also started a dialogue with the most relevant think tanks in the fields of organised crime, international relations and global cooperation, which has been successful in extending the EU's reach in specialised influential groups (EU-MEXICO Think Tank Dialogue Initiative since 2019). Communication with civil society groups aims to explain the EU's significant policies, particularly in those areas where there are different perspectives between the EU and the Mexican government, such as the EU Green Deal (Climate Diplomacy Weeks in 2017 and 2018). In human rights, the EU Delegation organises annual seminars and has created the "trialogues," a platform where the Mexican government, the EU Delegation, and civil society in Mexico and the EU discuss human rights issues. As part of public diplomacy actions, the EU Delegation also issues statements when human rights defenders or journalists disappeared or assassinated. In this regard, the EU Training for Junior Journalists (2019) targets media groups. The EU Delegation's activities synergise with EU Member States through "The Annual Action Plan for Joint Public Diplomacy". By defining key audiences, activities, and shared messages on campaigns, the EU Ambassador and EU Member States' Ambassadors participate, jointly or separately, in various public events (videos, talks).

### 9.8.2.2. Key audiences

Public diplomacy actions in Mexico target various groups, including political and economic decisionmakers, local governments, media, academic institutions, youth, think tanks, civil society organisations and the general public.

### 9.8.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps

The literature on the EU in Mexico and the EU Delegation acknowledges that there is a like-mindedness between the EU and Mexico, which allows for fruitful cooperation, but also some potential obstacles. The US overshadows the EU in media coverage and the scale of its public outreach events, even though both are not competing in the public diplomacy field. The current administration (2018-2024) demonstrates little interest in foreign policy which limits the attention to international actors such as

the EU in Mexico. Finally, the EU and Mexico also have opposing views regarding energy policy or human rights violation in Mexico. On top of the contextual obstacles, the EU Delegation lacks the established instruments that would produce information about the perceptions of the EU and public diplomacy in Mexico on a regular basis. Instead, it relies on event-based evaluations.

#### **9.8.2.4. Future outlook**

The public diplomacy activities in Mexico are likely to occur in an environment of political, economic and social stability at the global and regional levels, but also political and electoral domestic volatility. The EU Delegation aims to explain the significance of EU policies in the areas that are of importance and/or debated with local authorities – e.g., energy green policies.

## **9.9. Nigeria Country Report**

### **9.9.1. Literature review**

By population Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and is therefore of strategic importance. Nigeria is often articulated as a regional hegemon in Africa with respect to its dealings with the EU (Bakare, 2019). Nigeria, however, holds uneven perceptions of Europe and in particular, the EU. In the past five years, these perceptions are reflected in limited academic literature and reports, which target educated political leaders and civil society. The core themes in this literature include the EU's migration regime; the economy, including on investment, but especially on trade negotiations pertaining to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) in preparation for the re-negotiation of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement in 2021/2; and security.

#### **9.9.1.1. Overview**

Nigerian perceptions about the EU are fragmented. In Nigeria, the EU exists in the same space as more visible actors such as Brazil, China, India, Japan and the United States (US). Still, in a poll on perceptions of the EU conducted by Pew Research in Nigeria, there is a generally positive rating for the EU that has more or less held constant since the last polls six years ago, with 53% of Nigerians still holding a favourable view (Devlin, 2019). It is worth noting however that in terms of general perceptions, China and the US are viewed more favourably at 70% and 62% respectively (Devlin, 2019). Nigerian perceptions of the EU are largely situated within a broader outlook of the EU's roles in Africa related to issues around the EU's participation in conflict situations and therefore relate to security; trade and development; and migration and borders. The perception of Europe, and the EU that is articulated by the academic literature is limited to elite perceptions and by proxy through global opinion polls. This constrains the sort of claims that can be made about "Nigerian" public perceptions. For example, based on the Pew Survey (Devlin, 2019), only 6% of Nigerians consider the EU to be an 'economic powerhouse' (compared with 38% and 36% of US and China respectively). This constitutes an important gap in perceptions, wherein academic literature assumes the EU's economic dominance. Additionally, while EU engagements in Nigeria are myriad, including commitments to democratic consolidation, investments and the promotion of women's rights, the literature on perceptions of the EU in Nigeria did not significantly reflect on these issue-areas in Nigeria-EU relations in the last five years. For the most part, the perceptions that are reported in the literature are those of an educated public that includes journalists, think tanks, academics and political policy- and decision-makers.

#### **9.9.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

The main perceptions about the EU in Nigeria prioritise the visions of the EU a significant trading bloc, whose political power has amassed over the years with implications for regionalism in (West) Africa through its influence in security, trade and the movement of people. Dissecting the acknowledgement

of the EU as an actor, particularly in international trade through the EPAs, there is a sense that the EU used its power over West African countries as security signatories in a largely unfair trade agreement. Nigeria, for its part, resisted the EPA as, according to politicians and civil society groups, it did not serve the country's interests (Isaac & Bellonwu-Okafor, 2016).

Overall, the perceptions of the EU among Nigerian decision- and opinion-makers, particularly civil society, academics and policy-makers, are mixed. First, the EU is seen as an important actor, but one of many. In trade, it looms large but not especially positively in light of the EPAs (Osegbue, 2017) and in public opinion polls the EU ranks lower than China and the US in terms of its impact.

Second, perceptions of the EU range quite a lot depending on the thematic area. As for security, the perception is moderately positive. For example, with respect to Boko Haram, a terrorist organisation operating in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, civil society perceives that the EU has a role to play as a humanitarian actor and that the EU has done relatively well in this area, though it could do more (Hogerndoor, 2018). Moreover, the EU is viewed as one of a number of actors who has been supportive of programmes that have helped improve the security capacities of the sub-regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in which Nigeria is a major player. On the contrary, in the area of migration, perceptions – stemming from the experiences of migrants from Nigeria and critical African political leaders – are less positive. The perception is that the EU has a hostile migration regime (Ezemenaka, 2019) and simply wants to return Nigerian migrants, while Nigerian policy-makers seek for the EU to regularise migration pathways for Africans (Bisong, 2019; Arhin-Sam, 2019). Moreover, there is the view that the EU leverages its powerful position in West Africa (ECOWAS) to undermine regional migration policies (Bisong, 2019).

#### **9.9.1.3. Main gaps**

The main gap regarding perceptions is that there are generally no systematic studies that focus specifically on how Nigerians as a whole perceive Europe or the EU. As a result, Nigerian perceptions of the EU are meanly extrapolated from literature in other areas. In other words, while the literature articulates a variety of views on the EU's engagement in Nigeria, the primary focus is not on perceptions. Further, in the last five years, the focus on trade and negotiations, security and migration has diminished any emphasis on supporting democracy or gender rights. Despite a rhetoric shift in the EU in favour of opportunities for investment in Africa as a whole (Oloruntoba, 2016; Trouille, 2020), this issue has not generated much discussion or is reflected in the literature on perceptions of the EU in Nigeria. Perceptions of the EU are mainly derived from desktop research and interviews with elites and at household level in the case of the Pew Surveys.

#### **9.9.1.4. Key audiences**

Key audiences are policy-, decision- and opinion-makers including journalists, think tanks, academics and Nigerian policy-makers. In the area of trade, reports have also targeted members of trade unions (see Isaac and Bellonwu-Okafor, 2016). Where information is derived from the citizenry as in the case of the Pew Surveys on perceptions of the EU, the target still tends to be decision and opinion-makers including think tanks.

#### **9.9.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

Available literature does not explore changes or continuities. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that the academic literature on EU-Africa relations that attends to Nigeria focuses not only on trade, alongside development and security, but also on democracy and humanitarianism. Historically, the EU has been viewed as an important actor in Nigeria's democratic consolidation and has been seen to play an important humanitarian role, particularly in the north of the country (Marinelli & Udo, 2012). This focus, however, has given way to a much greater focus on the EU's impact on migration and the replacement of the Cotonou Agreement. There is no indication in the literature itself that there have been any significant changes in perception of Europe or the EU.

## 9.9.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Nigeria

Numerous public diplomacy initiatives are undertaken by the EU Delegation to Nigeria, sometimes in conjunction with EU Member States. The remit of these programmes, though not reflected by the existing literature, is focused on the youth in Nigeria as well as supporting other marginalised groups, especially women. EU Covid support has further created the opportunity for increased visibility of the EU Delegation in Nigeria across audiences and regions. The range of public diplomacy initiatives undertaken by the EU in Nigeria is extensive. This range and diversity are however not reflected in the literature.

### 9.9.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives

Priorities of EU public diplomacy initiatives fall into the following issue-areas: society, politics, education; health and environment. Public diplomacy initiatives that focus on social concerns like the promotion of human rights and gender equality constitute a main track of EU engagement in Nigeria. One of such programmes is the Spotlight Initiative – a collaboration between the EU and the United Nations (UN) to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls. Nigeria is one of the pilot countries for the implementation of, and events linked to the initiatives, which has facilitated a national conversation around gender-based violence. In one linked event, the Nigerian President Buhari and UN Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed were in attendance. This event got a lot of national media coverage and the commitment of state governors to frame gender-based violence as a national emergency. Another focus of public diplomacy initiatives has been on supporting democratic governance, primarily through election support. Recently, this has also targeted young people in advance of the 2019 national elections, promoting peaceful engagements in the electoral process. A third yet important focus that really highlights attention of public diplomacy to youth is around education through the Erasmus programme for Nigerian university students to study in Europe. With Member States, the EU organises the pre-departure orientation programme. However, the literature on external images of the EU does not reflect any of these initiatives. Meanwhile, Erasmus is also used to promote regular routes to immigration. Public diplomacy initiatives in political sector focus on peace and security and also mobilise EU Member States to act in supporting humanitarian action in the North East of Nigeria – a challenge which is reflected in the literature. While health as a theme has been absent from the literature, it has been galvanised in the public diplomacy initiatives by the response to the Covid pandemic, facilitating the activities of Team Europe by distributing personal protective equipment (PPE) across the country including rural communities, thus bolstering the visibility of the EU. In Nigeria this has translated to collaboration between the EU Delegation, France and Germany through Alliance Française and GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit). Spain leads on issues of migration, and Portugal with an interest in maritime security. Climate diplomacy is another area of visibility for EU Delegation. In this area, public diplomacy initiatives have been ongoing for many years, including Europe Day events that promote solar energy in Nigeria.

### 9.9.2.2. Key audiences

A substantive portion of public diplomacy initiatives target young people. This is justified on the basis that around 60% of the population of Nigeria are under 25 years old. Other initiatives are aimed at the government and the public through media campaigns around gender violence and election related political violence. Outside of Nigeria, Team Europe activities in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) and GIZ have also supported the regional economic community (REC), ECOWAS during Covid. This regional approach is being considered for the next programming cycle starting in 2022.

### 9.9.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps

It is difficult to marshal coherent stances among EU Member States, though this is changing. Moreover, Nigeria is viewed as a ‘complicated’ place due to its multiple stakeholders and general insecurities



including conflict in some areas of the country. Significantly, EU public diplomacy initiatives are not reflected in the literature on EU-Nigeria relations broadly, and Nigerian perceptions of the EU specifically. Yet, issue-areas covered by some public diplomacy initiatives are evident in the literature, for example on migration and humanitarian support in the Northern part of Nigeria. This suggests a gap between what the EU does, perceptions of the EU's roles in Nigeria, and the extent of the EU Delegation's reach outside of Abuja.

#### **9.9.2.4. Future outlook**

Future initiatives reflect an outlook that could see greater coordination between Member States and the EU Delegation particularly on migration and maritime security, which is also linked to a broader climate change/ environment remit beyond climate diplomacy. These new maritime security and environmental programmes would facilitate the removal of contaminants from the environment especially in the Niger Delta. Additionally, the EU Delegation has been in dialogue with the Nigerian authorities to focus on the empowerment of young people, women and people with disabilities. This focus is intended to a focal point in the lead up the 2023 elections where the EU Delegation's advocacy efforts want to underline the importance of including more people in decision making processes.

## **9.10. Republic of Korea Country Report**

### **9.10.1. Literature review**

In general, EU perceptions in Republic of Korea appear to be neutral. Since most of the literature in Republic of Korea deals with the EU media coverage, less can be said about perceptions of the general public and opinion-influencers. However, the literature reports that the traditional media tend to frame the EU rather critically in terms of its economic status (Chung & Park, 2016). In the last five years, studies of EU perceptions in Republic of Korea have started to engage with novel automated methods of text analysis (semantic network and sentiment analyses) and focus on new media (social media of YouTube and Facebook). Republic of Korean traditional media framing of the EU has not changed significantly (see Yoon & Chung, 2021 for an overview of Republic of Korean news media representations of the EU during 2010-2020). Republic of Korean media continues to focus on EU economic issues, especially those concerning trade relations (FTA), and multiple crises in the EU.

#### **9.10.1.1. Overview**

Literature on Republic of Korean perceptions in 2015-2021 centres on the EU's multiple crises but with a neutral interpretation. Relevant works observe the evolution of the crises (such as Brexit, the Greek financial crisis and Eurozone crisis) and how the EU deals with these crises. In this period, most studies of EU perceptions in Republic of Korea examine images of the EU in traditional and new (social) media rather than perceptions of the EU among the general public and/or national decision- and policy-makers. In the last five years, the media analyses tend to focus extensively on the EU in the context of crises events in Greece and the UK.

Economy is the central theme in the Republic of Korean perceptions, as reported by the literature. Perceptions of the EU's internal political issues, EU external relations, environment and health are secondary in focus, while themes such as RST, energy, culture as well as social affairs are rarely addressed by the perceptions literature in Republic of Korea. The literature also points to a deficit of systematic insights into the perceptions of the EU among the public and influencers/decision-makers. The key audiences are academics in EU studies or international politics, and their works are usually presented in the format of journal articles or book chapters.

### 9.10.1.2. Main documented perceptions

The main perceptions of the EU in Republic of Korea prioritise the vision of the EU as an economic and trade actor. The literature points out that the EU's economic/trade images are salient in relation to the EU's FTA with Republic of Korea (from the implementation process -2011 to 2015- to the ILO disputes since 2019) and China, as well as EU-US trade disputes under the Trump Administration over tariffs (Yoon & Chung, 2021). In the political arena, the EU's images are overshadowed by the US and Republic of Korea's regional powers (China, Japan and North Korea), while Iran was mentioned as a reference in terms of the EU's negotiations with a nuclear state and thus a local hook for Republic of Korean audience. The EU's normative images are not visible in the Korean media (Yoon & Chung, 2020; Park & Chung, 2019; 2020).

Since the works on perceptions of the EU in Republic of Korean focus largely on the EU as a whole, EU member states are of the secondary reference point in the relevant literature — particularly in reporting the EU crises (for example, Greece and Germany for the Eurozone crisis, the UK for Brexit and Italy for the rise of far-right parties and the Covid-19 outbreak). The literature further states that Republic of Korean media tend to focus on crises when reporting the EU — a trend explained by the newsmakers' preference to cover provocative issues in order to attract attention of their potential readers — yet media restrain from providing any evaluation of these crises. Analogously, more recent research reports the views of Korean general public towards the EU reports to be neutral. Yoon & Chung (2021) point out that the Republic of Korean general public perceive EU-Korea relations as neutral. The authors also suggest that most of the Korean respondent believe they do not know the EU well, but they would like to know more about the EU.

### 9.10.1.3. Main gaps

The main gap in the perceptions studies in Republic of Korea in the last five years is that beyond the media studies, there is a deficit of research into opinions among the general public, policy- and decision-makers and civil society. Existing studies about EU perceptions focus on (traditional and social) media content utilising manual/qualitative and automated/quantitative approaches. Since 2015, the quantitative methods of data scraping became popular and widely accepted, and the literature focused on exploring media framing and semantic network analysis (Yoon & Chung 2021). As a result, more detailed and elaborated explanations about EU perceptions in Republic of Korea become increasingly difficult to gauge.

Regarding specific topics, with the exception of trade and investment, most of other themes are also underrepresented in the available literature.

### 9.10.1.4. Key audiences

Key audiences, identified by the relevant literature, are academics. Most collected pieces of literature were either journal articles or book chapters in the areas of EU politics, international relations (Park & Chung 2019; 2020), area studies (Chung & Park, 2016; Chung et al., 2017) and interdisciplinary studies (Yoon & Chung 2020; 2021). The audiences tend to regard the EU, its images and performance globally. However, the EU is still an under-represented topic in international and area studies in Republic of Korea, while regional powers (such as China, Japan and North Korea) and the US receive more coverage in literature. Quantitative large-N data analysis based on web scraping are seen as useful, novel and convenient research methods due to the emergence of Big Data.

### 9.10.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions

The literature did not point to the evolution of perceptions of the EU in Republic of Korea but to continuity in terms of themes and actors in focus — the crises (e.g., Eurozone crisis or Brexit) were the central themes, and crisis-related actors (e.g., Greece, the UK and the EU) were the main actors reported. According to the literature, framing of the EU as a trade and economic actor was leading in the media pre-2015, and the EU's images in other areas (e.g., political, socio-cultural, developmental,

environmental, etc.) were underrepresented. Since 2015, the literature portrayed the EU's economic and trade power and its crises as the key factors contributing to EU images in Republic of Korea. However, media analysis in the literature reveals that these crises received nor negative nor any other evaluation, and public perceptions remain neutral.

## **9.10.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Republic of Korea**

The main aim of EU public diplomacy in Korea is to increase the EU's visibility among its key audiences: youth, civil society and general public as well as influencers and multipliers and local institutions, such as schools, universities, creative industries. The persisting problem is that despite several rounds of public diplomacy projects, the EU's visibility remains low largely due to the lack of interest in the EU among Korean general public and key influencers – the trend registered by the relevant literature as well. The EU Delegation to Republic of Korea has operated public diplomacy project 'EU Policy and Outreach Partnership in the Republic of Korea' (EUPOP ROK) and a number of press and information activities with the aim to increase the EU's visibility, raise the interest of the local public in the EU and build long-term partnerships. The first phase of the EUPOP ROK has been carried out in 2017-2019, and the project is entering its second phase now.

### **9.10.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives**

While the EU Delegation seeks to increase the visibility of the EU among the Korean public, the main themes of public diplomacy initiatives – education and culture with a thematic focus of on creative industries, human rights and climate change – are not reflected in the literature as those grasping attention of the general public in Korea. Instead, the literature reports that the Korean media in particular reflects on the EU's multiple crises (Eurozone crisis, Brexit and COVID-19 outbreak and responses), while the Korean people are more interested in the EU's economic performances (trade, investment and business). EUPOP ROK attempts to implement some activities with Embassies of EU Member States to synergise their performances in public diplomacy, but these are possible largely in culture and education. For example, the annual initiative 'EU goes to school' involves EU Member States' Ambassadors who are visiting schools. The 'Study in Europe' fair, together with the Member States, promotes the Erasmus plus programme and Erasmus Mundus scholarship programme in coordination with local universities and specifically on the base of Jean Monnet Activities (Chairs, Modules, Centres and Networks Holders). EU Member States also use their cultural foundations such as Alliance Française and Goethe-Institut Korea.

### **9.10.2.2. Key audiences**

The EU Delegation sets Korea's next generation as its key audience group. Public diplomacy activities are directed to high school ('EU goes to School') and university students (Erasmus+, academic exchanges, Model EU) who are very perceptive of the EU. The EU Delegation also considers academic institutions such as universities (e.g., Jean Monnet Activities recipients – chairs, modules, centres and networks) as its like-minded and supportive partners. However, civil society, academia and opinion-makers are seen as much harder to engage due to their specific, "niche" focus, while the general public lacks interest in the EU.

### **9.10.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps**

The EU Delegation in Korea attempts to reach out to their key audiences by diversifying the themes and channels of interaction, but this requires more staff working at the EU Delegation as well as research into what their audiences are interested in. The key obstacle is not the lack of information about the EU but the lack of interest in it. While Europe is perceived positively overall, there is lack of understanding how the EU relates to Korea and Koreans in "everyday life". The literature also reflects on this by stressing that the Korean general public are more interested in news about the EU's

economic/trade performance. In contrast, EU Delegation emphasises cultural and educational aspects of EU-Korea relations.

#### **9.10.2.4. Future outlook**

The EU Delegation that climate change, human rights and democracy will be the most relevant themes for public diplomacy initiatives in Republic of Korea. In going ahead, the EU Delegation seeks to organise seminars and press conferences and forums with a wider public, which could attract more supportive partners for EU public diplomacy efforts. Finally, to approach civil society effectively, the EU Delegation plans to engage with influencers among the Korean society (such as celebrities or Korean YouTubers who has many subscribers or followers on social media).

## **9.11. Russia Country Report**

### **9.11.1. Literature review**

Perception studies post 2015 define Russia's attitude towards the EU as negative and shaped by the state of EU-Russia relations at large. These relations are described as being in the state of crisis or conflict, with few to none opportunities for improvement. However, critical perceptions of the EU do not translate into pessimistic attitudes as to the future of Russia-EU relations, especially in the areas of culture and environment protection.

#### **9.11.1.1. Overview**

Since 2015, Russian perceptions of the EU have continuously deteriorated and the voluminous literature portrays the Ukraine crisis as a turning point in EU-Russian growing confrontation, followed by EU sanctions against Russia, the debates around the construction Nord Stream-2 and around the cases of the Skripals and Navalny. Some authors note that the current state of EU-Russian relations is a result of the EU's overall strategic miscalculation reflected in its policies throughout the 1990s, Eastern enlargement and, lastly, the Ukraine crisis (Headley, 2018; Foxall, 2017; Pop, 2016; Tichý, 2019).

#### **9.11.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

The literature on Russian perceptions focuses largely on the analysis of official and media discourse (including government sources) as well as public opinion towards the EU – all revealing a negative attitude towards the EU. The political theme dominates the discussion in *realpolitik* terms, wherein Russian officials see security issues (and a growing visibility of the US/NATO in this area) as well as the EU's growing presence in the post-Soviet space as a threat to Russia's national interests. Economy and energy are often mentioned in the context of EU-Russia relations at large and also overlap with political interests and conflict (Tichý, 2019: 215; Chaban, Knodt & Headley, 2018). Russia's national interests and its request for respect and equal treatment by the EU are seen as the main factors behind Russia's negative attitudes towards the EU.

Meanwhile, experts also consider the economy and energy as the areas of potential improvement for EU-Russia relations, which mirrors the framing of the EU in Russian media as an economic or trading power but not as one equal to Russia the US in geopolitical terms. As such, the EU's image in media is of a hostile, yet weak and condescending actor (Chaban, Elgström & Gulyaeva, 2017), and Brexit has further advanced to the perception of the EU as a weak and 'loose' union (Ananieva, 2020).

The general public appears to reflect this trend (Shestopal et al. 2016, Levada-Center 2021; VCIOM 2021). Russian respondents see the EU as a strong but gradually weakening 'decorative union'; the majority regard the EU as a partner but are disappointed with it, and about a quarter of respondents consider the EU to be an enemy. At the same time, Russians see their country as an integral part of

Europe and, through this, support neighbourhood and partnership relations with the EU. Despite ‘cooling relations’ between Russia and the EU, ‘the EU remains a strong educational partner for Russian HEIs, students and staff’, and ‘culture has become the only channel to engage with the Russian public’ for the EU (Valenza & Bossuyt, 2019: 5, 9). Finally, the EU has been mentioned as an international leader in environmental/ecological diplomacy, and its cooperation with Russia in that field is perceived in a positive way (Shestakova, 2017).

#### **9.11.1.3. Main gaps**

Russia’s perceptions of the EU have acquired significant coverage post-2015, but they focus largely on political conflict in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. Other publications cover energy, migration and human rights (LGBTIs), but remain almost invisible in the highly-dense, politicised context. This is even more true for culture and environment. Academic works often focus on official political discourse and analysis of state media, thus, examining the “official” narrative and very few works look into perceptions of other audiences, with the only one focusing on youth carried out under the Erasmus+ framework (Khukhlaev et al., 2019). Overall, EU perception studies in Russia do not have a systematic and coherent character adding to the method- and theory-focused gaps in the field.

#### **9.11.1.4. Key audiences**

Policy-makers and general public are the key audiences of the research, and their reported perceptions are largely negative. Some studies find that more educated respondents and those who have visited the EU reveal a more critical attitude towards the EU than those who did not and those who receive knowledge about the EU from the media and Internet (Shestopal et al., 2016). Despite neutral media coverage of the EU, negative evaluations dominate when emotive indicators are in check and/or when the EU’s metaphorical image is described (Chaban & Elgström, 2018; Chaban, Elgström & Gulyaeva, 2017; Soloviova, 2016). Scholars in general tend to prioritise a realistic outlook at the state of EU-Russia affairs, and even though they no longer perceive the EU as leading by example, their attitudes towards the EU are mostly neutral or positive (Kuznetsova 2017; Zverev and Rogozar 2016).

#### **9.11.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

While the majority of publications post 2015 focus on the most recent developments in EU-Russia relations, their analysis often counts back to the evolution of EU-Russia relations: beginning with the dissolution of the USSR and even further – to the debate about Russia’s civilizational choice between *zapadniki* (Westerners) and *pochvoenniki* (Slavophiles) (Barburska 2019; Volkov, 2018). The latter finds its reflection in the shifts in Russia’s domestic politics – one of the key drivers behind perceptions of the EU. Here, Russia’s reverse towards traditional values’ discourse and sovereign democracy under President Putin are seen as the main domestic factors shaping negative attitudes towards the EU (Headley, 2018; Foxall, 2017; Verpoest, 2018). EU-specific factors that have led to deterioration of its perceptions in Russia are largely shaped by the EU’s continuous intervention in the region, which Russia sees as part of its geopolitical space. Importantly, the impact of the EU’s policies (Enlargement, European Neighbourhood Policy, AAs and DCFTAs) and actions has been multiplied by the US and NATO. Russia’s perceptions of the EU have been and are more positive than those of the US/NATO, and the EU has been continuously seen as a ‘negotiating partner’ between Russia and the US (Foxall, 2017: 5). However, the EU’s support to the NATO’s enlargement, the “colour revolutions” and, finally, its role in the Ukraine crisis are seen as the key factors that have turned Russia away from the EU. As a result, Russian experts argue that the EU should be the first to initiate a dialogue with Russia (Zverev and Rogozar, 2016), while others point to the revision of the EU’s foreign policy, which may bear the fruit in the future (Headley, 2018). On the whole, EU-Russia current relations are seen as disrupted and in conflict; the literature does not predict any improvement in the attitudes towards the EU in Russia in a foreseeable future. However, some areas, where cooperation may still happen and potentially improve attitudes towards the EU are mentioned. These include “depoliticising” economic relationships, cooperation in the spheres of interest to both Russia and the EU (Ananieva, 2020) and cooperation in the fields of culture (Valenza & Bossuyt, 2019) and environment (Shestakova, 2017).



## **9.11.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in Russia**

The EU Delegation to Russia aims to promote EU principles and interests with a view to provide a factual view of the EU. Over the course of 2017-2020, the EU Delegation conducted over 170 events with Russian partners engaging 1000 people and organisations, supporting local projects or co-creating events with local actor.

### **9.11.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives**

In its activities, the EU Delegation emphasises people-to-people contacts in education (Erasmus +; Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC); the experts' EUREN network; EU info-centres; youth exchanges/EU study weeks)); culture (EU Film Festivals run online and in the regions, 'Russia is Europe' stressing similarities between Russia and Europe; all 27 EU Member States actively involved in cultural events and work with creative industries); climate diplomacy (high-level conference on this non-politicised topic); social issues (with focus on empowerment of women, inclusive society (e.g. programmes for disabled people, support towards minorities and human rights), journalists training on freedom of speech/media. 'Engaged Europe' – picking on non-politicised themes deals with climate, trades, digital. The EU Delegation informs its outreach actions by running its own research on public attitudes towards the EU: conducting opinion polls (Levada Center) twice a year in Moscow and focus groups in 2 regional big towns (Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk – in 2020 online). EU Member States are actively engaged in EU public diplomacy in Russia particularly in the field of culture and education. Among the most active ones are Germany, France, the Baltic States and Finland ('Memorial', EUREN), Spain and Belgium (the College of Europe).

### **9.11.2.2. Key audiences**

The EU Delegation seeks to address a variety of key audience groups with its public diplomacy activities while connecting like-minded people with a special focus on students and young people, academia and university networks, the media and social media influences, think tanks and activists and civil society organisations active on gender, the environment and human rights, as well as regional and federal authorities.

### **9.11.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps**

In line with the literature, the perceived obstacles in the EU-Russia relations are mainly of a political nature. These are disagreements about the nature of the Ukraine crisis, sanctions, the Navalny case, etc. There are some 'translation' moments: according to the EU Delegation, the term 'public diplomacy' does not resonate with many people and is used selectively by EU Delegation. Gaps in research on public opinion preclude knowledge of the attitudes and thus an incorporation in the planning of public diplomacy activities. Russia is a very big country, and the key challenge has been to reach out to regions as well as include people from diverse regions.-The attitude to Europe is benevolent in general, unlike the attitude to the EU. Still there is a strong correlation with personal experience in Europe and the source of information. People with personal experience in Europe perceive the EU much better than those who do not travel to Europe and get information from TV. The difference in perceptions is largely determined by the difference in the information sources that people use, as well as a growing generational gap. The worst perceptions of the EU were in 2014, and since then the attitude towards the EU improves.

### **9.11.2.4. Future outlook**

In light of the vast territory of Russia and in contrast to expectations, Covid has boosted the EU's outreach. In the future, the EU Delegation intends to organise more of hybrid events. Also, the EU and Russia are interdependent, interlinked geographically, culturally, economically and historically; hence, their cooperation will continue in the areas of joint interest. Such "islands of cooperation" provide thematic entry points for the EU Delegation and include cooperation projects across the border regions

of Russia, research and innovation, educational and civil society exchanges, counter-terrorism, migration, energy, issues related to the Arctic and addressing environmental challenges and climate change.

## **9.12. South Africa Country Report**

### **9.12.1. Literature review**

Awareness of the EU has increased demonstrably since 2015 – linked directly to the momentous Brexit referendum in 2016 and the resulting flurry of reporting in South Africa about the shocking result and its potential consequences for both EU-South Africa and United Kingdom-South Africa relations (Kotsopoulos, 2020).

#### **9.12.1.1. Overview**

Perceptions of the EU remain largely linked to specific groups within South Africa and centred around specific issue-areas. If the diverse spectrum of the South African population is considered, studies have shown a limited knowledge of the EU. This may also be an extension of general South African disinterest in international politics and limited perceptions of foreign institutions (Fioramonti & Olivier, 2007). Traditional media tends to be largely inward looking, focused primarily on domestic news. That said, the image of the EU is more positive than negative and remarkably stable over time. A Pew Survey of perceptions of the EU in 2013 and then again in 2019 revealed no change in South African public opinion about the EU (Devlin, 2019). Knowledge of the EU has risen discernibly with government officials and academia. South Africa's profile as the only African member of the G20 and BRICS, and its strategic partnership with the EU, have also ensured consistent South Africa-EU interactions. At the very least, this has increased the interaction of both actors and contributed to generally positive perceptions of the EU (Agnew & Fioramonti, 2019). Some specific issues have also served to put the EU in the South African headlines since 2015, most dominantly Brexit. Reporting on Brexit has centred around the result itself but even more around its implications for South Africa, especially in the area of trade and international finance (Kotsopoulos, 2020). Poultry has been another prominent issue, with a mostly negative perception of the EU's perceived aggressive exportation of chicken which undermines South African producers (Ward, 2017).

#### **9.12.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

Difficult to understand, the EU looks inconspicuous in the eyes of the general public (Kotsopoulos, 2020; pre-2015 see Fioramonti & Olivier, 2007). EU's inherent complexity makes it difficult to capture in the eyes of the public imagination, particularly if "the legitimacy of the EU rests on the power it is perceived to have" (Agnew & Fioramonti, 2018, p. 191). However, the trend identified in 2015 of increasing awareness of the EU has been maintained. Brexit, then, emerged as a very visible and highly debated issue. Some of the South African print media shone a negative light on the anticipated adverse economic repercussions of Brexit. In fact, no positive interpretations of Brexit were discernible in the media. However, the bulk of commentary brought the economic focus back into a South African context, with contrasting visions of Brexit as an opportunity for South African business (especially vis-à-vis the UK) as well as a possible threat to business interests in the EU (Kotsopoulos, 2020). Another specific issue of focus has been perceptions of the EU in energy governance (Fioramonti, 2017; Knodt, Chaban, & Nielsen, 2017). This research examined diffusion of EU norms in a competitive sector, in which South Africa increasingly had alternative options, particularly from its BRICS co-members. Further, recent work has compared perceptions of EU and Chinese narratives on various subjects (Keuleers, 2021; Keuleers, 2016). The results have revealed that the EU has not been as effective at transmitting larger ideational ideas about itself, over material and economic ones. This lack of relevance, emerges also in opinion polls, revealing that many do not see the EU as more effective than

other global institutions. While there are no recent studies, pre-2015 literature has noted a tension among decision-makers between acceptances of the importance of the EU on the one hand, and feelings that the EU operates by double standards on the other (Fioramonti & Poletti, 2008). The literature also reflects on negative perceptions as the EU is described as ‘inconsistent’, especially with respect to the pursuit of its interests in trade negotiations (Fioramonti & Olivier, 2007, p. 408; Fioramonti & Poletti, 2008, p. 171; Fioramonti, 2012, p. 154).

### **9.12.1.3. Main gaps**

Much of the literature uses a limited set of data. As for opinion polls, Afrobarometer is a common source but the one in which researchers have little control of the research questions. This leaves gaps in terms of probing what citizens know about the EU or how much they know about it. Given these limitations, some older studies of South African perceptions of the EU instead focus on interviewing decision-makers, taking advantage as well of South Africa’s open system and the accessibility of these people (Adelle & Kotsopoulos 2017; Fioramonti & Kimunguyi, 2011; Fioramonti & Kotsopoulos; 2015). A shortcoming of such interviewing, however, has been the continued over-reliance on a narrow band of audiences familiar with the EU, such as government officials and academics. Meanwhile, other audiences such as business and youth are underrepresented. Somewhat similar situation regards media, where the traditional media is well represented in the studies assessed but social media isn’t. As a result, research focus lies with policy-makers, general public and the media. Other areas such as the EU’s cultural impact remain under-explored.

### **9.12.1.4. Key audiences**

The general public, the media, civil society and policy-makers are the principal audiences identified in the literature. Public opinion is generally extracted from secondary data and poses a challenge in terms of accessing the original data. While more recent literature has expanded on the key audience groups of research in some cases, specifically to university students (Keuleers, 2016; 2021), civil society is represented through trade unions and NGO’s. The media is largely represented by both print and TV, but, as noted above, social media still plays a peripheral role in perceptions studies in South Africa. Research into the attitudes among policy-makers varies but the key audience group is largely represented through analyses of documents or speeches.

### **9.12.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

The evolution of EU perceptions in South Africa has been driven both by endogenous (to the EU) and exogenous (the global context and South African within that context) factors. Without doubt, Brexit has brought attention to the EU in incomparable ways to years past. This has been particularly evident in the traditional print media (Kotsopoulos, 2020). Brexit has fed into a broader interpretation of a shifting global order, where the EU is part of a diminishing Western-based power. This interpretation may even be more acutely felt in South Africa, which is strongly linked to alternative alliances such as the BRICS and institutions of the Global South like the African Union. It could be argued that studies of South African perceptions do not do an adequate job of capturing the current zeitgeist and shifting narratives in the country. Since 2015, there has been a marked rise in national student protest movements, many directly linked to redressing black South African marginalisation and the perpetuation of vestiges of the apartheid system. These protests, coupled with the greater prominence of decolonisation efforts within academic institutions and beyond, may contribute to shaping perceptions of the Global North. Understanding of the EU remains relatively low but linking it to the Global North and domestic issues surrounding the perpetuation of power structures favouring white (read: European) rule is easy to do. Capturing these dynamics could be revelatory.

## 9.12.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in South Africa

Public diplomacy practitioners from the EU Delegation in South Africa paint a picture of a varied set of public diplomacy initiatives that have met with success both before and, with some adjustments, during the Covid19 pandemic. While focusing on topics such as economy, climate change and civil society dialogue, the EU Delegation does not “shy” away from more sensitive issues – addressing the EU’s legacy of colonialism and Black economic empowerment and state procurement in their public diplomacy initiatives. The EU Delegation is hoping for an improvement of the EU’s visibility in the future.

### 9.12.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives

The EU Delegation focuses on three themes in its key public diplomacy initiatives: economic diplomacy (investment), climate change awareness (linked and timed to coincide with the EU’s climate week), and a “European Inspiring Thinkers” dialogue series with civil society. Public diplomacy initiatives in the field of the economy touched on sensitive issues such as Black economic empowerment and state procurement. The discussions were picked up by the mainstream media, eliciting timely discussions on these challenges including within the diplomatic community and the EU Delegation has worked closely with EU Member States on the initiative, and some have sought to emulate it since. The EU Delegation seeks to engage with local rather than European speakers on sensitive issues. Thus, on the question of illicit financial flows, a public diplomacy event was run closely with the former President’s foundation. Likewise, the EU Delegation also hosts a long-standing “European Inspiring Thinkers” dialogue series. The third series extended for a week, tackling hugely challenging issues like racism which have historically been linked to European engagement in the country. For a 2021 event on democracy, Constitutional Court judge Albie Sachs and the highly respected Thuli Madonsela (the public protector who pursued “state capture” charges of corruption under the Zuma administration) spoke. The EU Delegation also organises a “climate week” in South Africa. The initiative has grown exponentially over time. In 2019 the Delegation partnered with the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), for a well-received week-long event featuring students, government officials and academics. The subsequent 2020 event took place virtually, with many of the issues picked up in the conventional media and social media. On social issues the EU Delegation further engages on the topic of gender-based violence.

### 9.12.2.2. Key audiences

In the EU Delegation, officials recognise that most EU-sponsored events in South Africa largely engage government officials or civil society activist leaders. A concerted effort is not currently being made to broaden the key audiences through public diplomacy initiatives, however, the Delegation has recently engaged with tabloid outlet News24, to broadcast discussion sessions on topical issues such as gender-based violence in acknowledgement of the need to broaden audiences. The result has been a resounding success, with thousands of people viewing these sessions.

### 9.12.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps

Covid has upended the successful initiatives that require people to people contacts – particularly climate change awareness week which was based on a format of public in-person events through universities and think-tanks. The Delegation has pivoted and embraced virtual tools and arguably found them more useful in terms of addressing a broader audience. Somewhat unexpectedly, Covid helped to kickstart the use of South African personalities, since experts from Europe could not travel to South Africa. The Delegation has also had to contend with the historical baggage that European engagement with South Africa has entailed (as noted in the literature review). This could manifest itself in terms of the EU being perceived as hypocritically lecturing.

#### **9.12.2.4. Future outlook**

The Delegation provided a list of three issues that are contributing to the future outlook for perceptions of the EU in South Africa and their possible influence on public diplomacy activities. The first issue is Brexit. Prior to it, the South African media's Anglophone orientation had delivered news about Europe with a British focus. Brexit has given the EU Delegation a surprising opportunity to show how present the EU is in South Africa. The second issue is the Presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa. While under the previous administration of Jacob Zuma, Russia, Cuba and China took priority, the situation has improved under Ramaphosa, who takes a more pragmatic approach. Finally, the issue of Covid has been and will continue to be a factor in shaping public diplomacy initiatives. In the future, the Delegation seeks to broaden its key audience to include not only government officials and civil society leaders.

### **9.13. United States Country Report**

#### **9.13.1. Literature review**

Perceptions of the EU became more negative in the United States (US) over the period 2015-2021. This was largely due to more visible sceptical views about the EU amongst Republicans and conservatives during the Trump Administration, who increasingly viewed the EU as both an economic free-rider and a representation of global governance threatening American sovereignty. However, beyond the political elites associated with the Trump Administration, the overall majority of Americans still view the EU and Europe positively as a partner, due to similar values and a shared culture.

##### **9.13.1.1. Overview**

The most significant event over the period 2015-2021 that was reported in the literature and influenced US perceptions of the EU was the election of US president Donald Trump, who popularised nationalist, anti-globalist perceptions amongst a notable percentage of conservatives and Republicans in the US (Devlin, 2020). This worldview, in conjunction with negative comments by Trump against the EU over trade and security issues, led to an overall decline in positive perceptions of the EU. Based on surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center (Devlin, 2020), this trend was highlighted by a notable drop in favourable views of the EU amongst Republicans (and Republic leaning) from 56% in 2014 to 39% in 2019. Interestingly, support amongst Democrats (and Democrat leaning) held steady over this time period at 64/65%). This 26% gap in 2019 was the largest between the two political parties since this question was first asked in 2002. The partisan views of the EU also related to its preferred level of engagement with the world, with 46% of Democrats saying that the EU should be more involved in addressing the world's problems, while only 36% of Republicans supported this approach (Friedhoff, 2021). Besides partisanship, age segments also showed notable differences in perception, with millennials (born 1981 to 1996) the most favourable regarding the EU at 63%, versus Gen Xers (born 1965 to 1980) at 50% and Boomers (born 1946 to 1964) at 51% (Huang & Silver, 2020). However, despite declining perceptions overall, 78% of Americans view Europe as a partner, while only 18% view it as a rival (Chicago Council, 2019).

##### **9.13.1.2. Main documented perceptions**

The main perceptions about the EU in the US vary by population segment. Overall, the majority of Americans still view the EU and Europe positively, due to "similar values and a shared culture" (Gorà, 2019, p. 36) and a historic and deeply trusting relationship (Dominguez & Larive, 2019). However, during the Trump Administration the literature shows concern that the relationship and trust between the historic allies was declining (Riddervold & Newsome, 2018). The EU still tended to be viewed primarily as an economic actor, particularly amongst the public and experts (Góra, 2019). However, there was a growing negative narrative about this role due to President Trump's criticism of the EU



(Belin, 2019). This also applied to individual EU countries, which were viewed as both partners and rivals (Szabo 2018). Besides the economy (and trade in particular), EU external relations and security is also a common theme in the literature. On this topic, the literature focuses on criticisms by President Trump regarding the perception that the EU (via NATO) had weak defence and security capabilities, thus forcing the US to disproportionately contribute to the EU's security, making the EU a "free rider" (Riddervold & Newsome, 2018; Brattberg & Whineray, 2020). While the US appeared to be pushing for a more muscular EU defence capability outside territorial defence, this contradicted earlier suspicions about autonomous EU defence capabilities outside NATO, which were viewed as detrimental to US interests (Rees, 2017). Additionally, the literature also pays attention to internal EU politics, and especially the impact of Brexit. Here, there was a perception that the EU lacked unified leadership and was hindered by bureaucracy. This made it ineffective during recent crises, such as the migration crisis (Góra, 2019). There was also a view that there is a multiplicity of EU institutions and states with conflicting interests, which also made dealing with a crisis challenging for the organisation. The literature argues that this complexity led the US to sidestep the EU and deal directly with EU countries, depending on the issue at hand (Marsh, 2018).

#### **9.13.1.3. Main gaps**

Themes that are under-represented or not represented in the literature include health (despite the 2020 pandemic that significantly impacted the globe, including the EU). Culture and development are also missing in the literature. Science, research and technology is only briefly mentioned, but only in relation to the economy and defence. Energy is also mentioned in relation to Russia and its natural gas. There is limited engagement on the environment and climate in one article by Dominguez and Larive (2019). The main methods mentioned in the studies are opinion polls, which feature in about half the sources. Articles also rely on expert interviews and a theoretical/conceptual analysis.

#### **9.13.1.4. Key audiences**

The majority of articles do not mention specific audiences, but rather perceptions from the US and/or Washington, representing the views of the policy-, decision-makers and experts, especially for articles derived from interviews. There are a number of articles that make claims about American public opinion in general, and in these cases, views of groups are presented by political affiliation and age bracket. As younger American audiences hold the most positive view of the EU (and other multilateral organizations), more analysis on their views is needed and offers an opportunity to gain insights into the possible evolution of EU perceptions.

#### **9.13.1.5. Evolution and continuity of perceptions**

Both experts and opinion polls cited in the literature suggest that perceptions of the EU have become more negative between 2015 and 2020. This can be largely attributed to the negative narratives about the EU by former US president Trump, who was particularly critical of the EU on trade and defence (Stokes, 2018). However, the literature also argues that the relationship is still solid, despite the recent dip (Riddervold & Newsome, 2018). Others suggest that perception is based on the political context and that events over time impact EU perceptions, which fluctuate over time (Dominguez & Larive, 2019). A new Biden Administration could, therefore, set the tone for improving perceptions. A changing American population and desire for more diverse and progressive society amongst the youth offers opportunities for improved EU perceptions. However, this is in some ways in contrast to 'the dominant voices and faces driving transatlantic relations [which] remain overwhelmingly white' (Rivera, 2021). Reforms offer an opportunity to grow positive perceptions amongst the youth (and into the future) towards the EU, while failure to change represents a threat.

While the EU has been viewed positively in the US for decades, the period 2015-2021 shows that this cannot be taken for granted. The EU, like many other former largely apolitical subjects, is now increasingly being viewed from a partisan angle, with conservatives/Republicans becoming more

populist/nationalist, and viewing the EU increasingly as a rival and threat. On the other hand, liberals/Democrats and younger Americans continue to see the EU positively and more as a partner.

### **9.13.2. Overview of EU public diplomacy initiatives in the US**

Recent years have recorded growing political polarisation in the US, which has impacted the perception of the EU. As such, the EU has been cautious in its public diplomacy programming efforts to avoid becoming involved in US partisan debates and appearing to take sides. It has continued to engage a variety of audiences in a number of programmes spanning from education to culture in order to enhance awareness of the EU in the US. The EU Delegation sees Covid as an opportunity to reach more and geographically diverse audiences through online communication and hopes to use these lessons after the pandemic subsides.

#### **9.13.2.1. Main themes and activities under public policy initiatives**

The EU Delegation participates in public diplomacy programmes covering a number of different themes. The following list only highlights some of these. In education, the EU has a number of programmes including Jean Monnet activities, Schuman-Fulbright Fellowships, and education outreach through “Creating the Next Generation of ‘Transatlanticists’”. In the areas of science, technology and research and culture, the EU Delegation participates in the South by South West festival (EU@SXSW) and in 2021 the (online) conference promoted strong collaboration with the US on themes from “digital transformation” to “greening economies.” On environment and climate change, the EU Delegation also works with youth during its annual Climate Diplomacy Week. On the economy, the EU Delegation participates in a number of trade events to promote better trade between the two economic blocks. In the cultural arena, the EU Delegation holds the European Month of Culture and the EU Film Showcase.

Another important public diplomacy program that aims to increase the EU’s visibility and understanding about its policies and principles is the EU Policy & Outreach Partnership (EU POP). Launched in 2016, it has conducted hundreds of events both inside Washington DC targeting Congress, the Administration and other stakeholders and outside Washington with state governments and local organisations.

EU public diplomacy initiatives address some areas such as culture, science, research and development and environment and climate that received limited coverage in the US literature. They also address areas such the economy and trade that were covered. By promoting the role of the EU in these areas of limited literature focus, greater awareness is likely to develop.

#### **9.13.2.2. Key audiences**

Due to increasing polarisation in the US and the desire to avoid public controversy, the EU Delegation is careful to avoid any perception of bias so it attempts to approach audiences that are both receptive or relatively neutral. These may include Congressional staff, civil society organisations, academia, students, local authorities and administrations. There has also been a recent increased focus on youth and minority groups.

#### **9.13.2.3. Obstacles and main gaps**

There is a number of obstacles to the successful implementation of EU public diplomacy initiatives. One of them is the size and diversity of the US, creating challenges around reaching audiences in all 50 states with limited budget. A second obstacle is a lack of existing awareness in the US regarding the EU, as ‘the majority of Americans really have no perception of what the EU is’ (EUus1). The EU Delegation has programming to address all of its thematic areas; however, here the limited resourcing and the need to make decision over its allocation represent the main implementation gaps.

#### 9.13.2.4. Future outlook

Beyond the polarization of US domestic politics, the EU Delegation will likely continue targeting audiences and strengthening current and new networks that are receptive of the EU. The EU Delegation will also continue implementing some of the lessons of that the Covid pandemic has brought up regarding the opportunities to significantly increase the EU's outreach at a lower cost and through more efficient online options to which Americans are increasingly familiar with and open to. It will also adjust its former in-person programs to hybrid formats to benefit both from the potentially higher outreach and recreate the settings in which people are more comfortable sharing information.

## Conclusion

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This Literature Review has provided a systematic comparative review of the state-of-the-art research on external perceptions of the EU and Europe in the eyes of its 13 key international partners in the years 2015 to 2021. Drawing on the substantive overview provided by the Baseline Study published in 2015, this Literature Review has consolidated and synthesised the findings of existing work on EU perceptions between 2015 and 2021 and compared them to the findings of the Baseline Study. The scope of literature in this review includes academic publications, relevant outputs by think tanks and government agencies, policy evaluations and opinion polls. The Literature Review also overviews the public diplomacy initiatives undertaken by EU Delegations in 2015-2021 and compares them to the findings and themes presented in the Literature Review. It also compares the public diplomacy initiatives as they evolve, including insights into the perceived obstacles and gaps in the eyes of EU public diplomacy practitioners. The focus on the evolution of perceptions serves to assess how perceptions of Europe, the EU and its flagship policies might have shifted, what the literature and public diplomacy initiatives (re)focus on, and which central themes either change or are continuous. The Baseline Study of 2015 ended at the cusp of drastic developments and changes to *EU-specific* and *global* contexts, including the surge of nationalism and far-right populism, the EU's irregular migration crisis, terror attacks in EU Member States, Brexit, Russia-Ukraine conflict, but also increasing awareness of and protests and action against racism, the deteriorating environment and the existential threat of climate change. The contexts of the Update Study 2021 are marked by these developments and, at the same time, strongly impacted by Covid-19. The pandemic has posed fundamental challenges to the EU internally and externally, including its image around the world and the practice of public diplomacy.

This Literature Review of the Update Study has already considered above how relevant literature and EU public diplomacy practitioners conceive **(3.1) Gaps** and **(3.2) Key audiences**. Here we conclude that the identification of the evolution of gaps discussed above is crucial to better assess (1) risk and opportunities for the EU public diplomacy in selected countries; (2) the effectiveness of EU policies and public diplomacy measures and (3) their contribution to improving images of Europe, the EU abroad or to reduce misconceptions. We also conclude that Literature Review systematic reflections on **the evolution of key audiences, institutions and individuals** with high multiplier capacities in the selected countries and region is crucial (1) to engage with them in a more meaningful way and increase the EU's outreach capabilities in various policy areas, including the EU multi-stakeholder public diplomacy and (2) to modify perceptions of local audiences, institutions and individuals in response to specific actions or developments.

In the sections below, we summarise the main findings of the Literature Review focusing specifically on (10.1) **Evolution of perceptions** and (10.2) **Factors behind continuity and change in EU perceptions** in the last five years as identified by the relevant literature. Tracing **the evolution of perceptions of the EU in the selected partner countries including drivers of continuity and drivers of change**. Tracking the evolution of perceptions (1) provides a better understanding of which events, policies, outreach

measures and capabilities influence the evolution of perceptions of the EU; and (2) can identify how events, policies, outreach measures and capabilities can be opportunities for specific stakeholder and policy engagement in the future. In the final section, we elaborate on (10.3) **Future outlooks** on perceptions of the EU as argued by the literature in all key strategic partner countries as well as shared by EU public diplomacy practitioners.

## 10.1. Evolution and continuity of perceptions

The relevant literature has been coded by how each country argues for the evolution of perceptions – continuity or change – by short-, medium- and long-term frames. This section will further explore the factors of continuity or change in the perceptions of the EU and its policies by examining *location-specific*, *EU-specific*, *region-specific* and *global* factors.

### 10.1.1. Short-term frames

The dominant temporal frames for the evolution of perceptions identified in the Literature Review are *short-term* (over the last five years) and *extended short-term* (2000-2015). While not surprising, it has implications for how the EU is perceived across all countries. To start with, the *short-term* frame tends to be more negative than *medium-* or *long-term* foci, not least given that the dominant driver of perceptions are *location-specific* factors and they work as filters to *EU-* and *global-specific* factors, Especially the manifold crises in the EU, but also perceived changes in the make-up of the international system – and what these dramatic events mean for the location in question and its immediate geopolitical region – affect perceptions of the EU negatively. As such, the relevance of these crises for perceptions of the EU differs depending on *location-specific* and, to a lesser degree, *region-specific* contexts.

Further, the focus on *short-term* frames is naturally more susceptible to thematic changes. This means that *medium-term* and *long-term* frames are oftentimes more closely related to various forms of cooperation agreements in development over the years which result in a range of views built up incrementally, whereas *short-term* frames tend to evoke political themes, which, in turn, tend to be viewed more negatively. In this Literature Review, this includes external perceptions of political reactions of the EU towards the surge of populism in Europe/the EU, migration crisis and, lastly, the EU's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic (so far noticed in the literature in Japan and Republic of Korea). Politically, the *short-term* frames, also relate to developments within countries, such as the Trump Administration's stance on the EU, or, the 'turning point' in EU-Russian relations, the Ukraine crisis (DeBardeleben, 2018; Levada Center, 2018). While not all countries perceive *short-term* frames to automatically drive *medium-term* negative changes (Canada, the US, Japan, China), it is important to note that some *short-term* perceptions will have a crucial and potentially harmful effect, or at least, stir uncertainty around the future of perceptions of the EU (Yoon & Chung, 2021).

The literature reports that trade agreements concluded in the past five years, or currently in discussion, have increased the EU's visibility (sometimes reinforcing existing negative perceptions e.g., in Indonesia and Nigeria). In some other locations, such agreement facilitated a more positive perception. The literature observes that perceptions of the EU in the *short-term* frame have benefited from the CETA in Canada (Earnscliff Strategy Group, 2019) in conjunction with a *short-term* frame understanding of movement towards the EU during the Trump years and the effect of Canada-US relations on EU perceptions. Brazil is an example of positive perceptions of the EU with regional trade frameworks in view. Brazilian stakeholders have generally perceived the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations as positive since the early 2000s (Lucarelli, 2007) and it is also a trigger for positive perceptions of the EU in Mexico. Political agreements also carry the potential to facilitate positive perceptions in the *short-term* frame. While literature reports perceptions of the EU in Mexico as somewhat ambivalent in general, the recent

partnership agreement with Mexico is perceived to serve as an additional instrument that reinforces bilateral relations (Dominguez, 2021a; b).

### 10.1.2. Medium-term frames

*Medium-term* frames tend to be less negative than the *short-term* frames and tend to focus on the development of trade partnerships and relationships between countries and the EU. They are more “accepting” of continuity or development despite *short-term* changes in perceptions. It does not follow, however, that *short-term* changes in perceptions do not carry the potential to affect *medium-term* frames in the long run. Meanwhile, the focus on progress relates in particular to the development and conclusion of partnership agreements, some of which are still recent, yet have been in the making for a long time. While in some countries the negotiations for these partnership agreements have been laborious (Japan), it appears that the progress towards such agreements is an important tool to forge a common understanding of developing relations between a strategic country and the EU. For example, negotiations on the Global Agreement in Mexico are seen as a tool to compromise and reach a common position with regard to the future of EU-Mexico cooperation (Blanco & Bruno, 2018). Therefore, the *medium-term* historical perspectives engaged in the literature, help to demonstrate the trajectory of partnership developments. In Nigeria, such a perspective, for example, argues that the relationship between Nigeria and the EU gradually improved with the end of the sanction regime against Nigeria in 1999 (Bakare, 2019). Likewise, the literature on Mexico argues that the 1997 Free Trade Agreement with Mexico has institutionalised political dialogue, deepened cooperation and facilitated the relationship with the EU (Dominguez & Crandall, 2019).

### 10.1.3. Long-term frames

*Long-term* frame evaluation of perceptions of the EU depend on the historical experience of the key global partners with the EU. First, and foremost, colonial experiences and post-colonial perspectives continue to shape perceptions of the EU. For example, Asian and African countries take a more critical view of the EU’s normative power (Bacon & Kato, 2013; Chaban et al., 2015; Chang & Pieke, 2018; Chanona, 2009; Jain & Pandey, 2013; Jin & Kirchner, 2021; Stumbaum et al., 2015; Stumbaum, 2015). The legacy of colonialism and apartheid negatively influences South African government officials’ assessment of European or EU initiatives as modes of colonisation. Student-led protests and mobilisations against the vestiges of South African apartheid also carry significance for how the EU and Europe is perceived. Since 2015, there has been a marked rise in national student protest movements and they may contribute to shaping perceptions of the Global North more generally. Likewise, the historical, cultural, and colonial encounter with Europe, negatively conditions Indonesian perceptions of Europe/the EU (Luhulima et. al., 2009). Existing negative Nigerian perceptions have also shaped attitudes towards the EU in the context of the EPA (Isaac & Bellonwu-Okafor, 2016).

*Long-term* frames do, however, also serve to explain underlying affinities and closeness to the EU. Literature in Brazil, for example, argues for a cultural affinity with the EU owing to Brazil’s history, Portuguese colonisation and European migration (Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2019) – despite decreases in favourable views in the short-term (Devlin, 2019). The significance of shared tempo-historical space and interests is also visible when some of the short-term negative effects on perceptions can be negated by a longer temporal perspective. In Canada, the literature argues, for example, that historical development occurs in waves (Chaban, 2019). Such “tides” of history can negate the effects of *short-term* negative perceptions because they attribute less significance to *short-term* negative effects – even when those effects have not yet become fully visible or understood. *Long-term* frames can also serve to explain why some relationships are so strained and that, in theory, EU-Russia relations could move forward (Kuznetsova, 2017).



## 10.2. Factors of continuity and change

Factors of change are dominantly either *location-specific*, *EU-specific*, or *global*. Both *location-specific* and *global* factors and drivers of change are difficult, as they are often outside of the EU's control and thus require a more reactive stance. Given the temporal scope of this Literature Review, it is unsurprising that the dominant temporal frame in the literature is *short-term*. In light of the EU's multiple crises, however, this carries significance for how the EU is perceived, notwithstanding an uncertainty around how long-lasting such *short-term* drivers of perceptions will be.

### 10.2.1. Location-specific

It is noteworthy that the most significant changes in perceptions are oftentimes driven by *location-specific* factors, which are not necessarily inputs that the EU will be able to control. To start with, literature notes that populist governments, in particular, the Trump Administration in the US and the Bolsonaro Government in Brazil forged a perception of the EU as either a rival or, in the latter case as irrelevant to the focus on domestic policy. In the US, for example, literature reports an overall decline in positive perceptions of the EU (Devlin, 2019). The difference in favourable views towards the EU between Republicans and Democrats of 26% was the largest between both parties since the question was first asked in 2002, which indicates that increasing country-specific polarisation will have effects on positive and negative perceptions of the EU. A similar trend can be observed in Canada (Hurrelmann, 2020), where a more conservative political affiliation appears to link to more negative perceptions of the EU. Meanwhile, with Brazil's Bolsonaro Government, the ideological differences between Brazil and the EU have undermined the perceptions of the EU. In Russia, Putin's ascendance to power is seen as a crucial factor in domestic politics that led to a reversal towards traditional values in Russia and shaped more negative attitudes towards the EU – reflected also in the local media and public attitudes (Foxall, 2017; Verpoest, 2018). Since changes in political leadership are a part of the life of any democratic or quasi-democratic society, the perceptions of the EU may explicate a fluctuating dynamic (Dominguez, 2019), correlating with a ruling party vision.

Further to political affiliation, age appears to drive *location-specific* differences in perceptions. Younger people in the US and Japan tend to be more positively inclined towards the EU than older generations (Devlin, 2019). However, it is important to note that youth remains underrepresented in the literature across all countries. Further, while insufficiently studied, understanding domestically shifting narratives could be revelatory for how they affect EU perceptions. South African student protest movements, for example, protesting against Black South African marginalisation and against the perpetuation of vestiges of the apartheid system, will have an effect on how younger generations imagine the world order and power structures and thus also which role the EU is understood to play – this is the case especially where economic and financial themes still trump the themes for which the EU is more likely to be recognised for and thus selling short more ideational themes that might resonate with those who protest against existing power structures.

Likewise, bilateral support (Colombia) and trade agreements have also had an effect on the perceptions of the EU and will likely continue to constitute the main driver for perceptions. Whether these perceptions are affected negatively or positively depends on the *location-specific* context, as discussed above. More generally, however, the literature agrees that trade agreements can be a means to consolidate partnership aspirations. Likewise, the EU's support for the Colombian Peace Process has increased the relevance of the EU (Tremolada, 2019).

### 10.2.2. EU-specific

The second group of perceptions in the political issue-area relate to *EU-specific* factors – and the EU’s multiple crises in particular. The 2015 Literature Review cites numerous examples of the EU-specific crises as drivers behind negative or worsening perceptions of the EU across the 10 Strategic Partners. Literature observed in our Update Study demonstrates a similar trend. Multiple crises of the EU continue to capture the attention of perception scholars in this period and these critical junctures often highlight negative perceptions of the EU.

Dominant themes in the *EU-specific* drivers of continuity and change have been Brexit and the migration crises of 2015-2016, which both mostly negatively affected and weakened perceptions of the EU in most countries reflected in this study. While in some countries, the long-term implications of Brexit are considered uncertain (Japan, Russia), the UK’s exit from the EU has caused questions around the internal stability and international significance of the EU (China, Mexico, South Africa, Republic of Korea), while it is also argued in Republic of Korea that it merely increased the levels of awareness of the EU without further evaluation as to perceptions (Park & Chung, 2020b).

In other countries, however, Brexit has also revealed internal polarisation within the respective countries (Canada, the US), where party-political divisions drive Brexit-related perceptions (Bell & Vucetic, 2019; Hurrelmann, 2020; Speyer et al., 2020). Further, Brexit potentially stirred interest in and focus on bilateral relationships with key strategic member states such as Germany and France in the case of India (Lisbonne-de Vergeron, 2015; 2020). The EU’s handling of the migration crisis has caused criticism in Nigeria around the EU’s hostile migration regime (Ezemenaka, 2019) and India in terms of the response to the crisis (Sharma, 2020). It has also added to negative perceptions in Mexico. The crisis has further caused literature in the US to argue that the EU is institutionally ill-equipped to handle crises (Góra, 2019) and that it has weakened the EU’s international standing (Mexico). In addition to Brexit and the migration crises, literature has also engaged with the surge of populism, economic crises in Europe more broadly and the EU’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic (Japan, Republic of Korea). More generally, the manifold crises within the EU have done little to assure key global partners that the EU is a resilient bloc and have largely driven *short-*, and *medium-term* negative perceptions and questions as to the EU’s internal stability, unity and international standing. The migration crisis and the rise of illiberal democracies in Europe have negatively impacted Brazilian perceptions of the EU’s international role and the EU as a model of integration for Latin America (Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2020; Sandrin & Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2016). The literature is cautious, however, to suggest that this will carry into *long-term* changes of perceptions of the EU (see for example Endo, 2020; Tsuruoka, 2019). Most importantly, the *EU-specific* factors represented by crises almost always act in combination with *location-specific* factors. The latter serves as a filter that “sieves” the *EU-specific* inputs and weighs them in term of relevance, opportunities vs. and threat/risks and normative affinity of the location in question (Herrmann, 2013).

### 10.2.3. Region-specific

According to the reviewed literature, *region-specific* factors are not leading drivers behind the evolution of perceptions of the EU – *location-specific* drivers are too dominant. It follows that *region-specific* drivers interact with *location-specific* and *global* inputs in a complex and dynamic way. This does not mean, however, that *region-specific* factors are irrelevant in perceptions of the EU. For example, literature notes how Republic of Korea’s regional powers (China, Japan and North Korea) are perceived to have more visibility in Republic of Korea than the EU in the present and the future, but these factors ultimately remain dependent on *location-specific* or *global-specific* factors.

The evolution of perceptions of the EU also depends on the position of the regional hegemon, such as the self-perception of Russia. The analyses of Russia’s political discourse reveal a notion of shared,

common space with the EU, which translates in the request for the EU respect Russia's interest in the shared neighbourhood and particularly post-Soviet space. Disregard of Russia's interests there, thus, leads to conflict and negative attitudes towards the EU (Headley, 2018). The literature also reports how the US remains a leading (political) influencer of perceptions of the EU in the Americas (Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico in the Update Study). In Canada, the Trump Presidency has moved Canada and the EU closer together and US-Canadian relations appear to directly influence Canada's positioning in relation to the EU (Bendiek et al., 2018; Hage, 2020; Verdun, 2019).

*Region-specific* factors also become more relevant when they converge with *location-specific* interests. It is in this convergence of regional and local aspects of EU-Brazil cooperation that MERCOSUR as a form of regional cooperation appears as an instrument for upgrading the EU-Brazil strategic dialogue rather than an important factor on its own. In Indonesia, the establishment of economic partnership frameworks and building trust between the EU and Indonesia through EU-ASEAN forums (Fitriani, 2015) has highlighted the potential of regional factors in this specific region.

In some cases, a self-understanding as regionally hegemonic also drive perceptions of the EU in that it emphasises the relevance of a location for the EU. Indonesia being the biggest country in the region in terms of size and population is less dependent on international trade and thus harder to negotiate in a bilateral mode (Camroux & Srikandini, 2020; Sicurelli, 2020), but it plays a prominent role in the ASEAN and perceives the EU-ASEAN cooperation framework in a positive light (Fitriani, 2015). Meanwhile, in Nigeria, the importance of Nigeria for West Africa has also driven negative perceptions of the EU's engagement in the region and that the EU seeks to leverage its powerful position in West Africa through ECOWAS to undermine regional migration policies (Bisong, 2019) or to secure unfair trade agreements through the EPAs (Isaac & Bellonwu-Okafor, 2016). In the case of South Africa, a perception of shifts in global power dynamics has resulted in exploring alternative coalitions (such as with BRICS) (Keuleers, 2021).

#### 10.2.4. Global factors

*Global* factors that drive perceptions of the EU are related to how the literature assesses the relevance of shifts in the world order and the geopolitical landscape, including major global actors. Some of these factors are global-hegemon specific. Literature Review argues that globally significant events such as the election of President Trump and the US unilateral and protectionist turn have influenced perceptions of the EU. This is reflected not only in the change of perceptions in neighbouring Canada, where the EU (and the UK and Germany in particular) are now preferred partners and top the US in terms of Canadian preferences for international partners (Nanos & Atlantic Brücke, 2019). Likewise, prior to Covid-19 the Trump Administration and Brexit were the two most significant factors influencing perceptions of the EU in Japan (Endo, 2020; Tsuruoka, 2019). For Russian literature, the US' international standing and Russia's relationship to the US also carry significant purchase over how the EU is perceived. More generally, the literature in Russia appears to argue that the EU's dependency on the US weakens its international weight and significance (Kuznetsova, 2017; Shestopal et al., 2016).

Reflecting on the increasingly multipolar global landscape, literature appears to suggest a weakened position of the EU in the remaking of the international order, with the creation of BRICS, South-South cooperation (Saraiva, 2017), the rise of China and globalisation (Sicurelli, 2020). In South Africa, for example, global-level structural changes leading to the creation of BRICS and South-South cooperation, carry not only implicit assumption about the EU's future weight, but they also offer alternative models and alliances for cooperation. The pandemic has not yet translated more systematically into affecting the perception of the EU – with the notable exceptions in Republic of Korea and Japan (Yoon & Chung, 2021; Huang, C., & Silver, 2020) – yet, will likely increase the thematic acknowledgement of health in the literature.

### 10.3. Future Outlook

Where indicated, the literature across all countries tends to perceive the future of the individual country's relationship with the EU as carrying significant potential – despite short-term drops in favourable perceptions and uncertainties around global geopolitical shifts. In some cases, such potential is understood to require further investment in order to bear fruit (Nigeria), including for the EU to take the first step (Russia).

The key condition for mutual cooperation is seen to be in the delivery of the declared programmes, particularly in locations like Nigeria where the public appear to be disillusioned with the EU but still see potential for a more positive relationship (Adetula, Kew & Kwaia, 2010; Fasan, 2019; Rajput et al., 2020). As such, the perception-capability gap is the key theme of academic publications in the field of EU perceptions, while EUPOP materials do not allow to see whether these have been accounted for. Expectations often speak to domestic problems, contexts and national priorities which EU public diplomacy practitioners seem to be aware of. If local socio-economic factors and needs are accounted for, the literature also points to the means of better mutual understanding and normative dialogue with the EU (Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia). In the context of national priorities, the sense of missed opportunities in trade and normative cooperation hinders perceptions of the EU in Japan (Bacon & Holland, 2015, p. 62) and Republic of Korea (Yoon & Chung, 2020).

For EU public diplomacy practitioners across the world, such an outlook is very nuanced, because political contexts shape the ability to work with some audiences over others and make it difficult to reach to broader audiences more generally. Contexts can either be restrictive politically, where media is dominantly controlled (China), where the conflict with the EU hinders a more positive engagement (Russia), or where the EU is not of principal interest or governments have not made it a foreign policy focus (Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa).

The US literature, in turn, sees that a new Biden Administration in the US could set the tone for improving perceptions within a polarised US public – although it remains unclear with which effect the Trump years have damaged the relationship between the US and EU in the long run. Other EU Delegations do recognise considerable potential (Canada, Colombia, India, Indonesia) bar limitations in terms of resources, geographies and Covid restrictions.

In the literature, more generally, the interest in and means to develop relationships between the EU and different countries are dominantly considered in economic terms and sectoral engagement – even in cases where the relationship between the EU and the country are particularly strained (Brazil, China, Russia; Indonesia in specific issue-areas). In cases, where the EU is not ranked highly as a foreign political partner in geostrategic terms (India), economic and trade cooperation are significant tools for the improvement of relationships. Where common values are shared (Canada) or strategic partnerships in place (Japan), the literature acknowledges the potential for further cooperation and advancement in areas such as climate change and human rights. Importantly, such areas also appear “safe” in those locations where EU norms are being contested (e.g., in Russia, China; for Russia, culture is seen another area for diplomatic engagement). Some locations, for example, highlight the importance of connectivity, and building strategic networks and alliances (India, Japan). Although not framed around connectivity, the EU Delegation to Colombia seeks to also ally with strategic partners in the future, and the EU Delegation to Canada seeks to engage more widely with key and a more diverse range of stakeholders in a targeted manner.

More generally, EU public diplomacy practitioners highlight that the future outlook on public diplomacy initiatives in their respective locations builds fundamentally on (1) targeting specific stakeholder groups that are strategically important (decision-makers and young people – future decision-makers, as well as opinion-makers from media and influencers), and (2) starting at the “base” level of informing about the EU to a wider and more general audience where such awareness of and knowledge on the EU is lacking. Most locations also highlight the central role of climate diplomacy in

the future of public diplomacy initiatives (Canada, India, Nigeria, Mexico, Russia, Republic of Korea, South Africa), culture (Japan), the empowerment of women (Nigeria), minorities (US), and public diplomacy initiatives that speak to young audiences and engage with themes that are of principal interest to young people. The literature also assigns young people with a particular role of providing the EU with opportunity to respond to the challenges and grow positive. New generations are seen as progressive, yearning for more inclusive and diverse societies (particularly in South African and US literature – Hodgkinson & Melchiorre, 2019; Rivera, 2021) and appear to be interested in EU values. As one Delegation staff member notes: ‘now we’re looking more and more into how we can target younger audiences through social platforms, with different policy areas that we know that are dear to them, like climate, like sustainability, like equality’ (EUus1).

All practitioners account for the local context in their understanding of how to carry public diplomacy activities in the future, and the Covid pandemic has been central in their understanding of this. New tools of e-diplomacy and “hybrid” public diplomacy events, often “blending” key themes allow for a broader outreach to audiences and into regions. However, online tools challenge those public diplomacy initiatives to which people-to-people contact is crucial and cause “fatigue” on their own. “Vaccine nationalism” is another factor that has to be considered for the success of public diplomacy delivery.

The handling of the Covid pandemic overlaps with the geopolitical landscape and global developments – seen by the literature as the crucial factors in shaping the EU’s relationships with its global partners. Literature in India, for example, notes a changing global environment, the rise of China and US retrenchment (Mohan & Xavier, 2017), and South African literature speaks of a more general decline of Western power and the rise of BRICS, increasing viable alternatives for pursuing alliances and partnerships (see Olivier & Fioramonti, 2010). In summary, literature across all countries recognises a potential for the relationship between the EU and the key global partners. The *location-specific* factors that are found to be the leading drivers of perceptions of the EU, either alone or in combination with *regional-*, *EU-* and *global-specific* factors, invite EU public diplomacy to invest into their systematic consideration on a new level, with new tools and approaches to ensure a truly collaborative multi-stakeholder diplomacy in a world of increasing competition and contestation. As indicated above, the literature points to new perspectives in the studies of EU perceptions that could benefit EU public diplomacy with its key global partners – “mirror” perceptions studies; synergies with findings, tools and concepts of EU perceptions studies in the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy; and systematic extended comparisons of country-specific perceptions of the EU vis-à-vis perception of key global and regional actors in the same location. The overall sense of potential in both public diplomacy initiatives and the literature, however, also implies that the EU and its key global partners find themselves at a crossroads. The time for designing this future is now.



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## **UPDATE OF THE 2015 PERCEPTION STUDY:**

### **Annex II: Comparative public opinion survey report**

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## List of abbreviations

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BRA: Brazil

CAN: Canada

CHN: China

COL: Colombia

IDN: Indonesia

IND: India

JPN: Japan

KOR: Republic of Korea

MEX: Mexico

NGA: Nigeria

RUS: Russia

US: United States of America

ZAF: South Africa



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## Executive summary

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Annex II highlights the result of public opinion poll conducted in the course of the Update Study 2021 in the 13 key partners of the EU – Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and the US. The survey tracks perceptions of the EU among the general publics in the respective countries across the key research indicators: visibility; actorness/effectiveness; local resonance; and norm-setting. The survey for this study was conducted in the 13 target countries using an online panel sampling.

The survey findings reveal that across all countries surveyed, the general **awareness of the EU is high**, with a broad majority of respondent being able to say whether they feel positively, negatively or neutral about the bloc. The lowest share of respondents who can formulate their attitude towards th EU is in the US. The overall number of people who can formulate their attitude towards EU has increased compared to 2015 in all countries, except for China and the Republic of Korea, where it remains stable.

EU is perceived positively from the general publics across most of the target countries. Similar to the baseline study of 2015, respondents see the EU among the most positively viewed when compared to selected countries and international organisations. Consistent with findings across methods in this study, The EU usually shares the highest positions with the US and Japan, or the respondents' own country when applicable. In China and in the US where, as mentioned, views of the EU are less positive, it still comes third out of eight in terms of positive views. In Russia, the EU comes fourth after Russia, China and Japan in terms of positive view In most countries, respondents report high level of awareness of the EU in their day-to-day life with more than half of the participants hearing or reading about the EU at least once a week.

The distinction between the EU and Europe varies across the **themes**. Respondents appear more likely to associate the EU with the *economy* and *politics* than with *culture*, which is more strongly associated with Europe. Themes such as *climate, energy, research, science, and technology* and *social development* are less clearly identified with a specific entity. This is consistent with the visibility of the EU as an important partner in trade and international relations. The findings are consistent with the baseline study of 2015, when economy and trade were the mostly associated with Europe, and climate, science, research and technology remained heavily under researched.

Perceptions of the **bilateral relationship** with the EU vary across countries. However, when compared with bilateral relationships with other countries, the relationship with the EU is often among those perceived the most positive. It is only outranked by the US and/or Japan (in Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and the US). Russia is an exception with a significant share of the general public having negative opinions of the Russia-EU relation. However, compared to 2015, the perception has still slightly improved since 2015 in Russia, India and South Africa. In the US and even more noticeably in China, perceptions of the relationship with the EU have deteriorated.

Results also show that perception of EU global leadership varies across countries. The analysis was able to distinguish three groups where respondents share opinions. The first group includes Nigeria, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil. Their respondents see the EU's leadership as both highly likely and desirable. In all these countries except for India, the likelihood is seen as slightly higher than the desirability. In the second group of countries, respondents come from Canada, the US and Japan. Participants there see the EU's leadership as both moderately likely and moderately desirable. For these countries, the EU leadership is seen as slightly more desirable than likely, indicating a certain level of sympathy from respondents while they might also consider that the future of their country is less dependent on the actions and decision made by the EU. Finally, the third

group of countries is made of Russia, the Republic of Korea, and China. Respondents there, while showing moderate level of likelihood and desirability, also exhibit a higher level of likelihood than desirability of the EU's leadership. Perceptions of the **performance of the EU in specific thematic issue-areas** show its pronounced visibility in the economic field, especially in terms of global trade, as well as tourism and research, science, and technology. The role of the EU in fighting climate change and protecting the environment is seen particularly positively alongside its support for regional and international cooperation. EU actions when dealing with refugees and displaced people as well as integrating migrant and refugees remain to be seen more negatively by respondents across most target countries. However, apart from China, these indicators are perceived more positively in most of the partner countries compared to 2015.

## Introduction

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This Annex presents the final findings from the public opinion survey component of the Update Study 2021 and its methodology. Individual public opinion surveys were carried out between 28 April and 16 May 2021 in 13 target countries: Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and the US. This report provides insights into the findings in all 13 countries under this Study. Country-specific analysis is provided in separate Country reports, prepared for each of the 13 target countries.

The survey was a key source of information for the Update Study 2021. It follows the design originally conceived for the 2015 Baseline Study and covers the following indicators:

- The perceived *visibility* and *effectiveness* of EU policies;
- The importance of the EU as an actor, compared to selected countries and international organisations – *actorness*;
- The positive, negative or neutral perception of the EU, or what is the emotional connection with the EU – *emotive charge*;
- The *normative power* of the EU (or to what extent do the ideas and norms promoted by the EU are supported by the respondents)
- And the *local resonance* of the EU (what are the location-specific links and actions and to what extent these resonate with the pre-existing ideas and concepts in local contexts).

The main findings of the survey analysis are presented in Chapter 3 of this Annex. Chapter 3 is divided into four sub-sections. Section 3.1. describes the general view of the EU in all 13 target countries of the study. Section 3.2. focuses on descriptive images of the EU, as well as attractiveness of individual EU Member States. The report then moves onto the perceptions of the EU's role in international affairs, namely how desirable and likely the respondents find the EU to take a leadership role in world affairs. Sections 3.3. looks at the perception of the role of EU in global leadership, and Section 3.4. present the findings on how respondents from different countries view the EU's performance in different thematic fields including economic affairs and trade, global peace and stability and social development among others. Finally, Section 3.5. reports on how respondents view the importance of the EU in the issue-areas of trade, international relations, science, research and technology, and education. Section 3.6. reports on the perceived exposure to news about the EU the general publics in the target countries receive.

Chapter 4 of the report contains a comprehensive transcript of survey results with frequency tables of responses to all survey questions.

### Outline of the survey

The online survey was coordinated and conducted by PPMI through an online panel provided by Syno International. The methodology of the 2015 Study was reviewed and updated to reflect recent global changes, with some minor amendments made to the questionnaire. During the pre-fielding stage, the research team drew

nationally representative samples<sup>8</sup> of respondents and set up the online survey tool to collect responses in local languages (Table 1).

**TABLE 1. LANGUAGES OF THE SURVEY BY COUNTRY**

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>LANGUAGE(S) OF THE SURVEY</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	Portuguese
<b>Canada</b>	English, French
<b>China</b>	Simplified Chinese
<b>Colombia</b>	Spanish
<b>Indonesia</b>	Indonesian
<b>India</b>	Bengali, English, Hindi, Kannada, Tamil
<b>Japan</b>	Japanese
<b>Mexico</b>	Spanish
<b>Nigeria</b>	English
<b>Russia</b>	Russian
<b>South Africa</b>	English
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	Korean
<b>US</b>	English

Source: prepared by the Core Team.

Data collection took place from 28 April to 16 May 2021. When the data collection process was finalised, the research team proceeded with a thorough data cleaning process to ensure the quality of the data. Fraudulent cases, identified by speeding behaviours, illogical response patterns and un-matched profiles, were removed from the dataset. Weights were then produced for the results to be representative of each country population in terms of age, gender and the type of region. The final size of samples across all 13 countries are shown in Table 2 below. In each country, there are 5 age groups: 15-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55-64. The gender component is divided into 2 groups: male and female. The regional division varies in each country due to geographic characteristics.

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<sup>8</sup> The samples were composed, drawing information on various sources. In China, Nigeria, and US, we relied on World Bank indicators to compose the sample. See: World Bank World development indicators database: <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>. In Brazil: Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics, [http://www.abc.gov.br/training/informacoes/InstituicaoIBGE\\_en.aspx](http://www.abc.gov.br/training/informacoes/InstituicaoIBGE_en.aspx). In Canada: Statistics Canada: <https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/start>. In Colombia: Colombian National Statistics Directorate (DANE): <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/en/>. In India: India's Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner: <https://censusindia.gov.in/>. In Japan: Statistics of Japan: <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en>. In Russia: Russian Federal State Statistics Office: <https://eng.rosstat.gov.ru/>. In Mexico: Mexican National Institute of Statics and Geography (INEGI): <https://www.inegi.org.mx/>.

**TABLE 2. NUMBER OF RESPONDENT OF THE SURVEY**

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	1150
<b>Canada</b>	1018
<b>China</b>	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	1133
<b>India</b>	1145
<b>Japan</b>	1126
<b>Mexico</b>	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	1012
<b>Russia</b>	1114
<b>US</b>	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	1158
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	1030
<b>Total</b>	14427

Source: prepared by the Core Team

The research team conducted further analysis of the data to produce a comparative overview of the survey results across countries and present aggregated results from the survey. Independent variables such as work status, level of education and the household's income level, gender and age have also been used to assess whether perceptions of the EU vary within a country depending on these characteristics. Finally, the research team produced an update of the 2015 baseline results to show any evolution of perceptions between 2015 and 2021.

### **Disclaimer on the comparability of cross-country survey data**

As in 2015, the research team reiterates that collecting comparable data across different cultural contexts is a highly complex task. Any direct comparison of the public opinion survey data in the 10 strategic partners that were in the focus of research both in 2015 and 2021 should be approached with caution. Comparison for the "new" three countries cannot be performed.

The research experience suggests that scientific literature, documenting the existence of variable response styles across nations and cultures, does affect the way nations approach surveys. In particular, certain nations tend to have a bias in the style that questions are typically answered. In the case of Japan, respondents have avoided the



extremes of the scale, demonstrating the Acquiescence Response Style, or a tendency of respondents to agree with items despite having a range of possibilities to answer in a different way.<sup>9</sup>

This report therefore does not compare the country findings between themselves, but rather present findings from all 13 target countries included in the Update Study, and the differences between the results. The report also compares the findings of the ten target countries, included in the baseline sample, with the Update study, based on the same principle. For more information on the data presented in tables and charts, the research team has added frequency tables at the end of this Annex.

## A note on data protection

The employment of public opinion survey methodology included collecting personal data. The team prepared and disseminated a specific privacy statement to inform the participants of the purpose of the study and of our approach to handling their personal data. Their informed consent was obtained preceding each interview and filling-in the survey. Participants had the right to retract their consent and to pursue their other rights as data subjects at any stage of the project.

We implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a high level of security appropriate to the risks posed by the processing and the nature of the personal data to be protected. PPMI operates from a highly secure office with contingency plans. Project data is stored in the company's server, which is installed in a restricted area. PPMI also places importance on back-up facilities and critical infrastructure protection. When needed, backups are managed through cloud-based systems ('PPMI Cloud'). The cloud system is also used to maintain a secure working environment for our clients and project partners. Finally, all personal data is kept in two safeguarded servers with a mirror backup system.

PPMI employees are instructed on strict data protection principles. If a task involves any work with personal data, employees are instructed not to share any data informally, as well as to secure information to prevent unauthorised personnel from obtaining it (e.g. locking the work computer before leaving it unattended). All sensitive information is additionally secured by passwords. Project files and data are only accessible to the members of a specific project team. Access to confidential information is only granted to research managers, only accessible to other colleagues upon request.

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
<sup>9</sup> Paulhus, D.L. (1991), "Measurement and control of response bias", In J.P. Robinson, P.R. Shaver & L.S. Wrightsman (eds.), *Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes*, San Diego: Academic Press, pp.17-59.

# Findings from the public opinion survey

## The general view of the European Union

Attitude of the EU in partner countries was measured not only through its visibility, or in other word whether the respondents have an opinion about the EU or know about it. As part of the opinion poll, respondents were first asked how positive or negative they felt about a list of countries and organisations including the EU.

**FIGURE 1. ATTITUDE VIS-À-VIS THE EU IN TARGET COUNTRIES (2021)**



**Note:** based on the answers to survey Q1: Generally speaking, please indicate how positive or negative do you feel about each of the following countries and organisations (the EU)? (excluding “don’t know/cannot answer”) The total height of the bar shows the EU’s visibility.

Across all countries surveyed, the attitude of the EU is high, with a broad majority of respondent being able to say whether they feel positively, negatively or neutral about the bloc, see Figure 1. The lowest share of respondents who can formulate their attitude towards the EU is the lowest in the US where about 10% of respondents could not answer/did not know. However, it must be noted that the number of people who can formulate an attitude towards the EU in this country has increased compared to 2015, as it was the case in all countries included in the 2015 study, except China and the Republic of Korea. There, it remains stable (see Figure 2).

**FIGURE 2 FORMULATED ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EU (2015 AND 2021)**




**Note:** based on the answers to survey Q1: Generally speaking, please indicate how positive or negative do you feel about each of the following countries and organisations (EU)? (The columns show the sum of the percentage of all the answer options: “very positive”, “somewhat positive”, “neither positive nor negative”, “somewhat negative”, “very negative” excluding “don’t know/cannot answer” in 2015 and 2021) Lighter shades indicate that the change is not statistically significant ( $P > 0,05$ ).







The EU is perceived positively across the majority of countries in the sample (Figure 1), although views are less positive in China, Russia and the US. Perhaps more telling is the comparison with the perceptions of other selected countries and organisations. As in 2015, when compared to the selected countries (Figure 3), in 2021 the EU is one of the most positively perceived international actors in the majority of surveyed publics. The EU usually shares the highest positions with the US and Japan, or the respondents’ own country when applicable. In China and in the US where, as mentioned, views of the EU are less positive, it still comes third out of eight in terms of positive views. In Russia, the EU comes fourth after Russia, China and Japan in terms of positive view respectively.





When compared to other international organisations, the EU comes either first or second in terms of positive views in all surveyed countries except China, Indonesia, India and Nigeria (Figure 4).

Figure 3 and Figure 4 present the attitude towards the EU among the respondents in the surveyed countries. Each chart shows the views of respondents in the country indicated in the title and the bars are horizontally ordered from the highest level of positive views (sum of “very positive” and “somewhat positive” responses) to the lowest.

**FIGURE 3. ATTITUDE VIS-À-VIS THE EU AND SELECTED COUNTRIES IN SURVEYED COUNTRIES**
















**Note:** based on the answers to survey Q1: “Generally speaking, please indicate how positive or negative do you feel about each of the following countries and organisations?” (excluding “don’t know/cannot answer”). The logic of ranking follows the method of grouping together the “very positive” and “somewhat positive” answers.





**FIGURE 4. ATTITUDE VIS-À-VIS THE EU AND SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN SURVEYED COUNTRIES**










**Note:** based on the answers to survey Q1: “Generally speaking, please indicate how positive or negative do you feel about each of the following countries and organisations?” (excluding “don’t know/cannot answer”). The logic of ranking follows the method of grouping together the “very positive” and “somewhat positive” answers.

Compared to 2015, opinions about the EU improved in all surveyed countries except China - where they deteriorated, and the Republic of Korea where they remained stable<sup>10</sup>, see Figure 5.

**FIGURE 5. POSITIVE VIEWS OF THE EU (2015 AND 2021)**



**Note:** based on the answers “very positive” and “somewhat positive” to survey Q1: Generally speaking, please indicate how positive or negative do you feel about each of the following countries and organisations (EU)? Lighter shades indicate that the change is not statistically significant (P $\geq$ 0,05).

<sup>10</sup> The small change visible in the chart is not statistically significant (P $\geq$ 0,05)

## Descriptive images of the European Union

### Thematic association of the terms “EU” and “Europe”

While the terms “EU” and “Europe” are sometimes used interchangeably to refer to each other, respondents were asked to indicate which term first come to their mind when talking about specific topics. This allows us to assess two issues: firstly, we can see the dominant themes in association with the EU and with Europe, which illustrates what type of actors the two are perceived as being. Secondly, it allows us to see the differences in the associations respondents have with the two European across.

Results show that the terms are used distinctively in specific thematic contexts (the EU for *economy, politics, social* and Europe for *culture and sports*) and more indistinctively/interchangeably in other contexts (*research, science and technology*).

*Economy* is mostly associated with the EU over Europe (47.6% cross-country average for the EU compared to 25.3% for Europe) which shows that the EU is particularly visible in this area. This reflects the perception of the EU as doing well in the fields of economy, global trade as well as specific areas of international relations (see section 0). The topic of politics is also more strongly associated with the EU than with Europe, although to a lesser extent than the economy (43.1% cross-country average for the EU compared to 24.4% for Europe). In all countries surveyed except Japan and Russia, more respondents associate the EU with the economy than with politics (Table 3). Although the association is weaker than for the economy and politics, the topic of social development is also associated more strongly with the EU than with Europe (37.8% cross-country average for the EU compared to 27.9% for Europe).

On the other hand, the field of *culture and sports* remains strongly associated with Europe over the EU (36.4% cross-country average for Europe compared to 27.8% for the EU) which might reflect lower visibility of the EU in this domain but is also likely to reflect Europe as a historical entity, strongly associate with it’s culture. Indonesia, India and Nigeria are notable exceptions where culture and sports are more strongly associated with the EU than with Europe, see Table 3.

Table 3 present the terms most strongly associated with each topic by country. For example, in Indonesia, politics is more strongly associated with the EU than with Europe or specific European countries. We note this in particular, as it represents an interesting finding for EU cultural diplomacy. More details on the break-down of responses can be found in the country chapters.

**TABLE 3. THEMATIC ASSOCIATION OF THE TERMS "EUROPE" AND "EU" BY COUNTRY (2021)**

	Economy	Science and technology	Politics	Social development	Culture
<b>Brazil</b>	EU	EU	EU	EU	Europe
<b>Canada</b>	EU	EU*	EU	EU*	Europe
<b>China</b>	EU	EU*	EU	EU	Europe
<b>Colombia</b>	EU	EU	EU	EU	Europe
<b>Indonesia</b>	EU	Europe*	EU	EU	EU



<b>India</b>	EU	EU	EU	EU	EU
<b>Japan</b>	EU*	Europe	EU	Europe*	Europe
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	EU	EU	EU	EU	Europe
<b>Mexico</b>	EU	EU	EU	EU	Europe
<b>Nigeria</b>	EU	EU	EU	EU	EU*
<b>Russia</b>	EU	Europe	EU	EU*	Europe
<b>US</b>	EU	EU*	EU	Europe*	Europe
<b>South Africa</b>	EU	Europe*	EU	EU	Europe

**Note:** based on Q22 “Some people think about the EU when talking about economy, politics, culture, sports and other areas. In your case, which term – Europe or the EU – comes to your mind first when you think about the following subjects?” (“EU”, “Europe”, “Specific European countries”, “No difference between them”, “Do not know / cannot answer”). The data results can be found in chapter 10 Frequency tables.

\* Denotes lower level of differentiation.

Although a similar question was included in the 2015 study, the introduction of an additional answer category, namely “Specific European countries”, prevents from conducting historical comparisons “likes for likes”. However, the updated wording allows to observe the persistence of the relevance of national references when it comes to specific topics. Specific European countries remain important references in multiple countries and particularly when it comes to culture and sport (in Canada, Russia and the Republic of Korea), science research and technology (in Russia and the Republic of Korea) and politics (in Russia and the Republic of Korea).


## Attractiveness of the EU and EU Member States

The perceived attractiveness of specific EU Member States sheds a light on their persistence as relevant references in foreign countries, as opposed to being absorbed in an overarching European or EU entity. Indeed, differing level of attractiveness of EU Member States could indicate that they are still very much considered as having separate identities on the world stage, with specific culture that differs among various members of the bloc. Differing level of attractiveness could also be a signal that the EU’s image on the global stage builds on the image of specific Member States enjoying particularly high level of attractiveness. When respondents were asked to indicate which member-state(s) they found the most attractive (they could choose multiple Member States), noticeable differences appeared between Member States.

As reported in 2015, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain were most often found attractive by more than half of the respondents on average in all countries surveyed. Other Member States mentioned as particularly attractive included Austria Portugal (in Brazil), Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. The perceived attractiveness is likely to be influenced by a complex mix of linguistic, cultural, historical, family and sometimes former colonial ties between the surveyed countries and specific Member States. It is also difficult to define how respondents assess attractiveness (as an attractive tourist destination, a place to live, a feeling of convergence in values and culture), and therefore these findings should be interpreted with caution.

As in 2015, in 2021, the Baltic States and other Central Eastern European countries (CEE) were least often mentioned across the countries as most attractive. Figure 6 below provides a cross-country comparison of attractiveness of EU member states.

**FIGURE 6. ATTRACTIVENESS OF EU MEMBER STATES**



**Note:** based on Q25: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you? Respondents could choose more than one country

Despite the differences in the attractiveness of these member-state, the overall attractiveness of EU countries (in terms of culture and lifestyle – Q13) is high (ranging between 56.5% in Japan and 92.9% in Colombia). The cross-country average (77.9%) is higher than in any country in the sample, and is less sensitive to country variations. In other words, while countries enjoying high level of attractiveness such as the US and Japan show much lower level of attractiveness in a small subset of countries (China and Russia in the case of the US and the Republic of Korea in the case of Japan), the attractiveness of the EU is assessed much more uniformly across all surveyed countries, with none of the respondents’ groups in the 13 countries being visibly antagonistic. However, the attractiveness of the EU in China and the Republic of Korea decreased compared to 2015. The attractiveness of the EU as a place to visit

is the highest, followed by its image of a place to do business and create partnership with, and, finally, as a place to study.

## Visibility of different elements of the EU's image

Looking at the visibility of specific EU symbols, including institutions of the EU, the Euro appears to be widely known across all surveyed countries. When survey participants were asked about whether they had seen, read, or heard about EU symbols, they mentioned the common currency most frequently, followed by the EU flag and the EU citizenship. The EU citizenship was not included in the list in 2015, and this may explain the change in the propensity of other symbols and institutions marked as visible, the prevalence of EU symbols over EU institutions in spontaneous associations with the EU marks a change from 2015 where the European Central Bank and the European Parliament were part of the top most visible EU elements. These two institutions retain a high level of visibility in 2021 especially in Brazil, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico and the US.

As observed in 2015, the least visible answer option by a considerable percentage was the Erasmus student exchange programme, and, to a lesser extent, EU Delegations in the partner countries. The results of the Update study mirror the same pattern.

## Terms used to describe the EU

To gain a better understanding of how the EU is perceived in surveyed countries, respondents were asked to pick within a list of selected terms, those that in their view best applied to the EU. To limit bias in responses, the list included terms with both positive and negative connotations, and respondents were also asked to assign these terms to other countries alongside the EU.


The term most often associated with the EU is “modern”. It came first in all but two surveyed countries (Japan and the Republic of Korea). Interestingly though, respondents associate this term more strongly with other countries, particularly Japan and the US, and in certain cases with China. The terms “strong” and “efficient” are also often associated with the EU. “Strong” came second or third in eight surveyed countries, “efficient” came third in six countries, but, as is the case with “modern”, these two terms are also more strongly associated with other countries. “United” and “multicultural” are also often associated to the EU (see Figure 7). “United” (in Canada, Columbia, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, the Republic of Korea), “multicultural” (in Canada and the Republic of Korea) and “peaceful” (in Nigeria, South Africa, the Republic of Korea) are the three categories in which the EU tops in more than one country. Notably the Republic of Korea is the only country, where respondents see the EU as the most efficient and trustworthy actor on the list of eight international actors.







The multiplicity of terms used to describe the EU and the fact that the terms most associated with it (“modern”, “strong” and “efficient”) are even more likely to be associated with other countries shows a certain difficulty of respondents to get a clear picture of the bloc. In Japan, the US and Canada, a noticeable share of respondents even said that none of the terms listed matched their perception of the EU. This corresponds with lower level of visibility of the EU in these countries as shown in section 0.


Association with negative terms such as “aggressive”, “hypocritical” or “arrogant” is low across all countries, except Russia where “hypocritical” is the third term most likely to be associated with the EU. This is nonetheless an improvement from 2015 where the share of Russian respondents describing the EU as hypocritical was much higher (48% in 2015 compared to 24,5 % in 2021) and corresponds with

the general improvement of perceptions of the EU in Russia described in section 0. In turn, the deterioration of the perception of the EU in China is visible through the increase of respondents in this country associating the EU with the terms “hypocritical” (from 6.9% in 2015 to 17.2% in 2021) and “arrogant” (from 13.1% to 18.2%). Country chapters provide more details on the break-down of the association of terms with specific countries.

**FIGURE 7. TERMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EU IN SURVEYED COUNTRIES (2021)**








**Note:** based on Q2 “Which of the following words, if any, do you think best describes [the EU]?”, respondents could choose multiple words (except “none of these”). The bars represent the percentage of respondents who chose this word.

## Perception of the EU in a global leadership role

When looking at perceptions the EU’s leadership on the international stage in the future, we take into account two aspects. One is the perception of the likelihood of the EU’s leadership in the target country – to attempt to assess whether the EU is considered a relevant actor whose decisions and actions are likely to affect other countries in the future as well as the agenda-setting on the international stage. The other aspect is the perception of the desirability of the EU’s leadership. This measure is more likely to represent the local resonance of the EU in the target country and the perception of the bloc as an ally or as an actor to keep in check. A low level of desirability of the EU’s leadership combined with a high level of likelihood would indicate that the EU is seen as a relevant actor but also that its future leadership is perceived as potentially detrimental or threatening to the interest of the target country. In this context, it is important to note that the interest of the country should be understood as the aggregation of the interest of respondents in a specific country, which does not necessarily correspond to the stated interest of the government in place at the time of the survey.



**FIGURE 8. DESIRABILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF THE EU’S LEADERSHIP (2021)**



Source: Prepared by the Core Team

**Note:** based on Q4 “How desirable or undesirable is it that each of the following countries and organisations take a strong leadership role in world affairs? (EU)” and Q5 “In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that each of the following countries or organisations will take a strong leadership role in world affairs five years from now? (EU)”. The points represent the answers “very desirable” and “somewhat desirable” and the points “very likely” and “rather likely” for each target country. Yellow points indicate countries where the desirability is lower than the likelihood and blue points indicates countries where the desirability is higher than the likelihood.


When plotting the likelihood of the EU’s leadership against its desirability, three groups of countries are broadly visible. The first group includes Nigeria, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil. Their respondents see the EU’s leadership as both highly likely and desirable. In all of these

countries except India, the likelihood is seen as slightly higher than the desirability. More country-specific insights are available in the Country Case studies (see Volume 2 of the Final Report). In the second group of countries, respondents come from Canada, the US and Japan. Participants there see the EU's leadership as both moderately likely and moderately desirable. For these countries, the EU leadership is seen as slightly more desirable than likely, indicating a certain level of sympathy from respondents while they might also consider that the future of their country is less dependent on the actions and decision made by the EU. Finally, the third group of countries is made of Russia, the Republic of Korea and China. Respondents there, while showing moderate level of likelihood and desirability, also exhibit a higher level of likelihood than desirability of the EU's leadership.

However, this perception of the EU's leadership should be put in perspective with the perception of the leadership of other countries (see Figure 11). In the Republic of Korea for example, the EU comes second to only the US in terms of desirability and likelihood of leadership and in China and Russia, the EU comes third in terms of desirability to respectively China and Russia and vice-versa. In both China and Russia public believes their own countries to be more modern, peaceful, efficient, united, trustworthy, multicultural and stronger compared to the EU. In case of China the difference in positive opinion of certain characteristics of the EU compared to China reaches fifty percentage points. China and Russia form a distinct group of countries which see themselves as the most likely and desirable global leaders and the other country as their global "second best" (Russia for China and vice versa). In Russia China's global leadership is seen as desirable by 34.8% of respondents (33% for the EU, 19.7% for the US) and likely by 79.4% (57.9% for the EU, 69.3% for the US). In China, Russia's global leadership is seen as desirable by 59.3% (31.9% for the EU, 15.1% for the US) of respondents and likely by 63.4% (46.2% for the EU, and 44% for the US). The public in these two countries mutually see not only their own country but the other country of the two as stronger, more peaceful, more united, more trustworthy, and stronger than the EU and the US (the US is seen as more capable actor overall than the EU in both countries).


Overall, across all the 13 countries, the EU is seen as benevolent but less potent compared to other global actors. In China, Russia and the US, the public sees their own respective countries as the most likely and desirable global leaders. This is based on high opinion of their own countries' capabilities and relatively low opinion of the EU as an actor. And for most of the countries in this study the US is the most likely and most desirable global leader followed by the EU and Japan (in Canada and Colombia, the EU's global leadership is seen as the most desirable but the US still leads in likelihood). An exception is public perceptions in Indonesia, and Japan is seen as the most desirable and most likely global leader (followed by the EU and the US).

FIGURE 9. DESIRABILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF EU LEADERSHIP (2015)



Source: Prepared by the Core Team

**FIGURE 10. DESIRABILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF EU LEADERSHIP (2015 AND 2021)**





Source: Prepared by the Core Team

Timewise, the perception of the desirability and likelihood of the EU’s leadership has deteriorated dramatically in China in comparison to 2015 (see Figure 9). At the time, respondents in this country saw the EU’s leadership as moderately desirable (55.8% agreed) and highly likely (68% agreed). These proportions have significantly dropped in 2021. This is further illustrated when comparing the trajectory of Brazil and China’s public opinion between 2015 and 2021. While they had similar profiles in terms of perception of the EU’s leadership in 2015, Brazilian public perception has improved over time, while it did the opposite in China. Other significant changes are visible in India and South Africa, where public perceptions of the EU have improved both in terms of likelihood and desirability. In


Russia the perception of the likelihood of the EU's leadership has improved and in the Republic of Korea the perception of its desirability has decreased with the cumulative effect of widening the gap between likelihood and desirability in both cases.

**FIGURE 11. DESIRABILITY AND LIKELIHOOD OF THE EU'S AND OTHER COUNTRIES' LEADERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS (2021)**







**Desirability and likelihood of Brazil's leadership**



**Desirability and likelihood of India's leadership**



**Desirability and likelihood of Japan's leadership**



**Desirability and likelihood of South Africa's leadership**

Source: Source: Prepared by the Core Team

Looking at public perceptions of other countries' future leadership further helps to understand the perception of the EU's leadership in a global setting. In this regard, changes are visible in comparison to 2015 when the EU appeared as one of the top three major players in terms of desirability and likelihood of its global leadership in the majority of surveyed publics.



# The EU's performance in various fields

## Economy and trade

There is a strong cognitive association of the EU with the field of economy **among the general public**. This strong link, which can stem from a variety of factors such as the origins of the EU as an economic entity or the visibility of its single currency (see section 0) is transpire in the survey results. Indeed, a high percentage of respondents perceive the EU as an influential actor in global economic affairs (cross-country average 79% of respondents said the EU was either “very influential” or “somewhat influential”). This holds true across all surveyed countries, including such as China and Russia, where opinions about the EU on other questions tend to be more negative. When the EU's perceived influence is compared against other countries and organisations, the US and China are overwhelmingly seen as the most influential actors, leaving the EU somewhere close to Japan, the IMF or the WTO at the third place. In several instances, such as in Mexico, China or Nigeria, the publics rank the EU further below in this ranking. This challenge to the EU's position is also visible when comparing the results with 2015, as the proportion of those who see the EU as influential in global economic affairs has decreased in China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia while it has increased in India and South Africa.

In the list of economic activities, the EU is seen to perform particularly well in tourism (with a cross-country average of 77.9%), which echoes the high proportion of respondents seeing the EU as an attractive tourist destination. Tourism is also seen as the field where the EU performs the best in seven out of the 13 studied countries. Compared to 2015 where tourism came first in all ten countries except China and India, there is a diversification of the fields in which the general public see the EU perform the best. In 2021, global trade comes first in Canada, Nigeria and South Africa, development of new technologies – in China and India, and industrial development – in Indonesia. As some of these countries were not part of the 2015 Study and one field (global health) was added to the list in 2021, such comparisons should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the lead of the tourism sector visible in 2015 has weakened with a much smaller gap between the perceived performance of the EU in this sector and the perceived performance of the EU in global trade. Furthermore, the effect of Covid-19, which has significantly impacted the tourism industry across globe, should also be considered.

Indeed, global trade is another field where the EU is seen as performing particularly well with a cross-country average of 77.3%. The performance of the EU in this domain further echoes the fact that the EU is seen by respondents as an important trade partner for their country and that there is an appetite to further economic ties with the EU. In terms of foreign investments, variations are visible across countries, with large shares of respondents in emerging global powers such as Nigeria, Indonesia, South Africa, India, Mexico or Brazil seeing the EU as an important foreign investor while it is the case much more moderately in other countries. This perceived reliance on EU investments might explain a heightened perception of EU's protectionism as respondents in these countries are also more likely to agree that the EU protects its market at the expense of others.

Agriculture is a sector where the performance of the EU is the least positively perceived (together with space exploration). The respondents do not see the EU as an important source of agricultural and food products for their country (50,7 %cross country average), with the exception of India and Indonesia where respectively 72,3 % and 67,2 % of respondents do see it as such.

## Politics

While the political role of the EU might be more difficult to define per se, the areas where it was seen as performing particularly well were the support for regional and international cooperation, media freedom and foreign policy. It was seen as performing fairly well in fields related to global peace and security although the poll results to Q16 suggest that it is not the area where its action is the most visible. Similarly, as 2015, when comparing the perceived EU performance in fighting against terrorism and radicalisation, military operations and peacekeeping operations; military operation was perceived least positively.

However, the EU is still considered by respondents as having an important role in maintaining global peace and stability and when compared with other countries and organisations it comes third to the US and the UN in terms of importance in most surveyed countries. China, India, and Russia are exceptions with respondents in these countries seeing the role of their own country as more important. Compared to 2015, the perceived importance of the role of the EU has increased in Brazil, India, Mexico and Russia while it decreased in China and the US.

Similarly, the EU was seen as having an important role in promoting and defending human rights worldwide to protect human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity. When compared with other countries and organisations, it is always one of the three with the highest perceived importance as reported by respondents, except in China. Its cross-country average (81,8 %) is similar to the UN's (82,3 %). The perception of the role of the EU in this domain has improved over time in a majority of countries (Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico and Russia) while it decreased in China.

## Climate and environment

The role of the EU in protecting the environment was considered important by a majority of respondents across all countries. When compared with other countries and organisation, it came as one of the top three actors in this domain generally alongside the US and the UN. It was not the case in China, India, and Japan, however these results should be interpreted with caution as respondents tended to assess the importance of all listed countries and organisations as relatively high.<sup>11</sup> This year, an additional question was introduced to measure how the action of the EU and other actors was evaluated by respondents. Unlike in the case the assessment of the importance of countries and organisation in fighting climate change, some countries stand out as having a more positive action than others. The EU is one of them as it was evaluated the most positively by respondents across all surveyed countries (cross-country average 77,5 %) just above the UN (77,0 % cross country average). China was the only surveyed country where the EU was not among the top three countries and organisations in terms of positive action for the environment.


Although the action of the EU is evaluated positively by respondents - and better so than other countries and organisations, respondents in most surveyed countries considered it more important than positive. In India and Nigeria, it was evaluated equally important and positive. This pattern of evaluating

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<sup>11</sup> When results across countries appear to be uniform (while it is not the case in other questions across the survey), it is an indication that the question might be considered less relevant by respondents and therefore the results are less reliable. In this specific case it is also possible that the similar assessment of all countries reflects the awareness that climate change is a global issue.

countries and international organisations' action as more important than positive is not unique to the EU, other countries used for comparison exhibited the same pattern.

**FIGURE 12. IMPORTANCE AND EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE EU IN FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (2021)**



Note: based on Q8 “In your view, how important or unimportant a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in fighting global climate change and protecting the environment?” and Q9 “In your view, how positive or negative a role each a following countries or organisations play in fighting global climate change and protecting the environment?”

Looking at how the fight against climate change is seen when compared to other areas of EU action seems to show that although the EU is seen as doing well in this domain (and better than other countries and organisations as mentioned earlier), it is not necessarily seen as what define it in the eyes of respondents. Indeed, the EU is seen as doing fairly well in term of climate change activism (Q18), but it is not the area of social development where the EU is standing out the most. It is also the case when compared to other political areas (Q16) with the bloc seen as doing fairly well in fighting climate change but with doing even better in other areas. The same is true when comparing the EU performance in economic sectors (Q14), with green technologies and sustainability being evaluated positively but less so than tourism and development of new technologies for example.

## Development and aid

The EU was seen as having an important role in providing support to developing countries to eradicate poverty and to build a fairer and more stable world (Q10) by respondents across all countries. On average across all surveyed countries, 79,7 % of respondents said its role was either “very important”

or “somewhat important”. Russia was the country where this percentage was the lowest (57,0 %). However, in Russia, as well as in a majority of surveyed countries, the EU came in the top three in terms of countries and organisations having an important role in providing development aid. The UN and the US were often considered as the top actors in this domain followed by the EU. Compared to international organisations, although the EU comes behind the UN in a majority of countries, its role is usually considered more important than the role of the World Bank or the ASEAN. Country chapters offer more details on the perception of the EU role at country level.

However, when compared to other political areas, the action of the EU in supporting developing countries did not stand out and was even among the weakest (Q16). On average, across all surveyed countries 58 % of respondents said that the EU action in supporting developing countries was either “very good” or “fairly good”. The political area where the EU stood out the most was support for regional and international cooperation (cross-country average 65,8 %).

As noted for the field of environment, this gap in the assessment of the action of the EU compared to other organisations and the assessment of its action compared to other fields is likely to indicate that even though the EU is seen as performing well in this field, it is not seen as defining its identity on the global stage.

## **Social development<sup>12</sup>**

In terms of opinions on specific topics relating to internal social development (Q18), most survey respondents see the EU as performing particularly well in terms of overall quality of life and level of education. Anecdotal evidence gathered during survey development in Indonesia and Nigeria supports the idea that in some countries, the EU is seen as having very good conditions across all areas of social development comparatively to their own. It is reflected in high level of positive views of the EU action in all domains of social development in these two countries. Contrasts in the results are starker in countries where the standards of living are somehow similar to those in the EU (such as Canada, Japan or the US).

The action of the EU was evaluated less positively when it came to reducing income inequalities (in the bottom three fields of action in all countries except India and Mexico) and the eradication of poverty.

The area in which the action of the EU is seen the least positively is the integration of migrants and refugees. However, it is more positive in 2021 than in 2015. This could indicate that the image of the EU has been durably impacted by its perceived response to the increased arrival of migrants and refugees in 2015-16 (migrant crisis) and the policies of migration and the failure to integrate migrants. The protection of minorities was also an area where respondents in several surveyed countries saw the EU as performing less positively.

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<sup>12</sup> Social development is distinguished from the theme “social”, however, it is similar. Social development is the measure of the overall quality of life through indicators such as level of education, employment opportunities, fight for the environmental protection, human rights, minorities and equality in general. The *social* theme consists of education, multiculturalism, equality and diversity, migration, far-right, nationalism, populism, xenophobia, climate change activism and socio-economic inequality.

## Science, research and technology

In the field of advancing innovation and technological progress in the world, the EU is seen as an important actor (across all countries, 81,3 % of respondent said so) but it is also seen as lagging behind the US, China and Japan in most surveyed countries. This was also the case in 2015, the Republic of Korea being an exception with the EU coming second behind the US. In 2021, the EU comes second in the Republic of Korea but also third in Japan and in two countries which were not included in the 2015 study (Nigeria and Indonesia). In addition, respondents in Russia and in India rank the EU behind their own country.

Compared to other economic sectors, the development of new technologies and science and research were seen by respondents as sectors where the EU was performing very well. However, this did not extend to space exploration, which was the sector seen the least positively by respondents.

In terms of health, the EU was seen as doing well in both medical research (73.5% cross-country average) and global health (71.1% cross-country average) in most countries. Respondents in all countries, apart from Japan, evaluate both medical research and global health above 50 % positively up to above 95% in Nigeria.

### ▪ Culture and sports

Although the performance of the EU in the field of the entertainment industry and in media and publishing was seen relatively positively by respondents (the cross-country average of positive views for these fields were respectively 65,4 % and 66,9 %), these two sectors were among those evaluated the least positively by respondents at Q14 (with the exception of Russia for the entertainment industry). Similarly, respondents did not necessarily see the EU as a producer of music and arts popular in their countries although variations are visible across surveyed countries. It was more popular as a producer of luxury goods and clothes.

However, European culture still seem to appeal to respondents. As in 2015, all areas related to European culture were evaluated very positively and somehow equally by respondents(Q20). No category stood out above the others although multiculturalism was seen less positively among most surveyed countries with the exception of Colombia.

The fact that the EU is not particularly identified by respondents as a producer of arts and cultural goods but that specific fields of EU and European culture are seen very positively echoes the stronger association of the cultural domain with Europe than with the EU. In this sense, culture and sport might be identified as an important part of the European identity but the EU, as an actor, is not seen as its driving force. Similar reflections are found in other reports, annexed to the Update Study (Annexes I, III, IV and V) and Country Case studies in all 13 target countries.

This is also echoed the fact that a high percentage of respondents finds Europe attractive for its history and that EU countries are seen as attractive destinations in terms of culture and lifestyle by respondents and more so than other countries used for comparison (see 0).

## Local resonance


### Relationship with the EU and partnership

Respondents were asked to evaluate the relationship of their country with the EU. This varies greatly across countries with cultural patterns of response likely to play an important role here. As shown in Figure 13, the relationship is perceived very positively in India, Nigeria and Indonesia while other countries shows high level of neutral opinions. Looking at the perception of the relationship with the EU in comparison with the relationship with other countries and organisation is helpful as it provides additional context. It shows that the EU comes either second or third in terms of positive views in all countries excepts Mexico and Russia. It is usually outranked by the US and/or Japan (in Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, South Africa and the US). These results should be interpreted with caution as the list of countries against which the EU is compared is limited and might under play the influence of regional dynamics. Opinions are likely to be stronger (either positively or negatively) for countries with which the relationship is particularly visible, and therefore affect the ranking. For example, in the Republic of Korea, opinions of the relationship with Japan are much more negative than for any other country, which is likely to reflect historical tensions. In comparison, the perception of the EU is much more nuanced, with higher level of neutral opinions which perhaps artificially make it seems more positive. Country chapters offer a more granular views of these differences.

In Russia however, the perception of the relationship with the EU is much more negative than in other countries, with more than one respondent out of three (36,5 %) describing the Russia-EU relationship as “rather bad” or “bad”. In this country, only the relationship with the US is considered worse.



**FIGURE 13. PERCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU (2021)**




**Note:** based on Q3 “Generally speaking, which of the following words best describes your country’s overall relationship with each of the following countries and organisations (EU)?”

Even though the 2021 trend for Russia was more negative, perceptions of the relationship with the EU in Russia significantly improved since the last time the study was conducted, with positive opinions in this country going from 11 % in 2015 to 24 % in 2021. Perhaps less dramatically, perceptions also improved in India and South Africa. In the US and even more noticeably in China, perceptions of the relationship with the EU have deteriorated in a way that is consistent with the results to Q1 (see 0).

In some countries, the perception of the relationship with the EU varies by age. In Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Indonesia, India and Nigeria, people aged over 25 years old show more positive opinion of their country’s relationship with the EU than those younger than 25. It is the opposite trend, in China and Russia, younger people tend to have more positive opinions of the relationship with the EU than older ones (Figure 14).

**FIGURE 14. POSITIVE VIEWS OF THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU AMONG YOUTH (UNDER 25 YEARS OLD) (2021)**



**Note:** based on Q3 “Generally speaking, which of the following words best describes your country’s overall relationship with each of the following countries and organisations (EU)?” (“very good” or “rather good”)


The importance of the relationship between partner countries and the EU was also observed through respondents’ perception of the partnership with the bloc in specific areas. When comparing different fields of cooperation, results show that the EU is seen first and foremost as a trade and international relations partner. The importance of the partnership in the area of science, research and technology as well as in the field of education exchanges varies among target countries, see Figure 15. Interestingly, the perception of the partnership in specific areas appears more positive than the perception of the overall relationship with the EU. Although the two measures are not directly comparable, the extent of the gap in certain countries such as China and Russia is informative. It could indicate that despite perceived poorer relationships, the EU remain a key actor for partnership and conversely, that the perception of strong partnership does not have an impact on the perception of a positive relationship.

Compared to 2015, the perception of the importance of the partnership between the EU and the respondents’ country increased in all domains except education exchanges (where it remained stable) and across a majority of countries included in the 2015 study. China stands out once again as an exception, with the perception of the importance of the partnership with the EU decreasing in all domains.

The importance of the EU as a trade partner echoes the respondents’ perception that the EU is particularly visible in the economic domain where it is perceived to performs well (see section 0). However, as noted earlier this is not without raising some potential concerns from respondents in emerging countries regarding the perceived tendency of the EU to promote its market at the expense of others. Similarly, while the EU is seen as an important partner in international relations by respondents in all surveyed countries, it is not always considered as trustworthy partner. This is particularly visible in countries more established on the international arena such as China, Japan, Russia or the US.

However, this does not affect the interest in strengthening political ties with the bloc. A large share of respondents in all surveyed countries except the US, agree that their countries should have stronger ties with the EU. In the US, just above half of respondents say so (52,2 %).

**FIGURE 15. IMPORTANCE OF THE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EU IN SPECIFIC DOMAINS (2021)**



**Note:** based on Q15 “How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements (...)?” “The EU is an important trade partner for your country”, “The EU is an important partner to your country in science, research and technology”, and Q17 “Looking from your country’s perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?” “The EU is an important partner to your country in international relations” and “The EU is an important partner for your country’s education exchange “. This table presents the percentage of respondents in each country who answered “strongly agree” or “agree” to each statement.


○ **EU as a norm-setter**

Respondents were surveyed about their values and whether these aligned with those promoted by the EU. When asked whether the EU shared the same democratic principles as their country, respondents did not necessarily agree (cross country average 50,1 %). China and Russia had the lowest share of respondents agreeing with this statement (less than one respondent in three), but it was also low in other countries such as the US, South Africa, Brazil, Colombia and Japan (less than one respondent out of two). The EU was also not necessarily seen as a good example for the respondent's country in promoting equality between women and men. The percentage of respondents agreeing with this statement was lower in Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US.

### Frequency of hearing of the EU and information preference

The survey also provides information on how much exposure to news about the EU the general population of target countries receive. Respondents were asked to provide an estimate of the frequency at which they read or hear about the EU, not only through the media but also in the broader sense, through word and mouth. In a majority of countries (10 out of 13), there is a high level of visibility of the EU, with more than half of the population hearing or reading about it at least once a week, see Figure 16. In Japan, the US and Canada, the general population tends to hear or read much less about the EU with more than one person out of ten never hearing or reading about the EU, one out of eight people in the US.

**FIGURE 16. FREQUENCY OF READING/HEARING ABOUT THE EU (2021)**



**Note:** based on Q27: Generally, how often, if ever, do you hear or read about the EU?


Within the population of each target country, exposure to EU news varies by demographics. In all countries except Indonesia, men are more likely than women to report reading or hearing about the EU at least once a week, see Figure 17. There is also evidence that age plays a role in some countries. In Brazil, China, Colombia, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Russia and South Africa people aged 25 and over are more likely to read or hear about the EU at least once a week. In the US, it is the opposite, see Figure 18.

**FIGURE 17. FREQUENCY OF READING OR HEARING ABOUT THE EU BY GENDER (2021)**



**Note:** based on Q27: Generally, how often, if ever, do you hear or read about the EU? (“more or less every day” or “about once a week”). Countries where the difference between 2015 and 2021 is not significant are presented in lighter shade.

**FIGURE 18. FREQUENCY OF HEARING OR READING ABOUT THE EU AMONG YOUTH (2021)**




Source: Prepared by the Core Team

Respondents who indicated that they heard or read about the EU were subsequently asked through which medium they did. Online media and television channels were the sources of EU news the most mentioned by respondents across all surveyed countries (Figure 18). They were followed by social media in all countries except Japan and the Republic of Korea where print media (newspaper and magazines) came third. Results also indicate that few respondents get EU news from EU delegations in their country capital as it is one of the least mentioned sources of the list. Sources of EU news are further analysed at country level in country chapters. One should keep in mind that as respondents answered the survey online, results are likely to over-represent online sources (online media and social media) due to fact that all respondents - by definition, had access to the internet. Another observation regarding the source of information in the survey is the fact that younger age groups tend to use social media in a higher rate compared the older age groups.

In terms of information preference, results from the survey show that there is a certain interest in getting more information about the EU. Across all countries, between 54,8 % and 80,9 % of respondents indicated they would like to have more information, no matter how informed they currently are. However, in some countries (Japan and to a lesser extent China, the Republic of Korea, the US and Russia) a noticeable share of the population said they were not really interested in information about the EU, see Figure 19. While it was already the case in Japan, the Republic of Korea and the US in 2015, it is a new phenomenon in China.



**FIGURE 19. INFORMATION PREFERENCE ON THE EU (2021)**




**Note:** based on Q29 “Would you say you are sufficiently informed about the European Union?” Respondents who indicated that they “never” hear about the EU at Q27 and those who didn’t know how often they heard about the EU were excluded.

At the end of the survey, all respondents were asked to select the activities related to the EU or Europe in which they would be the most interested to take part. Figure 20 summarises answer to this question in each surveyed country.


**FIGURE 20. PREFERENCE FOR EU RELATED ACTIVITIES (2021)**

European film festivals


Joint sport initiative




**Cultural events**





**Academic exchanges**




**Activities between European and [Country] people**




**Getting information about EU policies**




**Getting information on how to live in Europe**




**Getting information on how to invest or do business in Europe**



**Getting information on how to travel to Europe**



**Online initiatives**



**Note:** based on Q30 “In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking parts?”

Cultural events were the most popular answer option among respondents, coming first in Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico and the US. Other popular activities included activities between people from the surveyed country and European people, European film festivals and academic exchanges.

When looking specifically at the type of information respondents were interested in, the most popular category was information on how to travel to the EU (chosen by 40,6 % of respondents across all countries), followed by information on how to live in Europe. The popularity of the latter was driven by large share of respondents choosing this answer option in specific countries (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia and South Africa) while it was seldom chosen in other countries.

## Summary

The EU is **well visible** compared to other leading actors, such as the US and China, as well as international organisations, such as the UN. Compared to 2015, opinions about the EU compared to other international organisations improved in all surveyed countries except China -- where they deteriorated, and the Republic of Korea where they remained stable.

The study found that EU Member States which have remained the **most attractive** in the eyes of respondents are France, Germany, Italy and Spain, as in 2015. Similarly, the Baltic States and other CEE countries were least often mentioned across the countries as most attractive.

The EU was **seen positively** across a majority of countries, except for China, Russia and the US, where it was seen less positively. The most negative attitude towards the EU is expressed by the Russian respondents, marking continuity from the 2015 study. Despite these poorer results in Russia, **perceptions of the relationship with the EU significantly improved since the last time the study was conducted**. However, in the US and even more noticeably in China, **perceptions of the relationship with the EU have deteriorated**.

The results of the perception of EU's and Europe's **actoriness** are largely in line with the results of 2015 survey. The public opinion survey reveals that economy and politics is mostly associated with the EU over Europe. In all countries surveyed except Japan and Russia, more respondents associated the EU with the economy than with politics. The topic of social development is also associated more strongly with the EU than with Europe. On the other hand, the field of culture and sports remains strongly associated with Europe over the EU. The term most often associated with the EU was "modern". It came first in almost all locations of the study. Association with negative terms such as "aggressive", "hypocritical" or "arrogant" was low across all countries, except in Russia where "hypocritical" was often used.

The evaluation of the **effectiveness of the EU as norm-setting agent** internationally is **mixed**. Only a little over a half of the respondents argued that the EU shares the same democratic principles as they do. China and Russia had the lowest share of respondents agreeing with this statement. The EU was also not necessarily seen as a good example for the respondent's country in promoting equality between women and men. The percentage of respondents agreeing with this statement was lower in Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US.

# Socio-demographic variables and survey data tables

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This chapter provides with a brief comparative overview of how the perception of the EU changes among the demographic groups from the aspect of age, gender, settlement, working status, household income and education in the different countries. The chapter also presents the frequency tables broken-down by country for all questions included in the 2021 public opinion poll.<sup>13</sup> Percentages are presented weighted by age, gender, region and settlement type (urban or rural). The bases are unweighted and represent the actual number of respondents from which the question was asked.

Table 3 and Table 4 summarise how the perception of the EU changes from the aspect of the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. While the questions of the survey can have positive or negative outcomes, the socio-demographic characteristics are analysed in a binary way as well.

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<sup>13</sup> The demographic questions (Q31 to Q37) are excluded, as well as the questions not directly referring to the EU (for e.g. Q1\_1 “Generally speaking, please indicate how positive or negative you feel about the US”

**TABLE 4 . INFLUENCE OF CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU**

	GENERAL VIEW OF THE EU	RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU	EU LEADERSHIP (DESIRABLE)	EU LEADERSHIP (LIKELY)	EU INFLUENCE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS	THE EU'S ATTRACTIVENESS
<b>Age</b> Older > 25 Younger < 25	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, JPN, KOR, NGA) Younger ↑ (CHN, COL, IDN, MEX, RUS, US, ZAF)	Older ↑(CAN, COL, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA) Younger ↑ (CHN, RUS, ZAF)	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, NGA, US) Younger ↑ (CHN, COL, RUS)	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, NGA, US) Younger ↑ (CHN, IDN, RUS)	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US) Younger ↑ (CHN)	Older↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF)
<b>Gender</b> Women Men	Women ↑ (BRA, CAN, CHN, IDN, IND, JPN, RUS, ZAF) Men ↑ (KOR)	Women ↑ (CAN, CHN, IDN, RUS, ZAF) Men ↑ (JPN, KOR, MEX, US)	Women ↑ (BRA, CAN, CHN, RUS, US) Men ↑ (IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA)	Women ↑ (CAN, CHN, COL, IDN, NGA, MEX, RUS, ZAF) Men ↑ (JPN, KOR)	Women ↑ (CAN, IDN, RUS, ZAF) Men ↑ (IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, US)	Women↑(CAN, IDN, JPN, MEX, RUS) Men↑(KOR, NGA)
<b>Settlement</b> Urban Rural	Urban ↑ (US, KOR, IND, IDN, COL, CHN, CAN, BRA) Rural ↑ (ZAF, RUS, NGA, JPN)	Urban ↑ (US, MEX, KOR, IDN, COL) Rural ↑ (ZAF, RUS, NGA, JPN, CHN, CAN)	Urban ↑ (US, MEX, KOR, JPN) Rural ↑ (ZAF, RUS, NGA, CHN, CAN)	Urban ↑ (ZAF, US, RUS, MEX, KOR, COL, BRA) Rural ↑ (IND, CHN, CAN)	Urban ↑ (US, RUS, MEX, KOR, IND, IDN, BRA) Rural ↑ (COL)	Urban↑(COL, IDN, IND, KOR, RUS, US, ZAF) Rural↑(BRA, CAN, CHN, MEX, NGA)
Working status Employed Unemployed	Employed ↑ (BRA, COL, IDN, IND, MEX, NGA, RUS, US) Unemployed ↑(CHN)	Employed ↑ (BRA, COL, IDN, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA) Unemployed ↑(CAN, CHN)	Employed ↑ (BRA, IDN, IND, JPN, NGA) Unemployed ↑(CAN, CHN, COL, KOR, ZAF)	Employed ↑ (BRA, COL, JPN) Unemployed ↑(CAN, IDN, KOR, RUS)	Employed ↑ (BRA, CHN, COL, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, RUS, US, ZAF) Unemployed ↑(CAN)	Employed↑(BRA, CHN, COL, IDN, IND, RUS, ZAF) Unemployed↑(CAN, JPN, KOR, NGA)



<b>Household income</b>	Higher income ↑(US, RUS, MEX, KOR, JPN, IND, CAN, BRA) Lower income ↑(NGA)	Higher income ↑(US, RUS, KOR, JPN, COL, BRA) Lower income ↑(ZAF, NGA, CHN)	Higher income ↑(ZAF, US, RUS, KOR, JPN, IND, IDN, CAN) Lower income ↑(COL, CHN)	Higher income ↑(ZAF, US, NGA, MEX, KOR, JPN, IND, COL, CHN, CAN, BRA)	Higher income ↑(ZAF, US, RUS, MEX, KOR, JPN, IND, COL, CHN, BRA) Lower income ↑(NGA)	Higher income↑(BRA, CHN, COL, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, RUS, US, ZAF) Lower income↑(CAN, NGA)
<b>Education</b>	More educated ↑(CAN, COL, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, RUS, ZAF) Less educated ↑(BRA, CHN, US)	More educated ↑(CAN, COL, IDN, IND, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF) Less educated ↑(CHN, JPN, RUS)	More educated ↑(BRA, CAN, IDN, MEX, NGA, RUS, US) Less educated ↑(CHN, JPN, KOR, ZAF)	More educated ↑(BRA, IND, RUS, US, ZAF) Less educated ↑(CAN, CHN, JPN)	More educated ↑(BRA, CHN, IDN, IND, KOR, MEX, NGA, RUS, US) Less educated ↑(CAN, COL)	More educated↑(BRA, COL, IND, KOR, MEX, RUS, US, ZAF) Less educated↑(CHN, JPN, NGA)

Based on country-specific cross tabulations generated from poll results for the analysis of explanatory variables. ↑ respondents tend to have a more positive opinion.

Source: Prepared by the Core Team

**TABLE 5. INFLUENCE OF CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS ON THE PERCEPTION OF THE EU**

	THE EU'S IMPORTANCE IN GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY	THE EU'S IMPORTANCE IN FIGHT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE	THE EU'S ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE	THE EU'S ROLE IN SUPPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES	THE EU'S IMPORTANCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS	THE EU'S ROLE IN WORLD INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY
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<b>Age</b> Older > 25 Younger < 25	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF) Younger ↑ (RUS)	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF) Younger ↑ (CHN, RUS)	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF) Younger ↑ (CHN)	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF) Younger ↑ (RUS)	Older ↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF) Younger ↑ (CHN, IDN, RUS)	Older↑(BRA, CAN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, US, ZAF) Younger↑(CHN)
<b>Gender</b> Women Men	Women ↑ (CAN, CHN, COL, JPN, RUS, US, ZAF) Men ↑ (IND, KOR, NGA)	Women ↑ (BRA, CAN, COL, JPN, RUS, US, ZAF) Men ↑ (IND, KOR)	Women ↑ (BRA, CAN, COL, JPN, RUS) Men ↑ (IDN, IND, KOR, MEX, US)	Women ↑ (BRA, CAN, COL, IDN, JPN, RUS, US, ZAF) Men ↑ (IND, KOR, MEX)	Women ↑ (BRA, CAN, CHN, IDN, JPN, MEX, RUS, US) Men ↑ (IND, KOR, NGA, ZAF)	Women↑(BRA, CAN, CHN, COL, JPN, MEX, RUS, ZAF) Men↑(IND, NGA)
<b>Settlement</b> Urban Rural	Urban ↑ (ZAF, US, RUS, NGA, MEX, KOR, JPN, IND, IDN, COL, CHN, BRA) Rural ↑ (CAN)	Urban ↑ (ZAF, US, MEX, KOR, JPN, IND, IDN, COL, CHN, BRA) Rural ↑ (RUS, NGA, CAN)	Urban ↑ (US, RUS, MEX, KOR, JPN, IND, CHN) Rural ↑ (ZAF, NGA, COL, CAN)	Urban ↑ (ZAF, US, KOR, IND, COL, CHN) Rural ↑(RUS, NGA, CAN)	Urban ↑ (US, MEX, KOR, JPN, IND, IDN, COL) Rural ↑ (RUS, NGA, CHN, CAN, BRA)	Urban↑(CHN, COL, IDN, KOR, RUS, US) Rural↑(BRA, CAN, JPN, MEX, NGA, ZAF)
<b>Working status</b> Employed Unemployed	Employed ↑ (COL, MEX, NGA, ZAF) Unemployed ↑(CAN, CHN, IND, JPN, RUS, US)	Employed ↑ (BRA, COL, IDN, IND, MEX, NGA) Unemployed ↑(CAN, CHN, KOR, US)	Employed ↑ (COL) Unemployed ↑(CAN, CHN, JPN, RUS, ZAF)	Employed ↑ (BRA, COL, IDN, IND, MEX) Unemployed ↑(CAN, KOR)	Employed ↑ (BRA, COL, IDN, MEX, NGA, ZAF) Unemployed ↑(CAN, CHN, IND, JPN, KOR, RUS, US)	Employed↑(COL, IND, MEX, ZAF) Unemployed↑(BRA, CAN, CHN, JPN, US)
<b>Household income</b> Higher income Lower income	Higher income ↑(BRA, CHN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, US, ZAF) Lower income ↑(CAN, NGA)	Higher income ↑(BRA, CHN, COL, IND, KOR, MEX, NGA, ZAF) Lower income ↑(RUS)	Higher income ↑(CHN, IND, JPN, KOR) Lower income ↑(BRA, COL, NGA, RUS)	Higher income ↑(BRA, CHN, IDN, IND, KOR, MEX, RUS, ZAF) Lower income(COL, JPN, US)	Higher income ↑(BRA, CHN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, US, ZAF) Lower income ↑(CAN, NGA, RUS)	Higher income↑(CHN, COL, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US, ZAF) Lower income↑(CAN)

<b>Education</b>	More educated ↑(BRA, CHN, COL, IDN, JPN, KOR, RUS, US, ZAF) Less educated ↑(CAN, IND)	More educated ↑(BRA, CHN, COL, IDN, IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, NGA, US) Less educated ↑(CAN	More educated ↑(IND, JPN, KOR, MEX, RUS, US) Less educated ↑(BRA, CAN	More educated ↑(BRA, COL, IDN, IND, KOR, MEX, US, ZAF) Less educated ↑(CAN, CHN, JPN, NGA, RUS)	More educated ↑(BRA, IND, KOR, MEX, US, ZAF) Less educated ↑(CAN, CHN, JPN, RUS)	More educated↑(BRA, CHN, IDN, IND, KOR, MEX, RUS, US) Less educated↑(CAN, JPN)
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Based on country-specific cross tabulations generated from poll results for analysis of explanatory variables. ↑ respondents tend to have a more positive opinion.

Source: Prepared by the Core Team

○ Frequency tables

Q1. Generally speaking, please indicate how positive or negative you feel about each of the following countries and organisations

European Union

	Very positive	Somewhat positive	Neither positive nor negative	Somewhat negative	Very negative	Do not know/cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	38.2 %	38.0 %	17.8 %	2.7 %	1.0 %	2.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	12.0 %	38.5 %	32.2 %	7.1 %	3.9 %	6.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	7.6 %	20.1 %	50.7 %	16.0 %	2.8 %	2.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	41.0 %	38.4 %	15.6 %	2.8 %	0.8 %	1.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	37.7 %	41.7 %	15.8 %	3.8 %	0.1 %	1.0 %	1133
<b>India</b>	33.2 %	42.0 %	18.3 %	3.4 %	0.3 %	2.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	8.3 %	28.6 %	45.0 %	7.8 %	2.2 %	8.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	13.7 %	34.0 %	40.4 %	5.5 %	3.1 %	3.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	38.0 %	38.8 %	18.2 %	2.3 %	0.7 %	2.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	56.6 %	28.9 %	12.0 %	2.1 %	0.4 %	0.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	9.8 %	30.0 %	41.1 %	13.5 %	3.9 %	1.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	14.2 %	28.8 %	31.6 %	9.9 %	5.4 %	10.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	28.6 %	36.5 %	23.2 %	6.0 %	3.3 %	2.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	26.2 %	34.3 %	27.7 %	6.4 %	2.1 %	3.4 %	14427

**Q2. Which of the following words, if any, do you think best describes each of the following countries and organisations? \* Please, select as many words as apply to each country/ organisation.**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Modern</b>	<b>Peaceful</b>	<b>Efficient</b>	<b>Strong</b>	<b>United</b>	<b>Trustworthy</b>	<b>Multicultural</b>	<b>Aggressive</b>	<b>Hypocritical</b>	<b>Arrogant</b>	<b>None of these</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	47,8 %	31,8 %	42,0 %	45,3 %	31,4 %	24,2 %	24,2 %	4,7 %	3,0 %	5,4 %	3,6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	32,0 %	26,8 %	22,7 %	24,2 %	29,7 %	17,8 %	29,2 %	3,8 %	6,3 %	6,3 %	16,2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	46,5 %	21,0 %	23,9 %	29,6 %	14,2 %	10,0 %	42,4 %	11,1 %	17,2 %	18,1 %	6,3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	56,4 %	32,5 %	45,8 %	43,3 %	39,5 %	27,8 %	35,0 %	5,8 %	3,1 %	4,2 %	1,9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	68,1 %	42,6 %	37,5 %	49,5 %	44,6 %	27,3 %	31,8 %	13,2 %	3,2 %	5,6 %	0,9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	55,5 %	45,3 %	50,6 %	47,9 %	37,0 %	30,8 %	26,0 %	15,4 %	11,1 %	6,6 %	2,0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	19,4 %	15,4 %	10,6 %	7,8 %	17,3 %	11,0 %	22,2 %	1,9 %	5,8 %	3,6 %	31,3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	23,2 %	32,0 %	27,1 %	16,4 %	25,3 %	22,3 %	21,6 %	2,8 %	5,8 %	5,3 %	8,6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	52,8 %	31,2 %	43,4 %	44,3 %	38,2 %	24,2 %	27,1 %	4,2 %	5,1 %	4,7 %	2,2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	64,8 %	55,0 %	52,5 %	55,3 %	47,3 %	31,7 %	24,5 %	4,4 %	4,1 %	3,7 %	1,1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	37,9 %	14,5 %	18,1 %	18,7 %	12,7 %	11,3 %	35,8 %	9,1 %	24,5 %	16,8 %	6,9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	29,7 %	27,1 %	22,1 %	20,7 %	22,0 %	13,7 %	23,2 %	5,8 %	8,2 %	9,3 %	22,6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	42,1 %	36,7 %	37,5 %	37,1 %	32,0 %	22,6 %	25,5 %	6,2 %	9,0 %	7,2 %	3,9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	44,5 %	31,6 %	33,5 %	34,0 %	30,1 %	21,1 %	28,4 %	6,8 %	8,2 %	7,5 %	8,2 %	14427

Q3. Generally speaking, which of the following words best describes your country's overall relationship with each of the following countries and organisations?

Response on European Union

	Very positive	Somewhat positive	Neither positive nor negative	Somewhat negative	Very negative	Do not know/cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	22.5 %	36.6 %	24.9 %	8.6 %	3.5 %	3.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	17.2 %	38.7 %	26.5 %	3.6 %	2.9 %	11.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	8.2 %	23.9 %	50.2 %	8.2 %	2.8 %	6.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	22.9 %	35.4 %	32.5 %	4.6 %	0.9 %	3.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	33.3 %	51.1 %	11.3 %	1.5 %	0.4 %	2.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	38.5 %	41.5 %	16.0 %	2.0 %	1.0 %	1.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	7.3 %	31.0 %	41.4 %	6.4 %	1.5 %	12.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	9.4 %	33.8 %	41.9 %	7.0 %	1.3 %	6.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	19.3 %	32.7 %	39.7 %	4.6 %	0.5 %	3.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	47.2 %	35.2 %	14.1 %	1.6 %		1.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	5.2 %	19.2 %	34.3 %	29.3 %	7.2 %	4.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	15.4 %	31.4 %	28.5 %	7.5 %	2.5 %	14.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	21.5 %	36.1 %	29.2 %	5.2 %	1.7 %	6.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	20.6 %	34.4 %	30.1 %	7.0 %	2.0 %	6.0 %	14427

**Q4. How desirable or undesirable is it that each of the following countries and organisations take a strong leadership role in world affairs?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very desirable</b>	<b>Somewhat desirable</b>	<b>Neither desirable nor undesirable</b>	<b>Somewhat undesirable</b>	<b>Very undesirable</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	36.4 %	31.3 %	17.2 %	7.3 %	4.9 %	2.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	19.7 %	35.6 %	25.0 %	6.9 %	4.7 %	8.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	7.7 %	24.2 %	47.6 %	10.4 %	3.1 %	7.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	37.0 %	37.8 %	17.8 %	3.9 %	2.2 %	1.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	36.5 %	37.5 %	18.4 %	3.9 %	1.8 %	2.0 %	1133
<b>India</b>	39.8 %	39.7 %	15.5 %	1.7 %	2.2 %	1.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.0 %	27.6 %	38.5 %	9.2 %	3.0 %	11.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.7 %	29.7 %	40.3 %	5.8 %	3.5 %	6.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	34.5 %	34.3 %	23.1 %	4.9 %	2.4 %	0.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	57.7 %	32.2 %	6.1 %	2.1 %	0.9 %	1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	7.4 %	25.8 %	32.9 %	17.8 %	10.2 %	6.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	21.8 %	28.3 %	24.5 %	7.5 %	5.2 %	12.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	35.8 %	35.9 %	16.8 %	5.5 %	3.5 %	2.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	27.7 %	32.3 %	24.9 %	6.7 %	3.6 %	4.8 %	14427



**Q5. In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that each of the following countries or organisations will take a strong leadership role in world affairs five years from now?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very likely</b>	<b>Rather likely</b>	<b>Neither likely nor unlikely</b>	<b>Rather unlikely</b>	<b>Very unlikely</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	38.0 %	33.9 %	17.3 %	5.8 %	2.9 %	2.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	19.1 %	34.5 %	26.6 %	7.6 %	3.0 %	9.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	11.0 %	35.2 %	33.8 %	7.1 %	5.6 %	7.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	38.0 %	38.8 %	14.9 %	5.7 %	1.8 %	0.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	46.7 %	37.2 %	12.8 %	1.4 %	1.3 %	0.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	39.7 %	38.6 %	17.5 %	3.0 %	0.4 %	0.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	9.5 %	27.7 %	36.5 %	11.6 %	3.1 %	11.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.0 %	36.4 %	32.5 %	7.3 %	3.1 %	5.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	36.7 %	38.5 %	16.5 %	5.8 %	1.3 %	1.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	61.4 %	28.9 %	6.1 %	3.1 %	0.1 %	0.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	14.3 %	43.7 %	20.3 %	12.6 %	5.1 %	4.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	21.4 %	25.7 %	26.5 %	10.1 %	4.6 %	11.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	39.5 %	34.3 %	15.6 %	5.9 %	2.3 %	2.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	30.1 %	35.0 %	21.2 %	6.7 %	2.7 %	4.4 %	14427

**Q6. In your view, how influential, if at all, in global economic affairs are the following countries and organisations?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very influential</b>	<b>Somewhat influential</b>	<b>Not very influential</b>	<b>Not at all influential</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	55.5 %	31.6 %	8.1 %	2.0 %	2.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	26.5 %	42.8 %	15.3 %	3.4 %	11.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	16.9 %	51.3 %	20.3 %	2.9 %	8.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	53.0 %	36.4 %	7.8 %	1.7 %	1.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	50.6 %	41.0 %	6.9 %	1.1 %	0.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	41.3 %	44.0 %	9.9 %	2.8 %	2.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	17.3 %	43.5 %	21.4 %	4.2 %	13.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	23.5 %	52.8 %	13.4 %	4.7 %	5.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	47.4 %	37.8 %	11.7 %	1.1 %	1.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	72.7 %	22.5 %	3.5 %	0.9 %	0.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	16.6 %	53.4 %	20.3 %	4.1 %	5.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	26.3 %	35.2 %	16.1 %	5.9 %	16.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	50.7 %	35.1 %	8.5 %	2.2 %	3.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.4 %	40.6 %	12.6 %	2.8 %	5.6 %	14427

**Q7. In your view, how important, if at all, a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in maintaining global peace and stability?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Somewhat important</b>	<b>Not very important</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	65.5 %	24.7 %	6.4 %	1.8 %	1.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	38.3 %	36.2 %	11.0 %	5.0 %	9.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	21.3 %	49.8 %	18.7 %	3.3 %	6.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	59.5 %	30.0 %	7.3 %	2.3 %	0.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	63.4 %	28.9 %	5.0 %	0.9 %	1.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	49.5 %	33.8 %	14.3 %	1.7 %	0.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	27.5 %	40.9 %	15.7 %	3.1 %	12.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	34.5 %	42.6 %	13.5 %	4.7 %	4.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	52.2 %	36.1 %	8.6 %	1.5 %	1.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	75.3 %	21.0 %	2.4 %	0.7 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	19.4 %	44.2 %	22.6 %	6.7 %	7.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	34.1 %	29.5 %	14.4 %	6.8 %	15.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	53.0 %	30.4 %	10.0 %	3.3 %	3.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	45.7 %	34.5 %	11.5 %	3.2 %	5.1 %	14427

**Q8. In your view, how important or unimportant a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in fighting global climate change and protecting the environment?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Somewhat important</b>	<b>Not very important</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	67.6 %	22.9 %	5.4 %	2.5 %	1.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	45.0 %	29.6 %	9.0 %	4.8 %	11.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	35.5 %	37.9 %	16.3 %	3.8 %	6.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	64.0 %	27.7 %	5.9 %	1.4 %	1.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	69.7 %	24.4 %	3.4 %	1.1 %	1.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	57.2 %	29.8 %	9.6 %	2.1 %	1.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	33.5 %	35.5 %	15.1 %	4.0 %	11.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	45.0 %	34.1 %	11.7 %	4.6 %	4.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	60.2 %	29.0 %	7.8 %	1.6 %	1.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	74.9 %	20.8 %	3.0 %	0.4 %	0.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	24.2 %	46.5 %	13.7 %	4.9 %	10.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	38.3 %	26.4 %	13.3 %	7.0 %	15.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	58.3 %	27.8 %	6.6 %	3.4 %	3.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	51.9 %	30.2 %	9.3 %	3.2 %	5.5 %	14427

**Q9. In your view, how positive or negative a role each of the following countries or organisations play in fighting global climate change and protecting the environment?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Somewhat positive</b>	<b>Somewhat negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	50.9 %	33.1 %	9.6 %	3.1 %	3.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.2 %	41.6 %	13.4 %	6.0 %	16.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	20.2 %	50.6 %	15.1 %	2.5 %	11.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	48.2 %	40.3 %	7.5 %	1.2 %	2.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	59.8 %	32.0 %	4.3 %	1.4 %	2.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	50.4 %	35.8 %	7.9 %	2.5 %	3.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	17.3 %	41.3 %	16.9 %	4.1 %	20.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	26.7 %	46.3 %	14.4 %	4.4 %	8.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	46.4 %	40.4 %	8.4 %	1.5 %	3.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	74.0 %	22.5 %	1.6 %	0.3 %	1.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	15.8 %	50.0 %	15.2 %	3.4 %	15.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	23.3 %	35.1 %	14.7 %	7.6 %	19.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	42.1 %	40.0 %	10.4 %	3.3 %	4.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.3 %	39.2 %	10.7 %	3.2 %	8.6 %	14427

**Q10. In your view, how important, if at all, a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in providing support to developing countries to eradicate poverty and to build a fairer and more stable world?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Somewhat important</b>	<b>Not very important</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	68.5 %	21.8 %	5.2 %	2.1 %	2.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	37.6 %	34.9 %	10.7 %	4.3 %	12.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	28.3 %	45.9 %	13.9 %	2.1 %	9.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	53.3 %	31.7 %	9.9 %	3.4 %	1.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	65.7 %	28.2 %	4.6 %	0.8 %	0.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	53.9 %	30.7 %	10.4 %	3.1 %	1.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	30.7 %	37.3 %	14.6 %	2.6 %	14.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	42.1 %	35.5 %	10.8 %	5.0 %	6.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	49.6 %	34.9 %	10.4 %	2.6 %	2.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	75.7 %	20.4 %	1.7 %	0.5 %	1.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	17.0 %	40.1 %	22.2 %	8.1 %	12.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	33.6 %	31.4 %	12.3 %	7.5 %	15.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	53.4 %	32.8 %	7.7 %	3.5 %	2.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	46.9 %	32.8 %	10.3 %	3.5 %	6.5 %	14427

**Q11. In your view, how important, if at all, a role do each of the following countries or organisations play in promoting and defending human rights worldwide to protect human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Somewhat important</b>	<b>Not very important</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	71.0 %	19.6 %	4.8 %	2.3 %	2.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	44.6 %	30.6 %	9.4 %	3.6 %	11.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	28.4 %	49.3 %	11.5 %	3.2 %	7.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	58.4 %	32.2 %	5.9 %	2.4 %	1.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	71.0 %	22.0 %	3.4 %	1.3 %	2.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	53.6 %	33.7 %	8.4 %	2.0 %	2.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	34.5 %	34.9 %	12.8 %	4.1 %	13.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	45.2 %	34.0 %	10.2 %	4.2 %	6.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	52.0 %	33.2 %	9.3 %	2.9 %	2.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	75.0 %	23.0 %	1.2 %	0.1 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	17.8 %	48.1 %	16.7 %	5.4 %	12.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	34.5 %	30.7 %	12.0 %	6.6 %	16.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	53.6 %	32.0 %	7.8 %	3.4 %	3.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	49.2 %	32.6 %	8.7 %	3.2 %	6.3 %	14427



**Q12. In your view, how important, if at all, are the following countries and organisations in advancing innovation and technological progress in the world?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Somewhat important</b>	<b>Not very important</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	64.9 %	25.7 %	5.7 %	1.5 %	2.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	37.6 %	33.7 %	12.0 %	3.9 %	12.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	33.7 %	44.7 %	12.1 %	2.5 %	7.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	56.0 %	32.2 %	9.2 %	1.0 %	1.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	68.8 %	24.4 %	4.3 %	1.7 %	0.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	50.5 %	36.4 %	9.3 %	0.9 %	3.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	29.5 %	36.4 %	14.3 %	4.4 %	15.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	38.2 %	37.0 %	13.7 %	4.7 %	6.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	56.5 %	32.7 %	7.2 %	1.3 %	2.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	75.1 %	20.6 %	2.9 %	0.4 %	1.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	22.6 %	47.8 %	16.9 %	3.9 %	8.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	31.8 %	32.6 %	13.5 %	7.3 %	14.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	55.2 %	30.6 %	6.9 %	2.8 %	4.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	47.8 %	33.5 %	9.8 %	2.8 %	6.1 %	14427

**Q13. How attractive, if at all, to you personally are the following countries in terms of their culture and lifestyle?**

**Response on European Union**

	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Somewhat important</b>	<b>Not very important</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	59.4 %	30.2 %	5.6 %	2.5 %	2.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	30.4 %	40.5 %	12.7 %	5.8 %	10.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	20.2 %	43.9 %	24.1 %	6.0 %	5.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	67.5 %	25.4 %	5.2 %	1.1 %	0.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	50.0 %	36.6 %	11.7 %	1.4 %	0.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	46.8 %	37.0 %	12.5 %	1.7 %	2.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	16.9 %	39.6 %	20.7 %	7.1 %	15.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	25.6 %	42.9 %	19.1 %	5.7 %	6.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	62.1 %	28.4 %	6.1 %	1.5 %	1.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	58.4 %	31.8 %	7.3 %	0.9 %	1.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	25.4 %	50.6 %	10.9 %	4.1 %	9.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	29.2 %	32.7 %	15.2 %	7.8 %	15.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	42.9 %	36.5 %	12.4 %	5.2 %	2.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	41.4 %	36.5 %	12.5 %	3.9 %	5.7 %	14427

**Q14\_1. Development of new technologies: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	58.8 %	28.1 %	8.0 %	1.4 %	0.8 %	2.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	20.9 %	38.5 %	19.6 %	2.9 %	1.7 %	16.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.0 %	46.8 %	20.9 %	1.3 %	1.4 %	7.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	42.4 %	38.9 %	15.4 %	1.3 %	0.2 %	1.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	51.2 %	39.8 %	5.9 %	1.1 %	0.7 %	1.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	57.8 %	35.9 %	4.8 %	0.5 %	0.2 %	0.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.1 %	37.2 %	24.8 %	4.6 %	1.9 %	17.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.1 %	39.1 %	28.8 %	4.0 %	1.9 %	8.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	44.2 %	36.9 %	15.7 %	1.4 %	0.2 %	1.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	67.5 %	27.6 %	3.6 %	0.2 %	0.1 %	1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	27.9 %	41.8 %	18.4 %	2.6 %	2.1 %	7.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	26.1 %	31.4 %	19.6 %	4.4 %	1.9 %	16.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	41.4 %	41.2 %	10.6 %	2.2 %	1.0 %	3.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.1 %	37.2 %	15.0 %	2.1 %	1.1 %	6.5 %	14427

**Q14\_2. Global trade: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	57.8 %	29.8 %	6.2 %	2.4 %	0.8 %	3.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.4 %	42.5 %	14.0 %	3.3 %	1.9 %	12.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	25.1 %	42.1 %	24.3 %	1.8 %	1.2 %	5.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	48.2 %	36.9 %	11.4 %	1.4 %	0.5 %	1.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	47.0 %	43.7 %	6.7 %	0.6 %	1.1 %	0.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	53.0 %	37.3 %	8.1 %	0.5 %	0.2 %	0.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	17.4 %	38.2 %	22.4 %	5.2 %	1.2 %	15.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.0 %	38.6 %	29.9 %	5.5 %	1.4 %	6.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	48.7 %	36.8 %	10.8 %	2.1 %	0.3 %	1.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	76.4 %	21.0 %	2.4 %	0.1 %		0.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	27.5 %	44.1 %	16.2 %	4.4 %	2.2 %	5.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	28.2 %	32.9 %	17.3 %	4.0 %	2.5 %	15.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	48.9 %	37.2 %	9.2 %	1.6 %	0.8 %	2.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	40.3 %	37.1 %	13.7 %	2.5 %	1.1 %	5.4 %	14427

**Q14\_3. Industrial development: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	55.7 %	30.4 %	8.3 %	1.8 %	0.6 %	3.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	20.1 %	41.7 %	18.6 %	2.6 %	1.8 %	15.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	26.7 %	38.5 %	25.5 %	2.3 %	1.5 %	5.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	43.9 %	38.3 %	12.9 %	1.3 %	0.9 %	2.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	52.8 %	40.2 %	3.8 %	1.3 %	0.4 %	1.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	57.6 %	31.2 %	9.9 %	0.7 %	0.2 %	0.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.7 %	33.7 %	26.9 %	6.1 %	1.3 %	17.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.0 %	37.3 %	32.3 %	5.0 %	1.4 %	8.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	40.3 %	43.4 %	13.5 %	1.5 %	0.2 %	1.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	71.0 %	25.0 %	2.4 %	0.7 %		0.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	25.5 %	44.4 %	17.2 %	3.1 %	2.8 %	7.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.7 %	31.6 %	21.1 %	6.2 %	2.5 %	15.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	43.8 %	37.1 %	11.7 %	2.9 %	1.0 %	3.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.9 %	36.4 %	15.6 %	2.7 %	1.1 %	6.2 %	14427

**Q14\_4. Agriculture: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	37.3 %	35.2 %	17.4 %	4.4 %	1.4 %	4.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	18.1 %	37.1 %	20.8 %	4.9 %	2.2 %	16.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	18.8 %	39.9 %	27.0 %	5.8 %	0.9 %	7.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	30.7 %	33.1 %	26.6 %	4.4 %	0.8 %	4.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	38.0 %	40.4 %	15.3 %	2.9 %	0.5 %	2.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	39.7 %	34.2 %	20.9 %	2.4 %	0.5 %	2.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	13.7 %	33.5 %	28.6 %	5.3 %	2.2 %	16.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	12.4 %	30.2 %	37.7 %	8.3 %	1.2 %	10.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	30.0 %	35.2 %	27.7 %	4.1 %	0.4 %	2.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	52.6 %	34.6 %	10.9 %	1.2 %	0.1 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	20.2 %	37.8 %	24.5 %	6.7 %	2.6 %	8.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	20.6 %	30.8 %	23.7 %	5.1 %	2.6 %	17.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.5 %	37.0 %	19.3 %	5.5 %	1.5 %	5.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	28.0 %	35.3 %	23.1 %	4.7 %	1.3 %	7.5 %	14427

**Q14\_5. Tourism: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	63.7 %	25.0 %	6.3 %	1.9 %	1.0 %	2.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	34.6 %	33.1 %	14.4 %	2.6 %	2.3 %	13.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	29.8 %	36.4 %	22.3 %	3.1 %	1.1 %	7.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	55.8 %	32.4 %	7.8 %	1.0 %	0.6 %	2.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	54.9 %	37.0 %	5.2 %	0.9 %	0.7 %	1.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	55.6 %	31.7 %	7.2 %	3.3 %	1.1 %	1.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	23.9 %	33.4 %	21.3 %	4.5 %	2.0 %	14.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	25.5 %	36.9 %	23.3 %	5.3 %	2.5 %	6.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	52.1 %	35.4 %	8.8 %	1.8 %	0.5 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	72.4 %	19.0 %	4.3 %	1.3 %	1.0 %	2.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	34.7 %	41.6 %	12.5 %	2.0 %	2.4 %	6.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	33.5 %	29.7 %	15.7 %	3.5 %	2.7 %	14.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	49.1 %	32.7 %	11.1 %	3.3 %	0.6 %	3.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	45.2 %	32.7 %	12.2 %	2.6 %	1.4 %	5.8 %	14427



**Q14\_6. High quality food industry: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	53,0 %	30,0 %	9,8 %	2,7 %	0,8 %	3,7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25,7 %	34,8 %	16,8 %	4,0 %	2,2 %	16,5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	25,6 %	41,6 %	19,1 %	4,2 %	1,2 %	8,4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	40,7 %	35,8 %	15,5 %	2,4 %	1,4 %	4,2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	50,9 %	38,1 %	8,0 %	0,9 %	0,7 %	1,3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	51,1 %	34,8 %	8,9 %	2,2 %	1,2 %	1,8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14,9 %	29,0 %	29,5 %	7,2 %	1,7 %	17,7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16,7 %	34,2 %	32,6 %	6,9 %	1,7 %	7,9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	42,1 %	38,5 %	15,2 %	2,4 %	0,1 %	1,6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	61,0 %	31,2 %	5,4 %	0,9 %	0,1 %	1,4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	26,4 %	34,9 %	22,3 %	6,2 %	1,7 %	8,5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	26,6 %	28,7 %	20,3 %	4,8 %	1,7 %	17,9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	42,9 %	33,4 %	15,7 %	2,4 %	1,7 %	3,8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	36,9 %	34,3 %	16,8 %	3,6 %	1,2 %	7,2 %	14427

**Q14\_7. Entertainment industry (movies, TV, music): How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	46.3 %	32.6 %	14.5 %	1.8 %	1.2 %	3.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	18.0 %	34.1 %	22.8 %	5.0 %	3.4 %	16.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	20.9 %	36.6 %	27.3 %	4.6 %	1.0 %	9.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	32.5 %	33.4 %	26.8 %	2.9 %	0.9 %	3.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	44.0 %	42.4 %	8.7 %	1.8 %	1.6 %	1.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	53.0 %	24.1 %	16.3 %	4.5 %	0.5 %	1.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.7 %	28.1 %	29.8 %	9.2 %	1.6 %	16.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.4 %	26.8 %	36.0 %	11.7 %	3.1 %	8.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	32.7 %	37.6 %	24.8 %	2.7 %	0.6 %	1.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	56.6 %	29.1 %	11.1 %	1.5 %	0.1 %	1.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	29.8 %	37.7 %	19.3 %	4.0 %	1.3 %	7.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.4 %	27.1 %	23.4 %	6.4 %	3.8 %	16.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	37.2 %	35.9 %	15.9 %	5.6 %	1.3 %	4.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	32.6 %	32.8 %	21.2 %	4.7 %	1.5 %	7.1 %	14427

**Q14\_8. Media and publishing: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	47.1 %	33.2 %	12.4 %	1.9 %	1.7 %	3.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	17.2 %	34.7 %	22.3 %	5.4 %	2.8 %	17.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	20.5 %	38.0 %	26.9 %	3.6 %	1.4 %	9.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	37.1 %	39.2 %	16.4 %	2.3 %	0.8 %	4.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	43.9 %	42.7 %	9.0 %	1.9 %	0.8 %	1.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	45.7 %	32.6 %	17.0 %	1.8 %	0.7 %	2.2 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	11.2 %	26.3 %	32.9 %	8.1 %	2.7 %	18.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.1 %	28.5 %	39.0 %	8.3 %	2.1 %	8.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	36.5 %	39.7 %	18.6 %	2.4 %	0.7 %	2.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	59.5 %	33.2 %	5.6 %	0.5 %		1.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	22.3 %	36.6 %	21.4 %	6.4 %	2.6 %	10.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.5 %	28.9 %	21.1 %	5.7 %	3.6 %	18.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	36.9 %	38.3 %	14.6 %	4.1 %	1.5 %	4.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	32.0 %	34.9 %	19.7 %	4.0 %	1.6 %	7.8 %	14427

**Q14\_9. Financial services and banking: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	54.5 %	28.6 %	10.3 %	1.4 %	0.8 %	4.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	21.2 %	37.4 %	16.9 %	4.0 %	2.2 %	18.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.4 %	43.9 %	19.5 %	3.8 %	1.4 %	9.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	44.1 %	35.6 %	13.1 %	2.4 %	0.8 %	4.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	49.2 %	39.5 %	7.0 %	1.0 %	0.8 %	2.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	54.6 %	30.3 %	9.6 %	1.8 %	1.0 %	2.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.5 %	28.2 %	31.1 %	6.0 %	1.7 %	18.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.5 %	35.5 %	29.9 %	6.7 %	1.8 %	7.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	42.1 %	41.0 %	11.4 %	1.5 %	1.1 %	2.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	73.4 %	21.0 %	4.5 %	0.5 %		0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	28.9 %	43.0 %	15.1 %	2.3 %	1.3 %	9.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.7 %	28.6 %	20.3 %	4.5 %	2.7 %	18.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	46.3 %	33.0 %	12.2 %	2.7 %	1.4 %	4.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.2 %	34.4 %	15.4 %	2.9 %	1.3 %	7.8 %	14427

**Q14\_10. Science and research: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	59.5 %	28.1 %	6.6 %	1.4 %	0.9 %	3.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.8 %	36.5 %	16.4 %	3.4 %	2.0 %	15.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	24.3 %	43.0 %	19.2 %	3.5 %	1.5 %	8.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	47.7 %	34.1 %	12.4 %	2.4 %	0.9 %	2.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	60.1 %	32.0 %	4.4 %	0.9 %	0.8 %	1.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	59.8 %	29.0 %	7.2 %	2.1 %	0.3 %	1.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.1 %	32.6 %	28.0 %	5.5 %	1.6 %	17.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	17.0 %	40.2 %	28.5 %	5.5 %	1.6 %	7.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	46.3 %	37.3 %	12.5 %	1.5 %	0.9 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	77.3 %	17.8 %	3.5 %	0.3 %	0.1 %	1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	26.8 %	40.7 %	18.0 %	2.8 %	1.6 %	10.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.6 %	31.5 %	19.0 %	5.6 %	2.2 %	16.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	49.3 %	31.5 %	11.3 %	2.7 %	0.8 %	4.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	41.3 %	33.5 %	14.3 %	2.9 %	1.2 %	6.9 %	14427

**Q14\_11. Global health: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	51.5 %	30.8 %	10.9 %	3.0 %	1.4 %	2.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.4 %	37.7 %	16.6 %	4.3 %	1.8 %	14.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	20.8 %	41.0 %	24.1 %	5.7 %	1.5 %	6.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	40.4 %	36.3 %	16.2 %	3.5 %	0.7 %	2.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	51.6 %	37.0 %	7.2 %	1.6 %	0.8 %	1.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	50.7 %	32.9 %	9.4 %	4.0 %	0.6 %	2.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.6 %	30.8 %	28.2 %	5.9 %	1.9 %	17.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.5 %	33.7 %	30.2 %	8.3 %	2.6 %	6.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	43.5 %	36.2 %	15.0 %	3.1 %	0.5 %	1.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	76.9 %	20.0 %	1.9 %	0.7 %		0.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	21.8 %	35.1 %	24.9 %	6.2 %	3.0 %	9.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.5 %	31.1 %	19.2 %	6.0 %	3.2 %	15.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	45.1 %	32.6 %	13.8 %	3.5 %	2.2 %	2.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.5 %	33.6 %	16.7 %	4.3 %	1.5 %	6.4 %	14427

**Q14\_12. Medical research: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	52.6 %	32.0 %	8.4 %	1.7 %	1.3 %	3.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.6 %	39.3 %	13.9 %	4.3 %	2.0 %	14.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.7 %	42.6 %	21.6 %	4.3 %	1.9 %	6.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	41.8 %	36.6 %	14.7 %	2.6 %	1.1 %	3.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	55.9 %	37.0 %	3.5 %	1.1 %	0.6 %	1.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	52.7 %	31.6 %	8.6 %	3.8 %	0.9 %	2.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.6 %	33.5 %	26.1 %	6.4 %	1.2 %	17.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.6 %	36.9 %	29.1 %	7.7 %	2.3 %	7.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	47.3 %	37.5 %	10.7 %	1.9 %	0.4 %	2.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	71.5 %	24.0 %	2.8 %	0.2 %		1.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	26.2 %	37.9 %	20.4 %	4.1 %	2.8 %	8.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.4 %	31.5 %	19.2 %	4.5 %	2.5 %	16.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	45.2 %	33.9 %	12.6 %	3.3 %	1.1 %	4.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.5 %	35.0 %	14.7 %	3.5 %	1.4 %	6.9 %	14427



**Q14\_13. Space exploration: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	45.2 %	28.1 %	16.3 %	4.4 %	1.0 %	5.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	14.4 %	27.5 %	24.6 %	9.1 %	3.6 %	20.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	17.1 %	37.9 %	29.1 %	5.7 %	1.5 %	8.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	30.8 %	28.9 %	27.8 %	4.4 %	1.7 %	6.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	46.1 %	40.0 %	8.8 %	1.8 %	0.5 %	2.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	48.1 %	27.5 %	14.7 %	4.2 %	1.3 %	4.2 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	11.9 %	23.6 %	34.0 %	9.8 %	2.1 %	18.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.4 %	31.2 %	33.2 %	9.2 %	2.4 %	8.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	32.3 %	34.4 %	24.8 %	3.4 %	0.9 %	4.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	58.7 %	27.0 %	9.3 %	1.2 %	0.1 %	3.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	16.4 %	33.5 %	27.4 %	9.4 %	2.5 %	10.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	19.2 %	24.0 %	23.3 %	9.8 %	4.5 %	19.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.0 %	30.7 %	22.0 %	6.2 %	2.2 %	7.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.9 %	30.4 %	22.7 %	6.0 %	1.9 %	9.2 %	14427

**Q14\_14. Green technologies and sustainability: How good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following fields?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	44.7 %	32.8 %	13.2 %	3.4 %	1.7 %	4.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.0 %	35.0 %	18.9 %	4.8 %	2.4 %	17.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.3 %	42.1 %	20.8 %	3.5 %	1.8 %	9.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	37.6 %	38.0 %	17.1 %	2.6 %	0.9 %	3.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	53.9 %	35.1 %	7.8 %	0.9 %	0.4 %	1.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	47.0 %	32.1 %	12.5 %	2.4 %	1.4 %	4.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	17.1 %	30.2 %	27.7 %	6.3 %	2.4 %	16.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.7 %	38.2 %	26.9 %	6.4 %	1.7 %	8.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	40.9 %	38.9 %	14.4 %	3.2 %	0.2 %	2.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	64.2 %	26.0 %	6.3 %	1.4 %	0.3 %	1.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	20.7 %	40.2 %	23.3 %	5.0 %	1.8 %	9.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.3 %	28.0 %	20.8 %	6.9 %	2.5 %	17.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	35.7 %	38.7 %	15.1 %	3.9 %	1.8 %	4.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	34.7 %	35.1 %	17.2 %	3.9 %	1.5 %	7.7 %	14427

**Q15\_1. The EU is an important trade partner for your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the economic relations with?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	39.9 %	35.5 %	15.9 %	4.4 %	1.3 %	3.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	33.3 %	36.4 %	15.5 %	2.8 %	1.7 %	10.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	30.7 %	45.1 %	17.2 %	1.4 %	0.3 %	5.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	35.2 %	40.1 %	16.8 %	3.7 %	1.2 %	3.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	50.9 %	38.6 %	7.4 %	1.9 %	0.4 %	0.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	52.1 %	35.7 %	8.9 %	1.6 %	0.5 %	1.2 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	21.5 %	40.2 %	18.4 %	6.0 %	2.4 %	11.5 %	1126
<i>Republic of Korea</i>	27.2 %	43.3 %	18.5 %	5.4 %	0.7 %	4.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	34.4 %	42.1 %	15.4 %	5.0 %	0.7 %	2.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	56.2 %	31.2 %	7.7 %	2.4 %	0.7 %	1.8 %	1011
<b>Russia</b>	25.0 %	43.3 %	20.6 %	4.4 %	3.2 %	3.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	36.8 %	26.1 %	17.7 %	5.9 %	2.2 %	11.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	42.4 %	35.5 %	14.4 %	3.7 %	1.0 %	3.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.3 %	38.0 %	15.0 %	3.8 %	1.2 %	4.7 %	14426

**Q15\_2. The EU is protecting its market at the expense of others: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the economic relations**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	24.6 %	31.3 %	28.1 %	9.0 %	2.3 %	4.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	14.7 %	29.2 %	29.8 %	7.0 %	1.8 %	17.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	13.3 %	23.8 %	39.7 %	10.7 %	2.9 %	9.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	23.2 %	32.7 %	28.5 %	8.6 %	1.0 %	6.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	24.4 %	25.7 %	28.5 %	13.8 %	2.4 %	5.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	38.6 %	38.8 %	13.3 %	5.0 %	1.3 %	3.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.0 %	23.3 %	34.5 %	13.8 %	3.4 %	15.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	12.0 %	27.9 %	34.5 %	15.1 %	1.7 %	8.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	24.1 %	38.1 %	26.9 %	5.5 %	1.5 %	3.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	44.8 %	30.5 %	17.7 %	4.8 %	0.3 %	1.9 %	1011
<b>Russia</b>	23.4 %	35.7 %	26.2 %	5.2 %	1.7 %	7.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	18.0 %	24.1 %	30.5 %	7.9 %	3.3 %	16.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	27.5 %	33.1 %	26.5 %	6.2 %	1.1 %	5.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	23.0 %	30.4 %	28.0 %	8.6 %	1.9 %	8.0 %	14426

**Q15\_3. The EU is an important foreign investor in your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the economic relations**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	28.9 %	37.4 %	22.2 %	6.0 %	1.3 %	4.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	20.7 %	38.3 %	19.5 %	3.9 %	2.6 %	14.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	18.9 %	39.8 %	26.0 %	4.4 %	2.0 %	8.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	29.9 %	41.6 %	17.3 %	6.0 %	1.4 %	3.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	36.5 %	44.1 %	13.0 %	4.4 %	0.5 %	1.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	45.9 %	31.6 %	16.7 %	2.4 %	1.1 %	2.2 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.4 %	32.8 %	30.5 %	7.2 %	2.8 %	14.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.2 %	42.6 %	23.2 %	7.8 %	1.7 %	6.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	29.8 %	40.2 %	21.8 %	3.7 %	1.2 %	3.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	48.0 %	32.4 %	12.5 %	4.3 %	1.0 %	1.7 %	1011
<b>Russia</b>	22.1 %	32.8 %	25.5 %	10.1 %	3.3 %	6.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	23.7 %	30.8 %	22.5 %	7.1 %	2.7 %	13.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	36.5 %	36.7 %	16.8 %	5.4 %	1.3 %	3.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	28.6 %	37.0 %	20.6 %	5.6 %	1.8 %	6.4 %	14426

**Q15\_4. The EU should have stronger economic ties with your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about the economic?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	50.3 %	31.8 %	12.2 %	3.4 %	0.4 %	1.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	26.8 %	37.2 %	18.4 %	3.7 %	2.2 %	11.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	32.8 %	41.2 %	15.6 %	2.7 %	0.5 %	7.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	49.7 %	32.6 %	12.1 %	2.7 %	0.8 %	2.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	45.3 %	43.4 %	7.5 %	1.1 %	0.5 %	2.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	44.9 %	37.6 %	12.5 %	3.7 %	0.1 %	1.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.9 %	37.9 %	25.4 %	6.1 %	1.9 %	12.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	25.7 %	44.0 %	17.0 %	5.9 %	1.5 %	5.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	50.2 %	34.3 %	10.4 %	3.1 %	0.8 %	1.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	59.2 %	29.7 %	8.0 %	1.8 %	0.4 %	0.9 %	1011
<b>Russia</b>	39.1 %	36.5 %	15.2 %	3.0 %	1.5 %	4.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.1 %	29.7 %	24.5 %	6.8 %	2.3 %	12.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	44.2 %	30.9 %	16.5 %	4.3 %	1.9 %	2.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	39.2 %	35.9 %	15.0 %	3.7 %	1.1 %	5.0 %	14426

**Q15\_5. The EU is an important partner to your country in science, research and technology:  
Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	28.0 %	32.7 %	24.0 %	7.7 %	2.3 %	5.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	23.8 %	37.8 %	17.8 %	3.8 %	1.8 %	15.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	25.4 %	39.0 %	23.5 %	3.1 %	1.2 %	7.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	27.4 %	32.7 %	27.3 %	5.2 %	1.6 %	5.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	46.4 %	42.5 %	8.2 %	0.9 %	0.9 %	1.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.9 %	36.6 %	13.9 %	4.5 %	0.2 %	1.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	16.1 %	34.8 %	27.2 %	6.0 %	2.4 %	13.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	20.2 %	45.0 %	21.0 %	6.5 %	1.2 %	6.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	28.0 %	40.4 %	20.6 %	5.2 %	1.5 %	4.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	44.1 %	33.7 %	17.8 %	2.5 %	0.9 %	1.0 %	1011
<b>Russia</b>	22.1 %	36.6 %	24.6 %	7.2 %	3.1 %	6.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.4 %	31.3 %	22.3 %	6.6 %	2.3 %	13.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	34.9 %	33.9 %	19.7 %	4.1 %	1.9 %	5.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.6 %	36.7 %	20.6 %	4.9 %	1.6 %	6.6 %	14426



**Q15\_6. The EU is an important source of agricultural and food products for your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	19.4 %	22.0 %	26.6 %	20.8 %	7.1 %	4.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	18.4 %	31.5 %	24.0 %	8.7 %	2.4 %	15.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	14.9 %	32.2 %	30.0 %	10.6 %	2.6 %	9.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	18.4 %	24.0 %	27.7 %	17.6 %	7.0 %	5.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	31.0 %	36.2 %	20.2 %	8.8 %	1.6 %	2.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	35.4 %	36.9 %	16.9 %	5.6 %	2.4 %	2.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.5 %	34.2 %	28.9 %	6.0 %	2.2 %	13.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	13.3 %	32.7 %	34.5 %	10.7 %	1.5 %	7.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	19.6 %	29.3 %	29.2 %	15.6 %	2.6 %	3.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	24.9 %	26.8 %	25.0 %	16.7 %	5.3 %	1.3 %	1011
<b>Russia</b>	14.3 %	26.9 %	27.5 %	16.6 %	8.2 %	6.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	20.0 %	27.3 %	26.6 %	8.5 %	3.6 %	14.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	24.2 %	28.5 %	24.8 %	12.3 %	5.4 %	4.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	20.8 %	29.9 %	26.3 %	12.2 %	4.0 %	6.9 %	14426

**Q16\_1. Support for regional and international cooperation: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	32.3 %	44.5 %	14.6 %	4.0 %	1.0 %	3.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	18.0 %	39.1 %	18.7 %	5.4 %	1.9 %	17.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	16.2 %	36.7 %	27.4 %	7.8 %	1.8 %	10.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	27.7 %	38.4 %	24.3 %	4.6 %	1.0 %	4.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.5 %	49.5 %	7.3 %	1.5 %	1.1 %	1.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	46.7 %	37.6 %	9.8 %	3.3 %	0.2 %	2.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.7 %	36.3 %	28.2 %	6.5 %	1.3 %	15.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.6 %	36.8 %	30.3 %	9.1 %	1.0 %	7.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	27.8 %	39.5 %	25.7 %	2.7 %	1.1 %	3.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	58.4 %	34.1 %	5.6 %	0.8 %	0.1 %	1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	13.7 %	32.1 %	28.7 %	11.8 %	2.7 %	11.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	21.9 %	28.6 %	24.3 %	5.4 %	3.4 %	16.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	29.1 %	41.7 %	16.5 %	6.5 %	1.4 %	4.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	27.6 %	38.2 %	20.1 %	5.3 %	1.4 %	7.4 %	14427

**Q16\_2. Foreign policy: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	31.0 %	43.4 %	16.3 %	3.2 %	2.7 %	3.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	13.8 %	40.5 %	19.4 %	6.4 %	3.0 %	16.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	14.4 %	29.2 %	34.9 %	8.5 %	4.8 %	8.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	24.8 %	39.3 %	28.2 %	3.4 %	1.4 %	2.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	32.7 %	51.9 %	10.6 %	2.7 %	1.1 %	1.0 %	1133
<b>India</b>	36.9 %	40.6 %	15.0 %	5.7 %	0.3 %	1.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	11.6 %	36.0 %	28.8 %	7.6 %	1.7 %	14.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.0 %	34.9 %	34.1 %	7.7 %	1.5 %	6.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	26.2 %	42.2 %	23.6 %	3.3 %	1.2 %	3.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	52.3 %	37.5 %	8.4 %	0.9 %		1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	13.0 %	30.2 %	27.0 %	16.1 %	5.5 %	8.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	17.8 %	31.8 %	22.3 %	8.5 %	3.5 %	16.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	24.5 %	43.8 %	19.5 %	5.4 %	2.2 %	4.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	24.1 %	38.7 %	22.2 %	6.1 %	2.2 %	6.7 %	14427

**Q16\_3. Justice and the rule of law: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	36.6 %	37.4 %	16.4 %	3.3 %	2.1 %	4.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	17.7 %	37.8 %	21.0 %	5.0 %	2.2 %	16.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	12.9 %	32.2 %	32.9 %	7.8 %	5.0 %	9.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	26.2 %	41.8 %	23.3 %	3.2 %	1.4 %	4.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	33.0 %	44.3 %	16.8 %	2.8 %	1.7 %	1.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	39.8 %	39.1 %	14.9 %	2.8 %	1.7 %	1.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	11.4 %	30.8 %	32.4 %	6.7 %	1.8 %	17.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	13.4 %	33.4 %	35.2 %	7.1 %	2.8 %	8.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	27.3 %	41.9 %	22.6 %	4.1 %	1.1 %	3.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	60.6 %	28.6 %	8.5 %	0.9 %	0.1 %	1.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	15.0 %	31.9 %	29.3 %	8.9 %	4.8 %	10.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	19.4 %	29.8 %	21.8 %	8.3 %	4.5 %	16.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.9 %	36.8 %	17.1 %	6.4 %	2.8 %	5.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	26.5 %	36.0 %	22.5 %	5.2 %	2.4 %	7.5 %	14427

**Q16\_4. Fight against terrorism and radicalisation: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	40.8 %	34.6 %	13.3 %	4.4 %	3.1 %	3.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	16.4 %	34.2 %	22.2 %	6.9 %	4.2 %	16.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	12.3 %	31.8 %	28.8 %	13.1 %	4.4 %	9.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	28.8 %	36.8 %	22.8 %	6.2 %	1.3 %	4.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	33.5 %	44.6 %	15.3 %	3.1 %	1.0 %	2.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	37.8 %	41.0 %	14.3 %	3.1 %	2.0 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.1 %	26.1 %	34.3 %	9.9 %	2.8 %	16.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	12.6 %	31.7 %	33.2 %	11.5 %	4.1 %	6.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	30.9 %	39.0 %	21.7 %	4.6 %	1.1 %	2.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	55.9 %	23.9 %	10.2 %	5.9 %	1.6 %	2.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	10.9 %	35.1 %	28.0 %	13.0 %	4.8 %	8.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	20.1 %	25.3 %	24.0 %	10.4 %	4.2 %	16.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	29.9 %	33.5 %	19.8 %	6.4 %	4.7 %	5.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	26.2 %	33.8 %	22.1 %	7.5 %	3.0 %	7.4 %	14427

**Q16\_5. Media freedom: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	37.1 %	37.7 %	15.7 %	2.7 %	2.9 %	4.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	19.5 %	35.2 %	19.2 %	5.8 %	3.9 %	16.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	14.2 %	36.2 %	27.5 %	9.0 %	3.1 %	10.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	33.3 %	39.5 %	20.0 %	4.0 %	0.8 %	2.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	37.5 %	44.0 %	12.0 %	3.3 %	1.3 %	1.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	47.6 %	33.4 %	15.7 %	0.9 %	1.2 %	1.2 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.4 %	31.7 %	30.5 %	6.8 %	2.2 %	16.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.5 %	34.8 %	30.2 %	9.4 %	1.8 %	7.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	35.0 %	38.2 %	20.3 %	3.5 %	1.0 %	2.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	58.0 %	31.3 %	7.4 %	1.1 %	0.2 %	2.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	12.7 %	33.8 %	26.8 %	12.7 %	4.3 %	9.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	18.2 %	29.1 %	24.0 %	7.6 %	4.9 %	16.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	28.4 %	39.0 %	18.8 %	5.3 %	3.4 %	5.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	28.5 %	35.8 %	20.6 %	5.5 %	2.4 %	7.2 %	14427

**Q16\_6. Fight against climate change and protection of the environment: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	36.7 %	39.4 %	14.2 %	3.9 %	2.4 %	3.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	18.5 %	37.7 %	20.0 %	4.4 %	3.4 %	15.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	15.9 %	40.0 %	23.5 %	9.4 %	1.7 %	9.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	35.5 %	39.3 %	18.3 %	2.8 %	1.9 %	2.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	40.5 %	47.2 %	9.3 %	0.9 %	0.6 %	1.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.5 %	37.5 %	15.2 %	2.5 %	1.4 %	0.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.7 %	33.1 %	28.9 %	7.2 %	1.2 %	14.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.4 %	38.0 %	28.5 %	5.9 %	2.6 %	6.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	39.3 %	36.8 %	17.3 %	3.5 %	0.9 %	2.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	66.6 %	25.0 %	6.3 %	0.6 %		1.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	14.4 %	38.0 %	26.6 %	7.8 %	2.7 %	10.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	23.6 %	27.0 %	22.1 %	6.8 %	3.9 %	16.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	32.7 %	39.5 %	16.7 %	4.0 %	2.5 %	4.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	30.7 %	36.9 %	19.0 %	4.6 %	1.9 %	6.9 %	14427



**Q16\_7. Support to developing countries: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	26.4 %	40.3 %	19.4 %	6.7 %	3.7 %	3.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	15.1 %	33.0 %	24.1 %	6.5 %	3.7 %	17.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	13.0 %	29.2 %	32.4 %	9.1 %	5.1 %	11.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	26.5 %	37.1 %	25.6 %	5.6 %	1.9 %	3.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	35.8 %	48.1 %	13.3 %	0.7 %	0.9 %	1.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	39.5 %	40.6 %	12.8 %	3.2 %	2.0 %	1.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	9.7 %	29.0 %	34.9 %	8.2 %	1.7 %	16.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	10.7 %	25.9 %	41.9 %	11.1 %	2.3 %	8.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	25.7 %	36.5 %	28.6 %	5.6 %	0.8 %	2.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	48.8 %	35.5 %	12.0 %	1.9 %	0.5 %	1.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	10.7 %	28.7 %	30.8 %	12.8 %	6.0 %	11.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	15.1 %	25.8 %	28.3 %	8.0 %	4.5 %	18.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	27.0 %	38.2 %	19.9 %	6.5 %	4.0 %	4.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	23.4 %	34.6 %	24.9 %	6.6 %	2.9 %	7.7 %	14427

**Q16\_8. Dealing with refugees, displaced people: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	23.2 %	35.0 %	20.4 %	10.6 %	6.1 %	4.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	12.9 %	31.3 %	23.3 %	10.7 %	4.7 %	17.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	12.6 %	28.9 %	33.8 %	9.6 %	3.7 %	11.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	25.4 %	34.1 %	26.1 %	6.7 %	2.0 %	5.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	28.8 %	47.3 %	17.4 %	1.9 %	1.8 %	2.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	36.9 %	32.8 %	21.0 %	5.4 %	1.4 %	2.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.5 %	28.8 %	32.9 %	9.0 %	2.2 %	16.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	10.9 %	24.4 %	39.5 %	14.0 %	4.4 %	6.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	25.2 %	33.7 %	27.4 %	6.8 %	2.0 %	4.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	48.1 %	32.7 %	12.8 %	3.3 %	0.7 %	2.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	12.2 %	25.0 %	28.7 %	16.9 %	8.3 %	9.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	16.2 %	23.6 %	24.5 %	13.0 %	4.9 %	17.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	20.2 %	36.3 %	21.3 %	10.4 %	5.1 %	6.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	21.8 %	31.9 %	25.3 %	9.1 %	3.6 %	8.3 %	14427

**Q16\_9. Military operations: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	28.1 %	37.6 %	21.4 %	4.1 %	2.1 %	6.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	11.0 %	32.4 %	26.4 %	5.9 %	4.0 %	20.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	10.2 %	22.5 %	35.3 %	14.0 %	4.8 %	13.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	20.3 %	34.2 %	33.3 %	3.4 %	1.9 %	6.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	33.2 %	43.2 %	17.0 %	2.8 %	1.2 %	2.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.5 %	34.9 %	15.0 %	2.0 %	1.6 %	3.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	8.7 %	27.7 %	35.6 %	7.2 %	2.4 %	18.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	9.4 %	24.1 %	44.6 %	11.0 %	2.5 %	8.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	26.5 %	37.8 %	25.8 %	3.5 %	0.8 %	5.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	52.5 %	30.7 %	10.7 %	3.0 %	0.1 %	3.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	8.4 %	21.6 %	31.6 %	16.8 %	8.1 %	13.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	16.9 %	23.1 %	28.1 %	8.6 %	4.5 %	18.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	24.7 %	38.1 %	22.8 %	4.1 %	2.5 %	7.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	22.5 %	31.5 %	26.7 %	6.6 %	2.8 %	9.8 %	14427

**Q16\_10. Peacekeeping operations: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each or the following political areas?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	32.7 %	40.2 %	16.7 %	3.9 %	2.2 %	4.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	15.3 %	37.2 %	21.1 %	6.0 %	2.9 %	17.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	9.7 %	29.3 %	38.8 %	6.5 %	4.2 %	11.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	26.6 %	41.5 %	22.4 %	4.2 %	1.4 %	3.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	40.2 %	46.7 %	9.1 %	1.0 %	0.8 %	2.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	38.2 %	35.7 %	17.3 %	5.2 %	1.1 %	2.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.8 %	31.8 %	31.5 %	5.5 %	2.0 %	16.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	12.6 %	36.6 %	33.8 %	7.6 %	2.7 %	6.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	30.3 %	40.2 %	21.9 %	3.2 %	1.9 %	2.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	55.3 %	30.7 %	6.6 %	3.4 %	1.4 %	2.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	8.9 %	21.9 %	33.2 %	14.2 %	10.1 %	11.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	18.3 %	27.3 %	26.3 %	7.3 %	4.5 %	16.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	30.4 %	37.9 %	18.1 %	5.1 %	3.3 %	5.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	25.5 %	35.2 %	22.8 %	5.6 %	2.9 %	7.9 %	14427

**Q17\_1. The EU is an important partner to your country in international relations: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	32.5 %	38.6 %	18.8 %	5.4 %	1.4 %	3.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	30.9 %	41.0 %	13.7 %	2.8 %	1.9 %	9.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	23.9 %	45.6 %	21.8 %	2.4 %	0.7 %	5.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	33.8 %	40.3 %	16.5 %	5.1 %	0.5 %	3.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	49.4 %	41.6 %	7.0 %	0.8 %	0.8 %	0.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	52.4 %	31.4 %	11.1 %	2.4 %	1.0 %	1.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	21.5 %	39.3 %	21.2 %	5.0 %	1.4 %	11.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	25.8 %	44.8 %	18.5 %	4.6 %	1.2 %	5.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	35.8 %	41.4 %	16.3 %	3.6 %	0.4 %	2.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	56.9 %	31.1 %	9.3 %	1.5 %		1.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	26.1 %	42.2 %	18.9 %	5.6 %	3.0 %	4.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	33.2 %	27.9 %	18.7 %	5.1 %	2.8 %	12.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	41.7 %	37.0 %	14.3 %	2.5 %	0.7 %	3.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	35.7 %	38.6 %	15.9 %	3.6 %	1.2 %	5.0 %	14427

**Q17\_2. The EU is a trustworthy partner to your country in international relations: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	25.7 %	36.5 %	26.7 %	5.4 %	1.8 %	3.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	26.6 %	41.5 %	15.6 %	3.4 %	1.9 %	11.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	14.7 %	31.2 %	37.9 %	6.4 %	3.1 %	6.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	26.9 %	43.5 %	20.9 %	3.4 %	1.4 %	3.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	41.3 %	43.9 %	12.2 %	1.0 %	0.8 %	0.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	44.8 %	36.3 %	14.0 %	2.4 %	1.5 %	1.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	18.9 %	35.4 %	26.2 %	5.2 %	2.0 %	12.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	20.8 %	41.2 %	24.9 %	6.0 %	1.3 %	5.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	28.6 %	46.4 %	18.8 %	3.3 %	0.2 %	2.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	41.2 %	38.4 %	14.2 %	3.1 %	1.4 %	1.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	14.9 %	26.1 %	27.3 %	17.3 %	9.2 %	5.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.8 %	28.6 %	24.2 %	6.9 %	3.6 %	11.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.5 %	38.0 %	20.2 %	4.1 %	2.6 %	3.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	27.8 %	37.5 %	21.8 %	5.2 %	2.4 %	5.4 %	14427

**Q17\_3. The EU should have stronger political ties with your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	43.3 %	35.0 %	14.5 %	3.7 %	0.8 %	2.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.1 %	35.4 %	21.5 %	3.4 %	2.4 %	12.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	23.0 %	44.1 %	21.5 %	4.1 %	0.5 %	6.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	44.5 %	35.1 %	13.2 %	2.6 %	1.7 %	2.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	40.6 %	43.7 %	12.6 %	0.9 %	0.5 %	1.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	41.3 %	43.5 %	9.4 %	2.6 %	1.6 %	1.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	19.1 %	33.6 %	27.0 %	5.9 %	2.0 %	12.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	20.6 %	44.1 %	21.9 %	6.0 %	1.7 %	5.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	46.6 %	35.7 %	12.6 %	2.3 %	1.0 %	1.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	53.2 %	32.9 %	10.3 %	1.9 %	0.2 %	1.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	34.3 %	40.9 %	15.8 %	3.4 %	1.3 %	4.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.3 %	29.9 %	25.5 %	6.3 %	3.4 %	12.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	32.7 %	36.3 %	19.9 %	4.7 %	2.7 %	3.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	34.5 %	37.7 %	17.3 %	3.7 %	1.5 %	5.3 %	14427



**Q17\_4. The EU is an important partner for your country's education exchanges: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	35.2 %	37.6 %	18.2 %	4.8 %	0.9 %	3.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	21.2 %	38.5 %	20.1 %	4.0 %	2.8 %	13.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	21.3 %	41.9 %	24.8 %	3.5 %	1.9 %	6.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	31.3 %	37.4 %	21.6 %	3.8 %	1.3 %	4.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	45.2 %	44.5 %	8.6 %	0.7 %	0.4 %	0.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	43.6 %	33.2 %	17.5 %	2.3 %	2.0 %	1.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	16.5 %	31.7 %	28.0 %	8.5 %	1.5 %	13.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.1 %	41.7 %	25.5 %	6.4 %	1.8 %	6.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	31.0 %	39.1 %	21.0 %	6.0 %	0.5 %	2.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	44.6 %	34.7 %	14.5 %	2.8 %	0.7 %	2.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	17.9 %	33.2 %	27.8 %	11.4 %	3.6 %	6.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	21.3 %	29.7 %	24.6 %	7.2 %	2.9 %	14.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.5 %	35.4 %	18.2 %	7.3 %	1.9 %	5.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.2 %	36.8 %	20.8 %	5.3 %	1.7 %	6.2 %	14427

**Q17\_5. The EU shares the same democratic principles as your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	19.7 %	26.0 %	29.4 %	15.7 %	4.3 %	4.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.1 %	37.4 %	19.4 %	5.1 %	2.4 %	13.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	9.2 %	22.6 %	32.7 %	17.7 %	8.2 %	9.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	17.2 %	25.4 %	33.2 %	13.3 %	3.6 %	7.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	30.3 %	33.3 %	25.8 %	6.4 %	1.1 %	3.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	39.0 %	31.3 %	21.4 %	4.7 %	1.0 %	2.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	16.0 %	31.0 %	29.0 %	7.1 %	2.5 %	14.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	17.7 %	43.6 %	23.6 %	6.3 %	1.8 %	6.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	21.5 %	30.1 %	30.5 %	11.2 %	2.4 %	4.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	23.9 %	29.1 %	25.7 %	14.5 %	3.6 %	3.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	10.9 %	20.1 %	25.7 %	21.4 %	12.7 %	9.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	17.6 %	29.5 %	25.7 %	8.1 %	4.6 %	14.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	20.4 %	28.1 %	28.2 %	11.2 %	5.7 %	6.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	20.5 %	29.7 %	27.0 %	11.0 %	4.2 %	7.6 %	14427

**Q17\_6. The EU is a good example for your country in promoting equality between women and men: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	32.2 %	33.1 %	22.9 %	6.4 %	1.5 %	4.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	21.0 %	32.4 %	23.3 %	5.6 %	2.8 %	14.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	13.5 %	31.6 %	33.9 %	8.6 %	3.3 %	9.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	34.6 %	38.1 %	18.8 %	3.1 %	1.7 %	3.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	33.2 %	39.9 %	17.2 %	5.6 %	1.4 %	2.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	43.0 %	37.0 %	15.4 %	2.1 %	0.8 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	19.4 %	30.8 %	26.7 %	6.2 %	2.5 %	14.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.4 %	36.8 %	28.6 %	6.7 %	1.8 %	7.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	36.1 %	40.5 %	18.3 %	2.7 %	0.7 %	1.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	46.5 %	34.5 %	12.4 %	2.2 %	2.6 %	1.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	16.5 %	22.2 %	22.9 %	14.9 %	15.8 %	7.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	20.8 %	25.8 %	26.1 %	8.7 %	3.3 %	15.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	32.6 %	34.5 %	19.3 %	4.9 %	3.7 %	4.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	28.4 %	33.7 %	21.9 %	6.0 %	3.2 %	6.8 %	14427

**Q18\_1. Overall quality of life: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	53.4 %	33.2 %	8.4 %	1.7 %	0.9 %	2.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	24.7 %	45.4 %	13.4 %	3.0 %	1.8 %	11.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	21.8 %	52.1 %	14.6 %	3.1 %	0.9 %	7.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	44.5 %	39.1 %	10.5 %	3.8 %	0.3 %	1.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	43.6 %	46.2 %	7.1 %	1.1 %	0.2 %	1.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	50.8 %	38.6 %	7.8 %	1.8 %	0.4 %	0.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.1 %	41.6 %	23.0 %	5.9 %	1.7 %	13.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	19.8 %	42.7 %	24.5 %	5.5 %	1.6 %	5.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	48.3 %	35.3 %	12.6 %	1.0 %	1.2 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	63.2 %	31.1 %	4.8 %	0.5 %		0.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	26.8 %	42.0 %	19.2 %	4.0 %	1.6 %	6.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.4 %	32.6 %	21.4 %	6.6 %	2.6 %	12.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	43.4 %	37.9 %	12.8 %	2.9 %	1.6 %	1.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.0 %	39.8 %	13.8 %	3.1 %	1.1 %	5.1 %	14427

**Q18\_2. Level of education: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	62.8 %	25.5 %	6.7 %	2.0 %	1.1 %	1.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	29.4 %	40.7 %	13.9 %	3.1 %	1.9 %	11.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	28.2 %	45.8 %	14.7 %	1.2 %	1.7 %	8.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	50.8 %	34.2 %	9.0 %	2.6 %	1.4 %	1.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	59.0 %	34.7 %	4.5 %	0.5 %	0.5 %	0.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	53.3 %	35.3 %	9.7 %	1.0 %	0.3 %	0.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	18.3 %	36.6 %	24.2 %	6.0 %	1.4 %	13.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	21.4 %	41.0 %	24.9 %	4.6 %	2.1 %	6.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	51.3 %	35.6 %	9.9 %	1.8 %	0.5 %	0.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	77.9 %	17.3 %	4.2 %	0.1 %	0.3 %	0.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	23.1 %	40.4 %	21.3 %	7.1 %	1.5 %	6.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.8 %	32.1 %	20.6 %	7.1 %	2.7 %	12.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	51.6 %	32.8 %	8.9 %	3.0 %	1.5 %	2.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	42.6 %	34.8 %	13.2 %	3.1 %	1.3 %	5.0 %	14427

**Q18\_3. Creating employment opportunities: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	47.6 %	34.4 %	12.0 %	2.9 %	0.9 %	2.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	16.5 %	38.5 %	21.2 %	6.0 %	2.3 %	15.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	13.2 %	42.6 %	25.2 %	6.5 %	1.4 %	11.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	36.6 %	39.1 %	16.6 %	3.0 %	0.8 %	3.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	42.2 %	45.7 %	9.0 %	0.6 %	0.6 %	1.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	47.2 %	34.8 %	13.5 %	3.1 %	0.3 %	1.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.8 %	29.8 %	34.3 %	7.7 %	2.0 %	15.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.4 %	35.3 %	32.5 %	9.1 %	1.6 %	7.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	41.0 %	39.5 %	15.0 %	1.8 %	1.5 %	1.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	61.8 %	27.0 %	8.7 %	1.9 %	0.1 %	0.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	16.0 %	37.0 %	31.1 %	6.9 %	2.0 %	7.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	20.5 %	29.5 %	22.9 %	8.0 %	3.1 %	16.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	38.4 %	35.9 %	15.0 %	5.9 %	2.0 %	2.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	31.4 %	36.2 %	19.7 %	4.8 %	1.4 %	6.5 %	14427

**Q18\_4. Climate change activism: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	35.7 %	38.6 %	17.4 %	3.0 %	1.5 %	3.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	17.9 %	38.9 %	21.2 %	5.2 %	2.2 %	14.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	14.7 %	35.6 %	30.7 %	5.2 %	2.2 %	11.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	30.7 %	38.9 %	22.9 %	3.3 %	1.9 %	2.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	36.5 %	48.2 %	11.7 %	1.3 %	0.6 %	1.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.3 %	32.6 %	17.2 %	3.7 %	1.4 %	2.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	13.9 %	33.9 %	29.3 %	6.5 %	2.0 %	14.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	17.9 %	37.8 %	25.6 %	6.7 %	4.7 %	7.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	36.4 %	38.5 %	18.3 %	3.5 %	0.5 %	2.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	56.9 %	33.6 %	5.9 %	2.3 %	0.5 %	0.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	13.6 %	37.3 %	31.1 %	7.4 %	1.3 %	9.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	19.8 %	28.8 %	25.5 %	7.3 %	2.6 %	15.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	32.9 %	37.1 %	18.2 %	5.5 %	2.5 %	3.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	28.5 %	36.9 %	21.2 %	4.7 %	1.8 %	7.0 %	14427



**Q18\_5. Eradication of poverty: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	31.5 %	36.4 %	19.7 %	5.3 %	3.0 %	4.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	11.5 %	34.6 %	24.8 %	7.3 %	3.9 %	17.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	8.4 %	38.8 %	31.2 %	9.1 %	3.1 %	9.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	26.9 %	34.0 %	29.0 %	4.9 %	2.3 %	3.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	35.6 %	47.0 %	13.2 %	1.2 %	0.8 %	2.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.4 %	33.1 %	18.8 %	2.4 %	0.6 %	2.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	8.5 %	26.1 %	38.3 %	8.1 %	3.2 %	15.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	12.5 %	27.0 %	38.3 %	12.0 %	3.1 %	7.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	28.9 %	34.8 %	27.4 %	5.3 %	0.7 %	2.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	54.2 %	29.7 %	10.6 %	4.3 %	0.5 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	13.2 %	28.9 %	33.8 %	11.9 %	4.6 %	7.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	16.3 %	23.7 %	27.6 %	9.2 %	5.9 %	17.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	29.4 %	36.4 %	18.8 %	6.9 %	4.5 %	3.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	24.6 %	33.2 %	25.5 %	6.7 %	2.8 %	7.2 %	14427

**Q18\_6. Equality between men and women: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	33.3 %	38.7 %	18.3 %	4.7 %	1.4 %	3.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	16.8 %	37.8 %	21.8 %	5.0 %	2.3 %	16.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	14.4 %	41.2 %	27.5 %	5.2 %	3.2 %	8.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	30.8 %	41.3 %	19.9 %	3.6 %	1.4 %	3.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	38.9 %	45.1 %	12.1 %	1.3 %	0.9 %	1.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	46.8 %	36.9 %	11.0 %	3.3 %	0.3 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	18.1 %	35.7 %	24.0 %	6.0 %	1.4 %	14.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	17.6 %	35.4 %	30.0 %	8.0 %	2.2 %	6.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	34.0 %	40.7 %	18.5 %	3.7 %	0.7 %	2.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	63.3 %	26.5 %	7.4 %	1.7 %	0.5 %	0.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	17.6 %	32.8 %	30.9 %	7.6 %	2.7 %	8.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	19.1 %	26.6 %	26.2 %	8.1 %	3.5 %	16.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.1 %	39.5 %	17.0 %	6.0 %	2.2 %	4.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.4 %	36.9 %	20.3 %	4.9 %	1.7 %	6.7 %	14427

**Q18\_7. Protection of minorities: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	27.4 %	35.0 %	21.5 %	6.8 %	4.1 %	5.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	13.7 %	32.0 %	25.2 %	7.9 %	2.8 %	18.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	12.6 %	28.7 %	34.2 %	7.9 %	3.8 %	12.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	23.6 %	35.5 %	27.4 %	6.1 %	2.1 %	5.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	30.2 %	43.3 %	18.7 %	4.1 %	1.1 %	2.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	41.3 %	33.3 %	16.3 %	3.9 %	1.4 %	3.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.5 %	24.2 %	37.4 %	9.0 %	2.0 %	17.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.1 %	32.4 %	33.4 %	8.2 %	4.0 %	8.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	25.7 %	38.3 %	27.0 %	4.2 %	1.1 %	3.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	50.3 %	35.1 %	9.0 %	2.2 %	1.9 %	1.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	19.7 %	30.6 %	27.0 %	6.0 %	4.7 %	11.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	16.7 %	26.1 %	26.6 %	8.8 %	5.1 %	16.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	26.9 %	32.8 %	22.9 %	7.2 %	4.3 %	5.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	24.1 %	32.9 %	25.2 %	6.3 %	2.9 %	8.6 %	14427

**Q18\_8. Reducing income inequality: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	30.3 %	36.3 %	19.0 %	5.9 %	2.8 %	5.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	11.3 %	31.3 %	25.8 %	7.3 %	3.7 %	20.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	12.1 %	26.9 %	35.5 %	11.0 %	2.8 %	11.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	25.8 %	33.1 %	26.1 %	5.8 %	3.4 %	5.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	29.6 %	48.2 %	17.0 %	2.5 %	1.1 %	1.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	40.3 %	38.3 %	12.8 %	3.4 %	1.8 %	3.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	9.0 %	21.7 %	39.6 %	10.5 %	2.3 %	17.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	12.0 %	29.0 %	37.1 %	10.6 %	4.3 %	7.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	27.2 %	38.3 %	24.8 %	5.1 %	0.7 %	3.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	41.1 %	38.0 %	12.4 %	4.5 %	1.3 %	2.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	11.2 %	26.7 %	33.3 %	11.8 %	5.3 %	11.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	15.5 %	25.1 %	28.5 %	8.6 %	4.5 %	17.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	23.3 %	33.3 %	25.2 %	7.5 %	3.3 %	7.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	22.3 %	32.9 %	25.9 %	7.2 %	2.8 %	8.9 %	14427

**Q18\_9. Social justice and solidarity (social rights, public welfare system): Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	38.4 %	37.0 %	14.8 %	3.2 %	2.2 %	4.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	17.5 %	37.6 %	19.6 %	5.9 %	2.9 %	16.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	16.2 %	38.1 %	27.2 %	3.7 %	4.4 %	10.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	30.7 %	40.2 %	19.4 %	4.2 %	2.8 %	2.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.2 %	45.4 %	12.0 %	1.1 %	0.6 %	1.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	47.5 %	36.8 %	8.6 %	4.5 %	0.3 %	2.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.8 %	32.5 %	28.5 %	6.3 %	1.8 %	15.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	17.9 %	36.2 %	28.3 %	8.0 %	1.8 %	7.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	32.5 %	40.5 %	20.3 %	3.2 %	0.9 %	2.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	58.7 %	30.4 %	6.2 %	2.2 %	0.3 %	2.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	18.7 %	31.2 %	26.6 %	9.5 %	4.0 %	9.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	19.7 %	27.3 %	26.7 %	6.6 %	3.7 %	16.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.6 %	37.8 %	17.8 %	4.8 %	2.8 %	5.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.6 %	36.3 %	19.7 %	4.8 %	2.2 %	7.3 %	14427

**Q18\_10. Integration of migrants and refugees: Generally speaking, how good or bad do you think the European Union performs in each of the following areas of social development?**

	Very good	Fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Fairly bad	Very bad	Do not know/ cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	23.8 %	33.7 %	22.2 %	10.3 %	4.4 %	5.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	12.9 %	32.1 %	25.5 %	8.7 %	4.2 %	16.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	10.7 %	31.6 %	34.7 %	8.0 %	2.7 %	12.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	22.0 %	35.3 %	26.7 %	8.8 %	2.6 %	4.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	27.4 %	45.5 %	20.8 %	2.8 %	1.2 %	2.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	37.8 %	38.2 %	15.8 %	3.2 %	1.0 %	4.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	9.8 %	24.9 %	36.2 %	9.8 %	2.8 %	16.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	11.4 %	24.7 %	38.3 %	15.3 %	2.5 %	7.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	21.1 %	38.2 %	27.2 %	6.7 %	1.7 %	5.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	44.4 %	35.3 %	13.5 %	3.2 %	1.1 %	2.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	11.4 %	24.5 %	29.8 %	14.6 %	7.4 %	12.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	14.4 %	26.3 %	24.1 %	11.3 %	6.2 %	17.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	22.2 %	31.7 %	26.6 %	8.0 %	4.8 %	6.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	20.7 %	32.6 %	26.3 %	8.5 %	3.3 %	8.7 %	14427

**Q19\_1. Music: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Fairly positive</b>	<b>Neither positive nor negative</b>	<b>Fairly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	48.9 %	34.0 %	11.7 %	1.7 %	1.0 %	2.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	27.3 %	38.5 %	18.6 %	1.9 %	1.2 %	12.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	26.0 %	45.1 %	20.5 %	1.4 %	0.7 %	6.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	45.1 %	33.5 %	16.9 %	1.3 %	1.2 %	2.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	44.7 %	45.5 %	7.2 %	1.0 %	0.5 %	1.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	53.6 %	32.8 %	11.5 %	0.5 %	0.1 %	1.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	25.7 %	36.6 %	21.5 %	3.6 %	1.2 %	11.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	21.1 %	41.0 %	25.1 %	5.8 %	0.9 %	6.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	45.0 %	32.8 %	18.1 %	2.8 %	0.2 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	60.0 %	30.1 %	5.3 %	2.8 %	0.7 %	1.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	28.0 %	46.0 %	16.7 %	1.8 %	0.6 %	6.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	29.8 %	26.7 %	21.9 %	4.9 %	2.5 %	14.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	36.4 %	38.1 %	15.5 %	5.4 %	1.3 %	3.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.9 %	37.0 %	16.2 %	2.7 %	0.9 %	5.3 %	14427

**Q19\_2. Arts: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	Very positive	Fairly positive	Neither positive nor negative	Fairly negative	Very negative	Do not know/cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	57.0 %	29.2 %	9.7 %	0.5 %	1.2 %	2.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	31.7 %	36.0 %	16.7 %	2.3 %	1.3 %	12.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	34.0 %	38.1 %	18.9 %	0.9 %	1.8 %	6.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	48.5 %	37.0 %	9.0 %	2.9 %	0.5 %	2.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	45.6 %	46.2 %	6.2 %	1.2 %	0.4 %	0.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	45.4 %	41.0 %	11.4 %	1.5 %	0.1 %	0.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	30.1 %	33.3 %	19.5 %	4.1 %	1.3 %	11.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	26.5 %	38.8 %	23.6 %	4.8 %	0.9 %	5.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	51.4 %	35.2 %	11.3 %	1.0 %	0.5 %	0.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	61.1 %	30.4 %	6.3 %	0.7 %	0.7 %	0.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	30.0 %	43.6 %	17.0 %	2.2 %	0.4 %	6.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	30.9 %	28.3 %	20.3 %	4.8 %	2.5 %	13.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	40.6 %	40.1 %	12.9 %	2.5 %	1.0 %	2.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	41.1 %	36.7 %	14.0 %	2.2 %	1.0 %	4.9 %	14427



**Q19\_3. Theatre and cinema: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	Very positive	Fairly positive	Neither positive nor negative	Fairly negative	Very negative	Do not know/cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	50.6 %	33.9 %	10.8 %	1.0 %	0.4 %	3.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.3 %	36.7 %	21.0 %	3.5 %	1.1 %	12.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.9 %	39.7 %	26.4 %	3.1 %	1.4 %	6.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	41.7 %	37.3 %	15.6 %	2.2 %	1.1 %	2.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	42.0 %	44.7 %	9.8 %	1.5 %	0.6 %	1.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	46.0 %	32.4 %	18.3 %	2.3 %	0.2 %	0.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	21.9 %	35.4 %	24.1 %	5.1 %	1.0 %	12.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.9 %	37.3 %	29.6 %	5.9 %	1.6 %	6.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	41.2 %	40.5 %	15.3 %	2.0 %	0.7 %	0.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	63.3 %	24.8 %	8.7 %	2.5 %	0.1 %	0.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	27.3 %	45.3 %	16.9 %	3.1 %	1.0 %	6.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.5 %	29.4 %	23.9 %	4.8 %	2.7 %	13.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	36.9 %	38.5 %	16.2 %	3.2 %	0.9 %	4.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	35.7 %	36.7 %	18.1 %	3.1 %	1.0 %	5.4 %	14427

**Q19\_4. Monuments and museums: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Fairly positive</b>	<b>Neither positive nor negative</b>	<b>Fairly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	61.2 %	25.3 %	9.1 %	0.7 %	0.6 %	3.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	38.8 %	30.9 %	14.0 %	2.4 %	1.3 %	12.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	33.1 %	31.6 %	22.3 %	3.9 %	1.6 %	7.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	55.6 %	28.5 %	12.1 %	1.2 %	0.7 %	1.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	50.8 %	41.8 %	5.8 %	1.2 %	0.1 %	0.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	47.4 %	39.1 %	9.2 %	3.4 %	0.3 %	0.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	31.7 %	30.6 %	20.6 %	3.7 %	1.3 %	12.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	27.0 %	35.9 %	21.8 %	6.6 %	2.1 %	6.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	54.0 %	32.9 %	9.4 %	3.2 %	0.1 %	0.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	62.6 %	30.0 %	3.7 %	2.0 %	0.4 %	1.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	32.0 %	41.6 %	14.6 %	3.1 %	1.0 %	7.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	32.7 %	26.1 %	21.5 %	4.6 %	2.4 %	12.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	43.1 %	33.9 %	14.0 %	3.4 %	1.6 %	4.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	44.0 %	33.0 %	13.7 %	3.0 %	1.0 %	5.4 %	14427

**Q19\_5. History: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	Very positive	Fairly positive	Neither positive nor negative	Fairly negative	Very negative	Do not know/cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	62.6 %	26.0 %	6.4 %	1.2 %	1.1 %	2.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	40.5 %	29.7 %	13.4 %	3.0 %	2.7 %	10.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	19.9 %	32.0 %	32.0 %	5.1 %	3.4 %	7.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	52.8 %	31.6 %	10.2 %	1.9 %	1.2 %	2.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	51.7 %	39.2 %	7.1 %	1.1 %	0.4 %	0.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	48.4 %	36.2 %	11.2 %	3.2 %	0.6 %	0.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	27.5 %	30.2 %	23.4 %	4.1 %	2.1 %	12.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	23.0 %	34.9 %	26.2 %	7.1 %	1.9 %	6.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	52.5 %	32.9 %	11.4 %	1.7 %	1.0 %	0.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	63.3 %	29.3 %	5.2 %	1.2 %	0.3 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	27.3 %	35.2 %	21.4 %	6.1 %	1.9 %	8.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	31.9 %	27.5 %	20.0 %	5.6 %	3.2 %	11.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	45.6 %	28.9 %	15.5 %	4.1 %	2.7 %	3.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	42.2 %	31.8 %	15.6 %	3.5 %	1.7 %	5.2 %	14427

**Q19\_6. Modern architecture and design: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Fairly positive</b>	<b>Neither positive nor negative</b>	<b>Fairly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	53.7 %	31.6 %	9.2 %	1.6 %	0.8 %	3.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	28.6 %	35.8 %	18.0 %	2.8 %	1.7 %	13.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	26.1 %	41.7 %	22.4 %	1.7 %	0.6 %	7.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	51.4 %	34.3 %	9.9 %	0.9 %	1.5 %	1.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	59.5 %	34.5 %	4.4 %	1.4 %	0.1 %	0.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	49.8 %	34.5 %	12.9 %	2.0 %	0.3 %	0.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	27.9 %	31.1 %	23.0 %	4.1 %	1.8 %	12.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	23.5 %	38.1 %	24.7 %	4.8 %	1.8 %	7.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	50.0 %	34.7 %	12.0 %	1.8 %	0.7 %	0.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	72.4 %	20.2 %	4.4 %	1.2 %	0.3 %	1.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	28.8 %	41.7 %	18.5 %	2.5 %	0.4 %	8.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.2 %	28.5 %	23.8 %	6.0 %	2.8 %	13.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	43.4 %	33.3 %	13.7 %	3.5 %	1.1 %	4.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	41.7 %	33.9 %	15.1 %	2.6 %	1.1 %	5.6 %	14427

**Q19\_7. Luxury goods and clothes: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	Very positive	Fairly positive	Neither positive nor negative	Fairly negative	Very negative	Do not know/cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	58.4 %	25.0 %	11.0 %	0.9 %	1.2 %	3.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	31.9 %	31.2 %	18.7 %	2.8 %	1.5 %	13.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	24.2 %	34.6 %	28.0 %	4.1 %	1.4 %	7.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	42.0 %	35.7 %	16.5 %	2.7 %	0.9 %	2.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	48.0 %	42.3 %	7.4 %	0.8 %	1.1 %	0.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	51.4 %	33.3 %	13.6 %	0.7 %	0.3 %	0.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	25.6 %	32.8 %	24.4 %	3.2 %	1.7 %	12.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	26.3 %	36.0 %	21.4 %	6.3 %	3.1 %	6.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	43.4 %	36.1 %	16.1 %	2.4 %	0.8 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	69.4 %	22.4 %	4.9 %	2.5 %	0.1 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	35.5 %	38.2 %	16.0 %	1.9 %	0.5 %	7.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	27.3 %	28.9 %	22.3 %	5.5 %	2.6 %	13.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	49.3 %	32.9 %	12.3 %	1.5 %	1.1 %	2.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	41.0 %	33.1 %	16.3 %	2.7 %	1.2 %	5.6 %	14427

**Q19\_8. Food and cuisine: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	Very positive	Fairly positive	Neither positive nor negative	Fairly negative	Very negative	Do not know/cannot answer	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	59.0 %	27.5 %	8.3 %	2.0 %	0.9 %	2.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	37.0 %	33.1 %	14.3 %	2.6 %	1.7 %	11.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	18.5 %	35.6 %	31.7 %	3.8 %	1.5 %	8.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	39.4 %	41.0 %	12.8 %	3.5 %	0.8 %	2.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	41.6 %	46.8 %	10.0 %	1.0 %	0.3 %	0.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	49.2 %	33.7 %	13.1 %	3.1 %	0.2 %	0.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	23.4 %	33.7 %	24.7 %	5.9 %	0.6 %	11.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	20.0 %	39.9 %	27.4 %	5.0 %	1.4 %	6.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	42.7 %	38.6 %	15.2 %	2.1 %	0.4 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	64.6 %	25.7 %	7.2 %	0.8 %	0.2 %	1.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	26.9 %	41.8 %	20.0 %	4.3 %	1.0 %	5.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	30.2 %	30.4 %	20.9 %	4.5 %	2.0 %	12.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	46.8 %	34.3 %	13.2 %	1.8 %	0.6 %	3.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.5 %	35.6 %	16.8 %	3.1 %	0.9 %	5.1 %	14427

**Q19\_9. Lifestyle: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Fairly positive</b>	<b>Neither positive nor negative</b>	<b>Fairly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	57.1 %	29.1 %	8.7 %	1.6 %	0.5 %	3.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	29.3 %	37.2 %	17.1 %	2.9 %	2.0 %	11.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	17.3 %	37.5 %	30.1 %	5.3 %	1.2 %	8.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	44.1 %	40.5 %	11.6 %	1.4 %	1.0 %	1.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.5 %	45.1 %	10.5 %	3.3 %	0.7 %	0.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	49.5 %	35.3 %	11.3 %	1.8 %	1.5 %	0.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	21.3 %	34.5 %	27.2 %	3.7 %	1.5 %	11.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.9 %	38.3 %	31.9 %	5.0 %	1.4 %	6.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	47.8 %	36.9 %	11.7 %	2.5 %	0.1 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	64.6 %	28.9 %	4.9 %	0.6 %	0.2 %	0.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	24.2 %	38.8 %	23.5 %	4.8 %	1.6 %	7.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	26.0 %	31.4 %	22.9 %	6.1 %	2.1 %	11.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	49.0 %	31.5 %	12.8 %	3.2 %	0.8 %	2.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.6 %	35.8 %	17.1 %	3.3 %	1.1 %	5.1 %	14427

**Q19\_10. Sports: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Fairly positive</b>	<b>Neither positive nor negative</b>	<b>Fairly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	50.5 %	32.8 %	11.1 %	1.5 %	1.1 %	3.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	24.9 %	37.9 %	18.4 %	2.8 %	2.2 %	13.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.4 %	40.6 %	25.3 %	2.5 %	0.9 %	8.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	46.5 %	35.5 %	12.8 %	2.3 %	0.7 %	2.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	53.0 %	40.4 %	5.2 %	0.5 %	0.5 %	0.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	50.7 %	31.6 %	12.4 %	3.8 %	0.8 %	0.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	20.4 %	34.1 %	28.8 %	3.7 %	1.0 %	12.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	22.3 %	37.5 %	25.5 %	5.8 %	1.0 %	7.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	46.9 %	35.1 %	15.5 %	1.0 %	0.2 %	1.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	71.0 %	22.6 %	4.6 %	0.8 %	0.5 %	0.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	25.5 %	43.7 %	20.7 %	2.2 %	1.0 %	6.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.7 %	28.5 %	27.6 %	4.7 %	2.4 %	14.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	45.7 %	33.2 %	13.8 %	2.9 %	1.0 %	3.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.8 %	34.9 %	17.0 %	2.6 %	1.0 %	5.6 %	14427



**Q19\_11. Multiculturalism: How positive or negative would you rate the EU and Europe as a whole in terms of the following fields of culture and sports?**

	<b>Very positive</b>	<b>Fairly positive</b>	<b>Neither positive nor negative</b>	<b>Fairly negative</b>	<b>Very negative</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	44.3 %	34.0 %	13.3 %	2.7 %	1.7 %	4.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.5 %	37.9 %	20.0 %	4.0 %	2.3 %	13.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	18.2 %	41.7 %	28.3 %	2.3 %	0.8 %	8.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	42.7 %	38.3 %	14.5 %	1.4 %	0.7 %	2.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	37.3 %	44.9 %	12.5 %	2.7 %	0.3 %	2.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	41.4 %	38.0 %	15.1 %	1.8 %	1.0 %	2.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	16.8 %	32.0 %	33.1 %	3.9 %	1.5 %	12.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.9 %	31.9 %	33.3 %	8.9 %	2.2 %	7.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	41.1 %	38.3 %	16.5 %	2.7 %	0.3 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	49.8 %	36.6 %	10.0 %	2.3 %	0.2 %	1.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	29.6 %	38.4 %	20.6 %	2.8 %	1.0 %	7.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	23.2 %	27.5 %	25.7 %	6.4 %	2.8 %	14.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	30.0 %	37.0 %	20.4 %	6.0 %	2.3 %	4.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	31.9 %	36.7 %	20.2 %	3.6 %	1.3 %	6.3 %	14427

**Q20\_1. Europe is an attractive destination for tourists from your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	66.9 %	25.2 %	4.8 %	1.9 %	0.2 %	1.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	48.4 %	31.2 %	10.8 %	2.7 %	1.3 %	5.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	26.6 %	42.2 %	23.6 %	2.5 %	1.4 %	3.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	66.0 %	24.3 %	6.9 %	1.9 %	0.2 %	0.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	54.5 %	38.1 %	4.0 %	2.0 %	0.6 %	0.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	56.5 %	34.6 %	7.2 %	1.3 %	0.2 %	0.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	31.8 %	37.3 %	16.7 %	3.6 %	1.6 %	9.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	31.6 %	42.8 %	16.3 %	4.1 %	0.9 %	4.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	63.7 %	27.2 %	7.1 %	1.7 %	0.2 %	0.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	66.0 %	24.5 %	6.6 %	1.6 %	0.9 %	0.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	45.3 %	36.7 %	13.4 %	2.2 %	0.6 %	1.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	42.0 %	27.6 %	16.2 %	4.9 %	1.5 %	7.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	55.0 %	30.3 %	10.7 %	2.2 %	0.6 %	1.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	50.5 %	32.4 %	11.0 %	2.5 %	0.8 %	2.8 %	14427

**Q20\_2. Europe is a producer of music and arts popular in your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	29.5 %	25.8 %	25.2 %	13.7 %	2.5 %	3.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	24.7 %	37.5 %	21.5 %	6.2 %	1.4 %	8.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	19.0 %	40.8 %	30.5 %	2.8 %	1.8 %	5.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	23.8 %	28.8 %	30.3 %	11.2 %	3.0 %	3.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	32.8 %	45.5 %	14.6 %	5.7 %	0.4 %	1.0 %	1133
<b>India</b>	36.4 %	40.3 %	17.1 %	3.7 %	0.8 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	26.2 %	35.0 %	21.5 %	5.9 %	1.4 %	10.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	22.4 %	38.3 %	26.3 %	7.4 %	0.9 %	4.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	32.0 %	34.7 %	25.1 %	6.5 %	0.8 %	0.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	31.4 %	25.0 %	20.1 %	16.9 %	5.7 %	0.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	30.8 %	42.5 %	20.7 %	2.9 %	0.6 %	2.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	26.8 %	30.8 %	22.9 %	7.5 %	2.6 %	9.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	26.3 %	31.8 %	22.7 %	12.2 %	4.6 %	2.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	27.9 %	35.2 %	23.0 %	7.9 %	2.0 %	4.0 %	14427

**Q20\_3. Europe is a producer of luxury goods and clothes popular in your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	35.6 %	32.3 %	18.2 %	9.6 %	1.3 %	3.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	30.1 %	37.8 %	18.5 %	3.1 %	1.4 %	9.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.1 %	41.1 %	24.8 %	4.1 %	1.9 %	6.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	26.3 %	34.1 %	25.1 %	10.5 %	1.5 %	2.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	43.2 %	44.5 %	9.6 %	1.6 %	0.6 %	0.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	41.0 %	39.7 %	15.6 %	2.9 %	0.3 %	0.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	27.7 %	36.3 %	19.8 %	4.7 %	1.4 %	10.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	29.0 %	42.1 %	17.6 %	4.8 %	1.6 %	5.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	36.7 %	32.5 %	23.9 %	4.8 %	1.1 %	1.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	42.1 %	31.2 %	16.0 %	8.7 %	1.7 %	0.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	35.8 %	40.1 %	16.8 %	2.2 %	1.3 %	3.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	31.7 %	28.7 %	21.2 %	6.6 %	1.9 %	9.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	37.8 %	34.3 %	19.0 %	6.1 %	1.3 %	1.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	33.8 %	36.5 %	19.0 %	5.3 %	1.3 %	4.0 %	14427

**Q20\_4. Europe should be engaged more actively in cultural exchanges with your country: Looking from your country's perspective, how strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	52.0 %	34.6 %	9.2 %	1.7 %	0.3 %	2.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	28.2 %	41.1 %	17.0 %	3.1 %	1.9 %	8.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	28.0 %	47.2 %	17.5 %	2.3 %	0.8 %	4.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	48.7 %	36.1 %	10.5 %	1.9 %	0.8 %	2.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	38.7 %	43.6 %	10.5 %	4.8 %	1.5 %	1.0 %	1133
<b>India</b>	41.7 %	36.4 %	13.9 %	3.4 %	1.6 %	3.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	23.4 %	32.4 %	25.5 %	6.3 %	1.8 %	10.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	24.8 %	42.7 %	22.0 %	4.2 %	1.0 %	5.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	51.4 %	34.6 %	10.9 %	1.7 %	0.7 %	0.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	47.6 %	35.5 %	9.8 %	4.5 %	1.2 %	1.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	35.7 %	39.0 %	18.9 %	2.9 %	1.1 %	2.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.4 %	31.0 %	26.8 %	5.3 %	2.2 %	10.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	37.6 %	36.9 %	17.2 %	3.9 %	2.3 %	2.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.3 %	37.7 %	16.1 %	3.5 %	1.3 %	4.1 %	14427

**Q21\_1. Respect for human dignity: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	42.4 %	40.4 %	10.3 %	3.0 %	3.8 %	<b>1150</b>
<b>Canada</b>	32.7 %	39.9 %	8.3 %	3.1 %	15.9 %	<b>1018</b>
<b>China</b>	17.9 %	51.7 %	15.6 %	2.7 %	12.1 %	<b>1108</b>
<b>Colombia</b>	43.7 %	36.1 %	12.5 %	3.9 %	3.9 %	<b>1106</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>	46.9 %	39.5 %	10.5 %	1.7 %	1.5 %	<b>1132</b>
<b>India</b>	49.0 %	40.8 %	6.7 %	0.4 %	3.1 %	<b>1145</b>
<b>Japan</b>	13.9 %	38.6 %	21.5 %	3.4 %	22.6 %	<b>1126</b>
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	20.5 %	49.1 %	17.2 %	4.1 %	9.1 %	<b>1030</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	45.6 %	38.5 %	11.0 %	2.4 %	2.5 %	<b>1227</b>
<b>Nigeria</b>	65.1 %	27.8 %	4.1 %	2.0 %	1.1 %	<b>1012</b>
<b>Russia</b>	30.7 %	40.3 %	16.4 %	5.2 %	7.4 %	<b>1114</b>
<b>US</b>	31.1 %	32.1 %	14.5 %	4.3 %	17.9 %	<b>1099</b>
<b>South Africa</b>	45.3 %	38.0 %	9.2 %	3.5 %	4.0 %	<b>1158</b>
<b>Total</b>	37.4 %	39.5 %	12.1 %	3.1 %	8.0 %	<b>14425</b>

**Q21\_2. Liberty: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	45.2 %	38.5 %	10.4 %	2.5 %	3.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	31.7 %	40.5 %	9.3 %	2.9 %	15.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	25.1 %	42.8 %	19.3 %	4.2 %	8.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	45.6 %	35.4 %	10.4 %	5.4 %	3.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.1 %	36.8 %	14.4 %	8.1 %	1.4 %	1132
<b>India</b>	47.4 %	36.9 %	12.7 %	1.3 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	16.1 %	38.7 %	19.2 %	4.3 %	21.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	25.9 %	46.2 %	15.9 %	4.3 %	7.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	48.4 %	38.5 %	9.4 %	2.3 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	57.2 %	33.0 %	8.2 %	0.9 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	28.3 %	39.5 %	18.5 %	6.6 %	7.1 %	1113
<b>US</b>	26.4 %	32.8 %	16.2 %	6.2 %	18.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	39.2 %	41.0 %	11.8 %	3.1 %	5.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	36.7 %	38.5 %	13.5 %	4.0 %	7.3 %	14425

**Q21\_3. Democracy: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	40.9 %	35.8 %	14.0 %	4.5 %	4.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	32.2 %	36.6 %	11.9 %	3.8 %	15.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	20.4 %	41.2 %	22.1 %	7.5 %	8.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	37.4 %	37.3 %	15.5 %	6.3 %	3.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	42.0 %	37.7 %	14.0 %	4.5 %	1.8 %	1132
<b>India</b>	50.0 %	34.6 %	10.7 %	1.8 %	2.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.9 %	36.1 %	21.7 %	4.0 %	22.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	25.1 %	44.2 %	19.0 %	3.7 %	8.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	37.1 %	40.9 %	15.6 %	3.3 %	3.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	57.7 %	25.6 %	14.3 %	1.7 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	24.4 %	33.8 %	22.9 %	9.7 %	9.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	26.0 %	33.5 %	16.0 %	6.9 %	17.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	38.8 %	36.6 %	14.3 %	6.1 %	4.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	34.4 %	36.5 %	16.3 %	4.9 %	7.8 %	14426



**Q21\_4. Equality: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	37.7 %	36.3 %	15.6 %	6.3 %	4.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	27.6 %	41.4 %	11.3 %	3.7 %	16.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	21.8 %	44.1 %	19.3 %	5.9 %	8.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	38.8 %	35.5 %	16.4 %	6.1 %	3.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	37.2 %	42.2 %	14.8 %	3.6 %	2.1 %	1132
<b>India</b>	50.9 %	34.1 %	10.6 %	2.4 %	2.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.0 %	36.1 %	24.3 %	4.6 %	21.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	21.3 %	44.8 %	21.1 %	4.9 %	7.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	43.4 %	35.7 %	15.0 %	4.4 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	60.4 %	25.8 %	10.3 %	2.5 %	1.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	24.6 %	33.9 %	25.8 %	8.0 %	7.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	26.8 %	32.8 %	16.3 %	6.5 %	17.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	38.3 %	37.0 %	14.1 %	6.1 %	4.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	34.1 %	36.9 %	16.5 %	5.0 %	7.4 %	14426

**Q21\_5. The rule of law: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	38.9 %	36.1 %	14.9 %	4.6 %	5.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	27.2 %	41.5 %	9.1 %	4.6 %	17.6 %	1017
<b>China</b>	21.9 %	41.6 %	21.4 %	3.3 %	11.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	34.4 %	38.7 %	16.3 %	6.4 %	4.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	35.9 %	38.3 %	16.0 %	6.0 %	3.7 %	1132
<b>India</b>	50.4 %	32.7 %	12.0 %	1.7 %	3.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.8 %	34.0 %	23.2 %	5.4 %	24.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.9 %	44.9 %	21.5 %	5.4 %	9.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	36.5 %	41.0 %	14.8 %	4.6 %	3.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	61.5 %	25.0 %	10.4 %	2.5 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	22.4 %	36.8 %	20.6 %	7.3 %	12.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	27.0 %	31.4 %	14.7 %	6.0 %	20.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	39.3 %	35.1 %	14.2 %	5.7 %	5.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	32.9 %	36.7 %	16.1 %	4.9 %	9.4 %	14425

**Q21\_6. Respect for human rights: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	42.8 %	34.9 %	12.9 %	5.5 %	4.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	30.7 %	39.3 %	11.0 %	4.0 %	14.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	21.9 %	39.7 %	21.0 %	6.6 %	10.9 %	1107
<b>Colombia</b>	42.2 %	33.6 %	13.8 %	7.1 %	3.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	43.8 %	37.3 %	12.8 %	4.0 %	2.0 %	1132
<b>India</b>	51.6 %	29.8 %	11.2 %	3.5 %	3.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.8 %	36.5 %	22.6 %	4.2 %	21.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	22.4 %	44.0 %	20.2 %	5.2 %	8.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	45.4 %	37.5 %	11.3 %	4.2 %	1.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	69.9 %	22.0 %	4.7 %	2.7 %	0.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	30.1 %	36.1 %	19.3 %	7.1 %	7.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.7 %	35.0 %	15.6 %	5.8 %	17.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	45.5 %	33.2 %	11.1 %	5.3 %	4.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.5 %	35.3 %	14.4 %	5.0 %	7.7 %	14425

**Q21\_7. Rights of persons belonging to minorities: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	30.7 %	37.9 %	19.7 %	6.3 %	5.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	26.3 %	37.5 %	13.1 %	5.4 %	17.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	19.2 %	39.4 %	22.5 %	5.9 %	13.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	33.2 %	35.7 %	19.5 %	7.1 %	4.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	34.7 %	35.1 %	21.0 %	4.4 %	4.8 %	1132
<b>India</b>	45.4 %	32.2 %	14.0 %	3.0 %	5.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.7 %	31.0 %	26.9 %	5.0 %	26.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.9 %	37.5 %	28.2 %	8.7 %	9.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	38.4 %	39.4 %	15.5 %	2.8 %	4.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	56.8 %	28.0 %	8.3 %	5.5 %	1.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	16.3 %	24.9 %	25.2 %	20.7 %	12.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.4 %	33.8 %	15.1 %	5.7 %	20.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	35.4 %	36.6 %	15.5 %	6.4 %	6.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.8 %	34.6 %	18.8 %	6.6 %	10.1 %	14426

**Q21\_8. Pluralism: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	30.3 %	37.5 %	17.0 %	4.2 %	11.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	18.5 %	36.1 %	11.2 %	3.4 %	30.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	23.3 %	49.5 %	13.8 %	2.3 %	11.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	28.1 %	41.8 %	19.0 %	4.6 %	6.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	33.3 %	39.0 %	17.7 %	4.5 %	5.5 %	1132
<b>India</b>	43.0 %	35.3 %	11.4 %	2.2 %	8.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.6 %	29.1 %	27.8 %	4.1 %	28.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.0 %	36.6 %	32.1 %	6.0 %	11.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	28.9 %	48.2 %	15.4 %	3.0 %	4.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	35.2 %	40.0 %	16.4 %	2.5 %	5.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	14.7 %	30.0 %	26.4 %	8.1 %	20.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	19.2 %	27.8 %	16.1 %	5.5 %	31.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	25.0 %	36.3 %	18.8 %	6.0 %	13.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	25.1 %	37.5 %	18.6 %	4.3 %	14.4 %	14426

**Q21\_9. Non-discrimination: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	32.1 %	37.2 %	17.5 %	7.7 %	5.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.3 %	40.7 %	13.2 %	4.9 %	18.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	17.0 %	38.5 %	25.5 %	7.5 %	11.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	37.4 %	32.9 %	18.4 %	8.0 %	3.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	32.2 %	41.0 %	18.0 %	3.9 %	5.0 %	1132
<b>India</b>	42.2 %	37.0 %	13.1 %	4.0 %	3.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.5 %	33.6 %	25.8 %	4.8 %	23.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.3 %	38.3 %	31.1 %	6.1 %	9.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	41.8 %	34.9 %	16.3 %	4.2 %	2.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	53.8 %	27.3 %	11.2 %	6.5 %	1.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	21.7 %	33.9 %	24.2 %	8.3 %	11.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.7 %	34.7 %	16.4 %	5.6 %	20.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	33.5 %	36.4 %	16.1 %	8.0 %	6.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.7 %	35.9 %	18.9 %	6.1 %	9.4 %	14426

**Q21\_10. Tolerance: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	33.2 %	36.9 %	18.0 %	6.0 %	5.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	23.9 %	40.7 %	12.7 %	4.5 %	18.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	17.7 %	45.5 %	20.2 %	6.3 %	10.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	35.9 %	38.3 %	16.7 %	5.8 %	3.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	40.3 %	38.0 %	13.6 %	6.2 %	1.9 %	1132
<b>India</b>	41.0 %	40.2 %	12.8 %	3.7 %	2.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	11.6 %	31.7 %	25.7 %	5.1 %	25.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.5 %	40.1 %	29.2 %	6.7 %	9.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	40.1 %	40.1 %	14.3 %	3.5 %	2.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	55.4 %	29.7 %	11.8 %	1.8 %	1.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	17.6 %	30.7 %	25.9 %	14.0 %	11.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	23.6 %	34.9 %	14.9 %	7.1 %	19.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	31.3 %	39.6 %	16.1 %	6.8 %	6.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.8 %	37.5 %	17.8 %	6.0 %	9.0 %	14426

**Q21\_11. Justice: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	39.1 %	34.2 %	14.2 %	7.5 %	5.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	26.4 %	41.5 %	10.8 %	4.6 %	16.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	21.2 %	36.8 %	23.0 %	8.8 %	10.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	38.3 %	32.1 %	14.4 %	11.7 %	3.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	40.1 %	38.4 %	14.3 %	4.1 %	3.0 %	1132
<b>India</b>	51.1 %	30.5 %	14.3 %	2.8 %	1.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.8 %	35.4 %	22.7 %	4.4 %	24.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.2 %	45.1 %	23.4 %	5.9 %	9.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	40.7 %	35.0 %	16.1 %	5.9 %	2.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	65.0 %	20.7 %	8.2 %	4.9 %	1.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	24.2 %	38.0 %	21.3 %	6.9 %	9.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.8 %	34.7 %	15.4 %	4.8 %	19.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	38.9 %	34.2 %	14.2 %	8.1 %	4.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	33.9 %	35.1 %	16.4 %	6.2 %	8.4 %	14426



**Q21\_12. Solidarity: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	39.2 %	38.8 %	13.2 %	4.6 %	4.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.0 %	39.8 %	11.1 %	4.0 %	20.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	17.9 %	42.1 %	23.2 %	6.9 %	9.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	39.8 %	36.7 %	13.7 %	7.1 %	2.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	40.1 %	41.4 %	13.1 %	3.5 %	2.0 %	1132
<b>India</b>	43.8 %	41.6 %	10.0 %	0.8 %	3.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	11.3 %	33.2 %	24.4 %	5.1 %	26.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.1 %	44.5 %	25.3 %	4.5 %	10.7 %	1029
<b>Mexico</b>	41.8 %	41.2 %	12.0 %	2.9 %	2.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	55.8 %	30.3 %	10.3 %	2.2 %	1.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	21.9 %	41.7 %	19.7 %	6.4 %	10.3 %	1113
<b>US</b>	22.6 %	33.2 %	14.6 %	6.5 %	23.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	33.4 %	38.2 %	14.6 %	6.5 %	7.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	31.5 %	38.7 %	15.7 %	4.7 %	9.4 %	14424

**Q21\_13. Equality between women and men: Thinking about your own personal viewpoint on each of the following issues listed below, please indicate how similar, if at all, are your views with the respective views of the EU?**

	<b>Definitely similar</b>	<b>More or less similar</b>	<b>Not very similar</b>	<b>Not at all important</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	36.6 %	37.2 %	16.0 %	5.3 %	4.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	27.2 %	40.4 %	11.2 %	4.0 %	17.1 %	1017
<b>China</b>	18.8 %	47.9 %	19.2 %	4.1 %	10.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	36.3 %	37.2 %	16.1 %	7.5 %	2.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.7 %	39.5 %	12.0 %	5.6 %	3.2 %	1132
<b>India</b>	55.0 %	31.8 %	9.4 %	1.6 %	2.2 %	1144
<b>Japan</b>	14.7 %	33.6 %	23.9 %	5.6 %	22.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	19.0 %	41.6 %	24.1 %	6.7 %	8.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	43.5 %	36.9 %	13.9 %	3.8 %	1.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	54.5 %	30.1 %	11.5 %	3.0 %	1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	24.9 %	36.4 %	19.8 %	9.2 %	9.7 %	1113
<b>US</b>	24.8 %	33.0 %	14.8 %	7.1 %	20.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	40.8 %	35.5 %	13.8 %	4.6 %	5.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	33.7 %	37.0 %	15.8 %	5.2 %	8.3 %	14423

**Q22\_1. Economy: Which term – Europe or the EU – comes to your mind first when you think about the following subjects?**

	<b>“European Union”</b>	<b>“Europe”</b>	<b>“Specific European countries”</b>	<b>No difference between them</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	52.1 %	27.8 %	11.1 %	4.6 %	4.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	38.4 %	21.4 %	14.6 %	12.2 %	13.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	46.3 %	23.4 %	13.4 %	6.5 %	10.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	54.3 %	28.2 %	11.0 %	4.8 %	1.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	59.4 %	23.5 %	9.6 %	5.2 %	2.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	52.6 %	26.4 %	15.5 %	2.7 %	2.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	28.9 %	27.4 %	12.2 %	12.0 %	19.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	48.7 %	20.3 %	14.9 %	8.3 %	7.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	51.4 %	29.7 %	11.6 %	5.1 %	2.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	65.2 %	24.4 %	8.3 %	1.9 %	0.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	38.8 %	22.5 %	20.7 %	10.1 %	7.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	33.7 %	24.2 %	13.1 %	11.4 %	17.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	49.1 %	28.2 %	13.3 %	6.9 %	2.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	47.6 %	25.3 %	13.0 %	7.0 %	7.0 %	14427

**Q22\_2. Science, research and technology: Which term – Europe or the EU – comes to your mind first when you think about the following subjects?**

	<b>“European Union”</b>	<b>“Europe”</b>	<b>“Specific European countries”</b>	<b>No difference between them</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	40.7 %	29.4 %	20.8 %	4.5 %	4.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	27.0 %	26.0 %	20.1 %	13.8 %	13.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	33.4 %	31.9 %	16.8 %	8.3 %	9.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	42.4 %	32.4 %	17.3 %	5.3 %	2.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	38.2 %	38.6 %	18.9 %	2.9 %	1.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	40.3 %	34.3 %	18.8 %	3.8 %	2.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	22.4 %	28.8 %	15.5 %	13.2 %	20.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	32.9 %	22.8 %	23.8 %	12.2 %	8.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	40.8 %	31.6 %	19.3 %	6.2 %	2.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	43.2 %	35.4 %	18.0 %	2.4 %	1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	22.5 %	29.4 %	27.5 %	11.1 %	9.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	25.5 %	24.7 %	18.8 %	12.8 %	18.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	32.6 %	33.6 %	23.1 %	7.5 %	3.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	34.1 %	30.8 %	19.9 %	7.9 %	7.3 %	14427

**Q22\_3. Politics: Which term – Europe or the EU – comes to your mind first when you think about the following subjects?**

	<b>“European Union”</b>	<b>“Europe”</b>	<b>“Specific European countries”</b>	<b>No difference between them</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	49.7 %	27.3 %	13.1 %	5.0 %	4.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	31.2 %	23.5 %	18.8 %	12.9 %	13.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	44.2 %	19.2 %	16.8 %	8.7 %	11.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	52.9 %	24.6 %	14.4 %	5.2 %	2.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	46.0 %	26.2 %	21.7 %	3.2 %	2.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	46.1 %	30.0 %	15.5 %	5.5 %	3.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	31.5 %	22.4 %	12.5 %	13.6 %	20.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	36.2 %	21.3 %	20.4 %	12.6 %	9.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	45.7 %	29.7 %	13.9 %	7.2 %	3.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	54.6 %	29.2 %	10.9 %	3.5 %	1.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	46.0 %	15.4 %	19.8 %	8.9 %	9.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	31.8 %	21.0 %	17.2 %	11.4 %	18.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	42.9 %	26.4 %	16.9 %	9.9 %	3.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	43.1 %	24.4 %	16.3 %	8.2 %	8.0 %	14427

**Q22\_4. Social development: Which term – Europe or the EU – comes to your mind first when you think about the following subjects?**

	<b>“European Union”</b>	<b>“Europe”</b>	<b>“Specific European countries”</b>	<b>No difference between them</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	43.2 %	29.5 %	16.7 %	6.3 %	4.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	27.6 %	24.2 %	19.7 %	13.8 %	14.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	37.5 %	28.7 %	13.9 %	9.7 %	10.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	45.8 %	29.1 %	16.4 %	5.5 %	3.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	45.5 %	27.1 %	20.4 %	4.8 %	2.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	45.5 %	27.4 %	18.7 %	5.7 %	2.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	24.2 %	28.2 %	13.1 %	13.9 %	20.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	34.0 %	25.3 %	15.5 %	13.9 %	11.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	47.0 %	31.1 %	14.6 %	5.0 %	2.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	49.8 %	31.3 %	13.7 %	3.3 %	1.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	28.3 %	25.0 %	22.6 %	11.9 %	12.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.3 %	25.5 %	16.3 %	14.2 %	19.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	36.8 %	29.6 %	17.5 %	11.4 %	4.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.8 %	27.9 %	16.8 %	9.1 %	8.4 %	14427

**Q22\_5. Culture and sports: Which term – Europe or the EU – comes to your mind first when you think about the following subjects?**

	<b>“European Union”</b>	<b>“Europe”</b>	<b>“Specific European countries”</b>	<b>No difference between them</b>	<b>Do not know/cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	31.4 %	40.2 %	18.9 %	4.7 %	4.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	18.5 %	34.3 %	21.2 %	12.6 %	13.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.3 %	38.8 %	19.9 %	8.6 %	10.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	30.4 %	40.4 %	20.3 %	6.1 %	2.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.5 %	34.2 %	17.7 %	6.0 %	2.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	40.6 %	30.5 %	18.3 %	6.3 %	4.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.6 %	39.1 %	14.8 %	11.8 %	18.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	24.4 %	30.2 %	25.5 %	10.8 %	9.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	32.2 %	42.9 %	17.3 %	5.7 %	2.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	41.6 %	37.4 %	14.0 %	3.8 %	3.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	18.2 %	32.8 %	28.1 %	12.0 %	8.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	18.8 %	30.5 %	19.4 %	13.7 %	17.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	27.6 %	40.4 %	18.7 %	9.1 %	4.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	27.8 %	36.4 %	19.5 %	8.5 %	7.8 %	14427

**Q23\_1. Europe is looking towards the future: Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	43.9 %	36.5 %	13.6 %	2.9 %	1.1 %	2.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.0 %	43.0 %	16.3 %	4.3 %	1.7 %	9.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	11.5 %	36.5 %	36.0 %	7.7 %	2.7 %	5.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	54.6 %	31.9 %	9.0 %	2.3 %	1.0 %	1.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	42.4 %	48.8 %	6.4 %	1.0 %	0.5 %	0.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	57.6 %	31.3 %	7.1 %	1.9 %	0.4 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.9 %	31.4 %	29.9 %	8.3 %	3.5 %	15.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	18.7 %	41.2 %	25.2 %	7.1 %	1.6 %	6.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	55.6 %	32.3 %	7.7 %	2.0 %	1.1 %	1.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	68.2 %	25.5 %	4.9 %	0.7 %	0.5 %	0.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	24.6 %	37.6 %	19.8 %	8.7 %	5.1 %	4.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	23.0 %	34.9 %	18.0 %	6.5 %	4.1 %	13.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	48.0 %	34.7 %	11.8 %	2.4 %	0.9 %	2.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	37.4 %	35.8 %	15.7 %	4.3 %	1.9 %	4.9 %	14427



**Q23\_2. Europe should be more united to tackle today's challenges: Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	43.5 %	40.2 %	11.6 %	2.2 %	0.9 %	1.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	25.6 %	37.9 %	20.5 %	3.8 %	1.5 %	10.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	20.0 %	46.3 %	22.0 %	4.1 %	2.5 %	5.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	52.8 %	31.9 %	10.6 %	2.1 %	1.6 %	1.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	48.6 %	43.7 %	5.7 %	0.1 %	0.1 %	1.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	46.1 %	41.6 %	10.1 %	0.7 %		1.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.5 %	35.1 %	25.0 %	5.4 %	2.0 %	17.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	23.1 %	42.7 %	21.7 %	5.3 %	0.9 %	6.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	54.4 %	32.7 %	8.7 %	1.8 %	1.0 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	69.0 %	28.2 %	2.3 %	0.3 %		0.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	29.3 %	41.2 %	18.6 %	3.2 %	2.0 %	5.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.4 %	32.3 %	24.5 %	5.0 %	2.6 %	13.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	43.4 %	38.0 %	13.6 %	2.1 %	0.8 %	2.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.1 %	37.8 %	14.9 %	2.8 %	1.2 %	5.2 %	14427

**Q23\_3. Europe is attractive for its history: Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	52.0 %	36.3 %	8.6 %	1.0 %	0.3 %	1.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	43.5 %	30.3 %	13.8 %	3.3 %	1.1 %	7.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	16.4 %	43.4 %	29.3 %	4.6 %	2.2 %	4.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	56.8 %	29.2 %	8.5 %	2.9 %	1.3 %	1.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	41.6 %	45.3 %	9.4 %	2.7 %	0.1 %	1.0 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.4 %	40.9 %	11.5 %	2.7 %	1.2 %	1.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	13.4 %	34.7 %	26.5 %	8.2 %	1.9 %	15.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	24.7 %	39.1 %	21.2 %	6.8 %	2.4 %	5.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	54.2 %	31.6 %	10.3 %	3.3 %	0.1 %	0.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	53.2 %	32.6 %	10.8 %	2.7 %	0.3 %	0.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	28.7 %	39.3 %	18.0 %	5.6 %	3.2 %	5.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	31.8 %	29.9 %	18.6 %	5.4 %	3.2 %	11.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	42.7 %	34.1 %	14.6 %	3.4 %	3.3 %	1.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	38.7 %	35.9 %	15.4 %	4.0 %	1.6 %	4.4 %	14427

**Q23\_4. Europe is providing many opportunities: Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	44.5 %	35.7 %	14.1 %	1.7 %	0.7 %	3.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	21.3 %	36.3 %	23.7 %	4.9 %	2.0 %	11.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	12.4 %	35.6 %	35.7 %	7.8 %	2.2 %	6.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	42.8 %	39.3 %	13.2 %	1.9 %	1.2 %	1.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	36.7 %	46.1 %	13.0 %	2.2 %	0.7 %	1.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	45.8 %	36.9 %	10.8 %	3.5 %	1.0 %	2.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	24.8 %	35.1 %	18.1 %	7.0 %	2.6 %	12.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.6 %	37.3 %	30.0 %	7.3 %	1.8 %	7.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	43.6 %	35.1 %	17.9 %	1.9 %	0.3 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	48.0 %	34.8 %	15.0 %	1.8 %	0.1 %	0.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	26.7 %	45.4 %	18.2 %	4.4 %	2.2 %	3.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	17.9 %	29.8 %	28.2 %	7.7 %	2.4 %	14.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	35.4 %	36.6 %	20.0 %	4.3 %	1.6 %	2.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	32.3 %	37.2 %	19.7 %	4.3 %	1.4 %	5.0 %	14427

**Q23\_5. Europe is a destination you would like to visit: Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	61.4 %	25.9 %	8.0 %	1.8 %	0.9 %	2.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	44.2 %	28.4 %	14.4 %	4.0 %	2.5 %	6.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	19.6 %	36.8 %	28.4 %	6.5 %	3.7 %	5.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	65.4 %	23.9 %	6.7 %	2.0 %	0.7 %	1.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	48.4 %	40.0 %	8.9 %	1.4 %	1.0 %	0.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	52.4 %	30.6 %	13.4 %	1.8 %	0.4 %	1.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	23.5 %	35.2 %	18.5 %	7.3 %	3.5 %	12.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	30.8 %	40.7 %	18.0 %	4.8 %	1.7 %	4.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	62.5 %	25.0 %	9.5 %	1.6 %	0.6 %	0.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	67.6 %	25.7 %	5.2 %	0.8 %	0.5 %	0.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	40.4 %	34.8 %	15.0 %	2.5 %	3.7 %	3.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	34.0 %	27.4 %	18.0 %	7.0 %	3.1 %	10.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	54.9 %	28.5 %	10.1 %	2.5 %	2.2 %	1.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	46.7 %	30.9 %	13.3 %	3.4 %	1.9 %	3.8 %	14427

**Q23\_6. Europe is a place where you would like to do business or create partnerships with:**  
**Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	50.2 %	30.7 %	12.4 %	2.9 %	0.7 %	3.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.1 %	30.1 %	27.0 %	4.8 %	2.7 %	13.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	13.9 %	36.4 %	31.0 %	8.7 %	3.2 %	6.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	50.8 %	32.9 %	11.6 %	2.1 %	0.8 %	1.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	35.6 %	47.1 %	13.3 %	1.8 %	0.7 %	1.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.3 %	42.8 %	10.8 %	2.3 %	0.3 %	1.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.1 %	32.4 %	28.3 %	7.2 %	2.3 %	15.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	17.9 %	40.7 %	25.3 %	7.7 %	1.3 %	7.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	46.7 %	35.6 %	14.4 %	1.1 %	0.8 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	62.2 %	30.1 %	7.2 %	0.2 %		0.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	21.9 %	29.4 %	26.6 %	8.8 %	6.3 %	7.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	19.7 %	26.3 %	26.7 %	8.9 %	4.3 %	14.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	46.3 %	32.0 %	13.7 %	3.3 %	1.6 %	3.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	34.3 %	34.4 %	19.0 %	4.5 %	1.9 %	5.9 %	14427

**Q23\_7. Europe is a place where you would like to live: Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	45.7 %	26.2 %	15.0 %	8.3 %	2.5 %	2.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	20.6 %	30.3 %	25.2 %	10.8 %	5.6 %	7.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	10.7 %	26.1 %	32.9 %	13.7 %	9.9 %	6.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	49.8 %	28.8 %	15.1 %	3.3 %	1.8 %	1.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	27.8 %	34.9 %	19.8 %	12.4 %	2.9 %	2.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	44.1 %	34.7 %	12.8 %	3.9 %	2.7 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.7 %	22.6 %	30.8 %	15.7 %	7.7 %	12.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	19.4 %	35.1 %	27.5 %	9.2 %	2.7 %	6.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	44.8 %	30.8 %	16.2 %	5.0 %	2.1 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	53.9 %	30.7 %	10.6 %	3.0 %	0.3 %	1.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	19.6 %	24.4 %	25.5 %	12.8 %	12.0 %	5.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	17.9 %	24.3 %	24.2 %	13.9 %	8.5 %	11.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	36.9 %	27.8 %	20.2 %	8.9 %	4.7 %	1.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	31.1 %	28.9 %	21.1 %	9.3 %	4.9 %	4.7 %	14427

**Q23\_8. Europe is a place where you would like to study (or your kids to study): Generally speaking, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about Europe?**

	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	55.1 %	28.3 %	10.6 %	2.7 %	1.3 %	1.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	23.7 %	31.0 %	23.0 %	7.3 %	4.8 %	10.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	9.7 %	29.3 %	33.2 %	14.2 %	7.3 %	6.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	58.6 %	29.4 %	7.9 %	3.0 %	0.5 %	0.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	36.3 %	41.3 %	13.9 %	5.8 %	1.4 %	1.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.9 %	39.0 %	12.8 %	2.4 %	1.2 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	13.7 %	28.1 %	26.8 %	11.3 %	6.2 %	13.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	19.9 %	37.0 %	27.1 %	7.6 %	1.7 %	6.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	54.6 %	30.5 %	10.8 %	2.0 %	1.3 %	0.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	70.7 %	22.6 %	4.8 %	0.5 %	0.5 %	0.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	22.9 %	30.4 %	23.9 %	8.5 %	8.6 %	5.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	18.5 %	31.4 %	23.9 %	9.0 %	5.2 %	12.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	44.9 %	30.7 %	15.0 %	4.5 %	2.8 %	2.1 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	36.4 %	31.5 %	17.9 %	6.0 %	3.3 %	4.9 %	14427

**Q24\_1. Have you ever lived (for longer than three months) in Europe?**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	10.9 %	89.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	19.6 %	80.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	10.5 %	89.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	12.6 %	87.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	17.1 %	82.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	38.9 %	61.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.5 %	89.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.8 %	83.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	12.3 %	87.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	21.4 %	78.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	16.0 %	84.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	22.5 %	77.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	19.3 %	80.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	17.5 %	82.5 %	14427



**Q24\_2. Have you ever visited Europe?**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	24.5 %	75.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	47.9 %	52.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	27.5 %	72.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	30.5 %	69.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	27.9 %	72.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	43.4 %	56.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	26.4 %	73.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	38.8 %	61.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	27.7 %	72.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	30.3 %	69.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	48.4 %	51.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	34.9 %	65.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	30.1 %	69.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	33.6 %	66.4 %	14427

**Q24\_3. Have you got any relatives that live in Europe?**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	37.4 %	62.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	44.4 %	55.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	18.8 %	81.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	53.6 %	46.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	34.5 %	65.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	56.6 %	43.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	11.5 %	88.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.3 %	85.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	23.9 %	76.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	68.0 %	32.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	31.0 %	69.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	27.0 %	73.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	39.7 %	60.3 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	35.2 %	64.8 %	14427

**Q24\_4. Do you speak any European language?**

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	33.8 %	66.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	41.0 %	59.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	27.1 %	72.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	39.1 %	60.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	29.8 %	70.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	37.7 %	62.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	15.4 %	84.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	22.2 %	77.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	30.7 %	69.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	49.1 %	50.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	36.8 %	63.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	24.6 %	75.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	36.8 %	63.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	32.5 %	67.5 %	14427

**Q25\_1. Austria: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	68.6 %	31.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	72.2 %	27.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	74.5 %	25.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	55.0 %	45.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	65.9 %	34.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	50.6 %	49.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	65.6 %	34.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	69.2 %	30.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	67.2 %	32.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	54.6 %	45.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	62.8 %	37.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	72.6 %	27.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	66.9 %	33.1 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	65.1 %	34.9 %	14426

**Q25\_2. Belgium: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	66.6 %	33.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	70.4 %	29.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	78.1 %	21.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	60.9 %	39.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	73.7 %	26.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	61.9 %	38.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	68.5 %	31.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	81.2 %	18.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	59.8 %	40.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	56.8 %	43.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	77.4 %	22.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	73.9 %	26.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	62.7 %	37.3 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	68.5 %	31.5 %	14426

**Q25\_3. Bulgaria: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	92.6 %	7.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	95.4 %	4.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	92.0 %	8.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	84.6 %	15.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	89.9 %	10.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	81.8 %	18.2 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	84.3 %	15.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	89.7 %	10.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	86.4 %	13.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	92.3 %	7.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	79.8 %	20.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	92.2 %	7.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	91.4 %	8.6 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	88.5 %	11.5 %	14426

**Q25\_4. Croatia: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	85.0 %	15.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	83.9 %	16.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	91.2 %	8.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	81.4 %	18.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	88.8 %	11.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	87.0 %	13.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	90.9 %	9.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	83.4 %	16.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	77.1 %	22.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	82.7 %	17.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	84.7 %	15.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	89.9 %	10.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	83.3 %	16.7 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	85.3 %	14.7 %	14426

**Q25\_5. Cyprus: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	95.9 %	4.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	92.1 %	7.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	94.9 %	5.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	91.3 %	8.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	94.7 %	5.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	84.3 %	15.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	95.1 %	4.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	95.3 %	4.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	93.4 %	6.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	78.5 %	21.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	66.2 %	33.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	94.0 %	6.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	87.7 %	12.3 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	89.6 %	10.4 %	14426



**Q25\_6. Czech Republic: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	87.7 %	12.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	86.7 %	13.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	94.0 %	6.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	80.8 %	19.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	89.1 %	10.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	85.9 %	14.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	89.3 %	10.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	87.4 %	12.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	80.4 %	19.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	87.8 %	12.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	72.6 %	27.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	91.9 %	8.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	91.0 %	9.0 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	86.5 %	13.5 %	14426

**Q25\_7. Denmark: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	66.1 %	33.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	67.8 %	32.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	67.1 %	32.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	66.0 %	34.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	70.3 %	29.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	60.4 %	39.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	78.1 %	21.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	71.2 %	28.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	65.0 %	35.0 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	70.8 %	29.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	79.5 %	20.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	73.3 %	26.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	66.0 %	34.0 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	69.3 %	30.7 %	14426

**Q25\_8. Estonia: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	95.8 %	4.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	94.4 %	5.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	95.0 %	5.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	93.5 %	6.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	95.3 %	4.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	95.5 %	4.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	95.1 %	4.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	96.0 %	4.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	93.9 %	6.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	95.8 %	4.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	91.8 %	8.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	96.1 %	3.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	95.6 %	4.4 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	94.9 %	5.1 %	14426

**Q25\_9. Finland: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	80.1 %	19.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	68.4 %	31.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	76.2 %	23.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	70.5 %	29.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	74.8 %	25.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	66.0 %	34.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	72.6 %	27.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	69.4 %	30.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	68.5 %	31.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	75.2 %	24.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	65.3 %	34.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	77.8 %	22.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	80.4 %	19.6 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	72.7 %	27.3 %	14426

**Q25\_10. France: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	32.4 %	67.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	47.2 %	52.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	47.8 %	52.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	24.4 %	75.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.5 %	60.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	43.2 %	56.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	54.6 %	45.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	57.5 %	42.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	24.9 %	75.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	36.4 %	63.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	52.5 %	47.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	58.1 %	41.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	38.5 %	61.5 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	42.6 %	57.4 %	14426

**Q25\_11. Germany: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	44.1 %	55.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	58.2 %	41.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	58.5 %	41.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	31.5 %	68.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	39.2 %	60.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	40.3 %	59.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	57.6 %	42.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	63.0 %	37.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	28.7 %	71.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	36.3 %	63.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	49.0 %	51.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	64.7 %	35.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	43.6 %	56.4 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	47.0 %	53.0 %	14426

**Q25\_12. Greece: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	57.8 %	42.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	60.9 %	39.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	74.9 %	25.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	44.8 %	55.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	72.4 %	27.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	75.7 %	24.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	79.4 %	20.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	78.7 %	21.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	49.3 %	50.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	77.3 %	22.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	63.6 %	36.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	68.1 %	31.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	62.3 %	37.7 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	66.3 %	33.7 %	14426

**Q25\_13. Hungary: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	92.4 %	7.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	90.0 %	10.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	94.9 %	5.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	87.3 %	12.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	92.9 %	7.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	81.2 %	18.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	92.4 %	7.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	90.5 %	9.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	88.7 %	11.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	86.0 %	14.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	87.0 %	13.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	94.8 %	5.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	93.5 %	6.5 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	90.1 %	9.9 %	14426



**Q25\_14. Ireland: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	72.0 %	28.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	60.1 %	39.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	85.3 %	14.7 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	72.8 %	27.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	83.2 %	16.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	68.3 %	31.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	89.7 %	10.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	84.4 %	15.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	68.3 %	31.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	68.6 %	31.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	84.2 %	15.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	64.2 %	35.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	70.7 %	29.3 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	74.8 %	25.2 %	14426

**Q25\_15. Italy: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	31.5 %	68.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	45.7 %	54.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	59.1 %	40.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	23.1 %	76.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	44.7 %	55.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	47.6 %	52.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	55.8 %	44.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	70.8 %	29.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	26.1 %	73.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	47.8 %	52.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	47.4 %	52.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	52.7 %	47.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	38.1 %	61.9 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	45.1 %	54.9 %	14426

**Q25\_16. Latvia: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
Brazil	97.6 %	2.4 %	1150
Canada	96.8 %	3.2 %	1018
China	97.4 %	2.6 %	1108
Colombia	95.3 %	4.7 %	1106
Indonesia	95.7 %	4.3 %	1133
India	96.5 %	3.5 %	1145
Japan	95.6 %	4.4 %	1126
Republic of Korea	95.6 %	4.4 %	1030
Mexico	95.9 %	4.1 %	1227
Nigeria	97.0 %	3.0 %	1012
Russia	91.9 %	8.1 %	1114
US	97.4 %	2.6 %	1100
South Africa	96.5 %	3.5 %	1157
Total	96.1 %	3.9 %	14426

**Q25\_17. Lithuania: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	97.5 %	2.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	96.2 %	3.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	96.8 %	3.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	94.8 %	5.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	97.4 %	2.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	95.5 %	4.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	95.3 %	4.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	96.1 %	3.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	94.1 %	5.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	94.0 %	6.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	94.8 %	5.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	96.7 %	3.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	96.3 %	3.7 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	95.8 %	4.2 %	14426

**Q25\_18. Luxembourg: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	86.3 %	13.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	87.5 %	12.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	91.4 %	8.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	73.9 %	26.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	90.9 %	9.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	89.1 %	10.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	90.9 %	9.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	89.6 %	10.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	77.4 %	22.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	89.6 %	10.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	77.3 %	22.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	91.5 %	8.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	91.1 %	8.9 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	86.6 %	13.4 %	14426

**Q25\_19. Malta: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	92.8 %	7.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	91.8 %	8.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	98.1 %	1.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	87.8 %	12.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	95.1 %	4.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	93.2 %	6.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	92.6 %	7.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	94.2 %	5.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	93.6 %	6.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	86.5 %	13.5 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	80.0 %	20.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	96.2 %	3.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	92.9 %	7.1 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	92.0 %	8.0 %	14426

**Q25\_20. Netherlands: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	86.1 %	13.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	65.0 %	35.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	71.9 %	28.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	43.6 %	56.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	50.7 %	49.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	66.2 %	33.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	71.4 %	28.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	68.5 %	31.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	45.2 %	54.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	58.1 %	41.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	77.6 %	22.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	73.0 %	27.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	61.2 %	38.8 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	64.4 %	35.6 %	14426

**Q25\_21. Poland: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	88.3 %	11.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	85.5 %	14.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	89.8 %	10.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	75.7 %	24.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	84.1 %	15.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	78.9 %	21.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	87.5 %	12.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	87.9 %	12.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	76.8 %	23.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	75.6 %	24.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	89.7 %	10.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	89.9 %	10.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	83.8 %	16.2 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	84.1 %	15.9 %	14426



**Q25\_22. Portugal: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	28.8 %	71.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	71.0 %	29.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	90.1 %	9.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	50.4 %	49.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	79.1 %	20.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	77.1 %	22.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	85.2 %	14.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	87.1 %	12.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	63.7 %	36.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	69.9 %	30.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	78.9 %	21.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	83.6 %	16.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	64.0 %	36.0 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	71.2 %	28.8 %	14426

**Q25\_23. Romania: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	92.6 %	7.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	91.1 %	8.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	96.8 %	3.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	80.6 %	19.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	89.7 %	10.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	78.7 %	21.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	92.7 %	7.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	94.6 %	5.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	77.4 %	22.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	88.2 %	11.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	93.6 %	6.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	90.5 %	9.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	86.6 %	13.4 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	88.5 %	11.5 %	14426

**Q25\_24. Slovakia: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	93.7 %	6.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	93.4 %	6.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	97.0 %	3.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	90.0 %	10.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	93.8 %	6.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	90.7 %	9.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	94.8 %	5.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	95.4 %	4.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	88.7 %	11.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	95.0 %	5.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	91.0 %	9.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	94.7 %	5.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	93.8 %	6.2 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	93.2 %	6.8 %	14426

**Q25\_25. Slovenia: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	95.0 %	5.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	94.7 %	5.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	97.6 %	2.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	91.6 %	8.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	94.4 %	5.6 %	1133
<b>India</b>	96.2 %	3.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	95.9 %	4.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	95.6 %	4.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	90.1 %	9.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	95.8 %	4.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	90.9 %	9.1 %	1114
<b>US</b>	96.3 %	3.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	95.9 %	4.1 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	94.6 %	5.4 %	14426

**Q25\_26. Spain: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	37.9 %	62.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	55.2 %	44.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	76.0 %	24.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	21.3 %	78.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	51.3 %	48.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	52.2 %	47.8 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	67.9 %	32.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	64.5 %	35.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	28.3 %	71.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	42.6 %	57.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	52.1 %	47.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	61.5 %	38.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	40.1 %	59.9 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	49.8 %	50.2 %	14426

**Q25\_27. Sweden: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	60.4 %	39.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	54.6 %	45.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	69.0 %	31.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	52.3 %	47.7 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	63.5 %	36.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	61.9 %	38.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	68.5 %	31.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	65.7 %	34.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	54.8 %	45.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	62.4 %	37.6 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	52.6 %	47.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	65.4 %	34.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	60.8 %	39.2 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	60.9 %	39.1 %	14426

**Q25\_28. None of these: Please indicate which European countries look the most attractive to you?**

	<b>Unchecked</b>	<b>Checked</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	98.3 %	1.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	94.7 %	5.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	88.1 %	11.9 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	99.8 %	0.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	97.1 %	2.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	97.7 %	2.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	82.9 %	17.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	92.3 %	7.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	99.7 %	0.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	98.8 %	1.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	96.6 %	3.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	85.4 %	14.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	97.1 %	2.9 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	94.6 %	5.4 %	14426

**Q26\_1. The Euro (the official currency): Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	71.4 %	21.9 %	3.1 %	1.6 %	2.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	56.5 %	22.3 %	7.2 %	5.2 %	8.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	52.3 %	29.2 %	7.4 %	2.5 %	8.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	77.7 %	15.2 %	3.9 %	2.0 %	1.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	81.8 %	14.6 %	2.4 %	0.1 %	1.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	71.9 %	21.5 %	5.1 %	0.5 %	1.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	46.4 %	26.2 %	11.9 %	3.9 %	11.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	59.7 %	23.8 %	7.5 %	3.3 %	5.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	71.3 %	21.7 %	3.1 %	3.1 %	0.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	82.9 %	11.7 %	4.2 %	1.1 %	0.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	74.4 %	18.9 %	2.8 %	1.3 %	2.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	44.9 %	20.9 %	11.6 %	7.5 %	15.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	73.6 %	16.2 %	5.3 %	2.7 %	2.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	66.6 %	20.3 %	5.8 %	2.7 %	4.6 %	14427



**Q26\_2. The European Flag: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	40.4 %	33.4 %	15.2 %	6.7 %	4.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	32.3 %	28.1 %	16.6 %	11.3 %	11.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	34.0 %	34.9 %	14.8 %	4.0 %	12.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	42.1 %	35.2 %	13.7 %	6.7 %	2.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	63.1 %	27.6 %	5.9 %	1.6 %	1.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	51.0 %	38.8 %	6.0 %	2.0 %	2.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	24.2 %	28.1 %	23.9 %	8.4 %	15.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	33.9 %	32.2 %	17.7 %	7.5 %	8.7 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	45.6 %	30.7 %	13.0 %	7.7 %	2.9 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	62.5 %	24.9 %	6.9 %	4.8 %	0.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	38.4 %	24.6 %	18.6 %	8.7 %	9.8 %	1114
<b>US</b>	23.7 %	25.3 %	20.2 %	13.5 %	17.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	48.9 %	27.4 %	13.6 %	6.3 %	3.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	41.6 %	30.1 %	14.3 %	6.8 %	7.1 %	14427

**Q26\_3. The Erasmus Student Exchange Programme: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	17.2 %	22.9 %	27.2 %	25.8 %	6.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	11.0 %	15.9 %	18.9 %	36.1 %	18.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	10.3 %	19.1 %	25.4 %	24.2 %	21.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	22.2 %	27.0 %	27.3 %	18.5 %	4.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	35.1 %	36.8 %	16.3 %	6.2 %	5.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	30.6 %	35.0 %	17.8 %	9.1 %	7.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	6.0 %	11.5 %	31.0 %	30.1 %	21.3 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	11.0 %	19.5 %	25.6 %	31.7 %	12.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	24.5 %	27.2 %	22.6 %	20.4 %	5.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	32.0 %	23.6 %	27.6 %	13.8 %	2.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	10.9 %	18.5 %	28.0 %	28.2 %	14.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	13.2 %	17.4 %	21.3 %	27.8 %	20.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	17.2 %	17.4 %	26.0 %	31.4 %	8.0 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	18.6 %	22.6 %	24.2 %	23.2 %	11.3 %	14427

**Q26\_4. The European citizenship: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	42.4 %	36.3 %	11.3 %	6.6 %	3.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.3 %	29.5 %	17.6 %	15.9 %	14.7 %	1018
<b>China</b>	29.2 %	37.6 %	17.5 %	5.3 %	10.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	41.7 %	37.3 %	13.1 %	6.4 %	1.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	47.4 %	36.2 %	9.2 %	4.5 %	2.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	43.8 %	37.6 %	13.5 %	3.3 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	8.9 %	21.8 %	31.7 %	19.8 %	17.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	23.6 %	36.6 %	21.0 %	10.7 %	8.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	37.1 %	37.0 %	15.6 %	7.7 %	2.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	53.9 %	29.3 %	11.5 %	4.2 %	1.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	39.4 %	32.8 %	13.1 %	6.4 %	8.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	18.4 %	27.6 %	19.5 %	16.8 %	17.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	38.1 %	33.5 %	16.4 %	8.8 %	3.2 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	34.4 %	33.4 %	16.2 %	8.9 %	7.1 %	14427

**Q26\_5. The European Union Delegation in your country: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	26.0 %	34.8 %	21.7 %	11.7 %	5.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	11.8 %	21.7 %	25.3 %	24.0 %	17.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	30.0 %	33.9 %	16.9 %	6.9 %	12.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	29.2 %	36.4 %	22.6 %	8.9 %	2.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	42.8 %	39.8 %	10.7 %	3.3 %	3.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	37.0 %	35.1 %	15.3 %	6.6 %	5.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	6.0 %	16.5 %	34.3 %	23.4 %	19.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.0 %	29.1 %	25.1 %	19.4 %	11.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	25.9 %	37.3 %	22.6 %	11.7 %	2.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	48.2 %	31.5 %	12.0 %	6.6 %	1.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	30.0 %	34.6 %	18.1 %	6.0 %	11.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	14.9 %	22.2 %	22.4 %	21.3 %	19.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	23.6 %	34.5 %	22.9 %	13.5 %	5.6 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	26.2 %	31.5 %	20.8 %	12.5 %	9.1 %	14427

**Q26\_6. The European Commission: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	31.6 %	37.4 %	18.3 %	8.1 %	4.6 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	15.0 %	27.2 %	21.9 %	19.9 %	15.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	32.7 %	30.8 %	17.9 %	6.9 %	11.6 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	35.7 %	41.8 %	13.9 %	5.1 %	3.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	26.4 %	38.8 %	23.9 %	4.8 %	6.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	35.8 %	33.9 %	18.4 %	6.3 %	5.6 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	12.3 %	26.2 %	27.2 %	17.5 %	16.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	15.1 %	29.2 %	26.7 %	18.1 %	10.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	27.4 %	36.8 %	21.7 %	11.4 %	2.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	50.6 %	28.3 %	16.3 %	4.1 %	0.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	30.7 %	36.1 %	19.5 %	5.7 %	8.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	13.3 %	24.0 %	22.5 %	22.2 %	18.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	26.0 %	33.9 %	23.8 %	11.4 %	4.8 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	27.1 %	32.8 %	20.9 %	10.8 %	8.3 %	14427

**Q26\_7. The European Parliament: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	40.0 %	35.8 %	14.7 %	6.1 %	3.4 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	20.9 %	29.2 %	17.3 %	18.2 %	14.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	28.3 %	36.1 %	16.3 %	5.9 %	13.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	42.8 %	37.6 %	13.4 %	3.3 %	2.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	32.4 %	38.2 %	19.0 %	5.3 %	5.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.1 %	39.0 %	12.7 %	2.9 %	3.4 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	13.6 %	29.0 %	24.6 %	16.2 %	16.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	22.0 %	35.6 %	20.6 %	12.6 %	9.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	35.9 %	38.3 %	17.0 %	6.5 %	2.2 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	42.6 %	31.9 %	18.8 %	5.4 %	1.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	37.3 %	38.6 %	12.5 %	4.4 %	7.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	20.1 %	28.8 %	19.1 %	15.3 %	16.7 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	32.0 %	34.7 %	18.7 %	10.8 %	3.9 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	31.7 %	34.9 %	17.2 %	8.6 %	7.6 %	14427

**Q26\_8. The Council of the European Union: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	34.1 %	38.0 %	16.8 %	7.0 %	4.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	16.6 %	26.4 %	20.9 %	20.5 %	15.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	32.5 %	34.7 %	15.2 %	5.6 %	12.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	31.7 %	40.8 %	18.7 %	5.8 %	3.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	29.6 %	37.9 %	20.7 %	6.1 %	5.7 %	1133
<b>India</b>	35.5 %	41.3 %	15.6 %	3.5 %	4.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.4 %	25.2 %	28.5 %	17.9 %	17.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	19.3 %	34.7 %	23.1 %	13.0 %	9.8 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	32.0 %	38.8 %	16.7 %	8.1 %	4.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	37.2 %	37.8 %	17.8 %	5.1 %	2.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	27.5 %	40.7 %	15.8 %	5.6 %	10.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	14.4 %	23.5 %	21.7 %	20.5 %	19.8 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	22.8 %	33.3 %	24.5 %	13.8 %	5.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	26.5 %	34.9 %	19.7 %	10.1 %	8.7 %	14427

**Q26\_9. The European Central Bank: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	39.0 %	36.3 %	14.0 %	7.0 %	3.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	22.4 %	28.7 %	17.9 %	17.7 %	13.4 %	1018
<b>China</b>	21.8 %	39.6 %	15.9 %	6.3 %	16.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	32.2 %	41.7 %	15.0 %	8.1 %	3.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	32.3 %	40.0 %	16.9 %	5.6 %	5.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	44.4 %	28.8 %	15.3 %	6.2 %	5.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	14.0 %	25.8 %	25.7 %	16.8 %	17.7 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	25.1 %	35.3 %	21.8 %	8.7 %	8.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	31.9 %	43.8 %	13.8 %	7.9 %	2.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	35.7 %	35.6 %	17.8 %	7.9 %	3.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	31.6 %	36.4 %	17.8 %	5.9 %	8.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	16.8 %	25.0 %	21.3 %	19.4 %	17.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	30.7 %	36.4 %	19.4 %	10.0 %	3.4 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	29.2 %	35.0 %	17.8 %	9.8 %	8.2 %	14427



**Q26\_10. The European Council: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>Definitely yes</b>	<b>Most likely yes</b>	<b>Most likely no</b>	<b>Definitely no</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	26.4 %	37.7 %	21.2 %	9.6 %	5.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	15.0 %	26.4 %	22.9 %	20.4 %	15.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	22.6 %	37.9 %	19.4 %	6.2 %	13.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	26.3 %	39.2 %	23.7 %	6.4 %	4.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	22.9 %	38.4 %	25.0 %	7.2 %	6.4 %	1133
<b>India</b>	35.9 %	35.7 %	18.8 %	5.1 %	4.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	9.3 %	25.0 %	28.9 %	18.2 %	18.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	14.6 %	33.5 %	28.3 %	13.5 %	10.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	25.6 %	39.7 %	20.0 %	11.3 %	3.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	36.4 %	34.7 %	19.6 %	7.4 %	1.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	23.3 %	39.2 %	18.8 %	5.9 %	12.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	13.0 %	26.1 %	22.0 %	20.4 %	18.5 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	23.3 %	34.9 %	23.6 %	12.6 %	5.5 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	22.7 %	34.6 %	22.4 %	11.0 %	9.2 %	14427

**Q27. The European Council: Would you say that you have ever seen, heard or read about...?**

	<b>More or less every day</b>	<b>About once a week</b>	<b>About once a month</b>	<b>Rarely</b>	<b>Never</b>	<b>Do not know/ cannot answer</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	33.3 %	35.6 %	12.9 %	13.7 %	2.7 %	1.8 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	13.3 %	28.4 %	17.0 %	23.6 %	10.1 %	7.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	25.5 %	35.0 %	13.1 %	19.3 %	4.0 %	3.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	35.5 %	39.9 %	12.7 %	10.9 %	0.3 %	0.8 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	25.1 %	31.6 %	13.5 %	26.6 %	2.3 %	1.0 %	1133
<b>India</b>	35.8 %	36.7 %	14.6 %	7.6 %	2.8 %	2.5 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	10.6 %	21.1 %	18.1 %	28.7 %	10.1 %	11.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.3 %	34.2 %	25.1 %	13.8 %	6.0 %	4.6 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	27.9 %	35.6 %	16.1 %	15.7 %	3.2 %	1.5 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	57.1 %	23.3 %	12.9 %	6.4 %	0.1 %	0.1 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	42.8 %	23.3 %	7.7 %	15.7 %	3.7 %	6.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	15.0 %	22.1 %	17.8 %	21.5 %	12.5 %	11.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	29.2 %	31.0 %	18.6 %	16.6 %	2.9 %	1.7 %	1158
<b>Total</b>	28.2 %	30.7 %	15.4 %	17.0 %	4.6 %	4.1 %	14427

**Q28\_1. Online media: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	24.4 %	75.6 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	45.0 %	55.0 %	837
<b>China</b>	29.6 %	70.4 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	33.3 %	66.7 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	15.5 %	84.5 %	1099
<b>India</b>	18.9 %	81.1 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	62.2 %	37.8 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	46.4 %	53.6 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	36.6 %	63.4 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	12.2 %	87.8 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	39.3 %	60.7 %	1020
<b>US</b>	53.6 %	46.4 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	23.2 %	76.8 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	32.8 %	67.2 %	13242

**Q28\_2. Print media: Newspaper and Magazines: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	69.6 %	30.4 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	82.6 %	17.4 %	837
<b>China</b>	75.6 %	24.4 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	67.6 %	32.4 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	74.5 %	25.5 %	1099
<b>India</b>	46.9 %	53.1 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	76.6 %	23.4 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	78.6 %	21.4 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	69.4 %	30.6 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	63.5 %	36.5 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	85.0 %	15.0 %	1020
<b>US</b>	79.4 %	20.6 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	75.4 %	24.6 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	72.1 %	27.9 %	13242

**Q28\_3. Television channels: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	34.9 %	65.1 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	44.7 %	55.3 %	837
<b>China</b>	35.7 %	64.3 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	30.0 %	70.0 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	43.9 %	56.1 %	1099
<b>India</b>	33.3 %	66.7 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	35.9 %	64.1 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	33.9 %	66.1 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	44.1 %	55.9 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	33.1 %	66.9 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	25.1 %	74.9 %	1020
<b>US</b>	52.8 %	47.2 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	34.5 %	65.5 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	36.8 %	63.2 %	13242

**Q28\_4. Entertainment streaming platforms (Youtube, Netflix, others): And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	57.3 %	42.7 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	75.9 %	24.1 %	837
<b>China</b>	73.7 %	26.3 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	52.6 %	47.4 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	56.5 %	43.5 %	1099
<b>India</b>	47.0 %	53.0 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	87.0 %	13.0 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	79.9 %	20.1 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	50.4 %	49.6 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	60.7 %	39.3 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	76.6 %	23.4 %	1020
<b>US</b>	75.3 %	24.7 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	63.4 %	36.6 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	64.8 %	35.2 %	13242

**Q28\_5. The radio: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	88.2 %	11.8 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	82.6 %	17.4 %	837
<b>China</b>	84.4 %	15.6 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	76.1 %	23.9 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	91.6 %	8.4 %	1099
<b>India</b>	81.3 %	18.7 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	93.0 %	7.0 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	88.6 %	11.4 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	87.6 %	12.4 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	72.4 %	27.6 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	81.0 %	19.0 %	1020
<b>US</b>	83.8 %	16.2 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	73.1 %	26.9 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	83.2 %	16.8 %	13242

**Q28\_6. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, others): And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	56.2 %	43.8 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	72.8 %	27.2 %	837
<b>China</b>	63.9 %	36.1 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	43.8 %	56.2 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	47.4 %	52.6 %	1099
<b>India</b>	43.0 %	57.0 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	85.7 %	14.3 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	80.7 %	19.3 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	46.5 %	53.5 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	37.2 %	62.8 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	69.6 %	30.4 %	1020
<b>US</b>	73.5 %	26.5 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	51.9 %	48.1 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	58.2 %	41.8 %	13242



**Q28\_7. School, college, university: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	85.6 %	14.4 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	89.0 %	11.0 %	837
<b>China</b>	88.2 %	11.8 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	80.0 %	20.0 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	83.3 %	16.7 %	1099
<b>India</b>	70.6 %	29.4 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	93.8 %	6.2 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	91.9 %	8.1 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	86.8 %	13.2 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	71.9 %	28.1 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	96.1 %	3.9 %	1020
<b>US</b>	90.6 %	9.4 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	85.0 %	15.0 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	85.2 %	14.8 %	13242

**Q28\_8. Movies, art, literature: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	85.7 %	14.3 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	86.1 %	13.9 %	837
<b>China</b>	78.7 %	21.3 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	69.9 %	30.1 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	73.2 %	26.8 %	1099
<b>India</b>	74.8 %	25.2 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	88.9 %	11.1 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	86.3 %	13.7 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	73.5 %	26.5 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	77.3 %	22.7 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	82.5 %	17.5 %	1020
<b>US</b>	85.1 %	14.9 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	80.5 %	19.5 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	79.7 %	20.3 %	13242

**Q28\_9. The Government: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	84.5 %	15.5 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	89.5 %	10.5 %	837
<b>China</b>	86.6 %	13.4 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	81.1 %	18.9 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	86.5 %	13.5 %	1099
<b>India</b>	76.6 %	23.4 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	94.3 %	5.7 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	92.5 %	7.5 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	87.8 %	12.2 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	79.7 %	20.3 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	83.1 %	16.9 %	1020
<b>US</b>	89.3 %	10.7 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	77.8 %	22.2 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	85.0 %	15.0 %	13242

**Q28\_10. Personal and professional contact with Europeans: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	91.4 %	8.6 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	89.5 %	10.5 %	837
<b>China</b>	94.1 %	5.9 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	86.5 %	13.5 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	93.9 %	6.1 %	1099
<b>India</b>	80.3 %	19.7 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	95.7 %	4.3 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	94.9 %	5.1 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	93.9 %	6.1 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	84.7 %	15.3 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	93.9 %	6.1 %	1020
<b>US</b>	91.7 %	8.3 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	87.0 %	13.0 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	90.4 %	9.6 %	13242

**Q28\_11. The EU delegation in your capital: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	97.8 %	2.2 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	97.1 %	2.9 %	837
<b>China</b>	95.4 %	4.6 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	94.4 %	5.6 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	93.5 %	6.5 %	1099
<b>India</b>	82.2 %	17.8 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	97.9 %	2.1 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	96.7 %	3.3 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	95.7 %	4.3 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	87.4 %	12.6 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	96.7 %	3.3 %	1020
<b>US</b>	96.8 %	3.2 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	92.8 %	7.2 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	94.0 %	6.0 %	13242

**Q28\_12. Other format: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	97.1 %	2.9 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	97.6 %	2.4 %	837
<b>China</b>	94.4 %	5.6 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	94.4 %	5.6 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	96.3 %	3.7 %	1099
<b>India</b>	96.0 %	4.0 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	97.5 %	2.5 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	97.8 %	2.2 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	96.0 %	4.0 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	95.3 %	4.7 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	98.6 %	1.4 %	1020
<b>US</b>	97.6 %	2.4 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	97.5 %	2.5 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	96.6 %	3.4 %	13242

**Q28\_13. Do not know/ cannot answer: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	99.4 %	0.6 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	98.2 %	1.8 %	837
<b>China</b>	98.1 %	1.9 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	99.6 %	0.4 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	99.7 %	0.3 %	1099
<b>India</b>	99.3 %	0.7 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	92.3 %	7.7 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	97.8 %	2.2 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	99.3 %	0.7 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	100.0 %		1005
<b>Russia</b>	98.8 %	1.2 %	1020
<b>US</b>	95.6 %	4.4 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	99.2 %	0.8 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	98.4 %	1.6 %	13242

**Q29. Do not know/ cannot answer: And which of the following best describes the main sources of information where you read or hear about the EU or more generally Europe as a whole?**

	<b>Yes. I have sufficient information</b>	<b>Yes. but I would like to have more information</b>	<b>No. but I would like to have more information</b>	<b>No. but I am not really interested</b>	<b>Base (n)</b>
<b>Brazil</b>	16.8 %	42.7 %	36.7 %	3.8 %	1105
<b>Canada</b>	22.3 %	37.2 %	31.8 %	8.7 %	837
<b>China</b>	9.2 %	35.3 %	37.8 %	17.7 %	1042
<b>Colombia</b>	16.1 %	43.0 %	37.8 %	3.0 %	1093
<b>Indonesia</b>	26.1 %	43.7 %	26.6 %	3.6 %	1099
<b>India</b>	44.1 %	37.2 %	17.6 %	1.1 %	1106
<b>Japan</b>	8.3 %	27.1 %	38.1 %	26.5 %	887
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	16.3 %	32.7 %	35.7 %	15.3 %	936
<b>Mexico</b>	16.2 %	40.9 %	39.8 %	3.0 %	1178
<b>Nigeria</b>	28.0 %	47.9 %	23.4 %	0.7 %	1005
<b>Russia</b>	16.1 %	36.8 %	37.3 %	9.8 %	1020
<b>US</b>	23.2 %	32.2 %	31.9 %	12.7 %	832
<b>South Africa</b>	21.0 %	39.3 %	34.2 %	5.4 %	1102
<b>Total</b>	20.4 %	38.5 %	33.0 %	8.1 %	13242



**Q30\_1. European Film festivals: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	55.0 %	45.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	72.9 %	27.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	61.2 %	38.8 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	59.9 %	40.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	51.2 %	48.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.9 %	57.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	73.4 %	26.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	76.0 %	24.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	53.4 %	46.6 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	49.1 %	50.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	58.1 %	41.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	71.9 %	28.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	54.5 %	45.5 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	59.7 %	40.3 %	14426

**Q30\_2. Joint Sport initiatives: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	68.8 %	31.2 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	82.5 %	17.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	69.0 %	31.0 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	66.7 %	33.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	61.5 %	38.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	56.0 %	44.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	77.9 %	22.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	73.0 %	27.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	68.6 %	31.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	62.8 %	37.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	75.7 %	24.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	81.8 %	18.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	67.7 %	32.3 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	70.0 %	30.0 %	14426

**Q30\_3. Cultural events: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	44.7 %	55.3 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	57.5 %	42.5 %	1018
<b>China</b>	55.9 %	44.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	36.7 %	63.3 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	49.5 %	50.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	42.1 %	57.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	64.9 %	35.1 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	59.9 %	40.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	42.9 %	57.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	57.7 %	42.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	49.6 %	50.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	58.8 %	41.2 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	50.2 %	49.8 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	51.3 %	48.7 %	14426

**Q30\_4. Academic exchanges, scholarships, and opportunities for academic mobility: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	45.0 %	55.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	79.1 %	20.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	70.8 %	29.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	35.5 %	64.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	42.1 %	57.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	57.3 %	42.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	88.5 %	11.5 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	84.7 %	15.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	47.2 %	52.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	28.7 %	71.3 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	81.5 %	18.5 %	1114
<b>US</b>	77.9 %	22.1 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	53.8 %	46.2 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	60.7 %	39.3 %	14426

**Q30\_5. Activities between European and my country people: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	47.3 %	52.7 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	65.7 %	34.3 %	1018
<b>China</b>	60.8 %	39.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	43.4 %	56.6 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	60.5 %	39.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	52.1 %	47.9 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	82.4 %	17.6 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	78.8 %	21.2 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	48.3 %	51.7 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	45.2 %	54.8 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	60.8 %	39.2 %	1114
<b>US</b>	74.4 %	25.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	47.1 %	52.9 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	58.8 %	41.2 %	14426

**Q30\_6. Getting information about EU policies: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	72.0 %	28.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	83.0 %	17.0 %	1018
<b>China</b>	83.5 %	16.5 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	75.5 %	24.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	71.7 %	28.3 %	1133
<b>India</b>	68.0 %	32.0 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	91.6 %	8.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	84.1 %	15.9 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	83.9 %	16.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	61.8 %	38.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	89.3 %	10.7 %	1114
<b>US</b>	83.7 %	16.3 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	74.8 %	25.2 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	78.7 %	21.3 %	14426

**Q30\_7. Getting information on how to live in Europe: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	52.9 %	47.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	75.4 %	24.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	81.7 %	18.3 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	44.8 %	55.2 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	63.5 %	36.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	59.9 %	40.1 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	94.1 %	5.9 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	83.0 %	17.0 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	55.6 %	44.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	48.6 %	51.4 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	55.0 %	45.0 %	1114
<b>US</b>	83.4 %	16.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	55.9 %	44.1 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	65.5 %	34.5 %	14426

**Q30\_8. Getting information on how to invest or do business in Europe: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	64.0 %	36.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	86.1 %	13.9 %	1018
<b>China</b>	82.8 %	17.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	59.6 %	40.4 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	65.8 %	34.2 %	1133
<b>India</b>	65.8 %	34.2 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	92.2 %	7.8 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	86.6 %	13.4 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	69.7 %	30.3 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	45.3 %	54.7 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	80.6 %	19.4 %	1114
<b>US</b>	90.4 %	9.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	59.0 %	41.0 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	72.8 %	27.2 %	14426



**Q30\_9. Getting information on how to travel to Europe: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	59.0 %	41.0 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	60.8 %	39.2 %	1018
<b>China</b>	67.9 %	32.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	49.1 %	50.9 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	61.9 %	38.1 %	1133
<b>India</b>	57.3 %	42.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	75.0 %	25.0 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	58.9 %	41.1 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	56.2 %	43.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	52.0 %	48.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	46.7 %	53.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	72.1 %	27.9 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	55.6 %	44.4 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	59.4 %	40.6 %	14426

**Q30\_10. Online initiatives open to my country: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	66.1 %	33.9 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	78.4 %	21.6 %	1018
<b>China</b>	62.8 %	37.2 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	60.9 %	39.1 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	70.1 %	29.9 %	1133
<b>India</b>	60.7 %	39.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	88.6 %	11.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	89.5 %	10.5 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	66.2 %	33.8 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	46.8 %	53.2 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	63.1 %	36.9 %	1114
<b>US</b>	87.4 %	12.6 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	50.0 %	50.0 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	68.4 %	31.6 %	14426

**Q30\_11. Others (please specify): In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	98.5 %	1.5 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	99.2 %	0.8 %	1018
<b>China</b>	99.9 %	0.1 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	96.5 %	3.5 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	99.2 %	0.8 %	1133
<b>India</b>	98.3 %	1.7 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	99.6 %	0.4 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	98.7 %	1.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	98.9 %	1.1 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	99.0 %	1.0 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	99.7 %	0.3 %	1114
<b>US</b>	99.0 %	1.0 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	99.0 %	1.0 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	98.9 %	1.1 %	14426

**Q30\_12. None of these: In which of the following activities related to the EU or Europe more generally would you be interested in taking part in?**

	Unchecked	Checked	Base (n)
<b>Brazil</b>	95.9 %	4.1 %	1150
<b>Canada</b>	80.9 %	19.1 %	1018
<b>China</b>	86.6 %	13.4 %	1108
<b>Colombia</b>	99.0 %	1.0 %	1106
<b>Indonesia</b>	97.5 %	2.5 %	1133
<b>India</b>	96.7 %	3.3 %	1145
<b>Japan</b>	68.8 %	31.2 %	1126
<b>Republic of Korea</b>	84.7 %	15.3 %	1030
<b>Mexico</b>	96.6 %	3.4 %	1227
<b>Nigeria</b>	99.1 %	0.9 %	1012
<b>Russia</b>	89.4 %	10.6 %	1114
<b>US</b>	75.6 %	24.4 %	1100
<b>South Africa</b>	95.9 %	4.1 %	1157
<b>Total</b>	89.9 %	10.1 %	14426



## **UPDATE OF THE 2015 PERCEPTION STUDY:**

### **Annex III: Comparative traditional media report**

**CONTENTS**


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## List of abbreviations

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AFP: Agence France-Presse

AI: Artificial Intelligence

AP: Associated Press

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AZ: Astra Zeneca

BTIA: Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement

CDRI: Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure

CEPA: Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

COVAX: The COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility

CPTPP: Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

EAEU: the Eurasian Economic Union

EC: European Commission

ECB: European Central Bank

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

EMA: European Medicines Agency

EU: European Union

FTA: Free Trade Agreement

HR: High Representative For Foreign Affairs And Security

QUAD: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

RED II: Renewable Energy Directive II

RST: Research, Science and Technologies

WHO: World Health Organization

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## Executive Summary

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Agenda-setting, traditional media (76 leading media) observed in the 2021 Update Study demonstrate a varying level of interest in reporting on the EU and Europe across the 13 countries and across media outlets in those countries. The greatest total amount of articles across the six media outlets in Republic of Korea (1454) is almost five times bigger than the total amount of articles published in South Africa (296). The median number of articles (825) is published by media in Mexico. In 2021, the key themes for the media coverage of the EU and Europe are *politics, economy, and health*. EU-related reports in the issue-area of health gain prominence in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic – a new development in comparison to the 2015 media profile of the EU.

Similar to 2015, EU press coverage is significantly impacted by crises. In 2021, the EU's responses to the Covid crisis – global, regional, and local – have gained high visibility in the media under observation. The press framed the EU and Europe in the context of the pandemic in a mixed manner, leaning more to negative evaluations of EU actions. Negative assessments dominate the coverage of the vaccine rollout in the EU and the overall handling of the pandemic within EU borders. When EU actions in this issue-area are seen to hurt the 13 partner countries (e.g., a "Europe First" approach to the vaccine access), reports again project negative profiles of the EU. More positive assessments of the EU are visible when EU actions are reported to help the locations to fight Covid-19. The strong negative charge assigned to the EU by influential agenda-setting and opinion-forming media outlets in the context of the Covid-19 across borders and media outlets, challenges the image resilience of the EU, currently and in the future. The press coverage in the new strategic partner countries (Nigeria, Indonesia, Colombia) and India tends to present the EU in a positive light across the thematic frames. Negative emotive charge in EU reportage is most prevalent in Russian media.

The pandemic also has brought to prominence the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which in 2021 has become the third most reported EU institution (after the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB)). Strong visibility of the EC and the ECB in 2021 is also because of the role of these institutions in shaping the EU's responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. The EC and ECB leaders are among the most visible EU officials.

Media analysis indicates a growing overlap and a mixture of themes ("blending of themes") in the press reporting on the EU. For example, news about trade agreements with the EU is framed as a part of political and normative themes set in bilateral and/or regional cooperation contexts; the Covid-19 pandemic is discussed in the context of its impact on bilateral economic relations; vaccine certification by the EU is framed as a political issue; research, science, and innovation topics are reported in the context of healthcare innovations; energy, climate and environmental issues tend to be reported either in combination or in the context of development, trade and the economy.

Germany and France remain the two EU Member States most covered by the press. Their respective leaders are mentioned in several countries more often than the leaders of EU institutions.

Compared to EU press coverage, articles discussing Europe present a higher share of news that focuses on culture (observed across all the 13 countries in the study). In other respects, Europe-related publications follow the same pattern as EU-related news. News on the EU can include a strong local hook, combine the local hook with the presentation of perspective on EU actions, but can also focus on EU or Member States as external actors.

## Introduction

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Annex III presents the main findings of the content analysis of the news reporting on the EU and Europe in reputable newspapers in 13 key partner countries: Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, and the US observed from 1 February to 30 April 2021. The structure of this Annex follows the logic of the key indicators – it presents the aggregated analysis across 13 countries focusing on the media portrayals of the EU and Europe in terms of visibility, actorness, normative power, local resonance, and emotive charge.

The detailed description of the methods employed for this task can be found in the Final Report, section 2.2.

The quantitative analysis was carried out by PPMI to identify general trends in the sample of 35,293 press articles published by 76 media outlets in 13 countries. The articles collected during the observation period in local languages in each country form two subsets: the "EU" dataset (10,986 articles in total) and the "Europe" dataset (24,307 articles in total).

The two samples are generated by using the Factiva repository and its' internal search engine which provides wider access to more than 32,000 sources worldwide in 28 languages and it has the most relevant traditional media sources from the old and new strategic partner countries. For the methodological continuity with the 2015 Update Study, only the articles are published in physical as well as electronic versions in the current Update Study. Factiva serves as a database for sample collection and has integrated automated categorization technologies and filters which allowed to extract required articles in PDF format. Text scraping and analysis were then conducted with the help of the Python programming language and the findings in excel format were sorted and presented in a visual format.

Search terms for the "EU" dataset are: "European Union", "EU", "European Commission", "European Parliament", "Court of Justice of the European Union", "EU presidency", "EU Council", "European Council", "Council of the European Union", "Eurozone", "European Central Bank", "European Investment Bank", "European Medicines Agency". The search terms for the dataset "Europe" are "Europe", "European", and "Europeans". The search terms for "EU" and "Europe" datasets consider both plural and singular forms as well as possible grammatical forms of the search terms in the local languages. The "Europe" dataset excludes articles containing any of the "EU" dataset keywords. Findings from the two datasets are presented separately throughout this Annex – firstly, focusing on the media framing of the EU, its policies, and institutions, and secondly, focusing exclusively on Europe.

The **sample for qualitative media analysis** in each country represents a subset of articles collected for the quantitative analysis. This sample focuses on the same three newspapers observed in the 2015 Baseline Study to ensure a comparative longitudinal insight (for ten countries in the study): these three outlets include two popular influential dailies and one business daily in each location. The qualitative analysis engages with the articles that report the EU and its institutions as the central theme/subject. The average number of articles in the qualitative in-depth content analysis is 67 per country in the observed period. The qualitative media analysis was coordinated by the PD-PCF, University of Canterbury, and conducted by Country Experts and their research teams in the partner countries in May 2021.

In total, the 2021 Update Study observes 76 reputable newspapers quantitatively and 39 newspapers qualitatively. The list of the news outlets selected for quantitative and qualitative media analysis is presented in Table 6.

TABLE 6. NEWSPAPERS USED FOR TRADITIONAL MEDIA ANALYSIS

Country	INCLUDED IN QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS SAMPLE IN 2021 (OBSERVED IN 2015)			INCLUDED ONLY IN QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS SAMPLE IN 2021		
	Newspaper 1 - Popular Prestigious	Newspaper 2 - Popular Prestigious	Newspaper 3 – Business oriented	Newspaper 4	Newspaper 5	Newspaper 6
Brazil	<i>O Globo</i>	<i>Folha de São Paulo</i>	<i>Valor Economico</i>	<i>Estado de São Paulo</i>	<i>Correio Braziliense</i>	<i>Zero Hora</i>
Canada	<i>The Globe and Mail</i>	<i>Calgary Herald</i>	<i>The National Post</i>	<i>The Toronto Star</i>	<i>Journal de Montréal</i>	<i>Vancouver Sun</i>
China	<i>People's Daily</i>	<i>Global Times</i>	<i>Reference News*</i>	<i>Beijing News</i>	<i>China Business News</i>	<i>China Youth Daily</i>
Colombia	<i>El Espectador</i>	<i>El Pais</i>	<i>Portafolio</i>	<i>El Tiempo</i>	<i>El Heraldo</i>	<i>El Nuevo Siglo</i>
India	<i>The Times of India</i>	<i>The Hindu</i>	<i>The Economic Times</i>	<i>The Hindustan Times</i>	<i>Indian Express</i>	<i>The Telegraph</i>
Indonesia	<i>The Jakarta Post</i>	<i>Antara</i>	<i>Investor Daily</i>	<i>Jawa Pos National Network (JPNN)</i>	<i>Koran Tempo</i>	<i>Indonesia Government News</i>
Japan	<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	<i>Nikkei Shimbun*</i>	<i>Tokyo Shimbun</i>	<i>Mainichi Shimbun</i>	<i>Sankei Shimbun</i>
Mexico	<i>La Jornada</i>	<i>El Universal</i>	<i>El Financiero</i>	<i>Reforma</i>	<i>El Economista</i>	<i>Milenio</i>
Nigeria	<i>This Day</i>	<i>Vanguard</i>	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>Business Day</i>	<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>The Sun</i>
Russia	<i>Rossiyskaya Gazeta</i>	<i>Kommersant</i>	<i>Vedomosti</i>	<i>Izvestia</i>	<i>Nezavisimaya Gazeta</i>	<i>Novaya Gazeta</i>
South Africa	<i>The Citizen (Replaced The Star)</i>	<i>TimesLIVE (formerly The Times outlet)</i>	<i>Business Day</i>	<i>Mail &amp; Guardian</i>	<i>Sowetan</i>	<i>The Sunday Times</i>
Republic of Korea	<i>The Chosun Ilbo</i>	<i>JoongAng Ilbo</i>	<i>Dong-A Ilbo</i>	<i>Maeil Business Newspaper</i>	<i>Hankook Ilbo</i>	<i>Busan Ilbo</i>
US	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>Washington Post</i>	<i>The Wall Street Journal</i>	<i>USA today</i>	<i>New York Post</i>	<i>Los Angeles Times</i>

Note: \*Not included in quantitative but analysed by an expert in qualitative analysis.

Given a larger sample in 2021 (76 newspapers in 2021 vs. 30 newspapers in the 2015 study and a tighter timeframe (9 months in 2021 vs. 12 months in 2015), the Update Study pursues an approach based on **two innovations**: (1) a combination of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media samples from each of the 13 countries; (2) comparative quantitative analysis of EU vs. Europe coverage by traditional media and EU coverage in social media observed in the same period (see Annex IV: Comparative Social Media Report). The media analysis aims to identify the **drivers behind higher EU visibility** in the influential international press. The drivers are classified as *EU- and EU Member States-related, location- or region-specific, and global*. As agreed with the Steering Committee, the observation period for traditional and social media was from 1 February 2021 to 30 April 2021 (see Section 2.2.4 of the Final Report for more details on social media).

# 1. Visibility

## 1.4. EU

Across all locations, the coverage of the EU during the period of observation is dominated by the unprecedented global crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic has captured global media attention given its newsworthiness, drama and tragedy, a threat to domestic audiences, global reach, and recurrent dangerous development. From 2020, news media around the world assign major visibility to reports on Covid at national, regional, and international levels. The overall visibility of Covid reinforces the EU's high media visibility within this theme. The analysis demonstrates that Covid-related reports on the EU are influenced by a set of factors – *EU* and *EU Member States-specific*, *location-* and *region-specific*, and finally *global*. Covid-related coverage of the EU in each of the contexts (*EU-specific*, *location-specific* and *global*) feature the EU ambiguously with a mix of negative, neutral, and positive assessments, but with high visibility.

Volume (quantitative analysis)

Quantitative media analysis tracks the main patterns in the EU's visibility in the press. Table 7 presents the volume of EU-related articles identified in each country during the period of observation. The sample of EU-related articles includes all identified materials containing at least one of the following keywords in the respective languages: *European Union*; *EU*; *European Commission*; *European Parliament*; *Court of Justice of the European Union*; *EU Presidency*; *EU Council*; *European Council*; *Council of the European Union*; *Eurozone*; *European Central Bank*; *European Investment Bank*; *European Medicines Agency*.

Republic of Korea followed by Canada, Russia, and Japan (see Figure 21 and Table 7) share the highest volume of EU-related news in this sample.

**TABLE 7. VOLUME OF THE NEWS ACROSS THE OBSERVED OUTLETS AND COUNTRIES IN THE "EU" DATASET**

	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA	COLOMBIA	INDIA	INDO-NESIA	JAPAN	MEXICO	NIGERIA	RUSSIA	SOUTH AFRICA	REPUB LIC OF KOREA	US
<b>Popular 1</b>	185	451	41	125	117	82	259	104	129	217	98	148	322
<b>Popular 2</b>	237	84	385	99	78	296	268	65	148	308	84	378	187
<b>Business</b>	114	195	25*	43	122	14	25*	221	142	107	78	172	295
<b>Newspa per 4</b>	95	294	25	10	248	59	187	52	51	134	20	314	26
<b>Newspa per 5</b>	141	25	338	19	51	11	195	188	32	308	15	357	27
<b>Newspa per 6</b>	49	92	103	246	120	28	222	195	73	51	1	85	59

### Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

<b>Total</b>	821	1141	892	584	736	490	1131	825	575	1125	296	1454	916
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**Source:** Sourced from the Factiva repository and the 2015 Study. For 2021, data was gathered by PPMI between 1 February to 30 April 2021.

Note: \**Pressreader* was missing 11 news sources, so *Factiva* was chosen to replace it, which was only missing two sources. To ensure the sound methodology stemming from the Baseline Study, experts in Japan and China evaluated the missing newspapers qualitatively. The sample of these media sources is 25, but it is not accounted towards the totals in the quantitative analysis sample.


**TABLE 8. VOLUME OF THE EU NEWS FOR 3 NEWS OUTLETS IN 2015 AND 2021**

	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA	COLOMBIA	INDIA	INDONESIA	JAPAN	MEXICO	NIGERIA	RUSSIA	SOUTH AFRICA	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	US
<b>2015</b>	573	598	480	-	310	-	750	551	-	509	251	340	685
<b>2021</b>	536	730	764	267	317	392	749	390	419	632	260	698	804
<b>Change (%)</b>	-6.5	22.1	59.2	-	2.3	-	-0.1	-29.2	-	24.2	3.6	205.3	17.4


**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository and the 2015 Study. For 2021, data was gathered by PPMI between 1 February to 30 April 2021.

Figure 21 presents the total monthly volume of the EU-related articles in each country under observation. The EU news dataset contains 10,946 articles in total. The highest volume of EU-related news is registered in March 2021 (36.4%) followed by April (32.6%) and February (31%). The coverage of the EU is not distributed equally among outlets in the sample – every location has one or two outlets leading in the coverage of the EU (Figure 21).

**FIGURE 21. VOLUME OF NEWS ITEMS WITH A REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (NO. ARTICLES)**



### Annex III. Comparative traditional media report



**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

To fine-tune the assessment of the *visibility* indicator, the quantitative assessment of EU press volume is complemented by the analysis of the **degree of centrality** in reporting on the EU, i.e. identifying reports where the EU and its institutions and policies are assigned a **major degree of intensity in representation** (Figure 22). Company coding is applied in the Factiva toolkit using extraction technology. It works by analysing a predetermined amount of text and extracting the text strings identified as EU institutions, which are then compared with contextual information in the article, thus determining whether the focus is on selected institutions, or it has only a secondary role in the article. Among the 13 countries under observation, the press in Mexico (35%), Japan (38%), and Colombia (40%) tend to assign the major degree of centrality to the EU and its policies the most. South Africa (7%) and Indonesia (3%) share the least number of reports the EU is a major topic in.



FIGURE 22. DEGREE OF CENTRALITY IN THE "EU" DATASET



Source: Sourced from the Factiva repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

### Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

To further understand the media visibility of the EU and its policies and identifying the factors driving higher visibility of the EU in media, we undertake a **qualitative analysis**, which focuses on EU reportage where the EU has a **higher degree of centrality**. We engage with the categories of placement and length for EU news that reports the EU as a major topic and track the drivers of visibility of the EU when a higher media profile appears (see Table 9 for the sample size of the qualitative analysis).

**TABLE 9. VOLUME OF ARTICLES PORTRAYING EU AS A CENTRAL SUBJECT (QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS SAMPLE)**

	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA	COLOMBIA	INDIA	INDO- NESIA	JAPAN	MEXICO	NIGERIA	RUSSIA	SOUTH AFRICA	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	US
<b>Popular 1</b>	19	27	10	15	13	12	24	34	15	18	19	27	41
<b>Popular 2</b>	36	1	43	12	4	31	29	30	21	13	16	48	13
<b>Business</b>	42	31	25	6	15	4	25	70	12	18	9	32	46
<b>Total</b>	97	59	78	33	32	47	78	134	48	49	44	107	100

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

#### Placement (qualitative analysis findings)

Assessment of visibility of the EU as a major subject of reportage also engages with the assessment of the reportage's *placement*, further informing the analysis of the factors behind the EU's raised media profile. There is no one definitive pattern in the *placement* of news about the EU with the major degree of centrality. In some countries, the EU press articles reported the EU as a major topic in 2021 (perhaps rather predictably) is often placed in 'international/world/foreign news' sections (e.g., *Valor* in Brazil, *People's Daily* in China, *Kommersant* in Russia, in newspapers in Colombia, US, Mexico, Republic of Korea). The EU news of higher visibility is also located in the 'current events' sections (*Global Times* in China). Typically, this placement features a portrayal of the EU in the *EU*-, *EU Member States*-, *3rd country-specific* and *global* contexts. When EU actions are reported with a "local hook" – either in political or socio-economic contexts – "politics", "economy/finance", "health" or "environment" sections often host EU news (e.g. in Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, India). Such placement tends to attract the attention of readers who are more interested in domestic news and not necessarily in international news. As one exception, China's *Reference News* places EU news into ten different sections. The EU news that reports the EU as a major topic is also dispersed across various sections in the Indian sample. Finally, in few locations, news about the EU is posted in sections that express opinions/debates: the EU is reported in "opinions" or "events and comments" sections in Russia (*Kommersant* and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* respectively) and the "opinion" section in Indonesia (*The Jakarta Post* in particular). In many business newspapers, the EU news with higher intensity in EU representation is not restricted to the sections on economy/trade/finances but often reported in the sections dealing with international affairs/world. Noteworthy, in some locations it was business dailies that has more and in-depth coverage of the EU than the popular prestigious newspapers (Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico). Country-specific preferences in placing news about the EU provide input for media outreach by EU communicators on the ground – journalists and editors who write for/edit those sections may be more interested in maintaining dialogue with EU Delegation discussing those key topics.

#### Length (qualitative analysis)

### Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

Given that qualitative media analysis focuses on articles that portray the EU as a major actor, we expected the sample to have longer articles, and it was confirmed after research. The articles reporting on the EU tend to be longer or at least of average length (assessed by Country Experts in the context of their country-specific media conventions). Longer articles tend to provide more space to explain/educate readers. They also send a signal of salience to the readers – if it is reported, it must be important; if it is reported as a longer piece, it must be more important.

#### Drivers behind EU visibility (qualitative analysis)

The Update Study qualitative content analysis reveals that the EU's higher visibility is largely driven by the *EU- and location-specific* factors, and their combination. EU-related news articles dealing with the topics of Covid, or climate change/environment also reveal *global* factors in action. In contrast, *region-specific* and *3rd country-specific* factors, while being detected, are not the leading drivers behind higher visibility of the EU.

In the 2015 Baseline Study, the *EU-specific* drivers of the migration crisis, the spike in the Eurozone crisis (in Greece), and political crisis (the UK's decision to hold Brexit referendum) triggered a more visible profile of the EU. In 2021, the Covid crisis is the main driver behind the EU's heightened visibility in the leading local newspapers. Unlike the coverage of the 2015 crises, the coverage of the EU in the context of Covid is triggered by a tri-factor of drivers – *EU-specific*, *location-specific*, and *global* factors acting against each other – with highly emotive charges attached to each factor.

Specifically, in the qualitative analysis sample, the EU's handling of the pandemic inside the EU and its actions with/concerning the EU Member States is an *EU-specific* driver. Both positive and negative frames of the EU are observed in press coverage. The EU reportage related to advancement with vaccines for its citizens, signs of normalisation of life in Europe, or demonstration of solidarity inside the EU is positive. It is negative when reports contemplate the failure of EU policies to fight the virus within EU borders and achieve internal consensus with the EU Member States. Media in some locations (e.g. Russia, China, Republic of Korea) focus their reportage on the problems with vaccination, vaccine shortages, and internal discord surrounding vaccine supplies to the EU. Dailies in Mexico, China, Republic of Korea, Japan, the US, Canada report on EU Member States, which began the Covid vaccination with Russian produced vaccine Sputnik V in violation of EU medicine registration procedures (Hungary).

The EU gets a major negative Covid-related coverage in the Brazilian press. It is presented as a rather ineffective actor, facing problems with vaccine procurement (disputes with the UK and AstraZeneca (AZ) for delays in vaccine supplies); vaccine registration process (delays with the European Medical Agency (EMA) approval of Johnson & Johnson and Janssen vaccines, exclusion of Sputnik V from the EU vaccination strategy while approving AZ); slow vaccine rollout; and restrictions on the use of AZ by certain EU Member States. In Mexico, the news linked to the difficulties around the reliability of the AZ vaccine and the Hungarian approach to the Sputnik V vaccine triggers major attention. Overall, the EU coverage in Mexican press is the most focused on the EU in the context of Covid, with the primary coverage concentrating on different aspects of EU policies addressing the Covid pandemic (69 articles cover the EU as a major and secondary subject). Most of the articles either are mixed or negative in tone. EU internal health policies received a more negative evaluation in the US media than its external health-related actions. A more neutral image appears in Colombian press, with news predominantly focusing on vaccination campaigns in the EU. The "Digital Green Pass" (EU travel pass issued after full vaccination) attracts attention in Russia, Brazil, and Republic of Korea.

The *location-specific* factors are also driving the EU's higher visibility in the context of Covid. We observe positive and negative frames again. News media report on the EU's assistance in vaccine administration in Nigeria and its region with highly positive assessments, yet EU restrictions on the export of vaccines to Mexico is covered in an intensely negative light. The decision by the European Medicines Agency not to register Chinese and Russian vaccines is framed in these countries as the EU reactions to human rights violations in the two countries. The Chinese and Russian media argue this move to disadvantage, not just China and Russia, but also the EU citizens.

## Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

More generally, the EU vaccine export regime has been viewed strongly negatively. Likewise, *global* factors also add to the higher visibility of the EU in the Covid context. The alleged EU “vaccine nationalism” on the global stage was framed in a highly negative manner.

### ***EU-specific factors***

Outside of the Covid theme, the *EU-specific* factors that drive higher visibility of the EU and its policies in all locations concerned the Green Deal and the EU’s climate mitigation/environment protection/green technology. The EU’s external action also attracted higher visibility. High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security (HR) Josep Borrell’s visit to Moscow triggered negative visibility of the EU in some media in this study. In addition, the *EU Member States-specific focus* is an important driver to raise the EU’s visibility. In some countries, e.g., Brazil, the *EU Member States-specific focus* is the leading driver in this respect.

### ***Location-specific factors***

As discussed above, the *location-specific* factors in the Covid context are among the most influential drivers behind the heightened visibility of the EU. Beyond this theme, political and/or normative conflicts in bilateral relations drive the EU’s visibility considering their importance for some locations and often with negative valence. This driver is the most pronounced in China and Russia, with the leading press exhibiting a framing of the EU similar to each other – i.e., both oppose EU political normative messages/actions, specifically on human rights. EU actions are framed as inappropriate interference in the matters of national sovereignty.

In several other locations, the EU’s interactions with the location in the context of major trade agreements increase the EU’s visibility. Yet, different country contexts and different stages in the trade negotiations mean that while the factor is shared across countries, the nuanced framing behind it remains *location specific*. For example, in Brazil, the EU’s higher visibility is linked to the resistance within the EU to ratify the EU-MERCOSUR agreement, which is portrayed as a reasonable response to Bolsonaro’s environmental track record. The EU’s evaluation is positive in this case. Coverage of the prolonged EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations are assessed neutrally, yet less negative than in the 2015 Study and with a positive outlook should a deal be agreed upon. Finally, EU actions towards countries in the context of climate change/environment protection also trigger higher media visibility of the EU. Often, the *climate and environment* theme overlap with themes such as *economy, research, science, and technology (RST) and energy*. In most of these reports, the EU is framed positively across the countries (with some reservations in Russia’s case, see below section on Actorness).

### ***Region-specific factors***

*Region-specific* drivers are more important in some locations than in others. For example, Nigerian coverage of the EU as a major subject in the regional context of fighting Covid and in a wider regional security context shows EU actions in Nigeria’s immediate region and raises EU visibility. EU-India bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region is a driver behind the EU’s higher coverage in India. The theme of connectivity is visible in India too.

### ***3<sup>rd</sup> country specific factors***

*3<sup>rd</sup>-country* specific focus has a marginal input into the EU’s media visibility. Reports on the EU’s actions/positions vis-à-vis the US, China and Russia are the most typical.

### ***Global factors***

*Global* factors such as Covid trigger EU visibility in combination with *location-* and *EU-specific* factors, and specifically in the context of the Covid pandemic and climate/environment (see above). Beyond Covid-19, the international press under observations comments on the EU’s global role as a leading actor in climate mitigation and environmental protection. However, the volume of such news is relatively low (contrary to the expectations in the light of the EU’s Green Deal).

## SUMMARY

Thematic frames of the EU news related to the Covid-19 pandemic are highly visible, polarising, and often triggered by more than one factor and in combination with each other. These frames have a higher capability to influence audience imagination momentarily and cumulatively over time and leave lasting EU images. The 2015 high-visibility coverage of the EU was also led by *location-* and *EU-specific* factors and their combination. In the 2015 Baseline Study, *EU-specific* factors (multiple EU crises in particular) were framed by external media as specific to the EU, while the rest of the world, including media in the ten Strategic Partners, observed the unfolding dramas from some distance. In contrast, the 2021 Update Study points to the tri-factor of drivers in the new crisis of the Covid pandemic. It means that *EU-specific* factors driving the higher visibility of the EU in the context of Covid are no longer “reserved” for the EU inside the EU but are framed to have direct consequences in all locations. The EU’s crises (Covid) no longer affect only the EU but have the potential to impact others. Further, in the 2021 Update Study, the role of *global* factors is much more pronounced. The EU has a global impact fighting the pandemic (ambivalent framing) and globally leading climate mitigation and environmental protection (neutral to positive framing).

### 1.1. Europe

The total volume of the news articles covering Europe is higher compared to the number of articles covering the EU (69% of the overall sample of the news referencing the “EU” and “Europe” keywords in the former case vs. 31% in the latter) across all 13 countries (Table 10). Similar to the pattern of visibility identified in the “EU” dataset, the highest number of articles referencing “Europe”-related keywords (2,847) – was identified in Republic of Korea media, followed by Canada (2,721), Mexico (2,662) and the US (2,525). The total number of articles in the “Europe” dataset is 24,356.

**TABLE 10. VOLUME OF THE NEWS ACROSS THE OBSERVED OUTLETS AND COUNTRIES IN THE “EUROPE” DATASET**

	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA	COLOMBIA	INDIA	INDO- NESIA	JAPAN	MEXICO	NIGERIA	RUSSIA	SOUTH AFRICA	REPUB LIC OF KOREA	US
<b>Popular 1</b>	389	974	59	186	465	60	479	374	573	524	384	312	849
<b>Popular 2</b>	438	217	347	391	153	964	434	367	410	395	308	608	561
<b>Business</b>	94	393	25*	67	461	52	25*	301	540	132	210	273	670
<b>Newspa per 1</b>	83	647	43	98	508	405	332	442	196	156	58	922	110
<b>Newspa per 2</b>	63	255	432	67	120	34	203	338	115	243	35	488	90
<b>Newspa per 3</b>	89	235	136	353	541	39	241	840	277	82	88	244	245
<b>Total</b>	<b>1156</b>	<b>2721</b>	<b>1017</b>	<b>1162</b>	<b>2248</b>	<b>1554</b>	<b>1689</b>	<b>2662</b>	<b>2111</b>	<b>1532</b>	<b>1083</b>	<b>2847</b>	<b>2525</b>

### Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

Note: \**Pressreader* was missing 11 news sources, so *Factiva* was chosen to replace it, which was only missing two sources. To ensure the sound methodology stemming from the Baseline Study, experts in Japan and China evaluated these newspapers qualitatively. The sample of these media sources was 25, but it is not accounted towards the totals in the quantitative analysis sample.


**TABLE 11. VOLUME OF EUROPE NEWS FOR 3 NEWS OUTLETS IN 2015 AND 2021**

	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA	COLOMBIA	INDIA	INDO-NESIA	JAPAN	MEXICO	NIGERIA	RUSSIA	SOUTH AFRICA	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	US
<b>2015</b>	286	694	1176	-	449	-	1216	372	-	668	200	929	362
<b>2021</b>	921	1584	838	644	1079	1076	1154	1042	1523	1051	902	1193	2080
<b>Change (%)</b>	322	228.2	-28.7	-	240.3	-	-5.4	280.1	-	57.3	451	28.4	574.6

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository and 2015 study. For 2021 data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

Similar to the visibility of the EU, the volume of news focusing exclusively on Europe is uneven across the period of observation and across monitored newspapers (Figure 3). Repeating the pattern of the EU-focused coverage, the highest volume of Europe-related news coverage is observed in March (36.4% of total news volume), followed by April (34.8%) and February (28.8%). Based on quantitative analysis findings, newspapers with higher-than-average interest in Europe-related news can be identified in ten out of thirteen countries.

FIGURE 23. VOLUME OF NEWS ITEMS WITH A REFERENCE TO EUROPE (NO. ARTICLES)



Source: Sourced from the Factiva repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

## 2. Actorness

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
### 2.1. EU

The present analysis evaluates EU actorness in the “EU” and “Europe” datasets by employing quantitative analysis to identify the thematic scope of EU- and Europe-related news articles. The analysis in 2.1. section proceeds with a discussion of the EU media framing in each of the themes in the articles selected for qualitative analysis. The thematic framework employed for this study includes the following themes: *economy and trade; politics; normative, climate and environment, energy, research, science and technology (RST), development and assistance, social, health*. Theme-specific keywords define each thematic category. Three rules are applied to identify the press article relevancy to a given theme in the quantitative analysis: 1) theme-specific keyword mentioned within the first 130 words of the press articles text; 2) theme-specific keyword mentioned within one sentence before or after the “EU” keyword in the text 3) several theme-specific keywords mentioned throughout the text. If at least one rule was satisfied, the article was assigned to the relevant theme.

The quantitative analysis demonstrates that *health, economy, and politics* are the three most covered themes in EU-related news articles in all 13 countries. News coverage in Republic of Korea, Japan, Russia, and China demonstrates a considerable interest in cultural topics like sports, arts in European Union. EU press coverage in Russia stands out due to a significant share of *energy* thematic frame (10%) compared to other countries. China is the only country that has a more balanced share of themes in all traditional media outlets. (Figure 24).



FIGURE 24. THEMATIC AREAS COVERED IN THE “EU” DATASET (SHARE OF THE TOTAL NO. ARTICLES)



**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data. Due to methodology one article can be coded as discussing several themes.

Qualitative analysis of the EU news that reported the EU as a major topic confirms that the thematic area of *health* – specifically, EU news related to the Covid-19 pandemic – is the leading theme in the reportage of the EU. In the section below, we elaborate upon all themes which attract a higher degree of intensity in reporting on the EU following the list of themes that guide the Update Study (see Final report section 2.1.3). The *main trend in reporting on the EU* with a high degree of intensity is a growing overlap and mixture of themes, e.g. trade agreements are framed as part of political and regional cooperation, the Covid pandemic is treated in the context of its economic impact, vaccine certification is framed as a political issue, research, science and technology are reported on the context of innovations in the health sector, energy and environmental issues tend to be framed together or in the context of development, trade and the economy.

### 2.1.1. Economy and trade

Despite the Covid pandemic becoming the key factor in the EU coverage in the 2021 qualitative analysis media sample, the EU's visibility in the *economy* press coverage remains high.

Unlike the 2015 Study, most reports of EU economic activities in 2021 portray the EU as using economic means to ensure progress in the areas of climate and environment and technological breakthroughs. For the Nigerian press, the EU's green economic growth, agri-business, and green recovery receive a visible profile. In Brazil, resistance by the EU Member States to ratify the EU-MERCOSUR agreement because of Brazil's current government resistance to setting tougher targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions receives considerable and positive media attention. In the Colombian media, globally relevant themes of the economy are closely linked to sustainable agriculture and the Green Deal, which are seen to impact Colombia.

In some locations, the media framing links trade and economic relations to strategic cooperation with the EU. In Russian media, economy and trade relations with the EU are framed positively, with their importance highlighted (particularly when the potential for EU-EAEU (the Eurasian Economic Union) cooperation is discussed). Yet, economy and trade relations are also presented as dependent on the state of EU-Russia political relations at large. Media outlets in India portray the EU-India trade deal as a step towards stronger cooperation on a regional geostrategic level – in light of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region for successful maritime trade.

Major trade agreements between the EU and the locations in question boost the EU's media visibility. For example, negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in Indonesia and negotiations on a trade deal to replace the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) in India contribute to the EU's higher media profile in the respective countries. Importantly, while these negotiations are reported as protracted, they receive positive assessments regarding potential benefits the agreements may bring to these two countries, e.g., trade, investment, finance, and industry in India and investment opportunities to Central Java in Indonesia. Despite the reported 'bottlenecks' in trade negotiations – the EU's access to the Indian financial market, the EU's palm oil ban and the ban on the nickel ore exports from Indonesia – the positive outlook persists. In a similar vein, the US media portray the launch of the EU-US trade negotiations as a positive step to remove trade barriers introduced during the Presidency of Trump. Trade deals with the EU are also the dominant economic theme in South Africa. However, the EU-UK trading relationship is in focus due to South Africa's close links to the UK. The threats to the South African poultry industry are closely considered, and negative evaluation refers to the perceived exploitative relationship between South Africa and the EU. Agriculture (Nigeria) and tourism (Colombia) emerge as sub-themes in the economy theme.

EU-UK post-Brexit trade negotiations attract their share of media attention, including in the US, Japan, Indonesia, and South Africa (as mentioned above). Brexit and Covid are seen as the major accelerators for EU-India trade negotiations (India). In the "EU" dataset, Brexit is framed as a hard and protracted 'divorce'. Brexit is considered the key reason behind the UK's application for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific

Partnership (CPTPP) (Japan, Republic of Korea). In Japan, Brexit is seen in the context of its economic effects, including fluctuations on the Tokyo stock exchange (together with the growth of interest rates in the US).

Overall, inflation rates, bonds, finance and fin-tech, taxes, monetary stimuli, and interest rates of central banks are common news topics in the EU news coverage by media in the US, Japan, Republic of Korea and, to a lesser extent, Russia. In Brazil, the ECB monetary policy is covered by *Valor Econômico*, a business daily in the sample. US dailies also report on the ECB's monetary stimulus policy, presenting a mixed reaction. The ECB stimulus policy is reported positively in the context of the pandemic and as a more aggressive policy given that the US Federal Reserve System has withdrawn such measures of its own.

The EU's economic growth in general and post-pandemic recovery, in particular, is a visible topic across several countries (Brazil, China, Japan, Nigeria, the US). Sometimes, parallels are drawn between the economic impact of the Covid pandemic and that of the Eurozone crisis (Republic of Korea). The EU's post-pandemic recovery is also framed in competitive terms, e. g. 'the EU is lagging behind the US and China' (a quote from Japan). In the US' framing, local media see the US, and not the EU, as the driving force behind economic recovery across the Western countries. At the same time, the EU receives some positive attention when reported in connection to green recovery the climate change mitigation (Colombia, some mentions in Canada).

Despite an occasional competitive framing, media in the above-listed countries assign an important role in the post-pandemic economic recovery to the EU – particularly when the EU is seen to be working in cooperation with these countries. Optimistic portrayals come from Brazil (including a positive outlook on Mario Draghi's becoming Italy's Prime Minister and the EU's recovery fund). Brazilian media formulates expectations of the EU economy returning to the pre-pandemic levels due to the vaccine rollout. A strong emphasis on the need for the EU's post-Covid economic recovery is also visible in Indian media. The positive EU framing in the economy-related coverage is different from 2015 when media articles featured a few highly negative reports following the dramatic twists of the Eurozone crisis in Greece. Finally, Chinese media also see potential in EU-China cooperation for the post-pandemic global economic recovery.

### 2.1.2. Political issues

The 2021 Update Study demonstrates a range of political topics as a high visibility theme in the EU coverage. In the 2021 sample, EU external political relations are typically more visible and prominent than EU internal political relations (except Colombia). EU-Russia relations and EU actions regarding Myanmar and China are in media focus in all locations. The EU's ban on the exports of the anti-Covid vaccines is another issue that dominates the articles on the EU's external political relations (specifically in Nigeria and South Africa. See also section Health in this report).

When reporting on the EU's external action, media in China and Russia frame the EU's position on human rights antagonistically, arguing that the EU is violating the sovereignty principle. The same refers to their reporting on the EU's position towards Myanmar and its human rights violations (see also a section on normative power below). In China, *People's Daily*, the official voice of the Chinese Communist Party, prioritises the EU reportage on political issues, presenting official retaliating statements against the EU position on camps in Xinjiang and Hong Kong electoral system. Chinese press points to social (in)equality in the EU, suggesting the double standards regarding human rights in the EU itself. In Russia, the main events that foster a negative assessment of the EU are the EU's reaction to Navalny case, the expulsion by Russia of the three EU Member States diplomats (from Germany, Sweden, and Poland) during the visit of HR Borrell to Moscow, and EU sanctions imposed on Russia. Sanctions are reported as a source of political tensions between Russia and the West and across its multiple locations (the US, the UK, the EU). Russian media also pay close attention to China and its response to the Western sanctions and boycott of Western brands. Media in China and Russia assign a negative assessment to the EU when it is framed as an exporter of its values to other countries.

### Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

Media framing of EU actions in response to the actions by Russia and China varies among the countries. For example, Indonesian media do not comment much on the EU's sanctions towards Russia, instead prioritising reports of the EU concerning Myanmar's situation while taking a mixed position towards EU sanctions against China (e.g., Indonesian media report that the Chinese government always tries to be friendly and open in accommodating the request of foreign countries officials to visit Xinjiang). In contrast, Japanese media mark solidarity between the EU, the US, the UK, and Canada in sanctions against China, but frame Russia's expel of EU diplomats as a strictly EU-Russia affair without pointing to Japan's position on the issue. One article in Brazil considers the EU-China relationship as 'multifaceted', characterised by 'cooperation, competition and systemic rivalry'.

When it comes to sanctions, Brazilian newspapers report positively and with a main degree of intensity on EU sanctions against China for human rights violations in Xinjiang. Mexican press assigns positivity to the European Parliament's active position concerning Russia's human rights violations. Mexican media reports positively on EU statements and actions regarding human rights violations in Bolivia, Honduras, Turkey, and China reinforcing the framing of the EU as a normative influencer around the world (also see below section Normative).

Of interest, media across several locations presents the US as a leader even when the report focuses on the EU. US media claim that Russia's expel of EU diplomats has pushed the EU closer to the US. Japanese media comment on the US "factor" in decisions on sanctions against China. According to them, the EU has shown a 'cooperative attitude' to the US. Japanese media also report on Anthony Blinken's visit to Brussels and Biden's visit to the European Council – all reaffirming US cooperation with the EU on China, Russia, human rights, and Covid. In Japan, such 'restoration' of the transatlantic alliance is framed positively. In Republic of Korea media, the UK and the US also seem to be more visible in the EU news that focus on China. Their visibility is driven by conflict. Similar to Japan, the media do not present Korea's position on the issue in a clear way. In the Korean sample, five articles reference EU sanctions towards North Korea due to human rights violations, positively increasing the EU's visibility. The EU's sanctions against North Korea sanctions are also reported in Japan (one publication).

Media in the US, Japan and China argue that sanctions may hurt the EU in light of its close economic ties with China. Media frame this situation in different ways in different countries. It is done in a more neutrally in Japan. US media point to the need for the EU to be less dependent on China. Chinese media point to that the EU's political dependence on the US damage European companies and benefits the US (the Sino-US technology and trade wars are factors here). As such, media environments imply the need for the EU's stronger independence – but from different actors and in different ways.

Media outlets also report the EU in relation to regional cooperation (India, Indonesia, Mexico, Colombia, Japan, China, and Nigeria). These reports reveal similarities and differences in geopolitical views by the EU and local actors. In India, many articles report on the EU's decision to create a strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific with the focus on multilateralism and security from a positive angle. The strategy is presented to be guided by the principles of climate, connectivity, trade, and investment and those resonate with India's positions. Local media comment on the EU's recognition of India's crucial role in the region in general as well as its potential as a net security provider and a counterbalance to China. Indian press stresses the importance of the Joint EU-Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) initiatives for the establishment of an open and accessible Indo-Pacific region and the rule-based world order. The EU's link to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) comes through in the Nigerian sample in a prominent way, as well as the EU's security and development assistance to this region. The EU's support to Nigeria and in some cases, to the regional organisation ECOWAS, via employing Team Europe, is a visible theme. Reports frame positively the EU's support for humanitarian action in the country and the region, its condemnation of Boko Haram and support on peace and security issues provided via the Nigerian government or ECOWAS. An Indonesian publication positively frames the EU's potential involvement in the Asia-Pacific in terms of economy, trade, technology, and people-to-people contacts. Japanese media also attaché positive assessments to the EU when they emphasise the

need to diversify EU relations with the like-minded countries in the region such as Japan, Australia, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. However, they also warn of China's potential reaction. In contrast, Chinese media demonstrate an extremely suspicious and negative attitude towards the EU's strategy in the Indo-Pacific, e.g., 'they [the EU] will seek to work with so-called like-minded partners to uphold the so-called fundamental rights of the Indo-Pacific region'.

The EU's external action is also noted in Brazil, and specifically the EU's reaction to Iran's refusal to accept the EU's invitation to participate in informal talks on the country's nuclear programme as well as the EU's support for Ukraine in the context of Russian military deployment to the country's border. International negotiations on Iranian nuclear issues are mentioned in Japanese media as well.

Problematic performance by EU leaders on the diplomatic stage is reported in several locations. Reports in Brazil, the US and Republic of Korea talk about the mistreatment of the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen during her official visit to Turkey and also implicate Charles Michel for failing to stand up. Likewise, in Japan, criticism refers not only to Turkey but also to the President of the European Council Charles Michel. The visit of HR Josep Borrell to Moscow is further discussed in Russia. Russia's media framing of the EU in this period focuses on EU personalities or individual Member States rather than the EU as a whole. For example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland is also reported to visit Russia after several European diplomats have been expelled, in an attempt to play an appeasing role in the EU-Russia relations. However, his success is reported as very limited.

As for the EU's *internal political* issues, problematic actions of the EU attract more negative portrayals in China where newspapers report on the EU as an ineffective actor in handling issues in Europe. In other locations, negative framing refers to democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary (specifically, freedom of the press – Brazil) and the rise of right-wing parties (Japan). Neutral assessment accompanies reports of the legal proceedings against the leader of secessionist movements in Catalonia and a leader of the fascist party in Greece (the US), coalition-building in Italy and Hungary (the US), political changes in Germany (e.g., Armin Laschet as a candidate to become Merkel's successor – Japan). Finally, media across many locations (Brazil, the US, Japan, Republic of Korea) report on the appointment of Mario Draghi as the Prime Minister in Italy with the increased visibility to the EU (as he was a former President of the ECB) and in a positive way.

Finally, the EU is seen as a highly relevant actor for several countries in our sample in their domestic political arena. In Colombia, the EU's actions in the context of peace and human rights in Colombia receive extensive attention and positive evaluations. Indian media overall report positively on the shared by India and the EU normative stance on international rules and norms. Local reporters also assign high-level meetings of officials with an important role. Indian media reports positively on the 2021 EU Summit in Portugal as the start of a series of high-level bilateral meetings in Europe for Indian decision-makers. The EU's Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis and the Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry attended the preparatory meetings for the Summit, and India's PM has been reported to plan a series of meeting to Europe beginning with the Summit. In Nigerian media, it is understood that the EU and Nigeria share similar norms, although disagree politically over how to reach them.

### 2.1.1. Climate and environment

*Climate and environment* theme receives distinct attention in the reports on the EU that feature the EU with major intensity. It is often connected to the themes of the economy, environmental protection, and energy as well as research, science and technology. It is important to note that the theme of *climate and environment* does not receive a major treatment as a stand-alone issue but features in conjunction with other themes.

Media in several countries point to the EU's international role in climate change governance – largely in a positive way. EU initiatives in climate change mitigation are framed positively in Indonesia, for example. Chinese media

point to EU regulations on emissions control and reduction and a consensus among the EU Member States on carbon neutrality which is legally binding. Positive framing of the EU in Chinese media further extends to the exchange of experience and technology in climate change governance and the expectation of the Chinese government to increase global climate change governance together with the EU. In Indian media, EU international roles in climate change governance touch upon carbon neutrality but extend further to other issues such as renewable energy, the initiative taken by the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) and the EU Green Deal for disaster-resilient infrastructure and management. The theme of sustainable development also features in Nigeria. Russian media frame the Green Deal positively in the context of potential cooperation between Russia and the EU, specifically in hydrogen sources of energy.

Several countries report specific EU actions in this issue area with a strong local hook and from a positive perspective. For example, in India, the regional edition of the *Times of India* (Chandigarh edition) reports on the celebration of Earth's Day (with EU delegates) in Roorkee. EU water supply projects in India and relevant technology are also reported and in a positive manner. In Colombia, the press report EU actions in preserving biodiversity in Colombia and sustainable agriculture. In addition to these locally grounded reports of the EU, globally relevant themes of the environment and EU actions in this context also get positive attention in Colombia. EU actions in climate change/biodiversity/ environmental challenges get major attention and positive assessment in Nigeria. Media in Nigeria focus on EU green economic growth, agri-business, and green recovery.

However, some EU initiatives in this issue area receive mixed evaluations. "Carbon tax" in particular is seen as a unilateral policy by the EU pushing/targeting developing countries and thus benefiting the EU (media reports from India, Russia). Russian media further question the EU's perceived reliance on renewable energy sources regarding their reliability as an alternative source of energy and pollution, similar to one article in South Africa. According to Russian outlets, equipment related to renewable energy produces more greenhouse gas than traditional energy sources. Further, the EU Renewable Energy Directive II (RED II) is framed negatively by Indonesian media regarding the palm oil import ban (relevant for Indonesia and Malaysia). It is interpreted as deepening the gap between the rich and poor nations. Japanese media, while not connecting carbon taxation in Europe directly to Japan, point to financial losses that Japanese companies will face as a result of the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism. They see it favouring EU companies that are incompatible with free trade and Japan's economic interests.

### 2.1.1. Energy

EU news in the *energy* issue area does not attract major media attention when the EU is reported with higher intensity. It is mentioned, for example, in Colombia, Russia (unrealistic ambitions of the EU when it comes to renewables, and potential collaboration with the EU in hydrogen energy) and South Africa ('Climate change: the solutions might turn out worse than the problem'). Mexico reports on EU actions in this area citing statements of Spain and Portugal on the energy reform in Mexico and potential legal disputes. Japanese media consider energy as 'driving a wedge' in negotiations with the EU over carbon border adjustment mechanism. The EU-proposed taxonomy based on companies' environmental efforts is seen as neutral, but the authors foresee difficult negotiations for Japan because the decision on nuclear power and natural gas is yet to be made. The EU taxonomy is also referenced negatively in one article in South Africa.



### 2.1.2. Research, science, and technology (RST)

When it comes to the news where the EU is a major theme, the EU as an actor in the research, science and technology issue-area gets limited coverage and only in several locations. Chinese media report positively on EU initiatives in promoting technology and innovation and strategic industry autonomy.

In light of the Covid pandemic, innovations in the health sector have become a more visible theme across many locations. In the US, EU innovations in the health sector are reported positively. In Brazil, most of the news on the EU's research, science and technology is about scientific discoveries and developments regarding vaccines. In India, the EU's approval for Indian pharmaceuticals (cancer drugs and treatment) draws media attention. This includes Covid vaccine production, certification and making vaccines more available externally. Not all reports are about innovations in the context of Covid. The regional (Chennai) edition of the *Times of India* also reported on EU-India collaboration on neurology research.

Finally, EU regulations concerning the development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology are framed as part of its effort to lead international rulemaking in the sector. Chinese media positively report on the EU's ambition to enhance competitiveness in AI and chip industry sectors. Of interest, the US' and China's samples feature one shared publication on the EU's AI regulations (an article from the *New York Times* reprinted in China). Japanese media, while framing the EU neutrally in the context of AI, point to the gaps in the initiative – 'AI could cause problems that cannot be dealt with by existing regulations', and the initiative may potentially lead to 'unfair' treatment of certain groups, e.g., harm innovation, affect individual companies. The EU's 'big tech' regulation is also referenced in Canada.

### 2.1.3. Development and assistance

This theme is underrepresented in the qualitative analysis sample. Only in Indonesia, the EU is framed as a 'friend in need' – helping Indonesians deal with the impact of flood and Seroja Cyclone by providing humanitarian and technical assistance to Indonesians. Two publications in India referenced aid/disaster relief in a positive light. Humanitarian and security assistance are also referenced positively in Nigeria, in conjunction with a wider focus on sustainable development.

### 2.1.4. Social issues

*Social* issues are rarely reported in the articles where the EU has a major degree of intensity. This is different from 2015, where the social issue of migration embedded EU reports the migration crisis. One exception is the Nigerian press, where the newspapers report on the Spotlight Initiative, where the EU is active in eliminating gender-based violence at the national level. Further, news on the EU in Nigeria features EU support for young people's initiatives to mitigate youth militancy. Other minor themes include EU approaches to migration. In a minor way, the EU was reported positively in education in India and Indonesia. In particular, in Indonesia, local media reported on the award ceremony for EU Social Digithon, held by the EU for young people – the EU's public diplomacy event attended by EU Ambassador to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam Vincent Picket.

### 2.1.5. Health

The actorness of the EU in the *health* issue area is a dominant multifaceted theme across media in all locations. Typically, negative evaluations persist, especially in the reports about the beginning of the EU vaccination campaign. The intensity of negativity depends on the interests at stake in each location. However, as time passes by, negative framing of the EU evolves into a more positive framing in several locations.

The EU's internal health governance is the main topic of reporting on this issue area. Media in most locations focus on the problems in vaccination, vaccine shortage and internal discord surrounding vaccine supply in the EU. In the US media, the EU's internal health governance to fight Covid receives more negative evaluations than the EU's actions in this issue area outside its borders. Mexican coverage of the EU overall is perhaps the most focused on the EU in the context of Covid, with the primary coverage of the three media outlets (69 articles) focusing on different aspects of EU policies addressing the pandemic. Most of the articles are either mixed or negative towards the EU.

Securing **vaccine supply** is the key event in this coverage. It speaks to the process of vaccine certification, the EU's securing contracts with Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Janssen, and AZ, and, finally, safety concerns over the safety of the AZ vaccine. In some locations, contractual disputes with AZ are framed as **the EU-UK "vaccine war"** (Republic of Korea, Brazil, China) or seen as a continuation of the painful Brexit 'divorce' (the US, South Africa, to a smaller extent Indonesia). The sources of negativity in this bloc of reporting differ. To some media, the very conflict over vaccine supply has triggered a negative framing of the EU (Republic of Korea) and its loss of moral authority due to the conflict (China). In other media, a negative image is assigned to the EU as an ineffective actor in light of slow vaccine rollout (Brazil, Indonesia, in US media – particularly compared to more successful US in this regard) and unequal distribution of vaccines among EU MSs (Republic of Korea). Finally, in some locations, EU difficulties in securing vaccine supplies are considered but do not seem to be crucial for its image in general (Indonesia, India). Here, the theme of vaccine supply is linked to the problems of reliability or safety of AZ vaccine (Mexico, Republic of Korea, India, Indonesia, Japan). More negative connotations refer to restrictions on the use of AZ by some EU Member States (Brazil) or internal vaccine distribution (Republic of Korea, South Africa, Nigeria, Mexico (with particularly negative evaluations)).

Apart from the EU-UK "vaccine war", another spike in negative framing of the EU comes from Russian and Chinese media reporting on the certification of their respective vaccines in the EU. In these countries, the EMA's decision not to ratify **Chinese and Russian vaccines** is framed as a political decision linked to human rights violations. Local media argue for this move to disadvantage not only China and Russia but EU citizens as well. Brazilian media point to the exclusion of Russian Sputnik V from the EU vaccination strategy, while Korean media follow the attempts for the Russian vaccine to receive approval in the EU more neutrally.

In some locations, Chinese and Russian vaccines are framed as yet another source of the **EU's internal divisions** in securing vaccine supply due to the EU's slow progress in vaccine supply (Japan, the US, China). For example, dailies in Mexico report on one EU Member State – Hungary – who violated the EU's directives and started vaccinations with the Russian vaccine Sputnik V. Korean media report that Hungary has begun vaccination with the Chinese vaccine Sinopharm. Japanese media mention Central and Eastern European Member States as those seeking vaccine alternatives. Canadian media also references (more neutrally) the EU's possible review of Russia's vaccine amidst shortages. US media pay close attention to these internal divisions in the EU marking Serbia's turn to 'the East'. US media see Russia and China building political capital in the EU through vaccine diplomacy as alarming. They are concerned about stronger ties between the EU and rival countries (Russia and China) and portray attempts to approve the Russian vaccine in the EU as a 'soft-power coup for Moscow'. In contrast, Chinese media report China and Russia acting together, e.g., 'hit back after the EU slandered "fake news" on vaccine release' and point to the faulty EU accusations when it criticises China and Russia for their vaccine diplomacy. Predictably, Chinese media frame the success of the Chinese vaccine in Serbia and Hungary positively and as part of 'successful influence in Europe'.

Bureaucratic and human rights issues are reported in consideration of an "EU Digital Covid Certificate"/Covid vaccine passport, or ID (travel pass after vaccinations) in Russia, Brazil, the US, Nigeria, Republic of Korea – largely about the needs of their respective countries. Republic of Korea media see potential in introducing vaccine passports in Republic of Korea itself. In the US and Russia, vaccine IDs are discussed concerning travel passes to the EU (tourism, visa applications). Occasionally more negative sentiments appear on Russian media regarding



human rights violations and in China regarding data protection issues. The problematic coverage is also tied to debates on which vaccines the EU will certify for a valid pass (Russia, China). A Mexican media article considers that the EU's centralisation of the vaccination process might be less efficient. However, the EU should not be punished for a more solidarity-driven approach (in contrast to, for example, the UK and the US).

Apart from the EU's internal vaccine 'squabbles' around vaccine supply and 'sluggish' vaccine rollout (Nigeria, South Africa), another most controversial issue in the EU's media framing globally is **the EU's ban on vaccine exports**. In some locations, media frame this ban as part of "vaccine nationalism"/sovereignty (Republic of Korea, the US, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa), a mistake, a bad example for other countries to follow and, thus, potentially a prelude to a global vaccine war (China). Chinese media also report on the negative impact of the vaccine ban for Hong Kong and Taiwan. In other locations, however, framings are more mixed.

Media in some countries express strong concern about the export controls of vaccines manufactured in the EU because their respective countries need vaccine supplies from the EU (Mexico, Japan, Republic of Korea, South Africa). In such locations, political interaction on a high, official level is often reported as part of negotiations with the EU. For example, the Mexican press dedicates major attention to their government's responses to EU regulations of vaccine exports, which projected a negative image of the EU. The EU Delegation to Mexico is mentioned in several articles explaining the rationale of the EU's regulations on the export of vaccines.

The EU's ban on vaccine exports has been the most relevant topic in Japanese media: 7 articles out of 78 in the sample talk about EU-Japan negotiations in this area, and this excludes other publications that speak about the ban more generally. At first, this move by the EU is perceived negatively due to Japan's dependence on the vaccine supply from Europe, but the approval for the vaccine exports to Japan brought relief. The press coverage repeatedly points to ongoing negotiations at the official level: Japanese government's 'asking the EU to ensure vaccine supply to Japan', vaccine minister Kono's anticipating the supply of vaccine contingent on import from the EU, the approval coming after Japan's foreign minister Motegi's telephone meeting with VP Valdis Dombrovskis.

Korean media report on vaccine negotiations with the EU along similar lines, although with less visibility. The press in Republic of Korea covers foreign Minister Chung Eui-Yong's talks with the EU HR Joseph Borrell to ensure that the new vaccine produced in Europe is surely provided to Korea. The EU's signing a contract for 1.8 billion vaccine doses with Pfizer is repeatedly mentioned in Korean news. The US media similarly closely follow the EU vaccine deals.

In an already familiar pattern, Indonesian media demonstrate an evolving attitude towards the EU – initial reports covered how the EU could not secure vaccine supplies from AZ. Yet later local media report that the situation has improved. Indonesian outlets also reported on Italy's blocking vaccine exports to Australia (3 publications out of 47) but ended by predicting that this issue would not affect EU-Australia bilateral relations in the long term.

Canadian media report that the EU did not hurt Canada with its vaccine export restrictions, and it gets a positive assessment. However, negative themes also appear in the Canadian reports of the EU – the EU 'blew it and won't see the COVID-19 pandemic end any time soon', while the EU's vaccination effort is 'woeful'. In their earlier reports, Indian media did not frame the EU as an effective international leader responding to the pandemic. Indian outlets also criticise the EU for not being able to achieve a consensus on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) waiver proposal at the WTO among its Member States. This is seen as adding to the gap between the North and the South in distributing vaccine technology and providing access to vaccines to all people. However, this framing changes to positive evaluations when the EU supports the request by India and South Africa for a waiver of patent and other intellectual property rights to the WTO.

A more neutral image of the EU persists in Colombia, where news focuses on vaccination campaigns in the EU in most of the articles. As such, in many locations, the initial negative framing of the EU in the context of vaccine

supply and exports control slowly changes to a more positive framing of the EU in light of resolving the problems. Perhaps the strongest positive evaluations of the EU come from Nigeria and Indonesia, and both in the context of COVAX (The COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Facility). In contrast, to other locations, the EU has mainly been praised in Nigerian media for its support of COVAX, although media express some disappointment that the EU refuses to directly distribute requisite numbers of vaccines outside Europe. Indonesian media chooses the Covid context to positively emphasise the EU's growing role as an international leader post-Covid, including in cooperation with Indonesia in such areas as technology and innovation, vaccine management, AI, i.e., beyond the EU's green and climate agenda and the palm oil issue. Indonesian media see the pandemic as an opportunity to strengthen EU-Indonesia strategic cooperation. The global nature of the pandemic is seen as the driving force for the EU's more positive, multilateral engagement with Southeast Asia including through tripartite cooperation between EU-Indonesia-World Health Organization (WHO). Indonesian media stress that the EU is the biggest single contributor to the COVAX facility under the Gavi vaccine alliance, and Indonesia has been allocated 13.7 million doses from the alliance.

#### *EU actors: EU institutions*

In the EU news, most mentioned EU institutions were monitored using quantitative methods. One mention is equal to one article. The European Commission, European Parliament and European Central Bank are the most visible EU institutions. In light of the Covid pandemic, the European Medical Agency also gained major visibility (see Table 12).

**TABLE 12. MOST MENTIONED INSTITUTIONS IN THE "EU" DATASET (NO. ARTICLES)**

	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	US	Total
Court of Justice of the European Union	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
European Central Bank	72	65	4	23	20	32	56	74	17	14	11	48	56	490
European Commission	104	179	5	76	49	39	91	83	41	157	18	13	120	978
European Council	27	13	26	12	17	10	15	11	14	89	9	14	33	284
European External Action Service	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	7
European Investment Bank	0	1	3	2	2	3	0	2	16	4	3	6	2	44
European Medicines Agency	97	134	64	73	63	21	77	84	52	19	32	12	94	818
European Parliament	43	20	55	24	17	8	54	30	10	90	6	39	56	452

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data.

Qualitative findings show that the EC is the most visible EU actor due to its role in the Covid response coordination, the activity related to the European Green Deal agenda and bilateral location-specific relations with the EU. In the Covid context, the EC is reported to take care of vaccine procurement, export controls and rollout (Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Japan). The EC is also visible in the context of the Green Deal and green recovery (Russia, Japan). The EC gets its high media profile in the context of bilateral relations (the EU's political relations with Russia, agreement with Mexico, EU-India collaboration, palm oil issue in Indonesia). The EP also got its share of visibility, and specifically because of its active approach and vociferous position on EU tensions with Russia and Russia's violations of human rights (Russia, Mexico, Nigeria, Colombia).

The **ECB** receives relatively higher visibility in the US and Republic of Korea media in the context of its monetary stimuli policy, interest rates and inflation control. It is also frequently referenced in the context of its former head, Mario Draghi, becoming a new Prime Minister of Italy. The ECB is visible in the discussion of new functions of financial institutions in times of crisis (Russia) as well as in the context of EU-India collaboration (India).

The **European Council** received some visibility across locations but largely in the background of the EC and EP (Nigeria, India, Russia, the US).

2021 also brought to the frontstage the **EMA**. It appears with major intensity in the context of vaccine certification, registration, approval, and safety in all countries.

#### *EU actors: EU officials*

Compared to EU institutions, individual EU officials received considerably fewer press mentions in the quantitative sample. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen was mentioned the most (405 mentions), followed by EU High Representative Josep Borrell (25 mentions). President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Central Bank Christine Lagarde received almost equal numbers of mentions (153 and 151 respectively).

**TABLE 13. MOST MENTIONED EU OFFICIALS IN THE "EU" DATASET (NO. ARTICLES)**

	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	US	Total
Charles Michel	13	15	1	8	9	3	33	5	8	28	7	17	11	153
Christine Lagarde	20	22	16	7	5	8	8	21	8	5	1	20	11	151
David-Maria Sassoli	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3
Emily O'Reilly	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Frans Timmermans	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	7	1	0	3	19
Josep Borrell	24	14	1	17	6	3	63	15	6	74	3	8	26	255
Margaritis Schinas	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	8
Margrethe Vestager	2	5	2	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	6	31
Maroš Šefčovič	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Ursula von der Leyen	48	68	54	37	9	6	0	21	21	52	18	4	67	405
Valdis Dombrovskis	2	11	4	1	17	3	0	1	8	5	0	0	3	55
Věra Jourová	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data.

The qualitative analysis identifies the same EU officials – Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borrell, and Charles Michel – as the most mentioned by the press. Moreover, in the news articles which cover **the EU is a major focus**, high visibility of certain institutions correlates with a high visibility of their leaders.

**Ursula von der Leyen**, the President of the EC, features frequently in the articles about the EU's reactions to Covid (Canada, Russia, Brazil, Nigeria, India, Mexico). In Brazil, Japan, the US, and Republic of Korea media reports also about von der Leyen's mistreatment in Turkey.



Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

<b>Austria</b>	49	26	52	23	15	15	35	27	15	14	6	76	29	<b>382</b>
<b>Belgium</b>	43	67	45	25	27	4	59	56	15	7	7	77	59	<b>491</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	15	15	16	8	7	8	4	18	9	15	5	19	13	<b>152</b>
<b>Croatia</b>	1	6	9	1	0	5	8	7	2	7	0	6	8	<b>60</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	4	31	1	7	5	7	0	11	7	0	9	0	20	<b>102</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	56	75	33	41	26	25	38	42	34	18	7	68	60	<b>523</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	20	19	16	10	18	9	4	11	10	23	1	17	4	<b>162</b>
<b>Finland</b>	19	18	12	9	16	3	23	11	7	11	10	26	8	<b>173</b>
<b>France</b>	199	227	293	103	154	28	165	130	74	85	66	330	299	<b>2153</b>
<b>Germany</b>	221	230	382	107	113	94	208	139	90	109	63	393	304	<b>2453</b>
<b>Greece</b>	31	22	38	24	4	2	35	31	11	26	6	42	45	<b>317</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	55	31	47	14	10	5	25	19	9	32	12	35	32	<b>326</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	29	66	33	19	27	17	27	32	26	10	8	27	43	<b>364</b>
<b>Italy</b>	133	147	119	80	47	50	121	99	53	46	29	185	169	<b>1278</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	14	15	12	10	8	8	1	13	12	23	2	20	18	<b>156</b>
<b>Lithuania</b>	14	8	20	9	7	6	10	11	11	29	2	21	9	<b>157</b>
<b>Luxembourg</b>	13	8	11	11	15	4	7	16	12	16	1	10	14	<b>138</b>
<b>Malta</b>	6	6	4	7	2	0	3	10	4	6	1	3	6	<b>58</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	44	56	67	32	43	34	50	27	29	16	17	82	43	<b>540</b>
<b>Poland</b>	46	26	41	16	13	17	22	29	10	51	7	32	42	<b>352</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	61	20	23	18	48	6	13	30	16	10	14	30	18	<b>307</b>
<b>Romania</b>	6	11	15	0	10	6	15	5	5	14	3	14	13	<b>117</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	18	19	16	3	1	4	5	6	6	23	2	11	14	<b>128</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	7	9	5	6	2	4	5	7	4	1	1	12	6	<b>69</b>
<b>Spain</b>	78	72	78	104	18	20	48	136	31	19	23	110	87	<b>824</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	41	60	35	14	23	23	48	30	14	19	8	80	34	<b>429</b>

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data.

In the qualitative analysis that focused on **the EU as a major topic of press coverage**, country-wise, EU Member States remain highly visible in India's media coverage of the EU. In China, EU Member States are mentioned more frequently (50 instances) than EU institutions (46) and officials (23). Twenty three out of the 27 EU Member States are mentioned at least once in the sample in the US.

Among the EU Member States, two – Germany and France – get a lion's share of media attention in the news both in quantitative and qualitative samples. In qualitative sample – in the context of the EU's internal politics, external actions, and internal health governance. Germany's visibility is also higher than that of France. In Japanese media, Germany is seen as the biggest and the most influential country in the EU; its upcoming parliamentary elections are in focus. In Russia, Germany is most visible in the light of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline construction (also briefly mentioned in Indonesia in this context). Chinese media assign Germany with a leading role in China-EU economic cooperation and react positively to Merkel's 'openness' to Chinese and Russian vaccines. Colombia, Germany is seen in the areas of environment and biodiversity. In Indonesia, Germany is reported in the context of Covid vaccine production. However, Germany also receives negative visibility in the context of Covid in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Nigeria (here specifically in the narratives around poor vaccine distribution).

The trend in the coverage of EU Member States is also reflected in a more frequent mentioning of Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron in the publications. A similar boost of visibility concerns the appointment of Mario Draghi to the post of PM in Italy – framed positively in a variety of locations in the context of his achievements as the head of the ECB. Draghi receives a particularly positive frame in Brazil, the US, Republic of Korea, Japan.

Meanwhile, Eastern EU Member States continue to receive a minimum of attention, with exception of Hungary and Poland. Hungary, Poland, and Serbia (the candidate for EU membership) are mentioned as receivers of China’s recent vaccine diplomacy. Hungary is also reported in Brazil for administering the non-EMA approved Sputnik vaccine as well as curtailing freedom of the press. Japanese media also point to the rise of the EU criticism by the right-wing parties in Hungary and Poland.

Nigeria reports on Italy, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, and the Netherlands in the context of poor vaccine distribution in Europe and abroad. In Mexico, Belgium is mentioned as one of the locations where the vaccines are produced, and Denmark is referenced for its decision to suspend the use of AZ.

As such, the visibility of the EU Member States in the context of the EU’s higher visibility coverage is linked to the situation around Covid, and most of these reports tell rather negative stories about some EU Member States under-performing on many levels in their handling of the Covid pandemic.

There are other contexts for the EU Member States to be reported in. In Colombia, Spain, France, and Italy feature in relation to environment and biodiversity. In India, apart from Germany and France, other visible Member States are Portugal (due to the May ’21 Summit), and the Netherlands (in the context of the EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific). Spain and Portugal are reported with a high profile in the context of the energy reform in Mexico and potential legal disputes.

To conclude, visibility of the EU Member States follows a tri-partite pattern: 1) Germany and France are two “big” EU MSs who are the most visible across all countries; 2) the EU Member States who are affected by Covid/handling Covid; and 3) EU Member States who interact/impact the location in question (mostly in the areas of trade, environment, and energy). Eastern EU Member States are the least visible in all locations, with exception of Hungary and Poland as trouble-making EU states.

#### *EU actors: EU member states leaders*

Individual EU politicians were mentioned by the press significantly less than individual the EU Member States. The Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel (455 mentions), president of France Emmanuel Macron (434) and prime-minister of Italy Mario Draghi (269) were the most mentioned EU politicians (Table 15), which correlates with the fact of Germany, France and Italy being the most mentioned EU Member States (see also Table 14).

**TABLE 15. MOST MENTIONED EU MEMBER STATES LEADERS IN THE “EU” DATASET (NO. ARTICLES)**

	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	US	Total
Alexander De Croo	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	7
Andrej Babiš	3	10	6	0	0	0	2	1	1	9	0	3	5	40
Andrej Plenković	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Angela Merkel	44	30	69	19	11	11	39	22	18	51	15	56	72	457
António Costa	6	0	1	1	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	12
Boyko Borissov	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	1	1	1	9

## Annex III. Comparative traditional media report


<b>Eduard Heger</b>	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	0	0	<b>14</b>
<b>Emmanuel Macron</b>	39	41	52	14	28	8	38	22	17	32	21	52	73	<b>437</b>	
<b>Gitanas Nausėda</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	<b>2</b>	
<b>Kaja Kallas</b>	0	1	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>	
<b>Kyriakos Mitsotakis</b>	1	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	1	1	1	<b>4</b>	
<b>Krišjānis Kariņš</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	<b>14</b>	
<b>Mario Draghi</b>	40	39	9	17	4	5	0	20	13	16	4	25	40	<b>0</b>	
<b>Mark Rutte</b>	1	1	2	2	4	3	0	0	2	0	1	1	3	<b>1</b>	
<b>Mateusz Morawiecki</b>	3	0	1	1	0	0	36	1	0	6	0	0	2	<b>268</b>	
<b>Mette Frederiksen</b>	1	4	0	0	3	1	5	3	2	2	1	3	2	<b>25</b>	
<b>Micheál Martin</b>	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>14</b>	
<b>Nicos Anastasiades</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	<b>22</b>	
<b>Pedro Sánchez</b>	6	0	1	10	0	0	1	10	8	2	1	2	2	<b>5</b>	
<b>Robert Abela</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	<b>1</b>	
<b>Sanna Marin</b>	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	<b>43</b>	
<b>Sebastian Kurz</b>	4	6	7	2	0	1	0	0	3	15	1	9	4	<b>2</b>	
<b>Viktor Orbán</b>	11	5	6	0	4	2	3	7	0	6	3	1	11	<b>6</b>	
<b>Xavier Bettel</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	<b>53</b>	

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data.

### 2.2. Europe

The quantitative analysis of the Europe-related dataset tracks the same themes as the analysis of the EU-related dataset. Similar to the “EU” dataset, *politics*, *economy*, and *health* are among the most covered themes in the Europe-related press articles. One major difference is that the theme of *culture* receives a much higher share of coverage in the Europe-related sample (20% average) vs. EU-related sample (9% average) in **all** of the strategic partner countries (in the EU sample it was only Republic of Korea, Japan, Russia, and China). *Energy* theme in Russian media is also more prevalent (10%) as in EU-related sample. In all countries, *politics* was a little less covered (15% on average) compared to EU-related news (23% on average).

FIGURE 25. THEMATIC AREAS COVERED IN THE "EUROPE" DATASET (SHARE OF THE TOTAL NO. ARTICLES)





Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data. Due to methodology one article can be coded as covering several themes.

The most visible EU Member States in Europe-related articles are Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. Germany is the most visible Member State almost in every country under observation. Notably, Spain is the most frequently mentioned Member State in the Colombian and Mexican press.

**TABLE 16. MOST MENTIONED MEMBER STATES IN THE “EUROPE” DATASET (NO. ARTICLES)**

	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	US	Total
<b>Austria</b>	29	44	22	17	21	19	23	80	16	14	14	105	52	456
<b>Belgium</b>	33	66	26	46	37	1	39	55	44	23	25	79	55	529
<b>Bulgaria</b>	6	10	3	12	16	20	4	20	8	8	10	11	12	140
<b>Croatia</b>	4	11	4	8	8	19	14	16	12	16	6	18	14	150
<b>Czech Republic</b>	1	14	2	21	11	24	0	16	14	0	17	0	18	138
<b>Denmark</b>	42	87	26	33	39	31	21	37	38	13	22	80	59	528
<b>Estonia</b>	3	14	4	11	9	14	7	8	9	18	5	11	9	122
<b>Finland</b>	14	47	9	12	19	15	23	11	14	20	1	36	17	238
<b>France</b>	198	402	248	182	180	30	240	224	173	73	158	562	405	3075
<b>Germany</b>	240	362	304	168	196	255	346	260	175	78	130	651	392	3557
<b>Greece</b>	27	37	23	31	13	22	32	22	15	14	22	50	58	366
<b>Hungary</b>	19	30	9	22	21	21	15	29	7	14	3	50	28	268
<b>Ireland</b>	28	94	11	19	16	20	20	24	29	6	32	53	82	434
<b>Italy</b>	148	205	91	138	111	174	191	206	117	51	95	322	217	2066
<b>Latvia</b>	8	12	3	7	5	3	6	7	10	16	4	13	16	110
<b>Lithuania</b>	6	8	8	7	6	11	7	3	11	11	2	11	11	102
<b>Luxembourg</b>	14	6	4	15	5	8	3	8	8	4	10	17	4	106
<b>Malta</b>	3	8	1	9	3	8	4	6	13	8	4	3	4	74
<b>Netherlands</b>	3	63	54	30	58	101	67	42	76	26	32	114	81	747
<b>Poland</b>	26	46	22	37	54	43	31	35	21	32	28	80	55	510
<b>Portugal</b>	123	40	9	46	34	60	59	56	37	20	39	66	28	617
<b>Romania</b>	15	12	7	4	9	23	15	21	11	8	16	26	17	184
<b>Slovakia</b>	1	19	9	7	3	11	3	32	8	16	7	6	14	136
<b>Slovenia</b>	3	8	4	16	2	20	10	4	10	12	9	2	7	107
<b>Spain</b>	128	147	53	214	86	184	206	409	119	41	71	280	170	2108
<b>Sweden</b>	88	81	28	26	23	37	34	39	36	21	10	97	70	590

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data.

Although the “Europe” dataset contains more than twice as many articles compared to the “EU” dataset, the “Europe” dataset excludes articles containing any of the “EU” dataset keywords (EU institutions). Therefore, the visibility of Member States officials is very unrepresented, and it is not included in the report. EU Member States leaders are mentioned exclusively in the context of “Europe”. The mentions of EU Member States leaders follow the same pattern as the Member States. The most visible Member States leaders in the “Europe” dataset are Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron and Pedro Sánchez (Table 17).

TABLE 17. MOST MENTIONED MEMBER STATES LEADERS IN THE ‘EUROPE’ DATASET (NO. ARTICLES)

	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Kenya	US	Total
Alexander De Croo	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4
Andrej Babiš	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	5	0	0	1	8
Angela Merkel	28	14	17	14	5	7	21	15	13	12	2	30	30	211
António Costa	7	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Boyko Borissov	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Emmanuel Macron	24	17	22	8	8	9	20	4	9	9	5	35	44	217
Janez Jansa	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
Kyriakos Mitsotakis	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	5
Mario Draghi	1	8	4	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	4	7	6	41
Mark Rutte	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	14
Mateusz Morawiecki	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Mette Frederiksen	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	3
Pedro Sánchez	5	0	0	14	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	1	0	30
Sanna Marin	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	8
Sebastian Kurz	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Stefan Lofven	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Viktor Orbán	4	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	8

Source: Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data.

### 2.2.1. Continuity and evolution in media framing of actorness of the EU and Europe

Analysis of the news media from 13 countries in 2021 confirms that news is wired towards drama, crisis, and negativity. The dominance of the reportage of the EU in the context of Covid is new compared to the 2015 Study. Yet, 2015 had its share of major crises that impacted the framing of the EU. While the crises are different in 2015 and 2021, the principle of what triggers higher visibility of the EU in news media remains the same. What is different in 2021 is how the Covid crisis is presented – it is framed to affect the EU, the location in question, the region surrounding it, and the whole world. This “comprehensive” crisis is rather unusual, and the EU seems to enter all levels in the reports about Covid in the 13 selected locations.

In 2015, the ECB was the most prominent actor (with exception of China, India, and Russia where the EC was more visible). The ECB was a leading EU institution that handled the next round of the Eurozone debt crisis in

Greece. Its former President, Mario Draghi, received major visibility in this context. HR Morgherini and Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager were also visible actors on the international stage. In 2021, most of the key EU officials are seen to be dealing with/reacting to Covid inside the EU and outside its borders. The President of the EC von der Leyen is the most visible official in this context.

Another issue-area that attracts newsmakers attention is politics, specifically EU problematic relations with China in light of the situation with education camps in Xinjiang, and Russia following the imprisonment of Alexey Navalny. The visibility assigned to external political matters is difficult to compare across time, as in 2015 there was no one pattern of visibility for external political issue area (every location had a different thematic priority). In 2015, the EU was framed as breaching human rights in the context of the migration crisis. In 2021, the EU was seen as a champion of human rights in its reactions to China and Russia. Perhaps one new feature is more media attention to EU actions in the areas of climate/environment and specifically following the EU's new policy of the Green Deal. The distinct focus on this theme presents a resonance to the emphasis put on this theme by EU Delegations in their public diplomacy initiatives (see Annex I (Literature review) of this report). It may indicate an area for an emerging synergy potentially useful for the EU's public diplomacy. To support this argument, even in locations with problematic political relations with the EU (China, Russia), the media framed the climate and environment issue-area as an area for potential collaboration with the EU.

In comparison to the 2015 Baseline Study, we again see Germany and France as the most visible EU Member States. However, in 2015 these two countries, and Germany in particular, received high visibility as the main actors leading the EU out of the next phase in the Eurozone crisis in Greece. In contrast, the 2021 coverage delivers an image of Germany, Europe's leader, as affected by the pandemic and in the same boat with other challenged EU Member States. In 2015, many EU Member States were reported in the context of problems, challenges, and underperformance. Greece hit by the next wave of financial problems was the most visible EU Member State in 2015. The southern EU Member States gained visibility due to the impact of the migration crisis on them. The UK, then an EU Member State, was visible as a state considering leaving the EU. In 2021, many EU Member States featured in the news due to the handling of the Covid crisis. Arguably, the media's well-known and well-researched bias towards dramatic and negative news means that multiple crises in the EU continue to attract attention and raise the visibility of the EU and its Member States, but from a negative perspective.

## 3. Normative frame

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The evaluation of the framing of the EU as a normative actor and normative power across different themes/events in general and in specific countries takes place in the **qualitative section of the media analysis** only – when the EU is reported as a **major theme** in the local newspapers.

### 3.1. EU

In 2021, media visibility of the EU's normative power remains limited as in the 2015 Study. Both negative and positive frames are triggered by whether the EU meets the normative standards it has set. Negative frames are in place when the EU is perceived to fail to meet its normative standards, being hypocritical and unduly interfering in domestic affairs of the partner countries. Positive frames are in place when the EU is reported as an actor enabling international governance, protecting the rule of law, the environment and helping to stabilise peace and security. Media analysis suggests that while the normative actorness of the EU is comparatively low in terms of its visibility, the emotive charge assigned to the normative framing of the EU in the mainstream media raises the impact of the frames. Thus, it serves as an access point for public diplomacy practice more broadly.

On the **negative** end of the continuum are frames of the EU as a normative actor in Russia and China in the context of human rights. In Russia, the main topic revolves around the coordinated Western sanctions on Russia in reaction to the poisoning and imprisonment of the opposition leader Navalny, including sanctions by the EU. EU actions are portrayed as an interference in the internal affairs of Russia and a clash of different norms. In China, all three newspapers paint the EU's normative profile negatively, portraying the EU's normative actions and messages as interference in the internal affairs of other countries. In China, this refers to EU sanctions against China on Xinjiang and commenting on the Hong Kong electoral system. Unlike in the 2015 Study, the conflicts between China and the EU on human rights, the rule of law, democracy, and liberty are more extensively reported across all three Chinese newspapers negatively, thus increasing the visibility of the EU in this frame. However, China is presented as assertive in confronting the EU in its 'interferences into domestic affairs' of China. This highlights that media frames a different perception of the Self with implications for portraying the EU. Some media sources point to that the EU's approach contradicts China's diplomatic principle of non-interference.

For Russian media, and as in the 2015 Study, the EU's normative profile is framed to reflect the EU's hypocrisy and double standards with no difference among the three dailies. Negative frames around the EU's normative power occur, particularly on human rights. They are less pronounced when it comes to environmental and climate norms, which receive more neutral coverage in Russian news (although seeking to stress that reliance on renewable energy sources is 'impractical'). Likewise, one Chinese article argues that the 'EU pursues a form of economic policy in the direction of sustainable development and carbon neutrality to impress China and thereby satisfy its demands'.

The normative frame evoked in reference to Covid, also shows a **mixed** response, although mostly negative. For example, in Nigerian media, the media outlets reflect negatively on the EU's handling of the Covid pandemic, especially in the first year, and the slow rollout of the vaccination within Europe. In contrast, the EU's support for COVAX is highlighted positively or neutrally – at least on a superficial level. In countries where the EU is seen not to deliver on COVAX as it should and where it is seen to pursue "vaccine nationalism", the press negatively reflects the EU's normative power or a mismatch between expectation and reality and vice-versa. The latter is true for several locations (Russia, China, Republic of Korea, Japan). The health context is also one of the two most prominent themes for the EU's normative visibility in Mexico, in addition to its external relations. EU regulations on the exports of vaccines are perceived negatively and a sign of erosion as a normative power. In the latter, instead, EU statements and actions regarding human rights violations in Bolivia, Honduras, Turkey, and China reinforce the perception of the normative power of the EU.

A more **positive** profile of the EU as a normative actor emerges in Nigeria and Colombia, both countries ravaged by conflicts and internal instability/governance problems. With peace and security being among the most aspired norms, the main normative themes in Nigerian press include the EU's support for peace and security, promotion of rule of law, and support for human rights, liberty, and good governance. These themes appear in the coverage of the EU's development and humanitarian work in Nigeria and the ECOWAS. Media in Nigeria positively cover EU efforts to prevent gender-based violence and sexual assault and Boko Haram and youth militants. The leading normative frame points to a particular media message – both Nigeria and the EU share similar normative objectives, but they do not always agree on meeting them. In Colombia, the three newspapers frame the EU as a normative power across such themes as peace, democracy, human rights, and sustainable development. These themes link to Colombia-specific factors. The EU's normative profile is framed as an example to Colombia. The EU's support for the pursuit of peace in Colombia is a visible theme in the coverage of the EU by the three dailies. A positive message is also conveyed by Indian media, particularly in regional cooperation on connectivity in the Indo-Pacific and support to multilateralism.

Human rights are another important norm connected to the media framing of the EU. The three most prominent EU interventions across countries in the human rights space are reactions to the Navalny case in Russia, the

situation of Xinjiang Uighur people in China, and the situation of Myanmar. In Republic of Korea, EU sanctions against Northern Korea for human rights violations stand out additionally. For Republic of Korea, the EU's normative frame is potentially more visible in 2021 than in 2015, although the difference in samples does not allow for a comprehensive conclusion here. Democracy promotion is another aspect that connects the normative frame of democracy promotion to EU actions. Some articles recognise the EU's role in the normative frame on par with the UN and the US. However, in Brazil and Japan, the EU is framed as a normative actor against democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary, which is perceived negatively.

Human rights issues are also referenced in Japan together with the EU's normative power in setting standards for addressing climate change and artificial intelligence, which mirrors the EU's recognition as a tech regulator in Canada. In the case of Japan, the EU's global role in climate change is connotated positively and considered an example for Japan to follow. However, *Nikkei* (business newspaper) questions the implications of the regulation on climate change and AI for businesses and the economy. Further to some of the reflection in Canadian media on big tech regulation, the only other references to the EU's normative power in the Canadian media sample are the EU's stance on the merger between Air Canada and Air Transat and when the EU is regarded as an advocate of the multilateral order and the rule of law (sanctions).

While the EU's normative profile in Japan and Republic of Korea has risen, Indian media still rarely recognise the EU as a norm-setter. Only a few articles mention the EU's normative role in the context of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. While EU actions in these normative frames are generally framed as positive in Indian news, the norms are described ambiguously and connected to reports about Jammu, Kashmir, Brexit, or cyber-security. Similar to the Indian case, the EU's normative visibility in the US is relatively low, with only a few minor references. This mirrors the findings of the 2015 Study.

For Indonesian news media, the EU's normative profile is connected to the rule of law and solidarity. In the latter case, it is noteworthy that where the EU is seen as failing to demonstrate solidarity both internally and externally (especially around vaccinations), it is connected mostly to negative frames. However, solidarity itself is emphasised as an important norm more generally. While the EU is framed more positively in Indonesian media on democratisation and human rights, normative evaluations around EU sanctions against Myanmar, Russia, and China are more neutral, weighted. Where specific Indonesian interests are at stake (such as on the issue of palm oil), the EU's normative role is framed as more ambiguous, stressing differences between the EU and Indonesia, although these frames still leave space for an amicable solution to these differences.

### **3.2. Continuity and evolution in media framing on the normative power of the EU**

In examining continuity and evolution of the EU, it is important to highlight that the 2015 Study found that 'each location has its own set of normative visions which it assigns to the EU, as a supranational political actor guided in its activities by a set of norms and values' (ANNEX IV – Comparative Media Report, p.20). While each location has factors that drive the normative appeal of the EU, the evaluation of the EU's normative power also rests on how the EU acts internationally and, further, which events drive the EU's normative image. Comparing the results of the 2015 Baseline Study to the 2021 Update Study is thus difficult. Further, the method of generating media data for the qualitative part of this Study is different to that of 2015, which – in addition to the three new countries – adds another layer of complexity when comparing data. Events drive the perceptions of the EU's normative power. However, it is also important to note that the short-term focus on evaluating the EU's normative appeal is skewed around Covid-19 and may not allow for a longitudinal perspective.

In 2015, the migration crisis on the European continent placed the EU under the spotlight of global scrutiny. The crisis-handling by the EU resulted in the negative press coverage of the EU, linked to the disrespect of human

rights standards (e.g., in Brazil, Mexico). International media critically questioned if the EU could live up to the normative standards it had been projecting internationally – on human rights in particular. The coverage of the Mediterranean crisis was substantial. Similar to 2015, EU actions in 2021 are evaluated against what is perceived as a normative standard of the EU. In 2021 the dominant event against which such standards are evaluated in the media data is Covid-19 – the EU’s handling of the Covid pandemic and a restrictive vaccine export regime in particular.

More generally and similar to 2015, the EU’s normative profile attracts limited media attention with ambiguous evaluations across all countries. Some countries have raised the visibility of the EU’s normative profile (Japan, Republic of Korea). In contrast, others exhibit a continued low profile of the normative theme (India, US, Canada) or a decrease (Mexico, Russia, China). For Japan, this higher normative visibility is particularly driven by the rise of China and the EU’s critical views and toughened stance on China.

## 4. Local resonance

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
In this section of the Annex, we discuss the indicator of Local Resonance. To produce quantitative division between local and international sources and most visible news agencies, Python programming language was used to scrape the data. It measured the division between local and international sources in the press articles and most visible international agencies. After that, the qualitative analysis was carried out to examine local resonance in the sample that reported the EU as a major theme. Categories of analysis, following the 2015 framework, were employed, namely the focus of domesticity of reported EU actions and “local hook”, and local vs. international news sources. Local sources tend to report the EU in the context of local priorities, themes, actors, and interests, thus raising the relevance of the EU to the locations in focus.

### 4.1. EU

#### NEWS SOURCES

The **quantitative data analysis** points to one tendency – the majority of media outlets across the 13 countries do not specify their news sources about the EU (Figure 26). One exception is Canada where most of the newspapers indicate sources of information and rely on international news sources. Several countries have at least one national newspaper relying heavily on international sources: for example, *Global Times* in China, *El Pais* in Colombia, *Antara* in Indonesia, *El Financiero* in Mexico, *The Citizen* and *TimesLIVE* in South Africa or *JoongAng Ilbo* in Republic of Korea. Local news sources were more prevalent in the US, to some extent in China and Nigeria (Figure 6.)

**FIGURE 26. DIVISION BETWEEN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL SOURCES IN THE “EU” NEWS DATASET (% OF NEWS ITEMS)**



**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**Note:** Findings on local and international media sources have methodological limitations due to a high number of local and regional newspapers referenced and abbreviations being widely used.

International news agencies that contributed the most to the coverage of the EU in all countries are in Table 18. Among the most frequently cited are international news agencies, such as *Reuters*, *Agence France-Presse (AFP)* and *Associated Press (AP)*. News agencies with 1% or less coverage compared to others are not included in the list.

TABLE 18. MOST VISIBLE INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES IN THE “EU” NEWS DATASET

NEWS AGENCY	NUMBER OF ARTICLES (ALL COUNTRIES)	SHARE OF TOTAL ARTICLES (ALL COUNTRIES)
<i>Reuters</i>	1009	30%
<i>Agence France-Presse</i>	470	14%
<i>Associated Press</i>	332	10%
<i>Bloomberg</i>	339	10%
<i>The Financial Times</i>	159	5%
<i>The New York Times</i>	131	4%
<i>BBC</i>	153	4%
<i>The Guardian</i>	104	3%
<i>CNN</i>	99	3%
<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	79	2%
<i>The Economist</i>	74	2%
<i>The Washington Post</i>	63	2%

**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021. Python programming language was used to generate results and sort the data.

The **qualitative analysis** finds that **local news sources** drive in-depth coverage of the EU in Russia, Japan, Brazil, India, the US, Indonesia, Nigeria, and *El Universal* in Mexico and *People’s Daily* in China. In the press of these countries, local news sources are the dominant sources of information about the EU. Our media analysis also finds journalists who specialise in writing about the EU (see country reports and the list of potential partner organisations for the names of journalists – a potential resource for EU Delegations and EU public diplomacy in the countries). In Japan, most of the publications are written by local Japanese correspondents posted to major European capitals (Brussels, London, Paris, etc.). Meanwhile, US outlets rely on information from EU and US interviewees depending on the issue, while the authors of the articles tend to be US journalists. For example, stories on vaccines interviewed US-based physicians, but also EU health policymakers and spokespersons. US outlets also serve as international news sources in other locations.

Other locations feature **mixed sources** behind individual publications – both local and international. More specifically, such publications are written by local authors, but they also cite international sources. Most of the *Chinese Global Times* – a leading daily reporting international news – sample consists of such items. To a lesser extent, articles with diverse sources are present in the Korean and Indonesian media samples. There is only one publication by a local author in India that references an international source (*Reuters* – in *The Economic Times*).

In contrast, Chinese authors often cite up to four publications per article; one article in the sample includes references to 13 international sources. *Reuters* appears to be the most quoted agency in the Chinese sample. Chinese newsmakers further involve a range of Western news sources (e.g., the UK’s *Financial Times*, the US’ *Bloomberg* and France’s *AFP*), as well as numerous German and Russian media sources. In Indonesia, all 18



publications that cite an international news agency (out of 48 in total) reference *Reuters*. In Republic of Korea, only a quarter of publications in the sample quote international sources (among them the most popular are *Reuters* (6) *Financial Times* (5), *The New York Times* (4) and *Bloomberg* (3)). Mixed news sourcing is also found in the Colombian *El Espectador*. Importantly, local authorship of the news with mixed sources means there is often a pronounced local “hook” to EU news in these locations.

**International news sources** inform the Colombian *Portafolio* and *El País* (*AFP* and *EPE*), the Mexican *El Financiero* (*Bloomberg* and *AP*). *Reference News* in China almost solely relies on international sources in its reportage of the EU (largely *Financial Times*, *AP* and various European outlets). The South African outlet *The Citizen* relies on the interaction between the local and international sources, most heavily reliant on *AFP*.

#### FOCUS OF DOMESTICITY

The **qualitative analysis** demonstrated that the distribution of domesticity shows a rather complex picture. Local outlets rarely frame the EU news solely from the perspective of the EU or the country in focus. Instead, EU news typically combines EU, country and global perspectives. How comprehensive the focus is, and the inclusion of the regional perspective typically depends on the interest and priorities of the location in question and the media outlets observed.

The distribution of the focus of domesticity demonstrates the following patterns: 1) news where the EU has a heavy local hook; 2) news where the EU’s local focus is combined with global (and sometimes regional) perspective on EU actions; and 3) news with a leading focus on the EU/EU Member States with a minimal local hook.

In the first pattern, **EU news with a heavy local hook**, stand out in the EU’s coverage in Russia. All three outlets present EU actions in the local context, e.g., reporting on EU sanctions against Russia or Nord Stream 2, the certification of vaccines in the EU overlooking the Russian Sputnik V vaccine, and green energy field for EU-Russia potential cooperation. The dominance of local news sources in India also translates into a pronounced media focus on EU-India collaboration. Indian newspapers report on EU-India cooperation that ranges from high-level diplomatic events to EU-led public diplomacy initiatives and EU-supported projects implemented in states. In Colombia, *Portafolio* and *El País* report locally focused news when authored by local authors. *El Espectador* relies on national and international sources equally in covering the EU, shows more interaction between the EU and Colombia in its news and frames the EU’s actions with local resonance. In contrast, Republic of Korea has the smallest number of articles where the EU has a local hook (only 10 out of 107), although those tend to be more positive in framing.

In the second pattern – **news where the EU’s local focus is combined with global (and sometimes regional) perspective on the EU’s actions** – China is the leading example. While most of its sample focuses on EU-related news, these articles often report on the global implications of EU-China cooperation (in the context of the post-pandemic economic recovery or climate change governance). They also report on EU cooperation with other international actors or their role in EU-China cooperation (the US, Russia). The regional angle is present in reports on the EU’s declared engagement in the Indo-Pacific in cooperation in security and connectivity. This type of news is also prominent in Indian media (in the context of maritime trade and security) and Japan (Indo-Pacific; CPTPP – the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership). Cooperation with regional actors is also referenced in India (the QUAD) and Indonesia (the ASEAN).

The Covid-19 pandemic is often framed in the global context. As such, Covid-related news about the EU reflects on a combination of domestic and global perspectives. In Nigeria, the interaction of the local “anchors” and global perspectives is especially visible in the discourse around Covid vaccinations. In Mexico, such interaction of domesticity layers reveals that newsmakers take a global perspective on the EU’s relationship with Russia. Indian media also connect global and EU-specific issues to India’s needs, e. g. Indian pharma and access to vaccine technology in light of the Covid-19 pandemic and multilateral cooperation (the EU’s support to the TRIPS

waiver). Indonesian and Nigerian media positively frame the EU's participation in the COVAX programme to make vaccines available globally.

The EU's global leadership role in the environmental policies is discussed largely in a positive light in Chinese, Indonesian and Russian media (except carbon tax in Russia, and reservations towards renewables in Russia and South Africa). The EU is also seen as attempting to establish its leadership positions in research, science and technology, by introducing AI regulations (China, Japan, the US). The EU remains an important part of the global post-pandemic economic recovery. However, evaluations as to its capacity to be one vary among the locations in focus (the US, China).

In the third pattern – **news with a leading focus on the EU/EU Member States with a minimal local hook** – EU-specific news relates either to its handling of the Covid pandemic within its borders/with its Member States or to the domestic political situation and post-Brexit negotiations. Such articles usually have no local hook, which in some locations (Republic of Korea) translates into a lack of the EU visibility. Most EU-related news focuses on the EU's poor handling of the Covid pandemic, the EU-UK disputes over AZ, internal discord regarding vaccine distribution and vaccine exports control (see section Health in Actorness). Importantly, in some locations (most pronounced in Japan and to a lesser extent in Republic of Korea) the ban on vaccine exports is framed in the context of its impact on the locations in question being under a threat of receiving no vaccines from Europe (Mexico, Japan, South Africa). Post-Brexit negotiations are visible in the media samples in Canada, the US and Japan. However, the focus on the EU there is rather "blurred", and the actorness of the EU is framed as less visible/effective when the UK steps in political issues as opposed to the situation with the economy. Finally, the appointment of Mario Draghi, the former head of the ECB, to the post of the Italian PM as well the rise of Euroscepticism in Hungary and Poland are also mentioned in Brazilian, Japanese, US and Korean media. The Italian story is more visible and positive than the one about far-right movements. In Brazil, most news items are about specific EU Member States (France and Germany, Italy and Hungary, see above); the EU in general (mostly Covid handling); or the EU and third countries (in particular China and Russia). As in the 2015 Study, very few articles have a local hook, although the EU tends to be seen more positively when seen as acting locally, in the case of Colombia or Republic of Korea, for example. Also similar to the 2015 Study, when a local hook is present in Brazil, it is usually the EU-MERCOSUR agreement (and specifically on the delay of ratification given Bolsonaro's environmental track record). In 2021, most of the articles with a local hook are about expected delays in the ratification of the agreement given Bolsonaro's environmental policy, heavily criticised by some EU Member States and some MEPs. Mexican press presents the highest level of domesticity in the coverage of the EU.

#### **4.2. Continuity and evolution in the local resonance of the EU**

Compared to the 2015 Baseline Study, certain patterns remain stable. For example, Russian media continue with the extensive local grounding of EU news. The EU continues to be presented as a close "Other" able to impact Russia politically and economically and thus directly important. Intensive local "hooks" continue to correlate with almost exclusive use of local news sources in all three outlets. Brazil and Republic of Korea, on the other hand, continue to publish few articles with a local hook. Similar to the 2015 Study, when a local hook is present in Brazil and Mexico, it is usually the EU-MERCOSUR agreement. News in India has a pronounced local hook in 2021, with more local news sources than in 2015. Differently, in China, the use of international sources has increased, particularly in the *Reference News*. Brazil also shows a change in leading news sources over time because, in 2015, more articles about the EU came from international news sources.

Observed stability in the patterns around the focus of domesticity of the EU coverage suggests that news priorities as defined by particular outlets and their news production practices may dictate how to frame international actors. For example, Japanese media with a substantial corpus of foreign correspondents posted to

Europe and more affluent US media outlets with many international correspondents continue to report on the EU’s relevance in the economic development in these locations.

Some changes are also observed. Due to the severity of the unfolding crises in the EU, the 2015 report indicated the high focus of domesticity in press coverage of the EU and EU Member States in Mexico. In contrast, in the 2021 report, the focus on the EU and location was prevalent. In Republic of Korea, there seems to be less news with a local focus on domesticity.


## 5. Emotive charge

In the **quantitative analysis**, the emotive charge of the EU and Europe press coverage was evaluated using Python programming language and an integrated English language sentiment analysis library. Due to the software limitations, emotive charge towards the EU and Europe could be identified in the quantitative analysis only in the English-language press articles published respectively by newspapers in Canada, India, Nigeria, South Africa and the US. **The qualitative in-depth analysis** was conducted by the team of Country Experts possessing the necessary linguistic skills to analyse sentiment in articles published in local languages.

### 5.1. EU

The analysis of the emotive charge suggests mostly neutral to positive sentiment in the press articles in the “EU” dataset (Figure 7).


FIGURE 27. EMOTIVE CHARGE OF THE EU PRESS COVERAGE IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE PRESS



**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021. Python programming language and integrated sentiment analysis libraries were used to generate results and sort the data. Due to the methodology of analysis the “neutral” category includes articles written in neutral tone and the articles with the mixed emotive charge. Due to methodology one article can be coded as reflecting more than one theme.

The general trend of neutral to positive evaluation continues across all themes observed.

FIGURE 28. EMOTIVE CHARGE OF THE EU, BY THEME (QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS)



**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021. Python programming language and integrated sentiment analysis libraries were used to generate results and sort the data. Due to the methodology of analysis the “neutral” category includes articles written in a neutral tone and the articles with mixed emotive charge. Due to methodology one article can be coded as reflecting more than one theme.

Limited quantitative findings were enriched by **qualitative analysis**. According to qualitative analysis of the news with the EU as the major focus, the EU receives a range of **positive, neutral** and **negative** evaluations in press coverage in each location. These assessments are highly theme-dependent and demonstrate a range of attitudes conveyed by the leading press in the 13 locations. The emotive charge also reflects on actorness and normative evaluations, and where the EU is seen not to match a role prescription or assumed normative behaviour, emotive charges appear negatively. It is important to highlight that the quantitative prevalence of an emotive charge does little in assessing the intensity of that charge. The qualitative dataset captures some of these moments by collecting emotive descriptors and addresses such intensity in this analysis to some degree. However, more specific research on conceptual metaphors and narratives is recommended to reflect how and which language drives emotive charge.

It appears that reporting on the EU generally comes from a neutral angle when some events bring positivity, and some negativity is driven by *EU-specific, location-specific* and *global* factors.

### Neutral

Concerning the “baseline” of neutrality, most media outlets that portrayed the EU as a major theme of their reportage indicate a general stance of neutrality, while events drive emotive charges.

In Canada, neutral reporting concerns developments during the pandemic and the developments in Brexit negotiations. More generally, neutral frames connect to EU-specific news in Canada, creating some “distance” between the EU as an actor and what is happening in Canada. The sense of “distance” is also observed in Colombia, where neutral assessments occur when the EU seems to be detached from the current situation in Colombia, or, rather, not directly linked to Colombia (please note that the media there frame the EU overall in

positive terms). Somewhat similar neutral framing of the EU in Republic of Korea also translates in the lack of “local hook”, or relevance to Korea.

Neutral coverage of the EU is pronounced in Canada, the US, and Brazil. In Brazil, neutral coverage is characteristic for articles covering the EU’s internal and external politics, its normative power, the economy, research, science and technology, climate/environment, social and health across all news outlets, also mostly dominated by news about the EU in general, followed by news about the EU Member States and the EU acting in a 3rd country.

Neutral coverage also dominates in Japan and Republic of Korea, except the health theme that boosted the emotive evaluation of the EU (to be discussed below). Thematically, neutral language is more pronounced in trade deals negotiations in India, Indonesia, and on the MERCOSUR trade agreement in Brazil. Even though such publications point to certain problems in negotiations (see Economic section), the stance is more based on facts and the benefits of the parties negotiating, or, in the context of Brazil, a more critical stance against the own government. The issue-area of the economy is generally framed with few to no emotive descriptors. However, exceptions in South Africa on poultry export (negative) and agribusiness and sustainable development in Nigeria (positive) exist. In Nigeria, neutral frames can be observed in conjunction with news that relate to Nigeria, such as potential future collaboration with the EU, increasing trade relationship with the EU, Brexit and the vaccine rollout – although the neutral frame does not dominate.

Overall, the EU’s coverage is neutral across many locations, where negative or positive reflections come from specific topics. However, neutral coverage in some themes overlaps with mixed or ambiguous perceptions, which will be discussed in more detail later.

### *Positive*

The positive images of the EU in the news that reports the EU with a higher degree of intensity tend to be connected to *location-specific* factors, or EU external actions in a *normative context*. For example, most positive evaluations in Nigeria, Indonesia and Colombia are driven by events where the EU is reported to act within the local context and provide support in terms of humanitarian assistance, sustainable development, agribusiness investment, security and peace (Nigeria), or in the context of environmental protection and economic cooperation (Colombia), or humanitarian assistance (Indonesia). Positive descriptors come with citations of EU actors and actions: ‘EU-Nigeria partnership had never been stronger and more relevant’ (Nigeria), the EU acting as ‘friends in need’ to help Indonesians with the impact of flood and Seroja Cyclone. The positive emotive charge in Nigerian press coverage is based more widely on emotive descriptors such as ‘partnership’, ‘collaboration’, ‘jointly’, ‘generosity’, ‘collectively’, ‘joining forces’, all of which point to working together, especially in development, but also sustainable development, and on strengthening the EU-Nigeria economic relationship.

More broadly, it appears that the themes of climate/environment and mutually beneficial bilateral collaboration are among the issues that attract positive evaluations to the EU across the countries. For example, Indian media frame the initiative taken by CDRI and the EU Green Deal for disaster-resilient infrastructure and management as ‘collaborative platform’, ‘welcome initiative’, ‘amicable strategy and adaptation’.

Otherwise, positive assessments of the EU are highly issue- and location-specific. For Russia, positive images of the EU appear in the reports on matters that do not touch upon Russia’s political relations with the EU, e.g., EU standards on fertilisers are beneficial to Russia’s exports and, thus, framed positively. EU-Russia economic cooperation is seen in a more neutral, pragmatic topic, with Western financial instruments more fitting their purpose than Russian ones. The coverage of the EU in the leading Chinese newspapers also suggests that China values the EU as its trade partner and considers it an important political actor in the international arena. Chinese media write positively about the EU’s advanced technology and its leading role in climate change mitigation, where China can also benefit and learn from the EU. South African media, while predominantly negative, frames the EU positively when it comes to some hope and confidence in the EU’s (economic and internal) future, climate

change, and the EU's action against Russia in the context of human rights violation. The picture is very similar to that presented in Mexican media, which also frames the EU in negative terms covering most issues. Still, it changes evaluation to positive in the context of collaboration, 'messages of hope' as the pandemic is slowly overcome, the EU's 'commitment' to the environment and the EU's 'protection of human rights by acting against Russia's violations of this norm.

While presenting dominantly neutral media reporting, Brazil places high hopes with strong positive connotations on Mario Draghi becoming Italy's Prime Minister (the same is observed in the US, Republic of Korea, and Japan). The new Italian PM is framed as 'Super Mario' in several instances, repeating the descriptor used in the 2015 coverage to describe his competent leadership of the ECB. Mario Draghi is also referred to positively in the context of EU solidarity and the Erasmus programme. On the EU solidarity, the article 'Vaccination in the EU could be worse without centralisation' (*O Globo*) argues that 'one of the main reasons why the EU is in trouble is because it has acted more based on the concept of solidarity than the UK and the US' and that 'it is strange to characterise as a failure a stance that should be celebrated. Canadian media – while presenting dominantly neutral coverage with a negative tilt – frame the EU positively in terms of its regulatory standards when it comes to big tech companies (*National Post*). The positive framing is also notably applied to the EU role in international sanctions regimes in defence of the rule of law (*The Globe and Mail*).

The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy is framed as a positive step in the EU's approach towards the Asia Pacific (Indonesia); the EU is 'betting big on India' (India) although anticipating Chinese observers 'raising eyebrows' at this initiative (India). Interestingly, positive framing of regional cooperation in Japan's reporting about the EU comes primarily from positive evaluation of actions by other actors such as the US or the UK. In such publications, the EU is rather on the background: the US is the factor on sanctions against China which are framed positively; the US initiates the restoration of the transatlantic alliance, while the UK's growing presence in the Indo-Pacific is anticipated in Japanese media.

Positive outlook into the EU's global role in the future is found in India and Indonesia through evaluations such as 'reclaiming Europe' post-pandemic, 'Europe fit for the digital age' where EU-India cooperation is framed as 'constructive'; 'comprehensive'; 'mutually beneficial' (India). Further, EU regulations of the AI technology are framed as, 'the EU is spearheading the development of new global norms to make sure AI can be trusted' (the US, word-to-word reprinted in Chinese media). In Indonesia, which has several unresolved disputes with the EU, one article argues that the EU ban on Indonesian palm oil is based on a 'misperception'; media, in general, see EU-Indonesia cooperation in a positive light and anticipate that this partnership will bring resolution to the remaining debated issues.

### *Negative*

The countries that report most negatively on the EU – when it is reported as a major theme – are Russia, China, Mexico and South Africa.

As commented in other sections, Russia and China frame the EU negatively in political and normative frames. Media in both countries portray the EU-backed sanctions as an attempt to exploit the theme of human rights. Both point to the EU's own double standards in this respect: while Chinese media link this to the notion of social (in)equality, Russian media draw to human rights violations during police actions against demonstrators in the EU Member States.

Russian media portray Russia and the EU as 'drifting apart', Russia being 'threatened' by sanctions. The titles of Russia's publications are usually sarcastic and provide a clear idea of the main message in the article. For example, the visit of Josep Borrell and the conflict over diplomatic expulsion receive titles such as, 'Josep Borrell was wittily dissected', 'Josep Borrell is charged with great humiliation', 'Expelled with good intentions. EU agency and impact are downgraded linguistically, e.g., Russia is ready to give an 'adequate reply' to any 'hard messages' and not react to 'mentor statements' of the EU. The titles of the articles portray Western sanctions as

something that will have no impact on Russia: 'Sanctions as a conversation with oneself', 'Sanctions as a blessing'. Similar framing is registered for the Chinese media that quote statements by Chinese officials on asking 'the European side to think twice'. EU sanctions are seen as 'walking on blade' and a 'naive' move by the EU to 'smear China'. In contrast, China's response sanction is seen as a 'timely' response to 'injustice'. Russian media further point to the EU being 'offended' by Chinese response sanctions.

Geopolitical references are more pronounced in the Chinese sample. Local media point to the EU's dependence on the US, e. g. the EU being 'inspired by the United States' in its foreign policy, 'plagiarising' the US human rights sanctions. Telling titles 'Blinken Tries Hard to Rally Europe Against China', 'EU follows US in manipulating sanctions over Xinjiang' point to those sanctions is a lose-lose situation for China and the EU but are conspired by the US to their benefit. Negative evaluations also concern the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy – as 'pointing the finger at China' despite the assurances. One of the titles questions 'Not "Anti-China"?', with the text stating 'they will seek to work with so-called like-minded partners to uphold the so-called fundamental rights of the Indo-Pacific region'.

Finally, EU institutions are framed extremely negatively in handling the Covid pandemic. While this is true for most countries under observation, the situation has been depicted the worst by media in Russia and China. There, local media frame the EU as unduly politicising EU-Russia relations and extending their conflict to the spheres beyond human rights, such as unfair competition against Russian and Chinese vaccines. The EU is framed to refuse in vaccine certification of the Russian vaccine because it is 'Russian' per se, the absence of the 3rd phase of tests is a 'pretext' to broader themes, because 'for some in the EU', buying the Russian vaccine 'is a sharp knife in the heart'. Similarly, Chinese media frame the EU's critique of Chinese and Russian vaccine diplomacy as 'inappropriate'. China and Russia are reported as acting together, e.g., 'hit back after EU slandered "fake news" on vaccine release'.

The Covid-19 pandemic has triggered probably the highest range of strong negative evaluations of the EU institutional capacity to cope with the crisis and the state of its internal solidarity or rather the lack of it. This type of coverage was present even in those countries that generally tend to keep the neutral tone (Brazil, Canada, Republic of Korea, the US, Japan). The particularly visible issue covered within this theme is the EU-UK 'ugly' 'vaccine war' (China), or 'battle' (Republic of Korea) and the EU's 'institutional paralysis' in the course of 'chaotic vaccine rollout' (US). The US media particularly portray helplessness of the '[EU] countries [...] grappling with uncertainties', because the EU only 'works in fair weather' referencing complaints of EU Member States, 'the Commission "should support us and not put a monkey wrench in the works with cheap advice"'. Descriptors towards the EU's vaccine rollout such as a 'fiasco', the EU 'plunged in chaos' (South Africa), 'European failure' and 'fiasco', 'EU countries devastated Covid variants' (Brazil) are common. Mexican media also references the lack of international solidarity and that 'Europe has lost the opportunity to become an international actor with its own voice' while assessing that the 'geopolitics of vaccines is rampant'. The US, Japan, Brazil report that 'EU countries are far behind in vaccination campaigns compared to the UK and the US although in more neutral terms. Negativity in Mexico is driven by the EU's restrictive vaccine export regime. Mexican press presents emotive descriptors such as that the EU is 'hoarding vaccines' and that 'highly developed nations brought out colonial copper and proceeded as they have historically done rampage and hoarding' (both in *La Jornada*). Republic of Korea media also frame exports ban in strong words such as 'vaccine scramble', "' vaccine nationalism" to the extreme', vaccine nationalism that 'sweeps Europe'. However, these titles are more negative than the actual texts of the publications.

Relatively smaller but still a visible theme in driving negative attitudes towards the EU is the introduction of the "carbon tax" which is presented by international media to benefit the EU and strengthen the gap between developed and developing nations (India, Indonesia, Russia). Here emotive references include such examples as 'G7 will make poor world pay for its climate policies' (title from some news from Indonesia), 'the carbon tax for the EU will be paid by other countries' (Russia). Carbon border adjustment mechanism also seems to favour EU

companies in the eyes of the Japanese correspondents. This is reported as incompatible with free trade and hard Japan's economic interests. Japan is advised to 'drive a wedge' here.

Brexit and particularly EU-UK post-Brexit deal negotiations is another theme that highlights the conflict and brings in more negative sentiments. In South Africa, Brexit is presented as indicative of the EU Commissions 'incompetence', despite local media frame the EU as 'seeking to contain the "fallout" from Brexit'. In the US, Brexit is 'compared to an angry divorce after nearly 45 years of marriage' that 'has since become the source of considerable problems and aggravations. However, this framing refers largely to the process itself rather than the negative attitude towards the EU (the US, Japan, India, China).

Finally, several location-specific issues lead towards more negative framing of the EU in local media. In Nigeria, it is the EU's handling of Covid vaccine distribution and global support for vaccination export, although the EU's assistance for vaccines in Nigeria is seen positively. In South Africa, negativity is driven by what is considered unfair poultry export conditions for South African producers and with the EU's trade policy being 'more assertive' at the disadvantage of South Africa and Africa more broadly.

Further negative frames concern a variety of themes, including politics internal and external, the economy, normative, research, science and technology, energy, development, climate/environment, social and health. Importantly, even in locations with more negative framing of the EU (Russia, China), local media report on viewpoints of both opposing parties.

Similar problems are found in India and Indonesia whose media portray the EU in rather neutral terms but point to reservations that regard trade deals. In India, the EU-India FTA negotiation is framed as highly bureaucratized and with no yet substantial outcome. The media also predict that some debated issues such as the EU's access to India's market and finances will remain unresolved. In Indonesia, the problems regarding exports of palm oil remain a debated issue in relations with the EU. The EU's filing a case against Indonesia to the WTO for the ban on the exports of nickel ore also drives conflict and negativity in media. In India, the issue that triggers negative portrayals of the EU is the EU accepting Pakistan's plea against India's claim over the exclusive geographical indication (GI) tag for the export of Basmati rice.

### *Mixed*

While mixed emotive framings of the EU do not dominate across the countries, they do point to ambiguity around the framing of the EU. The Green Deal is presented in Russian media as a depoliticised but difficult and non-strategic topic (the EU's over-reliance on renewable energy sources is considered unsustainable). This topic receives mixed evaluations – partly due to Russia's difficulties in decarbonising its energy sector and national interest in gas exports. Nigeria and Canada indicate a higher degree of mixed frames, followed by Mexico, which may point to more ambiguity about the EU in these locations. However, the numbers are too low to make a definitive statement on such ambiguity. One example of ambiguity comes from the US, where local media stress that sanctions against Russia and China 'hurt' some EU partners. According to local journalists, these partners still seek to 'boost commercial ties with China' and need to be more independent to soften the impact of any future similar measures.

In a different pattern, media publications in some other locations point to a change in attitudes towards the EU as the events unfold. For example, in India, 'the veil of secrecy' behind the EU's discussion on the intellectual property waiver translated into expectations of 'actionable realities' that were not met. However, a negative attitude towards the EU inability to find a consensus on the TRIPS waiver and support developing nations had changed towards a positive attitude when the EU supported India and South Africa in their request for waiver of patent and other intellectual property rights to WTO. In Japanese media, a somewhat similar change in attitudes is manifested in relation to the EU ban on vaccine exports. In light of the importance of this move for Japan's vaccine supply, the ban is framed negatively at first, but once vaccine exports to Japan are allowed, media portrayals of the EU move to more positive ones. A somewhat similar situation occurs to the framing of the




exports ban in Republic of Korea. At first, this move by the EU is mired by the fact that it continued to request other actors (the US) to continue their vaccine supply to the EU. However, positive evaluations emerge when the EU secures vaccine contracts with Pfizer, and the notion of the EU's support to Korea in vaccine procurement appears in media messages.

In the category of mixed emotive framing, Japanese reporting can be considered a lead. Generally neutral, it often requires the reader to “read between the lines”. Japanese media report ambiguously about the EU-proposed AI regulations. While they mark the EU's bid on becoming an international rulemaking in the field from a neutral-to-positive perspective, reporters also see the EU's AI monitoring as potentially leading to ‘unfair’ treatment of certain companies and even ‘harm innovation’. Another observation refers to carbon taxation in Europe, which does not seem to be directly related to Japan yet may cost Japanese companies 260 billion yen. The EU-proposed taxonomy based on companies' environmental efforts is reported from a neutral position. Still, the authors also foresee difficult negotiations for Japan because nuclear power and natural gas classification are yet to be decided.


A cautious ambiguous frame of the EU appears in the US media reporting on the ECB's monetary stimulus policy. While the policy is seen as a positive step in the context of the pandemic, reporters note that continuous support by the EU may be seen as aggressive. US media also point that the EU needs to make more efforts for its post-pandemic recovery because it lags behind the US in the recovery among Western countries.

While positive and negative evaluations are relatively easy to gauge through the analysis of dynamic descriptors and metaphors, we believe the detailed capture of the nuances in neutral and mixed press evaluations adds a crucial input. It allows for assessing a complex EU image dynamic as it is created and disseminated by the leading press across 13 key partners. Figure 29 presents the aggregated data of qualitative analysis that allow comparing findings country by country.

**FIGURE 29. EMOTIVE CHARGE OF THE EU, BY THEME (QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS)**



## Annex III. Comparative traditional media report



■ Positive ■ Slightly positive ■ Neutral ■ Mixed ■ Slightly negative ■ Negative ▨ No publications

**Source:** Based on experts' qualitative analysis. **Note:** Due to the lower sample of qualitative analysis, some themes were not covered at all. Due to the methodological specifics of the analysis, one article can be coded as reflecting more than one theme.

### EVOLUTION AND CONTINUITY OF EVALUATION

While the economic crisis confronting Greece and the migration crisis facing the EU were the ongoing themes in media reports on the EU in 2015 – with a corresponding tendency to profile negative assessments of the EU as an economic and social affairs actor – the Covid pandemic has firmly taken over as one of the main drivers of negative perceptions of the EU, diverting, in part, the negative effect of the EU's internal crises towards the main focus on the EU's handling of the pandemic and a restrictive export regime of vaccines in the media reports in the period observed.

#### *Neutral assessment*

Similar to the 2015 Study, neutral coverage of the EU remains dominant in Japan, Republic of Korea and the US. While media in these countries point to the problems in the EU, their emotive charge remains weighted or least dominant in the overall coverage. Among other countries, Canada, India, and Brazil are leaning towards more neutral framings – albeit Canada with a negative and Brazil and India with a positive tilt.

#### *Changed towards more negative*

In contrast to the 2015 Study, where Mexico produced a more balanced reportage, the picture in 2021 has changed towards a more polarised balance, with media in Mexico framing the EU now dominantly negatively (caveated, of course, by the limit in terms of the observational period). The same trend applies to Russia and South Africa whose media appeared to be the most neutral in 2015. Noteworthy, the 2015 media analysis in Russia already picked on the trends of more negative metaphorical and emotive evaluations, which has gained more visibility in 2021. China that featured in largely neutral coverage in 2015 has also reversed towards a more negative evaluation of the EU in the political field.

#### *Changed towards more positive*

While India's framing of the EU remains rather similar in 2015 and 2021 Studies, the views on the state of EU-India trade negotiations provide a more positive vision of future outlook.

**New locations**

“Newcomers” Nigeria, Colombia and Indonesia tend to frame the EU more positively, although a mixed view of the EU remains, especially as the negative descriptors carry more intensity than positive frames, including terms such as ‘sluggishness’ and ‘selfishness’ (Nigeria). For these three new countries, we cannot compare the continuity or evolution of media frames based on the 2015 Study.


**Future outlook**

In terms of future outlook, the level and theme of negativity define how media outlets across countries project a vision of the future. More generally, as the EU is increasingly seen to be able to address its problems and internal divisions the future outlook becomes more positive. In cases where negativity is dominant (Russia, South Africa and Mexico), such future outlook is not positive and tends to be overshadowed by the negativity associated with the EU or is not necessarily mentioned at all. In contrast, in India and Indonesia positive outlook persists despite the appreciation of existing difficulties in cooperation.

**5.2. Europe**

The distribution of emotive evaluations in the press articles in the “Europe” dataset resembles the pattern identified in the “EU” dataset, yet with a slightly higher share of negative evaluations. Findings from the quantitative analysis of the English-language outlets are presented in **Error! Reference source not found.**


**FIGURE 30. EMOTIVE CHARGE IN THE EUROPE PRESS COVERAGE IN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS**



**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021. Python programming language and integrated sentiment analysis libraries were used to generate results and sort the data. Due to methodological specifics of the analysis, the “neutral” category includes articles written in neutral tone and the articles with the mixed emotive charge. Due to methodology one article can be coded as reflecting more than one theme.

Assessing themes vis-à-vis the sentiment, no single theme is observed to attract a particularly strong negative or positive sentiment. The general trend of neutral to positive evaluation continues across all themes observed, yet with a slightly higher share of negative evaluations.

FIGURE 31. EMOTIVE CHARGE OF EUROPE, BY THEME (QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS)



**Source:** Sourced from the *Factiva* repository. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021. Python programming language and integrated sentiment analysis libraries were used to generate results and sort the data. Due to methodological specifics of the analysis, the “neutral” category includes articles written in neutral tone and the articles with the mixed emotive charge. Due to methodology one article can be coded as reflecting more than one theme.

## Summary

### VISIBILITY:

In 2021, the Covid-19 crisis becomes the major factor for EU visibility in the press across the 13 countries under observation. Differently from the 2015 Eurozone crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic has local, EU and global references. EU Covid-related actions can be reported as having an impact on the EU itself, on the country under observation, or globally, which reinforces the EU’s visibility in local media. Being reported in connection with a major global crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU is often presented negatively, posing potential risks for future framing of the EU in the local media.

Our special focus on the major visibility of the EU helps to understand the drivers behind visibility – in 2021, they are *EU-specific* and *location-specific* and in combination with each other. But the Covid-19 pandemic promoted the rise of *global* and *regional* factors. As a result, *global* and *regional* factors interact with *EU-specific* and *location-specific* factors more often.

### ACTORNESS:

The nature of the Covid-19 crisis triggers the visibility of EU institutions active in the EU’s response to the pandemic. The European Medicines Agency came to prominence in EU press coverage in 2021 and became the third most covered EU institution (after the European Commission and the European Central Bank). A significant

### Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

share of the European Commission and the ECB press coverage is also due to the role of these institutions in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Germany and France remain the most visible among the EU Member States. The smaller and newer EU Member States remain much less visible in the press coverage across the 13 countries under observation.

Both quantitative and qualitative media analyses indicate that the key themes for the EU media coverage in the thirteen countries under observation are *politics*, *economy* and *health*, with *health* gaining prominence due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Qualitative media analysis indicates a growing overlap and a mixture of themes in EU press reporting. As a part of this trend, reports on trade agreements are framed as part of political and regional cooperation; the Covid-19 pandemic is treated in the context of its economic impact; vaccine certification is framed as a political issue; research, science and technology are reported in the context of healthcare innovations; energy and environmental issues tend to be reported either in combination or in the context of development, trade and the economy.

Health news coverage has the top place and is followed by economy and politics. Compared to the 2015 study, qualitative media analysis indicates more EU-related news covering climate change and environmental issues. Other topics remain much less visible. Research, science and technology, culture, development remain under-addressed in the traditional media, which keeps overlooking “good news”. Quantitative analysis of the “Europe” dataset demonstrates a higher share of culture-related news compared to the “EU” dataset.

#### NORMATIVE:

Media analysis reveals that the EU’s perceived normative capacity is highly influenced by the local factors in countries under observation (e.g., the EU High Representative’s statements and actions concerning Alexey Navalny are approved in many countries, but not in China and Russia). The normative power of the EU as presented by the local media reflects the most important local issues rather than the EU itself. As such, it triggers a range of emotive reactions, remains ideologically loaded and thus sensitive.

#### LOCAL RESONANCE:

The “local hook” in the EU press coverage can be developed by local media in a non-straight-forward manner. This circumstance underlines the role of EU Delegations on the ground and the efficacy of their contacts with the local media.

The division of local and international sources of EU-related news in the 13 countries demonstrates the influence of a handful of international news agencies on framing the EU internationally (most of them are Anglo-Saxon, from the UK and the US; one exception is French *AFP*). These are the same leading international news agencies as in 2015, suggesting an ongoing influence on the global framing of the EU, as “sources make the news”. However, locations differ in their preferences between domestic and international sources when they report on the EU. Knowledge about domestic news sources and how they frame the EU is of special value for EU Delegations on the ground.

## 6. Short country summaries

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### 6.1. Brazil Country Report

Brazil media analysis covers news by GRUPO GLOBO (owner of *O Globo* and *Valor Econômico*) and GRUPO FOLHA (owner of *Folha de São Paulo*). There are no high circulation left-leaning newspapers in Brazil, and three newspapers selected for this analysis can be characterised as centre or centre-right and highly critical of the far-right Brazilian government. Overall, only a few powerful media conglomerates constitute the Brazilian media landscape. Heightened visibility of the EU in Brazilian media (here: *O Globo*, *Folha de São Paulo* and *Valor Econômico*) is driven by EU-specific factors, particularly the EU's handling of the Covid pandemic; domestic issues of EU Member States; and EU relations with third countries. The only location-specific factor mentioned is resistance within the EU to ratify the EU-MERCOSUR agreement, which is portrayed as a reasonable response to Bolsonaro's disregard for the environment. Compared to the 2015 media analysis, EU press coverage in 2021 is less emotionally charged.

#### 6.1.1. Visibility

Most of the EU-related news published in the business daily *Valor* (42 articles in total) are placed in the "world news" section, rather than "economy" or "finance", and cover a wide range of topics, as is news in *O Globo* (19 articles) and *Folha* (36 articles). Most of the articles are average in length. *Valor Economics* tends to report in shorter articles, *O Globo* – of average length and *Folha* writes longer articles more frequently.

#### 6.1.2. Actorness

The most visible themes in the sample are politics and health (Covid), followed by, in order, economy, normative, environment and research, science and technology. Differently from 2015, when social and culture featured prominently due to the migration crisis, other topics are rarely mentioned in the 2021 study. The distribution of themes is even among the news outlets. Regarding politics inside the EU, the topics with greater visibility are former ECB President Mario Draghi accepting the invitation to become Italy's Prime Minister; EU Commission concerns about democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary (freedom of the press); and the mistreatment of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in an official visit to Turkey. News about EU external relations highlight EU sanctions against China for HR violations in Xinjiang; Iran's refusal to accept EU invitation to participate in informal talks on the country's nuclear programme; and EU support for Ukraine in the context of Russian military deployment to the country's border. On health, Covid-related news dominate press coverage, presenting the EU as a rather ineffective actor, with a focus on vaccine procurement (disputes with the UK and AstraZeneca for delays in vaccine supplies); EMA approval of Johnson & Johnson, AstraZeneca and Janssen vaccines, exclusion of Sputnik from EU vaccination strategy; slow vaccine rollout; restrictions on the use of AstraZeneca by the EU Member States; EU export controls of vaccines manufactured in the bloc to third countries; and discussions on a "Digital Green Pass" (travel pass after vaccinations). With regard to the economy, most of the news are about market optimism (Draghi becoming Italy's PM; the EU recovery fund and expectations that, with the vaccine rollout, the EU economy would return to pre-pandemic levels). The ECB monetary policy is also covered, mostly by *Valor Econômico*. Most of the news in the category of climate and environment are about the EU setting tougher emission reduction targets and resistance by the EU Member States to ratify the EU-MERCOSUR agreement. Most of

the news pieces coded as research, science and technology are about scientific discoveries and developments regarding vaccines. Given the themes, the most visible EU institutions are the European Commission, the EMA and the ECB. The most visible EU officials are Ursula von der Leyen; Mario Draghi and Charles Michel (mostly his lack of action to prevent von der Leyen's mistreatment in Turkey). The most visible EU Member States are France and Germany (both in the context of Covid), Italy (election of Draghi), and Hungary (curtailing press freedom and administering the non-EMA approved Sputnik vaccine). Other actors are the US, China and Russia. The US is mentioned in articles about the vaccine rollout (favourably compared to the EU), and about joint EU-US actions on establishing sanctions against China and condemning Russia's military deployment to Ukraine borders. China appears vis-à-vis the EU as an important Covid vaccine exporter; for setting emission reduction targets and for human rights violations. Russia, apart from military deployments, is mentioned vis-à-vis the EU in articles about Sputnik approval.

### 6.1.3. Normative

The EU is framed as a normative actor in news pieces about democratic backsliding in Poland and Hungary (negative) and EU sanctions for human rights violations in China (neutral). In articles about EU sanctions on China, there are brief mentions of EU sanctions against Myanmar. Contrastingly, in 2015, the normative frame was mostly visible with regards to the EU's disrespect of its human rights standards in the handling of the migration crisis.

### 6.1.4. Local Resonance

Different to the 2015 Study, the only news source mentioned at all is local (*Folhapress*), in a few articles published by *Folha de São Paulo*. In addition, most of the articles were unattributed. The few local journalists with more than one article credited are André Mizutani and Rafael Vazquez from *Valor Econômico*. As in the 2015 Study, very few articles have a local hook. Most news items are about specific EU Member States (France and Germany, Italy and Hungary, see above); the EU in general (mostly Covid handling); or the EU and third countries (in particular China and Russia). Also similar to the 2015 Study, when a local hook is present, it is usually the EU-MERCOSUR Agreement (mostly reacting to Bolsonaro's detrimental environmental policy).

### 6.1.5. Emotive charge

The majority of articles, in all thematic frames, are neutral about the EU. The exception is articles about the EU's handling of Covid which are negatively framed with emotionally loaded descriptors such as: 'European failure'; 'fiasco'; 'EU countries devastated by Covid variants'; 'EU countries are far behind in vaccination campaigns compared to the UK and the US'. EU solidarity is framed positively: 'European solidarity makes it imperative to help other countries in order to save lives'; 'the EU has acted more based on the concept of solidarity than the UK and the USA'. There is no discernible pattern in the distribution of emotive evaluations across outlets. In 2015, most of the articles were also neutral about the EU. However, in 2015 there were more negative than positive evaluations of the EU, across several thematic frames and the press coverage of the EU now seems less emotively charged.

### 6.1.6. Summary

Factors leading the EU coverage in Brazil are mostly *EU-* and *EU Member States-specific* or EU actions in/with third countries. The main local hook, as in 2015, continues to be the EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement, now awaiting ratification by the resistant EU Member States, whose criticisms of the current Brazilian government



are portrayed as justified. Due to the lack of information on news sources, it is difficult to say who shapes the most visible narratives about the EU.

## 6.2. Canada Country Report

Included in the analysis are *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*, the two major country-wide Canadian broadsheet dailies. A new addition to the analysis in 2021 is the *Calgary Herald*, from the province of Alberta. Provincial dailies are a central feature of the Canadian media system, and Postmedia, which owns both the *National Post* and the *Calgary Herald*, owns similar dailies in five different provinces in the country. In total, the Postmedia group runs five out of the ten dailies with the largest circulation in Canada. In 2021, Canadian media stop addressing the EU most prominently in economic terms and instead skew towards Covid-related issues such as health and related innovation. Some issues such as Brexit or sanctions against Russia remain visible, but any discussions related to the environment or energy remain a non-issue. As in 2015, the 2021 Study shows that Canadian dailies focus on “crisis” EU stories (Covid in 2021; the Eurozone debt crisis and refugee crises in 2015).

### 6.2.1. Visibility

The sample includes 69 articles: 31 by *The Globe and Mail*, 28 by the *National Post* and 10 by the *Calgary Herald*. In the *National Post*, the placement of EU news is evenly found in the “world section” for Covid-related articles or in the “business section” (or the “Financial Post” at the *National Post*) for most other news. A few are also featured more centrally in the “news” section when there is a local angle to the story. *The Globe and Mail* has no dedicated world/international news section, and most EU articles appear in the large “news” section, around the middle (pages 5-7). In contrast to the *National Post*, Covid-related articles appear in both the general news and business sections (*The Globe and Mail*’s “Report on Business”). Finally, the *Calgary Herald* reproduces content from the *National Post* in the “world” pages. There is a greater proportion of long, detailed articles in *The Globe and Mail* in 2021.

### 6.2.2. Actorness

31 of the 69 total articles deal with the topic of health/Covid pandemic. While some of those feature an EU-specific dimension (Europe’s ineffective vaccine rollout), the most visible ones (size, placement) deal with the impacts of the EU’s vaccines export regime for Canada. 19 articles address internal politics in the EU, particularly Brexit and its consequences (e.g., Northern Ireland). Only 8 articles focus on external politics, almost all of them with a focus on Russia and the EU’s reactions to Russian vaccine diplomacy, military build-up in Ukraine, or Navalny and international sanctions. 23 articles focus on economic themes, half of which are on the EU’s trade policy and deals – mostly EU-UK post-Brexit deal, where the EU is usually depicted as a more cohesive actor vis-à-vis the UK. Only one of those articles focuses on the EU-Canada trade deal CETA. In 2015, the Canadian media reported prominently on economic matters, in line with the dominant perception of the EU as a trade partner for Canada (also reflected in the ECB’s and Greece’s place in the news). In 2021, an unusually high share of articles (19) also features research, science and technology in the context of Covid and innovations in the health sector. In reflection of the dominant themes, the most cited EU institutions are by far the European Commission and the EMA. Ursula von der Leyen (on Covid vaccine policy) is the most frequently named EU official (14 times), followed by Charles Michel (4) and Josep Borrell (4), and Christine Lagarde (2). Germany, Italy and France are the most cited EU Member States (mostly neutrally on Covid). In addition, France and Germany receive some mentions in articles on geopolitics and sanctions (e.g., Germany



in the case of Navalny), and Italy because of its government shakeup. Those three Member States are followed by Ireland (Brexit). Greece is only mentioned four times (most frequently named EU Member State in 2015). The US is by far the non-EU actor that receives the most mentions vis-à-vis the EU (imports and exports of the anti-Covid vaccines and vaccine diplomacy).

### 6.2.3. Normative

As in 2015, the EU is not usually framed as a normative power in the Canadian press. The two exceptions to this are when the EU is: 1) portrayed as a global regulator (on the issue of regulating big tech companies or airline mergers, i.e., Air Canada and Air Transat, or 2) regarded as an advocate of the multilateral order and the rule of law (on e.g., international sanctions).

### 6.2.4. Local Resonance

The distribution of news sources is where the contrast between the three outlets is the most striking, even more so than in 2015. In the 2021 sample, *The Globe and Mail* relies almost exclusively on its own reporters: Eric Reguly, a permanent correspondent for *The Globe and Mail* in continental Europe (based in Italy, 10 articles), and Paul Waldie and Mark MacKinnon, two *The Globe and Mail* European correspondents based in the UK (10 articles combined). *The Globe and Mail* local staff writers also contribute to some articles (on Covid vaccine export). In the *National Post*, only two articles from the sample are written by the journal's staff: one from John Ivison, comparing Canada and the EU's vaccine roll-out, and an editorial by Diane Francis, on the regulation of big tech companies. The *National Post* does not have a permanent correspondent in Europe. All other articles rely on international sources, most prominently *Reuters* (9 articles) and *Bloomberg* (8 articles). The trend is the same in the *Calgary Herald*, which republished John Ivison's article and shorter stories originating from *Reuters* or the *Washington Post*. In terms of the focus of domesticity, the local focus is more prominent in *The Globe and Mail* (one out of two articles with a minor or primary local focus) than in the *National Post* or *Calgary Herald* (one out of three).

### 6.2.5. Emotive charge

Of the total 59 articles, most portray the EU in a neutral way. 17 have some negative or neutral to negative framing, and they focus almost exclusively on the EU's way of dealing with the Covid pandemic and the vaccine roll-out. Three articles are particularly negative (by Eric Reguly in *The Globe and Mail*), speaking of 'a travesty of epic proportions,' the EU's vaccine roll-out as being 'botched,' and more generally, the EU described as 'miserable,' 'desperate,' 'failed' or 'incompetent.' In general, *The Globe and Mail's* coverage tends to be more negative than that of the *National Post* or the *Calgary Herald*. Only 7 articles have some positive or neutral to positive framing, equally present in *The Globe and Mail* and the *National Post*. In *The Globe and Mail*, this positive framing applied notably to the EU's role on international sanctions – in defence of the rule-of-law. In the *National Post*, it is mostly applied to the EU's leading role in attempting to regulate big tech companies. Finally, there are also a few articles on Brexit with a mixed perspective, where the EU and the UK tend to be presented as sharing the blame for the complicated implementation of the post-Brexit agreement. Overall, the share of articles with an emotive view (often a negative one) has grown in the 2021 sample.

### 6.2.6. Summary

To conclude, EU-specific news – especially the EU's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, lead the coverage in all three outlets. However, these stories usually become more visible when there is a "local hook". Though they

feature less centrally, news on Brexit, multilateralism and geopolitics, or Russia, is recurring between 2015 and 2021. *The Globe and Mail* can be seen as leading the news coverage, because of the depth of its coverage, informed mostly by the presence of three permanent correspondents in Europe. At the opposite end, an important provincial daily like the *Calgary Herald* only reports very minimally on the EU, and with no original content.

### 6.3. China Country Report

Three newspapers in the sample – *Reference News*, *Global Times* and *People's Daily* – are state-run. They reflect the government's attitudes and priorities. *People's Daily* and *Reference News* are the two most influential newspapers with the highest circulation in mainland China. *Global Times*, administered by *People's Daily*, also closely follows agenda-setters' opinions on domestic and international affairs. Throughout February-April 2021 the publications with the EU's higher visibility focused on a range of topics, with highlights on the EU's external and internal politics, economy, normative promotion and handling the Covid pandemic. Much of high visibility coverage deals with the deterioration of EU-China and EU-Russia relations, the revival of EU-US trans-Atlantic relations, and the continuous impact of Brexit on the financial sector, trade, business and social life in the EU.

#### 6.3.1. Visibility

The sample includes 78 articles: 43 in *Global Times*, 25 in *Reference News* and 10 in *People's Daily*. *Global Times* provides more comprehensive coverage of the EU, sometimes extending it to longer articles. The other two outlets tend to report the EU in shorter or average length. In *Reference News* the topics that refer to the US and Russia are more visible than those of the EU. The placement of EU news does not follow a single pattern. *Global Times* tends to report on the EU in "news background", while *People's Daily* – in its international section. *Reference News* disperses EU news across ten different sections, such as "social scan", "China land", "hot topic news", etc.

#### 6.3.2. Actorness

EU external relations dominate the coverage (EU-Russia diplomatic conflict and sanctions), followed by the EU's internal politics (lack of solidarity over vaccine issues). Equally visible are themes of health (the EU-UK "vaccine war"; "vaccine diplomacy"; Covid certificate for free movement in the EU) and economy (the EU's post-pandemic recovery; the UK applying for the CPTPP post Brexit; European companies losing profits due to EU sanctions against China). The normative frame follows (the EU's reaction to human rights in China and Russia and electoral vote in Hong Kong). Very few publications cover the EU in the context of research, science and technology and environment. When appears, coverage of research, science and technology is connected to innovations in general, e. g. artificial intelligence, chip industry and digital currency (positive evaluation), and health sector (negative for vaccine certification). Meanwhile, framing of the EU in the theme of *environment* is more positive, particularly in exchange of experience and technology in climate change governance between the EU and China. In comparison to the other two newspapers, *People's Daily* focuses on political issues more, presenting the Chinese government's official statements retaliating the EU over Xinjiang and Hong Kong issues (negative framing) and the government's expectation of increasing global climate change governance together with the EU (neutral/positive). In *Reference News*, the EU is discussed as being too dependent on the US politically and thus facing economic losses because the US is argued to benefit from EU-China opposition. *Reference News* also reports China's keen interest in the EU's post-pandemic economic recovery if and when both continue their economic collaboration. *Reference News* also assigns positive evaluations to the EU's actions in tackling climate

change (including the 2050 carbon-neutral initiative, proposals of setting up a series of climate change laws) and initiatives in promoting technology, innovation and strategic industry autonomy.

While the EU's coverage is overall neutral, most negative evaluations are assigned to health and the EU's foreign policy and *normative* frame. All three newspapers portray the EU as an ineffective actor in handling the pandemic (vaccine exports control, internal disagreement on vaccine allocation) and as intruding into domestic affairs of other states (Russia and China in light of human rights issues. EU institutions (European Commission, European Parliament and European Council) and relevant EU officials (Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borrell, Charles Michel) are most frequently referenced in the three newspapers. Germany and France stand out in the framing of EU politics, external actions as well as internal health governance. Hungary, Poland and Serbia (the last one as an EU candidate) are mentioned as receivers of China's recent vaccine diplomacy. The fact that China has overtaken the US and became the EU's largest trading partner is reported extensively in both *Global Times* and *People's Daily*, and as an argument against EU-imposed sanctions against China. The US is seen as manipulating the EU in this situation and benefiting from it the most. The UK and Canada are also mentioned as part of the sanctioning group. The EU's declared intention to create its own strategy in Indo-Pacific is also framed as a move against China, while the EU's work with Australia and New Zealand on Free Trade Agreements is portrayed neutrally. The EU is still framed as an important political and economic partner for China, however, their divergences on EU-upheld norms seem increasingly conspicuous and China is very assertive in confronting the EU in this regard. A balanced priority and visibility assigned to the EU in the context of economy and politics in 2021 coverage, mirrors the thematic priorities and their balance in the Baseline Study in 2015.

### 6.3.3. Normative

The three newspapers assigned the EU's normative actorness with negative connotation portraying EU normative messages and projections as interference in internal affairs of other countries. This referred both to the EU sanctions against Chinese officials over the issues of Xinjiang and Hong Kong and the EU's troubled relations with Russia over the imprisonment of Alexey Navalny. Different from the 2015 Study, the conflicts between China and the EU on human rights, rule of law, democracy and liberty were extensively reported across the three newspapers in a negative tone, thus, increasing the EU's visibility in this frame. However, China is seen to be very assertive in confronting the EU in its 'interferences into domestic affairs' of China. Here, the EU is seen to bypass or disregard China's diplomatic principle of non-interference.

### 6.3.4. Local Resonance

Local news agencies were the dominant sources for EU news by *People's Daily*. In contrast, *Global Times* and *Reference News* quoted international sources more frequently. *Global Times* often featured multiple (more than four) international news sources referenced in one single news article (in one publication their number peaked at 13). The most frequently used international sources are *AFP*, *Financial Times*, *Bloomberg*, *Reuters* as well as German, French and Russian sources (*AFP*, *Die Welt*, *Duetsche Welle*, *Handelsblatt*, *Sputnik*, etc.). This pattern is similar to the one discovered in the 2015 Study. Also similar to 2015, the EU news with a local hook balanced in visibility the news focusing on the EU and EU Member States. Most publications contain a strong 'local hook' when reporting on the EU whether it refers to its domestic developments or international roles, e.g., China acting on par with the EU.

### 6.3.5. Emotive charge

The stronger negative emotive charge was registered in *Global Times* than in the other two newspapers through narratives such as 'the EU utilises Northern Ireland in the most despicable way', 'the EU is everyone's enemy in

terms of vaccine conflicts". Negative evaluations across all three outlets concerned EU-China relations (the EU being 'morally arrogant' by interfering in Xinjiang and using 'double standards' in judging the situation in Hong Kong), Josep Borrell's diplomatic visit to Russia ('humiliating') and vaccine-related issues (a 'nightmare' of the EU's handling of the pandemic; 'helpless' small EU Member States; 'vaccine battle'). In contrast, economic relations (trade, investment) between the EU and China are seen as 'injecting new impetus to the world economy recovery' post pandemic. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment between the two is hailed as 'unprecedented' and bringing 'positive energy for maintaining multilateralism'. Therefore, as in the 2015 Study, the EU is still portrayed positively as a significant economic partner for Beijing, while the EU's external political and normative actions towards Russia still receive negative evaluations.

### 6.3.6. Summary

The coverage of the EU in the three Chinese newspapers suggests that China values the EU as its trade partner but dependent on the US political leadership, which prevents the EU from benefiting from EU-China relations. EU efforts in exporting its values to Russia and China contradict China's diplomatic principle of non-interference. The EU is still evaluated as an important partner for China in collaborating in international political, economic affairs and tackling climate change, but the negative perception of the EU's troubled external relations with Russia and the lack of the EU's internal solidarity remains. Importantly, several trends in the distribution of themes, sources and the foci of domesticity remain constant over time, assigning similar priorities and balances.

## 6.4. Colombia Country Report

The three newspapers analysed – *El Espectador*, *El País* and *Portafolio* – are high in circulation and among the main nationwide sources of current political and economic affairs. *El Espectador* is the oldest newspaper in the country with an independent and liberal outlook and national circulation. *El País*, with a conservative-leaning, is a newspaper with regional circulation, and *Portafolio* specialises on economic and business issues with a more liberal lens. All three newspapers are owned by the three largest publishing houses: *El Espectador* by Grupo Santodomingo, *El País* by Grupo Llorede and *Portafolio* by Grupo Sarmiento Angulo. These newspapers remain independent from the government and any political party in the country, providing an open platform to discuss key issues relevant to the country. The analysis demonstrates that the news reporting the EU with a major degree of intensity frame the EU as a positive referent. However, there is a low volume of news where the EU is visible through its actions/programmes in Colombia. The most relevant themes are biodiversity, energy, sustainable agriculture, peace and human rights. Colombia was not a part of the 2015 Baseline Study as such this report will not feature a comparative analysis of the framing of the EU over time.

### 6.4.1. Visibility

*El Espectador* (15 articles) covers the EU the most in this analysis, followed by *El País* (12 articles) and *Portafolio* (6 articles). The EU news in all three dailies focus on economy or trade, politics, social and environmental issues. While *Portafolio* is a business daily, both *El Espectador* and *El País* also report on economic news of the EU. *Portafolio* also reports on EU news other than economy and trade. World news and environment news are two sections with more presence of EU news in the observed newspapers. It is important to mention the alliance for an ambitious, educational, participatory and informative campaign called Colombia 2020 between *El Espectador* and the EU, which seeks to accompany the Peace Process. This partnership gives more visibility for EU news.

Most of the articles in the three newspapers are of average length and only a few articles are above average length and more thoroughly analytical.

#### 6.4.2. Actorness

There is no strong thematic preference for EU reporting in the newspapers. The three dailies report on the EU's action on a global, regional or local level. Globally relevant themes, such as the Covid vaccines, the environment, the economy, democracy and technology are the most visible topics reported in relation to the EU (*global* and *EU-specific* factors). Colombia-specific factors also trigger the reportage of the EU, for example, the EU actions in the context of biodiversity, energy, sustainable agriculture, peace and human rights. Specific events or EU policies mentioned in most of the articles are the vaccination campaign in the EU and the Green Deal (EU-specific). The three newspapers frame the EU as an example to be followed by Colombia. As such, the EU is presented in those news items as an effective actor. Many EU officials cited in the articles, with the most present being Joseph Borrell, Ursula von der Leyen, Patricia Lombart Cussac (Head of the EU Delegation to Colombia), The most visible EU actors are the European Commission, European Parliament and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), because of their importance and visibility around EU-specific contexts but also for their relevance globally, mostly in reference to Covid, followed by the environment, democracy and human rights issues. The evaluation of the EU in all the above themes is positive (when it takes action or participates in processes in Colombia) and on some occasions neutral (when the EU is mentioned in general terms).

The most visible EU Member States are Germany, Spain, France and Italy, given their role in the key issue areas within the EU (Covid and economic recovery) but also in relation to themes with Colombian interest in focus, such as environment and biodiversity. Other actors are rarely mentioned, with only a few references to the US and UN as multilateral partners in such themes as vaccines and environment.

#### 6.4.3. Normative

The three newspapers frame the EU as normative power across such themes as peace, democracy, human rights and sustainable development. These themes link to Colombia-specific factors. The EU's normative profile is framed as an example for Colombia and because of the convergence with Colombians' values and norms. The EU's unwavering support for the pursuit of peace in Colombia is a visible theme in the coverage of the EU and its positive framing.

#### 6.4.4. Local Resonance

*Portafolio* and *El País* source most of their articles with a major focus on the EU from international sources. There are only few articles authored by local sources (notably Ruben Lopez Peres of *Portafolio*) where the EU is mentioned in a secondary position. In contrast, *El Espectador* is the only newspaper in the sample that relies equally on national and international sources. Its news about the EU show more interaction between the EU and Colombia and frame the EU's actions with local resonance. Among the international sources used are AFP followed by EFE.

#### 6.4.5. Emotive charge

The evaluation of the EU is predominantly positive across the three newspapers. Neutral assessments mostly concern topics that do not appear to directly link to Colombia, whereas in those articles where the main topic is Colombian matters and where the support of the EU is present, there is a positive emotional charge in relation to the EU.



#### 6.4.6. Summary

In conclusion, the factors that are leading the coverage of the EU in the local news are *global* factors (vaccines, environment, economy, democracy and technology) in which the EU has a leading voice and is a leading actor with a more general positive emotive charge. They are followed by *EU-specific* factors and policies (vaccination campaign in the EU and the Green Deal) and by Colombian local factors (biodiversity, energy, sustainable agriculture, peace, human rights). The EU is seen as an effective actor, with news assigning the EU either neutral or positive emotional charge depending on the relevance of the topic for Colombia. The three outlets present dynamic informative news about the EU.

### 6.5. India Country Report

In the focus of this analysis are three leading Indian newspapers – *The Economic Times*, *The Times of India* and *The Hindu*. Owned by the Times Group, *The Times of India* and *The Economic Times* are the largest selling newspapers in India. *The Economic Times* is a leading business and financial daily and considered to be the left-leaning. *The Hindu* is also known as left-leaning, while *The Times of India* is argued to be centre-right and somewhat critical of the government. All the three dailies had a similar approach in covering the EU reported with a major degree of centrality, but, differently from 2015, the focus of Indian media is on the themes on the environment and climate change, smart cities, EU-India FTA and Covid vaccination.

#### 6.5.1. Visibility

*The Economic Times* has the highest coverage of the EU in the sample (15 articles), followed by *The Times of India* (13) and *The Hindu* (4). The three dailies prioritise reports on EU-India trade relations and bilateral cooperation, as well as, to some extent, the EU's internal policies, such as vaccine rollout, the Green Deal, cyber-security. *The Times of India* prioritises political and normative themes; *The Economic Times* covers themes related to the economy, while *the Hindu* provides opinion on the analysis of the EU's internal challenges in terms of their impact on the EU/ Europe's approach towards India. All three dailies project both positive (regional cooperation, FTA and bilateral cooperation) and negative (vaccine, TRIPS, carbon tax) evaluations of the EU. The majority of the articles are of average length (23). The news about the EU is placed in a range of sections, e.g., "world news", "top stories", "business news", "India news", "foreign trade". The most visible news items usually discuss investments and technology, the EU's involvement in the Indo-Pacific and security (located in the rubric "world/foreign news"). Other news, related to bilateral negotiations and vaccines, receive lesser visibility and are located on the side columns of printed editions.

#### 6.5.2. Actorness

The EU is framed not only as an economic player but also as an important international/global actor in the environment, climate and health. Media point to the EU's increased interest in India is due to India's growing importance in the region and the involvement of the global actors such as China, the UK and the US. The positive evaluation of the EU is assigned to its support for collaboration in the Indo-Pacific region with India and the QUAD nations (India, US, Japan Australia) (maritime trade and connectivity). The media also emphasise the long going FTA negotiations. *The Economic Times* communicates hopes and urgency for signing the FTA while the *Hindu* raises concerns. As opposed to the 2015 Study, the re-negotiation on FTA appears to have a future instead of being in a deadlock. Attention is paid to high-level meetings between Indian and EU officials. *The*

## Annex III. Comparative traditional media report

*Times of India* and *Economic Times* also positively report the EU Summit to be held in Portugal on the 8<sup>th</sup> May 2021 as the start of a series of high-level bilateral meetings in Europe. The EU's Commissioner for Trade Valdis Dombrovskis and the Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry attended the preparatory meetings for the Summit, and India's Prime Minister is planning a series of meeting in Europe beginning with the Summit. Health is another visible theme in the reporting, with a focus on the EU's vaccination strategy, securing vaccine supplies from AstraZeneca, and the approval for vaccine technology waiver (backed up by the BASIC nations, the League of 80 nations, India and Africa at the WTO. Here, the EU's ban on vaccine exports was communicated negatively at first, but the EU's support for the waiver of the patent has changed this evaluation to positive. Covid has drawn attention to health-related technologies and Indian pharma increasing the EU's visibility and positive framing of the EU. The EU's involvement in the environmental/climate and water projects is reported favourably. Also, EU public diplomacy events appear in the regional editions of Indian media: The *Hindu Coimbatore edition*, Tamil Nadu reported on EU-India collaboration in understanding human brain diseases, while *The Times of India* reported the celebration of Earth's Day (with EU delegates) in Roorkee.

The European Council, European Parliament, ECB, EMA and EU Trade Commission are the most visible EU institutions in the reports. The most visible EU officials are the EU executive Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis (in the context of the May Summit), the EU Ambassador to India Ugo Astuto and the heads of the referenced EU institutions. Apart from Germany and France, other visible EU Member States are Portugal (due to the May '21 Summit) and the Netherlands (cooperation in the Indo-Pacific). EU Member States remain highly visible in the news about the EU. The negative framing of the EU is in its acceptance of Pakistan's request on the geographical indication for Basmati rice. Among other visible global actors mentioned vis-à-vis the EU are the WTO, ASEAN, Quad and BASIC nations and China.

### 6.5.3. Normative

Similar to the 2015 Study, Indian media rarely portray the EU as a norm setter. Few articles mention it in the context of democracy, human rights and the rule of law but very ambiguously. These discussions usually belong to the reporting about Jammu and Kashmir (India), Brexit or cyber-security. Even though EU actions in this field are framed as positive, Indian media do not portray the EU as an efficient global normative leader. Here, the lack of unity within the EU overlaps with the challenges posed to it by other international actors, such as China, Russia, Turkey and Iran.

### 6.5.4. Local Resonance

As opposed to the 2015 Study, where international sources dominated, local sources are leading in the EU's coverage in 2021 in all the three dailies, except for one article in *The Economic Times* with a mixed source (local and *Reuters*). The dominance of local news sources translates into a focus on EU-India collaboration in the publications. Most of the EU news from the dataset were covered by Dipanjan Roy Choudhury (*The Economic Times*), followed by Indrani Baghchi (*The Times of India*) and Kirtika Sunaja (*The Economic Times*).

### 6.5.5. Emotive charge

The EU's appreciation of India's importance as a regional actor is a visible factor in the EU's media framing in India. EU cooperation with regional actors in the Indo-Pacific as well as support to India's initiatives and interests (intellectual property waiver) advance to a more positive framing of the EU. Some negativity transpired in reports towards the EU's inability to decide on its position about the intellectual property waiver proposal (complex internal negotiations), but once the EU decides to support the initiative, the resolution is seen in a positive light. Mixed evaluations are also seen in the coverage of the trade deal. Some issues there remain

unresolved and (according to media) will remain unresolved, but some kind of preliminary/interim deal is already seen as great progress. However, the EU's portrayal is overall neutral, with implied potential for bilateral cooperation yet without emotive descriptions. This refers even to seemingly negative factors such as protracted EU-India FTA negotiations. Also, and similar to the 2015 Study, Indian media framing of EU Member States continues to dominate over the coverage of the EU. In the coverage of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, the Netherlands stand out as a more visible partner than the EU.

### 6.5.6. Summary

Indian media in the sample frame positively the frequency of EU-India bilateral negotiations and the future of multilateral cooperation in collaboration with other regional actors. While there remain difficulties in bilateral relations (negotiations on a trade deal continue, and it is easier for India to strike such deals with individual European states), media see the potential in EU-India cooperation and highlight it positively. In contrast to the 2015 Study, media framing of the EU-India cooperation (particularly the prospects of FTA negotiations and the potential for bilateral cooperation) has become more positive.

## 6.6. Indonesia Country Report

The analysis of three leading Indonesian newspapers – the *Jakarta Post*, *Antara*, and *Investor Daily* – reveals that the coverage of the EU with a major focus of intensity in Indonesia is still low, with *Antara* leading. *Antara* is the country's national news agency, supplying news reports to many domestic media organisations. It is also the only organisation authorised to distribute news materials by foreign news agencies, such as *Reuters* and *AP*. *Antara* is published in English and Indonesian, this sample includes publications in the Indonesian language. The *Jakarta Post* is a credible English-language newspaper, owned by the Kompas-Gramedia Group, the leading media and publishing company. However, the *Jakarta Post* readers are largely foreigners (expatriates) and a limited number of Indonesians, such as policy/decision-makers and the general public. *Investor Daily* is a daily business newspaper, owned by Berita Satu Media Holdings, a subsidiary of Lippo Group. It is published in English and appeals to the business community and decision-makers.

### 6.6.1. Visibility

Most of the EU coverage is found in *Antara* (31 items) and the *Jakarta Post* (12 articles). *Investor Daily* focuses on the EU news related to the economy and features only 4 publications in the sample. EU news in *Antara* is spread across various sections: "ASEAN" (cooperation in managing the Covid pandemic), "business" (palm oil issue) and "international" (EU support to flood and typhoon victims in Indonesia). EU news in the *Jakarta Post* is usually located either in the "international" or "opinion" sections. The latter highlights topics, such as the EU's strategy towards the Indo-Pacific region and problems regarding Indonesian palm oil exports to the EU. These themes are covered by various authors but are consistently visible throughout the examined period. Overall, the focused coverage of EU affairs across all three outlets is limited: it is dispersed across different sections, is in different genres (news and opinion) and is of a shorter length. The elaboration of the issues however is comprehensive.

### 6.6.2. Actorness

Thematically, all three outlets focus on trade (CEPA negotiations – positively, Indonesian palm oil exports – negatively), EU sanctions (towards Myanmar and Russia) and the Covid pandemic (vaccination strategy outside



the EU; ban on vaccine exports to Australia). Less attention is paid to education and technology (e.g., implementing 5G technology). Furthermore, Indonesian outlets link the EU Green Deal and climate change to the future of EU-Indonesia discussion on the palm oil issue, which features clashing interests of the negotiating parties. The articles that cover economy and trade are dominant in the *Jakarta Post* and *Antara*. Some publications cover EU Delegation activities in Indonesia featuring the presence of the EU Ambassador to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam Vincent Picket.

The most visible actors are the European Commission (in the context of the controversial palm oil issue) and the EU Delegation to Indonesia (EU public diplomacy initiatives and high-level meetings). EU Member States (France, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium) and the European Commission are mentioned in EU-specific contexts, such as vaccine supplies. The same applies to EU officials: President of the EC Ursula von der Leyen, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, and previously mentioned EU Ambassador to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam Vincent Picket. Germany and France are more visible in the sample when EU-specific issues are discussed such as the availability of vaccines, the impact of Brexit on the EU, the EU's strategy towards the Indo-Pacific or Indonesian palm oil. Referencing actors other than the EU depends on the topic in focus. For example, Malaysia is mentioned as an actor similar to Indonesia in the context of palm oil exports. This issue is framed as crucial for Southeast Asia. Other actors are mentioned rarely, e.g., Russia, China and the US are discussed in the normative context below. AstraZeneca stood out in the news about vaccine supply negotiations and safety.

### 6.6.3. Normative

Rule of law and social solidarity are the most visible normative frames in the articles driven by global factors (vaccine availability, climate change, bilateral relations with Russia or the UK). The EU is framed more positively in the context of democratisation and human rights, but the framing of the EU sanctions against Myanmar, Russia and China is mixed. Further, when Indonesia-specific issues are concerned (palm oil), the news outlets stress differences in political stances of the EU and Indonesia, e. g. EU environmental standards vis-à-vis Indonesia's developmental needs for elimination of poverty. Importantly, media outlets leave space for amicable, dialogue-based resolution of this issue. Finally, in a very minor way, *Investor Daily* touches upon legal issues and global economic institutions in the context of business rules and regulations.

### 6.6.4. Local Resonance

Across the three dailies, *Reuters* is used as the sole international news source when EU-specific and global issues are reported. Yet most of the publications in the sample resonate with Indonesia's and regional contexts. EU activities in Indonesia (EU Social DIGITHON 2021 for Indonesian young people, EU support to flood & typhoon victims in Indonesia) and EU sanctions towards Myanmar are discussed in terms of their impact on the region. EU cooperation with Indonesia and the WHO on dealing with the pandemic is discussed not only in the context of Indonesia but also in Southeast Asia and globally. News in the *Jakarta Post* and *Antara* have a strong local hook.

### 6.6.5. Emotive charge

Evaluation of the EU depends on the issue in focus, the pattern of interaction and the actors involved. For instance, in the discussion on the EU strategy in Indo-Pacific, the idea of the EU's involvement is framed positively: since this is a brand-new issue for the EU and they are lacking experience in dealing with the Asia Pacific region. When the EU benefits Indonesia, it is perceived positively (cooperation with the WHO on dealing with the Covid pandemic in Indonesia, CEPA Negotiations, the EU's readiness to help Myanmar to restore

democracy) or negative and ambiguous (EU sanctions towards Myanmar, Russia and China). More conflict-based news receives more weighted coverage.

### 6.6.6. Summary

The EU's media coverage in Indonesia is caused by *country-* (palm oil, trade, environment/climate), *EU-* (vaccination) and *region-specific* factors (indirect land use change on palm oil, environment/climate, Indo-Pacific strategy; Covid handling in Southeast Asia) issues. Evaluation of EU actions also depends on the topics involved and their importance to Indonesia or its broader region. EU-driven news occupies the same share as Indonesia-related news with the EU. However, EU institutions and officials, EU Member States or other international actors are not in the main focus of Indonesia's media reporting on the EU pointing to a strong local hook of Indonesian news.

## 6.7. Japan Country Report

This study covers *The Asahi Shimbun*, *Yomiuri Shimbun* and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei)*. *Asahi* is the most established liberal paper, while *Yomiuri* represents conservative voices. *Nikkei* is the country's leading business daily (and the owner of the UK's *Financial Times*). The Japanese media landscape is extremely rich, and Japanese newspapers publish extensively about the EU with a major degree of intensity. Though most of the news articles treat the EU in a neutral way, one striking feature of the period under examination is the frequency of Japanese concerns and complaints about the EU's vaccine export control regime.

### 6.7.1. Visibility

While our media sample contains a proportionate number of articles by all three outlets, *Nikkei* usually carries the biggest number of EU-related articles in Japan. The dataset does not include information on sections either, but the themes of the publications point to the issues more likely to appear in the "international" or "world" sections (Covid response, green recovery, EU-China relations and transatlantic relations) or "economy and finance" (news about GDP figures, stock market and foreign exchange). In general terms, the level of visibility seems to be dependent on the news value rather than whether the story is about the EU or not. Overall, there was an extremely high level of interest in and concerns about the Covid vaccine export control and its impact on Japan's vaccine import. This led to a bigger number of EU-focused articles (and those tended to be rather critical of and negative about the EU). At the same time, the European response to the Covid and the state of vaccination in general also attracted much attention from the Japanese media. Apart from pandemic-related issues, no substantial change is observed from the 2015 Study. The number of EU-related articles is generally high in Japan, and the EU is reported predominantly in a neutral way.

### 6.7.2. Actorness

No substantial variation across the three outlets is observed in terms of themes and actors covered. External politics is a leading frame followed by health, normative and economy. Such topics as the pandemic, green recovery, Covid vaccines (including the EU's export control measures), climate change, EU sanctions on human rights against China and Russia, Iranian nuclear negotiations and transatlantic relations under the new US administration are covered by all outlets. A slight difference between *Nikkei* and *Asahi/Yomiuri* lies in the different degrees of attention to business interest, for example, related to carbon emission and artificial intelligence

regulations. *Nikkei* articles are often detailed about business reactions, including sceptical and critical voices regarding EU regulations, given the primary business focus of this outlet.

The European Commission, including its President, is the most frequently mentioned EU actor largely for EU-specific factors in the sense that the European Commission plays a central role in several visible EU processes, such as green recovery, vaccine distribution and export control, etc. Germany is the most frequently mentioned EU Member State, predominantly in EU-related articles. For example, Germany is framed as the biggest and the most influential country in the EU and a country getting ready for the upcoming 2021 parliamentary elections. Articles also mention different EU Member States actors, such as German, Hungarian, Italian and Polish leaders (in the context of elections in Italy or the rise of populism in other cases). Compared with the 2015 Study, no substantial difference can be observed other than the visibility of the health topic (Covid-related). Japanese press coverage on the EU in terms of the actorness remains constant by focusing on politics, crises events and the economy.

### 6.7.3. Normative

Normative images that the EU is a promoter of human rights and sets high standards for climate change and artificial intelligence seem to be established in the Japanese media, common to all three outlets, stemming from EU-specific factors. Articles on the EU's human rights sanctions against China regarding Xinjiang and progressive initiatives on climate change frame the EU in a positive way and as an example to follow with questions as to Japanese actions and reactions towards these initiatives. Japanese media portray Japan and the EU as sharing fundamental values, including human rights and freedom, a reminder to the readers about what distinguishes Japan from China. Again, *Nikkei* has a slightly different approach, particularly in the climate change and artificial intelligence domain in raising questions about the economic cost of enacting strict regulatory measures, particularly for Japanese private companies. *Nikkei* thus represents business interests more frequently. While a great deal of continuity in the normative dimension of EU perceptions in Japan from the 2015 Study can be discerned, the rise of China and the EU's more critical views and hardening position toward China makes this dimension more visible in Japanese media coverage, most notably demonstrated by the articles on human rights sanctions against China. Curiously, the EU's actions against Russia regarding the case of Navalny seem to be reported more neutrally, the normative elements not being particularly emphasised.

### 6.7.4. Local Resonance

All three outlets have their correspondents in major European capitals (Brussels, London, Paris, etc.) with editing headquarters in London. Japanese newspapers also carry other parties' articles such as those by Reuters and AP, but they tend to be shorter articles. Longer articles are almost always written by Japanese correspondents, including Aota Hideki, Hatakeyama Tomoko, Takeuchi Yasuo and Ishikawa Jun. While articles by correspondents in Europe tend to be of EU/European focus, the topics with a local hook like the Covid vaccine, climate change or artificial intelligence regulations and EU-China relations are more likely to get more attention of the editing Headquarters and get more space (resulting in longer articles). One of the issues in this regard – which could be problematic following Brexit – has to do with the fact that major media organisations including the three outlets surveyed here have European headquarters in London that have editing functions (furthermore, *Nikkei* is a parent company of *Financial Times*). The features above remain constant with no substantial change since the 2015 Study aside from the rise of Japanese local hook regarding the Covid, not least its vaccines, and artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies.

### 6.7.5. Emotive charge

Notably, emotive charges are used predominantly in a negative manner, such as ‘tensions’, ‘complaints’, ‘fluctuations’ and there is no difference between all three outlets in this regard. One of the rare exceptions to such a rule is about the vaccination in the EU, such emotive charges as “hope” and “confidence” are used. Given that the vaccination was not going well in Japan in early 2021 (February and March, in particular), the EU’s vaccination uptake was seen as successful. In comparison to the 2015 Study, no substantial differences in emotive charge have been observed. Japan’s media reporting is rather neutral.

### 6.7.6. Summary

*EU- and EU Member States-specific factors* (e.g., actions of a big EU Member States like Germany or elections or change of the government) are observed to be leading the coverage in all three Japanese news outlets in the sample. Japanese outlets carry a large number of EU-related articles, written by their correspondents posted in Europe, in a predominantly neutral way. Yet, regarding the topics of high interest in Japan, like the Covid vaccine export, climate change and artificial intelligence, news articles tend to reflect more sceptical and critical views of the EU.

## 6.8. Mexico Country Report

*El Financiero* (business outlet), *La Jornada* (centre-left) and *El Universal* (centre right) were selected due to their influence in setting and shaping the Mexican agenda. The analysis indicates that the dominant thematic frame is health (EU policies addressing Covid) and external relations (relations with Russia). *El Financiero* published the highest number of articles mentioning the EU, and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) is the most visible EU institution mentioned in the three newspapers. The news framing of the EU as normative power across different themes is limited to health and external relations and negative perception of the EU in Mexico mainly relate to EU restrictions on vaccine exports.

### 6.8.1. Visibility

*El Financiero*, a business newspaper, published the largest number of articles (70), followed by *La Jornada* (34), and *El Universal* (30). News about the EU are mainly published in the health (38 articles) and world sections (33), followed by politics (10) and economy (9). The EU is the primary actor in 52 per cent of the articles (*El Financiero*, 47 pieces, *La Jornada* 18, and *El Universal*, 15) and secondary 30 per cent (*El Financiero* 16, *La Jornada* 14 and *El Universal* 11). The articles are usually average length, and all news outlets share a similar number of longer articles (*El Financiero*, 15 articles; *La Jornada*, 13 articles; *El Universal*, 11 articles).

### 6.8.2. Actorness

The primary coverage of the three media outlets (69 articles as principal and secondary frame) is on different aspects of EU policies addressing the pandemic. Most articles are mixed, negative and neutral. Only a few articles present a positive portrayal of the EU in this theme (mostly on vaccine safety and regulations). In the thematic frame of external politics (38), *La Jornada* covers slightly more articles than the other two news outlets. *El Financiero* published more news on the theme of internal politics (17) and the economy (16). The thematic frames that receive less attention are science, research, and technology (6), environment/climate (5),

energy (3), culture (3), development (1) and social issues (1). *EU-specific* factors triggered news linked to the difficulties with the reliability of the AstraZeneca vaccine, the Hungarian approach to the Sputnik V vaccine, and EU reactions to increasing tensions with Russia. *Location-specific* factors mainly focus on the Mexican government's responses to EU regulations to export vaccinations, which project a negative image of the EU. The EU Delegation to Mexico is mentioned in several articles explaining the rationale behind the EU's permits for vaccination exports. The EMA is the most visible EU institution in various news linked to EU-specific, country-specific and global factors. The European Commission is mainly mentioned in reference to EU policies that deal with the pandemic and in news that link to the EU-Mexico Agreement. At the same time, the European Parliament features in views on tensions with Russia. Regarding EU officials, Josep Borrell is mainly mentioned on different aspects of EU-Russian relations and the EU's export of vaccines and Mexico. Articles that focus on various aspects of the EU's role in the pandemic mention Ursula von der Leyen. Germany and France are the most visible EU Member States (mainly related to the pandemic). Other visible actors are the US, Russia, UN and CELAC. EU-specific factors continue to play a significant role in framing the EU. In 2015, the EU actions were reported within the frames of the economy (Greece crisis) and politics (debates about the vote on Brexit, national responses to migration). In 2021, EU-specific factors remain the main element, but the events have brought up health as the main thematic frame. Country-specific factors are also mostly driven by Covid related news (procurement of vaccines).

### 6.8.3. Normative

The number of articles framing the EU as normative power across different themes is limited to health (*EU-specific*) and external relations (*EU in third countries*) and is divided. In the former, EU regulations on the exports of vaccines are perceived negatively and a sign of erosion as a normative power. In the latter, instead, EU statements and actions regarding human rights violations in Bolivia, Honduras, Turkey and China reinforce the perception of the normative power of the EU. *La Jornada*, closely followed by *El Financiero*, published more articles with normative discussions. The EU's affinity to Mexico's values and norms is conveyed in neutral and positive evaluations in the articles about the EU's defence of human rights in the world. The only pieces that clash directly with Mexico are on the delay and regulations to export vaccines to Mexico. The framing of the normative power of the EU received more attention in 2015.

### 6.8.4. Local Resonance

*El Financiero* relies heavily on international news sources, mainly Bloomberg (27 articles) and AP (25). *El Universal* depends on the local news Agencia El Universal (19), while the few articles *La Jornada* that indicate an international news source are Prensa Latina (1) and Sputnik (1). The articles published in *La Jornada* are signed by regular contributors (Alfredo Jalife-Rahme, Juan Pablo Duch, and Emir Olivares Alonso). Emilia López Pérez covers news about Europe in *El Financiero* and the Europe correspondent of *El Universal* is Inder Bugarin. The main focus on domesticity of EU actions across outlets is the EU (53, EU policies dealing with the vaccinations and the suspension of AstraZeneca). The focus on country-specific factors (29) is driven by Mexican reactions to EU vaccination export regulation and the electricity reform bill in Mexico. News in third countries (19) focus on EU actions to Russia, Honduras and Myanmar and globally, on the G20 or UN. The 2015 Study indicated the EU and EU Member States as the dominant focus on domesticity due to the severity of the unfolding crises in the EU. In contrast, in the 2021 report, the EU and country focus are more dominant.



### 6.8.5. Emotive charge

The three outlets reflect similar emotive charges, although some of them are more critical (e.g. op-eds in *La Jornada*). The reaction to the EU's vaccine export regime leads to negative emotive charges such as 'EU hoarding vaccines' or the 'geopolitics of vaccines is rampant'. In the case of external relations, the relations with Russia are often described as 'tense' or at 'one of the lowest points'. While 2015 referenced emotive charges mostly in relation to crises in the EU Member States, the emotive charges in 2021 are more common in areas related to the pandemic and dominantly negative overall.

### 6.8.6. Summary

*EU-specific* factors remain the primary trigger of news in Mexican media, followed by *country-specific* factors. The main challenge for EU public diplomacy in Mexico is to contextualize EU events reflected in Mexican media. The presence of the EU Delegation in media explaining the rationale of EU policies' rationale (EU regulations on exports of vaccines) is significant to improve the effectiveness of public diplomacy. Mexican media, in general, is overwhelmingly negative and the EU's recognition as a normative power remains limited.

## 6.9. Nigeria Country Report

Three newspapers in this analysis have major national reach: *The Guardian* (business-oriented daily focusing on middle-class elites, historically anti-military/-authoritarianism), *ThisDay* (a mainstream popular leading newspaper), and the *Vanguard* (a critical voice that historically holds government to account). Reporters without borders argue that Nigeria is one of the most dangerous places to be a reporter in West Africa, despite a high proliferation of news outlets. Since Nigeria was not a part of the 2015 Study, this report will not feature analysis of the media images over time. The EU is most visible in reference to Covid and normative frames. Covid generally dominates news that focuses on the local and the global often with reflections on the implications of the current state of affairs for EU internal and external health governance.

### 6.9.1. Visibility

*Vanguard* (21 articles) has the highest volume of EU news in the dataset, followed by *ThisDay* (15) and *The Guardian* (12). Across all outlets the length of articles is mostly average (22) and shorter and longer articles appear equally frequent (13). The focus of *ThisDay* is primarily on local and regional news while *The Guardian's* framing tends to be interrogative and global. However, overall, EU news in these newspapers is either long or of average length. Press releases often inform news across the three dailies: e.g. reporting on specific EU programmes related to sexual and gender-based violence, the EU's collaboration with ECOWAS on disarmament issues, or Team Europe's work on the distribution of PPE.

### 6.9.2. Actorness

Covid-related topics significantly dominate EU news across three outlets. The EU's support to Nigeria and in some cases, to ECOWAS, via Team Europe, is prominent. Additionally, in *The Guardian*, the EU is often reported in normative terms, dealing with human rights, governance, peace and security in addition to the economy and development. In terms of representations, the EU is most visible around external health governance. There is an emphasis on Covid vaccinations and the lack thereof in Nigeria and the possibilities of vaccine passports across Europe. The EU is praised for support to COVAX though media express a more general disappointment that

the EU refuses to directly distribute requisite numbers of vaccines outside Europe. Beyond the health theme, media assigns high visibility to the topics of EU green economic growth, agri-business and green recovery in addition to more nascent discourses around climate change/biodiversity/environmental challenges, mainly positively. The press also reports the Spotlight Initiative and EU activities to eliminate gender-based violence at a national level. Further, news on the EU feature EU support for initiatives targeting young people to mitigate youth militancy in Nigeria. Other minor themes include EU approaches to migration. EU institutions are highly visible in the dataset: the European Commission (EC); European Union Council (Council); European Investment Bank (EIB); European Medicines Agency (EMA); European Parliament (EP). Additionally, key officials that feature include Ursula von der Leyen; Charles Michel; Head of the EU Delegation Ketil Karlsen; Executive Director of the EMA, Emer Cooke and Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič. All EU actors are visible with reference to Covid and vaccinations, particularly poor rollouts or delays and COVAX. As for EU Member States, some are more visible in the narratives around poor vaccine distribution in Europe and abroad (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Portugal and the Netherlands), while others (Italy and Portugal) are mentioned in the context of trade and investments with Nigeria and Africa generally. Other actors mentioned include the UK (in relation to Brexit), the US, the UN, WHO, and a few NGOs.

### 6.9.3. Normative

The main normative themes include the EU's support for peace and security; promotion of rule of law; support for human rights, liberty and good governance. These themes appear in the coverage of the EU's development and humanitarian work in Nigeria and ECOWAS. Reports thus positively frame the EU's support for humanitarian action in Nigeria and West Africa, its condemnation of Boko Haram and support on peace and security issues provided via the Nigerian government or ECOWAS. *Vanguard* and *ThisDay* focus on country- and region-specific topics including the EU's efforts on preventing gender-based violence and sexual assault, as well as Boko Haram and youth militants. The leading normative frame points to a particular media message – both Nigeria and the EU share similar normative objectives, but they do not always agree on how to meet them.

### 6.9.4. Local Resonance

The majority of the coverage in the sample is from local news sources. The interaction of the local “anchors” and global perspectives is especially visible on themes linked to Covid vaccines. The EU-specific stories in this context speak to the sluggishness of the vaccine roll-out (in Europe and globally) and the safety of the AstraZeneca vaccine. Covid is often situated within a global context. In other areas such as peace and security, the stories detail the complexities of regional violence and the delivery of wider humanitarian programs. Beyond Covid, two news items capture disagreements between the EU and Russia featuring EU Member States, Germany, and another news item links to EU green investments activities in East Africa.

### 6.9.5. Emotive charge

Emotive evaluation of the EU is mixed. Significant keywords that describe the EU with negative connotations include sluggish, setback, vaccine imperialism, rebellion, interfering, tense, strongly condemned crisis, incompatible, or unbearable. The positive descriptors about the EU include strength, access, cooperation, stimulate, collaborative, boosting, innovative, best efforts, resilience, common goal. Negative emotive language is often used in relations into the EU's handling of Covid vaccine distribution and COVAX. Positive framings are related to green growth, agribusiness investment and humanitarian partnerships. Altogether, the media frames the EU more dominantly in positive terms, however.

### 6.9.6. Summary

Covid dominates news that focuses on the local and the global often with reflections on the implications of the current state of affairs for EU internal and external health governance. A tension arises between news that engage with the EU support for COVAX, at a rather superficial level; and the fact that in the first year of the pandemic, many European countries did not appear to have a handle on Covid, followed by the slowness of the vaccination programmes within Europe itself. Where the EU's support for COVAX is highlighted, this tends to be positive or neutral, however, this can be juxtaposed with the more negative frames that highlight the fact that COVAX is not delivering as it should; that there may be safety concerns with respect to AstraZeneca that is opaque, and that Europe's nations are among the wealthier in the world monopolising available vaccines. In addition, economic and green financing appears to dominate region-specific news for Nigeria and the regional economic community. Beyond this, there is also peace and security as an area where the EU is a "friend" of Nigeria. The EU is visible in its clear and early condemnation of Boko Haram especially. Relatedly, the EU also receives praise for its humanitarian commitments. Finally, gender equality as reflected in public diplomacy initiatives is an area that has some visibility in reporting and here, the EU is perceived as a partner to work with.

## 6.10. Republic of Korea Country Report

This report analyses three influential dailies with large national readership – *Chosun Ilbo*, *DongA Ilbo* and *JoongAng Ilbo*. All three are politically leaning towards the right and they are owned by independent family businesses. The outlets also feed news to Republic of Korea major web portals/internet platforms such as *Naver* and *Daum*. As such, the three dailies are important agenda-setters in both traditional and new media. Across all three outlets, Covid is the dominant factor driving a higher visibility of the EU. The EU's measures to handle the pandemic inside the EU, and conflict among its Member States on securing the vaccines, attract major – neutral to negative – media attention in Republic of Korea. Articles frame the EU's internal conflicts regarding Covid as a challenge to the project of European integration. In comparison to the 2015 sample, in 2021, there are fewer emotive charged articles, but they convey stronger emotive message than those in 2015. While the EU was described as a weak substance in 2015, in 2021, the EU is portrayed as a divided substance, in which the members should find their own ways of survival. The degree of negativity is more intense for the publications with the major EU focus.

### 6.10.1. Visibility

The sample consists of 107 news items reporting on the EU with major degree of intensity: *JoongAng Ilbo* (48 articles), *DongA Ilbo* (32) and *Chosun Ilbo* (27). The "world news" section sees the main placement of EU news in the three dailies, and the "economy" section follows closely. Across all outlets, the length of news articles has reduced from an average length in 2015 to shorter articles in 2021.

### 6.10.2. Actorness

When reported with major degree of intensity, the most dominant frame of the EU is health (46), followed by economic (33) and political issues (internal 19, external 29). When referencing the theme of health, the news focus on the EU and its Member States securing anti-Covid vaccination for their citizens (*EU-specific* factors). In the political theme, the EU's response to Russia's treatment of Alexey Navalny is the main event (*3<sup>rd</sup> country-specific*). The rest of the news are of *global* focus: the UK's post-Brexit interactions with global powers such as China, Russia and the US; the EU's normative actions towards Myanmar, Russia and China; and the ECB's influence on the global stock market. The newspapers do not try to assess whether the EU is effective or not, they rather attempt



to report on the EU more neutrally. The news with *region-specific* focus on EU sanctions towards North Korea because of its human rights violation is not very visible (approximately 5 articles). In comparison to the 2015 Study, the diversity of thematic frames has reduced significantly. The European Commission is the most visible institution in the context of handling the pandemic followed by the ECB and the European Parliament. Ursula von der Leyen is the most visible EU official followed by Josep Borrell and Thierry Breton. The Korean media portray Ursula von der Leyen in reference to the EU administration and EU internal processes and Josep Borrell in the context of the EU diplomatic and external actions. The three most visible EU Member States in the sample are France, Germany and Italy in the context of their struggles to secure Covid vaccines for their citizens. They are not that visible across other themes. Similar to the 2015 Study, Korean media in 2021 focuses on the EU's crises with the difference that the Eurozone debt crisis has been replaced by the handling of the Covid pandemic. However, in the 2021 Study, Covid is the biggest global factor in covering EU news. Moreover, the Korean newsmakers appear to be less inclined to report on EU issues in general. Their attention has dominantly shifted to covering "hot" news about the EU, such as domestic Covid issues (the confirmed cases and death tolls) rather than global affairs, with the exceptions of sanctions towards Myanmar, Russia, and China.

### 6.10.3. Normative

In comparison to the 2015 Study, the EU's normative media frame is slightly more visible in the 2021 Study and focuses on EU actions in Republic of Korea region (measures against China and North Korea) and the EU's region (sanctions against Russia). In 2021, the human rights theme in the three outlets is about EU reactions to human rights violations around the world (e.g. Alexei Navalny's case in Russia, the treatment of Xinjiang Uyghur people in China and the violation of human rights in North Korea). The 2021 sample also features the EU in the context of democracy promotion as another aspect in the EU's normative visibility (e.g. the EU's reaction to China's suppression of protests in Hong Kong or the military coup in Myanmar). The articles that feature a normative frame ascribe the EU a global role similar to the UN and the US.

### 6.10.4. Local Resonance

Similar to the 2015 Study, all articles in the 2021 sample are written by local in-house reporters of the outlets. However, in comparison to the 2015 Study, the reporters use international sources more frequently, among which the most cited are *Reuters*, the *Financial Times* and *New York Times*. The lead authors of EU in-depth news are correspondents from *Chosun* (Jinseok Son) and *DongA Ilbos* (Yun-Jong Kim) to Europe, who are based in Paris. In the 2021 sample, the Korean newsmakers heavily rely on Anglophone news media as their major sources of information about the EU. EU- and EU Member States-related news are predominant in the sample. Other foci – regional, 3<sup>rd</sup> country, local and global – are much less visible. More generally, news on the EU do not have a strong local hook, especially in comparison to the 2015 Study, where reports on EU-Korea FTA negotiations increased the EU's visibility in local media. Few articles report on the EU's benefits for Republic of Korea such as vaccines supply and economic co-operations. Articles with a local or regional hooks, are likely to contain positive (and neutral-to-positive) evaluations, such as towards the EU's sanctions against North Korea and possible vaccine provision to Republic of Korea.

### 6.10.5. Emotive charge

More generally, most analysed news items do not have a distinct emotive charge assigned to the EU with only fifteen cases with a pronounced negative evaluation of the EU in the sample of 107 articles. Most of expressions in these articles address the selfishness of EU Member States in the context of "vaccine nationalism". Some other cases address post-Brexit EU and its future relationship with the UK. Compared to the 2015 Study, the number

of emotively charged publications has reduced but their charge has intensified, e. g. the EU filled with ‘a feeling of outrage and disillusionment’ and ‘mudslide fight for vaccines’. Those few articles that share a positive sentiment are less assertive and touch upon the EU’s success in supporting vaccine supply contractually as opposed to the negatively framed EU-UK “vaccine battle”.

#### 6.10.6. Summary

Covid-19 is the main factor in the EU’s coverage in the 2021 sample which triggered negative media framing regarding vaccine supply and distribution, but the way of reporting about the EU in Republic of Korea has generally remained the same. Media framing in health regarding vaccine passports and vaccine certification is neutral. Meanwhile, those events that relate to Republic of Korea receive positive evaluations (EU sanctions against North Korea and possible vaccine provision to Republic of Korea). As such, those EU actions that allow Republic of Korea to overcome its crises/problems, gain higher visibility and positive evaluation, which is a crucial factor for the EU public diplomacy practitioners to consider. However, the number of such publications is minimal.

### 6.11. Russia Country Report

This report presents the analysis of three prestigious Russian newspapers influential among the country’s policy- and decision-makers: *Kommersant*, *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* and *Vedomosti* (a business daily). *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* is an official newspaper of the Russian Government. *Kommersant*, a daily with a prominent business block. *Vedomosti*, initially intended as a Russian version of *The Financial Times*, is now considered semi-independent and has a relatively liberal leaning. Media in the Russian sample focuses predominantly on the political aspects of EU-Russia relations such as sanctions imposed on Russia after the Navalny case as well as the visit of HR Borrell to Russia – all receiving negative evaluations. Covid and vaccines also add to the negative image of the EU (especially what is perceived to be an unfair evaluation of the Russian vaccine by the European Commission and the EMA leading to a slow certification of the vaccine). Implications of the EU Green Deal for Russia are discussed in mixed terms – a noble initiative to mitigate climate change, yet also an avenue to impose the carbon emissions tax on Russia.

#### 6.11.1. Visibility

The total media sample consists of 49 articles: *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (18), *Vedomosti* (18) and *Kommersant* (13). While all articles in the sample assign the EU with a major degree of centrality, *Kommersant* stands out: despite a lower volume of EU news in comparison to other outlets, its reporting of the EU is longer on average with pronounced inputs in the “opinion” section. *Vedomosti* prefers to report the EU in “world news” (22) and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* in “events and comments” (13). The EU’s visibility in the qualitative media sample is *high*.

#### 6.11.2. Actorness

All outlets focus predominantly on the EU’s foreign policy, human rights, health and environment, and specifically, sanctions against Russia (16 articles), followed by Covid vaccines certification (12) and green energy/climate (Green Deal) (7). The main events that foster the view of the EU are the Navalny case, the visit of HR Borrell to Moscow and EU sanctions imposed on Russia; the problems in vaccination in the EU; and the Green Deal. The European Commission is the most visible EU actor, particularly in the coverage of EU relations with Russia, the pandemic and the Green Deal. The European Parliament is also mentioned in the context of EU

sanctions. The EMA appears in light of vaccine certification and the ECB in the discussion of business support during Covid. Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borrell and Charles Michel are frequently mentioned. Germany is the most visible EU Member State especially in the context of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the US' opposition to the project and EU and US sanctions on Russia. Other actors mentioned in the coverage are the US (sanctions against Russia), China (Covid and climate change) and the EAEU. As in the 2015 Study, this report confirms the trend that Russian media focuses predominantly on crises when reporting about the EU. The main actors also remain the same: UN, the US, NATO, China, Germany. As in the 2015 Study, the EU and the US are consistently framed as *opposites* of Russia, but the EU as an adversary and the US an antagonist.

### 6.11.3. Normative

Since the main topic in Russian media is the EU and the coordinated Western sanctions on Russia because of the Navalny case, the most visible normative frame is human rights. Here, EU actions are portrayed as an interference in internal affairs leading to a clash of normative meanings (problems of understanding/translation). Normative framing of protection of environment/climate change/Green Deal receives a more neutral coverage, however, stressing the reliance in the EU solely on renewable energy sources as impractical. As in the 2015 Study, the EU's normative profile is framed to reflect the EU's hypocrisy and double standards with no difference among the three dailies.

### 6.11.4. Local Resonance

Examined newspapers rely mainly on local news sources. EU news is often authored by these journalists/experts: G. Dudina, E. Chernenko (*Kommersant*); A. Rokossovskaya (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*); I. Alabuzhin, G. Prostakov, G. Mishutin (*Vedomosti*). Among guest authors is F. Lukyanov of *Russia in Global Affairs* as a columnist for *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. Articles usually cite Russian experts' opinions. The local focus stands out in the framing of the EU. All three papers address the EU as acting in the local context, i.e., how EU actions affect Russia. As in the 2015 Study, such extensive local links suggest that the EU is presented by the media as a close "Other" able to impact Russia politically and economically and thus directly important. Intensive local "hooks" correlate with almost exclusive use of local news sources in all three outlets.

### 6.11.5. Emotive charge

The three dailies are neutral or positive when reporting on matters other than EU-Russian political relations. For example, EU standards on fertilisers are seen as beneficial to Russia's exports and, thus, framed positively, while the EU domestic problems with vaccinations are portrayed neutrally. The Green Deal appears mostly as a depoliticised topic but detrimental to the EU itself (here, renewable energy sources are deemed unsustainable) with mixed evaluations. EU intentions are negatively seen to exert pressure (e.g., unfair carbon tax) on economically poorer countries, such as Russia and China. Meanwhile, the future usage of hydrogen is assessed positively as a possible area of EU-Russian bilateral cooperation. In contrast, in political and normative frames, the evaluation of the EU is dramatically negative. The three papers depict the EU as exploiting the theme of human rights in Russia or China. In such cases, the authors use sarcastic headlines to attract attention of readers, and while the rest of the text appears neutral featuring quotes of officials (Russian or EU), the titles prompt a negative image of the EU as arrogant and as using double standards. The media portray the EU as not noticing its own human rights violations during police actions against demonstrators in EU Member States – the Netherlands, France and Germany. Compared to the 2015 Study, EU actions are seen to have caused the negative charge. EU institutions are framed as politicising EU-Russian relations and extending this conflict to the spheres irrelevant to human rights such as an unfair competition against Russian and Chinese vaccines, since the EMA

is delaying the approval of vaccines of these two countries. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* predicts a new pragmatic footing for EU-Russia relations to be set on.

### 6.11.6. Summary

Events in EU-Russia relations that affect Russia's domestic politics, environmental issues as well as the global pandemic make the news in Russia in the observed period. The three outlets shape visible and negatively charged narratives about the EU. The conflict drives the news, and the EU is portrayed as the cause of it. The neutral-to-positive evaluations are assigned to the EU in the areas of climate, and hydrogen energy specifically, and suggest a potential for EU public diplomacy in Russia. Culture, academic research, research and development, education (other promising areas for EU public diplomacy) does not get reflection in the articles that focus on the EU in a major way – a media image that challenges EU public diplomacy.

## 6.12. South Africa Country Report

The three papers used for the analysis are *Business Day*, which is a highly respected financial broadsheet; *Citizen*, which is a high circulation and slightly more tabloid-style news source; and *TimesLive*, another high circulation English-language conglomerate including a paper and online presence. The South African media landscape largely reflects the pronounced cleavages and inequalities in the country. Thus, many of the news outlets are deemed “elite”-oriented (even if that “elite” is rather broadly defined). Social media and *WhatsApp* are growing sources of news for many citizens. A majority of EU-related articles in the South African press sample focused on the Covid19 pandemic, invariably portraying the EU in a neutral or negative light based on the difficulties surrounding the bloc’s vaccine rollout or the exercising of ‘vaccine nationalism’ to limit global exports.

### 6.12.1. Visibility

The *Citizen* published 19 articles, *TimesLive*, 16 articles, and *Business Day* 9 articles. *TimesLive* and the *Citizen* usually place EU articles in their “world” or “news” sections. Most articles are also reprints from other, often European (e.g., *AFP*), sources. The one outlier in this respect is *Business Day*, which published several pieces produced by its own writers either as leaders or Op-Eds. The focus of the original *Business Day* articles mostly concerns trade between the EU and South Africa, although one publication focused on Brexit in the context of Covid 19. Almost all of the articles are of short to medium length (1 or 2 pages). Only two authors are credited for articles more than once, Khaya Sithole (*Business Day*) and Victor Mallet (*TimesLive*). Few articles about the EU are written by South African journalists, with most coming from international sources.

### 6.12.2. Actorness

The majority of articles in the media sample centre around the Covid 19 crisis and can be categorised around the following themes: a) the EU’s troubled vaccination rollout; b) the EU’s global vaccination commitments, especially towards the Global South; and c) the crisis of confidence with the AstraZeneca vaccine. Another group of publications revolves around issues specific to Europe, with several articles on France and the strengthening of the populist right, as well as some focus on broader thematic issues like the gender pay gap and LGBTQ+ rights. Most articles in this second tranche are republished from European sources, especially the *AFP* and *AP*. “In-house” articles produced by a South African newspaper itself mainly come from *Business Day* and deal with trade issues, specifically poultry and textile. Finally, a few articles focus on climate change,

with almost all taking a specific look at the automobile industry and the impetus to convert to electric cars. A few articles (from international sources, in particular the *Financial Times*) do discuss the EU in the context of the shifting global order and tensions between the US and China. The most visible EU institution is the European Commission, given its central role in the vaccine rollout in Europe as well as Ursula von der Leyen. Curiously, the most visible EU Member State is France, in reference to the rise of the populist right under the leadership of Marie Le Pen. The EMA also has prominence in most articles referring to the crisis of confidence in the AstraZeneca vaccine. Other actors are sometimes juxtaposed more positively against the EU, such as the UK, where the faster vaccination process is deemed beneficial to those who had made the case for Brexit. The WHO is also mentioned on numerous occasions as clashing with the EU, especially on the subject of vaccine nationalism and export controls. Other actors mostly played secondary roles.

### 6.12.3. Normative

Since the vast majority of articles in the sample come from a limited number of international sources shared by all three outlets, it is difficult to suggest that different outlets present different normative frames of the EU. However, we can deduce that the generally negative or neutral framing of the EU and its perceived 'sluggish' response to the Covid 19 crisis could inevitably affect the idea of the EU as a normative power. Few articles position the EU as a global leader unless in the context of vaccine approval (as in the case of the EMA).

### 6.12.4. Local Resonance

The vast majority of articles come from international news sources, with the *Citizen* and *TimesLive* using similar sources (e.g., *AP*, *AFP*) and *Business Day* frequently using the *Financial Times*. Most articles do not have a specific South Africa focus, unless authored locally. This occurs mostly with *Business Day*. In terms of the South African context, some of the articles about EU vaccine nationalism refer to the developing world or the Global South specifically, including the risk of negative consequences stemming from the failure of richer countries to help the rest of the world to augment vaccination rates. South Africa-specific articles are trade related, while the aforementioned poultry stories are negative about the EU and its perceived "dumping policies". One Op-Ed in the *Business Day* on textiles presented the trade arrangement between the EU and South Africa as an opportunity for exporters from the latter.

### 6.12.5. Emotive charge

Most articles in the sample portray the EU in either a negative or neutral light. That said, it is unlikely that there is an ideological motivation for the selection of stories (i.e. that the papers were known for being 'eurosceptic' or, perhaps more relevant in the South African context, wary of the Global North). Instead, it is likely the EU's "own-goals" in the early administration and procurement of vaccines that created a topical source of international news. Generally, however, mainstream international news sources tend to mute highly emotive language as most articles are simply republished from international sources. However, for locally authored pieces, language is a bit stronger and mostly negative. On the issue of poultry, terms like 'predatory dumping' and links to 'kill(ing) thousands of jobs' are made. The one positive article on EU-South Africa relations (on textile trade opportunities) is in fact penned by the EU Ambassador to South Africa, Rina Kionka. It used terms and phrases like "innovative channels" and 'EU's commitment to the region'. The international sources frequently refer to the negatively charged term 'vaccine nationalism'.

### 6.12.6. Summary

The Covid-19 pandemic has served something of a paradoxical role: it has at once heightened the EU's visibility and article frequency in the South African press, but mostly for "the wrong reasons". Just like Brexit in the years immediately after the 2015 Study, the recent time period has been dominated by the pandemic. Few of the articles concern EU-South Africa relations specifically, except a longstanding hot-button issue on poultry as well as concerns about EU vaccine nationalism undermining efforts in the Global South for less well-off countries to catch up. The immediate conclusion is that the EU continues to have much to do in terms of improving the narrative surrounding it as a capable and trustworthy international actor and partner.

## 6.13. United States Country Report

The three papers chosen for this analysis are the *New York Times*, a national and international agenda-setter; the *Wall Street Journal*, the leading business publication in the US, and also more conservative leaning than the other two papers; and the *Washington Post*, both a national newspaper and leading paper in both political analysis and investigative journalism. In US media coverage in which the EU is the major focus, the Covid pandemic and the related vaccine rollout are the most visible themes. This is different to 2015, where there was more focus on the economy and refugee crisis.

### 6.13.1. Visibility

In the sample of 100 articles across the three newspapers, the *Wall Street Journal* has the largest number of articles (46), followed by the *New York Times* (41) and *Washington Post* (13). The *Wall Street Journal*, as expected, focuses on business and economic matters, whereas the other two papers have more diverse coverage, with focus on issues such as the EU economy, the Covid pandemic, the EU diplomacy and Brexit negotiations. In terms of placement, the leading section in which the EU is featured is in "world news" (22 out of 46 articles in the *Wall Street Journal* and 33 out of 41 articles in the *New York Times*). In the *Washington Post*, EU stories are "Top Stories" in 12 out of 13 articles. In terms of the degree of intensity, the EU is the primary focus in 32 articles (out of 41) in the *New York Times*; 37 (out of 46) in the *Wall Street Journal* and 11 (out of 13) in the *Washington Post*.

### 6.13.2. Actorness

The dominant themes in the US coverage are health and the EU's internal politics followed by the economy (finance and fin-tech, investment, trade), EU foreign policy and research, science and technology (also connected to the theme of health due to innovations in the health sector). In terms of the individual outlets, the *New York Times'* coverage lies with the EU's internal politics, followed by its external relations and then health. The *Wall Street Journal*, on the other hand, prioritises the economy due to the paper's overall focus on business and economics. Yet even here health and EU external relations are the next thematic priorities. Finally, the *Washington Post* has health as the top theme followed by EU external relations and RST (also related to innovations in health sector; vaccines safety and certification). As such, the pandemic drives EU coverage in the US, largely in a negative light, and not only in the health sector. While the EU's vaccination rollout is generally framed as a failure, the pandemic is also believed to have slowed down the EU's economic growth, while the pace of vaccination has advanced the UK's positions in the UK-EU post-Brexit negotiations. The US is often mentioned in relation to the EU's vaccination efforts (negative-neutral). Another bloc of events refers to EU and US sanctions against China and Russia for human rights violation, with the US and the EU 'coordinating closely'. Here,

Russia's expel of EU diplomats is portrayed as a move that has pushed the EU closer to the US, but the US media still point to certain reservations as to the EU's position. Sanctions against China seem to 'hurt' some EU partners; the EU and the UK are also seen to be 'seeking to boost commercial ties with China'. Economy is another crucial theme in the US media sample, and its dominant role in the 2015 Sample reveals certain consistency in the US media focus in reporting about the EU. Thematic foci drive the visibility of EU institutions: the European Commission is the most visible one (39 mentions), followed by the ECB (21) and EMA (15). The most visible EU official is Ursula von der Leyen (21 mentions), followed a distant second by Christine Lagarde (6). The most visible EU Member States are Germany (52 mentions), France (46), Italy (28), Spain (14) and Belgium (14). Twenty-three of the 27 EU members are mentioned at least once. One notable event during this period is a change in the Italian government, which increased the visibility of Italy and Mario Draghi. Other actors mentioned outside the EU are the UK (21), China (19) and Russia (14), mostly in the context of sanctions. International organisations outside the EU receive very few mentions. Overall, in both the 2015 and 2021 Studies, media focus on issues that are more prominent to the EU and the EU-US relationship – in relation to the context at the time of observation. In the 2015 Study, there was a greater focus on the migration crisis and Eurozone crisis, while the 2021 Study focuses on the EU's vaccination policies and post-Brexit UK-EU relations.

### 6.13.3. Normative

Framing of the EU's normative actorness is limited, with only 17 articles mentioning some aspect of normative framing, and these are minor references. This pattern is similar to 2015 when the normative frame did not receive much of media coverage.

### 6.13.4. Local Resonance

All three papers in this analysis are local and by default international, relying on information from EU and US interviewees depending on the issue. For example, stories on vaccines interviewed US-based physicians, but also EU health policymakers and spokespersons. On the economy, interviews are often conducted with EU-based businesses and financial experts, especially in the *Wall Street Journal*. Overall, more European than US sources are cited throughout the sample. The *Washington Post* relies on EU-based authors based in Riga, Brussels and Berlin for 5 out of their 13 articles, whereas the *New York Times'* EU-based contributors account for 34 out of 41 articles. The *Wall Street Journal's* three leading EU-based authors contribute 26 out of 46 articles. The most frequent authors across the news outlets are Laurence Norman and Anna Hirtenstein (*Wall Street Journal*); Michael Birnbaum (*Washington Post*); Monika Pronczuk and Matina Stevis-Gridneff (*New York Times*). The vast majority of articles written in the three papers are written by the paper's EU-based journalists.

### 6.13.5. Emotive charge

Overall, the EU's framing is negative. Emotive descriptors used are usually negative, outlining difficulties and frustrations related to the Covid pandemic, health and safety restrictions, the slow vaccine rollout ('chaotic' – from one of the titles; European Union's 'institutional paralysis') and the negative economic impact. However, there are also more positive stories about the vaccine, highlighting its efficacy and also more neutral to positive stories on other issues. Further, Mario Draghi's nomination as Prime Minister is accompanied by a rise in the Italian stock market, which is noted by several articles.



### 6.13.6. Summary

The EU's efforts in managing the pandemic and vaccine rollout are the leading stories in the sample. These often focus on frustrations and failures. The prominence of the pandemic and its remedies raises the profile of health as an issue, and highlights institutions and individual actors responsible for managing the crisis. Other notable issues relate to the EU are its relationship to the UK post-Brexit and the US post-Trump. Both of these factors (Brexit and Trump) are significant events between 2015 and 2021 that now appear to be subsiding. EU news coverage tends to be on the EU and address the US based on the topic and the role of the US in relation to it. In 2015, the leading issues related to the migrant and Greek financial crisis. These issues are not widely covered in 2021. Outside the pandemic/vaccination, the US papers are also concerned with common EU-US diplomatic interests such as sanctions on Russia or China. There are growing signs that the early difficulties with the vaccine rollout will dissipate as it is distributed much faster in the coming months. Furthermore, the Biden Administration has signalled closer relations with the EU and a more multilateral approach to world affairs going forward.



# **UPDATE OF THE 2015 PERCEPTION STUDY:**

## **Annex IV: Comparative social media report**

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# List of abbreviations

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AI: Artificial intelligence

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union

ECHO: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

EEAS: European External Action Service

EU: European Union

EUCO: European Council meeting

EURES: European Employment Services

G7: Group of seven

HR/VP: High Representative/Vice President

LGBTQ+: Lesbian, gay, bisexual transgender, queer +

LNG: Liquefied natural gas

MS: Member State

NGO: Non-governmental organisation

RST: Research, Science & Technology

SME: Small and medium-sized enterprises

UK: United Kingdom

UN - NY: United Nations - New York

US: United States

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

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# Executive summary

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The social media analysis consists of two parts: (1) **general quantitative review**, that presents quantitative data on **visibility, actorness** and **emotive charge** of the European Union (EU) and Europe in social media posts in the Strategic Partner countries, and (2) **in-depth event analysis**, that looks into social media communications related to the EU and one of the three events that took place in 2021 (Europe Day, G7 Summit and European Council Meeting).

## Quantitative review

Generally, **Europe was more visible** than the EU. The EU is slightly more visible than Europe in the US and Russia, while in other Strategic Partner countries visibility of Europe dominates. Countries where Europe is significantly more visible than the EU are Japan (14 times more visible than the EU), Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria (4 times more visible). The US leads in the number of mentions of both Europe and the EU in the monitored social media (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) in the observed period. The visibility of Europe and the EU in the same period is the lowest on social media in the Republic of Korea.

In the “EU” sample, **the most visible EU official is Ursula von der Leyen. The most visible institutions are the European Parliament**, the European Commission and the European Medicines Agency in reference to the pandemic. Visibility of the EU officials and EU institutions are not analysed in the “Europe” sample because these actors are considered EU-specific. On the visibility of EU Member States, **Germany is the most visible**, followed by France in the “EU” sample. France followed by Germany are the most visible Member States in the “Europe” dataset. In both datasets, Italy and Spain are also among the most mentioned EU Member States. The visibility of the Member State leaders echoes the visibility of the Member States. **The most visible Member State leader is Angela Merkel** in both datasets, followed by Emmanuel Macron. In the “EU” dataset, Mario Draghi is the third most visible state leader, while in the “Europe” dataset the third position is occupied by Viktor Orbán. The visibility of Eastern EU Member States more generally, however, is lower.

While the thematic fields in which the EU and Europe are referenced are somewhat similar, the overall emotive charge assigned to the EU and Europe by social media users differs across countries. In the “EU” sample, **health, politics and economy are the most relevant topics**, *development* and *energy* are among the least visible themes. *Health, culture* and *politics* are emphasised in the “Europe” dataset and *development* and *climate and environment* are the least visible thematic areas. The EU is assessed positively in 30% to 40% of the aggregated social media samples. Social media users in Brazil, South Africa, Canada, Mexico and the US evaluate the EU more negatively than positively. Europe is considered more positively, between 38% and 60%, in all the countries except for Japan and China which have a high share of mixed sentiments towards Europe. Overall, Europe is considered more positively in all 13 countries rather than negatively.

## Event analysis

In this part of the report, the **authors of social media** posts are sorted into three groups: (1) **EU official accounts** and **non-EU accounts** which are subdivided into (2) **influential** (non-EU) and (3) **non-influential** (non-EU) authors.

The reception of the EU messages differed across three events. The analysis centred only on those posts that mentioned the EU and one of the events. This allowed us to explore the perceptions of the EU and analyse how “loud” the voice of the EU is in the discussions related to the EU through the prism of one of the events with different levels of international significance. The share of retweets of the official EU messages in posts made by non-EU authors reveals that the role of the EU messages in the general social media flow, related to the EU,

corresponds to the profile of an event. While **in the case of Europe Day official EU voice leads**, in posts on **European Council**, retweets of **EU messages constitute a smaller share of posts made by non-EU actors** in the Strategic Partner countries. **The share of EU voice is the smallest for G7**, an event of global importance.

Europe Day is mainly mentioned within the *cultural* frame, especially on part of the EU official accounts, followed by *politics* and *social*. The prominence of these two themes is due to the character of the event itself, a celebration, and due to the discussion about strategic political partnerships between the EU and the target countries. The most popular posts by non-EU authors are centred around celebrations of the event and EU symbols. The broader discussion raised problematic issues such as migration, EU institutional set-up, Brexit and external action. The EU's role in development and assistance and the EU as a normative actor received positive evaluations.

For G7, *economy*, *health* and *politics* are the main themes. Official EU accounts and influential non-EU accounts focused on a range of thematic frames, while non-influential posts talked about the EU and G7 predominantly within the *politics* frame. For this group of authors *health* is not as relevant in relation to the G7 as for the official EU and influential non-EU posts. Official EU messages that received attention among non-EU audience included general information on the EU participation in the G7 Summit, the EU role in global vaccination effort and external action and humanitarian assistance (related to Tigray conflict). The most popular posts by non-EU authors centred on general information about the G7 Summit, vaccination, and criticism of the EU participation in the G7. The wider discussion focused on Brexit, Tigray conflict, vaccination, China and Russia. The EU is perceived as a capable actor in some instances (global vaccination effort, humanitarian aid and climate) and less capable in others (i.e. regulation relations with Russia and China).

The European Council meeting received less attention on social media than the other two events. The main thematic frames are *politics*, *economy*, *social* (widely employed by official EU accounts) and *health*. The *social* frame's high visibility is due to topics such as migration, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ+) rights and equality which are emphasised by official EU sources in relation to this year's European Council meeting agenda. Posts indicate that in many cases there is a gap between high expectations of the EU and perceived EU (in)action (from climate to human rights).

Social media platforms were used differently by different groups of non-EU authors. Twitter is the dominating platform in terms of the volume of posts. Twitter was used by influential authors to discuss the European Council, while non-influential authors also used Instagram. On Instagram the authors spread short messages with basic information on the EU symbols, and the agenda of an event. Among popular posts made by non-EU actors, Instagram was most widely used to post about Europe Day. In case of Europe Day, it was the most engaging platform in terms of the number of likes and comments. Facebook was not used by non-EU authors to post about the European Council, but was actively used in case of G7.

# Introduction

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This *Comparative social media report* draws on analysis of *social media* posts in 13 Strategic Partner countries: Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, and the US.

The report is structured as follows. First, we briefly explain the methodological approach. The following two chapters introduce the results of social media analysis that consists of two parts. The first part is the **quantitative review (Chapter 1)** that presents a general outlook on social media coverage of the EU and Europe over the course of three months in the selected social media channels (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram). It introduces data on visibility, actorness and emotive charge of the “EU” and “Europe” datasets on social media. The second part of the social media report is the **event analysis (Chapter 2)**. While the **quantitative review** provides a general outlook on the perceptions of the EU and Europe on *social media* in comparison with the findings of the quantitative analysis of *traditional media*, the **event analysis** delves deeper into the types of messages spread by the EU and the perceptions of the Union by two groups of non-EU authors – influential and non-influential authors. It focuses on Europe Day, G7 Summit and the European Council meeting. Finally, **Chapter 0** presents the summary for both parts of the social media analysis. **Annex VIA** contains the list of keywords that were used to determine thematic distribution. **Annex IVB** consists of tables with the most popular social media posts related to the events from non-EU authors. The data in this chapter is presented separately for each social media platform and the group of authors (influential and non-influential).

Social media posts are collected from **Twitter, Facebook and Instagram** by drawing on the *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. We focus on the most common social media platforms because they are available in all the 13 target countries. China and Russia are considered as special cases because they use local social media platforms as well. However, *Mediatoolkit* allowed us to gather mainly Twitter-based data from Chinese locations in English and Simplified Chinese language. For future research, we recommend the use of a social media analysis software which approves the observation of local social media platforms in the specific country. We trace the coverage of the EU by using a set of EU-related keywords: “European Union”/ “EU”, “European Commission”, “European Parliament”, “Court of Justice of the European Union”/ “CJEU”, “EU Presidency”, “EU Council”, “European Council”, “Council of the European Union”, “Eurozone”, “European Central Bank”, “European Investment Bank”, “European Medicines Agency”. All the keywords are also traced in their one-word format to capture related hashtags (e.g. “europeanmedicinesagency”). Europe-specific keywords used for filtering relevant social media posts are “Europe” and “European”. Additionally, the tool uses a location filter was to ensure that the collected mentions originate from a particular target country. A language filter facilitated the collection of posts in English and in the respective local language (where applicable).<sup>14</sup>

In the current setup, apart for the EU-specific keywords, the “EU” sample contains “Europe” and “European” keywords if they are mentioned in one post alongside EU-specific keywords. In contrast, the “Europe” sample does not contain EU-specific keywords, as they are excluded to avoid false positive results (e.g. “European Parliament”). This way, the “Europe” sample contains only those mentions that are relevant to analyse the social

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<sup>14</sup> The list of languages used in addition to English: Brazil – Portuguese, Canada – French, China – Chinese (*Mediatoolkit* monitors all words and phrases that are classified as 'Chinese' from the part of the language detector in use. This means that it is not limited to a certain variety of the language, but recognizes Chinese characters written in all variants instead), Colombia – Spanish, India – Hindi, Indonesia - Indonesian, Japan - Japanese, Mexico - Spanish, Russia - Russian, Republic of Korea – Korean. For Nigeria, South Africa and the USA we collect only English samples.

media discussion around Europe.<sup>15</sup> While the observed period for the quantitative review is 1 February to 30 April 2021, it is worth mentioning that the data from February does not reflect the full picture in terms of the volume of mentions. Due to limitations of the archive search conducted by *Mediatoolkit*, not all possible mentions from February could be retrieved. This means that this data still significantly contributes to the analysis, however, it should not be used to draw comparisons in visibility between months.

The Update Study pursues an approach based on several new features if compared to the 2015 Baseline Study. Most importantly, the methodological design in the Update Study broadens the scope of inquiry into the social media highly appropriate in the new media ecology. The broader scope allows to surpass a number of limitations, not lastly due to the advances in the software for social media analysis:

- The quantitative review of social media and quantitative analysis of traditional media (press) collect data in the same period of observation. Both datasets employ similar indicators of analysis (visibility, actorness, emotive charge) to ensure comparability. This is an improvement compared to the 2015 Baseline Study which used a different research design.
- Social media analysis is not limited to a single social media channel. It includes overview of several most popular social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram);
- The analysis is not limited to the EU-focused posts released by EU officials and representatives and/or users referencing them. It includes posts of all social media users who mention the EU and/or Europe.

Following the design of the 2015 Study to ensure comparability over time, the update Study 2021 also conducts the in-depth event analysis of social media posts around three EU-related events: **Europe Day** (9 May), the **G7 Summit** (11–13 June) and the **EU Council Meeting** (24–25 June). To analyse social media posts related to the three events, we use the disaggregated Twitter, Facebook and Instagram data collected via *Mediatoolkit*. The data is filtered in statistical software R using event-specific keywords (e.g. EuropeDay, G7, #EUACO) in the EU-related dataset. Similar to 2015, we also assess how the visibility, actorness and the emotive charge differ when an author of a social media post is affiliated with the EU and EU institutions vis-à-vis non-EU authors. We also compare how these indicators differ between influential and non-influential non-EU authors. The data on visibility of the EU and Member State (MS) officials, MSs and EU institutions and thematic distribution is acquired by filtering the relevant mentions in R using the same set of keywords as for the quantitative review.

The observation period for the quantitative review of the social media, as agreed with the Steering Committee, is from 1 February 2021 to 30 April 2021. For comparability with the 2015 Study, the social media posts on the three EU-related events are analysed using the data from May, June and July 2021 to capture the discussion around Europe Day, G7 Summit, and the EU Council Meeting. The event-focused analysis is conducted during a period of one month (two weeks before and after) around each event.

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<sup>15</sup> It needs to be noted that the “Europe” sample contains EU and EU institutions related mentions if these are written incorrectly, or if the post contains an apostrophe (e.g. European Commission’s). The number of such mentions constitutes less than 1% of total mentions and therefore, should not impact the results of the analysis.



# 1. Quantitative review

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All data are shown by country and by the type of the dataset: the “EU” or “Europe” dataset. The visibility section contains data on the overall number of mentions related to the EU and Europe in social media, as well as the number of mentions of particular EU officials, EU institutions, Member States and Member State leaders. The actor section focuses on thematic frames (*culture, development, economy, energy, climate and environment* (referred as *Environment* on charts), *health, research, science and technology (RTS), politics and social*) in social media posts. The section on emotive charge presents the results of the automated sentiment analysis of social media posts across the datasets.

## 1.1. Visibility

The indicator of visibility in social media is measured by the number of mentions of the EU- and Europe-related key words in general, as well as by the number of mentions related to EU Member States, Member State leaders, EU officials and EU institutions in EU- and Europe-related social media posts. The mentions count corresponds to the number of times a keyword appears in social media posts, and not the number of posts as such.

The data are collected by automated tagging of social media posts in the “EU” and “Europe” samples with the use of *Mediatoolkit*. For each institution and person, we create an “automated action” with relevant keywords (i.e. name of an institution and name of a person) in English and the local language. For non-Latin languages, names of EU officials and Member States leaders are included additionally in the respective alphabets. If a name contains diacritics (e.g. ‘á’, ‘č’, etc.), we use a version of the name with standard Latin characters in addition (e.g., “Viktor Orbán” and “Viktor Orban”). For abbreviations not to create irrelevant results the data collection only uses full names of institutions and actors. Surnames are also not included as separate keywords as it might include common last names and skew the dataset. We argue that this does not infringe on demonstrating trends, however.

### 1.1.1. EU

**Mentions of the EU constitute 42% of total mentions** (“EU” and “Europe” datasets combined). Table 19 and Figure 33 show the number and the monthly distribution of the mentions for the observed timeframe in the different countries in the EU. In the quantitative review, during the period of three months (1 February – 30 April), the **highest number of mentions** are counted in the **US with 1,286,304 mentions, the lowest number** is counted **in Republic of Korea with 3,177 mentions**. Compared to the quantitative analysis of the *traditional media analysis*, these findings are different. In *traditional media*, Republic of Korea had the highest volume of news about the EU, South Africa was the country with the lowest volume of news.

The three most mentioned EU institutions in the “EU” dataset are the **European Parliament, the European Commission** and the **European Medicines Agency**. The three most mentioned EU officials in the EU sample are **Ursula von der Leyen, Charles Michel** and **Josep Borrell** (See Table 201). In *traditional media*, the most mentioned EU institutions differ (Annex III: Comparative traditional media report). The European Commission and the European Medicines Agency followed by the European Central Bank are the most mentioned institutes. The most mentioned EU officials are Ursula von der Leyen, Josep Borrell and Christine Lagarde, the current President of the European Central Bank.

The six most mentioned Member States in the EU-related sample are **Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain** and **Hungary**. Germany, France, Italy and Spain are mentioned in an economic framing, Ireland is mentioned in the context of the EU


given its extraordinary economic performance and special Covid-19 measures and Hungary is often mentioned in relation to its conflicts with the EU. The three most mentioned Member State leaders in the EU-related sample are **Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron and Mario Draghi** which are in line with the respective most mentioned Member States. The findings of the *traditional media analysis* confirm the findings of the *social media analysis*. The most visible Member States are Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark. The respective Member State leaders are the most mentioned in *traditional media* as well.

**TABLE 19. THE NUMBER OF MENTIONS IN EACH COUNTRY IN THE 'EU' DATASET**

	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA	COLOMBIA	INDIA	INDO- NESIA	JAPAN	MEXICO	NIGERIA	RUSSIA	SOUTH AFRICA	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	USA
Mentions	41006	27758	22162	5904	55236	15088	44779	30121	11382	20617	16291	3535	1426044

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**FIGURE 32. NUMBER OF MENTIONS IN THE "EU" DATASET DURING THE OBSERVED PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS BY COUNTRY**



Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021

**Note:** Please note that the US data is plotted on a different scale.

**TABLE 20. MOST MENTIONED INSTITUTIONS IN THE "EU" DATASET**

EU institutions	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	USA	Total
European Parliament	10419	428	21	621	115	61	634	1515	61	164	128	17	18437	32621
European Commission	459	779	0	261	21	174	981	1702	233	294	316	45	26054	31319
European Medicines Agency	895	527	57	160	6	126	4647	1411	190	31	234	32	14208	22524
European Council	73	122	0	23	7	18	70	156	27	190	61	3	3917	4667
European Central Bank	165	86	2	200	0	81	838	117	81	20	41	30	4320	5981
European Investment Bank	32	1	1	452	0	12	157	74	31	5	41	15	2499	3320
European Court of Justice	12	0	0	15	0	1	35	92	2	0	3	0	610	770
European External Action Service	1	0	0	0	1	2	28	4	15	5	6	3	316	381
European Committee of the Regions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	10	19
Council of the EU	23	0	0	0	0	5	5	13	0	25	1	0	278	350
European Court of Auditors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	10	12
European Economic and Social Committee	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	1	0	0	0	0	19	29

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**TABLE 21. MOST MENTIONED EU OFFICIALS IN THE "EU" DATASET**

EU Officials	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	USA	Total
Ursula von der Leyen	178	261	95	38	632	73	72	222	82	83	84	14	8838	10672
Charles Michel	23	61	16	12	132	34	23	11	20	166	26	2	2617	3143

Josep Borrell	18	30	12	8	49	14	18	9	8	124	11	0	1392	1693
Christine Lagarde	0	0	0	2	0	5	3	0	3	3	6	2	403	427
Frans Timmermans	1	5	2	0	7	1	0	0	0	10	2	0	113	141
Margrethe Vestager	2	2	2	1	30	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	82	122
Maroš Šefčovič	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	1	3	2	0	104	113
Valdis Dombrovskis	0	16	2	0	8	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	66	103
Věra Jourová	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	47	51
Margaritis Schinas	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	38	45
Dubravka Šuica	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
David-Maria Sassoli	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
Emily O'Reilly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**TABLE 22. MOST MENTIONED MEMBER STATES IN THE "EU" DATASET**

MS	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	USA	Total
Germany	701	597	354	64	2152	126	555	572	200	425	419	55	26796	33016
France	836	610	263	51	2533	67	414	456	177	242	302	45	24477	30473
Ireland	238	436	98	38	765	34	142	74	59	117	295	42	27100	29438
Italy	858	652	160	89	740	85	474	484	121	298	221	33	18436	22651
Spain	682	216	95	303	414	52	162	2958	49	148	181	45	16986	22291
Hungary	280	226	162	37	360	21	99	200	24	158	120	5	8848	10540
Greece	76	144	44	24	176	17	68	154	42	83	69	14	9439	10350
Poland	170	172	36	33	337	44	70	160	41	173	85	17	8465	9803
Denmark	93	330	73	16	347	1121	203	121	54	43	86	25	6852	9364
Sweden	92	208	72	17	437	79	147	81	60	46	64	19	6059	7381
Netherlands	54	125	64	9	187	32	161	169	132	45	63	33	6132	7206
Belgium	143	134	74	17	274	35	224	665	23	45	63	14	4897	6608
Austria	469	92	123	11	217	49	73	52	79	74	50	19	5000	6308
Finland	47	101	46	9	225	24	81	34	44	99	48	17	4999	5774
Cyprus	22	62	11	8	210	15	27	23	18	60	33	5	4057	4551
Czech Republic	36	59	70	9	74	9	156	26	13	165	34	7	3522	4180
Portugal	349	62	28	13	547	34	37	115	13	25	44	12	2590	3869
Romania	50	38	42	1	625	11	49	13	21	60	36	6	2536	3488
Bulgaria	37	56	8	3	55	5	48	54	14	103	37	10	2518	2948
Croatia	31	90	11	3	24	5	27	15	8	44	18	5	2590	2871
Slovakia	284	44	14	9	77	15	40	74	11	99	30	9	2051	2757
Malta	15	31	8	6	43	35	14	18	19	24	19	2	2228	2462
Slovenia	21	36	31	3	63	9	24	18	10	39	16	5	1901	2176
Luxembourg	28	50	8	3	122	6	29	36	24	21	13	4	1664	2008

Latvia	25	54	39	2	64	15	28	21	11	149	22	4	1405	1839
Lithuania	19	34	51	3	50	5	34	31	10	83	12	14	1306	1652
Estonia	13	42	36	3	65	13	22	14	11	83	11	5	1275	1593

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**TABLE 23. MOST MENTIONED MEMBER STATE LEADERS IN THE “EU” DATASET**

MS leaders	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	USA	Total
Angela Merkel	82	26	46	3	132	19	13	28	0	39	22	5	1922	2337
Emmanuel Macron	15	13	13	1	22	6	4	12	18	15	18	0	654	791
Mario Draghi	15	10	3	3	24	13	9	6	2	8	4	1	536	634
Viktor Orbán	9	14	5	2	9	1	0	18	0	8	5	1	468	540
Micheál Martin	0	8	0	1	1	0	2	1	0	2	1	0	234	250
Sebastian Kurz	4	2	1	2	5	0	0	3	0	29	3	0	167	216
Pedro Sánchez	2	1	0	18	2	1	0	121	0	0	0	0	13	158
Janez Janša	1	0	1	0	5	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	107	118
Mark Rutte	1	1	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	80	85
Andrej Babiš	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	15	0	0	43	61
Stefan Löfven	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	50
Xavier Bettel	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	36	39
António Costa	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	24	30
Kyriakos Mitsotakis	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	28	30
Mette Frederiksen	1	1	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	22	28
Boyko Borisov	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	18	24
Mateusz Morawiecki	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	17	22
Sanna Marin	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	19
Nicos Anastasiades	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	13
Robert Abela	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	11	13
Alexander De Croo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	4	10
Gitanas Nausėda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	2	9
Eduard Heger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	4
Kaja Kallas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
Andrej Plenković	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Klaus Werner Iohannis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Krišjānis Kariņš	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

### 1.1.2. Europe

Mentions of Europe constitute 58% of total mentions (“EU” and “Europe” datasets combined). Table 24 and Figure 33 present the number and monthly distribution of the mentions in “Europe” dataset. In the observed period, the highest number of the Europe-related mentions were counted in the US with 1,073,851 mentions,

followed by Japan. The **lowest number of mentions** was experienced in **Republic of Korea** just like in the case of the EU-related social media **with 4,416 mentions** (see Table 24). In *traditional media*, the volume of the Europe-specific news is the highest in the US as well followed by Republic of Korea. Colombia has the lowest volume of Europe-related news in *traditional media* and the second lowest number of Europe-related mentions in *social media*.


Similarly to the “EU” sample, the six most mentioned Member States in the “Europe” sample are **France, Germany, Italy, Spain Denmark and Ireland**. The three most mentioned Member State leaders in the Europe-related dataset are **Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron, Viktor Orbán, Mario Draghi, Mette Frederiksen and Pedro Sánchez**. In *traditional media*, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal are the most visible countries in the “Europe sample”. The most visible Member State leaders are the same in *traditional media* as well.

**TABLE 24. NUMBER OF MENTIONS ACROSS THE OBSERVED COUNTRIES IN THE “EUROPE” DATASET**

	BRAZIL	CANADA	CHINA	COLOMBIA	INDIA	INDO- NESIA	JAPAN	MEXICO	NIGERIA	RUSSIA	SOUTH AFRICA	REPUBLIC OF KOREA	USA
Mentions	147199	42148	36309	13349	96926	55231	642345	62929	50756	19388	29552	5121	1138363

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**FIGURE 33. NUMBER OF MENTIONS IN THE "EUROPE" DATASET DURING THE OBSERVED PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS BY COUNTRY**



Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**Note:** Please note that the US and Japan data are plotted on a different scale.



**TABLE 25. MOST MENTIONED MEMBER STATE LEADERS IN THE “EUROPE” DATASET**

	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	USA	Total
MS leaders														
Angela Merkel	71	30	18	6	2494	9	21	24	0	18	11	1	2485	5188
Emmanuel Macron	11	32	11	6	55	21	8	12	143	8	120	7	1172	1606
Viktor Orbán	6	19	3	3	10	6	12	3	0	4	3	0	653	722
Mario Draghi	3	3	5	2	13	13	5	3	5	4	6	1	473	536
Mette Frederiksen	0	3	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	2	0	42	53
Pedro Sánchez	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	33	0	1	0	0	14	53
Mark Rutte	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	45	52
Sebastian Kurz	1	0	0	1	4	0	0	1	0	4	1	0	27	39
Stefan Löfven	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	30	37
Micheál Martin	0	0	1	0	10	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	19	32
Janez Janša	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	18
Boyko Borissov	0	0	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	11	16
Mateusz Morawiecki	2	1	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	7	15
Andrej Babiš	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	12	14
Kyriakos Mitsotakis	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	14
António Costa	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	9
Robert Abela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
Alexander De Croo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3	6
Xavier Bettel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
Sanna Marin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3
Eduard Heger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2
Kaja Kallas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Andrej Plenković	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gitanas Nausėda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Klaus Werner Iohannis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Krišjānis Kariņš	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nicos Anastasiades	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**TABLE 26. MOST MENTIONED MEMBER STATES IN THE “EUROPE” DATASET**

Countries	Brazil	Canada	China	Colombia	India	Indonesia	Japan	Mexico	Nigeria	Russia	South Africa	Republic of Korea	USA	Total
France	2222	838	334	155	5548	406	4593	1494	770	484	311	177	32328	49660
Germany	1695	914	402	149	2490	959	3493	1316	748	532	376	219	32558	45851
Italy	3121	505	230	178	1001	1047	2934	1163	642	580	246	109	26102	37858
Spain	1775	437	149	422	702	755	273	3702	808	311	194	53	15859	25440
Denmark	315	317	81	55	1818	279	1526	397	240	54	85	39	8519	13725
Ireland	166	202	25	18	150	69	456	124	240	34	80	17	11699	13280
Poland	365	219	57	25	264	77	928	188	296	311	87	22	9301	12140
Greece	140	193	35	22	564	156	732	115	110	175	57	23	8576	10898
Sweden	555	309	35	39	307	102	854	183	234	101	97	68	7882	10766
Portugal	1396	131	32	77	224	378	1198	213	554	59	113	9	6077	10461
Netherlands	70	129	53	5	1013	438	1186	82	334	73	102	36	6931	10452
Belgium	352	124	42	37	975	112	1262	209	222	93	58	61	6245	9792
Austria	322	159	36	16	956	171	1177	133	105	95	42	29	6036	9277
Hungary	258	247	73	22	157	36	1137	101	38	84	49	41	5826	8069
Bulgaria	180	82	21	15	880	99	301	76	45	82	35	4	3936	5756
Finland	215	82	24	13	107	37	410	34	119	120	27	40	4183	5411
Czech Republic	35	91	34	13	84	32	926	63	161	166	47	33	2959	4644
Romania	84	55	4	4	50	56	392	133	39	36	29	14	2991	3887
Cyprus	35	29	9	9	61	30	125	16	137	47	16	5	3074	3593
Croatia	135	51	8	35	165	46	358	87	199	38	34	5	2381	3542
Estonia	358	147	21	7	79	21	193	29	73	63	35	12	2107	3145
Slovenia	66	62	15	6	76	52	252	31	37	23	27	10	2436	3093
Lithuania	37	130	62	8	67	39	177	44	92	44	31	11	2111	2853
Latvia	52	85	6	7	112	39	206	49	231	47	55	11	1742	2642
Slovakia	111	114	10	10	41	19	140	143	14	56	31	8	1932	2629
Luxembourg	107	72	8	13	117	46	199	68	259	16	49	1	1628	2583
Malta	49	72	12	1	32	17	155	16	49	15	10	3	1400	1831

Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

## 1.2. Actorness


To assess actorness, the analysis identifies key thematic fields in the “EU” and “Europe” dataset in English and the local languages (where applicable). The nine observed thematic fields are *culture, development, economy, energy, climate and environment, health, research, science and technology, politics and social*. The data on the thematic distribution is collected by an “automated tagging” process of all social media posts with the use of *Mediatoolkit* and by using a set of keywords to create automated tagging actions. For comparability with the *traditional media analysis* of the report, the same set of keywords is applied in the *social media analysis* thematic field mapping (See Annex IVB. Most popular social media posts related to the events). Each “automated action” tags a post with a

theme-specific tag (e.g. “politics”) if a post contains any of the relevant pre-defined keywords. In order to avoid false positive results, abbreviations are excluded from the thematic keywords lists (e.g. “LNG” for the energy theme).

### 1.2.1. EU

Figure 34 presents the distribution of the thematic areas in all EU-related social media posts. Among the most frequent thematic fields in which the “EU” is references across all countries, are **health, politics** and **economy**. The most visible thematic frames in *traditional media analysis* are *politics economy* and *health*.

FIGURE 34. DISTRIBUTION OF THE THEMATIC FRAMES IN THE “EU” DATASET BY COUNTRY




Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

### 1.2.2. Europe

**Error! Reference source not found.** presents the distribution of the thematic areas in all “Europe”-related social media posts. Among the most frequent thematic fields in which the “Europe” is referenced across all countries, are **health, culture** and **economy**. The findings from *traditional media analysis* are in line with the findings of *social media analysis*. Higher association of *culture* theme in with Europe is substantiated by the findings on

thematic frames in *traditional media analysis*. The most visible thematic frames for Europe are *economy, culture, health and politics* (see Figure 364).

**FIGURE 35. DISTRIBUTION OF THE THEMATIC FRAMES IN THE "EUROPE" DATASET BY COUNTRY**



Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

### 1.3. Emotive charge

This Annex shows the distribution of the overall emotive charge of mentions related to the EU and Europe as well the emotive charge of thematic fields in the “EU” and “Europe” samples. The main analytical tool employed is sentiment analysis (also known as emotion AI) is the process of measuring the tonality of text, categorised as positive, mixed/neutral or negative. An automated sentiment analysis with the use of *Mediatoolkit* assesses the overall emotive charge of each of the “EU”- and “Europe”-related posts.

The *Mediatoolkit* system relies on dictionary-based approach, where each mention is ascribed sentiment based on a set of keywords grouped in positive or negative connotations. The automated process is marked as mixed or neutral if it contains the equal number of positive and negative keywords that the system uses for identifying the sentiment. Due to the specifics of the automated sentiment analysis, we can only analyse the overall sentiment of a post which means that an overall negative sentiment can stem from direct criticism of the EU or Europe or the EU or Europe being mentioned alongside negatively connoted issues such as poverty, armed conflict, racism or hunger. The same logic applies to the positive sentiment analysis.

*Mediatoolkit* allows for analysis of mentions in all languages tracked in this study apart from Hindi. Therefore, only English-language posts are used for the sentiment analysis of social media posts in India. However, this limitation does not significantly impact the results of the study, as English language posts constitute a large part of the Indian sample.<sup>16</sup> Another limitation is that the sentiment analysis of posts in Japanese and Simplified Chinese language produce a considerable share of mixed or neutral results. *Traditional media* and *public opinion poll* found these two languages rather neutral or mixed as well.


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<sup>16</sup> 97.5% of EU-related posts and 82.6% of Europe-related posts.

### 1.3.1. EU and Europe


**Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.** and Figure 38 present the sentiments of the posts that referenced the EU- and Europe-related key words in the 13 countries. Figure 37 and Figure 39 show the emotive charge of the thematic fields by country. In most of the countries, except for China and Japan, **the EU is perceived positively (25-42%) and negatively (30-47%)**. The findings of other methodologies e.g. *public opinion* and *traditional media analysis* confirm that China and Japan tend to have more neutral or mixed emotions in general. **Europe is perceived somewhat more positively (38-60%)** and negatively (16-35%), in all the target countries, apart from China and Japan. The quantitative analysis of the *traditional media analysis* findings on emotive charge were limited. Canada, India, Nigeria, South Africa and US were analysed because the language sentiment could only be evaluated in English language. In “EU” and “Europe” datasets mostly neutral (40-46%) to positive (38-40%) sentiment is found. Although the share of negative and slightly negative news is identical between datasets (1% and 10% respectively), “Europe” dataset contains higher percentage of positive articles than EU (see Figure 36 and Figure 37).

FIGURE 36. EMOTIVE CHARGE IN THE "EU" DATASET



Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.


**FIGURE 37. EMOTIVE CHARGE OF THEMATIC FRAMES IN THE "EU" DATASET**



Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.




FIGURE 38. EMOTIVE CHARGE IN THE "EUROPE" DATASET



Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

**FIGURE 39. EMOTIVE CHARGE OF THE THEMATIC FRAMES IN THE "EUROPE" DATASET**



Source: Based on *Mediatoolkit* online media monitoring tool. Data was gathered by PPMI from 1 February to 30 April 2021.

## 2. Event analysis

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### 2.1. Events

The second part of the social media annex dives into three regularly occurring events with local, regional and international significance that have likewise been examined in 2015 to ensure comparability

- Europe Day (9 May 2021);
- G7 Summit (11 to 13 June 2021) held by a UK Presidency and attended by leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US and the EU with guests representing Australia, Republic of Korea, India, South Africa and the UN;
- European Council meeting or EU Summit (24 to 25 June 2021) with a focus on migration, climate change, security and defence, and the economy

The purpose of the case studies is to reveal and dive deeper into potential convergence and differences in content projected by official EU sources (including the EU Delegations in 13 target countries) and non-EU sources in Strategic Partner countries on social media.

### 2.2. Methodology

For the event analysis, we collect EU-related social media mentions from Twitter, Facebook and Instagram with the use of *Mediatoolkit* media monitoring tool following the same procedure as for the quantitative review. The corpus is filtered into three event-specific datasets that are analysed separately. In the first round of filtering, we keep only those mentions that are posted two weeks before and two weeks after each event to trace the discussion before, during and after an event, and ensure a consistent approach for each. Subsequently the datasets are filtered by event-related keywords.<sup>17</sup> Except for the analysis of the most resonant posts by official EU accounts, only English-language posts are analysed.<sup>18</sup>

The authors of analysed social media posts are sorted into three groups: (1) EU official accounts and non-EU accounts which are subdivided into (2) influential (non-EU) and (3) non-influential (non-EU) authors. This division allows for two levels of comparison. Firstly, we compare between the EU and local (non-EU) social media messages. Secondly, between two groups of local authors: the leaders of discussion in relevant Strategic Partner countries (influential) and the general public (non-influential). Influential authors are distinguished from non-influential authors based on the variable “influence score” in the corpus of EU-related mentions. The “influence score” is automatically calculated by *Mediatoolkit* algorithms and shows how influential a particular source is in comparison to every other source on the internet using the number of followers, likes and outreach.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> For Europe Day: “europeday”, “europe day”; for European Council meeting: “council meeting”, “#euco”; for G7 meeting: “G7”.

<sup>18</sup> The share of posts made by non-EU authors in languages other than English was insignificant: for G7, the share of English language posts was 99% percent. The share of posts in local languages is higher in the case of the official EU accounts. For G7, 77% of posts made by EU official accounts were in English language. For this reason, we include local language posts made by EU official accounts into the analysis of most resonant posts.

<sup>19</sup> An influence score of 1 means the source has a small audience, while 10 is typically reserved for globally influential websites with millions of followers. In this Annex, the author is considered influential with an influence score of 5 or higher, whereas authors with an influence score lower than 5 are considered non-influential authors.

The most resonant posts are identified by the combined measure of the number of retweets and favourites in the case of Twitter, likes, comments and shares in the case of Facebook, and likes and comments count in the case of Instagram.

Each case study consists of qualitative and quantitative elements. The main discussion topics linked to an event and sentiments are analysed through qualitative content analysis. The visibility of EU and Member State officials and EU institutions as well as the thematic distribution follow from quantitative analysis. The aim of the quantitative text analysis is to compare the visibility and actorness of the EU as projected by different groups of authors through the lenses of each event. Thus, we trace which themes were dominant in the official EU posts as compared with non-EU posts coming from influential and non-influential social media authors in Strategic Partner countries. The aim of the qualitative analysis is to distinguish the main topics related to the EU in connection with Europe Day, European Council meeting and G7 meeting and analyse how the EU was portrayed by the three groups of authors: official EU accounts, non-EU influential accounts and non-EU non-influential accounts.

## 2.3. Findings

### 2.3.1. Europe Day

The **total amount of collected posts** that refer both to the EU and Europe Day in the period between 25 April 2021 and 23 May 2021 (two weeks before and after the event) is **6904**. **Posts made by non-influential local authors constitute 91%** of all collected posts, those **by influential local authors – 3%**, **by official EU accounts – 7%**.

Regarding the sources, the majority of mentions comes from **Twitter (93%)**. At the same time, “Europe Day” has the largest share of posts coming from **Facebook (2.4%)** and **Instagram (4.5%)** compared to the other two events.

#### Qualitative analysis

The qualitative content analysis of English-language posts that are relevant to the EU and **Europe Day provides insights into the messages projected by the EU**, as well as the main discussion topics and the perception of the EU as an actor by non-EU authors on social media.

Both influential and non-influential authors posted on the following topics:

- **Congratulations on Europe Day** and celebrating the EU;
- **Development and assistance**: Gratitude from various partner countries (mostly developing countries) for assistance in elections, education, peaceful and sustainable development in-country, sustainable energy, improving coordination of disaster management and response, national climate pledges, empowering women, decrease violence and cooperation on various vital partnerships such as the World Food Programme;
- **Normative**: Praise of common foreign policy and shared values around the world, such as solidarity, human rights, democracy, harmony, peace, unity;
- **Brexit**: framed as the responsibility of the EU; Scotland and its aspiration of independence to reunite with the EU;
- Privacy and data protection regulation in the EU;
- **Turkey’s EU membership**: retweets of a post by President of Turkey Erdogan that highlights Turkey’s determination to join the EU despite “the double standards” it faces (while the identified location of tweets is the US, they mainly came from Turkey-related authors);
- **Migration**: Critique of the EU regarding migration and Frontex;

- **External action:** Ukrainian conflict, where the EU providing military and institutional support; The European Union External Action Service not fulfilling expectations of providing sufficient support to countries in need;
- **The EU institutional architecture:** Campaign ideas to reform European election law; The relation between the EU and the resources and the sovereignty of nation states.

The main topics identified by the qualitative analysis show that the **EU is discussed both positively and negatively on social media**. A common theme among the different authors is the celebration of the EU. While it is expected the EU is celebrated by EU official accounts, non-EU influential and non-influential authors equally congratulate the EU on Europe Day. The EU Delegation and other EU official sources tend to write about the **strong strategic partnership with partner countries outside the EU** and about future collaboration. Social media discusses the services provided by the EU such as trainings, exchange programmes to promote its image and culture. Further discussion topics include invitations to learn EU Member State languages and culture or meeting EU ambassadors “online” in the partner countries. Furthermore, some of the EU Delegation accounts express solidarity with refugees.


**Influential** (non-EU) sources mention that various partner countries have been supported in the fields of *development, politics, energy, climate and environment* and *social*. Through the lens of influential social media posts, the EU appears as a norm-setter in democratic values and human rights. **More controversial topics** with critical evaluation of the EU are **migration, the Ukrainian military conflict, Brexit and the future of the EU**.

Among **non-influential** (non-EU) sources, the EU receives more **criticism** in general regarding the **handling of migrants and refugees**. Non-influential authors express their concern about a flawed institution set-up of the EU. **Solidarity and fraternity** are also visible in posts by non-influential sources as they see Europe Day as an occasion to celebrate unity.

### **Quantitative text analysis**

The quantitative text analysis shows that Europe Day is covered mostly within the theme of *culture*, especially by official EU sources. *Politics* is among the most relevant themes because **strategic partnership and the political relationship between the EU and other countries** are often discussed. The theme of *energy* has a big number of mentions because the keyword “coal” is captured in relation to the Coal and Steel Community that is often referenced in connection to the event (mainly referenced by non-EU sources). However, it does not reflect on the *energy* theme as Coal and Steel Community used to be the former name of the EU.

FIGURE 40. DISTRIBUTION OF THEMES - EUROPE DAY



Source: prepared by the Core Team

In terms of visibility, there are no significant differences in coverage of the EU and Member State officials and institutions between EU official, influential and non-influential social media posts. The **most referenced EU officials** are **Ursula von der Leyen (400 mentions)**, Josep Borrell (60) and Charles Michel (29). **Emmanuel Macron (106 mentions)**, Antonio Costa (86) and Angela Merkel (15) are the most frequently referenced EU Member State officials. The EU institutions most frequently referenced are the **European Commission (2584)**, the European Council (224) and the European Parliament (220). Altogether the most frequently used terms in the dataset for EU official and non-official sources show that Europe Day is frequently associated with terms such as “united”, “solidarity” and “celebrated”.

Generally, wider audiences actively engage with official EU posts on Europe Day. Among all posts related to Europe Day made by non-influential authors, **retweets of the EU official posts constitute 42%; this share is lower for influential authors (35%)**.

Among the original posts made by **non-influential authors, the most resonant ones were on Instagram** (based on the likes and comments score). These posts mentioned the **EU symbols** (EU flag, EU anthem, EU institution buildings) or notified about the upcoming events related to Europe Day (Conference on the future of Europe, photo competition organised by Frontex, open door days). Among **influential authors, Twitter was the main channel**.

The list of the most popular non-EU posts can be found in Annex IVB. Most popular social media posts related to the events.

### 2.3.2. G7 Summit

The **total amount** of collected posts that refer both to the EU and G7 Summit in the period between 29 May 2021 and 26 June 2021 (two weeks before and after the event) is **81481 – the largest volume of mentions among the**

**three events.** Posts made by **non-influential local authors constitute 99%** of all collected posts, those by **influential local authors – 1%, by official EU accounts – 0.1%.**

Regarding the sources, the majority of mentions comes from **Twitter (99%).** Shares of Facebook and Instagram constitute less than 1%.

### Qualitative analysis

The qualitative content analysis of English-language posts that are relevant to both the EU and the G7 Summit provides insights into the messages projected by the EU, as well as the main discussion topics and perceptions of the EU as an actor by non-EU authors on social media.

Posts by influential and non-influential authors revolve around similar topics and include:

- **Brexit:** Post-Brexit tensions between the UK and the EU, especially for posts from the US, Canada and South Africa. The UK-EU dispute is criticised for overshadowing the goals of the G7 meeting with criticism primarily targeted at the UK, while the EU's actions are portrayed as legitimate;
- **Tigray:** The Tigray conflict is widely discussed, especially in non-influential (non-EU) posts. The EU and its officials (i.e. Josep Borrell) are urged to act. Posts lament that the G7 does not focus on this conflict although the US–EU roundtable on the humanitarian emergency in Tigray (that took place on June 10 2021) finds acknowledgement;
- **Vaccination:** Vaccinations and requests to share the vaccines worldwide – G7 nations and the EU are seen as carrying the responsibility to contribute to the vaccination rollout in less developed countries;
- **G7 Summit composition:** Critical evaluation of the EU's overrepresentation (mainly in posts originating from the US but posted by UK-related actors) through individual Member States and EU officials giving the EU an unfair advantage over other members. Some posts question that the EU, not being a G7 member, is invited to the G7 meetings while others underline the EU's role as the largest trade bloc in the room; A popular post from South Africa voiced a belief that African Union representatives should be invited to G7 similar to EU representatives;
- **Climate:** the need for G7 nations and the EU to deal with climate change and financially support clean economic development;
- **China: Criticism of the EU** for blocking G7 efforts to call out the use of Xinjiang slave labour by China;<sup>20</sup> Some posts mention the EU's economic ties with China (namely big investment projects) as a reason for perceived inaction. In posts originating from China, this is a major topic of discussion alongside vaccines and the Tigray conflict (the EU disagreeing with the US "Cold War" approach towards China; EU-China economic ties underlined; US, UK and Canada vs. France, Germany and Italy division over China);
- **Development:** request for financial support from the EU to fund education worldwide;
- **Russia:** Biden's statement on being in a better position to represent the West vis-à-vis Russia than the EU is circulated widely in posts from the US. The EU is seen as not capable to regulate the relations with Russia without US involvement.

Generally, the framing of the EU by non-EU authors is mixed. On the one hand, its stance in post-Brexit tensions with the UK is perceived positively. Moreover, social media posts acknowledge the **importance of the EU's role in global vaccination efforts** and in **tackling climate change**. On the other hand, the EU is criticised for not being able to sufficiently act against the Uyghur genocide in China; Furthermore, the EU is presented as an actor that is **less capable** than the US to regulate relations with Russia. Still, **the role the EU plays in humanitarian aid**

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<sup>20</sup> China was mentioned in the G7 conclusions, but without "slave labour" reference.

and conflict regulation is acknowledged by the wide circulation of messages that call the EU to take action in relation to Tigray crisis.

Official EU posts related to G7 focused on the following topics: **climate, global vaccination efforts and future health threats, Tigray conflict, trade, technologies, and corporate tax reform**. There was no direct engagement with the official EU posts on part of influential local authors – in our sample there are **no retweets of official EU posts** by this group of authors. At the same time, non-influential authors engaged with the EU official posts by retweeting some of the messages (this constitutes 1% of all posts made by non-influential local authors in relation to G7 and the EU). Among such messages are posts by the **European Council President Charles Michel on global vaccination efforts**, posts by European Commission that list the main points on the **G7 Summit agenda**, and tweets by High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) Josep Borrell on the joint action by G7, the European Commission and USAID in relation to **Tigray crisis**. The topic of Tigray was widely discussed with relation to the EU by the general public (represented by non-influential local authors) on Twitter.

To provide more detail on who the influential authors are, we present the categories of authors that posted on the EU and G7.

**TABLE 27. TYPES OF INFLUENTIAL AUTHORS**

<b>CATEGORY</b>	<b>ACTIVE ACCOUNTS</b>
News	99
Journalist	56
Individual (unidentified occupation)	34
Political figure	30
Researchers and experts	26
Entrepreneur	12
NGO	12
Official institution	11
Activist	11
Think-tank	8
Cultural figure	6


Source: prepared by the Core Team

### **Quantitative text analysis**

The distribution of themes between official EU sources and posts by non-EU authors reveals several differences. In general, official EU messages related to the G7 and those of the influential non-EU authors are closely linked. Issues brought up by local non-influential authors differ from those by influential non-EU authors and official EU authors. The general discussion (reflected in posts by local non-influential authors) is focused mostly on *politics*. For this group of authors *health* is not as relevant in connection to the G7 as for the two other groups. For local non-influential authors, *development* is a prominent frame, most often linked to the Tigray conflict. The thematic distribution in posts of influential authors and official EU accounts is more balanced and centres on the three main themes: *health, economy, and politics*.



FIGURE 41. DISTRIBUTION OF THEMES - G7



Source: prepared by the Core Team

In terms of visibility, there are no significant differences in coverage of EU and Member State officials and institutions between the posts of EU official and non-EU influential, non-influential authors. The most visible Member State official is **Emmanuel Macron (1282)**, followed by Merkel (216) and Draghi (63). Notably, top-EU officials are generally more visible than the heads of EU Member States. **Josep Borrell receives an especially high number of mentions (43136)**, almost all of them from non-influential sources (wide circulation of posts related to the conflict and humanitarian crisis in the **Tigray region**). In the EU-related posts on G7, **Ursula von der Leyen (1387 mentions)** is more visible than Macron.

The **European Commission is the most frequently referenced EU institution (52846)** (mostly in connection with Tigray). The European Council is less visible, but frequently mentioned in relation with the G7 meeting itself (6650). The European Union External Action Service (319 on Tigray), the European Central Bank (64) and the European Parliament (49) are mentioned, but to a lesser extent.

The list of the most popular posts can be found in Annex IVB. Most popular social media posts related to the events.

### 2.3.3. European Council meeting

The **total amount** of collected posts that refer both to the EU and the European Council Meeting in the period between 10 June 2021 and 8 July 2021 (two weeks before and after the event) is **1513 – the lowest volume of mentions among the three events**. Posts made **by non-influential local authors constitute 96% of all collected posts**, those by influential local authors – 2%, by official EU accounts – 2%.

Regarding the sources, the majority of mentions comes from **Twitter (99%)**. Shares of Facebook and Instagram constitute less than 1%.

## Qualitative analysis

The qualitative content analysis of English-language posts that are relevant to both the EU and European Council meeting provides insights into the messages projected by the EU, as well as the main discussion topics and the perception of the EU as an actor by non-EU authors on social media.

The main topics in posts made by non-EU authors are:

- **Orban, Hungary and the anti-LGBT law:** the EU and the European Council (as an institution) are described as slow and indecisive in taking action against Hungary;
- **Russia:** some posts refer to the hypocrisy of the EU for advocating closer ties with Russia and criticising Orban for the anti-LGBT law that follows Russian propaganda law. The EU's general relations with Russia is a wider discussion topic;
- **Migration:** the indecisiveness of the EU and its leaders and a perceived inability to agree on the necessity of saving the lives of migrants on the sea;
- **Health:** the EU and the European Council in particular are urged to have a united voice to support the expansion of the #TRIPSwave for all Covid medical tools and the provision of vaccines to African countries;
- **External action:** failure of the EU to include North Macedonia's negotiation framework approval; call for sanctions on Belarus on the limited freedom in the country; the EU is asked to take action in connection with Tigray conflict;
- **Turkey:** the missed opportunity for EU leaders to use the European Council meeting to call on Turkey to improve its press freedom and acknowledge Erdogan's expanding authoritarianism;
- **Climate change:** marginal theme; more radical action is expected from the EU (theme brought up by non-influential authors);
- **Normative:** respect for human rights, equality, dignity and non-discrimination; the EU serves as an advocate for multilateralism, peace and human rights; EU values and LGBTQ+ rights (LGBT rights showing the East/West division within the EU).

Generally, in some cases the EU portrayed as an indecisive actor, in particular when it comes to the condemnation of human rights abuses outside and within the EU and on climate action. A wide array of posts calls on the EU to take action in various fields (from humanitarian assistance to sanctions and human rights advocacy). Posts indicate that in many cases there is a gap between high expectations of the EU and perceived EU (in)action.


Posts made by official EU accounts brought up the agenda of the European Council meeting: Covid, migration, external relations, LGBTQI non-discrimination, economic recovery, Turkey, Russia, and normative. While the thematic coverage is similar across all types of authors, official accounts simply listed the themes without any elaboration, unlike the posts from non-EU accounts that often included an opinion.

## Quantitative text analysis

Across all types of authors, *politics* is a top thematic frame, especially visible in posts by influential authors. The *social* frame is rather prominent in the official EU posts (second most used frame after *politics*) than in posts made by non-EU authors. The *social* frame's high visibility is based on the visibility of topics such as **migration, LGBTQ+ rights and equality that are highlighted by official EU sources** in relation to this year's European Council meeting agenda. In non-influential sources *economy* and *politics* receive an equal share of attention, while for influential sources *politics* is the most visible theme (constituting more than a half of posts that are marked as

referencing a theme). *Energy, climate and environment* and *research, science and technology* are almost non-existent in posts by EU official accounts and influential local accounts.

**FIGURE 42 DISTRIBUTION OF THEMES - EU COUNCIL MEETING**



Source: prepared by the Core Team

**Viktor Orban (253)**, Emmanuel Macron (156) and Mark Rutte (106), followed by Antonio Costa (85), Janez Janša (39) and Angela Merkel (29) are the EU Member States officials that are most frequently mentioned. **EU officials are less visible in general.** Ursula von der Leyen receives 55 mentions, followed by Charles Michel (27) and Josep Borrell (17). Among the EU institutions the most visible one is, expectedly, the **European Council (769)**. The Commission (69) and the European Parliament (37) are also mentioned but to a lesser extent.


**The share of EU voice** in discussion around the European Council is **not as big as in the case of Europe Day**, but is significantly **bigger than in posts about G7**. Where non-influential authors engaged with the EU official posts, **the share of retweet of official EU messages constituted 12%** of all posts made by non-influential local authors in relation to The European Council. These posts mainly listed the points on the European Council agenda.

Among the most popular original posts made by non-EU authors, discussion led **by influential authors** took place only on **Twitter**. The most popular topics were **Hungary** (EU taking long to take action against violations) and the **EU – Russia relations**. Among **non-influential authors**, the most popular posts on **Twitter** were on the **use of LGBT flag during European Council** (received positively), on **Russia** and on **sanctions against Belarus**. **The most popular posts on Instagram contained broad information about the European Council meeting** and its agenda.

The list of the most popular posts can be found in Annex IVB. Most popular social media posts related to the events.

## 2.4. List of official EU accounts used in the event analysis

At the data collection stage, queries were set up to collect posts of the EU Delegations in target countries (apart from all EU and Europe-related posts in 13 countries social feeds). Initially, we planned on using only posts coming from the EU Delegations. However, at a later stage, we managed to broaden the scope of the EU official accounts by retrieving posts from additional official EU accounts from the US sample of all EU-related posts that was collected previously. This was possible because many official EU social media posts are marked by the location filter as coming from the US. The list of these accounts is presented below.

1. Official accounts of the EU Delegations in each of the 13 target countries
2. Additional accounts:
  - European Commission
  - European External Action Service – European External Action Service (EEAS)
  - European Parliament
  - Council of the European Union
  - EU at UN-NY EU
  - European Union at the UN – New York
  - Digital EU EU
  - EU Agriculture 
  - EU Civil Protection & Humanitarian Aid - ECHO
  - EU Finance EU
  - EU Food & Farming
  - EU International Partnerships EU
  - EU Social EU
  - EU Trade EU
  - Energy4Europe EU
  - EU Environment
  - Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship & SMEs
  - EU neighbours south
  - EU\_ScienceHub
  - European Employment Services (EURES)
  - EU Green Capital
  - EU Ambassador to China
  - EU and Palestinians
  - EU in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
  - EU Neighbours
  - EU Regio Interreg
  - European Innovation Council
  - European Institute of Innovation & Technology
  - European Union in Laos
  - European Youth
  - Europeana
  - Horizon EuropeEU
  - HORIZON: the EU Research & Innovation magazine
  - WeBalkans.eu EU

- Visit European Parliament
- Charles Michel

## Summary

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### Quantitative review

The quantitative review presents the visibility, actorness and emotive charge of the EU and Europe in the 13 target countries. The visibility of the EU and Europe is based on the number of mentions related to them in all the 13 countries. The visibility of Member States, Member State leaders, EU official and EU institutions are presented in relation to the EU, Member States and Member state leaders in relation to Europe based on the number of mentions. The most discussed thematic fields are presented in the EU as well as in Europe. Finally, the emotive charge of the EU and Europe are introduced alongside with the sentiments towards the thematic fields in each country. These findings are comparable with the quantitative results of the *traditional media analysis*.

#### Visibility

- On average, **Europe is more visible than the EU**. The EU is slightly more visible than Europe in the US and Russia, in other Strategic Partner countries visibility of Europe dominates. Countries where Europe is significantly more visible than the EU are Japan (Europe is 14 times more visible than the EU), Brazil, Indonesia and Nigeria (Europe is 4 times more visible).
- **The majority of mentions** related to the EU and Europe **originate from the US**. The visibility of Europe and the EU is **lowest on social media in the Republic of Korea**;
- **Germany is the most visible Member State** in the “EU” dataset, followed by France. **France is the most visible** EU Member State, followed by Germany, in the “Europe” dataset;
- The visibility of the Member State leaders reflects the visibility of the Member State: **Angela Merkel** is the most visible EU Member State leader in the “EU” and “Europe” sample, followed by Emmanuel Macron. Mario Draghi (in the “EU” dataset) and Viktor Orban (in the “Europe” dataset) are the third most visible EU Member State leaders respectively;
- The visibility of the **Eastern European states** and leaders is generally lower;
- In the “EU” sample, the most visible EU official is **Ursula von der Leyen**;
- The most visible institutions are the **European Parliament**, the European Commission and the European Medicines Agency, reflecting on the recent pandemic.

#### Actorness

- In the “EU” sample, **health, politics** and **economy** are the most relevant topics, while *development* and *energy* are among the least visible ones. **Health, culture** and **politics** are emphasised in relation to Europe and *development* and *climate and environment* are the least visible thematic areas in the “Europe” dataset.

#### Emotive charge

- The EU is most positively perceived in India and Nigeria, while Europe receives the largest share of positive mentions in Nigeria, Indonesia, South Africa and US.
- Brazil, US, Canada, and South Africa share the highest number of negative mentions in connection to the EU. **Europe** is perceived somewhat **more positively (38-60%)** and negatively (16-35%), in all the target countries, apart from China and Japan

## Event analysis

This section presents the main findings of the event-focused analysis. The event analysis consists of two main parts: qualitative content analysis and quantitative text analysis. Different authors are identified for the analysis: EU official, influential (non-EU) and non-influential (non-EU) authors. The content analysis reveals the main discussed topics within the frame of the specific event in relation to the EU. The quantitative text analysis presents the results of the visibility of EU and European actors when the social media posts are written by the above-mentioned different authors. It is also identified, which social media content written by the different authors is retweeted or shared, favourited/liked the most to evaluate the reception of the social media content within the frame of the specific event (the number of retweets and favourites in the case of Twitter, likes, comments and shares in the case of Facebook, and likes and comments count in the case of Instagram).

### Europe Day:

- *Actorness*: The *cultural* frame is most prominent, especially among official EU sources;
- *Emotive charge*: The EU receives mixed evaluations;
- *Visibility*: EU officials are mentioned more often than Member State officials.
- *Reception of the EU messages*: the social media activity around Europe Day was led by messages spread by the official EU accounts -- these were often retweeted and constituted a large share of all posts;
- For non-influential posts, Instagram posts were the most resonant.

### G7:

- *Actorness*: The main thematic frames are *economy*, *health* and *politics*. Themes discussed by the official EU accounts and those by influential non-EU authors are closely linked and differ from themes brought up by non-influential authors. Non-influential posts mainly focus on the theme of *politics*;
- *Emotive charge*: The framing of the EU is mixed;
- *Visibility*: EU officials are more visible than Member State officials;
- *Reception of EU messages*: retweets of official EU posts constituted a very small share of all posts about the EU and G7. Official EU posts about the EU leadership in vaccination efforts and external action and informative posts on G7 agenda and EU goals for the event were the most resonant;
- Popular posts by non-influential sources come mainly from Twitter and Instagram; Facebook posts by this group of authors were not very popular. At the same time, Facebook posts made by influential sources were highly resonant.

### European Council:

- Among three events, the European Council was the least discussed in social media;
- *Actorness*: The main thematic frames are *politics*, *economy*, *social* and *health*. The *social* theme is much more widely employed by official EU accounts than by non-official accounts;
- *Emotive charge*: Sentiment and content of the posts reveals that high expectations from the EU go hand in hand with criticism of perceived indecisiveness of the Union;
- *Visibility*: EU officials are generally less visible than Member State officials;
- *Reception of the EU messages*: the share of EU voice in discussion around the European Council is not as big as in the case of Europe Day, but is significantly bigger than in posts about G7. These posts mainly listed the points on the European Council agenda;
- Facebook was not used by non-EU authors to post about the European Council. Twitter was the main platform for influential authors discussion on the event, while non-influential authors also used Instagram. On Instagram, general information about the event was shared.



# Annex IVA. Main themes and the respective list of keywords

TABLE 28. MAIN THEMES AND THE RESPECTIVE LIST OF KEYWORDS

MAIN THEMES (AND SUB-THEMES)	KEYWORDS/TERMS
<p><b>Economy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Green growth and green recovery</b></li> <li>• <b>Finance and fin-tech</b></li> <li>• <b>Investment</b></li> <li>• <b>EU taxonomy</b></li> <li>• <b>Trade and trade deals</b></li> <li>• <b>Agriculture and food</b></li> <li>• <b>Industry</b></li> <li>• <b>Sustainable and circular economy</b></li> <li>• <b>Digital economy</b></li> <li>• <b>EU internal trade</b></li> </ul>	<p>economy; economic; economies; green economy; green economies; green growth; green recovery; finance; finances; fintech; financial technology; financial technologies; investment; investments; tax; taxes; taxation; trade; trades; agriculture; agricultural; industry; industries; industrial; industrialisation; business; businesses; job; jobs; capital market; capital markets; financial market; financial markets; Eurozone; currency; currencies; debt; export; exports; import; imports; employment; unemployment; income; interest rate; interest rates; labour market; labour markets; labor market; labor markets; monetary; money; bank; banks; inflation; deflation; sustainable economy; sustainable economies; circular economy; circular economies; digital economy; digital economies; innovation economics; innovation economy; economic innovation; new economy; new economies; e-business; e-businesses; e-commerce; online platform economy; online marketplace; online marketplaces; market; markets; tariffs; tariff; goods; toll; recovery fund; EU payment; commerce; commercial; bank loan; bank loans; monetary fund; monetary funds; funds; industry strategy; industrial strategy; industry strategies; industrial strategies; agriculture strategy; agricultural strategy; agriculture strategies; agricultural strategies; global economy; austerity; GDP; gross domestic product; GNP; gross national product; hyperinflation; national income; national debt; recession; public debt; stagnation; stagflation; EU Recovery plan; NextGenerationEU; next generation EU; economic recovery plan; stimulus package; long-term budget; next generation EU; fair transformation fund; European Horizon; Digital Europe Agenda; incentive measures; financial support; state aid; business support; supporting business; supporting businesses; government support; governmental support; financial grants; government subsidy; government subsidies</p>



## Science, Research and Technology

- R&D
- Innovation
- Intellectual Property Rights
- Research Cooperation
- Technology Transfer
- Innovations in the health sector (specifically Covid-19)
- Smart cities
- Green technology (e.g., batteries, hydrogen)

intellectual property; intellectual properties; information technology; information technologies; communication technology; communication technologies; information and communication technologies; electric vehicles; electric vehicle; satellite technology; satellite technologies; innovative technology; innovative technologies; research cooperation; research; technology transfer; AI; artificial intelligence; digitalization; digitalisation; machine learning; experimental development; research development; software development; intellectual property rights; invention; inventions; data mining; data processing; blockchain technology; fintech; financial technology; financial technologies; process automation; automatization; automatisisation; smart contract; cloud computing; cloud storage; distributed ledgers; distributed ledger; digital integration; data-driven; joint venture research; patent; prototype; patent prototypes; innovations; disruptive innovation; marketing innovation; organizational innovation; organisational innovation; product innovation; process innovation; ultraviolet-C lamps; UVC technology; smart systems; greentech; cleantech; driverless cars; autonomous cars; smart traffic control; internet of things; science; scientific; green tech; green technology; wireless technology; digital city; e-governance; 5G; open innovation; innovation-driven; horizon 2020; horizon Europe; breakthrough; automated driving; nanomaterials; knowledge valorisation; high-tech; self-driving vehicles; e-bike; e-bikes; electric bike; electric bikes;

## Political

### Internal to the EU

- EU institutions (Treaty, documents, strategies)
- Human rights
- Internal solidarity (tested by crises)
- Equality, diversity and inclusion
- Rule of law
- Integration (broadening, deepening, reversing (Brexit), differentiated)
- EU Green Deal
- Just Transition
- Rise of the far right and populist parties

politic; politics; political; policy; policies; human rights; human right; equality; diversity; social inclusion; rule of law; rules of law; rule of laws; integration; disintegration; green deal; just transition; fair transition; security; peace and stability; responsibility to protect; non-proliferation; counter-piracy; terrorism; counter-terrorism; terrorist; terror; peacekeeping; war; wars; warfare; climate change; biological threat; chemical threat; environmental disaster; environmental disasters; conflict resolution; rebellion; rebellions; impeachment; foreign policy; neighbourhood policy; global strategy; EU Delegations; diplomacy; diplomatic; diplomat; diplomats; European External Action Service; geopolitics; geopolitical; effective multilateralism; governance; intergovernmental; democracy; democratic; migration; emigration; refugees; refugee; migrant; migrants; asylum; cyber-crime; cyber security; disinformation; sanction; sanctions; social right; social rights; health threat; health threats; public diplomacy; police; hybrid warfare; administration; public service; public affairs; energy security; Minister; nuclear talks; nuclear accord; rise of far right; far right; populism; populist; xenophobia; nationalistic; national movement; national movements; nationalist movement; nationalist movements; election; voter; vote; elections

## External to the EU

- **Security (peace and stability, R2P, Non-Proliferation, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping)**
- **Cascading security threats (climate change, biological and chemical threats, environmental disasters, health threats)**
- **Conflict resolution and mediation**
- **Foreign policy (Neighbourhood policy, EU Global Strategy, EU Delegations, EEAS, public diplomacy)**
- **Geopolitical weight (shaping power on world stage)**
- **Effective multilateralism (intergovernmental affairs)**
- **Human rights (governance, democracy)**
- **Mass migration and refugees**

## Energy

- **Security of supply**
- **Equality of supply**
- **Green energy and sustainability**
- **Competitiveness (energy market)**
- **Governance regulation (for the Energy Union)**
- **Energy efficiency (EED)**
- **Hydrogen**
- **Renewable energy (solar, wind)**

sustainable energy; solar energy; wind energy; renewable energy; energy supply; energy supplier; wind power; wind farm; wind farms; solar power; solar farms; solar farm; green energy; energy market; energy provider; energy providers; provider of energy; providers of energy; renewable resources; renewable source; renewable sources; renewable resource; nuclear energy; atomic energy; nuclear waste; radiation; electricity; geothermal energy; hydropower; thermal energy; energy efficiency; biofuel; biofuels; biogas; biomass; biodiesel; diesel; gas; gasoline; coal; coal-fired; powerplant; oil; crude oil; clean energy; fossil fuel; fossil fuels; petroleum; decarbonization; decarbonisation; liquefied natural gas; liquefied petroleum gas; tar sands; pipeline; smart grid; energy storage; fusion power plant; air pollution; clean energy; clean electricity; photovoltaic electricity; photovoltaic cell; energy conversion; solar panels; solar panel; energy efficiency; oil pipeline; gas pipeline; energy independence; energy dependence; dependence on energy; power generation; combustion; energy consumption; petrol; energy efficiency; EU energy; EU energy efficiency directive; renewable energy share; share of renewable energy; renewable energy directive; energy union; governance regulation; governance of the energy union; national energy and climate plan; national energy; climate

	plans; hydrogen Europe; hydrogen strategy; EU hydrogen; sector coupling; energy storage; energy system; energy integration; integration of electricity; integration of gas
<p><b>Development</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Aid/poverty alleviation</b></li> <li>• <b>Disaster relief</b></li> <li>• <b>The EU and UN SDGs</b></li> <li>• <b>Green development standards</b></li> <li>• <b>Mitigation, adaptation and resilience support</b></li> </ul>	international development; international aid; international financial aid; international support; poverty alleviation; alleviation of poverty; sustainable development; sustainable development goal; sustainable development goals; SDG; SDGs; disaster relief; humanitarian aid; humanitarian initiative; green development; green growth; cleantech; climate change mitigation; mitigation of climate change; global development; social development; smart development; development aid; development support; support for development; economic development; development policy; development policies; poverty rate; poverty; disaster management; development fund; food security; sanitation; developing world; development partner; development partnership; development cooperation; development effectiveness; policy coherence for development; ACP-EU partnership; EU-ACP partnership; ACP countries
<p><b>Environment</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Climate change, climate law and net-zero (climate-neutral) target by 2050</b></li> <li>• <b>NDCs and UNFCCC-process</b></li> <li>• <b>Biodiversity</b></li> <li>• <b>Environmental protection and preservation</b></li> <li>• <b>Land use and agriculture/food</b></li> <li>• <b>Circular economy</b></li> <li>• <b>Climate mitigation and adaptation</b></li> </ul>	solar energy; wind energy; wind power; wind farm; wind farms; solar power; solar farms; solar farm; climate change; global warming; climate law; net-zero emissions; climate-neutral; Paris Agreement; nationally determined contributions; biodiversity; environmental protection; protecting the environment; environmental preservation; preserving the environment; environmental degradation; sustainable land use; sustainable agriculture; sustainable food; clean energy; carbon; carbon emission; carbon emissions; circular economy; climate mitigation; climate adaptation; pollution; green energy; greenhouse effect; biofuels; biofuel; sustainability; recycling; recycle; recycled; endangered species; waste management; deforestation; natural resources; natural resource; carbon footprint; ecological; ecology; environmental issues; environmental disasters; exhaust fumes; environmentalist; environmentalists; industrial waste; renewable energy; renewable sources; renewable source; emission restrictions; greenhouse gas; emissions; climate neutral; ecosystem; ecosystems; sustainable forestry; low carbon; climate goals; climate goal; climate catastrophe; environmental policy; environment friendly; eco-friendly; environmental policies; environmental impact; environmental management; environmental impacts; environmental action plan; Green Deal; decarbonisation; decarbonization; green recovery; climate accord; emission sharing; effort sharing; emission target; emission targets; EU emissions; emissions trading system; climate-neutral ETS sectors; non-ETS sectors; emission reductions; emission reductions; sharing regulation

<p><b>Social</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Education</b></li> <li>• <b>Multiculturalism, equality and diversity</b></li> <li>• <b>Migration (the EU as receiving and sending actor)</b></li> <li>• <b>Far right, nationalism, xenophobia, populism</b></li> <li>• <b>Climate change activism</b></li> </ul>	<p>education; educational; educative; school; schools; university; universities; multiculturalism; multicultural; society; social; equality; diversity; social inclusion; migration; emigration; immigration; segregation; racism; social integration; environmentalist; environmentalists; climate movement; climate movements; climate action; climate actions; social movement; pluralism; civil rights; equal opportunity; social fairness; identity; identities; social identity; social identities; discrimination; inequality; globalisation; globalization; refugee; asylum; European social agenda; EU social agenda; social justice; equal opportunities; gender equality; minority; minorities; migrant; migrants; immigrant; immigrants; asylum seeker; asylum seekers; seeking asylum; asylum application; social inequality; health inequality; expat; expatriate; social policy; social engineering; rise of far right; far right; populism; xenophobia; nationalistic; national movement; national movements; nationalist movement; nationalist movements</p>
<p><b>Cultural</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Visual and performing arts</b></li> <li>• <b>Sports</b></li> <li>• <b>Music</b></li> <li>• <b>Literature</b></li> <li>• <b>Architecture</b></li> </ul>	<p>art; arts; culture; cultures; cultural; sport; sports; gallery; galleries; artist; artists; painting; paintings; artwork; artworks; museum; museums; opera; operas; music; musician; musicians; performer; performers; performance; theatre; theatres; architecture; architect; architects; architectural; dance; dancer; dancers; literature; writer; writers; cinema; movie; movies; musical; musicals; films; film; sculpture; photography; football; soccer; basketball; volleyball; handball; tennis; cricket; hockey; rugby; baseball; golf; championship; olympic games; olympics; poet; poetry; prose; book; books; classics; classicism; neoclassicism; aesthetics; monument; romanticism; renaissance; baroque; medieval; romanesque; symbolism; modernism; impressionism; expressionism; surrealism; conceptual art; literate; concert; concerts; festival; festivals; exhibition; vernissage; art residency; landmark; digital art; digital museum; virtual museum; art workshop; architect studio; sculpture; museum visit; cultural event; cultural events; contemporary art</p>
<p><b>Health</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>EU internal health governance</b></li> <li>• <b>EU external health governance</b></li> </ul>	<p>vaccine; vaccines; health; cancer; infection; infections; covid; covid-19; COVID; COVID-19; corona; coronavirus; hospital; hospitals; medicine; medicines; medical research; allergies; allergy; immune response; immunity; disease; diseases; nutrition; fitness; illness; HIV; AIDS; Ebola; tuberculosis; influenza; infectious disease; hepatitis; communicable diseases; epidemiology; pharmaceutical; pharmacy; antibiotics; antimicrobial resistance; patient; patients; health; public health; healthcare; medical devices; medical device; immunisation; immunization; clinic; clinics; health facility; health facilities; medical treatment; therapy; pandemic; healthcare; covid test; syringe; disease prevention; healthcare facilities; healthcare</p>

personnel; health measures; health system; universal health coverage; health policy; health policies; health strategy; health strategies; health plan; health plans; health regulation; health regulations; preventive health service; rehabilitative health service; health security; Emergency Response Coordination Centre; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; disease prevention; prevention of disease; disease spreading; spreading of the disease; spreading of a virus; spreading of the virus; disease control; corona response team; coronavirus response team; vaccination

Source: prepared by the Core Team

## Annex IVB. Most popular social media posts related to the events

TABLE 29. MOST POPULAR INSTAGRAM POSTS ON EUROPE DAY, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET

INSTAGRAM POST EXCERPT	LOCATION	LIKE AND COMMENT COUNT
We're happy to see one of <b>BE</b> Brussels' most famous residents dressed up in blue and yellow for <b>EU</b> Europe Day! The Manneken Pis statue is a famous symbol of Brussels, home to many EU institutions including our own headquarters at the Berlaymont building – which you can visit virtually today at <a href="http://europeday.europa.eu">europeday.europa.eu</a> ! There are Europe...	USA	6955
Hand in hand for freedom, peace and solidarity. <b>EU</b> Turn up your 🎧 sound and enjoy our European anthem ahead of #EuropeDay celebration tomorrow. In 1985, EU leaders adopted Beethoven's "Ode to Joy" theme as the official anthem of the European Union. The anthem brings us together and celebrates our shared values through the universal language...	USA	3668
Shine bright like the ✨ stars, on the <b>EU</b> EU flag! 😊 Celebration of Europe Day goes well beyond the European Union borders every year. From us New York to <b>PY</b> Asunción, <b>CH</b> Lucerne and <b>BA</b> Sarajevo, last year the EU flag was shining on many buildings around the world. Ahead of Europe Day, let's take a trip back to some top...	USA	3544
I am 66 years old. My favourite colours are blue and yellow. And my head is often in the stars. Who am I?... The EU flag! <b>EU</b> Over the years, it has become the most recognisable emblem of the European Union and, more broadly, the identity, diversity and unity of Europe. There are so many stories behind the EU flag! Ahead of Europe Day,...	USA	3453

Happy #europeday #frontex organized a photo competition to "celebrate peace and unity across the EU" So today we celebrate violent border guards, minefields, meter high fences, illegal push backs and the violation of fundamental human rights - all build up to ensure the privileges and the wealth of #eu We are calling on Europe - it's citizens...	USA	3111
"Europe is a story of new beginnings. After every crisis came a European Renaissance." President ursulavonderleyen spoke this week at European University Institute in Florence π, the birthplace of a new beginning of arts and science after the great plague of the late Middle Ages. Her message? We have risen to the challenge of this pandemic...	USA	3096
The future is yours! This Sunday 9 May is the inaugural event for Conference on the Future of Europe – on Europe Day at the European Parliament in Strasbourg! Tune in live on our Facebook, Twitter or LinkedIn accounts to watch the event, featuring: ◆ Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic ◆ David Sassoli, President of the...	USA	1734
"Love is not just looking at each other, it's looking together in the same direction." – President ursulavonderleyen quoting Antoine de Saint-Exupéry during the ceremony to launch the Conference on the Future of Europe in FR Strasbourg last Sunday. She sat down with young Europeans to hear what they had to say about the future of Europe....	USA	1551
Happy #europeday! #Europe #EU	USA	1331
Things are a bit different this year. But what we know for sure is that #NextGenerationEU will be more digital. And for that reason, we have thrown our virtual doors open for you to visit us! Come explore our virtual headquarters and: 🎮 play games 📺 watch videos 📖 learn more about what we do and how it impacts your life Check out our stories...#EuropeDay #EuropeanUnion #EU	USA	1186

**TABLE 30. MOST POPULAR TWITTER POSTS ON EUROPE DAY, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

TWEET EXCERPT	LOCATION	RETWEET AND FAVORITE COUNT
RT @EU_Commission Today is #EuropeDay! eu On this day in , the Schuman Declaration proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, the European Union’s ancestor. Only through unity and solidarity are we able to maintain the	USA	3087
RT @EU_Commission Today is #EuropeDay! eu On this day in , the Schuman Declaration proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, the European Union’s ancestor. Only through unity and solidarity are we able to maintain the	Russia	1765

Happy #EuropeDay! 🇪🇺 🇬🇧 🇮🇹 What better way to celebrate eu than with the #OdeToJoy, the official anthem of the European Union? Enjoy this classic flashmob from a time before #COVID!	USA	471
On #EuropeDay, a short thread on independence in the EU – in wake of SNP/Greens majority in Scottish elections. iScotland can apply to (re)join the EU and would be well placed to do so fairly rapidly.	USA	353
"In the run-up to the referendum, Vote Leave promised that there would be “no change for EU citizens lawfully resident”, Five years on, we know this to be untrue." On #EuropeDay Paula Wilcox shines a light on the mistreatment of Europeans in	USA	271
Hi @Frontex, with regards to your photo competition for #EuropeDay here's my participation with a photo of a shipwrecked rubber boat on which ~ persons lost their lives on April st/nd, while no EU & national authorities acted. It illustrates,	USA	238
Happy #EuropeDay! #EuropeDay #EU	USA	173
RT @eucopresident Happy #EuropeDay! 🇪🇺 The EU promotes peace, freedom and social rights. What does Europe mean to the young generation we met in Porto this week? #StrongerTogether	USA	154
RT @vonderleyen I am moved to see world famous monuments lit up in #EuropeanUnion colours in celebration of #EuropeDay! RT @EmpireStateBldg Blue & yellow lights	USA	153
#EuropeDay #AskCuria @vonderleyen @AsijCatalunya What sanctions can expect public employees whose workplace is at stake in the event that a member of the EU doesn't apply the regulations stated in EU's Directive?	USA	105

**TABLE 31. MOST POPULAR FACEBOOK POSTS ON EUROPE DAY, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

FACEBOOK POST EXCERPT	LOCATION	LIKES, COMMENTS AND SHARES COUNT
The relationship between Australia and the European Union has never been more important - to our economic future, to ... Today is Europe Day and I had the honour of addressing a reception of ambassadors and officials from all over the EU and	USA	63
NYC's iconic Empire State Building is lit up in #EU🇪🇺 colors to celebrate #EuropeDay 🇪🇺 #EuropeDayNYC European Union at the UN – New York	USA	44

We're now live for our Europe Day event 'Lejn il-ġejjieni ta' Malta Ewropea' where our panel of experts will be discussing topics pertaining to Malta in the EU and the Future of Europe MT EU	USA	23
Today we celebrate Europe Day and we stand to celebrate the peace and unity within the European Union! A revolutionary platform that works towards a better Europe. We have the honour of being represented as a country and being able to discuss	USA	17
UNHCR and the EU in India are strong partners to protect forcibly displaced people like eight-year-old refugee Safar in India. On this #EuropeDay we count on our strong partnership with EU in India to respond to the impact of COVID- on refugees	USA	16
Meet the panellists for our Europe Day event tomorrow EU Mr Vincent Bloem- Employee at the European Parliament Liaison Office in Valletta Mr Andre Debattista – Lecturer at the Institute for European Studies at the University of Malta Ms Mandy	USA	11
Tweet by EU in India ----- Music for solidarity as the EU & India stand united. EUIN have come together to mark #EuropeDay through a special rendition of the European anthem "Ode to Joy", to express ideals of freedom, peace & solidarity through	USA	7
We asked #YoungEuropeanAmbassadors Elene Kobaidze, ԱԵՆՍԻ ՄԿՐՈՂՅԱՆ & Viktor Demko #EuropeDay #Futureofeducation EU Neighbourhood & Enlargementt EU neighbours east European Youth EU Social	USA	7
Have you made plans for Saturday night yet? Grab a 🍷 and join European Union in the United States & more than #EU embassies in DC for #EuropeHouseLive EU concert to celebrate #EuropeDay! We're proud to present Curly Strings from EE Estonia!	USA	5

**TABLE 32. MOST POPULAR TWITTER POSTS ON EUROPE DAY, INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

TWEET EXCERPT	LOCATION	RETWEET AND FAVORITE COUNT
Happy #EuropeDay to our friends and neighbours across Europe. Scotland voted against Brexit and we are looking forward to regaining our place in the EU as an independent country #EuropeDay #Scotland	USA	4252
Sunday 9 May is Europe Day. Celebrated by the Council of Europe, of which the UK, as a founding member, remains part. The nations of the British Isles will all be part of the EU again soon too.	USA	2014
The @UN attaches the highest importance to its partnership with the European Union. On #EuropeDay, I look forward to continued friendship and cooperation to build a better world for all.	USA	1061



Wow ! European Parliament in Strasbourg looking spectacular for tomorrow's launch of the Conference on the Future of Europe ! #CoFoE #EuropeDay Staff doing a great job on preparations ! 🙏	USA	355
Freedom of movement is the ❤️ of EU. It's coming back. Happy #EuropeDayEU	USA	294
EU May : We usher in #EuropeDay with #EuropeHouseLive, a virtual concert featuring artists from across the EU, hosted by @Alyssa_Milano. 🎤	USA	278
On #EuropeDay, thank you #EU EU for your solidarity and cooperation in countries worldwide. The #EU-@UNDP partnership has impacted the lives of millions of people, incl. the most vulnerable. #StrongerTogether	USA	203
Today, on Europe Day, we celebrate the close partnership and strong ties that unite Canada and the European Union. Read Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's statement: <a href="http://ow.ly/qKtElfa">http://ow.ly/qKtElfa</a>	Canada	197
<b>Name:</b> EU flag <b>Age:</b> 66 years old <b>Values:</b> Unity, solidarity, diversity and harmony Over the years, the EU flag has become the most recognisable symbol of a European identity. Discover all the details of our flag here <a href="#">📄</a> #EuropeDay	USA	109
On #EuropeDay EU we would like to congratulate the citizens 🧑🏫 in the #EU 🌐 📅 Cooperation allows us to achieve better results. As it is the case of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism that makes us safer	USA	90

TABLE 33. MOST POPULAR FACEBOOK POSTS ON EUROPE DAY, INFLUENTIAL SUBSET

FACEBOOK POST EXCERPT	LOCATION	LIKES, COMMENTS AND SHARES COUNT
The Allianz Arena will be lit up in the colours of the EU between 20:00 and 22:00 CEST tonight to mark Europe Day 🇪🇺🎆	USA	4593
🎧 ມາຮ່ວມສະເຫຼີມສະຫຼອງວັນເອີຣົບ ຫຼື Europe Day, ໂດຍຈະມີການສຳພາດສົດ ທ່ານທູດ ອີຢູ ປະຈຳ ສປປ ລາວ. Join us on #EUROPEDAY EU for live chat with Ina Marčiulionytė, EU Ambassador to Laos	USA	222
Experience performances from all across the European Union brought to you in real time on the eve of Europe Day. Join EU Ambassador to the U.S. Stavros Lambrinidis as he kicks off the festivities at 7 PM ET. Then, meet our artists as	USA	158

With 27 countries in the European Union, there are 27 countries with diverse and ever-changing Jewish life. For Europe Day today, we celebrate a Europe of peace and unity, a Europe where Jewish life is protected, and all peoples can thrive.	USA	154
Pastoralists in East Africa face persistent food insecurity. How FAO & EU are helping to promote peace & food security in the region 🌍 #TogetherforDevelopment #EuropeDay	USA	115
Join us on #EUROPEDAY eufor live chat with Ina Marčiulionytė, EU Ambassador to Laos on May from : -: Live at Lao Youth Radio FM . Mhz	USA	95
#EuropeDay : Head of the European Union Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS, Ambassador Ketil Karlsen, and Ambassadors of EU Member States in Nigeria during the Europe Day celebration in Abuja on Thursday. #TeamEurope #EUinNigeria	USA	76
marks the anniversary of the historic Schuman declaration, which started Europe on the path to today's European Union. The Council and other #EU institutions traditionally celebrate Europe Day by opening their doors to the public. This year,	USA	55
ທ່ານສາມາດອ່ານຂໍ້ມູນເພີ່ມເຕີມໄດ້ 📖 The EU celebrates Europe Day on May. The date marks the ... Schuman Declaration of , considered to be the first official step in the creation of what is now the European Union.	USA	48
Europe Day : 'Team Europe is the very essence of our partnership with Nigeria'- Ambassador Ketil Karlsen, Head of EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS #EuropeDay #EuropeDay #EUDiplomacy #EUintheworld #EUDiplomacy #TeamEurope #EEAS	USA	45

**TABLE 34. MOST POPULAR TWITTER POSTS ON G7 SUMMIT, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

TWEET EXCERPT	LOCATION	RETWEET AND FAVORITE COUNT
..President Biden thought you were Trump's clone ..The EU say you don't keep your word #CNews Gary Gibbon interviews Boris Johnson at the #G7 #FBPE	USA	27075
#G7 were hosted at the Eden Project £ million of the £ million used to fund the Eden Project came from the EU Without the EU, there would be no Eden project or the jobs it created	USA	5290
RT @ukiswitheu ..President Biden thought you were Trump's clone ..The EU say you don't keep your word #CNews Gary Gibbon interviews Boris Johnson at the #G7 #FBPE	USA	2553

Johnson and his Brexit clique said we had to leave the EU to become an independent sovereign country again. But standing with him at the G7 are leaders of independent sovereign countries who are members of the EU. I don't understand?	USA	1450
Beth Rigby on Sky saying Boris was isolated at G7 - what a load of left wing BS, we left #EU get over it!	USA	1412
Good for Gordon Brown to speak up for rejoining the EU. He speaks for many millions of us! Gordon Brown says he will not give up fight to reverse Brexit	USA	1381
Why are the UN and the EU at the G7?	India	1267
#G7 The Worlds greatest democracies.....and the #EU 🇪🇺🇪🇺🇪🇺	Canada	1011
RT @nimaelbagir As part of public push on #Tigray ahead of the G7 this US-EU round table will be webcast live . - . EST. It's being live streamed and I'll be moderating, details at the link below. Hopefully, will give urgency to the global	USA	919
RT @ukiswitheu ..President Biden thought you were Trump's clone ..The EU say you don't keep your word #CNews Gary Gibbon interviews Boris Johnson at the #G7 #FBPE	USA	879

**TABLE 35. MOST POPULAR FACEBOOK POSTS ON G7 SUMMIT, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

FACEBOOK POST EXCERPT	LOCATION	LIKES, COMMENTS AND SHARES COUNT
The participants will include the leaders of the seven G7 member states as well as representatives of the European Union. In addition to Presidential and VIP support, the “Nighthawks” of HMX- maintains the role as the primary Operational Test and	USA	189
Moderated by economist and former Member of the European Parliament Molly Scott Cato, the forum will highlight Green leadership on two key Green demands from G7 and COP – Carbon Tax and Dividend, and Climate Justice – as well as provide a platform	USA	43

Note: only two Facebook posts that received users’ reactions in the form of likes, comments and shares were identified. The rest of Facebook posts from non-influential authors received no interactions.

**TABLE 36. MOST POPULAR INSTAGRAM POSTS ON G7 SUMMIT, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

INSTAGRAM POST EXCERPT	LOCATION	LIKES AND COMMENTS COUNT
The EU is acting to ensure global vaccination happens – and happens fast. 🌐 ... 📷 President von der Leyen speaking ahead of the g7 Summit © European Union ... #StrongerTogether #G7Cornwall #UnitedAgainstCoronavirus #EU #EuropeanUnion	USA	3193
I enjoyed exchanging with members of the European Parliament on the rapid progress we are making with our recovery plan ... globally, as well as our aims for the upcoming summits: • the #G7 in Cornwall this week, and • next week, the EU	USA	2373
The meeting, which is expected to last all afternoon, comes at the end of Mr Biden's first foreign trip as president which has taken him to Cornwall for the G7 meeting and Brussels for separate NATO and EU summits. At all of these meetings, messages	USA	2279
Welcome to ursulavonderleyen, President of the europeancommission, and charlesmichel, President of the eucouncil, who ... ahead of the G7 Summit EU #G7UK #G7 #G7Summit #BuildBackBetter #Cornwall #CarbisBay #G7Cornwall #G7UK #EuropeanUnion	Canada	1631
#g7 #g7summit #g7cornwall #cornwall #uk #europeanunion #eu #europe #biden #joebide. #jillbiden #kamalaharris	USA	1043
He'll take part in G7, NATO and US-EU summits. It's a sign that our relationship is being reinvigorated, as the US takes ... #eu #biden #us #europeanunion #europe	USA	548
be traveling to the U.K., Belgium and Switzerland from June - for the G7 summit, NATO summit and U.S.-European Union ... Find full coverage of the president's trip at c-span.org #g7summit #nato #europeanunion #queenelizabeth #queenelizabethii	USA	523
#G7 #UK #US #China #Canada #Japan #France #Italy #EU #Uyghur #ccp #biden #xi #corona #COVID	USA	382
The initiative will see the members of the G7 (the US, the UK, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan, and the EU) provide 'high quality financing for vital infrastructure' in developing countries. The British PM Boris Johnson commented on the project	USA	227
#GlobalPolitics #Politics #borisjohnson #UK #UnitedKingdom #France #Germany #Italy #Canada #USA #UnitedStates #Japan #EU #EuropeanUnion #G7 #Global7 #Cornwall #CarbisBay #G7Summit #BuildBackBetter	USA	215

**TABLE 37. MOST POPULAR FACEBOOK POSTS ON G7 SUMMIT, INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

FACEBOOK POST EXCERPT	LOCATION	LIKES, COMMENTS AND SHARES COUNT
That's why I'm in quarantine after the G7, NATO, and Canada-EU summits. That's why I took my Day- test today. And that's why I'll keep working from home until my -day quarantine comes to an end.	USA	131692
President Joe Biden took his place Friday alongside the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada and the European Union to pose for a landmark "family photo" in Carbis Bay, England, marking the start of the G7 summit.	USA	6965
The G7 comprises: GB the United Kingdom US the United States of America CA Canada FR France DE Germany JP Japan IT Italy EU representatives of the European Union also attend. This year the United Kingdom has invited the leaders of	USA	3286
Now more than ever, world leaders need to work together to tackle the challenges of today and tomorrow. To do that work, I'll head to the UK for the G7 Leaders' Summit next week - and I'll go to Belgium for the NATO Summit and the Canada-EU Summit.	USA	2911
The seven members of the G7 are the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy, plus the EU. We are working with the international community to address global challenges and build back better - for everyone.	USA	2349
Prime Minister Boris Johnson met: FR President Emmanuel Macron, DE Chancellor Merkel, EU European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President, Charles Michel at the G7 Summit earlier today #G7UK #G7Cornwall	USA	1881
Biden will attend the #G7, NATO and EU summits. He will also meet Queen Elizabeth II, Erdogan and Putin. Palki S Upadhyay gets you the details.	USA	812
It was all smiles between Joe Biden and Boris Johnson ahead of the G7 summit but will the UK-EU dispute over the Northern Ireland Protocol prove to be a sticking point? Gary Gibbon reports.	USA	533
Secretary Blinken: "Looking forward to joining President Joe Biden this week on his travel to Europe for the G7, NATO, and U.S.-EU Summits, as well as the President's meeting with Russian President Putin in Geneva." Learn more about the Secretary's	USA	502
Analysts say that EU leaders disagree with a US-type of Cold War approach against China. #G7	China	474

**TABLE 38. MOST POPULAR TWITTER POSTS ON G7 SUMMIT, INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

TWEET EXCERPTS	LOCATION	RETWEET AND FAVORITE COUNT
Biden flew to Europe and jumped into a demanding schedule of meetings with foreign leaders -G7, the Queen, NATO, EU, Summit with Putin....he even squeezed-in visit to / memorial, walks on the beach with Jill and Sunday mass. When I go to Europe,	USA	24159
That's why I'm in quarantine after the G7, NATO, and Canada-EU summits. That's why I took my Day- test today. And that's why I'll keep working from home until my -day quarantine comes to an end.	Canada	17223
RT @ukiswitheu ..President Biden thought you were Trump's clone ..The EU say you don't keep your word #CNews Gary Gibbon interviews Boris Johnson at the #G7 #FBPE	USA	6585
RT @PhMarliere I have always wondered why French presidents always get a front row position and the most central spot on any G7 or EU group	USA	5462
Biden in a week does UK, G7, NATO, EU, Erdogan & Putin meetings (and more). All go off flawlessly. Major progress on global vaccine push, trade, revitalizing the Atlantic alliance, US-EU relations. Right wing press read out of the trip: Biden got	USA	5408
The EU at the G7 can be represented by Germany, France and Italy, three voices. So why does the EU also get to send two EU Presidents as well to give them a majority?	USA	4862
Only by working together can we beat this pandemic, create good jobs, fight climate change, and build a better future for everyone - that's why I'm heading to the @G7 Summit today, and why I'll be at the @NATO Summit and Canada-EU Summit early next	Canada	4692
After three busy days at the @G7, we landed in Brussels last night for the @NATO Summit and the Canada-EU Summit. We'll work with leaders over the next two days to address threats and challenges, strengthen our partnerships, and advance our shared	Canada	4691
difference in how journalists cover Biden vs how they covered Trump RT @PoliticoRyan Biden heads to Brussels after global win #G7 #NATO #EU	China	4184
The EU used its over representation at the G7 to disagree with President Biden's China policy and water it down. It toughened its assault on Northern Ireland. Pity it couldn't find more to agree about with its major allies.	USA	1913

**TABLE 39. MOST POPULAR TWITTER POSTS ON EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

TWEET EXCERPTS	LOCATION	RETWEET AND FAVORITE COUNT
EU 🇪🇺 A nice gesture ahead of the European Council: Brussels welcomes all EU leaders with the 🇪🇺 flag. #EUCO #LoveIsLove	USA	396
EU foreign ministers have now also given political green light for sectoral sanctions on #Belarus, hitting parts of its potash, oil and banking sectors. will be endorsed by leaders at #EUCO and then officially approved a few days later.	USA	162
EU ambassadors are today set to give green light to the sectoral sanctions against #Belarus. they could be adopted ahead of #EUCO tomorrow.	USA	118
on top of this, EU foreign ministers are also likely to give green light to sectoral sanctions ( possibly energy, banking, potash) on Monday, June. these measures likely to enter into force a bit later, possibly around #EUCO #Belarus #Ryanair	USA	79
amid all the talks about the #EUCO conclusions on #Russia last night, the EU leaders also gave green light to prolong by months the economic sanctions on Russia over the annexation of #Crimea & support of separatists in eastern #Ukraine. they have	USA	62
.@DmytroKuleba slams the idea of resuming EU summits with #Russia that the #EUCO will debate today. #Ukraine #Crimea #Navalny #Salisbury #Vrbetice #Georgia	USA	52
possible compromise tomorrow, if not it goes to foreign ministers on Mon or EU leaders at #EUCO on Thu.	USA	43
Back for day of the European Council. 📺 Good morning everybody and stay tuned... #EUCO	USA	27
Initiative to end fur farming next on the agenda of this evening's #AGRIFISH @EUCouncil meeting. We urge MS Ministers to support the NLAT initiative to #MakeFurHistory & eradicate SARS-CoV- reservoirs on #fur farms. 👁️👁️Follow the debate LIVE	USA	32
Says 'EU membership should offer protection for Hungarian citizens' #Orban #Hungarylgbt #EUCO	USA	37

**TABLE 40. MOST POPULAR INSTAGRAM POSTS ON EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING, NON-INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

INSTAGRAM POST EXCERPT	LOCATION	LIKE AND COMMENT COUNT
This week's meeting of EU leaders in Brussels focused on ... participating in the - June meeting of the eucouncil © European Union / Source: EC - Audiovisual Service / ... Dati Bendo #StrongerTogether #EU CO #EuropeanUnion	USA	2706
Let's talk about the European Council Meeting. If we want a stronger and fairer Europe, EU Member States should look beyond ... #eu #europeanpolitics #europeanunion #ruleoflaw #humanrights #euforeignpolicy	USA	499
Today, #ALDEParty Acting co-Presidents timmydooleysen and ilhankyuchyuk joined the reneweurope Pre-Summit meeting to discuss key issues and common challenges ahead of #EU CO EU . . . #ALDE #ALDEParty #liberal #liberals #EU #Europe	USA	120
#EU CO _____ #PlenaryWeek #plenaryspeech #epplenary #diplomacy #ManfredWeber #europeanparliament	Russia	94
Taoiseach michaelmartintd attended the European Council ... as Covid-, the delta variant, vaccines, Russia and EU ... #belgium #bruxelles #europeanunion #europeancouncil #politics #belgique #architecture #euco #parlementeuropeen	USA	49
During the #EU CO Summit held on - June, EU leaders ... ♦The eucouncil called on the #EuropeanCommission to ... #Bruxircle #euturkeyrelations #europeanunion #eusummit 📺 European Council Audiovisual Resources	USA	44
- President of the European Commission ursulavonderleyen europeancommission will be holding the opening speech of the ... #FrankfurtAmMain #FrankfurtDuBistSoWunderbar #UrsulanVonDerLeyen #EuropeanCommission #EuropeanUnion #EU CO #Frankfurt	USA	13
A years memorial of the EU Council meeting in Gothenburg that took place between June - in and ended in riots and police brutality. #livemusic #anarchy #queerchoir #queermusic #protestmusic #europeancouncil	USA	10
#Morocco is level #Covid_ Low Grey -> COVID- unknown #news #infos #worldnews #noticias #noticia #notizie #neues #nachrichten #nieuws #nyheter #nyheder #eupol #euco #europe #europa #EU #UE #SaharaOccident #WesternSahara #MoroccanSahara	USA	6
EU leaders meet on and June in Brussels. #EU CO #eudebates They ... On the second day, the members of the European Council discuss the economic ... They are joined by the Presidents of the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup	USA	6

**No Facebook posts** on the European Council made by non-EU authors (both influential and non-influential) were identified.



**TABLE 41. MOST POPULAR TWITTER POSTS ON EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING, INFLUENTIAL SUBSET**

TWEET EXCERPTS	LOCATION	FAVORITE AND RETWEET COUNT
3 years it took the European Council #EUCO to hold a debate on Hungary - no conclusions or actions yet. I am stunned & angry: time to stop Hungary's anti-LGBT law, time to fully use Article 7!	USA	1199
Rutte in his #euco intervention suggested Orban trigger article 50 which "exists for a reason" if he doesn't want to comply with EU values 🏹	USA	113
Orban's regime reflects poorly on entire EU, says Greece: "We cannot export democracy & human rights and we cannot be the ... #EUCO #LGBTQ 🏹	USA	74
🔔 NEW: France and Germany have called for revival of EU summits with Putin and closer dialogue with Russia on eve of #euco summit. Move has wrongfooted rest of the bloc and sharpened divides ahead of tomorrow's #euco via	USA	45
Helpfully blunt Rutte says he doesn't mind EU commission and council heads meetin Putin. "I will not participate with the meeting with Putin myself". #euco	USA	42
EU takes hard line on Russia: * Expectations & demands prerequisite for diplomacy * Accountability for MH370 * Responsibility Ukraine war * New sanctions should Kremlin persist in "malign, illegal & disruptive activity" #EUCO #StrongerTogether	USA	40
🔔 "Work needs to pay and provide viable protection against poverty" say ETUC & @social_platform in joint statement urging Employment Ministers in EU #EPSCO Council meeting today to ✓ support the proposed Minimum Wages Directive.	USA	34
A group of EU countries will confront Viktor Orban this afternoon at #euco and demand he repeal the country's LGBTI+ bill	USA	32
EU ambassadors tonight spent mins (aptly) on draft #euco conclusions on Russia. Will be changes made before start of summit but will be up to leaders to decide how to tackle main sticking points on whether to retain list of areas for cooperation	USA	28
🌐 Happening now 🌐 European Parliament debate on the EU summit and migration #EUCO [1][1]	USA	24
Rutte in full: says if Hungary does not withdraw its LGBT+ bill, they have "no place in the EU" #euco ... RT @EUCouncilTVNews Doorstep by @MinPres Prime Minister of #Netherlands, ahead of the #EuropeanCouncil #EUCO taking place	USA	18
But for 7 EU leaders to extend an invitation to come to Brussels will be seen as a reward, and goes too fast." Doorstep @MinPres after #EUCO Day .	USA	18

Asked Taoiseach to raise it at next European Council meeting.. Crowe - “we need to fix this supply chain like PPE, If we don’t construction sector will collapse”	USA	14
EU leaders at #euco are also being asked to get involved in the governance of European sport by Slovenia's incoming presidency Janez Jansa. Jansa has beef with his compatriot and Uefa boss Ceferin. Diplomats think Jansa may use the presidency to put	USA	13
#euco is over. Leaders end the night having seemingly rebuffed the DEFR request for new summitry dialogue with Putin. Conclusions have now stripped references to exploring formats at either leaders or EU instituional level. 🤖	USA	12
Devastating judgment on my carpet which I fear I may never recover from: RT @michaeltanchum @Danjsalt There is one like in the European Council meeting hall @b_judah	USA	10
This is the draft Franco German #euco text on Russia tabled at a meeting of EU ambassadors today. At the meeting, Germany's ambassador also suggested a format to revive EU-Russia talks - the context clearly being Biden - Putin talks last week.	USA	8

No Instagram or Facebook posts from influential authors regarding the European Council meeting were identified.



# **UPDATE OF THE 2015 PERCEPTION STUDY:**

## **Annex V Comparative focus groups report**

2021



# Contents

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## List of abbreviations

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ACFTA: African Continental Free Trade Agreement
ACFTA: African Continental Free Trade Agreement
ASEAN: Association of South Asian Nations
AU: African Union
BIMSTEC: The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BRICS: Brazil, India, China, South Africa
CETA: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
CUSMA: North American free trade agreement
EAEU: Eurasian Economic Union
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
LGBTI+: lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex
MERCUSOR: trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
QUAD: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
SAARC: South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
UN: United Nations
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund

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# 1. Executive summary

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This Annex presents the findings of focus groups with 114 university students in 13 locations in focus for the Update Study 2021. Our research shows that while the level of awareness of the EU differs across the participants, all students show at least some knowledge about the EU. Moreover, they convey emotive attitudes and formulate evaluative judgments towards the EU and its policies irrespective of their knowledge about the EU. Students' perceptions are very often refracted through location-specific concerns and visions of "our own" problems. When personal experiences affect the perception of the EU (student exchanges, visits, etc.) they do not necessarily translate into more positive perceptions towards the EU.

The most visible issue-areas where the EU attracts intense cognitive reflections, pronounced emotive attitudes and normative evaluations are the following: *economy and trade, value-based political activity, environment and climate change* (overlapping with *research, science and technology and energy*) and value-based *social issues* with special attention to *education and health* (the latter is linked to the Covid pandemic).

Perceptions of the EU in the most visible thematic areas come with high expectations directed at the EU to act in line with its normative profile and to counter the problems and to the benefit of the location – even when awareness of the EU is low.

Observing continuity in the perceptions of the EU over the last five years, the most visible and persisting images differ across locations. The majority of negative changes in the image of the EU are linked to the multiple crises faced by the EU – the Eurozone debt crisis, Brexit, the refugee crisis and finally the Covid pandemic. A positive change in imagery is linked to the EU's resilience in the face of crises. In the eyes of the students, in the short-term future, the EU is often seen as being at crossroads given its numerous challenges and especially those that undermine its coherence. In this light, the next five years are seen as decisive for the EU's future. Images of how EU perceptions will evolve long-term (10-20 years) come with major existential questions – will the EU survive or not? – and feature even more ambiguity and fewer predictions than short-term evaluations. The perceptions of the EU are driven mainly by EU-specific factors such as the capacity of the integration process to bring EU Member States closer and to address current challenges more effectively and location-specific factors, e.g. how the EU may benefit the countries of the participants and make a difference to their life personally. These outlooks by young people are, therefore, linked to the EU's ability to overcome its problems and promote its global leadership, especially in key areas such as the economy and climate change.

## 2. Introduction

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How young people form views of the EU/Europe profoundly matters for future dialogue and geopolitical orientation: Political socialisation research shows that the 15-24 age period is most important in the formation of political attitudes and identities (Flanagan et al., 2015; Neundorf et al., 2013; Ghitza et al. 2019). People are particularly sensitive to events and challenges, and open to new ideas, during their transition into adulthood (Furlong, 2006; Arnett, 2014). Unsurprisingly, youth is one of the key audiences for public diplomacy – including 'promising young people' (future decision-makers, multipliers and influencers) and members of the general public (Gonesh and Melissen, 2005). The 2015 Baseline Study concluded with a recommendation to include youth – as a key audience for EU public diplomacy – into future studies of perceptions of the EU around the world and factor the



findings into the conduct of EU public diplomacy. The ToR for the Update Study 2021 stressed the importance of studying the perceptions among educated youth – tertiary education students, potential future decision-makers.

This annex presents the findings of focus groups with students in the thirteen key partners of the EU: Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, the US. Employing the method of a focus group (FG), the Update Study 2021 examines perceptions of the EU and its policies among young people who are higher education students. The method of focus groups encourages participants to explore more sensitive topics and produce more elaborated accounts in interaction and discussion with each other, producing rich qualitative data about personal opinions, views and narratives, while allowing to track perceptions among a larger group of people.

Data collection and reporting were coordinated by experts from the Public Diplomacy and Political Communication Forum, University of Canterbury, New Zealand (PD-PCF UC). The Country Experts organised and conducted focus groups in 13 locations with 114 young people (8-12 participants per country) between 22 March and 10 May 2021<sup>21</sup>. With the exception of two countries (India and China) all focus groups took place in April 2021. Due to the precarious health situation, most of focus groups took place in virtual format while making use of some additional digital features, such as polling tools and automated transcripts in some languages. All focus groups were conducted following strict Human Ethics Guidelines. All focus groups interviews adhere to data protection and regulation standards to ensure the highest standard of data protection and data safety when conducting focus groups either face-to-face or online. All responses will remain de-identified.

This annex was prepared by PD-PCF UC and revised by the Country Experts and members of the Quality Assurance Team. Upon providing the summary of the findings, Annex V introduces the reader to the key methodological aspects of the research and elaborates on the type of research participants that are included in the focus groups. The report proceeds with explaining the main themes in youth perceptions of the EU shared by the participants of the focus groups. The Annex then elaborates on perceived obstacles and gaps between expectations towards the EU's performance and perceptions of the EU and its policies. The annex continues with exploring the perceptions of the EU vis-à-vis other geopolitical actors and international organisations, as well as outlining explanatory factors. Annex V reviews the evolution of perceptions of the EU among young people comparing findings of the 2021 Update Study to the findings of the 2015 Baseline Study. The report also includes concise country-specific chapters presenting key findings for 13 countries in the Study.

## **2.1. Type of research participants**

Our sampling for focus groups sought to grasp wider range of students – future diplomats and policymakers but also students in those fields that the EU intends to enhance its leadership position, such as the environment, climate mitigation, research, science and technology. For each country sample, we engaged students from multiple disciplines – (i) students who study the EU/Europe as a part of their professional training, (ii) students who are predisposed towards a more informed position about international relations and political life in general and (iii) students who study in the fields not related to the EU or politics (see Table 1 for the summary of the participants' background). Predictably,

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<sup>21</sup> The approach to focus groups was agreed with the project Steering Committee at the initial stages of the Study. The number of the focus groups and the total number of participants reflect the fieldwork limitations under the COVID-19 restrictions and the limited time allocated for this Study.

groups (i) and (ii) are more aware and knowledgeable about the EU than group (iii). The wider disciplinary profile of the sample as well as different levels in students' awareness of the EU were specifically requested by the Steering Group.

Furthermore, students in the country samples tend to be more aware of the EU than the general population in their countries. Student samples are also not representative of the demographic dynamics of young people in their countries (regarding, for example, socio-economic status, access to education and mostly larger universities likely in capitals/main cities). The total sample involves students of the final years of their undergraduate and early-year of their first post-graduate degrees. We seek to approximate gender balance albeit in acknowledgement that country samples may not be perfectly balanced (Table 2). Since the sample is small, the study did not assess opinions of student from major vs. minor, central vs. peripheral, state vs. private, or liberal vs. conservative universities. Next iteration of the perceptions study – should it take place – may prioritise this element in its ToR if educated young people gain even more importance as a key audience group for EU public diplomacy in the future.

**TABLE 42: FOCUS GROUP SAMPLE BY PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND**

	BR	CAN	CHN	CO	IND	IDN	JP	MX	NGA	RU	SA <sup>22</sup>	SK	US
<b>Total</b>	8	7	8	8	9	8	8	10	9	8	10	9	12
<b>International relations and political science</b>	x		x	x	x	x	x	x					x
<b>EU Studies</b>				x			x						x
<b>Media studies, communication and journalism</b>	x		x	x		x			x				x
<b>Information science / technologies</b>			x				x						
<b>Social sciences and sociology</b>				x						x			x
<b>Environment, climate, geology</b>	x			x	x		x			x			x
<b>Philosophy</b>	x	x			x								
<b>Computer Science</b>						x	x		x				
<b>Security</b>													x
<b>Economics</b>		x	x		x				x	x			
<b>History</b>		x			x			x	x				

<sup>22</sup> This information was not recorded for the South African sample; however, the students were pooled from international relations and foreign policy courses.

Law										x			
Development and cooperation												x	
Human resource management			x										
Civil engineering			x									x	
Literature and linguistics			x		x								
Gender studies				x									
Domestic violence										x			
Chemistry										x			
Pharmacology			x										

Source: prepared by PD-PCF UC and the Country Experts for the Core Team

**TABLE 43: DEMOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION**

	BRA	CAN	CHN	CO	IND	IDN	JP	MX	NGA	RU	SA	SK	US
<b>Total (114)</b>	8	7	8	8	9	8	8	10	9	8	10	9	12
<b>Female (55)</b>	5	3	4	6	3	3	3	5	4	5	8	3	7
<b>Male (51)</b>	3	4	4	2	6	5	5	5	5	3	2	6	5
<b>Age</b>	20-22	20-25	20-23	18-23	20-25	20s	20-24	21-24	18-20	19-24	18-21	20s	18-29

Source: prepared by PD-PCF UC and the Country Experts for the Core Team

The Update Study identifies three groups of participants in terms of the overall awareness the EU/Europe. The groups of awareness range from high (across all majors) to mixed to low (Table 3). Importantly, we do not equate awareness and exposure. More exposure may bring higher awareness, but, as relevant research shows, it is only among people who have a reason to support the organisation (*The Measurement Standard: Blog edition*, online). We assess awareness by (i) students' personal experiences (e.g., tourism, work, education in Europe), (ii) personal contacts (e.g., family and friends in/from Europe) and (iii) personal education (e.g., study of a discipline/classes that focus on the EU and Europe). As such, students' education/work in Europe, classes about the EU/Europe as well as family/friends living in EU Member States are seen as those types of exposure that may lead to higher awareness of the EU. Tourism is not necessarily a type of exposure that may raise awareness about the EU.

**TABLE 44: LEVEL OF AWARENESS AMONG PARTICIPANTS**

	BRA	CAN	CHN	COL	IND	IDN	JP	MEX	NGA	RU	SA	SK	US
<b>Highly aware</b>	x	x					x			x			x
<b>Mixed awareness</b>			x	x	x			x			x		
<b>Low awareness</b>						x			x			x	

Source: prepared by PD-PCF UC and the Country Experts for the Core Team

While the level of awareness in our sample differed across countries and disciplines, all students have demonstrated at least some knowledge about the EU. Moreover, they were able to convey emotive attitudes and formulate evaluative judgments towards the EU and its policies. Cognitive, emotive and normative elements of the images of the EU and its policies are very often refracted through location-specific concerns and visions of “our own” problems. When personal experiences affect the perception of the EU (student exchanges, visits, etc.) they do not necessarily translate into more positive perceptions towards the EU.

### 3. Main themes and perceptions towards the EU

The most visible issue-areas where the EU attracts intense cognitive reflections, pronounced emotive attitudes and normative evaluations are the following: economy and trade, value-based political activity, environment and climate change (overlapping with research, science and technology (RST) and energy) and value-based social issues with special attention to education and health (the latter in the light of the Covid pandemic). Table 4 further reflects on the perceived importance of the EU in the respective issue-areas.<sup>23</sup>

**TABLE 45. RELEVANCE OF THE THEMES FOR FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS**

	BRA	CAN	CHN	COL	IND	IDN <sup>24</sup>	JP	MEX	NGA	RUS	SA <sup>25</sup>	SK	US
<b>Economy and trade</b>	4.6	4.3	4.9	5.0	3.6	5.0	4.3	4.5	3.4	4.7	4.9	4.3	3.9
<b>Average: 4.4</b>													

<sup>23</sup> These are results from the min-poll with participants following the question ‘Please rank the following key themes/areas according to their relevance and importance regarding EU policies in your country from 1 to 5, where 1 is not at all important and 5 is very important’. Numbers are calculated as average for each location. NB: not all participants have ranked all the themes.

<sup>24</sup> Please note that because of technical difficulties students responded to this question selectively.

<sup>25</sup> Please note that because of technical difficulties only 9/10 focus groups students responded to this question.

<b>Politics</b> Average: 3.8	4.6	4.6	3.6	4.5	2.6	4.5	3.3	3.4	2.4	4.7	3.9	3.6	3.3
<b>Climate and environment</b> Average: 3.9	4.7	4.7	2.8	4.5	4.1	3.5	4.4	4.7	3.6	3.4	3.0	4.1	3.3
<b>Energy</b> Average: 3.8	3.5	3.3	3.9	4.0	4.2	2.0	3.5	3.6	3.6	4.7	N/A	3.9	3.4
<b>RST</b> Average: 4.0	4.6	3.9	4.3	4.5	3.6	4.3	3.4	4.6	3.8	4.1	3.0	4.1	4.8
<b>Development/ assistance</b> Average: 3.2	3.9	3.6	2.9	4.3	2.2	3.3	3.0	3.2	4.0	2.6	3.0	3.2	2.8
<b>Social</b> Average: 3.1	3.7	3.6	2.9	3.8	2.1	4.0	3.1	2.8	3.6	3.3	1.3	3.2	2.9
<b>Education<sup>26</sup></b> Average: 3.5	4.7	3.7	3.1	4.1	2.9	4.0	3.0	3.3	3.2	3.7	3.0	4.4	2.6
<b>Culture</b> Average: 2.9	3.9	3.3	2.4	3.7	2.2	2.0	3.5	3.0	3.2	3.6	1.0	3.8	2.5
<b>Health</b> Average: 3.1	3.9	3.6	3.4	3.1	1.6	3.0	3.0	4.0	3.6	3.0	2.7	3.4	2.3

Source: prepared by PD-PCF UC and the Country Experts for the Core Team

The most visible thematic areas of EU perceptions come with several expectations directed at the EU to act to counter the problems and to the benefit of the location. Even when awareness is low, such links between thematic areas and expectations exist. When students find that such expectations are not met, they are easily disappointed, or their perception is affected negatively. We find frequent expectations in the following areas:

- Students perceive the EU as a trading and economic power and as such they expect and wish for the EU to be an investor in local economies and to facilitate economic links between the EU and their countries.
- Students perceive the EU to be a leader in climate change mitigation, environmental protection and green technologies and as such expect the EU to share green technology know-how to help in their countries to achieve better success in mitigating climate change. They also expect the EU to step up its global leadership role in environment and climate change to the benefit of their countries, acceleration of climate ambition, and even exercise pressures onto governments that are lacking in climate action.

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<sup>26</sup> Please, note that education is typically a sub-topic of “Social Issues” theme. Here it stands out as a separate theme due to the importance of the theme for the cohort in focus.

- Students perceive the EU as a normative leader and a promoter of the rule of law, and thus expect the EU to provide more support to fight crime in their countries (e.g., corruption, drug trafficking, etc.).
- Students perceive the EU as a wealthy humanitarian actor and as such they expect the EU's leadership on global health in the context of the Covid pandemic, including providing medicine to developing countries. Students are frustrated by the EU's poor handling of the Covid pandemic inside Europe and "Europe First" attitudes in the global vaccine distribution.
- Students perceive the EU to be a global promoter of democracy and expect the EU to be a liberal democracy region; as such their perception of the EU has been particularly negatively affected by the democratic backsliding in the EU.
- Students perceive the EU as a champion of human rights, tolerance, diversity and gender equality and thus expect the EU to uphold these norms internally. Students react very negatively towards the EU when the migration crisis shows otherwise or when such norms are perceived to be breached within the EU more generally.
- Students perceive the EU to be an international leader in education and thus expect the EU to provide more support for educational opportunities for students, including providing scholarships facilitating exchanges to study in Europe and support with domestic development or restructuring of education systems.

Students also link reflections on the EU to the images of Europe, mention historical legacies of their respective countries' relations with European actors, and make references to the cultural cache of Europe.

### 3.1. Economy and trade

Students across all locations recognise that the economy is the most important facet in the image of the EU and that the EU is an international leader in trade. Economy and trade is the most relevant theme to focus group participants, but students do not demonstrate a shared pattern in perceptions of the EU in this issue-area. When perceived positively, the economy is tied to an image of the EU as a wealthy region, as a beneficial partner for the country in focus or as an international leader. When perceived negatively, the EU is linked to the topics of trade tensions, recession, and self-interest. Importantly, the analysis demonstrates that a dominant – and somewhat simplistic – past image of the EU as an "economic powerhouse and trading giant" is much more nuanced in the eyes of the international educated youth.

Perceptions of the EU's visible actorness in terms of its economic power come with four caveats:

- a) They serve to underline the image of the EU as *not* a military power. In this instance, the EU is perceived not on par with other global actors such as the US or China (in China, India, South Africa, Russia).
- b) The EU's visible profile in economy and trade positively stresses its key role in economic terms globally (Japan, Russia, Republic of Korea, the US).
- c) The perceptions of economic power of the US and China offset the image of the EU's relevance in the global economic context – some students suggest a similar level of actorness (Colombia, Republic of Korea, Japan,), some view the EU less powerful in contrast (South Africa).
- d) The perceived inequality in socio-economic development among EU Member States adds onto the image of the EU as a less coherent and powerful actor (Brexit adds to that image in some locations, e. g. Nigeria).

The local context filters the perceptions of the EU as an economy and trade actor. The conclusion of trade agreements is an important aspect that increases the perceived relevance of the EU and drives the students' focus on the economy and trade in perceptions of the EU. This is the case particularly where

students hope that a recently concluded trade agreement with the EU can bring benefits to the national economy (a high level of expectations from the EU). For example, for Colombian students, the EU-Colombia/Ecuador/Peru Trade Agreement signed in 2013 is the most relevant EU programme. They also expect more European investments into Colombian industry. Likewise, students in Mexico expect more economic bilateral cooperation between Mexico and the EU. Brazilian students positively highlight the EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement for their own country and especially the diplomatic pressure exerted by the EU and its Member States (particularly France) onto Brazil. Importantly, Brazilian students welcomed diplomatic pressure on Brazil only when it concerns climate and environment, while in other areas they are critical about the EU pressuring other countries.

Where the EU appears to fulfil the high expectations directed towards it, students appear to react positively. Canadian students see the EU as a stable, trusted, and like-minded partner. The economy and trade is one of the three areas where the EU's relationship with Canada is seen to be most important. Students in Canada mention the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) as a policy that brings stability to the trade partnership with Canada, especially in the context of the US Trump Presidency. However, for Canadian students, the North American free trade agreement (CUSMA - which replaced NAFTA) is seen as more significant than CETA. It is noteworthy, that the theme of stability also emerges in the context of the US focus group, where the absence of stability on the context of trade tensions between the US Trump Administration and the EU stirs negative sentiments, although not necessarily linked to the perception of the EU per se.

In the cases when students comment on the EU's financial and other crises, they sometimes endow the image of the EU with negativity either around perceived instability of the EU or its perceived weakness (Brazil, China, India, Japan and Mexico). Russian students see the EU as a powerful economic actor in general but acting under the influence of the US. As a result, the EU is seen as Russia's adversary, yet not an antagonist (such as the US). This perception is indicative of students' views on the EU as economic rather than political actor. In comparison to the 2015 Study, in which Russian youth saw the EU as a union founded to guarantee peace, in the 2021 sample they see the EU as largely an economic organisation. With positive connotations of wealth and economic advance assigned to this entity, Russian students do believe that the EU should pay more attention to its internal stability. Somewhat similar perception is registered among Chinese respondents. They see the EU as an economic powerhouse, and to them the EU delivers the image of prosperity, but this does not translate into the EU's international leadership. Local filters come in place in China when students reveal China's focus on its own economic development. In this context, cooperating with the EU is seen as a part of achieving this national, goal, including by means of trade deals between China and the EU.

The location-specific filter extends in temporal scope and perspective when shaped by the historical encounters and experiences with the EU and Europe through time (especially in Nigeria and South Africa). For example, Nigerian students connect the theme of economy with dominantly negative image of the EU as a neo-colonial actor who disadvantages Nigeria. EU trade practices are seen as unfair, and thus perceived negatively. Perceptions of Europe and the Global North – especially in the context of the economy and trade – are also described as exploitative in the South African sample. Such historical lenses shape how intentions and motivations of the EU are being interpreted. For some South African students, not only the EU runs an exploitative and unequal relationship between the EU and South Africa, but the EU is seen as not willing to engage in a true dialogue with South Africa. As such, respondents shared a rather negative perception that there was little added benefit to South Africa's relationship with the EU.

Findings from other locations support the argument for the importance of nuance and local filters in tracking and understanding external perceptions of the EU. Japanese students report very neutral perceptions of the EU in the context of the export promotion of wine and cheese following the Economic Partnership Agreement, while Korean students mention the tariffs to provide cheaper German cars to Republic of Korea. An element of unequal economic distribution permeates the conversation in other

countries (Mexico, Russia, Republic of Korea). Finally, Indonesian students, while sharing a positive attitude towards the EU as a global economic leader, perceive the EU in a negative light when the palm oil sector is concerned.

It is noteworthy that the economic and trade theme does not necessarily connect to positive or negative imagery on one common pattern. The EU is perceived in strong negative terms when it appears to break expectations attached to its perceived, in particular, when it comes to stability and internal crises. Across all countries, historical experiences and political context of bilateral relations shape perceptions and expectations of the EU in the theme of trade and economy. More generally, the EU is asserted to be economically superior in most countries. When such dynamics are perceived positively, they are connected to a positive impact on a relationship with the partner country (Canada, Colombia). When they are perceived negatively, they lead to frustration and a perception of the EU as an exploitative, neo-colonial and unfair power (Nigeria, South Africa).

### 3.2. Politics

Perceptions of the EU in the issue of politics are extremely diverse and very much influenced by *Self-images, location-specific* factors, and visions of a country's "own" problems. Images in this issue-area are heavily influenced by **normative considerations** (see section Normative).

The political theme is heavily influenced by global dynamics and the interaction of global players such as China and the US. Students across countries (Japan, South Africa, Republic of Korea) are watching the relationship between the EU and China suspiciously and attentively and are in some cases afraid of a deterioration of EU-China relations (Republic of Korea). Images of the EU as a political actor have occasionally involved perceptions around security issues, but those are not dominant. In Russia and India, the EU is credited for its potential in the areas of cybersecurity, counterterrorism, defence and security. In other locations, there is a concern about the future of the security relationship. To some students in Canada, the EU appears vulnerable in the field of high politics, such as security and defence, while students in the US point to the need for the EU to develop its own security capacities. In general, the EU is seen as lacking "hard power" qualities without a necessary positive or negative evaluation. For example, Korean students in general do not see the EU as an effective political actor on the global stage yet uphold a neutral attitude in this perception.

It is also difficult to track a shared student positions on the EU's global political leadership role. Some students are neutral to the EU's global leadership (Republic of Korea), others do not find that the EU played a big role (or that it should – Nigeria). Some find that the EU influences through soft power assets such as fashion, sport and culture (South Africa), while others find such assets irrelevant to their country (China). It is further difficult for some students to see where the EU is leading as an organisation. For them it is EU Member States that are seen to be more prominent in local contexts, that the EU.

In the context of the EU's domestic politics and particularly European integration, one development is seen to be of a major negative impact for the EU – Brexit. Brexit has challenged the notion of the EU as a model for regional integration (Brazil, Nigeria). It is also seen to have compromised the EU's position on the world stage (India) by threatening European coherence and the continuation of the European project (Brazil, Nigeria). Brexit has cast a negative light on EU perceptions among students in the US, Republic of Korea, Japan, Indonesia and Brazil. Some students link Brexit to other crises and challenges the EU has faced into a wider narrative of the EU in crisis (China, Japan, the US) whereas chaos around Brexit is not only perceived negatively but is connected to instability of the EU (China, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia). Other students find that Brexit has had a significant impact on their perceptions of the EU, although with little emotive evaluation altogether (China, Republic of Korea). Similarly, mixed perceptions refer to the consequences of Brexit. In almost every location, some students follow the



disintegration narrative in fear that the EU would “fall apart”. Yet, positive outlooks are also observed. Students in the US think that the EU might move forward. One Canadian student finds that Brexit has proved much less damaging to the EU than probably most Canadians would have thought. Russian students also differ in their evaluations of Brexit: some think that it is changing the image of the EU from a monolith to a puzzle, while others believe it has no impact at all or that this impact is yet to be seen.

### 3.3. Normative

Students across all locations (except for China) see the EU as a **normative leader**. Some participants, for example, in India, go further in considering the EU as global leader in setting international regulations, consolidating international rules, norms and institutions, whether in the area of trade, environment or human rights.

The EU is seen as a multicultural society that embraces diversity (India), upholds the values of human rights, gender justice and democracy (Mexico). One student from Russia finds the EU to be more tolerant than Russia. Students across multiple locations (India, Japan, Mexico, South Africa) converge with the EU around issues such as diversity, inclusion, human rights, and climate change. The exception here is China where students claim they are not familiar with the norms of the EU or any other international actors. The EU in the context human rights attracts minimal reflections from students in Indonesia and Republic of Korea.

One of other prominent reflections on the EU is its perception as of a **neo-colonial actor**. Thus, Nigerian students see EU-Nigeria relations as expedient and solely beneficial to the EU, which is reinforced by the EU’s migration regime towards Nigerian introduced in 2015. South African students voice a similar scepticism and caution of EU interests. Mexican students call the EU to revisit European colonialism: in their opinion, the EU should close the gap between being a normative leader and the historical debt to ex-colonies, particularly in Africa. One Brazilian student particularly wishes for the EU to have reparation policies for colonialism.

For some focus groups, the theme of human rights emerges through a firm local hook. For example, in Mexico, the image of the EU in this area links to the Spotlight Initiative to fight femicide in Mexico. Colombian students expect the EU to support/defend human rights, gender equality and peace in Colombia with more forceful actions (including recent threats to social leaders). The **EU as a gender equality advocate** within human rights discourse is positively appreciated in Russia, Mexico, India, Colombia; students from Mexico, India and Colombia also expect the EU to deliver into this area locally. In contrast, in Nigeria students see the EU as a global promoter of human rights but not locally: while they acknowledge that the EU promotes human rights, they think it could do more. In India, the EU is seen to fall short of timely concerted action in human rights.

While EU perceptions are positively associated with the value of **human rights**, they are likewise affected particularly negatively when the EU is seen to fail in upholding such values (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Republic of Korea and to a lesser extent – Japan and the US). Meanwhile, the expectations directed at the EU to continue being a champion of human rights are high (Japan), particularly in the locations where students fear a domestic shortcoming either as a global leader on the issue or given a poor domestic track record. The political handling of **migration** – linked to the issue of **human rights** – is seen as a divisive issue and mostly impacts the perceptions of the EU negatively in the eyes of students in all locations. For Indian students, migration policy shortfalls explicate a lack of coherent, timely and concerted efforts from the EU. For Canadian students, migration highlights inconsistency of the EU – it sees itself as a human rights promoter, but it treats immigrants and refugees poorly. Students in Republic of Korea also believe that the refugee issue should be handled better, including in the area of negative perceptions of refugees and social problems in some EU Member States (Greece,

Italy). For Russian students, the opinion is somewhat different: they believe the EU should pay more attention to its internal cohesion as migration from the Middle East challenges Europe.

Linked to the expression of expectations around human rights, students in Japan are concerned about Hungary and Poland when reflecting on the rule of law and demand consistency between internal and external action (especially where the EU engages in domestic dialogues on the death penalty). More generally, the **rule of law** – similar to the issue of human rights – reveals expectations held by students towards the EU. In Colombia and Mexico, students expect the EU, perceived to be governed by the rule of law, to help to fight local crime, drug trafficking and femicide. Colombian students wish for the EU to consider Colombia's local specific context better – given high levels of corruption in Colombia and a lack of transparency in the execution of rural projects.

**Democracy** is another theme that elicits mixed cognitive reactions and emotive attitudes. Here, the students' reflection on illiberal democracies in Europe come with negative perceptions of the EU. Importantly, the rise of far-right populism is also perceived as a threat to the EU by the Russian students. For them, the image of the EU is now linked not only to the civilizational differences between the EU and Russia (a perception that led in the 2015 Study) but to a less clear border between Russia and some EU Member States in this regard, because Russian students see EU Member States as driven by different values (e.g. liberal France vs. more conservative Poland). Canadian students connect negative perceptions of the ongoing risk of democratic backsliding (including radical movements and parties and remaining high levels of populism) and share similar concerns with students in locations elsewhere (Brazil, Japan, the US). Some students even perceive democracy and human rights violations in Hungary and Poland as triggers for the EU to fall apart (Japan). The important element around the value of democracy is that it is seen as a driver of EU unity and when implicated is connected to strong concerns and negative perceptions on division, hypocrisy and weakness.

**Peace** as a norm is also in focus, although it is not a leading perception. Students in Republic of Korea positively perceive the EU's continuous contribution to world peace. In Colombia, the EU is seen as being active in peace promotion, post-conflict support and the Colombian Peace Process. Somewhat linked to peace is the perception of the EU as an example of a successful regional **integration project** that allowed to achieve peace in Europe (India, Canada). A separate niche here is the perception of the EU as an international leader in regional integration (Russia, India) and a model of integration (Mexico). Here, students frequently reference Brexit (see section Politics) as the event threatening the whole idea of European integration and its future. However, many participants still see the EU as a reference point for regional integration in their locations. Indonesian students associate Schengen and the free movement of people as having inspired the ASEAN to adopt its own visa-free policy, the EU in general being perceived as a role model for the ASEAN. Nigerian students share a consensus that the EU serves as a model of integration to the African Union. However, *location-specific* factor comes in play here because these students do not appreciate the EU's extra-regionalism (the EPAs).

### 3.4. Climate and environment

Sustainable environment and climate change mitigation are among the leading themes in the perceptions of the EU among the educated youth. Even though the relevance of this theme varies across locations and respondents, in most locations climate change and environment are among the top three areas where EU actions are perceived to be of relevance for domestic and global interests.

When the EU is mentioned in the context of environment and climate change, young people in all locations assign actorness to the EU. They refer to the EU's global leadership in this area (Republic of Korea), and more so than that of other international actors such as the US and China (Japan). The EU is seen as leading by example (Japan). The EU also appears to have the highest visibility in this theme in Brazil, Colombia, India, as this issue area is of close interest for many students in these locations. In the

field of environment and climate change, the EU is seen a leader even in those locations where it is not acknowledged as a global political actor (India, Russia) or even when the EU's visibility in the area of environment and climate change is lacking/less frequently mentioned (Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Colombia, Nigeria, South Africa).

Similar to the themes of the economy and politics discussed above, perceptions of the EU as a leader in environment and climate come with high expectations of the EU's leadership in this area and with the hope that the EU's leadership can benefit the partner countries and drive more ambitious domestic action (Brazil, India, Japan, South Africa). However, students are less clear about what a successful fulfilment of their expectations would look like. Some students expect generally more investment in environmental protection and climate change mitigation in their country (Colombia), others are interested in the EU's specific action on tackling the effects of climate change, such as droughts (South Africa) or deforestation (Brazil).

Most students do not perceive the EU's actions in this area as interference with national sovereignty – a perception that is visible in some other themes. Japanese students positively perceive the EU's stance against the financing and export of coal power, while Brazilian students support the pressure on the Brazilian government on deforestation. The exception here is Indonesia, where students disagree with the EU's ban on palm oil.

Students' high expectations towards the EU in the field of environment and climate change also trigger some negative perceptions. Republic of Korean students find that EU environmental actions are not sufficiently visible and EU implementation policies in this area are not distinct enough. Students in India and Indonesia also feel that the EU is falling short in developing a more intensive cooperation, especially on green technology transfer. They hope for a more proactive role of the EU in this regard. Some students fear that the end of Merkel's chancellorship may negatively affect the EU's climate leadership (Brazil, Russia). As such, the actions of EU Member States also matter for how the EU's leadership in this area is perceived.

### **3.5. Energy**

The theme of energy is significantly less important to students across all countries in general, apart from Russia. Where the theme does emerge, it is often in connection to the theme of environment and climate change or research, science and technology. Students generally consider the EU's leadership in green and clean energy (China, India, Japan, Russia), and this theme evokes more generally positive perceptions. Although students consider the EU to fall short in transferring knowledge and green technology expertise (India, Indonesia), the theme of energy functions as a means of cooperation to them. EU Member States do, however, play a crucial role in this perception, and Russian students, for example, recognise gas projects with Germany, Austria, the UK and France, or joint green energy projects. This also adds to a more complex mix of positive and negative opinions from Canada on the EU's cohesiveness of energy policy: some European countries support nuclear energy while others do not and some countries are heavily dependent on Russian gas, which impacts the EU's foreign policy towards Russia. US students in contrast reflect on the EU in the theme of energy only through considering the Russian threat to the energy security of the US and the EU. The question of energy extends to other locations as well. For example, Russian students see China as partner of Russia in the field of energy, while Chinese students link energy to China's domestic demand and a factor affecting military power indirectly.

### 3.6. Research, science and technology

Students in fewer locations point to the EU's role in this issue area. Among those who reflect their interest are Russia, India, China and Brazil. In India, the EU is seen to deliver advanced research and scientific innovation, a trend-setter in RST, development and specifically green technologies (overlapping with the climate theme). For Indian students, the theme of RST is among the top three areas in EU actions that are of most relevance for Indian interests. The same is true for Chinese students, who see EU-China cooperation in this field as a priority to China and thus perceive it positively. They also point to RST as part of 'politics and military power'. In contrast, Russian students link EU achievements in this field closer to academia (science and research) and health. Finally, Brazilian students recognise the EU's important contribution in RST, but they also believe that the EU should be more active in this area.

### 3.7. Development and assistance

The thematic area of development elicits neither many reflections nor a distinct perception. Sometimes youth assign the EU with a leading role in development (e.g. Colombia). However, their perceptions are mixed. For example, students in Indonesia connect this theme to the EU's low visibility and little relevance for their daily life. In the Nigerian case, the EU's actions in humanitarian sphere and international development are recognised in general, but not seen to take place in relation to Nigeria. There is an understanding that the EU could do more in this area. Colombian students mention a broader idea of 'human development' but to not either elaborate or assign an emotive connotation. In general, EU actions in the area of development are seen to overlap with the themes of global solidarity, vaccine support, education assistance, green technology transfer and historic responsibility to address colonialism and inequality. Sometimes, the EU is also seen to compete with other actors, such as China (Japan).

### 3.8. Social

Perceptions of the EU social issues highlight a range of opinions and no one distinct perceptual pattern. In Japan, India and Indonesia, the EU actions in this issue area are perceived to be less visible. Positive perceptions are assigned to a high standard of living in Europe (Colombia), welfare policies (China), social security achievements and inclusive society for minorities such as LGBTQ+ and in terms of gender equality (Russia). The most negative assessment emerges in reflection to immigration and human rights (normative dimension) as well as neo-colonial themes (Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa). For example, Nigerian students mention the EU's poor treatment of Africans who either travel to Europe irregularly or live there.

The rise of the far right, racism and discrimination are of particular relevance to the students. Mexican students feel that the EU's social fabric has gaps and that the EU must close the gap between narrative and reality by working harder to fight racism, discrimination and attacks on minority groups. They urge the EU to develop a stronger sense of social solidarity and compassion for people in distress. Reflections from Mexico also pick up inequality as another critical gap in the EU. Students see this gap as particularly striking given that the EU is a wealthy region in the world. A similar perception is registered in Brazil where students talk about the EU in terms of its "diplomatic hypocrisy": the bloc pressuring other countries to adopt policies on social issues that remain unresolved inside the EU, such as LGBTQ+, race and gender issues. The EU is perceived as promoting "pink and purple nationalisms", presenting itself as "being perfect", a champion of minority rights, while at the same time promoting restrictive migration policies and turning a blind eye on democracy and human rights violations inside

the bloc. Brazilian students think that the extreme right and religious restrictions (such as the hijab ban in France) will gain strength. Students perceive the EU through the realities of their own societies seeking parallels and comparisons, in some locations – by relating to colonial experiences and an expectation of the EU to tackle its issues in this regard (Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa).

Within the theme of social issues, students across all locations give special consideration to the EU in the context of education, and higher education in particular. This is perhaps unsurprising given the sample of university students. Education attracts fewer negative perceptions more generally, is more visible than other areas of EU actions and with stronger engagement. Students tend to reflect on opportunities the EU offers in general and for them personally. Scholarships (and Erasmus+ scholarships in particular) are mentioned most frequently. Students in Mexico, Colombia and Republic of Korea call on the EU to increase the number of scholarships to study in Europe. Republic of Korean students, who perceived European education as advanced, also expect discounts based on their international student id cards during their exchanges in Europe, although only one respondent there actively recalls educational programmes such as Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020. Canadian students also mention study tours and Erasmus+, but consider such educational opportunities to be little known by their peers.

Perceptions of the EU's leadership in the field of education vary. Some students see it to be not very active and lacking on leadership (Republic of Korea, Indonesia) or falling short due to a lack of coherent, timely and concerted efforts despite high standards and potential for bilateral cooperation (India). Indonesian students urged the EU further develop its leadership role in education. Students in Nigeria place emphasis on how the EU could support education, not necessarily only in Nigeria but in developing countries more broadly and in partnership with UN agencies. Finally, Russian students describe the EU as an international leader in education and specifically in student exchanges pointing to the potential for EU public diplomacy in this area.

### **3.9. Culture**

The theme of culture is in a peripheral position in the students' reflections, although the EU is visible in this area. Students do not always detail what they mean when they recognise the EU's visibility in this sector, and their attitudes vary. Indian students appreciate rich cultural diversity of EU societies. South African students recognise the EU's influence in fashion, culture and sports, while Russian students point to the potential of culture for the EU public diplomacy. Some students across countries recognise cultural activities, such as film festivals (Indonesia, Russia). More generally, however, students connect culture as a theme to EU Member States rather than the EU (Brazil, Indonesia). Brazilian students have a positive opinion on EU Member States financing cultural projects and initiatives through the Goethe Institute, Alliance Française, Instituto Cervantes and Heinrich Böll Stiftung. However, together with their Colombian peers, they find the EU's activities in this theme deficient.

In contrast, Chinese students find culture the least important issue in the context of EU-China cooperation. They think that the EU and China are too different in cultural terms so they cannot influence each other by such means. Culture also evokes a mixed reaction in Nigeria where it is deemed to be less important than other themes, such as politics and health.

### **3.10. Health**

In light of the Covid pandemic, health has become a visible theme in student discussions. Students comment on the EU's coordination to address the pandemic in most locations (apart from the US where one student mentions that the EU should put renewed energy into and support the struggling arts

sector). The perceptions of the EU in this issue are predominantly negative – students are frustrated by the EU's poor handling of the Covid pandemic both inside and outside the EU. Russian and Canadian students see the EU as under-performing; they believe the EU should pay more attention to the health system considering the pandemic. Students in China share this perception but also point to the importance of the EU's internal coherence: 'Member States should help each other [...] rather than giving up each other'. Students in Republic of Korea find that the pandemic has revealed that the EU has less advanced a public health system than originally anticipated or perceived. The progress in vaccination but particularly vaccine supply is also something that Korean students would like to see the EU doing not only internally but externally. Likewise, Brazilian students see it imperative that the EU needs to take up global health leadership, including providing medicine to developing countries. They share particularly negative perceptions of the EU in this area and as acting on a "Europe First" basis when it comes to securing vaccines during the pandemic. South African students perceive the EU's handling of the pandemic through a wider lens of an exploitative relationship between the EU and South Africa, with the example of vaccine nationalism given as well as a critique of a French initiative to have South Africans serve as "lab rats" for the testing of vaccines.

More generally, health emerges as a theme where expectations and reality clash decisively – to the detriment of EU perceptions. The few exceptions here are India, Japan and Mexico. Indian students see the EU as a normative leader that may help to managing the Covid pandemic. Meanwhile, the Japanese students confess that they initially found the EU's handling of the pandemic discouraging but are now positively surprised by the progress in vaccination among its Member States (notably, in the UK is one of such examples). EU efforts to fight Covid are also positively appreciated by students in Mexico.

## 4. Obstacles and gaps

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Reflections on the obstacles and gaps faced by the EU have led students from the partner countries to formulate several distinct lines of perceptions – all closely linked to *expectations*. Several perceived gaps between expectations towards the EU and perceptions of the reality of EU activities and policies have emerged. These gaps are also indicative of hopes or wishes among the students for a deeper, more tailored cooperation between the EU and their countries. Students' personal experiences and specifically the perceived lack of the EU's relevance and benefit to their daily lives is one of the main obstacles to raising students' awareness of and interest in the EU. However, personal experiences with the EU do not necessarily lead to more positive perceptions of the EU (Brazil, Nigeria). The individual-level factors overlap with the perceived location-specific circumstances and domestic policies in the respective countries. This combination can be seen as the root of the 'expectation-perception gap' in the external perceptions of the EU (Chaban & Elgström, 2021a;b;c).

### *Inconsistency and double standards*

EU-specific discrepancies between declared (level of expectations) and achieved (level of perceptions) goals, particularly in the normative domain, trigger a negative perception of the EU as an inconsistent (at best) and a hypocritical and exploitative (at worst). A quote from a Canadian student sums up this expectations-perceptions gap: 'when you place yourself as a role model, you should back up what you say with real actions' (FGCAN). Youth reflects on the gaps in the EU's narratives vis-à-vis its policies both in its internal and external normative action.

In relation to EU-specific factors, young people mark a *discrepancy in the EU's projected image* of a multicultural space embracing and promoting diversity vis-à-vis the EU's perceived lack of realising this multicultural space. For example, a student from Japan remarks that the EU as a whole remains predominantly Christian notwithstanding its multiculturalism claims. Students in Brazil criticise the French hijab ban in a similar vein. Students are critical about the mismatch between the EU's noble

discourse on human rights vis-à-vis the EU's realities of violating human rights in the context of the migration crisis (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Republic of Korea). Students also observe a divide between economically poorer/weaker and richer/stronger EU Member States (Russia, Republic of Korea) or a contrast between the distressed poor in Europe vis-à-vis the sheer wealth of the Union (Mexico) – all adding to the EU's perceived internal socio-economic inequality. Students in China further argue that the EU should create a better social environment for living.

The *gaps between the EU's external narratives and domestic developments* points to another set of EU-specific obstacles. Some students see the EU as pressuring other countries to adopt policies on social issues of minority rights while these issues (human rights in general; LGBTQ+, race and gender issues) remain unresolved inside the EU itself (Brazil and to a lesser extent Japan and the US). Students also see examples of the EU presenting itself as a promoter of democracy while turning a blind eye to democracy violations inside the Union, particularly in light of the rise of extreme right and populism (Brazil, Canada, Japan, Russia, US). Populism and the activation and mobilisation of the far-right in Europe into radical movements and parties are considered major problems in the fabric of the EU's society, and the students are concerned about the ongoing risk of democratic backsliding, wishing for the EU to withstand these challenges.

### *Missed leadership opportunities*

In the context of the EU's international roles, the mismatch between *local expectations towards the EU's normative leadership and its perceived capability to act as such* form a part of location-specific obstacles. A perception from the US describes the EU as being looked towards for leadership on a number of issues but risking losing its popularity if it fails to evolve as such a leader: 'For the EU, there is not much of a difference between surviving and thriving'. Meanwhile, US students question the EU's ability to promote its norms and achieve a normative impact inside the US.

Importantly, some participants see the EU's normative pressure as excessive and wish for the EU to lift its requirements either in the view that its assistance is unwanted (China, Japan, Russia) or in view that the EU does not consider local needs attentively (Colombia). In other locations, the perceptions reveal opinions that EU interlocutors have varied capabilities to adapt to the normative changes required by the EU (Indonesia), or that the EU is establishing a one-sided relationship that only serves the EU needs (Nigeria, South Africa).

### *Vestiges of colonial past*

One of the particular themes, where the EU's self-image as a global normative leader confronts its actual actions and overlaps with *location-specific* factors, is its engagement with its historical ex-colonies, especially in Africa (reflections from Mexico, Nigeria, Brazil, India, South Africa). Respondents point to the *historical responsibility* of the erstwhile colonial powers and the resources they possess to help developing countries (India, Indonesia). One Brazilian student particularly wishes for the EU to have reparation policies for colonialism, such as not having restrictive migratory policies and returning objects of artistic and historical value to former colonies. Meanwhile, for Nigerian students, EU engagement in Nigeria (and Africa) represents a form of neo-colonialism although opinions vary about the degree of impact and the thematic areas where the EU engages in. The majority of respondents in South Africa also describe the EU's relationship with their country and the larger continent as exploitative whereby the EU does not engage in an 'honest dialogue' because it is 'winning' over the weaker actor – South Africa.

### *Gaps between narratives and reality*

The EU's resources and, thus, capabilities to act as a global leader are also linked to *domestic expectations towards its policies* among partner countries. Here, perceptions of EU global roles are driven by *location-specific* factors. For example, while the EU is perceived overall positively in terms of its global leadership (particularly in environment), educated young people recognise a gap between the EU's

narrative as a leader and champion of environment and climate mitigation vis-à-vis realities on the ground. Moreover, reality of the energy supplies (i.e., gas from Russia) is seen to lead to the peculiarities of the EU foreign policy decisions (specifically towards Russia) (Canada). Russian students similarly point to that the EU's foreign policy towards Russia is overshadowed by the EU's negative perception of Russia-China cooperation.

### *Under-addressing local needs*

Students reflect on *location-specific* obstacles and gaps. Here, their expectations towards the EU are based on their personal experiences of the perceived needs of their respective countries and are informed by the EU's normative identity and narratives. Often, the EU is seen to underperform in location-specific contexts. On individual level, this translates into students' expectations of the EU's stronger support to scholarships and exchange (see Section Education in this Annex for more details) as well as financial assistance to their countries (Mexico, Colombia). When "layered" onto domestic realities, the EU's normative image also creates mixed perceptions among youth. For example, Indonesian students perceive the EU as ineffective in the area of the ASEAN visa liberalisation not because the EU has a direct impact in this process but because Indonesian students deem this area important to them personally and see the EU as a role model in this regard. In contrast, Japanese students perceive the EU's criticism of Japan's death penalty as an intervention into Japan's domestic affairs, while students in Korea mention EU-Republic of Korea ILO disputes as obstacles for EU-ROC bilateral cooperation. Finally, in China, students believe that the EU 'should not discriminate against China in terms of human rights affairs in China'.

### *Differences in values and normative approach*

Normative, value-based and historical differences between the EU and locations in focus represent another set of obstacles. Among the perceived challenges of the EU in Russia are differences in societal (post-modern vs. traditional) and religious (Catholicism/Protestantism vs. Orthodoxy) values. An important note here is that Russian students see Europe as more tolerant than Russia but not completely different or alien to Russia. In contrast, students in China find it hard for China and the EU to influence each other given the differences in their history and culture.

A different level of normative differences refers to policy priorities of local governments, e.g., in Brazil, China and South Africa. Yet while students in Brazil place responsibility for the lack of dialogue on president Bolsonaro, in other locations the EU is seen as the one to launch a "fair" dialogue (South Africa) or change its attitude towards the country in focus (China).

### *Geopolitical and regional tensions*

In several locations, students have also reflected on conflictual situations in bilateral relations with the EU, often pointing to geopolitical tensions. In Russia, students regret the deterioration of EU-Russia relations and believe that relations should be restored. They link the crisis to the EU's perceived dependence on the US, and this dependence is also mentioned as a negative factor for China-EU relations by Chinese students.

Geopolitical and regional tensions represent another set of obstacles, particularly in Asia and in relation to China. Thus, Russian students believe that Russia's cooperation with China triggers the EU's negative perceptions of Russia and more aggressive foreign policy by the EU. Republic of Korean students see the EU's conflict with China as a factor that may 'spark a fire in Korea-EU relations' in a negative way, while Japanese students also comment on Japan's close attention to the EU's relations with China.

### *Multiple crises of the EU*

The multiple crises faced by the EU in the last five years add to the perceived gaps and obstacles among the students. *Brexit* in particular has sent a controversial message about the EU's capacity as an international leader (the US) and has revealed internal contestation regarding the model of European



integration (Mexico). For Nigerian students, the “loss” of the UK as one of the most powerful actors in the Union, points to the EU’s limited political reach. Accordingly, their perceptions of the EU as a model to follow in regional integration have been undermined.

The *Covid* pandemic has revealed more obstacles towards positive perceptions of the EU. It prompted a discrepancy between images of the wealthy socially secure Europe vis-à-vis the EU’s poor performance in its public health sphere (Brazil, China, Russia, Republic of Korea). The perception of a shocking handling of the pandemic internally and subsequent actions on a “Europe First” principle in securing the vaccines supply, are also seen as contradicting the image of the EU as global humanitarian actor in the eyes of the students in Brazil, China and South Africa (see Health for more details).

#### *Deficient communication*

Students point to the EU’s *deficient communication* with the locations as an obstacle for improving its image. First, students share a perception of the EU suffering from low visibility (India) and lack of interest in the EU (Republic of Korea) particularly among the general public. The EU is seen as poorly understood and insufficiently known (China, Nigeria, the US). The media are also seen to be a rather limited source of information about the EU. Students believe that the lack of information in the media about EU actions in the location can limit the public recognition of the EU within the country (Colombia, Indonesia, Republic of Korea). Moreover, media portrayals are noted to focus on the negative side of EU actions (Republic of Korea) and its underperformance (Mexico). In Nigeria, the perceived lack of the EU’s ‘relevance’ presents itself as another challenge.

#### *Low information input*

With media input about the EU seen as modest, the EU itself is noted to under-deliver in communication with the general public, especially on the EU’s involvement in the issues important for the country (Colombia). Students believe that the information about the EU projected by its Delegations reaches only a limited circle of people (India, Indonesia). A low information input and lack of communication is seen to challenge the EU vis-à-vis a more visible presence and higher recognition of other countries and organisations (Colombia). One way to overcome this communication gap for the EU is to enhance its outreach, visibility and dissemination of information on the EU by engaging with a more diverse set of stakeholders (India) and engage more actively (Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea).

## **5. Partner countries and international organisations**

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In exploring a perception of a more competitive and contesting multipolar world and the EU’s position in it, the analysis explicates that the EU is typically juxtaposed with the US and increasingly with China. Depending on the country of the respondents, various multilateral (specifically UN) and regional organisations are also compared to the EU.

The EU is often presented as an international leader with a potential to act, yet not a superpower. It is seen as a leader in specific fields, although not altogether as a major (political) power. This particular position seems to appeal to many young people in the sample. However, the degree of positivity assigned to the EU varies. Some participants do not see their countries as great powers and to them the EU appeals as a more relatable partner (Colombia). Others are more preoccupied with the themes typically associated with “hard power” issues (such as security, migration, etc.), and in these areas, the EU’s perceived importance drops significantly, especially vis-à-vis the US or China (Japan, Russia,

South Africa, Republic of Korea). As one student from Brazil explains, the EU will continue to 'play the game of being an adult at the negotiating table' but with fewer opportunities to have a 'final say' in the international affairs, because the 'children' (China, the US) 'are now grown-ups' and the 'adult' (the EU) is in crisis. As a result, students from Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Japan and Republic of Korea see the EU as a visible international actor and an important foreign policy interlocutor but question its importance vis-à-vis other international actors due to the lack of recognition (Republic of Korea), the economic nature of its power capacities and the lack of military power (South Africa). Students in China further consider the EU an important international actor, but not a leader.

### *The EU vis-à-vis the US*

In formulating the position of the EU vis-à-vis the US, opinions among students differ. In most locations, participants see the US as one of the most present and/or important international actors in their locations (Brazilian respondents have not reflected on the US vis-à-vis the EU). In Canada, the US comes first, even though the students appreciate the value-based partnership with the EU. In Colombia, students assess the EU in a positive way, including when compared to the US or China, even though to them the EU is less visible. The US remains the key actor in Asia as well. For Korean students, the US forms a 'strong blood alliance' with Korea in terms of military and economic power; it is also the only treaty ally for Japan, according to Japanese students. Interestingly, Japanese students see the EU as an actor more credible than the US, at least on climate change, and with potential to counterbalance the US (one Mexican student also references often-coercive tactics of the US foreign policy when comparing it to the EU). However, Republic of Korean students already remark on potential obstacles given the significant interest in climate change by the new US Administration. Finally, in some other locations, students think that the EU is blindly following the US or is under the influence of the US without asserting its own voice (China, Russia), even though in Russia the EU is perceived more positively than the US.

As such, the more students focus on issues that are traditionally associated with hard power (migration, security, etc.), the weaker is the perceived visibility and importance of the EU in these fields. For example, in India, the EU is seen as a less significant actor if compared to the US and even EU Member States or a number of other regional powers or other international actors (Afghanistan, Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, the UK). Meanwhile, the US participants wish for the EU to develop its own security apparatus to grow as a potential new partner for the US, in addition to NATO, and thus able to defend itself without the US increasing its military expenditures.

### *The EU vis-à-vis China*

Students across many locations increasingly see China as a very powerful actor. Respondents in India put China on par with other important international actors. Japanese youth recognise it as an important regional player. Korean students mark China's importance in economic terms and see EU-China relations as a potential factor in EU-Republic of Korean relations as well. Colombian students consider China's visibility to be higher than that of the EU, but they share a more negative perception of China when it is compared to the EU. Meanwhile, for Canadian students, China competes with Europe for the second place in visibility and perceived significance – after the US. Importantly however, they see this competition on different turfs: for Canada, the focus on China is a foremost economic one, while in the case of Europe, students appear to value a much stronger value-based partnership. US students recognise China's effectiveness in economy, military, politics and technology but share a negative perception of China's growing impact not only for the US (up to the perception of it as a military threat) but also for the EU. US respondents find China's investment strategy of targeting 'the more vulnerable EU nations' as alarming. To them, China is also replacing the "West's" development and aid system – shifting 'the positive attitudes and preferences' of Eastern Asia and African nations 'to the east'. This shift is also marked by respondents in other locations. In Russia in particular, young people see China as a valuable ally of Russia in the view of the China-US rivalry. However, some students have reservations as to China's ability to treat its partners as equals and the predictability of its policies vis-

à-vis those of the EU. According to Russian students, China sees the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as an economic block, while Russia considers it to be a military-political one. In the responses by the students from South Africa, China also features prominently, not only as a partner to South Africa but also as the impetus for more EU engagement in Africa. Students there find that the EU needs to compete with this new superpower and act. Importantly, Chinese students have not reflected on the US in their discussion of international collaboration. Compared with the EU, countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), African countries and other developing nations and China's neighbours in Asia are considered more important to China as partners. Such states are seen to be connected to China through the concept of kinship and likeness, where China could perform as a leader of the developing nations.

### *The EU vis-à-vis regional organisations*

The above perceptions create an image of a very complex geopolitical dynamic between China, the US and the EU, but the participants do not elaborate in detail upon their expectations of the EU in this regard. Students' reflections on the regional cooperation frameworks are even more scarce. Perceptions of the EU vis-à-vis regional/multilateral organisation have been dominant only in Indonesia, Nigeria and South Africa. For Indonesian students, the link between the EU and ASEAN matters the most. The EU's visibility is strong and positive when its cooperation with the ASEAN is in focus and the EU is seen as ASEAN's long term inter-regional partner. Meanwhile, Nigerian students focus in their reflections on the EU as a model of integration and specifically the degree of integration. For them, the level of integration within the EU is positively acknowledged, particularly when compared to ECOWAS. For this reason, Nigerian students have been extremely critical of the EU when reflecting on Brexit as it undermines the perception of the EU as a model of regional integration. Students in South Africa also see their country as becoming more "Pan-African" in orientation, to the detriment of Europe's standing, but they also mention partnerships on the continent that are the most important to South Africa's needs: Lesotho Highlands Water Project and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA).

Meanwhile, participants in the rest of locations only mention organisations that they consider relevant to their countries briefly. In the majority of them, the EU is seen as a better model of integration but not necessarily as the most important regional organisation. For example, Russian participants consider the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) important in economic terms but not as advanced as the EU in terms of organisation. The students also see economic potential for Russia's cooperation with BRICS and emerging economies. This potential for cooperation mirrors other reflections as to alternative regions and actors: In Mexico, students consider Central America as an essential region to Mexico and the Pacific Alliance as a mechanism for regional cooperation, while students in Republic of Korea look towards cooperation with the ASEAN (due to the New Southern Policy) and MERCOSUR as a new potential market. In several countries, perceptions of the EU and its cooperation mechanisms appear to be less important than other regional networks. For Canadian students, the North American Free Trade Agreement (CUSMA - which replaced NAFTA) is more significant than CETA. For Indian students, the EU has weak visibility and significance if compared to the ASEAN, BIMSTEC (The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), BRICS, SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) and QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue). Finally, for Brazilian students, the reflection on the EU as a regional organisation is a reminder that Brazil has 'isolated itself' due to the position of its government. They reference MERCOSUR, BRICS and the UN as previously important international actors in Brazil – all having lost relevance due to Bolsonaro's Presidency.

### *The EU and the UN*

Irrespective of the above differences, the perceptions of the EU vis-à-vis regional organisations are seen to be driven by *location-specific* factors, and this refers also to the EU's perceptions vis-à-vis other international actors. The EU's international role is often seen as matching the UN mission and

programmes (health, environment and social issues – US) in a positive, collaborative way and is more pronounced in the countries that focus on multilateral collaboration. The EU's connection to the UN is seen in positive light by students in the US, Mexico, Colombia and Nigeria. In Colombia, participants believe that the EU can work on similar and different themes than the UN, but the EU is seen to be equally or more effective than other international actors. In Nigeria, students perceive the EU as a unique actor primed for partnership with UN agencies (especially partnering on education and humanitarian assistance) who enjoy more trust among the respondent group. For Russian students, however, there are also certain reservations as to UN's effectiveness despite it being normatively strong and having wider reach than the EU.

To conclude, perceptions of the EU vis-à-vis other actors (global poles of the US and China, regional and multilateral/regional organisation) are typically linked to the *location-specific* factors, drivers, priorities and benefits international actors are perceived to bring to the location in question. Across numerous locations, the importance of the EU is lower than the importance of the US or China. Here, the EU's evaluation – positive or negative -- is based largely on its perceived normativity and values-based partnership.

## 6. Explanatory factors

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### 6.1. Geopolitical factors

In the geo-political set of factors, students often refer to what can be called the “tyranny of distance”, which translates into the lack of personal experiences with the EU and, through this, into the absence of the EU in students' daily life – a crucial aspect that shapes students' perceptions. For example, most participants in the US perceive the EU as a distant political organisation that does not directly affect their lives. Colombian students also see the EU distant to Colombians in general. As a result, they do not feel close to Europe, and this makes it hard for them to establish a personal connection with Europe. By contrast, they feel closer to the US given its geopolitical influence in the region. The sense of distance holds true for Indonesian students as well. They see the EU and its Member States too far away geographically. They perceive such space as something that prevents them from travelling to the EU, thus, gaining personal experiences with Europe, as well as complicating the EU's outreach to Indonesia. Consequently, Indonesian students pursue a closer cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, who are geographically closer. Republic of Korean students also mention distance as an explanatory factor for the lack of personal experiences with the EU and/or its presence in their daily lives. In addition, they believe that the EU and Republic of Korea choose different regions to focus their geopolitical interests: for the EU it is its Neighbourhood/wider Europe, for Republic of Korea, it is Northeast Asia respectively. This difference in the regional focus means that a substantial impact of global superpowers (US and China) may affect regional priorities of the EU and Republic of Korea. Likewise, Chinese students see countries along the BRI, African countries and developing nations elsewhere as geopolitically more significant given their geographical proximity. Finally, students in Canada and Russia have somewhat unique views. Canadian students see geopolitical relations with the EU as an economic need to somewhat minimise the dependency on the US – another external driver of deepening relations with the EU in the past few years. In contrast, Russian students see the EU as part of the crisis in relations between Russia and the “West” that broke out in 2014 and involves a number of actors (China, NATO, Ukraine, the US). In this geopolitical dynamic, the EU is understood to lead an aggressive policy towards Russia and impose further sanctions.

## 6.2. Political context

Reflecting on the EU in political contexts, students focus on the perceived differences between views of the EU and its strategic partners. Oftentimes, it is in reflection on the content of bilateral cooperation or domestic political developments. Due to the idiosyncratic, location-specific character of the perceived differences, it is difficult to draw on a common pattern. For example, Russian participants refer to political contexts and stress differences in the views of Russia and the EU as part of the crisis in their relations post 2014. In Indonesia, differences manifest in the perception of the EU as pursuing its interests and imposing its standards and policies in Indonesia in contrast to Indonesia's incapability to cope with EU requirements. Chinese students see the EU's interference in domestic affairs as negative and Nigerian students do not see the added benefit of the EU's engagement in Nigeria.

As such, domestic political contexts drive expectations towards the EU among the students as part of *location-specific* factors and often reflect on a particular expectation towards the EU in terms of the focus of cooperation and fund allocation. For example, Colombian students stress the need for the EU to have a better awareness and acknowledgement of Colombian reality and thus ask for the EU not only to formulate projects based on the European idea but to articulate them in a way that would meet Colombian requirements (e.g. monitor and control project finances and resources, or verify proper allocation of support), given the high levels of corruption in Colombia and a lack of transparency in the execution of rural projects. In a similar vein and in reflection of the importance of understanding local cultural characteristics, Mexican students note that the EU's approach to cooperation with Mexico should account for cultural diversity and federalism in Mexico.

Domestic political contexts also speak to specific areas of cooperation in which students see interest for their countries. Thus, Indian students emphasise cooperation in the fields of green technology, education, and science. Students in Indonesia expect the EU to assist the Indonesian government with social issues, such as minority rights, secularism and the improvement of the local education system. In Brazil, students expect the EU to put more pressure on the Brazilian government to curb deforestation. Students in Colombia recognise the EU's importance in the Peace Process and post-conflict while, in Mexico, students perceive the EU in the context of Mexico's ongoing democratisation and modernisation. In both Colombia and Mexico, the EU's engagement in resolution of local "ills" such as underdevelopment, drug's policies, and organised crime is welcomed. In Japan, students expect the EU (being a champion in the protection of fundamental rights across the world) to move/inspire Japan's quite limited role in this regard. While such influence in domestic affairs appears to be more lenient when it concerns the environment, it is perceived more negatively when it concerns human rights. Both Japanese and Chinese students perceive the EU's involvement in domestic human rights debate negatively. In Republic of Korea, students mark differences in bilateral priorities between the EU and Republic of Korea: while Republic of Korea is understood to be interested in trade and investment, the EU seems to prioritise culture and education. Meanwhile, students across all locations recognise the EU's potential in environmental and climate policies.

A number of EU internal political developments (*EU-specific* factors) have created a background that has affected youth perceptions of the EU. One of the factors is driven by students' reflections on the EU vis-à-vis EU Member States: For example, students in Japan underline that the images of Europe among the Japanese youth are shaped by individual countries, such as France, Italy, Germany, and the UK rather than the EU as a whole. Similarly, Indian students see bilateral relations between India and EU Member States to prevail over EU-India relations. To them, the regional integration project of the EU represents foremost a cooperation between individual European countries to achieve greater development. Students in Russia go further in their evaluation and point to differences among EU Member States in terms of their socio-economic development and values (conservative vs. liberal). Economic differences among EU Member States are also seen in a negative light in Korea.

Another factor pertaining to the EU's image in the EU-specific political context is the EU's multiple crises: Eurozone debt crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit and the Covid pandemic. The participants across most locations claim that these have been extensively covered by local media and have thus grasped their attention. Among these events, Brexit appears most visibly either as an existential threat or a litmus test to the EU's resilience (for more details about Brexit see section Politics). The migration crisis has also created a stark contrast between the EU's perceived humanitarian policies and the *de facto* management of the crisis for students in Republic of Korea, Japan and Brazil. Finally, the handling of the Covid pandemic and vaccine nationalism has become another factor feeding into more negative perceptions of the EU in Brazil, China and South Africa.

Importantly, while students share the image of the EU in crisis or even at a crossroads (a view from Russia), their perceptions ultimately result in more optimistic scenarios. Chinese, Russian and Japanese students seem to share the idea that the EU possesses an ability to overcome its crises (economic or migration), while the rest of the participants simply observe the situation.

### 6.3. Cultural and Historical Contexts

The respondents often combine cultural and historical contexts in their reflections on explanatory factors, which is why these two categories are presented together. Cultural and historical factors have been mentioned as explanations of EU perceptions in China, Russia, Colombia, the US, Brazil, Indonesia, India and South Africa. These factors are usually mentioned in the context of long-term relations (colonialism, historical ties, values) with very few references to the EU's cultural programmes or events. Importantly, these factors seem to overlap significantly with students' personal experiences and expectations. For example, Indonesian students mention culture as something that could affect their perceptions of the EU through cultural events, such as the European Film Festival. However, students see these events as a form of entertainment rather than a programme that can deliver a strong message about the culture of the EU (or European) countries. The students in Colombia also reference the EU at the programme level. They claim that EU actions in the cultural field are invisible, which translates into a lack of awareness of the EU.

In the rest of the locations, culture and history are used interchangeably in the context of long-term factors and personal experiences and are not directly linked to specific EU programmes or policies. To Russian students, Russia and the EU/Europe are close in historical terms, and Europe is seen as interesting and attractive actor in this context. Students also believe that, while Russia and the EU may have differences in views or values, these actors are historically and geopolitically interdependent, and their relations should be restored. The US' students reference the history of the EU and of Europe as a driver of perceptions in the US specifically in the post-WWII context, while participants from Canada point to a shared history and family ties with Europe.

In contrast, for a number of other countries, history and culture often appear in the context of the colonial past and post-colonial developments linked to Europe. The participants from India mix and match political, historical and geopolitical factors in their perceptions of the EU but focus on India's bilateral cooperation with individual EU Member States. Similarly, students in Colombia see a common history with Spain, supported by personal experiences of tourism and family ties, as an important factor of relations with this specific Member State, yet not the EU in general. Differently, the Brazilian students see their country suffering from 'a mentality forged by colonisation', which manifests in a 'stray dog complex' – a vision of Europe as 'a paradise on Earth' and 'everything European' being superior which somewhat predefines students' perceptions of Europe. While Nigerian students do not reflect on the colonial past, they do negatively reference the EU as a neo-colonial power. Finally, South African students share strong, negative reflections as to the colonial past of their country linking the perceptions of Europe and the Global North to the legacy of apartheid and white supremacy. While such perceptions do not define their attitudes towards the EU per se, it delivers a reflexive degree of

scepticism when they interpret motivations of Europeans in South Africa. Students in China find that the differences in history and culture make it difficult for the EU and China to influence each other altogether.

#### 6.4. Training and education

Programmes in education and student exchanges (Erasmus, Erasmus+ and the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence familiar to students in the US, Brazil, Russia, Republic of Korea, Canada) are naturally seen by the young people as a factor shaping their perceptions of the EU. However, students remain largely unaware about any other EU public diplomacy programmes (Japan, the US, Colombia, Nigeria, Canada, Indonesia, China). For example, the Colombian participants do not know much about training and education in Europe and, as a result, they do not have plans to study or work in the EU (in contrast to their wish to realise such plans in the US). To them, the perceived lack of EU actions and programmes in the cultural field translates into a lack of awareness about the EU. Meanwhile, for the Indonesian students, such programmes (Film Festivals) do not provide enough information about the culture of individual European countries, which together with the EU's geographical distance, makes it more difficult to receive information about the EU. As a whole, limited exposure to Europe and low information input about the EU are cited in Japan, Republic of Korea and China and sometimes lead to a perception of the EU as inactive (China).

The communication gap emerges as another obstacle in the formation of EU's perceptions among its strategic partners that translates into low awareness of the EU among the general public. Thus, students from the US, Canada, Republic of Korea and Japan report that the main communication channel for the EU in their countries is primarily the local news media. In Mexico, students argue that perceptions about the achievements of the EU are often overshadowed by news that focus on the underperformance of EU policies in areas such as migration and economic crises or the EU's racism. Republic of Korean students reflect on a similar trend in their local media, which focuses on the EU's crises and negative developments.

Another trend refers to the lack of the EU's media representation and, as a result, its low outreach to the broader public. US students think that media representations of the EU come to life in the local media only when the EU is directly relevant to the US. This phenomenon results in what participants describe as a 'skewed view', which makes news about the EU less accessible to those who lack a specific interest in the EU. Lack of interest in the EU among the public as well as its low visibility and popularity in media are the key factors behind the EU's perceptions in Republic of Korea. Similarly, the EU is not an important topic in the Canadian media, and the domestic population there remains uninformed about what the EU is and what it does. Chinese students all find that perceptions of the EU are mainly shaped by reading news articles (of which three participants are clearly aware of censorship of information in China), by watching TV or exposure on social media.

In South Africa, the students seem to replace the lack of knowledge about the EU as an institution with references to the colonial past and the elements of a larger North-South struggle. On an individual level, some students in Nigeria identify how their perceptions have changed over time – with age, in the context of Brexit and informed by news. In contrast, Japanese students claim that the more knowledge they have of the EU, the more positively their views tend to develop. However, in order to learn about EU activities, Japanese students have to rely on their own social networks. In Brazil, students mention European films as a driver of EU perceptions. Finally, India represents a rare case where students claim their perceptions of the EU are driven by popular culture, media, interaction with people who are related to Europe and diplomatic meetings between high-level officials, as well as media.

## 6.5. Personal exposure to Europe

Personal exposure is viewed as a crucial influence of images and perceptions of the EU and Europe, exchanges being one of the key levels of public diplomacy (Cull, 2008). Students from Japan claim that their personal experience of living and travelling in Europe has shaped their views towards the EU. In contrast, the lack of exposure either via training programmes (Colombia) or the ability to visit European countries (Indonesia) makes the EU appear as distant to students in other locations. Participants from these locations wish for more exchange opportunities. Some of those who have experienced some degree of exposure wish for some changes around their visits to Europe, e.g., the EU offering more incentives such as scholarships and/or discounts to students during their international exchange (a view from Republic of Korea). Personal exposure to the EU is limited in China and personal experiences are often noted via proxy through experiences of family members.

Importantly, however, personal experiences result in both positive and negative perceptions of the EU. For example, both positive and negative perceptions about the EU and Europe are visible in the case of Japan, although the positive outlook dominates in this case, while negative perceptions are reported in Brazil and Nigeria. In Brazil, the colonial discourses have conditioned the perception of everything European as superior, but the actual experiences in Europe reported by students have had a “sobering” effect, especially if students visit rural areas, smaller towns and villages in Europe. Nigerian students also report negative perceptions, and these are linked to their personal difficulties around obtaining visas or personal experiences of their family members who have travelled or migrated to Europe. Even though being able to immigrate to the EU is viewed as a positive opportunity in Nigeria, the process of doing so and negative experiences upon arrival affect how Europe is viewed by those back home. Participants in Canada perceive shared values, a common history, two common languages and often direct personal connections (current family or ancestors) to explain the proximity with Europe.

# 7. Evolution of EU perceptions and future outlook

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## 7.1. Major evolutions in student perceptions over time (vs. 2015 group interview)

Observing continuity in the perceptions of the EU over the last five years, the most visible and persisting images differ across locations. For Indian students, the EU continues to be a normative actor with positive evaluations of its actions in climate change and energy. In Canada, the positive assessment of the EU remains intact in the context of trade value-based partnership and the importance of the US to Canada. In contrast to these positive foci, students in the US tend to focus on the EU’s crises and challenges as the key themes in their perceptions of the EU both in 2015 and in 2021. Students in Mexico in both Studies recognise negative effects of the EU’s internal challenges but believe that the EU still projects a model of inclusiveness, democracy and respect of human rights. The Russian youth also reveal consistency in their perceptions: they see energy, economy and politics as the key areas in EU-Russian cooperation and have similar predictions for the future of the EU, which will remain weak but will not disappear. In Republic of Korea, negative perceptions persist for the students from both 2015 and 2021 Studies with low visibility of the EU and its perception of lacking in action and leadership. Finally, Japanese students in both the 2015 and 2021 Studies reveal concerns about the EU-China relationship and watch it closely.



The multiple crises faced by the EU – the Eurozone debt crisis, Brexit, the refugee crisis and finally the Covid pandemic – are referenced as EU-specific factors behind triggered negative changes in the image of the EU (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, the US). The EU's handling of the migrant crisis is a strong factor behind the change in students' perceptions of the EU in Russia, Brazil and Republic of Korea. Change in students' perceptions is often linked to the problematic actions of the EU around accepting and protecting refugees (Republic of Korea) as well as the EU's democratic backsliding and the surge of the extreme right (Brazil). Brexit has become by far the most influential factor in the evolution of perceptions of the EU across most locations. It has triggered an image of the EU as a weaker actor in India, China and Nigeria and denounced the EU's image of the united community in Russia. To some Mexican students the EU that they used to know is 'no longer there'. They are less optimistic than their peers from the 2015 Study as to the long-lasting effects of Brexit for the EU integration model. Similar views are shared by students in Nigeria in 2021 (although Nigeria did not participate in the 2015 study). Meanwhile, the EU's handling of the Covid pandemic has also triggered a change in perceptions of the EU towards the negative overall (Brazil, Canada and Republic of Korea). Japanese students reveal an interesting case whereby they criticised the poor handling of the pandemic by the EU and its Member States at the beginning to Covid in Europe in 2020 but are now encouraged by the progress in vaccination among its Member States.

In one common pattern, students across all countries mentioned the EU's crises frequently. It is the cumulative effect of the multiple crises that has led to deterioration of the EU's image in the eyes of students. For Brazilian students, those crises altogether have broken the 'fairy tale' of the EU – a perfect, cohesive bloc with no social problems has been tarnished. The notion of the EU's 'arrogance', prominent among the Brazilian students in the 2015 Study, has been replaced by the perception that the EU is 'falling apart'. Such a deterioration in perceptions has been reported by students in Nigeria when they were asked to reflect on the evolution of the EU's images in the last five years. Chinese students find that the internal crises have demonstrated that the EU has failed to establish itself as a credible international actor.

Yet, the change in perceptions does not only concern negative dynamics. The EU's resilience in the face of crises has also led to a positive change in imagery: In Canada, the EU is seen stronger and more cohesive than it might have been anticipated – whether it is Brexit or handling of the pandemic, students are surprised to see that the EU has managed to speak with one voice and even demonstrate a diplomatic pushback against President Trump. Similarly, in the US, some participants in the 2021 study positively acknowledge the EU's democratic values and progressive norms through initiatives such as the Paris Agreement which altogether contrasts rather negative views towards the EU among the participants of the 2015 Study.

In several other locations, the registered change in EU perceptions in comparison to the 2015 Study is linked to *location-specific* factors. In the Russian case, the perception of Russia's own foreign policy has changed from being inadequate to one that asserts Russia's national interests, and Russian students no longer perceive Russia and Europe alien in civilizational terms. Instead, differences in values between Russia and the EU are seen as somewhat similar to differences in values among different EU member states. To Japanese students, the EU's handling of the pandemic has become the key event and factor that has influenced their perceptions of the EU and will be important in the future. In contrast, in Korea, the EU's visibility was more pronounced in 2015 in light of the EU-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, while the lack of a similar scale interaction/event between the two parties in 2021 has resulted in a lower visibility of the EU. Chinese students note that the perception of the EU has also been affected by the rise of China, which is seen to have changed China's perception of the EU more broadly.

## Short-term evolution of perceptions (in the next 5 years)

When asked to share a vision of continuity or change in perceptions of the EU in the short-term future (5 years), students share mixed (positive and negative) perceptions across most of the locations. Students struggle to predict the EU's short-term future or its relations with its strategic partners in a great detail. In general, the EU is often seen as being at crossroads given its numerous challenges and especially those that undermine its coherence. In this light, the next five years are seen as decisive for the EU's future: it either 'steps up to the challenge and remains as one of the global leaders or it just falls apart'. It is 'either [that the EU is] going to meet the high goal of integration over time [...] or it won't', but 'the EU cannot stay in the rather messy reality of the state it is in without it losing popularity' (a student from the US). This view summarises various scenarios of the future of the EU shared by the students.

### *The ongoing impacts of Brexit*

Pessimistic short-term scenarios come from Brazil, Nigeria and to a lesser degree Russia and Mexico. These perception scenarios are induced by the images of the EU's domestic turbulences at large (Brazil) as well as the rise of far-right populism and growing internal divisions as a threat to the EU (Russia). In most locations, these negative scenarios mention long-lasting effects of Brexit on the EU integration process as well as on the perceptions of the EU's future stability as a regional polity. According to one Mexican student, the institutional model of the EU that everyone 'used to know' as a centrepiece of progress 'is no longer there'. In Nigeria, Brexit also has become the key input into the negative scenario for the EU's future, but a more apathetic scenario, where the image of the EU in the nearest future renders the idea of stagnation. Brexit is seen as important in Nigeria due to the importance of the UK rather than the perceived relevance of the EU. Brexit also triggers mixed perceptions among students when they think about how the EU's image will evolve in the next five years. For example, Russian students do not have a unanimous position as to the effects of Brexit on the EU, but they predict that the image of the EU will deteriorate in the EU Member States, yet not in countries outside the EU. Some Chinese students feel that the EU might be able to overcome its crises moving forward, while others are not entirely sure as to the effect of the crises on the EU in the nearest future.

### *The "China factor"*

The "China factor" is another input into the negative scenarios for the EU's perceived importance in the next five years. A student from Brazil notes that 'China has been growing in a steady speed', and it can substitute the EU as a global leader in the near future. Students in South Africa also see the EU in a precarious position vis-à-vis China. In their opinion, the EU would have to engage more in South Africa to be able to compete with the new superpower on the continent. In Republic of Korea, where most respondents see no improvement to the EU's image in the future, some believe it will get worse, not lastly due to the EU's conflict with China which may affect EU-Republic of Korean relations.

### *The "US Factor"*

Korean respondents anticipate that EU policies on climate change may evolve in response to the policy shift under the Biden administration. With the US "coming on board" and returning to the Paris Agreement, students hope for a global shift on this issue and are curious about what the EU will make of this shift in return.

### *"Conditionality"*

Students in locations where mixed perceptions dominate (e.g. China, India, Indonesia and Russia) point that the EU can meet some conditions and this will improve cooperation (and EU image) in the future. Russian students wish for the EU to ameliorate its relations with Russia and see the improvement of its image in future as contingent on the EU's more independent stance towards Russia, away from the US influence. For Indonesian students, the EU's geographical distance will continue to be an obstacle for

the EU's outreach and image, but some students believe that if the EU works with Indonesia in the fields of climate change mitigation and development/humanitarian assistance then its image will improve sooner than later. Climate change, in general, has emerged as a crucial theme and issue where students wish and urge for their countries' stronger cooperation with the EU in the near future (including in India and China).

### *EU Member States*

Students assign a special role to EU Member States in their views on the short-term evolution of the EU's images. In Indonesia, students see the increasing role of individual Member States and their political leaders as an outcome of the Brexit and irregular migration crises. For them, these crises have triggered the growth of Euroscepticism and doubts in the EU's role as a regional leader. Students in Brazil and Russia perceive a potential weakening of Germany in the near future. For Russian students, it is about a perception of the growing inability of Germany and particularly its chancellor Angela Merkel to cope with the migration crisis. Brazilian students are concerned about the upcoming end of her leadership and its potential impact for the EU's ambitious climate change policy. Students in Japan see the EU's recovery post-Brexit as dependent on the role of individual Member States (particularly, France and Germany).

### *Lingering hope*

Japanese students share cautiously optimistic views as to the EU's immediate future. These students shared negative and sceptical views towards the EU in light of Brexit, yet some of them believe that the EU has survived a series of crises so far and, thus, is highly likely to overcome the current ones to develop further. Japanese students share a view that negative perceptions of the EU's initial problems in managing Covid have changed to a more positive perception due to the EU's progress with domestic vaccination. Participants in India also note the important role of the EU in managing the Covid pandemic as well as in upholding the rules-based international order – both are seen as positive inputs into how the EU will be perceived in the near future. One participant in China believes that the EU's image will change to the better as the EU is considered 'good at solving problems, especially Eurozone problems. However, other Chinese students in the group are not so sure about the EU's future or the future perception of the EU.

Such perceptions open the way to more positive outlooks. Such outlooks often depend on the field of cooperation. For example, Republic of Korean students recognise the EU as a model in many policy sectors which, in their view, brings opportunities for cooperation in the fields of economy, climate change and environment, health and welfare in the future. They see advanced education (establishment of innovative schools) and eco-friendliness (electric vehicles, hydrogen vehicles) as new areas for future engagement with the EU. US participants also see the EU as a leader in environmental and social policy – a view shared in multiple locations.

### *Positive trajectory*

The EU's image is seen to be improving in the short-term future in the US, Canada and Colombia. US students optimistically predict that the engagement of the Biden Administration with the EU will improve the perceptions of the EU as a significant partner mitigating some of the impact of the Trump Administration which has cast a negative light on the image of the EU in the last five years. US students also acknowledge the potential of the EU's global leadership in bringing issues that may have been "overlooked" into the international arena and it is seen as a leader in climate policy. A somewhat similar perception is found among the Canadian participants, who are positively surprised by the EU's handling of its crises (it proved much stronger and more cohesive than might have been anticipated) and the level of diplomatic pushback that the EU has voiced against Trump, despite the frequent depiction of the EU as a weak diplomatic actor. The participants from Colombia also point to the potential of the EU's leadership in Latin America and globally. However, to them the EU's importance

in the future is largely in extending cooperation with Colombia – from the areas of peace and trade to climate and the environment.

## **Medium- and long-term evolution of perceptions (in the next 10-20 years)**

Images of how the EU perceptions will evolve long-term (10-20 years) come with major existential questions – will the EU survive or not? – and feature even more ambiguity and fewer predictions than short-term evaluations. The perceptions of the EU are driven mainly by EU-specific factors such as the capacity of the integration process to bring EU Member States closer and to address current challenges more effectively. These outlooks are, therefore, linked to the EU's ability to overcome its problems and promote its global leadership, especially in key areas such as the economy and climate change.

### *Existential dilemma*

The key factors that drive EU perceptions long term are the EU's resilience and the ability to overcome its crises, as well as convergence between its normative aspirations and narratives and realities on the ground. Once again, students in different locations have come up with optimistic and pessimistic scenarios based on their views as to the above issue. For example, a student from Republic of Korea asks whether the EU will remain the same in the future precisely because of the 'jeopardy' it faces. Indian students feel that if the EU continues to face multiple crises, its existence in the next 10-20 years could be questioned, but they also believe that if the EU manages to tackle these issues, it will emerge as a powerful organisation: 'more Europe' and a 'greater' union are seen as the only solution. Taking an optimistic stance, Japanese students share a view that the EU is likely to survive and develop further in the next decades. Students in the US think that the perceptions of the EU in the long run will be driven mainly by its capacity to unite Member States and handle ongoing challenges.

### *Lack of internal cohesion*

Whereas the EU's ability to withstand crises is seen by students across locations largely in positive terms, the perceived lack of internal cohesion within the EU drives negative outlooks. In Colombia, where participants are overall positive about the long-term future of relations with the EU, the future image of the EU is seen to deteriorate for internal (nationalist populism) and external (migration pressures) reasons. In 10 to 20 years, Colombian students predict a significant albeit not fatal deterioration of the image of the EU precisely for these reasons. Students from Russia find it 'hard to predict' the effects of Brexit long-term and exhibit polar views on the changes of the EU's image in the next decade. To them, however, the EU's ability to overcome its internal crisis is a crucial determinant of EU perceptions in the long run. The uncertainty is also a hallmark of visions on the EU's long-term prospects in Brazil: students there are negative in their evaluations of the EU's future outlook predicting either a 'poorer EU' or a 'stronger' union but 'forged by years of colonisation and racism'.

### *EU Member States*

Students predict how the EU's image will evolve in the long-term time frame by linking images of the EU to EU Member States and the EU's internal cohesion. For Japanese students, a successful long-term scenario for the EU depends on the leadership of France and Germany. Meanwhile, Russian students believe that if national interests of EU Member States prevail over the interests of the EU as an organisation, the EU may disintegrate. For Mexican students, the deep-seated consequences of Brexit for European integration mean that Brexit leaves open the potential option for other Member States to leave the EU. Similarly, students in Nigeria see that other countries may follow the UK out of the EU, particularly those concerned with sovereignty.

### *A growing role of the US and China*

In reference to the EU's long-term future, *location-specific* and global factors are often overlapping in the context of the EU's global leadership and relevance to the locations in focus, apart from Republic of

Korea where students overall predict a growing role of the US and China as more influential and powerful global leaders. South African students also think that the EU needs to compete with China and act in Africa, although such views are not explicitly tied to the long-term vision of EU perceptions.

In contrast, participants from the US seem confident that it is the EU that will eventually grow into its leadership role, and perhaps even replace the US in some areas, as these students see the US as losing power on the international stage. In consideration of *location-specific* and global factors, Indonesia stands out as a case because of a visible drive towards regional cooperation. Indonesian students see a positive change in the EU's image in the future under the condition that the EU strikes collaboration and partnership with countries in other regions (for instance Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific). In this light, the EU is seen as one of the global actors, which can play a significant role in global issues, based on its capacity, whereas Indonesia may become one of the EU's important partners in South-East Asian and the Asia-Pacific region. Students in Republic of Korea believe that in the next 10-20 years, EU relations with their country will remain steady or even improve in potential areas of cooperation. A similar view of the future of bilateral cooperation is observed in Colombia. Finally, the theme of climate change is considered one in which the EU can surpass other international leaders in relevance in the next 10 to 20 years.

To conclude the section, *EU-specific* factors seem to dominate when a long-term outlook is concerned, while *country-specific* factor provide more context and detail to the short-term future of bilateral cooperation with the EU key partners.

## 8. Short country summaries

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### 8.1. Brazil Country Report

Brexit, Eurozone and migration crises, democratic backsliding, the surge of the far right and the EU's handling of the Covid pandemic have negatively affected the EU's image among educated youth in Brazil, but Brazilian students expect (and wish) that the EU will step up its global leadership role in climate change and environment – to the benefit of Brazil.

#### 8.1.1. Type of Research Participants

The sample includes 8 final-year students (20-22 years), 3 men and 5 women, from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio): 5 from international relations, 1 from philosophy (with the focus on environmental studies) and 2 from media studies. Except for 2 students, all had personal experiences with/in Europe: 2 have spent a year in exchange programmes in EU countries (France and Germany), many visited several EU countries as tourists (Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Greece and Hungary) and mention that they have met and interacted with European students in school or at university; 3 are in contact with family from/living in Portugal.

#### 8.1.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU

Most of the students rank the themes economy; politics; education; science, technology and research; and climate/ environment as *very important* regarding EU policies in Brazil, whereas energy; health governance; development/aid provision; social issues and culture are seen as *important*. Among specific EU public diplomacy initiatives and policies in Brazil, students name the Erasmus+ programme and

Jean Monnet Chairs as well as Model EU simulation events, supported by EU Delegation in Brazil and organised by students from international relations at PUC-Rio. Participants also positively highlight the EU's financing of cultural, scientific and environmental projects, EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement, and diplomatic pressure exerted by the EU and member states (particularly France) on the Brazilian government with regard to environmental issues. Among initiatives of individual member states, the Goethe Institute, Alliance Française, Instituto Cervantes and Heinrich Böll Stiftung are mentioned as important.

Nevertheless, perceptions and expectations towards the EU's policies and actions are mixed. On the one hand, the EU is considered by many as an example of democracy, social and environmental protection, and impartiality in international negotiations, being favourably compared to the US. The EU is also spontaneously equated with development, good quality of life, cultural and intellectual richness, strong institutions and diversity. Furthermore, most of the students express positive perceptions and expectations of EU leadership in climate change and environment, although some fear that the end of Merkel's chancellorship could negatively affect the EU's environmental leadership. One student notes EU 'diplomatic hypocrisy': the bloc pressuring other countries to adopt policies on social issues yet unresolved inside the EU, such as LGBTQ+, race, and gender inequalities. The EU is perceived as presenting itself as 'being perfect', a champion of minority rights, while at the same time promoting restrictive migration policies and turning a blind eye to democracy and human rights violations inside the bloc. Another student conveys his wish that the EU implements reparation policies for colonialism (such as returning historic and artistic objects). Another student expects that the EU globally leads on global health, including providing medicine to developing countries, which are frustrated by the EU's poor handling of the Covid pandemic.

### **8.1.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

All students agree that the Bolsonaro Government is the main obstacle for the EU in Brazil. In reference to areas in which the EU should be more active, students mention the environment (putting pressure on the Brazilian government to curb deforestation), culture, education, and science and technology. They also wish for the EU to be more active in *internal* EU matters, such as public health (since the EU's handling of the pandemic was "shocking"), and external matters *unrelated to Brazil*, such as development and humanitarian aid (since some EU countries are acting based on "Europe First" concerns when it comes to securing vaccines during the Covid pandemic, for example). Therefore, a combination of Brazil-specific and EU-specific factors was mentioned as the main obstacles and gaps.

### **8.1.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

On partner countries and international organisations students have a higher degree of convergence. They mention MERCOSUR, BRICS and the UN as *previously* important international actors in Brazil, all having lost relevance due to Bolsonaro's Presidency. They express concerns that Brazil has 'isolated itself', and the other actors 'do not want to have relations with Brazil nowadays'. In relation to the EU, one student expects that the EU will continue to 'play the game of being an adult at the negotiating table' but sees fewer opportunities to have a 'final say' in international affairs, because the 'children' (China and the US) 'are now grown-ups' and the 'adult' (the EU) is in crisis. None of the students mention other relevant international actors to/in Brazil.

### **8.1.5. Explanatory Factors**

According to the students, one of the main drivers of EU perceptions in Brazil is 'a mentality forged by colonization', which makes Brazilians develop a 'stray dog complex' and see 'everything European' as superior, Europe as 'a paradise on Earth', and expect Europe's leadership. Nonetheless, this 'colonial

mentality' becomes more unstable once one had experiences in Europe. Two students mention that during their exchange programmes (in the countryside of Germany, France, the Netherlands and Portugal), they did not encounter the cultured, cosmopolitan and politically engaged Europeans they expected, but rather provincial people, which, for them, was considered frustrating. Therefore, real life experiences have collided with originally positive connotations. Finally, a student mentions European films as drivers of perceptions.

### **8.1.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

Most of the students agree that the image of the EU has changed for the worse in the last five years due to Brexit, Eurozone and migration crises, democratic backsliding, the surge and popularity of the extreme right, human rights violations in Hungary and Poland, the ban of the hijab in France, and the EU's handling of the Covid pandemic. The EU's credibility, the 'fairy tale' of EU's internal cohesion and the image of the 'EU as a model' are negatively affected. If in the 2015 group interview the perception of EU "arrogance" appeared prominently, in this focus group the dominant perception is that of the EU "falling apart" both in the context of its internal crises (Brexit, the surge of the far-right, economic crises, migration crisis) and the rise of other global powers, namely China. Regarding their visions for the future, most express uncertainty, not only about the EU, but about the world as a whole. Nevertheless, one student expects the next five years to be decisive: the EU either steps up to the challenges and remains as one of the global leaders or 'it just falls apart' and is replaced by China. Students do not elaborate on visions that compare the near-term trajectory to a longer-term future.

## **8.2. Canada Country Report**

The group discussion features a strong consensus amongst student participants on perceiving the EU as a stable and trusted partner for Canada, especially an economic one, and an important like-minded global player. The EU however remains largely unnoticed by Canadians, whose attention focuses predominantly on the US.

### **8.2.1. Type of Research Participants**

The focus group brings together seven undergraduate university students (four males, three females), aged 20-25, from across Canada (British Columbia, Ontario, Québec). Participants are for the most part majoring in political science/international relations. Some had minors in economics, philosophy or history. Five already had a class on European integration/EU studies, two in environment, two in gender studies, three in media and communications, and two in AI/data governance. The participants' knowledge of the EU is certainly above average and what could be expected from typical undergraduate students. Their awareness of Europe is informed by classes on the topic and/or various "Eurotrip" experiences undertaken during their high-school years or through internships (only one participant never went to Europe). Four students mentioned European family roots in Belgium, France, Italy, Northern Ireland – a rather frequent feature in the Canadian population.

### **8.2.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

The general sentiment towards Europe is rather positive. As part of the students' spontaneous associations, the EU is equated with "unity", "peace", and "stability" on various occasions. Despite criticisms voiced against the EU (see below), students see that European integration remains an example for the rest of the world, to the extent that European states have abandoned the idea of going

at war against each other. Participants rank the economy, politics (including foreign policy and diplomacy), and the climate/environment change as the three areas where the EU's relationship with Canada is most important. Specifically, the EU is seen by some as a global leader in setting international regulations (e.g., on data privacy) and consolidating international rules. As one participant puts it, 'everything seems to be in Europe' when you think about major international norms and their institutions, whether in the area of trade, the environment or human rights. Group participants mention the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) as an example of a specific EU programme in Canada. The CETA is rated positively as a policy that brings stability to the trade partnership with Canada, seen as a welcome development at the time of the Trump Presidency in the US. The other public diplomacy initiative highlighted by students is EU-supported study tours and Erasmus+ programme. While participants know about these opportunities thanks to their EU classes and interest in Europe, they observe and regret that it is not usually the case for their peers or friends.

### **8.2.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

A certain lack of EU cohesiveness or consistency is highlighted by some participants on the issues of the environment, energy or human rights. Examples include: some European countries support nuclear energy while others do not; some countries are heavily dependent on Russian gas, which impacts the EU's foreign policy towards Russia; the EU sees itself as a human rights promoter, but it treats immigrants and refugees poorly. One participant observes that 'when you place yourself as a role model, you should back up what you say with real actions' and that is not always the case. In general, major gaps are identified in high politics, especially security and defence, where the EU appears as vulnerable. On internal EU issues, students consider the ongoing risk of democratic backsliding as worrisome, because of radical movements and parties, and remaining high levels of populism.

### **8.2.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

Without any surprise, the US is the very first country that comes to the mind of participants when thinking about the most important international partners for Canada. Even though Canada faced difficult times during the Donald Trump Presidency – which led to increased trade tensions with Canada – the US always comes first in the mind of Canadians, agree group participants. By extension, the North American free trade agreement (CUSMA - which replaced NAFTA) is seen as more significant than CETA, by far. Apart from the US, and to put it simply, China competes with Europe for the second place. However, this happens on different grounds: for Canada, the focus on China is foremost an economic one, while in the case of Europe, students appear to value a much stronger value-based partnership, which means that issues such as culture or education are more prevalent in the conversation between the EU and Canada than they are with other partners.

### **8.2.5. Explanatory Factors**

As a former British colony, and a Commonwealth member, Canada has always been close to Europe. Participants point to shared values, a common history, two common languages and often direct personal connections (current family or ancestors) to explain the proximity with Europe. Economically, the need to minimise dependency on the US is also seen as an external driver, which, the past few years have accelerated, and a couple of students believe that the EU has grown stronger out of its crises. One student notes that the EU's crises have not made it weaker, but only showed it is 'a work in progress'. This being said, participants also make clear that in general, the Canadian population remains very neutral towards the EU. It does not express strong views, simply because the EU is not an important topic at all in the media. In general, the population remains quite uninformed about the EU, what it is and what it does.



### **8.2.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

Thinking about the past five years, the general view of the participants is that the EU proved much stronger and more cohesive than might have been anticipated: Whether it is Brexit or managing the pandemic, several participants are surprised to see that the EU managed to speak with one voice. For example, one student finds that Brexit proved much less damaging to the EU than probably most Canadians thought. On the pandemic however, other participants disagree, as they mostly point to the EU's weak vaccination policy. Another participant was struck by the level of diplomatic pushback that the EU voiced against President Trump, despite the EU'S frequent depiction as a weak diplomatic actor. To summarise, the various answers clearly point to the fact that the evolution of perceptions seem driven either by EU-specific, regional or global, exogenous factors, rather than by domestic ones. Domestic politics in Canada seem to have very little impact on how Canadians view Europe. Finally, continuity seems to prevail over change, including in the way that students perceive the EU. Their general assessment changed very little from the group interview that was conducted in 2015, both in terms of general positive evaluation and in terms of dominant themes (predominance of trade issues, value-based dimension, importance of the US as a filter of Europe's perceptions).

## **8.3. China Country Report**

Attitudes towards the EU among the Chinese students are mixed. While they see the EU as an important international and in the first place economic actor overall, their perception of the EU's normative role in China and dialogue with China is extremely negative. This prompts a negative outlook as to the future of EU-China relations and a growing pragmatic approach towards cooperation based on a "win-win" approach.

### **8.3.1. Type of Research Participants**

The focus group consists of eight undergraduate students (divided in two groups, aged 20-23) from different universities in China, majoring in human resource management, pharmacology, information technology, civil engineering, economics, business, English, journalism and international politics. The personal experience with the EU is limited among both groups. One student studied in the UK for a month on an exchange programme, another student worked as an intern in Germany. Some family members of the students study in the EU. The students' awareness more broadly remains limited and is mostly drawn from Chinese social media and Chinese news. In 2015, students were more personally exposed to the EU through tourism and exchange programmes.

### **8.3.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

Students' spontaneous association with the EU is unanimously Brexit (8 participants). In contrast, EU flag and diverse EU Member States come as distant second (3). This associative focus is also reflected in the perceptions of the EU's international roles. Participants positively identify the EU as an international leader and global powerhouse in the economy connected to an image of prosperity, but this does not translate into a more general image of the EU's international leadership. The EU's economic policies are considered relevant mostly in the context of trade deals between China and the EU. The focus on whether EU-China cooperation benefits China is visible across all themes: in RST it is seen positively, in the field of health it is deemed significant but is viewed mostly negatively due to the EU's perceived poor handling of the pandemic. The field of climate/environment is considered important and urgent, and participants support joint action on tackling global warming even though

this theme is ranked as less important than the previous ones. Associations with power have repeatedly come across the responses as students considered the importance of the issue areas (energy, economy, RST) for military and/or national power capacities. This is different from the 2015 Study where respondents considered economy, science to a lesser extent culture as important areas of EU-China cooperation. In terms of public diplomacy initiatives, the change is also visible: students in 2021 are generally not aware of EU programmes, policies and initiatives with the exception of the Erasmus Programme, while their colleagues in 2015 named a number of such initiatives/programmes.

### **8.3.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

The key message from the participants here is that the EU should resolve its own domestic issues before moving onto China. The EU is seen as not coping with its own domestic crises. Students mention most frequently social crises, refugee and safety problems and managing the pandemic. The Covid situation in particular has created an image of divided EU: 'member states should help each other when crisis arises rather than giving up each other'. This is very different from the 2015 Study, where young people did not reference the EU's crises at all. Further, students in 2021 do not see the EU in the position to 'discriminate against China in terms of human rights affairs in China' in part because of the EU's perceived domestic problems. In communication with China, students expect the EU not to 'consider everything from political stance' and 'have its own voice rather than simply follow the US'. Participants in the 2015 Study also stressed that the key problem in the EU's normative promotion was the mentoring stance it had adopted towards China. Like in 2021, the 2015 participants want the EU-China relationship "depoliticised". However, in 2015 their perception of the EU in terms of normative promotion was very positive, while in 2021, 'there is no trust between China and the EU'. While language barrier was mentioned in the 2015 Study as one of the other obstacles, in 2021 the other obstacles are geographical distance and competition (EU tariffs on imports from China; technology competition).

### **8.3.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

In contrast to the 2015 Study where participants frequently refer to the UN (in security, education, science, and culture) and WTO (in trade) as the key visible international actors, the participants in 2021 do not generally compare the EU with other international actors. Instead, they point to countries along the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative), China's neighbourhood more generally, African countries and other developing nations to be more important to China than the EU. Among others, G20, BRICS, WTO and APEC, but participants are not aware of specific programmes and policies of other international actors, which is another difference from the 2015 Study.

### **8.3.5. Explanatory Factors**

Local filters are crucial in determining how Chinese students perceive the EU. More generally, their perception is driven by the benefits EU-China cooperation can bring to China and them personally (on trade relations, welfare state policies, luxurious goods, a good place for immigration). The EU is perceived to communicate its norms to China in a student-teacher relationship instead of a dialogue. Among other issues is the fact that the EU countries are geographically far away from China, and students agree that their perception of the EU was mainly shaped by media (three participants are clearly aware of censorship of information in China).

### **8.3.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

In comparison to the 2015 Study, EU perceptions among youth have become more critical and negative. While the EU's crises were not visible in 2015, they have created a sense of a divided EU in 2021. Further, in 2015, participants claimed China was learning EU norms and appreciated human rights and democracy as benefiting 'Chinese people, even though not welcomed by government', while in 2021, students see the EU's normative promotion in a negative light. All participants indicate that the EU's interference in China's domestic affairs has pushed bilateral relations to a worse state. They see the future development of EU-China relations as uncertain and dependent largely on how the EU shifts its attitudes towards China. They also frame cooperation in terms of power and competition and focus more on the areas of trade and RST. In comparison to the 2015 Study, these themes remain a priority but cooperation in the field of environment has become more visible (in 2015 it was culture). The EU is seen as a leading actor in new technologies and recognised for its continuous efforts in fighting climate change. It is positively perceived in these areas with the expressed desire for it to continue doing so. Overall, the participants seem pessimistic about the future of EU-China relations but are more confident in the EU surviving its multiple crises. Despite Brexit has prompted a perception of the EU as demising, one student finds the EU is capable to solve its problems and thus moving upwards in the next five years. In the long-term outlook, students attest a weakness of the EU and 'lack of confidence' going forward, although they think that the EU will still exist.

## **8.4. Colombia Country Report**

Participants of the focus groups show a notable interest in the EU. They recognise active presence of the EU in Colombia but also criticise the lack of visibility of those actions in the eyes of the general public – something that could affect the perceived effectiveness of the EU's actions/programmes. In the future, students foresee a stronger relationship developing between Colombia and the EU with the growing role of the EU in comparison to other international organisations and partner countries.

### **8.4.1. Type of Research Participants**

The sample includes 8 participants (6 female, 2 male), aged 18-23, in their 3<sup>rd</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup> year of their undergraduate degree in areas such as environmental engineering, government and international relations, European studies, social sciences, gender studies, communication and journalism. In general, the participants are aware of the EU, however there is a clear difference between the participants from the political disciplines and participants from social studies, environmental engineering and journalism in that the former are more informed about the EU. Some students in engineering and environmental sciences use the EU and Europe interchangeably. Students have a minimum (and often impersonal) experience of Europe. They do not feel a closeness with the EU, and it is not in their personal or professional plans for the future. They see the EU as rather distant.

### **8.4.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

The participants see the EU as a strong actor globally, with a positive and a visible image. First associations with the EU include community/integration, economy and cooperation. They consider economy as the most important theme for EU policies in Colombia followed by science, technology and research, politics and environment. Themes of development/aid provision, education, energy, social issues, culture and health follow in this order. For students, the EU is capable in political and economic terms, but not visible in health, education and culture. Other important themes associated with the EU

are human rights, gender, the promotion of peace, alternative media and standard of living. Respondents see the EU as an international leader, particularly active in politics, trade and normative promotion – but not currently as the most important global actor. Despite this, EU actions are seen as cohesive towards Colombia and globally. For students, the most relevant EU programmes and public diplomacy initiatives/policies in Colombia are trade agreements, such as the EU-Colombia/Ecuador/Peru Trade Agreement signed in 2013, support and protection of human rights in Colombia, support to Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, support to the Colombian Peace Process, financial aid through the post-conflict fund, and, finally, Erasmus scholarships. Students are aware that the EU is already active in peace and post-conflict and trade-related issues, yet they see a lack of communication with the general public on the EU's involvement in other key issues.

#### **8.4.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

Most students believe that the EU is successful in carrying out activities and programme in Colombia and that EU actions have a significant impact on Colombian rural areas especially in activities on the Colombian Peace Process. At the same time, students demand a better awareness and acknowledgement of Colombian reality and thus ask for the EU not only to formulate projects stemming from the European idea but to articulate them in a way that would meet Colombian requirements (e.g., monitor and control project finances and resources, or verify proper allocation of support), given high levels of corruption in Colombia and a lack of transparency in the execution of rural projects. At present, students find that some of the challenges the EU faces in Colombia concern the lack of communication and information about EU actions vis-a-vis a more visible presence and higher recognition of other countries and organisations such as the US, UN and its agencies. Students think that the lack of information about the EU's activity in Colombia in the media limit the public recognition of the EU within the country.

#### **8.4.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

Participants think of the EU's visibility as weak in comparison to the visibility of the US, China or the UN and see a closer relationship with the US and neighbouring countries, with the exception of Venezuela. However, students do positively perceive EU engagement in comparison to the US or China, which some students feel negatively about. Moreover, in comparison to other international actors, EU actions/programmes are considered to be executed with high effectiveness. Participants believe that the EU can work on similar and/or different themes as the US or UN, but the EU is seen to be equally or more effective than other international actors.

#### **8.4.5. Explanatory Factors**

Generally, the perception of the EU is positive among the participants. Yet, they see the EU as distant to Colombian people and do not feel close to Europe. This makes it hard for them to establish a personal connection with Europe. In contrast, the participants feel closer to the US because of its geopolitical influence in the region. In the political context, the EU is perceived positively, given its support of the peace process and post-conflict process. Students recognise the EU as the most relevant cooperating actor in the pursuit of peace. In contrast, in the cultural field, EU actions and programmes are not visible, which translates into a lack of awareness about the EU. Historically, students see a common history with Spain supported by personal experiences (tourism and family) with this member state, but not the EU in general. Participants do not know much about training and education in Europe and, as a result, they do not have plans to study or work in the EU in contrast to the US.

#### **8.4.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

Students see the EU as being continuously involved in Colombia in the context of the trade agreement and the support of the post-conflict process. In the future, they wish for a stronger position of the EU, vis-à-vis the US or the UN, particularly in human rights, environment, health and drug policy in Colombia. Students also think that the EU will have more leadership in the region and in the global context. Factors that drive EU perceptions are thus dominantly *location specific*. Students' expectations of the EU in the future are high. While the respondents recognise the effectiveness of EU policies and programmes, they also expect to see the EU more connected to Colombia reality, with more presence in Colombian public opinion and with more information about the EU in media. They wish for a stronger connection between EU/Europe and Colombia in the next five years. However, in a long run, students believe that the image of the EU will negatively but not "fatally" deteriorate for internal (nationalist populism) and external (migration pressures) reasons. While recognising these problems of the EU, students still see the EU as a role model and hope for a stronger relation with it.

### **8.5. India Country Report**

The EU is identified as the best example of successful regional integration between countries that once experienced extreme hostility towards each other in their history but have overcome it through integration. It is perceived positively as a group of high performing economies with advanced research and development, scientific innovation and high standards of education. Yet, youth perceptions of these achievements and a potential capability to assume a global leadership role contrast perceptions when the EU is considered to fall short of exploiting its full potential in various areas, and foremost in the transfer of green technology, education and migration, due to a lack of coherent, timely and concerted efforts.

#### **8.5.1. Type of Research Participants**

The focus group consists of nine students (3 female and 6 male), of diverse disciplinary backgrounds (history, linguistics and literature, philosophy, international relations, political science, geology and economics) pursuing graduate degrees. All of them are aware of the EU and have friends from European countries. Two have had personal experiences with Europe because their extended family members live in Europe. One participant has studied in the Netherlands and the UK.

#### **8.5.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

Among the respondents, the visibility and awareness of the EU are the strongest in the areas of climate change, environment, freedom of movement, regional integration and in regarding the EU as a multicultural space with rich cultural diversity. The participants associate the EU with human rights, democracy, strong institutions, economic development, transnationalism and supranational organisation. In contrast, very limited visibility is assigned to development assistance, social issues and health. These areas are also identified as low priority areas, in which the respondents do not have much information about the EU. Overall, the image of the EU appears to be lacking "hard power" qualities. The EU is perceived as an international actor mainly in the fields of environment, energy, climate change and human rights and as an international leader in regional integration and as an economic block. It is also perceived as upholding the values of democracy, human rights, gender justice and a multicultural society that embraces diversity. Further areas where the EU is seen as a trend-setter are cybersecurity, science and technology, research and development, and green technologies.

Energy, climate change/environment as well as science and research and technology are the top three areas in EU actions considered by the students to be the most relevant for Indian interests. EU actions in economy, education and politics are also perceived as important; yet the respondents considered that the EU and India have not been able to successfully cooperate in these areas, and, as a result, there is an image of an under-utilised potential for cooperation.

Overall, the EU is seen to have the capacity and capabilities to be an influential normative actor/leader globally in social, economic and political terms. However, according to the respondents, at times it falls short of timely concerted action, for example in the areas of human rights and green technology. Such perceptions are true for the students both with and without personal exposure to the EU and of various majors.

### **8.5.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

For students, the EU suffers from low visibility in India. The bilateral relations with the individual EU member states are seen to prevail over relations with the EU as a whole. The students feel that the EU Delegation in India could enhance its outreach, visibility and dissemination of information on the EU by engaging with a more diverse set of stakeholders. The information about the EU is seen to reach a limited circle, or group of people, and not the wider audience or the general public.

Most of the participants consider that as a bloc with resources and capacities, the EU could play a more proactive role and further help developing countries by exchanging knowledge and transferring technology to curb climate change. This is considering the historical responsibility of the erstwhile colonial powers and the resources they possess vis-a-vis developing countries in need of technology and assistance for development. Students also think that greater bilateral work could strengthen EU-India trade relations (e.g., removing non-tariff barriers), act proactively in transfer of green technologies to India and undertake a more comprehensive collaboration in counterterrorism. Four respondents of various specialties feel that the EU must further develop its leadership role in issue-areas of the transfer of green technology, education, and science and technology.

### **8.5.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

Students note that the EU has weak visibility and significance if compared to other international organisations such as ASEAN, BIMSTEC, BRICS, UN, SAARC and QUAD. Countries such as the US, China, Pakistan, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Afghanistan, the UK, France, Germany, Russia and Japan are seen to matter more for India than the EU because of their geo-political and strategic significance in trade and security as well as economic partnerships with India. The India-EU relations are considered visible and, from a positive viewpoint, only in the field of energy and climate change. In other areas, the EU is generally perceived as ineffective and/or invisible.

### **8.5.5. Explanatory Factors**

Indian students see the EU as an epitome of regional integration and cooperation between European countries to achieve greater development. However, bilateral relations between India and EU member states tend to prevail over EU-India relations. The factors determining such perceptions are mainly political, historical and geopolitical. The EU is also seen as being in trouble post-Brexit. The perceptions are driven by popular culture, media, interaction with people who are related to Europe and diplomatic meetings between high-level officials.

### **8.5.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

The general perception of the EU has remained relatively similar over the last 5 years and in comparison to the 2015 baseline study. The EU continues to be perceived as a normative actor with positive evaluations of its actions in the field of climate change and energy and has a more negative image in the context of specific issues, such as the refugee crisis, Brexit or the Eurozone debt crisis. Currently, the EU appears as a weaker organisation to the participants. They feel that if the EU continues to face the crises that have marked its recent history, even its own existence in the next ten to twenty years or so could be questioned. However, students believe that if the EU manages to tide over these issues, then it will emerge as a powerful organisation. 'More Europe' and 'greater' union are seen as the only solution. In the short-term perspective (5 years), the EU is seen as upholding an important role in managing the Covid pandemic as well as in upholding the rules-based international order.

## **8.6. Indonesia Country Report**

Indonesian students in the sample recognise the EU and its achievements, but they are still less clear about what specifically makes the EU and how relevant it is to Indonesia. Students, therefore, express a strong need for more exposure of the EU's profile, its activities and achievements among the general public.

### **8.6.1. Type of Research Participants**

Eight university students (three females, five males) of diverse disciplinary backgrounds (media studies, computer sciences and international relations) from Bina Nusantara University took part in the focus group. Six students have a vague understanding of the EU and five are more familiar with EU Member States such as the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Belgium, although they have not lived there. Four students of diverse majors have visited the EU or have strong awareness of the EU through interaction with their relatives and friends who live in EU countries (the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and France). One student majoring in international relations participated in a student exchange programme.

### **8.6.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

When recalling the EU's spontaneous image, students mention three key aspects: its geographical distance to Indonesia, the EU's capacity in the economy, trade, culture, including cuisine and cinematography, education and development assistance), and the EU's institutional set-up (as a regional group of countries or a supranational institution). Students name economy, science and technology, education and climate/environment as the most relevant areas for Indonesia, followed by development aid and social issues. However, they share negative sentiments towards EU policies in Indonesia, such as social issues and development aid claiming they have very little knowledge on the EU in these areas. In contrast, they positively evaluate science and technology, economy, and education as more visible in their daily life, naming examples such as European cars, the EURO, and scholarship programmes. All participants acknowledge the EU as an international leader in several areas, such as science and technology, and economy, but they perceive it as less active in education and culture – areas that involve the younger generation. Moreover, the EU and its Member States are seen as upholding different values to Indonesia (e.g., product standardisation on palm oil) which creates frictions in the interaction with Indonesia.

### **8.6.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

The participants would like the EU to engage more actively with Indonesia and to assist the Indonesian government with social issues, such as minority rights, secularism, improvement of the local education system and to transfer skills on green technology. Students find that there is a lack of EU knowledge sharing in green technology, higher education as well as culture, which is why the participants wish for the EU to be more active and more elaborate in promoting cooperation with Indonesia in education and culture through scholarships and cultural festivals. The participants believe that this would allow to build awareness, a better image of the EU and to create a more positive perception among Indonesians. Most students express a wish to be more exposed to the EU and EU activities in Indonesia by receiving information and/or participating in the related events.

### **8.6.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

None of the students mention specific actors on par with the EU that are important to Indonesia. However, all students consider the ASEAN to be very influential in the region and important for Indonesia in terms of support for Indonesia's international profile, economic development and people-to-people contacts. Against this background, the EU's visibility is strong and positive when its cooperation with the ASEAN is in focus. The EU is seen as ASEAN's long term inter-regional partner. Students also note that the EU is one of ASEAN's Dialogue Partners and recently both organisations have signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement. The EU-ASEAN partnership is also seen as advancing the EU's effectiveness, because EU standards are being adopted and implemented in trade regulations with the ASEAN countries.

Schengen visa-free policy is also associated with the EU, and free movement of people within the EU has inspired the ASEAN to adopt its own visa free policy. However, the EU's effectiveness in this field is limited to performing as a role model, while the ASEAN visa free regime is less effective than the EU's regulations of free movement of people. The Indonesian students wish for the ASEAN visa liberalisation to allow them studying and working in the ASEAN region the way the Schengen zone works for European students, but their expectations have not been met yet. For this reason, students see the EU's influence in this policy area as low.

### **8.6.5. Explanatory Factors**

The perceptions of the EU/EU Member States programmes among Indonesian youth in the sample are strongly influenced by geographical factors and cultural contexts. The EU and EU Member States are seen as geographically and culturally distant from Indonesia, which makes it harder for the EU to reach out to Indonesia. At the same time, the EU is seen as pursuing its interests in Indonesia and imposing its standards and policies, while Indonesia still does not have enough capacity to cope with such outreach (for instance the EU's ban on Indonesian palm oil).

### **8.6.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

For the students, the image of the EU in Indonesia is changing slightly towards becoming more negative in light of the EU's domestic problems, such as Brexit, the rise of racism and irregular migration in a short term. According to the students, these problems reveal the EU's incapability as an organisation to manage such issues, which affects the EU's regional leadership and more generally internal coherence. The latter is reflected in the perceived growth of Euroscepticism within the EU, while, at the same time, the growing role of individual Member States and their political leaders, such as Germany and its chancellor Angela Merkel.



Globally, however, the EU's image seems to have changed more favourably, especially when the EU is actively participating in solving global issues such as combatting climate change, as well as giving more development and humanitarian aid to other regions and on other continents, such as Africa.

The collaboration and partnership with partners in other regions (for instance Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific) is seen as a leading factor that will continue to improve the EU's global image in the next five to ten years. In this light, Indonesia is seen as one of the EU's important partners in South-East Asian and the Asia Pacific region, for which students see a need for the EU to work with its partners and promote their capacity by building a partnership through collaboration that benefits both sides. Indonesian students see this in the EU's support to Indonesian education sector as well as provision of scholarships and opportunities for Indonesians to pursue higher degrees in EU countries. In their opinion, this will help Indonesians to improve their intellectual capacity and also raise the EU's visibility among Indonesians.

## **8.7. Japan Country Report**

Japanese focus group participants believe that the better people are informed about the EU, the more positive their perceptions of the EU are. The students also see some differences between Japan and the EU/Europe and generally have high expectations of the EU in the issue-areas where Japan is perceived to under-perform, e.g., climate change, human rights and gender equality. Youth perceptions of the EU are also heavily influenced by the Covid pandemic and particularly the way in which the EU has been dealing with the pandemic, both positively and negatively.

### **8.7.1. Type of Research Participants**

All eight participants in the focus group sessions (5 males and 3 females, aged between 20 and 24) are undergraduate students at one of the top private universities in Japan, studying political science, international relations, European politics and environment and information science. Four out of eight participants have lived in Europe for an extended period of time (4-6 years) during their childhood (Rome, Paris, London) and they keep communicating with their former classmates and friends in Europe on a daily basis. As such, the group cannot be seen as representative of ordinary Japanese students: they are far more exposed to Europe (and the world at large) than other Japanese students and show higher level of awareness of the EU.

### **8.7.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

The participants' spontaneous images of the EU seem to be heavily influenced by the series of crises the EU has undergone over the past decade, including the Euro crisis, Brexit and the immigration crisis – those crises that are frequently reported in the Japanese news media. Yet at the same time, more positive images such as peace and globalisation are also associated with the EU.

The level of visibility of and awareness about the EU as a whole is high among the participating students, particularly in reference to the themes of economy, energy and climate/environment. Areas such as science, technology and research, development/aid provisions and social issues receive less attention among the participants. According to students, this is mainly because there is not much information on those issues (unless students research those issues in the internet).

Nevertheless, many participants see the EU as, first and foremost, a leader in fighting climate change (in a positive sense). They say that when the EU takes the lead, other countries find it easier to follow. Some find Europe's export promotion activities interesting, like the promotion of European wine and

cheese following the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Japan and the EU. While recognising the importance of the EU in the international trade realm, they seem to be rather neutral about its role in this field.

### **8.7.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

Participants' expectations of the EU are high in the field of human rights. They know that the EU champions the protection of fundamental rights across the world vis-à-vis the fact that Japan's role in this regard is quite limited and, thus, they expect more engagement by the EU in the world. In relation to this, they also pay close and partially suspicious attention to the EU's relations with China and the way in which Brussels deals with Beijing. Some participants raise the issues of the rule of law in Hungary and Poland, demanding consistency between the EU's external and internal actions. Some feel frustration and raise questions about the EU's position regarding Japan's death penalty. They see the EU's criticism of Japan's death penalty as an intervention in domestic affairs. Another participant expects the EU to embrace and promote religious diversity – she finds the EU as a whole remains predominantly Christian at the expense of other religions.

### **8.7.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

The US is seen as a military power special to Japan's security as the only treaty ally. It is noteworthy that in relation to the US, the EU is seen as an actor that 'constrains' US power. The EU is also seen as more credible than the US in climate change, where the EU's role is seen as reassuring, meaning that when the US is absent from the central stage of international cooperation and leadership, the EU could replace the US and play its role. One participant calls the EU a 'safety net' for international cooperation. Other than the US and China, the participants do not think of comparing the EU with other international organisations, such as the UN or ASEAN.

### **8.7.5. Explanatory Factors**

EU programmes are generally not known to the participants. Many say that they have no idea what the EU Delegation in Japan is doing. They rely on news media (like newspapers, TV news and the internet) for information on the EU, where they gain most of the information about the EU. Without social networks, they do not normally recognise the activities of the EU Delegation and Member States' embassies in Japan. Their perceptions seem to be heavily shaped by their personal experience of living and travelling in Europe, both in positive and negative ways, but largely in a positive way. Furthermore, youth images of Europe as a whole are shaped by individual countries, like France, Italy, Germany, etc. (and the UK). Interestingly, their perceptions of Central and Eastern European countries are separate from Western Europe (and the EU). It seems that the Nordic countries are also perceived in a discreet category.

### **8.7.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

Compared to the student interviews in 2015 Study, there does not seem to be any substantial difference regarding Japanese students' perceptions of the EU. Yet, in 2015 students were a little more concerned about the EU's domestic situation claiming that the EU needed to address its internal problems before thinking about its policy to Japan. While students' perceptions are changing in this respect, they share the concern about the EU-China relationship. The major difference in the 2021 Study is that the Covid pandemic has heavily influenced perceptions of the EU – both negatively and positively. The extremely high death toll in many EU countries has made students sceptical about the EU's (and individual EU countries') capability to deal with the pandemic. However, once some European companies succeeded

in developing anti-Covid vaccines and some countries progressed well in the roll-out of vaccinations to their public, the image of the EU among the students became more positive. The Covid pandemic is set to shape the participants' perceptions of the EU at least in the short-term (5 years).

Prior to the Covid pandemic, Brexit caught a lot of Japanese attention, leading to more negative and sceptical views on the EU. But some participants argue that, given that the EU has survived a series of crises so far, it is highly likely that the EU will overcome the current one and develop further, particularly in the longer-term (10-20 years). Here, a lot depends on the leadership of France and Germany, they say. It can, therefore, be said that the EU-specific factors are dominant in their view about the future outlook of the EU.

## **8.8. Mexico Country Report**

Participants identify the EU as an international leader in cooperation, human rights, environment and gender equality, while some participants mark the Spotlight Initiative as a notable EU policy. However, many believe that the EU should allocate more resources and pay more attention to domestic problems in Mexico related to drug trafficking and organised crime. While the group acknowledges the benefits of the EU model, they are aware of the EU's economic (inequality), political (Brexit) and social challenges (migration and refugees). Students in the group rank the economy as the most important issue in the EU-Mexico agenda and expect more EU economic bilateral cooperation in aid, investment, and trade as well as scholarships to study in Europe. Regarding other key partners countries, the US is perceived as the most significant actor in Mexico and China as an increasingly important economic partner.

### **8.8.1. Type of Research Participants**

The focus group consists of ten undergraduate students (five female and five male participants aged between 21 and 24) from four cities: Mexico City (Capital, 5), Tijuana (border with California, 3), San Luis Potosi (Centre, 2), and Monterrey (most industrial city, 1). All are senior students of diverse academic backgrounds and institutional affiliations majoring in international relations, political science, economics, business and history. While all the participants have taken a course about Europe or the EU, only three have travelled to Europe, and four have had contact with European students in Mexico. None of the participants have studied in Europe. The focus group participants are more aware of the EU than most Mexicans and other non-social science students.

### **8.8.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

Among the immediate associations, participants identify the EU flag, the European Parliament, multiculturalism, Michelangelo, and Angela Merkel in a positive way, while the image of migrants in the Mediterranean, refugees from Syria, Boris Johnson and chaos are perceived negatively. The group ranks the economy as the most important theme regarding EU policies in Mexico (13 mentions), followed by climate/environment change (8); science, technology, and research (7); health (5); politics (3); education, culture, and energy (2 each); and social issues (one). Participants mention other areas where the EU plays a leading international leading role: multilateral cooperation, human rights, environment, gender equality, tourism, and health (coordination to address the pandemic). Two students bring up the discussion about revisiting European colonialism in Mexico and Latin America. Students positively identify the Spotlight Initiative against femicide as the central EU policy.

### **8.8.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

The main expectations of the group centre around the EU continuing to lead on the environment, human rights and migration. However, particularly in immigration and human rights, students feel that the EU must close the gap between narratives and realities in various areas of its internal and external agenda. Internally, by working harder to reduce discrimination and attacks on minority groups and develop a stronger sense of social solidarity and compassion for people in distress. The group also identifies inequality as another critical internal gap in the EU, which the students see as particularly striking given that the EU is a wealthy region in the world. Externally, the students mention that the EU should close the gap between being a normative leader and the historical debt to ex-colonies, particularly in Africa. Regarding the challenges and expectations that the EU faces in Mexico, the group expects more EU economic bilateral cooperation in aid, investment and trade. Participants agree on the need to increase the number of EU scholarships to study in Europe. In particular, the group considers that the EU should pay attention to problems in Mexico related to drug trafficking and organised crime. As participants are based in different cities, they mention that another challenge in implementing EU cooperation policies in Mexico is to recognise the cultural diversity and challenges of local politics and federalism in Mexico.

### **8.8.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

Participants consider the US the most significant actor in Mexico. The US' influence extends to a wide range of areas, including trade, diplomacy, cooperation, soft power and culture. However, one of the participants mentions a perception of often-coercive tactics of US foreign policy. The presence of Asian countries is also crucial: China is seen as the most influential country, while Republic of Korea and Japan are mentioned as key investors in Mexico. Regionally and given the interconnectedness of the networks of undocumented migration, students consider Central America as an essential region to Mexico and the Pacific Alliance is further mentioned as a mechanism of regional cooperation. For international organisations, the UN and NATO are mentioned by several participants and UNESCO and the OECD by one student. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and International Amnesty are on the participants' radar regarding human rights. In the identification of other partners, countries and international organisations, students do not reference the EU at all in terms of its comparative standing.

### **8.8.5. Explanatory Factors**

The group reiterates that *location-specific* factors dominantly drive the perceptions of the EU and identifies three main explanatory trends while acknowledging that EU-related factors (particularly Brexit) are also crucial. Considering the gradual process of democratisation and modernisation in Mexico, the EU is still perceived as a model for development and inclusion. In parallel to these positive views, the participants argue that Mexicans, sensitive to their local problems such as migration, economic crises or racism, observe attentively negative events in the EU that are close to Mexican concern. In this regard, the group mentions the struggle of the EU to deal with three main events: the 2008/9 Global Financial/Eurozone debt crisis, the refugee crisis and Brexit.

### **8.8.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

Participants in the group interviews in 2015 and focus groups in 2021 agree on negative and positive perceptions of the EU over the past decade. While both groups recognize that the image of the EU has been negatively affected by internal challenges, both also agree that the EU still projects a model of inclusiveness, democracy and respect of human rights. In contrast to the 2015 group, the 2021

participants indicate a slightly less optimistic prospect for the EU especially around the long-lasting effects of Brexit on the EU integration process. One of the students thinks that the institutional model of the EU 'that we used to know' as a centrepiece of progress 'is no longer there'. The group shares a concern about the deep-seated consequences of Brexit for European integration, as Brexit opens the potential option for other countries to leave the EU. In this regard, when discussing the potential future of the EU, students do not provide specific recommendations about what policies the EU should implement or innovate in the future but agree that it is crucial for the EU to seriously address the challenges to internal social cohesion to reinvigorate the European integration project.

## **8.9. Nigeria Country Report**

Nigerian students reveal attempts to provide balanced views towards perceptions of the EU at first, but these become outweighed by a largely apathetic or negative view of the EU as the focus groups progress. Themes discussed range from Brexit to trade policy and the EU's migration regime, and the participants are largely critical of the EU in these fields. While the EU is noted as an example to follow in terms of regional integration, Brexit appears to have interrupted that initial perception. In contrast, the role of the EU in humanitarian support, climate change and energy are viewed positively, and especially regarding its role as a human rights promoter. The possibility of the EU working with other UN agencies is also perceived in a positive light, although suspicion remains of the EU acting as a neo-colonial actor in Nigeria. Generally, there is limited knowledge of EU public diplomacy programmes barring that related to human rights though a specific initiative is not named.

### **8.9.1. Type of Research Participants**

Focus group participants were represented by university students at Babcock University aged 18-20, including five male and four female students across five subject areas (mass communication, computer science, economics, international law & political science, and history & international Studies). A majority of the participants have never been to Europe, though a couple have family in the UK. For most, perceptions of the EU come from media and their own research linked to university studies.

### **8.9.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

The EU in Nigeria can be read as neo-colonial. This view is fuelled by perceptions that the EU's trade practices are unfair, with one respondent saying the EU should 'make policies that are fair to everyone'. While this perception is linked to EU's trade practices, the EU's immigration regime is also viewed as unfair because it is difficult to get visas (when attempting to go through regular means) and based on news about how Africans are treated when travelling irregularly and when living in Europe. Further, Brexit is seen to have compromised the EU's position on the world stage threatening European coherence and the continuation of the European project. Brexit challenges the notion of the EU as the world's most successful regional integration project from which African organisations like the African Union (AU) could learn. While there is a general awareness of the EU's roles in human rights promotion, climate change mitigation; clean energy; humanitarian action and international development, these are not perceived as areas in which the EU engages within Nigeria, and so there is the perception that the EU could partner better with UN agencies like UNICEF to fulfil these governance and policy challenges. The EU is not generally seen as a leader per se in the world when compared to the United States, for example.

### 8.9.3. Obstacles and Gaps

The majority of participants agree that EU engagement in Nigeria (and Africa) is a form of neo-colonialism though there is a variance in the degree of impact. This presents a challenge for further EU engagement in the socio-political landscape. There is suspicion of the EU's extra-regionalism in Africa, which is against the logic of regional actors to act within their own regions. The EU's trade policies they are viewed as mainly negative by the students. As one respondent notes: 'they [the EU] should be more considerate when they are making some of these [trade] policies because it doesn't just affect the European nations that are there, it affects the world at large'. EU-Nigeria relations are generally viewed as expedient and solely beneficial to the EU, which is reinforced by the EU's migration regime since 2015.

### 8.9.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations

While the level of integration within the EU is universally admired, particularly when compared to ECOWAS; AU and ASEAN, the EU is not seen as a leader. One respondent notes: 'just like ECOWAS, ... they are not really global leaders in [helping other countries' economies]', however this is of course not consistent with reality so this underscores that the EU is not really on the radar of students and the fact that a country like the UK would leave appears to give credence to the fact that the EU has limited reach. The EU is identified as a unique actor primed for partnership with UN agencies who enjoy more trust among the respondent group. There are no references to specific countries.

### 8.9.5. Explanatory Factors

Brexit has played a significant role in the immediate reactions to the EU, in addition to perceptions of the EU's approach to trade relations. But in the main, knowledge of EU initiatives is limited. As one respondent notes: 'If you take a survey around the whole of Nigeria, there are very few people that actually know of the EU and their influence...But then, when you start hearing about Brexit...it's just created a vacuum'. Further, personal exposure to Europe via family experiences of migration to Europe, and the difficulties around obtaining visas form key drivers of negative perceptions of the EU. Being able to immigrate to the EU is viewed as a positive opportunity, but the process of doing so and possibly negative experiences of life upon arrival affect how Europe is viewed by those back home in Nigeria.

### 8.9.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook

Brexit has had the most significant impact on views of the EU's future stability as a regional polity, and ostensible "instability" of the European project looms large. Apart from Brexit's lasting implications, there is no marked sense that the EU is changing, either in Nigeria or globally. Some respondents note that *their* perceptions have evolved – with age, in the context of university studies, Brexit and informed by news. For the majority of those who note change, these changes are neither negative or positive – more like a sense of greater awareness of how the EU is located in the global landscape and its involvement in different issue areas. For others, greater awareness (from none or simply of the EU as a regional polity) is the prevailing sense of the EU as a neo-colonial power. There is no differentiation in the short-term to long-term perceptions based on knowledge of the EU now.

## 8.10. Republic of Korea Country Report

Focus groups in Republic of Korea reveal that those students who are less informed about the EU and/or less exposed to its policies in general. Majority of respondents have no clear opinion about the EU and its role globally and in Republic of Korea. Moreover, Korean youth in the sample have generalised perceptions of the EU, shaped largely by media and not personal experiences with Europe.

### 8.10.1. Type of Research Participants

Nine students (6 males, 3 females) in their early and mid-20s from three different majors (international studies, development and co-operation, and civil engineering) participated in two focus groups. Most of respondents had some experiences with students from the EU/wider Europe as their classmates or through exchange programmes but are not directly influenced by the EU or its policies. Students not majoring in international relations have no direct communication with friends or family in the EU/wider Europe.

### 8.10.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU

EU perceptions among the participants vary. For example, students from international relations have a shared spontaneous image of the EU as an economic power (linked to the Euro) and a leader in global development. They also point to Brexit as one of instantaneous associations with the EU. Meanwhile, spontaneous perceptions of the respondents from other majors are more diverse: the EU, Brexit, Germany, peaceful region, eco-friendliness and a tourist destination. Reflecting on the EU's international roles, most respondents consider the EU as an important international actor but not a global leader per se. The perceived importance of the EU varies according to the major. Students from international relations and global studies see the EU to be influential in the areas of politics, development, environment, social issues and education, while students from civil engineering perceive the EU to be more influential in the areas of economy, energy, science, technology and research. However, most respondents and particularly those not exposed to the EU and not from international relations studies cannot name any relevant programmes or policies promoted by the EU in Republic of Korea, with the exception of Erasmus+ and the EU Green Deal.

Expectations towards the EU also differ among the students and concern largely environment and education. Some participants find that EU environmental actions are not sufficiently visible and EU implementation policies in this area are not distinct enough. One participant is curious about how the EU will implement particular policies to address climate change in response to the policy shift under the Biden Administration. Students also expect some changes around their visits to Europe under condition that the EU will offer more incentives such as scholarships and/or more discounts to Korean students based on their international student id cards during their international exchange to Europe. Other issues mentioned in the context of EU actions relevant to Korea are the EU's continuous contribution to world peace and reducing the tariffs to provide cheaper German cars to Korea. Students admit that their perceptions of the EU and its policies are generic and shaped by the national media mainly. For example, students from international relations and global studies claim that Brexit is the main issue, which shaped their perception of the EU. Students also claim that news media influence images of the EU because they report about diverse aspects of EU actions, such as European Green Deal, advanced and cutting-edge policies in Europe and programmes, as well as the refugee crisis. As a result, the EU is seen as a regional entity whose members have different levels of socioeconomic development; it is a regional entity that reflects different perspectives on accepting refugees from outside the EU; it is also an eco-friendly region and a region with less advanced public health system, as the Covid pandemic has revealed. One of the students also recognises EU education programmes, such as Erasmus+ and Horizon 2020; however, the rest of participants could not recall any. Students

majoring in civil engineering also could not point out to any driving factors behind their perceptions of the EU.

### **8.10.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

The respondents believe that the EU should put its effort to devise more effective refugee, development and environmental policies. Some respondents say that the EU needs to be more active in the areas of public health, trade, education and cultural exchanges. The biggest obstacle between the EU and Korea in terms of the EU's challenges in Korea could be the EU's lack of popularity and visibility in Korea. While it is hard for the participants to define obstacles in EU-Korea cooperation, some mentioned the EU's conflict with China (Korea's regional actor) and EU-Republic of Korea ILO disputes.

### **8.10.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

Most respondents point out that the US is the most important international actor in Republic of Korea in terms of military and economic power and, thus, its potential impact on Republic of Korea. One student mentions China as an actor that is important for Republic of Korea given China's economic significance. For international organisations, some students suggest the UN (no specific reasons), ASEAN and MERCOSUR (for its potentials regarding further cooperation in the future).

### **8.10.5. Explanatory Factors**

There are three main aspects of Republic of Korean perceptions of the EU: 1. lack of attention (or low interest), 2. insufficient visibility or popularity, 3. expectation mismatch. The EU and Republic of Korea are interested in different regions of cooperation (the EU's Neighbourhood/wider Europe vis-à-vis Republic of Korea's Northeast Asia) due to geographical distance. Meanwhile, the different regional focus between the two correlates with the substantial impact of global superpowers (the US and China) in these regions. Finally, the two have different preference in their relations (Republic of Korea focuses on trade and investment, while the EU – on culture and education).

### **8.10.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

EU perceptions among Korean youth reveal the same pattern over time – low visibility of the EU and the lack of its activity in Republic of Korea and globally. While in 2015, the EU's visibility was more pronounced due to the EU-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement for some students who saw the EU as somewhat active in Republic of Korea, in 2021, there are no contention issues between the two partners, and the EU has even lower visibility. In both studies, students do not see the EU as an effective actor on the global stages. In comparison to the EU, the US and China are seen as more effective global actors for Republic of Korea given their perceived influence in Korea. Moreover, most respondents of the 2021 Study do not envisage that the EU's image will improve in the future. Most respondents mention that it will remain the same, while some believe it will get worse, possible also because of EU's conflict with China (Korea's regional actor) or EU-Republic of Korea ILO disputes. Some students nevertheless believe that EU-Republic of Korea relations would remain steady or improve due to potential areas of further cooperation such as economy, health, environment, welfare and education.



## **8.11. Russia Country Report**

Russia's focus group participants perceive the EU positively in the areas of student and cultural exchanges, green energy and economy at large. They view it as a successful model of economic integration and an organisation tolerant in values. Negative perceptions refer to politics, particularly the poor state of EU-Russia relations in geopolitical terms as well as the EU's internal crises (pandemic, migration) and uneven socioeconomic development of EU Member States.

### **8.11.1. Type of Research Participants**

The sample consists of eight participants (five female and three male), 19-24 years old: four BA (3-4 year) and two master's students as well as two university tutors of various backgrounds: theoretical sociology, chemistry, ecology, domestic violence, economics, energy, international relations (Middle East, the EU) and political science. Respondents visited many European countries, mainly as tourists. All have personal experiences with and are aware of the EU. Two participants have participated in exchange programmes, six have worked/studied with people from the EU/wider Europe, five have family or friends in the EU/wider Europe with whom they stay in touch.

### **8.11.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

Students associate the EU with its symbols (the Euro banknote, the EU emblem, EU Headquarters), personalities (Jean-Claude Juncker, Jean Monnet, Ursula von der Leyen) or recall abstract images of the EU (complex organisational structure; interesting history; free movement for EU citizens; a successful union of countries, yet with differences in socioeconomic terms). Economy, energy and politics are seen as the most relevant fields in Russia's cooperation with the EU and its Member States. They often overlap. Students also highlight cyber-security, counterterrorism, migration, propaganda, human rights, defense and security and culture as important areas for Russia-EU cooperation. In contrast, development/aid are not seen as relevant. The EU is considered active in the fields of green energy, feminism, LGBT rights, but these actions, which the students mostly believe to be positive, are not widely debated in Russia. Culture, cross-border cooperation and student exchanges are seen as potential areas for EU public diplomacy. Most respondents consider the EU to be an international leader in regional integration, climate and environment/green energy, human rights, social security, culture, science and education (especially student exchanges). However, EU Member States are seen as socio-economically different from each other and driven by different values (e.g., liberal France vs. more conservative Poland). The participants also perceive disappointment with the EU among some of its Member States (e.g., Bulgaria, Latvia).

### **8.11.3. Obstacles and Gaps**

The expectations of the EU differ. Participants express polar views on the consequences of Brexit for the EU: from disintegration to no effect at all – and believe that the EU should pay more attention to its economic stability and internal cohesion; migration from the Middle East and terrorism; as well as health system considering the pandemic. Students also believe that the EU should create more economic equity among its Member States to avoid the exodus of workers in poorer EU Member States to wealthier EU Member States and ease financial burden on EU Member States that support poorer EU Member States through EU budget redistribution. Among the perceived challenges of the EU in Russia are differences in societal (post-modern vs. traditional) and religious (Catholicism/Protestantism vs. Orthodoxy) values. While culturally close, the EU and Russia are seen as political adversaries: the EU is seen to be under the US influence and to have a negative perception of Russia's foreign policy (including cooperation with China). This seems to prompt the EU to undertake aggressive policy

towards Russia, including sanctions. Students regret the deterioration of EU-Russia relations and believe that relations should be restored.

#### **8.11.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

As a model of integration, the EU is considered more successful than the CIS, EAEU and BRISC, which are still to prove themselves. There are also certain reservations as to UN's effectiveness despite it being normatively strong and having wider reach than the EU. Finally, the US and NATO are seen as ideologically driven political and military actors and political antagonists of Russia, wherein the EU is primarily seen as an economic actor under their influence. The EU is not perceived as a military threat to Russia. This makes the EU Russia's adversary rather than antagonist. The EU is also perceived more positively than the US in building an inclusive society for different minorities (particularly, LGBT) in contrast to "excessive" US policies that cause resentment in Russia. While China is seen as a good economic partner and a political ally of Russia in counter position to the US, it remains an enigma, wherein the EU's goals and policies are perceived as clear for Russians.

#### **8.11.5. Explanatory Factors**

The participants demonstrate knowledge of geopolitical factors, current political contexts, cultural and historical ties and differences guiding the EU-Russia relations. In light of the crisis in Russia-West relations that began in 2014, a number of actors (US/NATO, China and Ukraine) affect EU-Russia relations. In this geopolitical dynamic, if the EU will perceive Russia's policy as aggressive it will impose further sanctions, while, in the historical and cultural contexts, Russia and the EU/Europe are close, and their relations should be restored. The EU is seen to be at the crossroads, with Brexit being one of the causes. Its effect ranges between changing the image of the EU from a monolith to a puzzle to no impact at all, or the impact yet to be seen. The EU's ability to overcome its other crises (economic, migration (internal and external) and uneven development of EU Member States affect its perceptions. Here, the rise of far-right populism is a threat to the EU.

#### **8.11.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

Similar to the 2015 focus group, energy, economy and politics remain the main issues in EU-Russian cooperation. Students exchange programmes are also central. However, the image of the EU has changed from a union founded to guarantee peace to a largely economic organisation. The perception of Russia's foreign policy has changed from being inadequate to one that asserts Russia's national interests. Contrary to 2015, students do not perceive Europe as a different civilization with values alien to Russia. Instead, differences in values between Russia and the EU are seen in relation to differences in values and culture among EU Member States (similarities were noted between Russia and Poland, but differences between EU Member States, e.g., Poland vs. France). The EU is perceived as more tolerant than Russia. Participants of the 2021 research express polar views on changes of the EU's image: to some, it remains the same, to some it changes under the impact of Brexit and various EU crises. The key driver is the question of whether the EU will be able to overcome these crises. Students forecast that the image of the EU will deteriorate in EU Member States, but not externally. The participants decline to predict the future of the EU in the long run (10-20 years), however, they note that the EU may disintegrate if national interests of EU Member States overwhelm the interests of the EU as an organisation. Predictions for future EU-Russia cooperation remain the same as in 2015: it will remain weak, but it will not disappear.

## 8.12. South Africa Country Report

Trade and economics dominate perceptions of the EU in South Africa. This can be broken down in terms of a) how the EU is perceived globally (i.e., as a trade power); and b) the core drivers that the focus group participants deem central to the relationship. Most perceptions dwell less on the EU's soft power and public diplomacy, and more on what many consider an EU interest-driven and unequal relationship with South Africa. Elements of the contested history between Europe and South Africa and the legacy of colonialism are also evident in many of the students' remarks.

### 8.12.1. Type of Research Participants

Ten students took part in the focus group, conducted over Zoom. All ten students are based in the Faculty of Humanities in various disciplines (8 female students, 2 male students). Seven of the students are black South African and three white. All of the students have had interactions with Europeans in South Africa. The majority also have friends or family in Europe. Only two, however, have visited Europe: (Italy for two weeks and the Netherlands for three months with a visit to Portugal as well).

### 8.12.2. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU

All participants rate economy as the most important EU policy area in its relationship with South Africa. This is followed in most instances by politics (which is rated 4 out of 5 in terms of importance). Other areas identified as moderately important include science/technology and research, climate/environment, and education. Health policy and development and aid are considered of moderate to low importance. At the bottom of the scale is culture. Student knowledge of actual policy programming or initiatives between the EU and South Africa is vague. Only one participant cites a specific programme, the European South African Science and Technology Advancement Programme (ESASTAP). One student mentions programming from an EU Member State, Germany, through the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (foundation), which has a notable presence in South Africa. Another notes a non-EU member, the UK, and the culture-related programming of the High Commission in the country. The EU's global leadership is acknowledged and linked largely to its trade power. One participant suggests that as an organisation lacking military power, the EU could not be considered a power in the same category as the US or China. Mention is also made of Europe's influence on global trends through fashion, sport and culture.

Perceptions of the EU among the majority of participants are often quite starkly negative, although some express a more neutral or pragmatic opinion. The latter group of students see the EU as a global leader in trade seeking access to markets and raw materials, including from South Africa. EU investments in South Africa, it is added, helped secure the country as an ally. In stark contrast, the majority of participants take a less charitable view, describing the EU's relationship with South Africa and the larger continent as exploitative: "Africa keeps getting its lunch taken away" (Yzaf1); the EU had no incentive to engage in an "honest dialogue" with the continent because it was "winning" (Yzaf2); and lastly that South Africa's (social and economic) problems did not concern the EU. One student claims he could not think of any "great benefits" (Yzaf3) that South Africa derived from its relationship with the EU. Finally, some criticism is registered about the EU's response to the global pandemic, with the example of vaccine nationalism given as well as a critique of a French initiative to have South Africans serve as "lab rats" for the testing of vaccines.

### 8.12.3. Obstacles and Gaps

The chief gap, repeated on several occasions, is the need for more honest dialogue between the EU and South Africa. Students voice anxiety about South Africa being the weaker party in the relationship and

being obliged to follow the EU's lead. The EU also had to improve its public diplomacy in South Africa. Interestingly, no one suggested that there was any onus on the South African government to improve the relationship, nor any mention if the political climate in the country could serve as an obstacle. Obstacles and gaps are thus driven by *EU-specific*, not *location-specific* factors.

#### **8.12.4. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

Students list a wide range of other key partner countries: Neighbouring Lesotho is mentioned as a critical partner for South Africa's fresh water supply (Lesotho Highlands Water Project) -- an issue of national prominence in recent years of drought. China features prominently, not only as a partner to South Africa but also as the impetus for more EU engagement in Africa. The African Union is also identified, not only in what some perceived is South Africa's visible prominence in the organisation, but also the importance of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) for the continent's economic future. Finally, the US is mentioned as an important partner. Students do not mention the UN.

#### **8.12.5. Explanatory Factors**

Perceptions of Europe and the Global North are invariably connected to the legacy of apartheid, white supremacy and settler colonialism in South Africa. This does not mean that attitudes are necessarily circumscribed. It does, however, mean that a reflexive degree of scepticism is often discernible when the motivations of Europeans in South Africa are interpreted. Furthermore, in this instance, where most students had an image of EU but not necessarily a high degree of specific knowledge of the institution, elements of the larger North-South struggle are grafted on to perceptions of EU-South Africa relations. This inevitably leads to mostly negative or sceptical perceptions of the EU. Parenthetically, it could be noted the two most positively inclined students towards the EU were white.

#### **8.12.6. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

The EU's overall image has suffered in recent years for several endogenous and exogenous reasons. In terms of the latter, the EU is deemed by several students to be in a precarious position vis-à-vis China. The EU would have to engage even more in South Africa to be able to compete with the new superpower. A sense that the EU had to get its "act in order" first is also articulated by other students. This is in response to several existential (endogenous) crises afflicting the Union, including Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic. One student suggests that South African students were becoming more "Pan-African" in orientation, to the detriment of Europe's standing. Students do not reflect on a particular future outlook of the EU in the long-term term.

### **8.13. United States Country Report**

US students mention sustainability, development and EU-US security as main themes in EU-US relations, while some participants recognise the Erasmus programme as an EU policy. Expectations towards the EU range widely based on the issue. However, many believe that the EU is poorly understood and insufficiently known in the US. While the EU responses to the economic crises, immigration pressures and Brexit have negatively impacted the perceptions of the EU, the normative role of the EU is also acknowledged by three participants.

## **8.14. 8.13.1 Type of Research Participants**

The focus group included 12 undergraduate and graduate students (7 female, 5 male) within the 18-29 age range from diverse academic backgrounds and institutional affiliations: international affairs, security studies, European studies, sociology, political science, journalism, media and communications and environmental sciences. Eleven out of twelve participants have travelled to Europe, with their experiences ranging from tourism to working in Europe for several years. Four participants have studied in Europe, seven have close friends in Europe and four have family living in Europe. Out of the different EU Member States, Germany and France are most frequently mentioned. Overall, this group has more knowledge about the EU than most Americans, although those students who specialise in European studies, have taken courses on the EU, or who lived and worked there, know much more than those who have had more limited experience.

### **8.14.1. Main Themes and Perceptions towards the EU**

Ten out of twelve participants consider the EU a leader in at least one area, with sustainability, development and the EU's role of a normative leader (in particular on Socialist democratic values and environmental regulation) as the most frequently cited areas. Participants are familiar with education and academic programmes such as Erasmus, Erasmus+ and the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, but are otherwise not familiar with other EU public diplomacy programmes and initiatives. When considering images that come to mind on the EU, focus group participants mention the EU flag the most, followed by the map of Europe and the Euro currency. There also frequently reference institutional imagery such as the European Parliament building and official settings and meetings.

### **8.14.2. Obstacles and Gaps**

Expectations of the EU range widely based on the issue of concern: students were observing growing negative sentiments around US-EU tensions over trade and security during the Trump Administration and expressed negative sentiments around internal EU dynamics related to Brexit. Positive sentiments relate to the EU's approach to social policy and the environment. Students anticipate positive improvements for the EU after a more difficult period highlighted by Brexit and democratic backsliding. Expectations regarding the EU's global role are generally high, with the exception of two participants who are more critical of EU programmes and policies, describing them as 'extremely broad and vague' or 'somewhat flawed'. Participants identify a broad range of areas for the EU to pay more attention to, including cultural and student exchanges, geopolitics and counterterrorism. Participants identify more opportunities than challenges overall. However, many believe that the EU is poorly understood and insufficiently known in the US. Challenges faced by the EU in the US include those associated with spreading its norms and policy preferences in areas such as the environment, health and social policy, especially in light of the changing political landscape in the US during and since the Trump Administration, which shifted conservative voters away from policy preferences associated with the EU.

### **8.14.3. Partner Countries and International Organisations**

For international organisations, the UN is the one most widely cited. The UN and its organs are seen as active in health, environment and social issues, with the role of the WHO singled out. In terms of the international actors of importance, every participant who mentioned a country brought up China. Participants believe that China is an effective and active country, especially in areas such as the economy, military, politics and technology. China's foreign direct investment strategy is understood to be particularly successful and is seen as effecting the EU. Russia is also identified as important to

national and energy security, and a potential risk in both areas and fares comparatively worse in comparison to a more benign view on China.

#### **8.14.4. Explanatory Factors**

No specific EU programmes or EU Member States programmes are identified outside education/academia (i.e., Erasmus and Jean-Monnet). Instead, most participants perceive the EU as a more distant political organisation that does not directly impact their lives. However, at the same time, the EU is also viewed as a global symbolic leader on a number of issues, such as social policy and climate/environment that would need to continue to evolve or lose its popularity in these areas. The perception of the EU is tied by participants to its representation in US media and news, seen as covering the EU only when directly relevant to the US. This phenomenon results in what participants describe as a 'skewed view', which makes news about the EU less accessible to those who lack a specific interest in the EU. Finally, the internal historical evolution of the EU and of Europe has been also referenced as a driver of EU perceptions in the US in addition to more *EU-specific* factors, such as the EU crises.

#### **8.14.5. Evolution of EU Perceptions and Future Outlook**

Participants in the 2021 focus group, similar to the 2015 group interviews, agree that the EU's image has been negatively affected by the way the EU has managed the 2008/9 Global Financial and the Eurozone crisis, the migration and refugee crisis and Brexit. During the last five years, students acknowledge further deterioration of the EU image due to the adversarial approach of the Trump Administration to NATO and the EU, and Brexit. In contrast to the negative perceptions, some participants in the 2021 focus groups acknowledge the EU's democratic values and progressive norms through initiatives such as the Paris Agreement positively. Participants think that the EU engagement of the Biden Administration (post-Trump) will improve the perceptions of the EU as a significant partner of the US. On future trends, participants seem confident that the EU will eventually grow into its leadership role, and perhaps even replace the US in some areas, as they see the US as losing power on the international stage. From different angles, students in the group 2021 agree that the perceptions of the EU will be driven mainly by *EU-specific* factors related to the capacity of the integration process to bring closer its Member States and address more current specific challenges more effectively. However, US-specific factors may influence the evolution of the EU, particularly with changing approaches in the US. One area of concern relates to the development of an autonomous EU security apparatus, which could impact EU-US security relations through NATO. Another area relates to climate policy as an area of possible future tensions due to historically different approaches to the issue [and significantly different approaches by US political parties]. Students did not specify between short-term and medium-term future visions.

TABLE 46. FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE

CATEGORY OF QUESTION	CORE QUESTION	DETAILED QUESTIONS	BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ANSWER(S), KEY POINTS	THE MOST INTERESTING, TELLING, "JUICY" QUOTES
<p><b>General impression</b>  <i>[will feed into VISIBILITY indicator in the case and final reports]</i></p>		When you hear the words the EU, what three images come to you mind?		
<p><b>Personal background</b>  <i>[will feed into EXPLANATORY FACTORS including AWARENESS in the case and final report]</i></p>	What personal experiences have you made with/in Europe?	<p>a) Have you ever worked, studied or stayed in Europe? Where exactly? For how long?</p> <p>b) How would you describe your experiences with Europeans/European institutions?</p> <p>c) How would you describe your experiences with people in EU MS/domestic institutions in these states?</p>		
<p><b>Key themes</b>  <i>[will feed into indicators of VISIBILITY and ACTORNESS in the case and final reports]</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do you see the EU as an international leader? If yes, in what areas?</li> </ul> <p>Which themes related to the EU/Europe or EU MS do you know of and consider important?</p>			
	<p>a) Which key themes or policy areas</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Please rank the following key themes/ areas according to their</li> </ul>		

*Will also feed into PD recommendations from each location*

<p>do you consider most or least important when thinking of EU foreign policy?</p>	<p>relevance and importance regarding EU policies in your country – starting with 1: not at all important, up to 5: very important:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economy &amp; Trade</li> <li>- RST</li> <li>- Politics (internal to the EU and external to the EU)</li> <li>- Energy</li> <li>- Development</li> <li>- Environment/Climate Change</li> <li>- Social Issues</li> <li>- Education (part of Social issues in the report)</li> <li>- Culture</li> <li>- Health governance</li> <li>• Please name any other important areas and themes that come to your mind.</li> </ul>		
<p>b) Which are the most relevant programmes and initiatives implemented</p>	<p>a) Please name the most important and relevant programmes, public diplomacy initiatives and policies promoted by the EU in your country and within your area of expertise?</p>		



	by the EU or EU MS?	b) Please name the most important and relevant programmes, public diplomacy initiatives and policies promoted by EU MS in your country and within your area of expertise?		
<b>Perceptions of the EU/EU MS policies</b>	Which are the perceptions of EU programmes and initiatives by EU MS?			
<i>[will feed into indicators of EFFECTIVENESS, ACTORNESS and COGNITIVE RESONANCE]</i>	Which aspects of EU/EU MS' programmes are subject to public debates?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Which objectives do you think the EU/EU MS have in your country?</li> <li>b) How much, do you think, people are aware of the above-named programmes or initiatives? Which societal or political groups are more aware, which less?</li> <li>c) How do you perceive the EU's or European state's programmes, initiatives and policies in your country?</li> <li>d) Do the performances of the EU match the expectations of the EU in your country?</li> <li>e) Does the performance of your country match the</li> </ul>		

expectations of the EU in your country?

- f) In the policy area of ... *(to be specified depending on interviewee's selection of most/ least important main themes and area of expertise)*, do you consider the EU/European states especially active? In which terms?
- g) In the policy area of ... *(to be specified depending on interviewee's selection of most/ least important main themes and area of expertise)*, do you consider the EU/European states especially visible? In which way?
- h) In the policy area of ... *(to be specified depending on interviewee's selection of most/ least important main themes and area of expertise)*, do you consider the EU/European states especially effective? In which way?

		<p>i) Do you consider the EU particularly successful or weak as a norm setter in the policy area of ... <i>(to be specified depending on interviewee's selection of most/ least important main themes and area of expertise)</i>, or with regard to the implementation of particular programmes or policies?</p> <p>j) Do you consider EU MS particularly successful or weak as norm setters in the policy area of ... <i>(to be specified depending on interviewee's selection of most/ least important main themes and area of expertise)</i>, or with regard to the implementation of particular programmes or policies?</p> <p>k) Do you think, EU policies respond to specific conditions in and needs of your country? Please explain.</p>		
<p><b>Explanatory factors</b></p>	<p>How would you explain the perception of the EU/EU</p>	<p>a) Why do you think the EU is considered particularly strong or weak in the policy area of.../ with</p>		

<p><i>[will feed into EXPLANATORY factor and FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS]</i></p>	<p>programmes/EU MS' programmes?</p>	<p>regards to the implementation of a specific programme?</p> <p>b) Why do you think EU MS are considered particularly strong or weak in the policy area of.../ with regards to the implementation of a specific programme?</p> <p>c) Why do you think a specific programme or diplomatic initiative in the policy area of... is considered particularly fruitful? In which way?</p>		
<p><b>Other international actors</b></p> <p><i>[will feed into VISIBILITY, ACTORNESS and EFFECTIVENESS]</i></p>	<p>Which other international actors do you consider important in your country?</p>	<p>a) Can you please name other relevant international or regional organisations or institutions that are present in your country?</p> <p>b) Can you please explain in which areas these actors are especially active, effective, visible and normatively strong?</p> <p>c) Which of their programmes, initiatives and policies have been particularly successful? Could you explain why?</p>		

<p><b>Potential partner organisations and institutions</b></p> <p><i>[will feed into FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS]</i></p>	<p>Which are potential cooperation partners for the EU in your country?</p>	<p>a) Could you name regional, national or local institutions and organisations that are the most active in areas the EU is involved, or attempts to engage in, in your country?</p> <p>b) What are the specific competencies of these institutions and organisations and what are the areas they are specifically influential in?</p>		
<p><b>Gaps and obstacles</b></p> <p><i>[will feed into EFFECVTIVENESS, ACTORNESS and COGNITIVE RESONANCE]</i></p>	<p>What areas should the EU pay more attention to?</p> <p>Which obstacles does the EU face in your country?</p>	<p>a) In your opinion, in which areas should the EU be more active?</p> <p>b) To your knowledge, are there any areas in which the EU is already active in but its involvement is not recognised or debated?</p> <p>c) Do you think the EU faces or will face challenges or hindrances in your country due to historical, cultural or political reasons? To what extent, do you think translational issues and education play a role in this context?</p>		

		d) Where do you see the relationship between the EU and the partner country develop in future?		
<p><b>Evolution of EU perceptions and Future Outlook</b></p> <p><i>[will feed in to the EVOLUTION OF PERCEPTIONS in the reports]</i></p>	Is the EU's image changing over time?	<p>a) In your opinion, has the image of the EU changed in the last five years? If yes, in what way? In the last 20 years?</p> <p>b) Is there continuity in the EU's image? If yes, in what aspect?</p> <p>c) How do you think the image may change in the future 5 years?</p> <p>d) What are the main factors that could change the EU's image?</p> <p>e) Where do you personally see the EU in 5, 10 and 20 years from now?</p> <p>f) Why do you think the EU's images are changes? Is to the EU crises, to the unmet expectations, or something else?</p> <p>g) Why do you think some of the EU's image remain unchanged?</p>		

## 9. Resources

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